MJ

KoRn, Here is some more info on the subject from Vrej Nersessian's "Treasures from the Ark:" The Date of Armenia's Conversion to Christianity In the past twenty-five years remarkable re-evaluations have been made of the sources concerning the Christianization of Armenia. These advances have been accomplished through an analysis of the sources, as well as through some notable revisions in our understanding of the genealogical and chronological aspects of the history of the Armenian Arshakuni kingdom. The exact year in which the conversion of King Trdat tool: place is not agreed among scholars. Tournebize argued that the most probable date lay between 290 and 295. E. Dulaurier, M. Ormanian, M.-L. Chaumont and Father Poghos Ananian, relying largely on the evidence of Movses Khorenatsi's History, have calculated it to have been in or about 302.[12] Movses had concluded that Trdat had begun his reign in the third year of the emperor Diocletian and that St Gregory the Illuminator had 'sat on the throne of Thaddeus in the seventeenth year of Trdat's reign'.[13] Diocletian's reign began in November 284, so Trdat's year of accession would have been 286 or 287, and his seventeenth 302 or 303. H. Manandyan's reading of the evidence leads to a different date.[14] He placed the return of Trdat to Armenia from Rome in 298 or 299, subsequent to the peace established between Rome and Persia after Galerius's victory. Hence Trdat's seventeenth year fell in 314, which, he concluded, was the date of the king's conversion. Behind this conclusion lies Manandyan's proposition that Trdat could not have adopted the Christian faith before 313. It would have been impossible for Trdat, the protege of the Romans and Diocletian in particular, to have adopted officially the Christian faith in his realm when it was opposed by imperial policy. In a passage preserved in the Greek version of Agat'angeghos, Trdat's reliance on Diocletian in matters of religion is put in these terms: From a youthful age raised and educated by you [Diocletianj ... hailing the gods who saved our power together with ourselves, I loathe the so-called Christians. What is more, I gave over to the bitterest death [after] tortures a certain Cappadocian [named] Gregory beloved by me, throwing [him] into a pit in which dwell snakes who devour [those] thrown therein. And now, Lord emperor, I will fulfill thy orders to me with all haste and willingness.[15] An external evidence for the dating of Trdat's conversion is provided by St Gregory's consecration in Cappadocia. According to Agat'angeghos's History of the Armenians, Gregory went to Caesarea where a council of bishops had been held on the occasion of his consecration. The date of this council is fixed at 314.[16] This date is consistent with another statement in Agat'angeghos that, on his return from Caesarea, Gregory had brought with him the relics of St Athenogenes. The latter was martyred probably about 303-5, so his relics would have been available in 314. Following this line of the argument, Ananian concluded that the year 314 was also the date of the 'official' conversion of the Armenians.[17] Behind Ananian's conclusion lies Manandyan's proposition that Trdat could not have adopted the Christian faith before 313, as this was the year in which an edict had been promulgated in Milan by the emperors Constantine and Licinius granting freedom of worship to Christians. The non-Armenian evidence for the conversion of Armenia is small, but nevertheless important. Sozomen in his Ecclesiastical History refers to the Armenians: the Armenians were the first to embrace Christianity. It is said that Tiridates, the sovereign of that nation, was converted by means of a miracle which was wrought in his own house: and that he issued commands to all the rulers, by a herald, to adopt the same religion. Subsequently, the Christian religion became known to the neighbouring tribes, and was very greatly disseminated.[18] A second external source is Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History. The author records in relation to Emperor Maximinus Daia, who governed the Roman province of Oriens: In addition to this, the tyrant had the further trouble of the war against the Armenians, men who from ancient times had been friends and allies of the Romans; but as they were Christians and exceedingly earnest in their piety towards the Deity, this hater of God, by attempting to compel them to sacrifice to idols and demons, made them foes instead of friends, and enemies instead of allies.[19] This war took place in 312. The outcome was that Maximinus Daia 'was worn out along with his commanders in the Armenian war' . The question that now arises is: if Gregory was sent to Caesarea for consecration in 314, when was Trdat's conversion likely to have taken place? Relying on the chronology of the Narratio de rebus Armeniae, compiled in about 700, the Council of Nicaea had been held 'in the thirty-fourth year of Trdat and the twentieth after the deliverance of St Gregory'. The deliverance refers to Gregory's emergence from the dungeon. His release had occurred just before the king's conversion. If the Council of Nicaea was held in June 325, then the release of Gregory and the subsequent conversion of the king took place in 305 or 306. Confirmation of this dating is provided by Patriarch Michael's independent testimony that Gregory's mission took place 'at the beginning of Constantine's reign', i.e. around 306. Furthermore, Trdat's persecution of the Christians now coincides with the Great Persecution that broke out on 23 February 303, led by Diocletian. The flight of the thirty-three Christian nuns to Armenia must have taken place between 304 and 306. It was led by Gayane and Hrip'sime, and they suffered martyrdom at the hands of King Trdat sometime during those years. St John Chrysostom in his panegyric dedicated to St Gregory, written during his exile in Armenia (AD 404-7), refers to the two virgin martyrs. The death of the young women led to the eventual conversion of the king. Bibliography 12. Tournebize, Fr., Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Armenie. Paris, 1910, pp. 428-44; Dulaurier, E., Recherches sur la chronologie armenienne. Paris, 1859, p. 47; Ormanian, M., The Church of Armenia, 2nd edn, London, 1955, p. 8; Chaumont, Marie-Louise, NOTES Recherches sur I'histoire d' Armenie. Sassanides conversion du Royaume. Paris, 1969, pp. 156-8; Manaseryan, Ruben, Hayastane Artavazdits mintchev Trdat Meds (Armenia from Artavazd to Trdat the Great). Erevan, 1997, pp. 196-201. 13. Movses Khorenatsi, History of the Armenians, transl. R.W. Thomson. Cambridge, MA, 1980, II, 82 and 91. 14. Manandyan, Hakob, K'nnakan tesut'yun hay zhoghovrdi patmut'yan (Critical analysis of Armenian history). Erevan, 1957, vol. 2(1 ), 114-28; Mirichian Ara, 'Samuel Anetsin Rayots K'ristoneut'iwn endunelu t'uali:ani aintchut'eamb' (Samuel Anetsi on the date of the conversion of Armenia to Christianity), Shoghakat (July 1953), 193-6; Fntglian Garnik, Hayots dardzn i I('ristoneut'iwn (The conversion of Armenia to Christianity), pp. 20-21. 15. Garitte, G., Documents pour I'etude du livre d'Agathange (Studie Testi 127). Vatican City, 1946, pp. 37 and 293. 16. Lebon, J., 'Sur un concile de Cesaree', Le Museon 51 (1938), 89-132. 17. Ananian' Poghos, Grigor Lusavortchi jernadrut'ean t'uakane ev paraganere (The date and circumstances of Gregory the Illuminator's consecration). Venice, 1960, p. 172. 18. Sozomen, The Ecclesiastical History. Bli:. II, 8, transl. by Edward Walford. London, 1855, p. 63. 19. Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine, transl. and introduction by H.J. Lawlor. London, 1927-28, pp. 214, 286; Frend, W.H.C., The Early Church. Philadelphia, 1982, p. 123. [ January 19, 2003, 05:08 PM: Message edited by: MJ ]

quote:Originally posted by axel:Christian Orthodoxy is about remaining faithful to the True Spirit, period. And the Christian Catholicism is about "remaining truthful" to the False Spirit? quote:Originally posted by axel:Show me a passage in the Bible about papal infallibility or the purgatory or the immaculate conception or any other ideologically-motivated catholic inventions... Why should I?

OK, Axel. I'll leave it there since you still don't get it. Could any of our ideologists show me a passage in the Bible about "Orthodoxy?" P.S. BTW, don't take it personal. I am mean to everyone ...and welcome to the forum. P.P.S. And remember, "We are all contributors: Making good, making trouble, or making excuses." (I have stolen this phrase and paraphrased it from H.V. Adolt) [ January 17, 2003, 10:07 AM: Message edited by: MJ ]

quote:Originally posted by axel:You should know that the Apostolic Church is NOT in spiritual communion with the roman catholic church. Actually one wonders if there is any Spirit left in the catholic church (among its religious members that is) for there to be a communion. I don't believe in the filioque and the infallibility of the roman pope, a mere human, the emperor of an earthly kindgom. I have Faith in Christ Who said My kingdom is not of this world(Jn 18:36) I have to point out the Apostolic Church is not even in spiritual communion with the Chalcedonian Orthodox Churches (Russian, Greek...) but this is actually a sad reality for there are no major divergences between them... hoping the following material will refresh your memory: Orthodoxy and catholicism Which tells me again that you have no clue what you are talking about. You neither know the history of Armenian Church, nor you know anything about the recent developments, nor you believe in God you preach about, nor you have put enough time to understand the New Testament you claim to have read, nor you have Faith. You are merely exercising an ideological etude of very low quality on God and Faith, which is OK, given that many others exercise such things on much lower levels.

Hopping that it will cut some of the pathetic ventilations of this thread and to provide some hints on some events in history, I would like to bring the below material to the attention of the readers. I would also want to remind that the Armenian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church have already come to terms along the lines that the Greeks and the Romans are trying, now. Axel, also, so that not to talk nonsense "in your opinion," why don't you read the New Testament so that to know from there what Church means, and in general, to cut the ideological garbage in the name of "Faith." Remote Greek monks resist eviction Friday, January 17, 2003 Posted: 7:44 AM EST (1244 GMT) THESSALONIKI, Greece (AP) -- Power and water have been cut, authorities have halted supplies of food and medicine, and a deadline for forcible eviction looms. For now, though, more than 100 Greek Orthodox monks are resisting efforts to force them from their 1,000-year-old monastery on a remote peninsula in the Aegean Sea as punishment for their bitter opposition to reconciliation between orthodox Christians and the Roman Catholic church. Holding up a knotted rope rosary, the monastery's abbot, who goes by the name Methodius, said the monks of the Esphigmenou Monastery would challenge the eviction order in Greece's highest administrative court. Methodius also vowed to appeal to a higher authority. "We will fight with our prayer beads," he told a news conference on Thursday in Thessaloniki, a port city about 80 miles west of Mount Athos, a peninsula home to some two dozen monasteries. The expulsion was ordered for rejecting the authority of Eastern Orthodox leadership. Members of the monastery condemned church leaders for holding talks with Roman Catholics as part of a long-running effort to reconcile the two main branches of Christianity. Mount Athos, known as the Holy Mountain, is considered a spiritual cradle of Orthodox Christianity, and its conservative monks are widely perceived as being guardians of the faith. The inhabitants of Esphigmenou are considered the most doctrinal of all the 2,000 or so monks living on Athos. For decades, the monks have shown their opposition to any reconciliation with Catholics by adorning their monastery with black flags and a giant banner reading "Orthodoxy or death." They have referred to the pope as a heretic. Orthodox Christian Churches and the Roman Catholic Church have been separated since the Great Schism of 1054 in a dispute over papal authority and interpretation of their creed. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, spiritual leader of the world's Orthodox Christians, on December 14 declared the ultraconservative monks at Esphigmenou as "schismatic." That decision allowed Mount Athos' Greek government administrator to order their forcible eviction by January 28. It would be the largest-ever known eviction of monks from Mount Athos since the community was founded more than 1,000 years ago. The last eviction, for the same reasons, took place a decade ago and involved five monks living in an isolated hermitage. Since the eviction order was issued on December 14, authorities have cut electricity to the monastery and prevented the supply of food, heating oil and medical supplies, Methodius said. A legal adviser to the monks, Ifigenia Kamtsidou, said the men were not given an opportunity to respond to the charges before the eviction order was issued. "Constitutional procedures were not upheld," Kamtsidou said. The monastery's first serious falling out with the ecumenical patriarchate came in the mid-1960's, after Catholic and Orthodox leaders withdrew a series of anathemas -- or damnations -- issued in 1054. Dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholics began in earnest when Bartholomew was elected patriarch in 1991. Travels by Pope John Paul II have also helped promote contact between the churches. "Our battle is for truth and the true orthodox way of life, which the patriarch is attempting to silence," Methodius said.

quote:Originally posted by Azat:Kocharyan urged the Russian counterparts to consider plans for long-term business relations with Armenia. "People never draw up business plans for just another 12 months," he said. Yeah, sure. He still has job to do. P.S. Note that I don't mind privatization of Armenian enterprises and transferring them under foreign ownership. I am all for it - but only when the transaction makes business sense for Armenia.

Good job, Robik. Now you will be given another term to destroy the country further.

My Republican "Dream Team" would like to know whether you have received the information on Arab states' lack of desire "to see Turkish involvement in their affairs" from "reliable sources" or it is resulted from your expert "analysis." Furthermore, let's assume that the "peace pipeline is an attempt to provide a stranglehold on the region." Isn't the region strangled by Turkey (as far as the water resources go) without the proposed pipeline, currently? I also wonder why every time there is a mention of religion or Republicans, your feathers get raffled? Is there something hidden in your childhood, which comes up to the surface at the mere mention of such words?

Foreign Policy Research Institute A Catalyst for Ideas www.fpri.org E-Notes Distributed Exclusively via Fax & Email THE TURKISH FACTOR IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE POST-SOVIET SPACE by Igor Torbakov January 10, 2003 Igor Torbakov is an historian and visiting fellow at Harvard University. Currently working with the Central Eurasia Project, he holds degrees from Moscow University, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. This paper draws from Dr. Torbakov's November 20 presentation to FPRI's Interuniversity Study Group on Russia, Europe, and the United States, which is chaired by Vladislav Zubok and William Anthony Hay. THE TURKISH FACTOR IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE POST-SOVIET SPACE by Igor Torbakov As the U.S.-led war on terror gains momentum and the Bush administration contemplates military operations against Iraq, Turkey gains in geostrategic importance. America's ally and a NATO member since 1953, Turkey's location, right in the middle of the Southern Caucasus/Northern Mesopotamia region, makes it a key player in several overlapping regions: Western Europe, the Balkans, the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus-Caspian complex, Central Asia, and the Black Sea. In close proximity to the major oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea and northern Iraq, it is also a key player in the "Great Game" of pipeline politics in the region. The post-Soviet world is rife with threats to Turkey, but presents opportunities as well: in economic relations with Russia, as a hub for energy distribution, and in new regional cooperation schemes. Despite its unusually active foreign policy in post-Soviet Eurasia, Turkey has failed to attain a leadership role in the former Soviet periphery. This failure, exacerbated by Ankara's serious economic and political problems, has led Russia and other countries in the region to perceive Turkey in much more neutral terms than they did in the early 1990s, when Ankara was seen as a strategic competitor. Thus, the conventional picture of Moscow and Ankara as uncompromising archrivals jockeying for position in the former Soviet Union's southern periphery is somewhat simplistic. The assumption that there are rigid, opposing blocs of states (U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia vs. Russia-Iran-Armenia) does not correspond with the far more complex reality. To be sure, the Great Game is taking place in the post-Soviet space. However, it involves elements of both competition and cooperation. Turkey's November parliamentary elections introduced yet more uncertainty into the picture. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), a moderate Muslim party styled on European Christian Democrats but with roots in Turkey's political Islam, won the majority of seats in parliament. AKP leaders claim that their primary goal is Turkey's integration into the EU. However, Europe's mistrust of Turkey and Turkey's own political and economic troubles may well cause the AKP to shift its orientation. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY The Turkish Republic built by Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s and 1930s is very much a frontier state. From the outset Ankara has been preoccupied with issues of national security and territorial integrity. This necessarily dictated a conservative approach to foreign policy, avoiding extraterritorial interests or activities extending beyond the country's borders. This was encapsulated in Ataturk's famous dictum "Peace at home, peace in the world." Kemalism and the character of the Turkish state have also isolated Turkey in its relations with it neighbors in the Arab world and Europe. Turkey maintained a sometimes precarious neutrality during World War II, in part as an extension of Ataturk's cautious policy of limiting international contact. It was Stalin's claims on northeastern Turkey and the Turkish Straits that pushed Ankara into its Western alliance. The Cold War, however, imposed a certain amount of order. Turkish foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was restricted to just a few basic (if crucial) questions: how to ward off the Soviet threat and how to maintain and strengthen ties with the United States and NATO. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the acceleration of European integration challenged the very foundations of Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's geostrategic value to the West was no longer clear-cut. The EU's rejection of Turkey's bid to become a full member was widely interpreted by both Turkey's political class and the broader public as exclusion on explicitly cultural grounds, which bred a sense of isolation and insecurity in Turkish elites. This paradoxically led to a more activist and assertive foreign policy in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Turkey's embrace of the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, argues Prof. Ziya Onis of Koc University in Istanbul, embodied an important psychological dimension. A closer bond with people of common historical descent was a means of overcoming Turkey's traditional fear of isolation. This sense of isolation, Onis contends, is crucial in understanding both the initial euphoria concerning the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia and the subsequent development of close military and economic ties with Israel. Ankara seemed to hope that its active leadership in both regions would help revitalize Turkey's strategic value to the West. Significant changes in Turkey's domestic policy have contributed to Ankara's external activism, particularly in relation to the former Soviet republics. Where traditionally, Turkey's foreign policy was shaped by a narrow group of political figures, state bureaucrats, and the military's upper echelon, the recent resurgence of Islam and nationalism in Turkish politics has broadened the circle of those concerned with foreign policy. A distinct emphasis on non-European or non-Western dimensions of Turkish identity became the hallmark of the Islamist and ultra- nationalist parties, which have been gaining a voice over the last decade in the highly fragmented party system. The basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy remain pro-Western, but Turkey's position at the edge of the Western world requires it to maintain a separate identity with a definable role in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. ANKARA'S EFFORTS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA: A Failure of the "Turkic World" Model With the relative weakening of Russia, many officials in Ankara hoped to establish close ties with the newly- independent states, making Turkey a leading actor in the former Soviet southern periphery. It formed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, Turkish Cooperation, and Development Agency and set up annual "Turkic summits" of the presidents of Turkey and the Turkic republics. Turgut Ozal, prime minister and then president of Turkey from 1983 until his death in 1993, entertained a sweeping project that included a vibrant Turkic Common Market and a powerful Turkic Trade and Development Bank. After Azerbaijan's president Heydar Aliyev and Georgia's president Eduard Shevardnadze called for a regional stability pact, Ankara proposed the Caucasus Stability Pact as a means to settle the region's conflicts and accommodate sometimes contradictory interests. A "Turkish model," based on Turkey's imperfect but seemingly workable market economy and somewhat restrictive parliamentary democracy, was projected to the post-Soviet states as a roadmap for their transition. The Western governments encouraged this, since the alternatives seemed to be either an Islamist-based Iranian model or a return to Soviet domination. However, Turkey failed to play a leadership role in the post-Soviet space. Its recent activism in Eurasia is real but fragile, for several reasons. First, the post-Soviet states have been wary of Ankara's acting as a new "big brother" when they just escaped the clutches of another big brother. The Turkic states, in particular, sought to develop their own national identities. The Caucasus and Central Asian states obviously preferred more limited and equal relations with Ankara. They were unwilling to bind themselves exclusively to Turkey-dominated organizations and eager to secure political and economic support from other states, including Russia and Iran. Second, Turkey is a relatively poor country recently in severe economic crisis. Indeed, Turkey's more ambitious regional schemes, including Black Sea cooperation and efforts in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have been hindered by Ankara's limited ability to fund sweeping geopolitical projects. Third, while Moscow lost direct control over its former borderlands, its influence didn't disappear. The presence of Russian troops in a number of countries (Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan), powerful economic levers (gas and electricity deliveries), and its ability to manipulate regional ethnic conflicts compel the local leaders to take heed of Russia's wishes. Fourth, a Turkish model appears to have lost much of its appeal both for the post-Soviet states and the West. The democratic component in the Turkish system proved not so attractive to the authoritarian leaders in the Caucasus and Central Asia, who had little interest in fostering broader political participation and pluralism. The newly independent republics' rulers styled their regimes more on the old Soviet system than on Turkey's. For its part, the West realized that its initial fears concerning Iran's influence had been exaggerated. Nor did Turkey's identity-based foreign policy appear to help settle the South Caucasus conflicts, most notably the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Artsax. Turkey actively supported Baku on the grounds of common ethnicity and culture. However, even some Turkish commentators suggest a more far-sighted policy would have developed closer links with both countries, thus possibly reducing the efforts of Yerevan and the Armenian lobby in the West to wage a hate campaign against Turkey. Finally, Eurasia's energy riches prompted the West, and the U.S. in particular, to opt for more direct involvement rather than relying on regional proxies like Turkey. The deployment of American troops in Central Asia and the Caucasus within the framework of the war on terror underscored its strategic decision to engage the region more actively, which had been taken even prior to 9/11/01 attacks. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION Ankara's relations with Moscow exhibit marked dualism. Historically, and perhaps in the longer-term, managing relations with Russia is Turkey's leading security issue. But the magnitude of Turkish-Russian trade (including large- scale energy imports) and the need for coexistence at the political level work against more competitive policies. For the first time in centuries, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey and Russia no longer share a border. However, since the Turkish and Russian "near abroads" overlap in the Caucasus and Central Asia, some degree of competition is inevitable. In the early 1990s, almost everyone predicted intense rivalry between Moscow and Ankara in Eurasia. This has ultimately not been realized: as discussed above, Turkey has been unsuccessful in gaining a leadership role in the region. Besides, Ankara has focused on Turkey's own internal problems and other foreign policy priorities in Europe and the Middle East. Like Turkey, Russia has been troubled by its own economic weakness and was diverted in the 1990s by competing foreign policy priorities, especially by its post- Cold War relationship with the United States. Yet in the mid-1990s Russia appeared to perceive Turkey as a massive security challenge. For instance, The White Book of Russian Special Services (Moscow: O***revatel, 1996) described Turkey as an aspiring regional power that supported Muslim movements and cherished pan-Turkic ideas. It argued that Turkey might move into the geostrategic niche in the Caucasus created by Russia's weakening state. Moscow repeatedly accused Ankara of supporting the Chechen separatists during the first Chechen war. >From the end of the 1990s, Moscow fundamentally revised its perception of Turkey's role in Eurasia. Pavel Baev of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo argues that Moscow now views Turkey primarily as a partner rather than a threat, with one important reason being gas. Turkey and Europe compose Russia's major market for gas. Some of the largest energy business deals in Russia have been signed with Turkey. The recent completion of the Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea will increase Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas, and Russia is beginning to see Turkey as a transit country for its energy resources rather than simply an export market. Moscow also reevaluated Turkey's strategic potential. By 2000-01, Turkey came to be typically portrayed not as a geopolitical challenger but as a weakening competitor, preoccupied with internal troubles. The Russian Security Council now perceives Turkey's penetration into the Caucasus as a low-intensity risk, and the sharp political and economic crisis in Turkey in early 2001 only confirmed these assessments. Thus, issues such as the export of Russian gas to Turkey, tanker traffic through the Straits, and the regulation of the "shuttle" trade dominate the agendas of intensive bilateral contacts at various levels. Strategic alliance with Armenia notwithstanding, Russia has stayed clear of the international controversy around the genocide of 1915-18, in contrast to the proactive stance taken, say, by France. And Ankara has neither provided support to the rebels in the second Chechen war nor shown any softness toward the Chechens inside Turkey. With respect to the EU, Turkey and Russia are basically on the same page. Both countries have complex negotiations with the EU, not only for the development of their economies but for their future political and cultural identities as European countries. Russia and Turkey also share similar views with respect to Iran and Iraq, which differ from those of the U.S. Both countries have improved their relationships with Israel. Further improvements in U.S.-Russian relations as well as in Turkish-Russian relations and the United States' willingness to consult both countries on potentially contentious U.S. policies in the broader region could help foster a real Russo-Turkish relationship, ultimately transforming the politics of the Southern Caucasus even more than any dramatic change in U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow appears particularly keen these days to send friendly signals to Turkey. In a recent interview with the Turkish Daily News, Aleksandr Lebedev, Russia's ambassador to Ankara, stressed the unique Eurasian nature of both countries. Lebedev has also tried hard to prove the historic stereotypes wrong. The common impression that the Russian and Ottoman empires have been in a state of war most of the time is absolutely untrue, said the ambassador. He referred to a study conducted by Russian and Turkish historians that concludes that over 500 years, the tsars and sultans were engaged in direct conflict for only 25 years, and noted the past alliances against the British and the French. There have also been remarkable shifts in the Great Game over the Caspian oil export pipeline routes. Until recently, Russia and Turkey have been rivals in the transportation of Caspian oil to lucrative Western markets. Unlike the case with gas, Turkey is not seen as an important market for Russian crude oil. Turkish and Russian policy-makers competed for a main export oil pipeline across their territory to carry Azerbaijani and possibly Kazak crude to the European market. Ankara (together with Washington) has pushed for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline project that would bypass both Russia and Iran, while Moscow backed the "northern route" to Novorossiisk. By mid-2001, however, the Russian government--to the surprise of some observers--had dropped its opposition to the BTC project. Instead, Russia has taken steps toward finishing the construction of the high-capacity Tengiz-Novorossiisk pipeline (built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium), cautiously but shrewdly playing Kazak oil against Azerbaijani oil on the world markets. With the CPC pipeline becoming operational it seems that officials in Moscow have come to believe that a BTC pipeline will not run counter to Russia's interests. Thus, despite occasional over-heated statements, Moscow clearly prefers to present this issue in geoeconomic rather than geopolitical terms, putting cost efficiency ahead of balance of power and emphasizing competition between economic actors rather than struggle for spheres of influence with Ankara or Washington. Of course, the potential for competition between Moscow and Ankara remains. A fundamental objective underlying Russia's policies in Eurasia is to keep "outsiders" like Turkey and Iran from interfering in its sphere of influence, while Ankara's primary objectives in Eurasia are consolidating the independence of former Soviet states and promoting "strategic pluralism" across the region. Thus Ankara is wary about the operation of Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia. Turkey would also like to see the CIS peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus conflict zones (primarily in Abkhazia) replaced by international forces. For its part, Russia is obviously displeased with Turkish military and security officials' cooperation with their counterparts in Georgia and Azerbaijan. In January 2002, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey concluded an agreement on regional security. Given Georgia's strategic location and the steady deterioration of relations between the Putin and Shevardnadze governments, Turkey's lively contacts with Tbilisi cause concern in Moscow. As Zeyno Baran, director of the Caucasus Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently pointed out, "in the past, Georgia had asked the Russians for help against the Ottomans, but today Georgia receives military, economic, and political assistance from Turkey." In 2000 Turkey even surpassed Russia as Georgia's largest trading partner. Georgia's military contacts with Turkey make Moscow especially unhappy. A particular irritant is Turkey's assistance in modernizing the Marneuli airbase near Tbilisi. This seemingly confrontational trend, however, is counterbalanced by continuing Russo-Turkish cooperation. Turkey was the first NATO member to start purchasing Russian arms in the 1990s: helicopters and armored personnel carriers for use against the PKK. Military ties continue to develop as evidenced by the visit to Ankara of Russia's Chief of General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin in January 2002. Also, in November 2001 the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers signed a memorandum promising to coordinate their policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus, despite Russia's and Turkey's longer-term competing agendas, Moscow is now more open to cooperation with Turkey in the Caucasus, and Turkey is becoming more adept at framing its involvement in the region in a way that does not offend other countries' sensibilities. IN THE AFTERMATH OF ELECTIONS: A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY At present, it would seem that Turkey's relations with the EU have eclipsed whatever ambitions Ankara might still have in the post-Soviet Eurasia. Ankara is pushing hard to obtain from the EU at its summit in Copenhagen in December a precise date for the beginning of the accession talks. EU members appear to be split on the issue. Turkey is entering a potentially turbulent period fraught with many uncertainties. If Ankara encounters new obstacles and snubs in its EU conquest, its inherent fear of being isolated and marginalized could reemerge. This might well strengthen the non-European elements in the peculiar Turkish dichotomy and bring about changes in policy orientation, as has happened in the past. For instance, in 1994, then foreign minister Mumtaz Soysal called for Third Worldism, nationalism, and anti-Westernism in contrast to Turkey's traditional Western- oriented policy. And while then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan finally dropped the rhetoric about Turkey spearheading a new Islamic NATO or Common Market, in 1996-97 he promoted the establishment of a development group, the D- 8, consisting of Turkey, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Initially it was even called the M-8 (M stands for Muslim). The Turkish military took care of Erbakan in the "post-modern coup" of 1997. However, in spring 2002, a top Turkish commander, National Security Council Secretary-General Tuncer Kilinc, apparently frustrated with the discriminatory attitude of what he called a "Christian Club," suggested that stronger relations with Russia and Iran could be considered a viable alternative to EU membership. In the November 3 parliamentary election, the AKP won a landslide victory and secured almost two thirds of the parliament seats. Its strong showing at the polls gives it a rare opportunity to form a stable one-party government. The party's leader, Tayyip Erdogan, and top officials wasted no time confirming their pro-European orientation and their eagerness for EU membership. It is not yet clear how the party will behave under the pressure from its grass-roots, not all of whom share this enthusiasm, if their Europe- oriented policy is given a cold shoulder by Europe. The first test occurred on November 8, when Turkey's bid to join the EU was condemned by former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing, chairman of the EU's constitution committee. He bluntly said that Turkey "is not a European country" and that its membership would represent the end of the EU. The European Commission swiftly disassociated itself from Giscard's comments, but he was probably not far from the truth when he claimed that most EU members are privately against admitting Turkey. A number of Western analysts argue that the EU is playing a dangerous game treating Turkey in this way: Ankara is well aware that the EU is not its only option. One analyst, Simon Allison, comments that the EU might regret its current stance vis-a-vis Ankara. The position of the West with regard to the war on terror and Iraq would become a lot more difficult without Turkish support and cooperation. ---------------------------------------------------------- You may forward this email as you like provided that you send it in its entirety and attribute it to the Foreign Policy Research Institute. If you post it on a mailing list, please contact FPRI with the name, location, purpose, and number of recipients of the mailing list. If you receive this as a forward and would like to be placed directly on our mailing lists, send email to FPRI@fpri.org. Include your name, address, and affiliation. For further information, contact Alan Luxenberg at (215) 732-3774 x105. ---------------------------------------------------------- FPRI, 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610, Philadelphia, PA 19102- 3684. For information, contact Alan Luxenberg at 215-732-3774, ext. 105 or email fpri@fpri.org or visit us at www.fpri.org

quote:Originally posted by axel:We, Armenians, have the autocephalous Apostolic Church which is the church of Christ and a vector of unity for our People. This is why everything you say comes as fake.

BTW, who are Kafka and Kant?

Thanks. I especially liked the photo: http://www.kiosek.com/dostoevsky/images/Fetalsmall.jpg

But I looked here and didn't see any materials.

Btw, who is Dostoevski? P.S. I don't have time to kill today.

Dear Axel, I like the way you write and appreciate your emotions. However, I disagree with several of your statements. Let’s see if I can elaborate adequately. For example, when you define God as an “absolute” and as “out of reach for science, which encompasses all ideals,” I think it doesn’t serve the purpose, since you are merely substituting the concept of God, and everything which is attributable to God by the concept of “spirit.” One of the problems is that spirit is even more complicated subject/object to comprehend than God. Second, what God encompasses or not does not shed light on the essence of God, but describes some of God’s properties/qualities. Much like you have successfully described the nature of science, Beauty also exists only within the perimeters of various axiomatic frameworks, therefore, I disagree that it is an abstract category in the sense that we are unable to comprehend Beauty as an abstract category, but can only deal with its particular manifestation. I also think that it is quite possible to build societies with God and accomplish quite a bit. In my view, the contemporary [especially] European society is an example. The fable of the tower of Babel may indeed be eloquent, but so is the legend of Pygmalion, for example. I also think that the righteousness of people is not necessarily a religious or spiritual category. Righteousness has not much to do with the spirituality and faith, overall. Entire civilizations (such as the Roman) and religions (such as Judaism) are based on the concept of righteousness without requiring referral to God. I also disagree with your logic that if, “God doesn’t exist than Man is God.” I think if God doesn’t exist, Man cannot be God, at least because there is no God. Our actions are definitely based on moral judgments, but religion is not the sole source of morality. Morality, which itself appears to be a relativistic issue, has its source in human experience rather than anything else. One can also claim that people have created and recreated God in their own image, based on their own experience in different stages of development of society. I also think that the twentieth century has been the most moral century in the history of Humanity, despite all the human cataclysms in that century. At least in the sense of the elevation of the human consciousness to unparalleled heights on the stage of morality. I also like your classification of the three ages in life and history. However, I fail to accept your symbolic explanation of it through “incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection.” I would rather say that these stages are indicative of evolution of human thought, since God is a static concept, at least in the realm of all major religions. I also disagree with your contemplation on the subject of art, especially the “so-called modern art.” In fact, I think modern art is as far from consumerism as art can possibly get. The average Armenian consumer, for example, just wants Mt. Ararat on his/her wall. Similar examples can be brought for other nationalities. Consumers don’t want modern art. Those, who are in search of their spirituality, are the ones who want modern art. As far as death and distraction are concerned, based on human history, there has been nothing more distractive and death-delivering than Religion, Faith, God, etc. Human history is one big Genocide in the name of God, or if God exists, then by God. I don’t know if there is atheist art. I doubt that art has an objective of being atheist or religious. Art is a form of self-expression and is a communication media for the like-minded. There is enough room in art for Raphael and for Andy Warhol. My utmost disagreement in your thoughts is, however, with your assertion on Armenian identity and unity. To the degree that Armenian identity is linked to spiritual integrity, any other identity also may be linked to such. Additionally, if there is such a link, then we should observe that this spiritual integrity has overwhelming flaws. I am also disappointed with your contemplation about unity. You sort of spoiled the spirit of what you had said before. Spirituality being abstract category and being associated with non-ethnic God, cannot be a national unifying factor. In fact, if anything, spirituality tends to disunite people. Besides, why do we need unity beyond amongst Armenians which is already apparent – the territorial integrity, the Constitution, the economy of our Republic, etc. I also don’t know who our enemies are, and being spiritual creatures, why would we have a perception of having enemies. P.S. Just had some time to kill. [ January 12, 2003, 07:13 PM: Message edited by: MJ ]

Well, Thoth, I am always flattered to receive a stamp of approval from you.

quote:Originally posted by MJ: I also think that it is quite possible to build societies with God and accomplish quite a bit. In my view, the contemporary [especially] European society is an example. The fable of the tower of Babel may indeed be eloquent, but so is the legend of Pygmalion, for example. Here I meant to say, "...it is quite possible to build societies without God and accomplish quite a bit." quote:Originally posted by MJ:Besides, why do we need unity beyond amongst Armenians which is already apparent – the territorial integrity, the Constitution, the economy of our Republic, etc. Here, I meant to say, "... why do we need unity amongst Armenians beyond what is already apparent - ..." Overall, what I have been trying to say is that the concept of God is unduly ideologisized in the above material. If it is about spirituality, it cannot be about morality (morality can be quite non-spiritual), 'wisdom,' national unity, etc. I think Hyebruin's contemplation on the subject of God is more convincing. [ January 12, 2003, 03:52 PM: Message edited by: MJ ]

I somewhat disagree with you, Vava, when you claim that people like Wh00t have challenges in being accepted by Armenian communities. Not that I mean they don’t have such challenges, but I mean, why would they give the “key of acceptance” to the “accepters?” Why would they need the “approval” of someone else, rather than to claim ownership of Armenia (not that I am using this tem over and over not out of some idle caprice) on their own will? Obviously the Diasporan structures are fading away, and they are doomed to extinction. Part of it is due to the improved lifestyle of Armenians. Once the conditions of daily life improve people, in general, tend to become more private and isolated. This is especially true, when Armenians are transiting from the realm of small merchants dependent on each other as clients, into the realm of “shareholders” (in the broad sense of the word) of the “corporate cake.” The existing communities, other than reflecting small-business incentives, are indicative, on their own, of non-acceptance by the earlier-settlers. Thus, why would one care about being accepted by the non-accepted, if one has a whole world in front of him/her that the “communities” are not even exposed to? Finally, I think attitudes amongst the youth are changing very consistently. The new attitudes can formalized as, “I don’t care.”

Vava, I think such problems are not solved with PR.

Wh00t, My answer would be somewhat indirect. From what I guesstimate, the Republic of Armenia is not able to support population infrastructures for people in excess of 3 million, if we are talking about dignified lifestyle. One can pretend that we can modernize Armenia so much that we can increase this number substantially. Pretending is good, but reality is a different thing. Like DL has claimed above, I also believe that Diaspora, at least as we know it, has a lifespan of about 100 years. Additionally, it is evident that only a very small percentage of it is associating its identity with Armenia. The majority of Diaspora wants to have nothing to do with Armenia or Armenian issues. Of those who [indirectly] have/want to do something with the Armenian issues, the majority is more interested with the issues surrounding Turkey rather than Armenia. In fact, I consider them to be not an Armenian Diaspora but a Turkish one (of Armenian ethnicity) - they are spiritually and otherwise connected more with Turkey than with Armenia. As unpleasant as this is to hear, this is a reality. It is very unlikely that their children would be any better than them as far as the future of Armenia is concerned – they would be worse, though I do accept the possibility of some exceptions. Whatever positive we accomplish in terms of what you proclaim to be our "Cause" (this is yet something to be defined), is accomplished by a very small number of Diaspora Armenians - at least on the relative scale. So, the numbers are not necessarily indicative of purpose and aspirations. In the view of all this, within the perimeters of our 'needs,' under rational self-organization, our ‘goals’ can be achieved by some 5 million Armenians worldwide (maybe this is still an exaggeration). So, for the foreseeable future, this is what I would consider critical mass. With all this said, I am not suggesting to discount those who claim ownership of Armenia – regardless if they “fit into the profile” or not. However, we have to be aware that there are two types of Armenians - merely ethnic Armenians (why would one care about them?) and Armenians who claim ownership of Armenia. I think it is important to be able to make a distinction between them.

quote:Originally posted by wh00t: We are what, 7 million in the world? What gives us the right to pick and choose who among us are the most desirable to keep? Does this mean we accept an ever-diminishing population as long as those that are left are "true Armenians"? How can we complain about assimilation and simultaneously continue this type of behavior? Wh00t, While I generally am sympathetic and think that this idea of "true Armenian" is a corrupt one, I would like to raise a question about our numbers. Why do you (or anyone else) consider that having more Armenians around the world is better than having less? Is having more going to increase Armenian Army, improve Armenian Economy, boost Armenian Culture? What is the benefit of the more rather than the less, as long as the critical mass is sustained?

quote:Originally posted by THOTH:And MJ - I think the Germans were anti-Armenian basically only to appease the Turks. Prior to WWI Turkey was by no means a clear German vassal - far from it. In fact Britian held much more sway. Germany knew that it must appease the Turks in as many ways as possible to ensure their cooperation. Being anti-Armenian was not something that would likely come back at them (particualrly when their enemies - the Russians - were seen as being so very pro-Armenian). Thoth, Generally, I find this notion of someone (other than Azerbaijan in our days) being "anti-Armenian," "pro-Armenian," "anti-Turkish," "pro-Turkish," blah, blah, blah, most ridiculous and most meritless. As far as Armenians were/are concerned, if there is anything that can characterize the attitude of the powerful countries towards Armenians, it would be indifference due to our complete irrelevance.

I just thought of it: http://www.armenianhighland.com/images/illustration262.jpg Made in Armenia for non-dairy products!

quote:Originally posted by MosJan:Yeraj@shta-HAvaqa-Mrtsuyt ??? How about "erazhstuit," then?

How about "erazhshtahavak?"