MJ

... and one more counterexample: If one is to support the expression "indz hamar djour ber," with the same logic one has to support also the "indz hamar djour tur" expression. Try to say the latter and see if your tongue would not break over it.

The little brat has gone out of her box, again..

ø³ÝÇ áñ Ëõáëùը ѳë³í ÑÇÙ³ñáõÃÛ³ÝÁ, ûñ¨ë å³ï»Ñ ¿ Ëáë»É ݳ¨ ï•ÇïáõÃÇ³Ý Ù³ëÇÝ: “Ինձ էլ ջուր բեր” ³ñï³Ñ³ÛïáõÃÛáõÝÁ h³Û»ñ»ÝÇ ×Çßï Ó¨Ý ¿: ê³Ï³ÛÝ ³Ûë ÷³ëïÝ ÇÝùÝÇÝ áñ¨¿ ³éÝãáõÃÛáõÝ ßáõÝÇ “ϳå»ñÇ ëÕÙ³Ý Ñ»ï”, ³ÛÉ å³ñï³¹ñí³Í ¿ h³Û»ñ»Ý É»½íÇ Ó¨³µ³ÝáõÃÛ³Ý ûñ»ÝùÝ»ñÇ å³Ñ³ÝçÝ»ñáí å³Ûٳݳíáñí³Í ïñ³Ï³Ý ÑáÉáíÇ ÏÇñ³éٳٵ` ³Ù»Ý³ÛÝáñ»Ý ѳëϳݳÉÇáñ»Ý: “ԻÙ համար էլ ջուր բեր” ³ñï³Ñ³ÛïáõÃÛ³Ý Ù»ç, ïíÛ³É å³ñ³•³ÛáõÙ, “Ç٠ѳٳñ” ¹³ñÓí³ÍùÁ ѳٳñÅ»ù ¿ “ÇÝÓ” ¹»ñ³Ýí³ÝÁ: ä»ïù ¿ ³í»É³óÝ»É, ë³Ï³ÛÝ, áñ ëáíáñ³Ï³Ý å³ñ³•³Ý»ñáõÙ, ³Û¹ “ÇÙ համար էլ ջուր բեր” ³ñï³Ñ³ÛïáõÃÛáõÝÁ ѳۻñ»ÝÇ Ñ³Ù³ñ ËñÃÇÝ Ó¨ ¿` ÝáõÛÝù³Ýáí áñù³Ýáí áñ “ÇÝÓ Ñ³Ù³ñ էլ ջուր բեր”-Ý ¿ ËñÃÇÝ: ºÃ» »ë ×Çßï »Ù Ñ³ëϳÝáõÙ ²ñ÷³ÛÇ í»ñçÇÝ ÙÇïùÁ, ݳ ÝÙ³Ý ³ÏݳñÏ ¿ ³ÝáõÙ: ²é³í»É, áÙ³Ýó ÏáÕÙÇó ³é³ç³ñÏí³Í å³ñ³•³Ý»ñáõÙ, “ÆÝÓ Ñ³Ù³ñ” ³ñï³Ñ³ÛïáõÃÛáõÝÁ Çñ»ÝÇó å³ñ½³å»ë Ý»ñϳ۳óÝáõÙ ¿ “ÇÝÓ” ¹»ñ³Ýí³Ý ³Ýï»ÕÇ ÏñÏݳå³ïÏáõÙ: “Երբ կհոգնես, կգազազես աշխարհից, ¹արձիր իմ մոտ, վերադարձիր դու ÝáñÇó...” »ñÏïáÕÁ Áݹ³Ù»ÝÁ î»ñÛ³ÝÇ ÏáÕÙÇó h³Û»ñ»Ý É»½íÇ Édzϳï³ñ ïÇñ³å»ïÙ³Ý íϳÛáõÃÛáõÝÝ ¿: ܳËáñ¹ ϳñÍÇùÝ ³ñï³Ñ³ÛïáÕÇ Ï³ñÙÇñ •áõÛÝáí Ýß³•ñí³Í ûñÇݳÏÝ»ñÁ å³ñ½³å»ë ѳݹÇë³ÝáõÙ »Ý »ñ»Ïí³ ³ñï³Ñ³Ûïí³Í ÙÇïùÁ íϳÛáÕ ÑÕáõÙÝ»ñ` ËáëùÇÝ µ³Ý³ëï»ÕÍ³Ï³Ý í»ñ³Ùµ³ñÓ ½•³óáÕáõÃÛáõÝ Ñ³Õáñ¹»Éáõ Ýå³ï³Ïáí ÏÇñ³éí³Í ã³÷³½³ÝóáõÃÛáõÝÝ»ñ: ²ÝϳëϳÍ, Ý»ñùáÑÇßÛ³É ù³éÛ³ÏÁ •ñ³Ï³Ý h³Û»ñ»Ý É»½íÇ Ñ³ñ³½³ï Ó¨Ý ¿` ûå»ï µ³Ý³ëï»ÕÍ³Ï³Ý á׳µ³ÝáõÃÛ³Ý î»ñ۳ݳϳÝ-â³ñ»Ýó³Ï³Ý ³í³Ý¹áõÛÃÝ»ñÇ ÑÇå»ñµáÉ³Ï³Ý ã³÷áճϳÝáõÃÛáõÝÇó ½áõñÏ. “Ես էլ անգետ եմ- մոլոր քո պես Մոլոր ու որբ եմ չարիքի դեմ, Բայց միշտ ձեր հետ եմ, եղբայր եմ ձեզ Ձեր պես անզոր եմ, ձեր պես անզեն:” P.S. I just don't get why Armenan "g" doesn't come across sometimes.

Shouldn't this thread be moved to the Humor sub-forum?

Lord, have mercy… I don’t like the arguments for the sake of the arguments themselves. Therefore this would be my last injection on this topic. What I have argued is that the logical form of the expression is “im hamr” and “im vra.” And it is not simplification – it is consistent with the core and, if you wish, the mainstream of the Armenian language. One advantage that [Eastern] Armenian language has over the other languages that I know (English, for example) it is the fact of having very structured and logical grammar. I don’t know German, but I hear it has a similar quality. In any case, this argument [on German language] tangential for the point I am trying to deliver. I also don’t know what “standardization” means. As far as the dialects are concerned, everyone is free to use the dialect of his/her choice (though I think dialects are expressions of underdeveloped forms of communication.) But we are not discussing dialects here, but literary Armenian. And as far as the pompousness of the expression is concerned, you have turned my comment upside-down. What I have said was “indz hamar” is the pompous way of expressing the corresponding phrase not the other way around. Most likely it has been introduced by Terian, Charents, et al, in a poetic context. This is fine in poetry, where people are trying to convey a special, at times exaggerated, sentiment. I agree that one should not go through the trouble of learning two different forms, when one of them is obviously not typical for the given language. As for as the “logic of the language” is concerned, at least in the case of the structure of the Armenian language, it is manifested [partially and relevant to this discussion] through the rules of “holovumner,” which unequivocally speak in favor of “im hamar.”

But who is forcing someone to use something which is out of the mainstream of the Armenian language, when there is a completely acceptable, logical form, which is being used by the mainstream of educated [in Armenian language] people? Why should we create an artificial problem and then struggle with it? One explanation I could perhaps give is that "indz vra" sounds quite "verambardz" (sort of pompous) and that might be the reason some people tend to use it. As to the date issue, again, I am saying that the message which is supposedly posted by me on November 2nd (according to the current record) and thus sorted in the body of all messages accordingly, has been posted by me several days ago. The date of it has been altered for some reason.

Yes, the date is still wrong. I have not posted the "You are speaking correct Armenian. Why does the opposite seem to be correct to you?" message today. When I posted my reply to your earlier comments on "im" and "indz" today, that message was were it was supposed to be Now, regarding my sources... I have no sources at my disposal at this time. I have no books here on Armenian Grammar. I would be interested to know if the book referenced above by you is about the Eastern or Western Armenian grammar. My "source" here is primarily the logic and the structure of Armenian grammar. One thing that is remarkable about the latter is that it has very robust and well structured logic. Sure, there are always exception, but exceptions are justified only when there is a good reason for them. In this case, I don't see any good reason to use "indz mot" or "indz hamar" - every bit of it contradicts to the rules of Armenian "holovner." Now, in the examples you have brought above, there is also an explicit argument to be made, which would demonstrate the arbitrariness of the interpretations in favor of "indz vra" or "indz hamar." If according to the proposed by some logic we should us "Indz vra" rather than "im vra," then we should also use "indz tak." However, this would be the weirdest thing to say in Armenian language - to the level of vandalizing one's ear. I think I have an idea where the opinion on the acceptability of the expressions “indz vra,” “indz hamar” comes from. In 1960s and on, an opinion existed among some Armenian linguists that if something is commonly used then it is right, since “the Armenian language is a living and breathing organism” and the rules may change. Basically that means that the rules should comply with the habits of people. While this type of argument can be understood, in general, I think one has to also draw a line somewhere. For example, in vast segments of Armenian people, in Glendale for example, you would here people use “indzi” rather than “indz.” However, there is no such word in [Eastern] Armenian language as “indzi.” Finally, it is one thing to accept something that is commonly used, even though it may be inconsistent with the logic of the Armenian language based on the argument that it is “commonly used,” it is another thing to dismiss the correct and consistent way of expressing it based on some arguments that have never been provided.

I see something starnge in this thread. The last message under my name was posted several days ago. Today, it shows as if my last message. This is not how things should have been sorted.

You are speaking correct Armenian. Why does the opposite seem to be correct to you?

That's true. Tomorrow, we can "celebrate" the end of the beginning of the assertion of the Russian dominance over Caucasus at the detriment of the people of Caucasus.

It appears to me that new revelations have been bestowed "Nairiin vra." I wonder which rule of Armenian grammar gives basis for such statements?

… perhaps because (as we have discussed it several times throughout the life of Hye Forum) they are very parochial. Moreover, they feel it buys for them a round-ticket to Heaven.

Received by email: The following article may be of interest to you: Transitions Online Fathers and Sons ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 October 2003 The change in generations in the Caucasus offers a chance for long-term change, but it is the relationship with Russia that may prove critical in the short term. by Richard Giragosian WASHINGTON, United States--It has been a year of elections and drama in the south Caucasus. The final act of this play begins on 2 November, when Georgians vote in parliamentary elections. The first act, the presidential elections in Armenia, was seriously flawed and merely consolidated the power of the incumbent president. The second act, Azerbaijan's presidential elections, was even more stage-managed and offered nothing more than a new face on an old regime, a dynastic transition unpopular enough to produce violent clashes and death in the streets. Georgia's parliamentary elections may very well produce more surprises--and even greater turmoil--than both previous acts. The entirety of the changes now underway represent a profound transition from the political legacies of Soviet rule. For both Azerbaijan and Georgia, the graduation from the Aliev and Shevardnadze periods is an important break from the past, ending a decade of dominant rule by two very accomplished products of the Soviet system of power-politics. In Armenia, this process has been underway longer, with a more pronounced (though subtle) shift to a firmly post-Soviet period. The impressive resilience of these former Soviet leaders, Aliev and Shevardnadze, is not simply rooted in the power of their personalities. Firstly, the reforms of the first post-Soviet decade were painful and, in most instances, unpopular. The infant states of the region saw the rise of strong leaders, often seen as best-equipped to handle the painful period of early reform. Throughout the region (and also Central Asia), the first years of the transition from Soviet politics were marked by a trend toward authoritarian leadership. The reign of these authoritarian strongmen has drained democracy of some of its meaning. In the case of Azerbaijan and Georgia, it stunted overall democratic and economic reform, with the elite choosing instead to pursue power and profit. These reformed or recast Communist leaders were often legitimized by a lack of real alternatives. They posed as leaders more capable of managing the reform effort than the dangerous populists, flagrant fascists, and hard-line ultra-nationalists that strode onto the stage to challenge them--and most in the Caucasus accepted the old school's claim was right. The second source of their staying-power springs from a political culture unique to these former Soviet states. While the maxim that "all politics is local" may apply in the United States, in the southern Caucasus (and in Central Asia), it is more accurate to say that "all politics is personal." Former Communist leaders have appealed to personality rather than platform--and the ploy has succeeded. In most of the southern Caucasus and Central Asia, they rule by constructing one-man, one-party systems of governance, supported by a clan-based network of patronage and complicity. Although Armenia lacks the one-man, one-party rule, it too suffers from its own form of clan-based patronage politics. Heidar Aliev has left the Azeri stage and Georgia's Shevardnadze is already heading for retirement, assuming he does stand down (as due) in 2005. The region is now graduating from the rule of "reformed" communists. It might conceivably graduate also from reform by overbearing leaders and from the personalization of power. Ahead lies the possibility of a deeper democratization and a new era of more responsive, open governance. But it is just that--a possibility. More needs to be done to ensure that these small, weak states are guided (and prodded) into a new period of promise and peace. The legacy of the old generation is etched deeply onto the new. Armenia has the longest record of democratization, untainted by either civil war or coup d'etat--although it did suffer from a short-lived but very significant burst of political violence in 1999, when its prime minister and other leading politicians were gunned down in parliament. In contrast to its two troubled neighbors, Armenian democracy continues to improve (albeit too slowly), and it was the first in the region to elect a new generation of leaders. Armenian President Robert Kocharian is less marked by the Soviet past than his elder Azeri and Georgian counterparts, whose rise to power in the post-Soviet independence era relied on the power they built up in the Soviet system. But such a generational shift has not meant stability or peace, and Armenia's democracy continues to hobble. Its clannish elite still governs for self-interest rather than national interest. In Azerbaijan, the new generation actually bears the name of the old. The decline in the health of 80-year-old President Heidar Aliev may have been sharp and dramatic, but it brought into play a script for succession crafted with the cunning and experience of a veteran of the higher echelons of Soviet politics. In the one-man, one-party state that is Azerbaijan, the path to power needed to be secured in advance and not in the polling station. In moves modeled perhaps along Syrian lines, Heidar passed the mantle down to his 41-year-old son, Ilham. The constitution was changed to allow a sick president to confer presidential powers on the prime minister; the president's son was elevated to prime minister; and when the president was laid low, his son was duly elevated with suspicious ease. The result is the further entrenchment of a political elite already dug in deeply. If Azerbaijan's succession was mere choreography, Georgia's is true drama. The final act is two years off--when Shevardnadze's presidency ends--and the succession unclear. His would-be successors are numerous and varied, ranging from long-time opposition figures to ambitious former figures of the Shevardnadze regime, and the parliamentary elections on 2 November will merely set the stage for a very difficult denouement. The drama of succession comes against the backdrop of deep fissures and internal weaknesses in each of the three countries. In Armenia, the ruling elite remains consumed by corruption with social polarization only mounting, while in Georgia the fundamental rifts follow regional lines. In Azerbaijan, despite significant social discontent, perhaps the greatest challenge for the inexperienced Ilham Aliev will be to secure control over his father's network of political patronage. The elite may have been mobilized to support Ilham's presidential campaign and, in the short term, see no viable alternative to Ilham, but internal discord is mounting. A troubling example of this is the violent aftermath of the election. Ilham' s heavy-handed reaction may actually have increased the challenge to the new president. Ilham may arguably have felt compelled by hardliners to restore "order," but by carrying out the crackdown he comes to rely even more on the elite around him. If so, a young and inexperienced leader will find himself painted into a corner where he can do little without the old elite. These are all daunting problems for the new generation. Arguably, though, the most immediate challenge for these states is to manage relations with Russia. Always a looming presence, Russian interests have sought to exploit the region's instability by exerting even greater pressure on the region. This Russian power-game was most clearly demonstrated by the takeover of key parts of Georgia's energy sector. Early this summer, the Georgian government committed the country to a 25-year agreement with Gazprom, Russia's state-owned gas producer. Then in August, Unified Energy Systems (UES), the Russian electricity group, bought a 75-percent controlling interest in the Tbilisi electricity generator, Telasi. UES's director, Anatoly Chubais, stressed that the acquisition of Telasi was purely commercial, and that Moscow would not "blackmail Tbilisi by threatening to cut off energy supplies." Possibly, but Russia has a history of exercising its leverage readily, and its growing influence is not limited to ventures into the energy sector, or isolated to Georgia. Prior to the foray into Georgia, Russia's primary target was Armenia. With a series of questionable "assets for debt" deals, Russia gained control over key strategic enterprises and dominance over the tiny country's vulnerable economy. Russia was able to secure, with the assent of an overly compliant Armenian government, the control--or outright ownership--of much of the country's energy network, including its hydroelectric plants and its sole nuclear-power plant. This has resulted in a quick Russian acquisition of 80 percent of the Armenian energy sector, prompting the World Bank in the past few days to express its concern over Russia's mounting influence over the Armenian economy. What we are seeing, then, is a new generation that will have to deal with old geopolitical concerns with even greater urgency than their predecessors. The challenge of a resurgent Russia could, one hopes, produce a new rugged class of leadership, capable of overcoming the internal constraints and external challenges that have marked the southern Caucasus as a true "region at risk." Or, it could further undermine their authority--and exacerbate the already serious internal weaknesses of these three countries.

I think it is safe to suggest that Turkey has maintained its neutrality in WWII for a simple reason - it was not clear who would win. And the entry of Turkey into WWII in its last days may also be explained by the same argument. We were taught in the course of traditional Soviet History that there existed agreement between Germany, Turkey and Japan, that right after the fall of Stalingrad into German hands, Turkey and Japan were going to open respective fronts against USSR. I think this is attributable to 1943. I don't think this was a Soviet propaganda.

As if Armenians have not done the same... I am sick and tired to read about the Armenian Genocide on a daily basis. I feel nothing but disgust and contempt hearing, speaking and writing about it. Same concerns when I come to this forum, and every day observe masturbations accompanied by the imagery of the Armenian Genocide. It is truly disgusting.

Actually, I am using KDWIN when printing. Now I see that it gives a choice between phonetic and typewriter layouts. But what a mess it is to type with typewriter layout...

Apparently, I am using phonetic layout. Should I change? How?

гۻñ»Ý É»½íÇ ïñ³Ù³µ³ÝáõÃÛ³ÝÁ ѳϳëáÕ áõÕÕáõÙÝ»ñÝ ³ñÅ»ù ã»Ý ³í»É³óÝáõÙ: Ð. . â•Çï»Ù û ÇÝãå»ë ã³Ï»ñïÝ»ñ ïå»Ù: "G" doesn't come across correctly. Does anyone know what can be done?

150,000 out of Armenian sounds right to me, Domino. I don't know better than what is contemplated in the above material.

Memorandum October 16, 2003 Re: Official voter list information contradicts the claim of 1 million refugees Voter list information from the October 2003 Presidential elections in Azerbaijan shows that the IDP population from the regions under temporary control of the NK Armenian forces is less than half a million people. The number of registered voters in those rayons is 356,700. Special Electoral Districts Per the Azerbaijan CEC website, (http://www.infocenter.gov.az/menteqeler.html) the boundaries of 10 electoral districts (out of 125) are drawn so that they include the former Nagorno Artsax Autonomous District and the neighboring Azeri rayons under temporary control of the NK Armenian forces. (Side note: The re-drawing of electoral districts was carried out earlier this year, as the new Elections Code abolished party-list voting replacing it with majoritarian-only elections. What this means, in practice, is that the government will be able to 'elect' at least 10 members of Milli Majlis in these essentially non-existing electoral districts in the next parliamentary elections.) The following is the list of those special districts that are referred to as “Armenian occupied territories” in official parlance: #83 Agcabed Agdam; #84 Fizuli; #97 Goranboy Agdam Terter; #118 Agdam Seher; #119 Agdam Kend; #120 Cebrayil Qubadli; #121 Lacin; #123 Kalbacar; #124 Susa Fizuli Xocali Xocavend; #125 Zangilan Qubadli. Another district (#122) is supposed to represent 'Xankendi,' but is completely left out of voter lists and elections. Note that the presumed size of "Xankendi district" is approximately 35,000, i.e. some of NK's Armenian population (the total pre-conflict population of Artsax was 180,000, of which 150,000 were Armenian) has "inflated" the voter rolls in these special districts. Here's a breakdown of the voter rolls in these 10 districts: District# No of Voters 83 - 35,452 84 - 34,153 97 - 30,765 118 - 35,760 119 - 35,441 120 - 36,998 121 - 35,784 123 - 35,834 124 - 38,443 125 - 38,070 TOTAL: 356,700 Conclusion Thus, the adult population in those districts is 356,700. The adult population in this case would be defined as those of voting age (18 and older). The next step is to use Azerbaijani 2001 census to obtain data on the general population breakdown by age group (available at the Azeri State Committee on Statistics http://www.azstat.org/publications/yearboo.../en/002_3.shtml ). According to the website, the percentage of Azeri population under age 19 is 39.1% of total population. Next, I am using this perecentage to extrapolate the voter rolls in 10 districts into an estimate of general population there. According to this formula, the general population in those 10 districts is 496,169 people (356,700 * [1+0.391]). Thus, the number of IDP's cannot exceed this number. As a matter of fact, it is going to be less than that since (a) electoral districts 83 (Agcabedi-Agdam), 84 (Fizuli) and 97 (Goranboy Agdam Terter) are mostly under Azerbaijan’s control; (b)even the original voter rolls are inflated by apparent inclusion of Armenian population of NK; © the birth rate and share of younger population is bound to be lower among the IDP population given their social-economic conditions. The total Azerbaijani population displaced from around Nagorno Artsax can be estimated at under 350,000. From sources in the Armenian Embassy in U.S. and the Armenian Assembly of America.

The 21 Rules Of Halloween 1. When it appears that you have killed the monster, NEVER check to see if it's really dead. 2. Never read a book of demon summoning aloud, even as a joke. 3. Do not search the basement, especially if the power has gone out. 4. If your children speak to you in Latin or any other language which they should not know, shoot them immediately. It will save you a lot of grief in the long run. However, it will probably take several rounds to kill them, so be prepared. This also applies to kids who speak with somebody else's voice. 5. When you have the benefit of numbers, NEVER pair off and go alone. 6. As a general rule, don't solve puzzles that open portals to Hell. 7. Never stand in, on, or above a grave, tomb, or crypt. This would apply to any other house of the dead as well. 8. If you're searching for something which caused a loud noise and find out that it's just the cat, GET THE HELL OUT! 9. If appliances start operating by themselves, do not check for short circuits; just get out. 10. Do not take ANYTHING from the dead. 11. If you find a town which looks deserted, there's probably a good reason for it. Don't stop and look around. 12. Don't fool with recombinant DNA technology unless you're sure you know what you're doing. (does anybody REALLY know what they're doing when it comes to playing God? K.) 13. If you're running from the monster, expect to trip or fall down at least twice, more if you are female. Also note that, despite the fact that you are running and the monster is merely shambling along, it's still moving fast enough to catch up with you. 14. If your companions suddenly begin to exhibit uncharacteristic behavior such as hissing, fascination for blood, glowing eyes, increasing hairiness, and so on, kill them immediately. 15. Stay away from certain geographical locations, some of which are listed here: Amityville, Elm Street, Transylvania, Nilbog (you're in trouble if you recognize this one), anywhere in Texas where chainsaws are sold, the Bermuda Triangle, or any small town in Maine. 16. If your car runs out of gas at night on a lonely road, do not go to the nearby deserted-looking house to phone for help. If you think that it is strange you ran out of gas because you thought you had most of a tank, shoot yourself instead. You are going to die anyway, and, most likely, be eaten. 17. Beware of strangers bearing tools. For example: chainsaws, staple guns, hedge trimmers, electric carving knives, combines, lawnmowers, butane torches, soldering irons, band saws, or any devices made from deceased companions. 18. If you find that your house is built upon a cemetery, now is the time to move in with the in-laws. This also applies to houses that had previous inhabitants who went mad, committed suicide, died in some horrible fashion or had inhabitants who performed satanic practices. 19. Dress appropriately. When investigating a noise downstairs in an old house, women should not wear a flimsy negligee. And carry a flashlight, not a candle. 20. Do not mention the names of demons around open flames, as these can flare suddenly. Be especially careful of fireplaces in this regard. 21. Do not go looking for witches in the Maryland countryside.

Lose weight and brush your teeth.

Errr... there goes our chance... out the window...

So, could you share a room with someone in Istanbul or Baku?

Hey Khodja, could you make it happen in the countries hostile to Armenia, too?