New War?

[joseph parikian]

South Caucasus: A war-zone or a place for holidays?

An Interview with Hratch Tchilingirian

 

by Khatchig Mouradian

 

 

Seventh of August,2004

 

`Abkhazia is not a place for holidays...it is a war zone,' said Georgian

leader Mikhail Saakashvili earlier this month, threatening to sink foreign

(implicitly understood as Russian) ships that enter the region without

permission from his government. His comments came as tensions escalated

between the central authorities of Georgia and two of its breakaway regions,

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Saakashvili has promised to win back.

Saakashvili's pronouncements on South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been

furiously opposed by Moscow, whose relations with Georgia have plummeted

from bad to worse since a `rose revolution' brought pro-western Sakhasvili

to power.

 

Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia's South Caucasian neighbors, have been

struggling with problems of their own, the most important of which is the

Artsax conflict. But despite the various international conflicts they are

engaged in, as well as their serious domestic economic and social problems

the three ex-soviet republics of the South Caucasus continue to struggle

towards political stability, reform and democracy. In this respect, the

example of Armenia is telling.

 

I discussed the conflicts in the South Caucasus with Hratch Tchilingirian,

who has written and lectured extensively on the region. He is Associate

Director of the Eurasia Programme, the Judge Institute, University of

Cambridge. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics and

Political Science and his Master of Public Administration (MPA) from

California State University, Northridge. His research covers political and

territorial disputes in the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the

region's political, economic and geostrategic developments. He has authored

over 120 articles and publications on the politics, economy, culture,

religion and social issues of the Eurasia region, especially the Caucasus

and the Armenian Diaspora.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- In the Caucasus region ethnic tensions existed during the Soviet era,

and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these tensions were rekindled

and some of them became full-blown wars. Can you put these conflicts into

perspective?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- One of the areas that has not been much researched

when it comes to these regional conflicts, and which I have made part of my

research, is what I call the management of minority-majority relations. You

have a number of minorities living within the majority nationalities in this

particular part of the former Soviet Union, and the tensions actually go

back before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; indeed, to the

beginning of the Soviet period. The majority of these problems were not

resolved by the sovietisation of the region, they were rather frozen and,

for decades, somehow controlled or managed. These conflicts also need to be

examined from the point of view of how titular nations deal with their

minorities. When the larger group or nationality is not able to deal with

its minorities, whether for objective or subjective reasons, it creates many

problems for both the minority and the majority. I believe this is an issue

that has been overlooked, especially by western scholars.

 

In addition to these minority-majority relations, there are territorial

claims which further complicate the situation. But, for the moment, if we

concentrate on the socio-political, cultural, and economic levels, we see

that the post-Soviet independent states in the South Caucasus have not been

able to create stable and dependable infrastructures for economic

development, democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech within their own

societies, let alone for their disgruntled minorities. The regimes in

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have been unpopular in the last 10-12 years.

In Azerbaijan, the opposition is almost completely wiped out. When a society

lacks healthy political development, it is easy to see where the other

problems are coming from. If an Azerbaijani opposition in Baku cannot freely

express himself or herself or is thinking about reprisal, how can we speak

about the issue of the rights of Armenians in Karabagh?

 

In my opinion, in order for these conflicts to be properly resolved, there

is, first and foremost, the need for basic political structures that are

stable and a certain level of democracy and openness.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- Some people argue that the rise of nationalism led to these land

issues and ethnic conflicts. What is your take on that?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- Nationalism is, of course, a part of the whole fabric;

but I would argue that nationalism is not the only reason that you have a

conflict there. Some people say, rather naively, `These people have always

hated each other and have fought wars throughout history', they present the

issue as if it were an innate thing. They fail to appreciate the objective

reasons that contributed to the conflicts -- at least in the Soviet period

-- in Karabagh, Abkhazia, or Ossetia. There were policies dictated by the

centre which affected education, cultural preservation, language teaching,

socio-economic priorities, etc. When you look at the record, there are

objective reasons that made these minorities unhappy; these factors feed

into the nationalistic ideology that is driven by the elite; we have to look

at these other factors as well; we cannot fully explain these conflicts only

by theories of nationalism.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- You are saying that during the Soviet era, these conflicts were under

control. Don't you think that some of the policies of that time have, in

fact, worsened the situation?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- Yes, but one also has to remember that the Soviets had

this internationalist ideology where the ultimate goal was to create the

Soviet People -- individual nationalities and separate territories did not

matter. However, individual or separate nationalities or ethnic groups still

preserved their sense of national identity.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- Some scholars argue that although the Soviets wanted to create a

homogenous country, the leaders of individual states were using a

nationalistic rhetoric when tackling key issues in their respective

countries.

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- If one looks at theories of nationalism, one sees that

it is useful as a political program. So we have to know why nationalist

ideology is being used in this particular era. What is the purpose? Is it to

resolve or address certain issues? What I'm trying to stress is the context

in which events develop; things don't happen in a vacuum. The elite or the

leadership exploits certain fault lines within a society for nationalistic

purposes. Indeed, existing problems and conflicts in society provide such

opportunities for exploitation. One should also ask why conflicts happen at

a given time: the time factor, the change of leadership, the change of

climate, the change of politics is very important.

 

During the late 80s and early 90s, the societies in this region, as in other

parts of the Communist world, allocated the necessary resources -- human,

financial, military, or other -- to gain independence or autonomy. The

weakening of the center (Moscow) was one of the most favorable factors which

provided the republics and peripheral autonomies to re-appropriate power

from the center. And this was occurring very rapidly. The central government

in Moscow was collapsing and you had two or three layers of the state

apparatus trying to appropriate power from the center. When the center

completely collapsed, the republics declared independence and the autonomies

forced a divorce.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- You are stressing the fact that history does matter. But in conflict

resolution, how far back in history can one go to address the core issues?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- As time passes, people forget why the conflict started

and what the initial spark that triggered the conflict was. The present

moment becomes the starting point of analysis; history and the beginning

point become less relevant. And this is part of the problem in this region

specially. Indeed, when you look at the way the mediators work, for instance

the Minsk Group, you see that what matters is today, the year 2004, not what

happened in 1988 or 1991. Yet, for the minorities in the conflict the

starting point is very important.

 

You have the present moment, which dictates the process of dealing with the

issues. The points of reference for the various groups involved in the

solution could be very different. For instance, on the one hand, you could

have a powerful country trying to impose a solution; and on the other hand,

you have the very people who are going to be affected by such a solution.

Their references or `starting points' could be very different. This is where

the issue of compromise becomes very important: how far back do you go and

what kind of criteria do you use to resolve the conflict. For instance,

presently Armenia is viewed as an occupying force as far as Azerbaijanis are

concerned; on the other hand, there is no reference as to why or when these

regions were occupied; it's irrelevant. Yet this is relevant for Karabagh

Armenians, it is relevant for at least certain groups in Armenia. So it is

very important to understand and analyze these various layers that add to

the complexity of the matter.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- How practical is the approach of solving the conflict by force?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- My argument is that any quick or imposed solution in

this region would not be a lasting solution. When one looks at the history

of Karabagh or Abkhazia in the last 200 years, it is easy to see that there

have been various types of political or military conflicts every few years.

Any solution that does not address the fundamental issues of the conflict

would not be lasting. If a solution is imposed just as it was during the

Soviet period, the problems will resurface whenever there is an opportunity.

I believe one of the key issues that should be addressed is the

majority-minority relationship. How you manage and maintain that

relationship will determine the durability of the solution.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- So you think that democratizing the region would make the situation

better.

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- Democratic regimes provide a more conducive ground for

conflict resolution.

 

 

 

Aztag- What about the issue of territorial demands? Even if we had a

democratic Georgia or Azerbaijan, the conflicts would still be there because

of the land issue, wouldn't they?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- Yes, I believe so, because especially in this part of

the world, territory is very important. In Europe, throughout history, the

situation was the same. But the European Union has made territory less and

less important. In the Caucasus, territory is still a very important

identity marker, it is a very important political and strategic factor, so I

don't think this region will become like a mini-EU any time soon.

 

If you look at the European Union, the issue of territoriality is not

important anymore, you can travel within the EU as if you are in one

country. Today, territorial boundaries are not contentious in Europe, to a

large extent because nobody is suppressed; various national or ethnic groups

are free to practice their culture, to speak their language. But when you

have discrimination, when you have inequality, then people want to protect

their socio-political boundaries; they want to be their own boss!

 

 

 

 

Aztag- It is no secret that Russia and the US have their strategic interests

in the Caucasus and each tries to enlarge its own circle of influence in the

region. How does this affect the already volatile situation in the Caucasus?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- This issue has two dimensions: internal and external.

If you look at the internal situation, when the regime is weak and not

stable, then it would be affected by the big powers, whether positively or

negatively; the ruling elite itself needs the backing of a "sponsor" or a

big power, to secure its position.

 

The external aspect is that Russia has definite interests in this region;

historically this region has been part of the Russian sphere of influence;

it has been part of the Russian Empire for centuries. Russia is interested

in preserving that influence and role. The US has its own strategic

interests in this region, especially in the Caspian, so there is going to be

rivalry among the superpowers, just like any other region. I would add that

this competition is not unique to this region, it happens throughout the

world.

 

The issue also depends on how the countries in this region view their

strategic interests. For instance, it's very important for Armenia to have

good relations with Russia for security and strategic reasons. Armenia also

has trade and economic dependency on Russia, not the least of which is the

large remittances that come from Russian-Armenians who send money to

Armenia. So if there were a choice, Russia would be a priority -- even

though Armenia tries to have good relations with both Russia and the US and

virtually with everyone else.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- What's your take on the current situation in Georgia and the way

President Saakashvili is dealing with the separatist movements?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- Well, I think any leader would wish or would want to

resolve conflicts in his country. Saakashvili has an interest to do that as

the new leader of Georgia. On the one hand, he appears to project a strong

position when it comes to dealing with these conflicts; on the other hand,

he sounds like he is willing to compromise, provide autonomy and so on. But

I would come back to my earlier point: it would ultimately depend on how

Tbilisi is going to manage its relations with the various minorities within

Georgia.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- In Adjaria, Saakashvili had his way rather easily, didn't he?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- Yes, that was because the problem was limited in one

person, Aslan Abashidze. However, after the removal of the immediate

problem, if you do not provide the guarantees, the opportunities that these

people expect, then you are not resolving the conflict.

 

On the other hand, he has said that he is willing to give Abkhazia a very

wide autonomy; but it is debatable whether at this point Georgia has the

capacity to deliver. Does Georgia have the capacity and the resources to

deliver? I am not sure. Georgia is hardly paying the salaries of state

employees. Is Georgia ready to help the Abkhazians or the South Ossetians

with their needs? The same goes for Azerbaijan. I do not think the central

governments in Tbilisi and Baku are in any position to make the lives of the

Abkhazians or Karabagh Armenians any better at this point. What clear

incentives or gains do the minorities have? I believe this is missing from

the various solutions that are being proposed. At the end of the day, the

population, the villager, the farmer living in Abkhazia or in Karabagh or

wherever, is going to ask: What am I gaining that I don't have now through

this agreement? What is this going to add to my current situation?

 

When mediators look at it purely from a political perspective, it looks like

you could resolve the conflict. On paper, it looks like it is just a matter

of sharing territory or changing flags or sending a governor. But as

scholars we look at it at a deeper level, on the everyday level, the

sociological level -- for instance, the fact that people were once neighbors

and became enemies overnight.

 

 

 

 

 

Aztag- In your opinion, how far are we from the resolution of the Artsax

conflict?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- In my opinion, the conflict will take a very long time

to resolve; probably 20-25 years. This is not something that can be resolved

in a few years. Even if a peace agreement is signed within months or a few

years, it will take a long time to implement that agreement on the ground.

When you look at Cyprus, it took more than 30 years just to come up with a

framework, not a solution. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more than 50

years old and nowhere near resolution.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- Could you give us a brief background about the conflict in Abkhazia?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- The Abkhaz conflict is going to take a long time to

resolve. It has a long history. There were inter-ethnic tensions throughout

the Soviet period.

 

The Abkhazian Autonomous Republic -- situated on the eastern Black Sea coast

with an area of 8,700 sq km -- was part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist

Republic, with a population of over 500 thousand. The Abkhazians constituted

a minority of 18%, compared with the 46% majority of Georgians. However, in

the late 19th century, before the 'Georgianisation' of the region, as Abkhaz

scholars argue, Abkhazians were the majority, with some 55% and the

Georgians counted for only about 25%.

 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Abkhazian-Georgian relations

deteriorated, when, in 1992, the Abkhazians reinstated their 1925

Constitution to prevent Georgian attempts to curtail the political status of

the autonomous republic. A full-scale war broke out between the Abkhazians

and Georgia, after the fall of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the ultra-nationalist

president of Georgia, which resulted in the defeat of the Georgians in

September 1993. Obviously, the Abkhazians were assisted by Russia, whose

policy, at least at the time, was to use the conflicts in Abkhazia and

Artsax to pressure Tbilisi and Baku, which were rapidly drifting away from

Moscow's "sphere of influence".

 

A ceasefire between the Georgian and the Abkhazian was reached in 1994;

since then the United Nations have been involved in mediating a solution.

While unrecognized by the international community, Abkhazia, like Artsax,

has achieved de facto independence in what is now the 'Republic of

Abkhazia'. Nevertheless, Abkhazia remains extremely isolated and extremely

dependent on Russia. The international community recognized only the

independence of what were the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics. The

international community, in fact, discouraged further break up of

second-tier `states' in the Soviet system, such as autonomous republics like

Abkhazia, and third-tier autonomous regions like Artsax. As such, the

international community puts more pressure on the secessionists than the

recognized states.

 

The Abkhaz problem has many similarities with Karabagh, especially in terms

of independence, in terms of breaking off with the center, in terms of

determining their own affairs and lives, and so on. But it also has some

important differences. The Abkhazians were willing to have a federative

relationship with Georgia, but because Georgia was not forthcoming and did

not take it seriously, the Abkhazians declared full independence from

Georgia in 1999. And nowadays they talk about having a special association

or a membership association with the Russian Federation. This proposed

association is a model that does not exist in any other place in the world

yet. Abkhazia would not become a member of the Russian Federation or a

federal entity, but it will have a special, still to be defined association

with Russia. In a way Abkhazia will keep its independence, but in many ways

will dependent on Russia, as it is now.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- So being part of Georgia in any way is not an option for Abkhazia.

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- It is not a desired option for the Abkhazians. When

you speak to political leaders and ordinary people in Abkhazia, they say

they do not want to be part of Georgia, they prefer to be part of Russia.

But Abkhazia is very isolated from the rest of the world; they are very

dependent on Russia, so ultimately, Russia's role in the resolution of the

conflict will be a determining factor. On the other hand, Karabagh is

different from Abkhazia because it has an outlet to the rest of the world

through Armenia -- Karabagh is a virtual province of Armenia. Perhaps

legally or on paper Karabagh is a separate entity, but de facto, it is part

of Armenia.

 

 

 

 

Aztag- What do you think about the recent pronouncements of President

Saakashvili?

 

Hratch Tchilingirian- The nationalistic pronouncements of the President of

Georgia are not surprising, but the logic of his threats to sink Russian

ships going to Abkhazia is hard to understand. Saber rattling with Abkhazia

is one thing, but with Russia it has serious consequences. Russia still has

enormous levers in this region. Hostility towards Russia is not going to

make Georgia's position any better nor is it going to resolve the Abkhaz

conflict to Georgia's favor. I believe, once Saakashvilli's `Rose

Revolution' honeymoon is over, he is going to realize that the resolution of

Georgian's major territorial, political and economic issues depend on good

relations with Russia.

 

 

http://www.aztagdaily.com/interviews/tchilingirian1.htm

[VanSystems]

Thanks for the great info. I will follow this issue.

[mx5]

Great articleParikian,

 

and great Picture Teutonic Knight..

[Armen]

AZERI GENERAL REPORTEDLY ARRESTED, SEVERAL CORPS COMMANDERS DISCHARGED

 

Vatandas Hamrayliyi, Baku

15 Aug 04

 

Text of information department report by Azerbaijani newspaper

Vatandas Hamrayliyi on 15 August entitled "Corps commanders are being

discharged" and subheaded "National Hero Rovsan Akbarov has been

reportedly arrested"

 

Reports have been circulated that the commander of (the Baku) corps,

National Hero (Lt-Gen) Rovsan Akbarov, has been arrested. According to

reports, the general, who was discharged last week, was arrested three

days ago.

 

Together with Rovsan Akbarov, several other generals have recently

quit their military careers, according to reports from our sources at

the Defence Ministry. It is reported that all discharged generals were

corps commanders. Our source said that the political motives for the

conduct of a "purge" at the Defence Ministry were mainly political.

 

After long-drawn-out investigations by Defence Minister Safar Abiyev,

numerous professional officers were discharged from the national army,

reports say.

 

According to our information, in the run-up to the October (2003)

presidential elections, the defence minister had reports that several

corps commanders were cooperating with the opposition. However, for

some reasons, Safar Abiyev did not want to verify those reports at

that time. The minister started examining the reports only when the

election outcome was known. The investigation has resulted in the

discharge of several corps commanders.

 

One of our sources at the Defence Ministry said that the corps

commanders were victims of the defence minister's ambitions. The

source said that in the latest operation, Safar Abiyev got rid of the

generals believed to be his actual replacement. "Rovsan Akbarov's name

was repeatedly mentioned to be amongst the most promising

candidates. Discharging him from the ranks of the national army, Safar

Abiyev mostly saved his career from expected danger. A similar

incident occurred four years ago. In 2000, Safar Abiyev gave the

go-ahead for the discharge of another corps commander, National Hero

(Col) Rasim Akbarov."

[gamavor]

Let them try! Here is who they have to deal with!

 

http://www.azator.gr/archive/2004/photos/zoravarjoutiun_5_12_8_04.jpg

 

http://www.azator.gr/archive/2004/photos/zoravarjoutiun_2_12_8_04.jpg

 

http://www.azator.gr/archive/2004/photos/zoravarjoutiun_1_12_8_04.jpg

 

http://www.azator.gr/archive/2004/photos/Ohanian_Seyran_12_8_04.jpg

 

http://www.azator.gr/archive/2004/photos/Ghougasian_Sarksian_12_8_04.jpg

 

http://www.azator.gr/

[Teutonic Knight]

http://www.itogi.ru/paper2002.nsf/Article/...rabakh-29lo.jpg

[Photo: Camouflaged sniper hiding in the bushes, taking aim.]

 

http://www.itogi.ru/paper2002.nsf/Article/...rabakh-47hi.jpg

[Photo: A commander is inspecting a squad standing at full

attention.]

 

http://www.itogi.ru/paper2002.nsf/Article/...rabakh-39hi.jpg

[Photo: A tank driver looking out from his tank.]

 

http://www.itogi.ru/paper2002.nsf/Article/...rabakh-20hi.jpg

 

[Photo: A squad of soldiers in full gear, fatigues, and camouflage

on tactical exercises.]

[skhara]

If not anything else, Armenia is blessed with excellent diplomacy - Oskanian is doing outstanding job.

While Mr. Brzezinski has his "Grand" Chess game to play, Armenians have a chess game of their own to play. And we are pretty good at chess .

 

As for Turkey I think its role and importance in this modern geopolitical era is highly exagerated,I dont think that the west is in desparatly need its favours any more,the Cypros invasion was done under completely different conditions with the presence of soviet union and the promise(which was a blunder)Makarios than made to the USSR giving them a base in Cypros.

 

I don't know about favors, the importance is that Anatolia is a gateway. Just like the Balkans is a strategically important area for NATO, so is Turkey, so is the Caucasus.

Edited August 17, 2004 by skhara

[Accelerated]

guys, you should know better: propaganda shots are not much better than threatening language. As far as I am concerned there will be no winners in another war, just like there werent any in the last war, only 20000(?) dead - at the end of the day we will have to make peace with our neighbours or wipe them out completelly, in which case we will have a brand new set of neighbours....

[mx5]

I don't know about favors, the importance is that Anatolia is a gateway. Just like the Balkans is a strategically important area for NATO, so is Turkey, so is the Caucasus.

Geography has nothing to do with the govermants controling it,govermants can go but geography will stay and may switch hands,if this landscape becomes in Armenian hands(for example) will still have the same stratgic importance,wouldnt it?!!!.

[skhara]

Yep. There needs to be a major policy shift though and I'm not very optimistic about that happening any time soon.

[Siamanto]

Azeri political science experts have said, meanwhile, Armenia is deliberately trying to attract Azerbaijan into the war, as the renewed military operations can bring economic sanctions upon Azerbaijan. Not only might the United States impose economic sanctions on Azerbaijan, but also European countries may enforce economic restrictions if war restarts , they said.

 

For some reason, the Azeri "experts'" analysis - as in the quote - seems incomplete! I understand why they assume that an eventual War - if initiated by Azerbaijan - would harm the Azeri interests because it can bring sanctions upon Azerbaijan. Curiously, they fail to explain how Armenia would benefit of such a scenario! It is true that Azerbaijan is Armenia's enemy, but is it true that Armenia's highest priority is to harm Azerbaijan? I don't think Armenian leaders are simplistic enough to think that an Azeri failure would necessarily mean an Armenian success? That is typical to Turkish/Azeri - a bit childish - mindset!

 

 

 

Armat> It is also a middle eastern Turkish bravado deeply part of the culture. Remember all the blood baths repeatedly uttered by Iraqis and we now know how well they fought simply pathetically.

 

Siamanto> It is true about the Middle Eastern and/or Turkish "bravado." It is also true that the same "brave" Middle Esatern/Turks may - and did in the past - chose the less rational and more emotional path i.e. the War...and "fight pathetically!"

(By the way, am I wrong to assume that Armat is Argishti/Ruben?)

 

 

Edward> time is against us,

 

Siamanto> Hard to tell! The question is:

"We know what Azeris say about this matter, but, how do Azeris - in reality - perceive it?"

It may be the case that Azeris are simply trying to "attract Armenia into a quick deal!" Can it be that they, in reality, perceive that time is against them?

 

 

Armat> I meant we have the possession of the land and it is them that have to worry and furthermore time erodes people’s desires and passions for nationalism however phony that is. In case with Azerbaijan longer Artsagh remains free the harder it would be to regain both militarily and politically

 

Siamanto> Yes!

 

hytga> with the profits made from oil, they can by enough weapons etc.

 

Siamanto> I would not count on it i.e. the profits from oil!

 

 

Regards,

Siamanto.

[Sasun]

For some reason, the Azeri "experts'" analysis - as in the quote - seems incomplete! I understand why they assume that an eventual War - if initiated by Azerbaijan - would harm the Azeri interests because it can bring sanctions upon Azerbaijan. Curiously, they fail to explain how Armenia would benefit of such a scenario! It is true that Azerbaijan is Armenia's enemy, but is it true that Armenia's highest priority is to harm Azerbaijan? I don't think Armenian leaders are simplistic enough to think that an Azeri failure would necessarily mean an Armenian success? That is typical to Turkish/Azeri - a bit childish - mindset!

Well, perhaps we should be happy that they do at least some analysis Compared to a very high ranking military official stating that Armenia would soon be a part of Azerbaijan (an extremely aggressive and stupid statement! ) those incorrect analyses that come out of Azerbaijan seem like great intellectual achievements.

 

Welcome back Siamanto, and hope you will be able to stay longer this time around

[hytga]

does any one of you guys have any statistics on military hardware possesed by armeina and Artsax?

 

how many planes, armoured wehicles, tanks etc?

[mx5]

does any one of you guys have any statistics on military hardware possesed by armeina and Artsax?

 

how many planes, armoured wehicles, tanks etc?

Six million soldiers,6 million tanks,assuming each individual soldier fights like a Tank,and no need for warplanes cause they use Electro -Magnetic Pulse developed mutualy by Armenian and Rusiian scientists!!!!...

Edited August 19, 2004 by mx5

[Teutonic Knight]

Six million soldiers,6 million tanks,assuming each individual soldier fights like a Tank,and no need for warplanes cause they use Electro -Magnetic Pulse developed mutualy by Armenian and Rusiian scientists!!!!...

As they say in rabizland: "Ape gji kayf a tvel?"

[hytga]

As they say in rabizland: "Ape gji kayf a tvel?"

lol

 

seriously guys, does any one know these statistics?

[Artsakh]

i do have the statistics. however, i don't want to bother typing it up because its too long. if you'd like, i could mail you a copy.

[Siamanto]

Sasun> Well, perhaps we should be happy that they do at least some analysis smile.gif Compared to a very high ranking military official stating that Armenia would soon be a part of Azerbaijan (an extremely aggressive and stupid statement! ) those incorrect analyses that come out of Azerbaijan seem like great intellectual achievements.

 

Siamanto> I see what you mean and you have a point! Nevertheless, metaphorically speaking, shades of gray may not look as polarized as black and white; but, may distract and confuse with a myriad of secondary details.

 

 

Sasun> Welcome back Siamanto, and hope you will be able to stay longer this time around smile.gif

 

Siamanto> Thank you! It is generous and gentle - as in gentleman - of you! I'm "sure?" you know what I mean!!!

I'll try to make, when possible, my occasional and "erratic" appearances more frequent!

 

Regards,

Siamanto.

[hytga]

i do have the statistics. however, i don't want to bother typing it up because its too long. if you'd like, i could mail you a copy.

you can pm me

 

thanks

[Siamanto]

seriously guys, does any one know these statistics?

 

I hope that the following will answer - at least partially - your question:

 

 

Agency WPS

DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)

August 27, 2004, Friday

 

ARMENIA BUILDS UP ITS MILITARY MIGHT

 

SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 32, August 25 - 31, 2004, p.

2

 

by Samvel Martirosjan (Yerevan)

 

 

ARMENIA BUILDS UP ITS MILITARY MIGHT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE

DEEPENING CRISIS IN THE RELATIONS WITH AZERBAIJAN THAT THREATENS WITH

FULL-SCALE WAR

 

 

The Russian-Armenian military cooperation develops quite dynamically.

Not long ago, Russia lent a sympathetic ear to Armenia's request

concerning training of up to 150 officers. Complicated situation in

the Caucasus forces the authorities of Armenia to pay unfeigned

attention to national defense. According to official data alone, the

2004 Armenian state budget allocated almost $82 million for military

needs, an almost 10% rise against war spendings in 2003. Estimates of

the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) show that

in 2002 Armenia was the CIS leader in the arms spendings to GDP ratio

- 6.4%, an equivalent of $162 million.

 

The CIA claims that as far as this particular parameter is concerned,

Armenia is the 11th in the world; it spent $135 million on its army

in 2001. When the closed parliamentary hearing of fulfillment of the

2003 budget was over not long ago, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh

Sarkisjan said that arms spendings would be increased next year

again. Sarkisjan refused to elaborate but said that the Armenian

national army was initiating a program of rearmament.

 

It should be noted that the population of Armenia, not exactly a

wealthy country, does not object to these measures taken by national

leaders. The population is perfectly aware of the undeclared war with

Azerbaijan that is under way. Serious clashes are regularly reported

in the areas where Armenian and Azerbaijani troops face each other;

shots have been fired by sharpshooters for a decade (ever since the

cease-fire on the Artsax front was signed). Moreover, official

Yerevan positions itself as a guarantor of security of Artsax.

 

Turkey is another potential enemy. Diplomatic relations with Turkey

have never been established. Ankara is still blocking the border with

Armenia and pursuing an openly anti-Armenian policy. Sociologists of

the Armenian Center of National and Strategic Studies discovered that

47.5% respondents in Armenia believe that the war with Azerbaijan may

be resumed within five years, and 7% more expect a Turkish aggression

within the same span of time.

 

Figures

 

Armenian national army is considered one of the most combat ready in

the Caucasus. These days, it is over 60,000 men strong. According to

the CIA, there are 810,000 men in Armenia aged 15 to 59 and almost

650,000 of them are fit for combat. Most experts say, however, that

mobilization resources of Armenia amount to 300,000 men, i.e. almost

10% of the total population (over 3.2 million).

 

Under the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, in 2001 Armenia

declared 102 T-72 tanks and 204 armored vehicles (most of them

infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers). With the

military hardware the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe does not

apply to, Armenia has up to 700 armored vehicles. Its artillery

comprises 225 pieces of 122 mm and larger calibers including 50

multiple rocket launchers.

 

The Armenian Air Force includes five SU-25 ground-attack aircraft,

one MIG-25, 35 helicopters (the latter include twelve MI-24 attack

helicopters), and 3,000 servicemen. Yerevan intends to build up this

component of its Armed Forces. Not long ago, Defense Ministry of

Slovenia proclaimed the sale of ten SU-25s to Armenia (nine SU-25K

one-seaters and one SU-25UBK two-seater). The consignment will cost

Armenia $1 million. Armenia bought two IL-76 military transports from

Russia not long ago. The transports were bought at Russian domestic

prices and made it to Armenia together with Defense Minister of

Russia Sergei Ivanov.

 

Armenia builds up its Air Force in the hope of making it a match for

the Azerbaijani, but its antiaircraft defense is considered the best

throughout the Caucasus. Armenian antiaircraft defense comprises an

antiaircraft missile brigade and two regiments armed with almost 100

antiaircraft complexes of various models and modifications (Osa,

Krug, S-75, and S-125). Numerical strength is estimated at about

2,000 servicemen. Armenian antiaircraft defense developed in a hurry

in the war over Artsax when Azerbaijani Air Force regularly and

energetically bombarded Armenian trenches and settlements both in

Artsax and in Armenia's own border districts. There was nothing

Armenia could do about it then. By 1993, however, it already had a

formidable antiaircraft defense in Armenia itself and in the Republic

of Nagorno-Artsax. Its deployment cut Azerbaijani advantage in the

sky to the minimum.

 

These days, the Armenian skies are controlled by Armenian and Russian

antiaircraft defense units on joint combat duty since 1999. There are

at least 30 MIG-29 fighters and a regiment of S-300s quartered on the

territory of Armenia.

 

Allies in the Organization of the CIS Collective Security Treaty

 

Armenia is a member of the Organization of the CIS Collective

Security Treaty. As such, it participates in all events organized

within its framework. In any case, Russia is Armenia's oldest and

traditional ally. Ever since the regaining of sovereignty, the tandem

of Moscow and Yerevan has served as one of the few examples of bona

fide military-political cooperation in the Commonwealth. There is

practically no discord between Russia and Armenia in this sphere.

 

Russia and Armenia together defend the Armenian airspace or, rather,

the southern border of the Commonwealth. Armenian borders with Turkey

and Iran are manned by almost 2,000 Russian bodyguards who serve

shoulder to shoulder with their Armenian counterparts. Yet, it is the

102nd Military Base in Gyumri that is Russia's major outpost in

Armenia. Unlike Tbilisi or Baku, official Yerevan never brings up the

subject of withdrawal of the Russian troops. When Sarkisjan is asked

the question, he never answers believing it a rhetoric question.

Armenian society regards the Russian troops as a covering force

defending it from the Turkish aggression.

 

Until recently, the 102nd Military Base had 74 tanks, 17 battle

infantry vehicles, 148 armored personnel carriers, 84 artillery

pieces, up to 30 MIG-23s and MIG-29s, and a regiment of S-300

antiaircraft complexes. In the last eighteen months, however, a great

deal of military hardware was moved there from Georgia. Armenia gave

the land and objects used by the 102nd Military Base over to Russia

and covers some communal services.

 

Officer training is another sphere of Russian-Armenian military

cooperation. In the first years of sovereignty when Armenia did not

have military educational establishments of its own, officers of its

army were trained in Russia. Even now when Armenia has a military

college on its own territory, the Armenian officer corps honors the

tradition and is trained at Russian military educational

establishments. On a visit to Armenia in late May, Ivanov said that

600 Armenian servicemen are being trained in Russia. "Armenia asks

for the permission to send 150 servicemen to Russia in 2005, and

Russia gave its consent," Ivanov said.

 

It seems that Moscow and Yerevan do not plan to stop. The first

meeting of the joint Russian-Armenian government panel for

military-technical cooperation will take place this autumn. According

to Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Russian factories will participate

in the Armenian program of military hardware modernization. He even

said that Russia is prepared to supply the necessary spare parts an

equipment.

 

Belarus is another ally of Armenia in the Organization of the CIS

Collective Security Treaty. The two countries signed a treaty in

2002. Under the document, Armenia will receive light weapons, armored

vehicles, ordnance, and optical devices in return for spare parts and

gadgets for military hardware. Armenia also intends to have its heavy

military hardware upgraded at Belarusian factories. Lieutenant

General Sergei Gurulev, Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian

Armed Forces, says that the Armenian-Belarusian military contacts

"become systematic and deliberate."

 

Do not forget NATO

 

Greece is Armenia's best ally in the Alliance. Greece and Armenia

share ancient ties and a common enemy - Turkey. Armenian officers are

trained in Greece. Every now and then Athens puts into motion

military aid programs. In 2003, the two countries signed another

military cooperation accord under which Greece will up the number of

Armenian servicemen trained at the military and military-medical

academies in Athens.

 

Armenia became a peacekeeper in February. It sent 34 servicemen to

Kosovo where they became an element of the Greek contingent. Armenian

servicemen in Kosovo are paid by the Greeks.

 

Yerevan has been shifting towards NATO lately, mostly within the

framework of the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. Cooperative

Best Effort exercise (the first one where Russia was represented) was

run on the territory of Armenia in 2003.

 

Armenian cooperation with NATO is mostly declarative for the time

being, but the United States - the country steadily upping its clout

with countries of the region - has far-reaching plans with regard to

Yerevan. In early 2003, the Pentagon announced several major military

programs in the Caucasus. Washington's military aid to Armenia in

2004 will amount to $5 million even though the US Administration

intended to restrict it to $2 million at first. Armenia and the

United States signed a military-technical cooperation accord in

April. Some articles in the American media imply that the accord

specifies the use of Armenian airfields by the US AF.

 

Proclaiming complementariness as its foreign political doctrine,

official Yerevan never misses a chance to advance its contacts with

Washington. When the war in Iraq was under way, Armenia remained

neutral. It neither supported the war and America's action nor

condemned them. These days, however, the parliament and government of

Armenia are working on the legislation that will enable Yerevan to

send servicemen to Iraq. The Cabinet already endorsed the decision of

the Defense Ministry to subscribe to the memorandum "On the command

and settlement of issues in connection with activities of the

international division in the forces of coalition in Iraq". At first,

Armenia will probably send 10 de-miners and 3 doctors and some trucks

to Iraq.

 

Moreover, Armenia even permitted the United States to modernize its

communications, one of the most vulnerable items. Yerevan expects to

get communications means from American companies. The deliveries will

be paid for by the White House (the sum amounts to $7 million).

Commenting on it, Sarkisjan said that Russia is quite understanding.

"We are allies. It means that the strengthening of one partner will

benefit the other," said Sarkisjan. "We initiated the process a year

ago, and I found our Russian colleagues quite understanding." He said

that from military cooperation with the United States Armenia

expected to up combat potential of its own army.

 

So, Armenia ups its military might against the background of the

deepening crisis in the relations with Azerbaijan, the crisis that

threatens to deteriorate into another full-scale war. It should be

noted as well that in any conflict the Armenian national army may

count on servicemen from Artsax. In fact, the Artsax army even

leaves the Armenian behind in some parameters. Artsax armed

formations cannot match the Armenian army in manpower (about 20,000

servicemen and mobilization resources at 60,000 men), but they are

certainly ahead of Armenia in heavy military hardware: 316 tanks, 324

armored vehicles, 322 artillery pieces of calibers over 122 mm, 44

multiple rocket launchers, and the antiaircraft defense system that

performed flawlessly in the hostilities in the 1990's.

 

Translated by A. Ignatkin

 

 

http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg92385.html

[gamavor]

With the same amount of validity and in light of the recent archeological discoveries in Kelbadjar, the Armenian side may claim that the Armenian province, Antrapatkan (today's Azerbaidjan) is stil under Azeri/Turkish occupation. Therefore, Armenia MUST develop weapons of mass distruction in order to protect her citizens and to ensure the sustainability of the Republic of Armenia.

 

[Bakersfieldian]

Not to start the day off complaining but...................

 

The Armenian Air Force includes five SU-25 ground-attack aircraft,

one MIG-25, 35 helicopters (the latter include twelve MI-24 attack

helicopters), and 3,000 servicemen. Yerevan intends to build up this

component of its Armed Forces.

 

Our Airforce has 1 MIG???

(and it's a MIG25 at that)

What do they do? Take turns flying it?

 

Why bother even making uniforms for this.

 

We should run a fund raiser to buy them another damn jet.

We could double the size of the "force" for under $100k.

 

Washington's military aid to Armenia in

2004 will amount to $5 million even though the US Administration

intended to restrict it to $2 million at first.

 

A couple million???

What the hell can you buy with a couple million???

In Venture Capital, I have funded resturaunts bigger than this.

 

I surely hope nobody is actually grovelling or begging for this "shoe shine" money.

(Sadly, I know they are.)

 

There are a number of Armenians in the USA who could buy the entire armed forces of Armenia. They really need to be confronted with this.

[THOTH]

Therefore, Armenia MUST develop weapons of mass distruction in order to protect her citizens and to ensure the sustainability of the Republic of Armenia.

 

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I hope you are being facitieous here...

 

..how about "implements of Mass Constuction" instead...eh?

[hytga]

There are a number of Armenians in the USA who could buy the entire armed forces of Armenia. They really need to be confronted with this.

i agree with you, but i wish i had money. :-( lol.

 

btw. how do you guys like my avatar.? it's hillarious isn't it?

Edited September 2, 2004 by hytga

[Bakersfieldian]

I love that avatar.

 

Maybe we should handle the airforce situation in the traditional Armenian way.

 

Bake Sale!!!

 

i agree with you, but i wish i had money. :-( lol.

 

btw. how do you guys like my avatar.? it's hillarious isn't it?

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