Georgia

[MJ]

I don't know how to post it in Armenian, but the following interview of Vazgen Manoukian in today's Aravot should shed some light about military's involvement in Armenia's elections.

 

http://www.aravot.am/2003/aravot_arm/Novem...mber/25/p02.htm

I think this time he is more to the point than he has been before.

[Accelerated]

Georgia’s situation will reflect badly on Armenia. I see them getting all friendly with the Turks.

 

Cant get too friendly though. Russia has great influence over Georgia's separatists and has the potential of making a real mess. Not that we should be happy, we we're likelly to be right in the middle of it.

Edited November 25, 2003 by Accelerated

[ARR]

Sure, there is not any more democracy than in Georgia or any less corruption.

Sasun,

 

I agree with you for the most part except Armenia is actually less corrupt then Georgia, which was recently published by an international organization. If I remember correctly Armenia ranked 75th, while Georgia and Azerbaijan 123rd. Also, Armenia is more democratic.

 

Kocharian does not really have a real opposition except for a bunch of envied ex-prime ministers, ex-ministers, sons and brothers of ex-you name it. Stephan Demirchian is a dummy whose only quality is his dad’s name. Artashes Geghamyan is a demagogue who is unhappy with everything his eyes see or don’t see. Vazgen Manukian lacks a backbone by switching sides to many times he has no respect.

 

Kocharian might not have won with 80%, but surely he got over 50% of votes. I think after 5 years most people will realize that he was the right choice.

[alpha]

An interesting article in today's Montreal Gazette.

http://www.canada.com/montreal/montrealgaz...4D-59A3566029D0

 

 

Georgia seemed to have it all

But in spite of its highly educated work force, strategic location, sub-tropical climate and tourist-pleasing landscapes, the former Soviet republic is a failed state desperately in need of reform

 

LEVON SEVUNTS

The Gazette

 

 

Wednesday, November 26, 2003

 

Opposition supporters in Tbilisi celebrate Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation.

 

CREDIT: MISHA JAPARIDZE, AP

 

 

Armenia and Azerbaijan can breath a sigh of relief now that the upheaval in neghbouring Georgia turned into a "velvet revolution" and did not degenerate into civil war.

 

For both those feuding countries, Georgia is a vital link to the outside world. About 90 per cent of Armenia's trade passes through Georgia. And Azerbaijan depends on Georgia to ship its Caspian oil to world markets, and hopes that an oil pipeline to be built through Georgia will bring it future prosperity.

 

Georgia also has substantial Armenian and Azeri minorities, which would have been caught in the crossfire of a civil war.

 

But for presidents Robert Kocharian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, the resignation of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze is bad news.

 

Opposition parties in Armenia and Azerbaijan have been following Shevardnadze's ouster closely, hoping to do the same with their respective presidents. The success of the Georgian opposition will only encourage them to try harder to get rid of Kocharian and Aliyev.

 

But can they?

 

All three countries in the South Caucasus went through a series of deeply flawed parliamentary and presidential elections recently. Huge - and in the case of Azerbaijan violent - protests followed. Both Aliyev and Kocharian are seen by some as lacking in legitimacy.

 

Yet only in Georgia did protesters manage to boot out the president. Why?

 

In truth, Georgia has so far been a failed state.

 

It once enjoyed the highest standard of living in the Soviet Union, and seemed to have been blessed with everything to become a prosperous independent country.

 

It has a highly educated workforce, a strategic location on the crossroads between Asia and Europe, an incredibly hospitable and warm people, breathtaking landscapes and rich culture to attract tourism, and a mild subtropical climate for agriculture.

 

But instead, Georgia has been lurching from crisis to crisis.

 

A wave of extreme, myopic nationalism swept through Georgia in 1990, as it struggled for independence from the Soviet Union under the leadership of its first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

 

Gamsakhurdia's rallying cry, "Georgia for Georgians," was suicidal for a country that consists of a patchwork of ethnic groups with distinct cultures.

 

Even before Georgia gained its independence, it lost control over South Ossetia (not without interference from Russia).

 

In December of 1991, I watched the private militia of reputed-mobster-turned-democrat Dzaba Ioseliani pound the presidential palace in downtown Tbilisi with Second World War anti-aircraft guns. Gamsakhurdia eventually fled but not before Tbilisi's majestic Rustaveli Ave. was gutted by house -to--house fighting.

 

In came Eduard Shevardnadze to the rescue of Mother Georgia.

 

By then, real trouble was brewing in Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and it seemed that the country would fall apart. In September 1993, the minority Abkhazs (again not without Russian help) delivered a humiliating defeat to Georgia's ill-disciplined army, and drove out the majority Georgian population.

 

Shevardnadze himself, trapped in the Abkhaz capital, Sukhum, had to be rescued by elite Russian marines.

 

To his credit, despite the loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Shevardnadze managed to keep the country together. That's what he will be remembered for.

 

But 10 years later, Georgia still doesn't have much of an army. Georgian police are notoriously corrupt and incompetent. Crime is rampant and Georgians still suffer from chronic electricity and water shortages.

 

The Georgian opposition was able to capitalize on this. The people who stormed the parliament building last week did so not only to restore their democratic rights but also to bring back an uninterrupted supply of electricity, and law and order.

 

Despite their share of war and political turmoil, Armenia and Azerbaijan are in much better shape as states. Partly because of the threat of resumption of war between them, Armenia and Azerbaijan keep their armies and law enforcement forces in reasonable shape.

 

Armenia, thanks to radical market reforms prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and help from the vast Armenian diaspora, and Azerbaijan, thanks to its oil wealth, are in much better economic shape than Georgia, too.

 

Rallying public support and defeating the iron fist of the government in Armenia or Azerbaijan would be much harder, especially since the opposition in both countries lacks leaders of the same calibre or appeal as Georgia's Western-educated Mikhail Saakashvili and parliament speaker Nino Burdzhanadze.

 

No, opposition forces in Armenia and Azerbaijan will have come to power the hard way - through elections.

[THOTH]

In general i view Scheverdnaze's ouster as a good thing. And it is a clear signal to the leaderships of Georgia and Armenia that perhaps they could be next (at least some hope for opponents)...all these nations indeed have a very long way to go - both politaclly and economically. I only hope that the corruption in Armenia doesn't extend to the levels that would completly ruin it as a viable nation - which is entirely possible I think. And in many ways I think each of these nations troubles speaks to the fact that to some degree they are not in fact viable nations. I don't think any of the Caucuses nations have enough wherewithall to go it alone and that at some point some sort of confederation is going to be requirred where the three (as well as the renagade Georgian provinces - and who knows maybe even parts of the Northern Caucuses) band together economically, militarily and eventually politically to form some kind of viable confederated state concept - even if each unit maintins some sort of quai-political independence and identity. And its also clear that more powerful outside forces and pressure are requirred to whip each of these nations into politcial and economic shape. Its apauling that the United States has failed to practice what it preaches and has allowed the travesties that called themselves elections to occur in these nations recently. But I really don't think any of these countries can continue long in the manner that they are currently being run.

 

As an aside - a friend of mine who sometimes/often works with all the Governments and political parties in the region once (in 2001) had a conversation with a leading Azeri political figure concerning the person justifying driving many of the opposition parties out from government controlled buildings (just to make things more dificult for them - etc). The man said that Azaerbaijan has no problem with opposing political parties...because there is plenty of jail space for the lot of them....

 

Asd an aside

[Sasun]

And its also clear that more powerful outside forces and pressure are requirred to whip each of these nations into politcial and economic shape. Its apauling that the United States has failed to practice what it preaches and has allowed the travesties that called themselves elections to occur in these nations recently.

 

No no no... keep your whip to yourself and stick to your own affairs. None of these countries has elected you to whip them. That is democracy. If you are going to help then help in a positive way, if not then mind your business... now Thoth don't take this personal - this is my view on American self-centered propaganda lines that you seem to repeat

[THOTH]

Sasun - the US is under no obligation to give assitance to nations it is having problems with. I think that the US and other western nations should use the leverage of assitanc etied to clear politcal progress - and with lack thereof - shold withhold that assistance. It won't likley happen - but i believe that it should.

[Sasun]

Sasun,

 

I agree with you for the most part except Armenia is actually less corrupt then Georgia, which was recently published by an international organization. If I remember correctly Armenia ranked 75th, while Georgia and Azerbaijan 123rd. Also, Armenia is more democratic.

 

Kocharian does not really have a real opposition except for a bunch of envied ex-prime ministers, ex-ministers, sons and brothers of ex-you name it. Stephan Demirchian is a dummy whose only quality is his dad’s name. Artashes Geghamyan is a demagogue who is unhappy with everything his eyes see or don’t see. Vazgen Manukian lacks a backbone by switching sides to many times he has no respect.

 

Kocharian might not have won with 80%, but surely he got over 50% of votes. I think after 5 years most people will realize that he was the right choice.

ARR, a fair post, I agree. Armenian as made some progress, and Kocharian did get the majority votes - that's my impression as well although we never will know it for sure.

 

But speaking of corruption, Armenia is still very corrupt. I guess I don't know the curruption in Georgia in all its depth to say that its the same as in Armenia. But there is not a qualitative difference yet. There is a progress in making the investors' lives easier, for example, but the justice system is only getting more corrupt over time.

[Sasun]

Sasun - the US is under no obligation to give assitance to nations it is having problems with. I think that the US and other western nations should use the leverage of assitanc etied to clear politcal progress - and with lack thereof - shold withhold that assistance. It won't likley happen - but i believe that it should.

That would be fair and would work. But that's not what is happening in Iraq for example... that's what I had in mind. Frankly, I personally don't want the US to give any assistance to Armenia because it creates dependance and sort of lazyness.

[Armat]

Sasun - the US is under no obligation to give assitance to nations it is having problems with. I think that the US and other western nations should use the leverage of assitanc etied to clear politcal progress - and with lack thereof - shold withhold that assistance. It won't likley happen - but i believe that it should.

Prime example number one Israel!! Problems with? Democracy? Why has US not withheld any assistance to Israel despite of its continued violations of building illegal settlements, suppression of its Arab population, legal rights, building permits, creating obstacles for peace etc. Now we are talking about billions not mistily pocket change Armenia got.

[564312]

Sasun I agree with you that Georgia was always in good terms with the Turks but I think the new government seems more nationalist and knowing the Georgians character they will start with their claims of lands.. just like they stole Akhrkalak from us.. well maybe not too bad for us more bad for Abkhazians and the rest.

 

And as far as the Georgian and Armenian Election is concerned. Shevarnadze resigned so there won’t be bloodshed. This cannot be said for our president.

All these always remind me the contrast between Armenians and others. We are the only ones who never take what are others but always what is ours.

[Khazar]

Question remains: What position will the new leadership in Georgia take? Unlike Armenians, Georgians are highly suspicious of Russia and its influence. They will want a more pro-western stance. Georgia, however cannot live without close relations with Russia, for obvious reasons. We'll see how they balance it.

 

Worrisome: There have been hints of awakening nationalism - people associated with Gamsakhurdia's presidency are coming out of the woodwork. This is scary for ALL the minorities of Georgia.

 

In reaction to potential for a more nationalist govm't, South Ossetian, Abkhazian and Adjarian leaders today went to Moscow for a joint meeting with their Russian counterparts. I think they are preparing for the worst - just in case. South Ossetia and Abkhazia restated their desires to join the Russian Federation, and Abkhazia's pro-Russian stance is no secret. But any attempts to break away from a Georgia with a leader who will flatly consider it out of the question might lead to violence. Armenia should watch out for that.

[Khazar]

One more thing: Events in Georgia mean that Kocharyan has all of a sudden become the most senior presidential/political figure in the TransCaucasus. He has more experience than the other presidents (and future president in Georgia's case). But can he use this to his advantage and actually become an influential regional leader?

[Sasun]

This should be interesting. Even discounting Radio Liberty's anti-Russian bias the below is a clear risk that Russia is putting pressure on Kocharian to play the dangerous game of being Russia's guy against Georgia. Hope Kocharian will find a way to avoid it and stay in good terms with Georgia.

 

................................................................................

..........................

 

Kocharian To Hold Unplanned Talks With Russia's Putin

 

By Emil Danielyan

 

President Robert Kocharian will fly to Russia's second city of Saint Petersburg on Sunday for an unexpected meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin announced on Friday. Political observers suggested that the situation in Georgia will feature large at the talks.

 

The news, announced by the Kremlin through news agencies, was confirmed by Kocharian’s spokesman. The presidential press secretary, Ashot Kocharian, told RFE/RL that the Armenian leader will travel to Russian on a “working visit” at Putin’s invitation. He declined to disclose issues to be discussed by the two presidents.

 

Kocharian, whose country is Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus, is a frequent guest in Moscow, having already met Putin on several occasions this year. The approximate agenda of such meetings was normally publicized by the two governments in advance, and it is the first time that a Russian-Armenian summit is announced at such a short notice. It is also unclear why it will take place in Putin’s hometown, not the Russian capital.

 

According to some local analysts, the talks are necessitated by the volatile situation in Georgia in the wake of the bloodless overthrow of its veteran President Eduard Shevardnadze by the opposition. Putin has already discussed the issue by phone with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev.

 

“I think that Kocharian’s unexpected visit has to do with Georgia,” said Aghasi Yenokian, director of the Yerevan-based Center for Political and International Studies. “Russia wants to use Armenia in a quite intensive way so that it can achieve its political goals in Georgia.”

 

Russian-Georgian relations have been strained throughout Shevardnadze’s 12-year rule and could deteriorate further under the new Georgian leadership which is seen as even more pro-Western than the deposed president. Some Russian politicians have already expressed unease over the almost certain victory in the January 4 presidential election of Mikhail Saakashvili, a U.S.-educated lawyer who led the “velvet revolution” in Tbilisi.

 

The Kremlin indicated its intention to continue to exploit its main leverage against Georgia by hosting a meeting earlier this week of the leaders of the country’s three independence-minded regions that have effectively been beyond Tbilisi’s control for the past decade. The leaders of Abkhazia, Ajaria and South Ossetia met in Moscow ostensibly to discuss ways of deepening their economic links. All of them are deeply mistrustful of Georgia’s new leaders.

 

Citing unnamed Russian Foreign Ministry sources, the Moscow daily “Izvestia” reported that the Kremlin is ready to offer Abkhazia and South Ossetia the status of a Russian “protectorate” which would solidify their de facto independence from Georgia.

 

Meanwhile, Ajar strongman Aslan Abashidze, who denounced Shevardnadze’s ouster as a coup d’etat, was on Friday again received by Russian Foreign Igor Ivanov. Abashidze’s defiant stance is shaping up as the most serious challenge facing Saakashvili and his allies who have pledged to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity.

 

Yenokian suggested that Putin is seeking Armenia’s backing of his Georgian policy. “I believe that serving Russia is more important for Kocharian than thinking about Georgian-Armenian relations,” he claimed.

 

Kocharian and other Armenian leaders, however, ruled out any intervention in Georgia throughout the political crisis engendered by the November 2 parliamentary elections denounced as fraudulent by the West.

 

The Armenian president’s hotly disputed reelection, which sparked similar opposition demonstrations in Yerevan earlier this year, was endorsed by Russia.

[Shahumyan]

However, what is going to change with the new leadership?

How are they do change?

 

firstly they are more pro-american, therefore weakening Armenians position to bargain and play USA off with Russia

 

Secondly, they are corrupt and have links with Mafia, do we want to be neighbours with the mafia?

 

Hopefully however, this will be a wake up call for the Armenian people to show where power REALLY lies, ie in the hands of the people.

 

Kocharian has impeaded freedom of speach with his decision to close A1+

Kocharian didnt even win the election, and is in power illegitametly

Kocharian is handing over public services to the capitalists left right and centre, how is this going to improve the people position?

 

Its not, its time for a real opposition to emerge, one which truly represents the people, not the mafia nor the bourgeoise. However, we dont have one, and this simply helps Kocharian and his mob to continue their undemocratic regime

[Sasun]

Looks like Sahakashvili is trying to get Armenian votes. Will he really lower the tariffs?

 

MIKHAIL SAHAKASHVILI: ARMENIA – GEORGIA'S MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGIC PARTNER

01.12.2003

 

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Ties with Armenia are of the utmost importance for Georgia, because Armenia is Georgia's most important strategic partner, presidential contender and leader of the "United National Movement" Mikhail Sahakashvili stated in his interview to the Armenian Public Television. In his words, the new Georgian leadership wishes the Armenian Diaspora, which has activated its links with Armenia recently, to take active part in the infrastructural investment projects carried out in the region. M. Sahakashvili also stated that Armenia should maximally benefit from Georgia's transit geo-position by transporting Armenian leads through its territory. In this regard he noted that after the presidential election the new Georgian government will lower the transit tariffs for the railway trucking industry.

[Sasun]

Perhaps on top of getting votes (which he will have without major difficulty) Sahakashvili's goal is also trying to prevent Armenia from being utilized by Russia against his likely presidency. Here is a quote from Armenia Liberty radio: http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniarepor...D5A7357DD01.ASP

 

Abashidze as well as the Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders met in Moscow last week for joint consultations initiated by the Kremlin. The move fueled speculation that the Russians are playing the ethnic card to hold the new Georgian leadership in check. Some Yerevan commentators believe that they also need Armenia’s backing for the success of the endeavor.

 

In a separate development, the man tipped to win the January 4 Georgian presidential election has pledged to seek closer ties with Armenia and facilitate its communication with the rest of the world. In an interview with the state-run Armenian Public Television broadcast on Sunday, Mikhail Saakashvili accused Shevardnadze of paying little attention to the “vital” Georgian-Armenian relationship.

 

“Armenia is Georgia's key strategic partner and neighbor,” Saakashvili said. “A stable and prosperous Armenia would be a guarantor of Georgia's success and prosperity.”

 

The 35-year-old popular lawyer, who was instrumental in the success of the “velvet revolution” in Tbilisi, acknowledged that transit fees levied by Georgia from Armenian cargos are disproportionately high and promised to cut them considerably once in office. He blasted Shevardnadze for tolerating corrupt customs officials who routinely extort kickbacks from Armenian businessmen and therefore “don’t give a damn about Georgia’s state interests.”

 

More than 90 percent of landlocked Armenia’s external trade is carried out via Georgia.

 

Talk about a politician's double talk and hypocrisy

[Khazar]

Looks like things are coming to a head. Todays' gazeta.ru (for those of you that read Russian) http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/12/03/rossiaostavi.shtml

 

it was titled, 'Armenians keeping Russians in Georgia". Burdjanadze has renewed the issue of kicking out the Russians from their two remaining military bases: Batumi and Alkhakalaki. In Batumi, the pro-Russian Adjars don't want to see them go, and in Alkhakalaki, the Armenians don't want to see them go. And the Russians don't want to see them go!!!

 

I can see serious tension brewing as Tbilisi gets pissed off about this. I don't know how many Armenians live in Georgia, but I know it is a pretty significant number. This may begin to cause inter-ethnic problems...

[Shahumyan]

i think 12% of Georgian population is of ARmenian ethnicity.

 

this shows the problems of having a leader who works for the bourgeoise and uses ethnicity as a tool to strengthen their power, as opposed to a leader whose priority first and formost is the people

[alpha]

An interesting article, though contains points that I strongly disagree with.

 

Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), United States

Dec 3 2003

 

Georgia: Soros, Stalin, And a Gallon of Wine

by Roman Bessonov

 

On Nov. 21, two correspondents of the Russian newspaper Kommersant

Daily travelled from Gori, Georgia, the birthplace of Iosif Stalin,

to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi - accompanying a column of

opposition activists headed by Michael Saakashvili, an ambitious

young man with an American education and economic views considered by

Georgian businessmen to be "complete nonsense." After a rally before

the huge statue of Stalin, the marchers set out under a Crusaders'

banner with five white crosses on a field of red. A 40-liter cask of

wine helped them along. By the time the buses were greeted by

thousands at Rustaveli Prospect in central Tbilisi, Saakashvili had

decided to introduce prohibition for a 24-hour period.

 

Next day, the square in front of the Parliament in Rustaveli Prospect

was flooded with a huge crowd of enthusiastic supporters of

Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, and Zurab Zhvania - three former top

activists of President Eduard Shevardnadze's Citizens' Union of

Georgia, now assembling to overthrow him. Shevardnadze was scheduled

to open the first session of a new Parliament, elected on Nov. 2. The

three opposition leaders, however, refused to take part, insisting

that the election returns had been falsified. They had two arguments

in support of this position: first, that the official results

conflicted with exit polls; secondly, the U.S. State Department had

just declared that the election returns had been falsified.

 

In fact, the official returns were not unfavorable to Shevardnadze's

young opponents. Saakashvili's National Movement won 18%, the

Burjanadze-Democrats bloc 9%, and the New Rightists over 7% of the

vote. Shalva Natelashvili's Labor Party, also regarded as a part of

the opposition for its harsh criticism of Shevardnadze's economic and

social policy (but not working with Saakashvili, et al.), was

credited with 12%. In the new Parliament, the President's opponents

could have prepared an orderly transition to a new state leadership,

scheduled to take place with Presidential elections in 2005.

Shevardnadze, now 75, had already promised Georgians and the world

community that his current term was his last.

 

The election results had been forecast with great precision in an

analytical article in Moscow's Nezavisimaya Gazeta in August. Its

authors correctly noted the increased popularity not only of

Saakashvili's party, but also of the Revival Party of Aslan

Abashidze, president of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria in

Georgia's West.

 

Meanwhile, the President's Citizens' Union, now without its former

general secretary Zurab Zhvania (who had joined Mrs. Burjanadze in

her brand new party project), had merged with several

well-established parties - Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia's National

Democratic Union, and Vakhtang Rcheulishvili's Socialist Party - into

the Union for New Georgia. On the eve of the elections, the

President's bloc was gaining additional support from ethnic

minorities, who fear Saakashvili's nationalist banners. And even the

remains of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's movement expressed support for

Shevardnadze, though the latter was first made President in the wake

of Gamsakhurdia's overthrow in 1991. Meanwhile, the Revival Party had

almost unanimous support in Ajaria's main city, Batumi, as well as

growing influence in Tbilisi and in the Armenian-populated district

of Javakheti.

 

But Saakashvili had proclaimed, months before, that he was organizing

a "velvet revolution" to remove Shevardnadze. And the exit polls said

the elections were a fakery. These exit polls were conducted not by

the Georgians, nor by official observers from the United States,

Russia, or the EU. They were provided by a Washington-based polling

company, Global Strategy Group, which works for the U.S. Democratic

National Committee and boasts of having run Al Gore's campaign in

2000.

 

One more message, which activated the street campaign of

Shevardnadze's opponents, was a report from The Times of London,

published by Georgian media the day before the expected opening of

Parliament. Claiming that Shevardnadze planned to emigrate, the

report came with a photo of a luxurious villa, allegedly purchased

for Shevardnadze in Germany.

 

It may have been true that Germany was prepared to provide political

asylum for Shevardnadze. It is also true that the - now former - elected

President of Georgia had very close relations with the German

establishment, since, as Soviet Foreign Minister, he had played a

crucial role in German reunification in 1989-1990. It was also true

that this strong affinity of Shevardnadze towards Germany was a

matter of permanent dissatisfaction for those in the Anglo-American

oligarchy, who preferred their own, completely controlled and

predictable stooge, instead of him. Such interests were out to

undermine any productive political economic relations between Georgia

and either Germany or Russia, using traditional carrot-and-stick

methods. The carrots were mostly virtual, expressed in quite

unrealistic, but heavily advertised investment projects, which

especially irritated the Russian side, as well as neighboring

Armenia. Sticks would come down on Shevardnadze's head, any time he

even attempted to seek - never mind implement - an alternative to

Anglo-American geopolitics in the region.

 

Western mass media compared Shevardnadze with King Lear. On the day

of the well-prepared revolt, he found himself almost completely

isolated. By the time Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov arrived in

Tbilisi on the evening of Nov. 22, Shevardnadze had already lost

access even to national television.

 

The Old Fox and the Young Tomcats

Eduard Shevardnadze's relations with Moscow had been undermined in

1997 by a large and very attractive carrot from Britain. This was the

scenario of a Caucasus Common Market, uniting Georgia, Azerbaijan,

Russia's breakaway Republic of Chechnya, and, potentially, the whole

Caucasus. The headquarters of the project was to be in Tbilisi,

involving Shevardnadze's nephew and then-President of Azerbaijan

Haidar Aliyev's son. Its promoters were Lord Alistair McAlpine and a

Polish adventurer named Macej Jachimczyk, who converted to Islam in

London and took the name "Mansur." At the center of the project stood

the Chechen gangster, former felon Hojakhmed Nukhayev, who did not

speak English but controlled Russia's Post of Novorossiysk.

 

The Common Market scheme collapsed after a group of British engineers

was decapitated in Chechnya, but Moscow would not forget this

flirtation by Shevardnadze's circles with Chechen rebel leader

Maskhadov, and reminded Shevardnadze about it immediately after the

Sept. 11, 2001 catastrophe in New York and Washington. President

Vladimir Putin raised the issue of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge as a

cradle of Chechen gangsters, whose links with Afghan narcotics- and

arms-trade networks were being highlighted in international mass

media at that time.

 

The chill in Russian-Georgian relations affected ordinary people, as

well as top officials. A visa regime for travel between the two

countries, introduced by the Russian side, hurt the popularity of

both Shevardnadze and Putin within Georgia. Further feeding

Georgians' disappointment with Russia was the haughty tone of the

Moscow liberal mass media, which bullied, offended, and ridiculed not

only Shevardnadze, but Georgia as a nation. Stinkbombs blasted by

Izvestia, Moskovsky Komsomolets, and other Moscow papers - owned by

Russia's foreign-tied nouveaux riches - echoed in the hearts of

Georgians as painfully as did bombs dropped from Russian aircraft on

Pankisi Gorge. No wonder Georgians felt offended, rather than

inspired, when liberal wunderkind Anatoli Chubais, CEO of Russia's

United Energy Systems, bought control over the Tbilisi electric power

utility, Telasi. (The seller was the U.S.-based AES Corporation,

specialists in electricity privatization, which had bought and

exploited the Tbilisi power grid, and now wanted out.) Chubais

declared himself a "liberal imperialist."

 

Georgians were no happier about the "secret protocols" signed earlier

this year between Shevardnadze and CEO Alexei Miller of the Russian

natural gas giant Gazprom. Secrecy arouses not inspiration, but

suspicion. Moscow's "liberal imperialists," regarded by ordinary

Russians as merciless and immoral privatizers, were perceived in

Georgia as invaders, not as friends in need. Russia's offer to supply

natural gas and electricity was seen as a Trojan Horse, and no

wonder! In his comments on the purchase of Telasi, Chubais focussed

more on the prospects for Russian energy sales to Turkey, than on

bringing light and heat into homes in Georgia.

 

The Gazprom projects that Miller and Shevardnadze discussed off the

record were economically very promising indeed. Shevardnadze was

losing faith in U.S. promises to build a gas pipeline from Baku,

Azerbaijan, to Turkey's Erzerum, across Georgia. Experience told him

Georgia might freeze before this project were completed. Miller

promoted two more realistic projects, also undoubtedly much cheaper.

The Russian gas monopoly proposed to refurbish two existing gas

pipelines - one connecting Vladikavkaz (the capital of North Ossetia,

in Russia) with Tbilisi and Yerevan, Armenia, and another connecting

the Blue Stream (Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea floor) with

Tbilisi and Batumi. The latter project could be seen as a bridge

between Georgia's central cities and Ajaria, which would benefit not

only personal relations between Shevardnadze and Abashidze, but the

integrity of Georgia.

 

The Russian side, as often before, overlooked the influence of the

mass media on the population. The Rustavi-2 TV channel - financed by

George Soros' Open Society Georgia Foundation as an "independent"

media source - warmed Georgian homes more efficiently than the dull,

greasy moustache of Alexei Miller or the freckled nose of a newly

converted imperialist Chubais, whose name in Tbilisi, as in Moscow or

Vladivostok, is usually given to tomcats with a talent for stealing

sausages.

 

Chubais and Miller, bold as they might be, realized they were trying

to steal a juicy sausage from very powerful international interests.

Months before, Gazprom had been forced to reduce prices of Blue

Stream gas exports to Turkey - not only because of U.S. pressure on

Turkey, but also due to Turkey's own economic problems, which made

the original agreement with Gazprom unsustainable. If the talks were

public, the Turkish side could become angry and close off Blue Stream

altogether.

 

But, as the Russian saying goes, you can't hide an awl in a sack. It

didn't take surveillance satellites to see that the Vladikavkaz

pipeline was under reconstruction. Secrecy played into the hands of

the new, Western-trained generation of Georgian politicians, who used

these - economically reasonable - Russian gas and electricity

infrastructure development proposals, as yet another reason for

dumping Shevardnadze - to whom they actually owed a great deal of their

careers. Thus the Russian overtures, discredited by Miller's whispers

and Chubais' chatter, turned into a real Trojan horse for

Shevardnadze. "Georgia should not sell its independence for

electricity" - these words of Speaker of the Parliament Nino Burjanadze

became the motto of a new wave of anti-Russian sentiment,

transforming the political scene of Georgia.

 

Two years ago, any Georgian official, told that Michael Saakashvili

was a realistic Presidential candidate, would have laughed in your

face: Who? This young, haughty demagogue with a wild mixture of ideas

in his overheated brain? Today, Saakashvili is a not only a political

star in the Tbilisi sky, but a person whose words and actions move

masses, and directly affect the political mood throughout most of

Georgia. Both Moscow influentials and their counterparts in Tbilisi

government offices overlooked the steady rise of the new star, which

started not in Summer 2003, but much earlier.

 

The Ghost of the Fifth Rome

On Sept. 18, 2001, Justice Minister Michael Saakashvili arrived at

the Parliament of Georgia with a pack of photos, depicting luxurious

mansions owned by top police officials. Meanwhile, mass media

reported that his flat was visited by "unidentified persons," who

tried to steal some documentation. This added heat to the media

scandal, portraying the ambitious minister as a target of organized

crime and corruption, and initiating his ascent to the exceptional

popularity he enjoys today.

 

The engineers of his career had studied the psychology and moods of

the Georgians - and not only Georgians. In a similar way,

"anti-corruption careers" were made in other transitional or Third

World countries, from Mexico to the Philippines. The Georgian brew

was cooked to a recipe tested many times before, especially where

luxury and misery live side by side, and the physical economy is

ruined. The country Shevardnadze took charge of in 1992 was actually

in worse shape than it is today; but progress has been very slow, due

to his trust in the West. Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO)

with a ruined economy, Georgia, like Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, expected

a huge flow of investments. Instead, money fled the country.

Saakashvili and his ilk, however, avoid the real background of the

economic problems, instead blaming particular figures in the

landscape. Economists from the New Rightist Party, later his ally

against Shevardnadze, admitted that Saakashvili's economic views are

a wild mix of unrealistic assessments.

 

Saakashvili resigned as Justice Minister, with complaints that the

state leadership (to which he owed his party and government career),

was impeding implementation of his demagogic National Anti-Corruption

Plan. This project had received ample attention from megaspeculator

George Soros, who promised assistance in the effort to cleanse the

Georgian establishment. Soros appreciated the earlier reform of the

law enforcement bodies, whereby the Penitentiary Authority was

transferred from the Internal Affairs Ministry to the Ministry of

Justice. As Saakashvili's partner, Soros was going to become a

benefactor of Georgian jails, to improve the conditions there. In

Georgia's destroyed economy - especially after its WTO entry - the

penitentiary industry, with George Soros' help, would become an

island of prosperity.

 

But that was not enough for the megaspeculator: The next step was

supposed to be a sound whipping of the Georgian police, replacing its

top cadres with "decent persons" selected by him and Saakashvili.

Though the effort ostensibly failed, the discredited Internal Affairs

Minister Kakha Targamadze was forced out, replaced by Koba

Narchemashvili. The website of Soros' Open Society Georgia Foundation

was not indifferent to this change of figures. Earlier, as head of

the Customs Authority, Narchemashvili had been blamed by Tax Minister

Michael Machavariani for "not opposing crime." But Soros' site

explained that Machavariani, in attacking Narchemashvili, was

motivated purely by personal ambition, intending to introduce his own

crony to the lucrative customs post! In addition, the site warned

that the new Internal Affairs Minister would have difficulty fighting

crime, because of the resistance of Targamadze's old staff.

 

This excessive sympathy of Soros towards Narchemashvili may explain

the unexpectedly easy surrender of the police to the crowd under the

Crusaders' banners, on Nov. 21. For the whole period from September

2001 till November 2003, Saakashvili was under ardent tutelage from

George Soros. The latter's Open Society Georgia Foundation co-founded

the Liberty Institute of Georgia, and launched a "youth assistance

program." Its young disciples were promptly organized into a movement

entitled Kmara! (Enough!), which took lessons in organizing protest

actions from professionals in former Yugoslavia and Ukraine.

 

The broad-shouldered young guys in leather jackets, who mounted the

tribune of the Parliament on Saturday, Nov. 22, smashing tables and

chairs, belonged to Kmara! As the BBC's correspondent said, these

persons "hissed out" the elected President from the Parliament

building. The social-populist phraseology of Saakashvili and the

choice of Gori as launch-place for the decisive move into Tbilisi,

represent nothing new in this sort of "regime change" operation.

Anywhere George Soros appeared in the post-Soviet area, he would

mimic the character of the local protest mood. In Lviv, Ukraine, his

magazine Derzhavnist (Statehood) introduced the idea of "Ukraine as

the Fourth Rome," and published an article saying that the execution

of Jews in Babiy Yar, near Kiev, in 1941, was actually an execution

of Ukrainian patriots by Jewish commissars. The local Jewish

community was shocked, as were, no doubt, survivors of Stalin's

prisons in Georgia, but such details have never bothered Soros, for

whom the end seemed to justify any means. After all, Stalin's image

might serve as a suitable symbol of a "Fifth Rome."

 

It was St. George's day on Sunday, Nov. 23, when Shevardnadze

resigned. George Soros' day was celebrated with gallons of wine in

the central squares of Tbilisi.

 

Backing the Georgian Opposition

George Soros may have found his disciple, Saakashvili, at the offices

of Patterson, Belknap, Webb, and Tyler LLC in Tbilisi, where the

young lawyer started his career after coming home in 1992 from study

at Columbia University. A professor there, R. Scott Horton, combines

the careers of human rights defender, and privatization consultant in

the former U.S.S.R. In the 1980s, he was the lawyer for aging

Academician Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner. Today,

Horton represents the Ukrainian intelligence Major Mykola

Melnychenko, whose peddling of audiotapes of President Leonid

Kuchma's private conversation launched a political crisis in Ukraine

in 2001.

 

At a 1998 Columbia University conference on Caspian oil reserves

(co-sponsored by Exxon), this friend of dissidents presented a report

astronomically remote from human rights - on the juridical implications

of the division of the Caspian Sea. By that time, Patterson, Belknap,

Webb, and Tyler had been in Kazakstan for ten years, and in Moscow

for five. In Russia, the firm is a partner of Alpha Group's Tyumen

Oil Co. (TNK), recently merged with British Petroleum, and the

largest Russian telecommunications company, Svyazinvest,

co-privatized by George Soros, Boris Jordan, and Vladimir Potanin in

1997.

 

Another "permanent nomenklatura" figure, now operating for the

Carlyle Group (defense contractors), is ex-Secretary of State James

Baker III. He turned up in Tbilisi in August, to present urgent

amendments to the Election Code, which became known in Georgia as

"the Baker Plan." Implementation of the demands foundered in a brawl

among opposition forces, seeking seats on the Electoral Commission.

James Baker III arrived not merely to advise. He expressed his

opinion that the next leader of Georgia should be Nino Burjanadze,

Speaker of the Parliament.

 

Shortly before his arrival, PA Consulting, the American management

company for Georgia's United [Electricity] Distribution Authority,

disconnected 23 districts for non-payment of debts. And at the same

time, a International Monetary Fund mission was pressuring Georgia's

government to impose new austerity measures. Though the economy has

been controlled by criminal clans for years, the President alone was

blamed for the increasing economic problems.

 

One can imagine President Shevardnadze faced with such massive

sabotage and permanently bullied by the inviolable "human rights"

mouthpiece, Rustavi-2; he appeared to be close to real depression.

But this was what was expected of him: Should he have been reluctant

to resign, a "grateful" Burjanadze reserved for herself the option of

declaring him incompetent. If Georgia's King Lear had not resigned on

St. George Soros' Day, he might have faced an Anglo-American mental

examination.

 

Georgia's 'Lady Thatcher'

The scandal around the Russian energy proposals was a real political

gift to Mrs. Burjanadze, whose reputation in Tbilisi was far from

perfect. A series of spicy articles had followed the 2002 appointment

of her husband, Badri Bitsadze, to the post of Deputy General

Prosecutor. (A day before the revolt, he resigned, complaining of

"pressure" from the already powerless Shevardnadze.)

 

"The Landlady of a Big House," as Tbilisi papers called her, had

figured in press accounts of a scandal around the Tbilisi office of

Maskhadov's unrecognized Chechen government. This office was

headquartered in the building on Gulua Street, where the company of

Mrs. Burjanadze's father, Anzori, a former Communist Party official

and big grain trader, was also located. The head of the Chechen

office, Hizri Aldamov, claimed that his mission in Georgia was

unofficial, but Russian sources listed him among the ambassadors of

the independent Ichkeria (Chechnya), most of whom had criminal

backgrounds. Aldamov had twice been in jail for economic wrongdoing.

When Ichkeria's office was caught smuggling pharmaceuticals from

Turkey, Aldamov threatened to release compromising information on

Georgia's customs agency - and was immediately forgiven. His son,

caught in Pankisi with drugs, was also safely released. He continued

issuing more than eccentric statements; Radio Liberty quoted him

naming Russia's Vladimir Putin as global terrorist No.1, and Osama

bin Laden as an agent of the Russian special services.

 

When in Summer 2002, Hizri Aldamov was forced to leave his office in

Gulua Street (so as not to compromise Mrs. Burjanadze's family), he

declared that he really had been working for Maskhadov - contradicting

Maskhadov himself, as well as Georgia's Foreign Security Chief

Avtandil Ioseliani. When he participated in a later international

human rights event in Tbilisi, however, Aldamov was identified by a

Chechen website as "the general representative of Ichkeria in

Georgia."

 

Mrs. Burjanadze's family connections with Chechen separatists well

correspond with her international career. The case of Chechnya, as

well as other Caucasus insurgencies, and many other "indigenist"

movements across the globe, was inherited from Lord Palmerston's

19th-Century Foreign Office, by today's top figures in "human rights"

and "anti-corruption" circles of the British oligarchy. It is quite

natural that Nino Burjanadze's political ideal is Margaret Thatcher.

In 1995-98 - the heyday of the Caucasus Common Market project - Mrs.

Burjanadze chaired Georgia's Permanent Parliamentary Delegation in

Great Britain.

 

Burjanadze's mission in Britain was obviously the starting point for

her career in European institutions. In 1998, she was selected as a

Rapporteur of the General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights, and

Humanitarian Issues of Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, and two years later became a vice

president of OSCE's PA. This status played a decisive role in her

election as the Speaker of Georgia's Parliament. Immediately

thereafter, she also became an officer of the Black Sea Community of

Economic Cooperation.

 

During the parliamentary elections, several candidates protested that

Burjanadze was using her Speaker's staff and facilities for her

personal needs. And she was a candidate, the leader of an election

bloc named after herself, at the same time as representing an

international institution that supervised the elections. Such a

combination of roles and functions fits the classic definition of

corruption, as does Saakashvili's simultaneous employment in the

Parliament and a U.S. law firm internationally known as a lobbyist

for powerful transnational corporations.

 

Burjanadze was a professor of law in the Tbilisi University. Before

becoming the Speaker, she headed the Law Committee of Parliament. In

that capacity, she participated in IREX's international conference

"Black Sea Region: Priorities and Prospectives for the XXI Century."

Among the other speakers, we find a familiar name: R. Scott Horton,

professor of Columbia University, partner of Patterson, Belknap,

Webb, and Tyler, president of International Human Rights Fund,

director of the Sakharov Fund, etc., etc.

 

The Stolen Alternative

Since the major Russian TV channels, obediently bowing to the

generally accepted version of the events in Tbilisi, describe them as

a "velvet revolution" - concealing the tragic truth from Russians on

the eve of their own Dec. 7 parliamentary elections - the only source

of detailed information from Georgia for the Russian audience is

Aslan Abashidze's Ajara TV. This channel was disconnected from

Tbilisi on the day of the revolt, along with the state TV company,

giving Soros' Rustavi-2 a monopoly. For months before, Rustavi-2 had

been slandering the leader of Ajaria, describing the aged Aslan, a

Georgian nobleman, as an old Communist apparatchik and potential

dictator - though Abashidze never danced around the statue of Stalin,

and his highly professional TV company broadcast not only the best

classic Soviet movies, but also the masterpieces of European and

American cinema art.

 

Abashidze's mass media relied upon the feelings and tastes of a

thinking intellectual and an industrious peasant, not just following

their expectations, but trying to upgrade their education. For

several years, it had been a source of hope for a decent life, in

which human happiness was associated with productive labor. It had

been a very strong alternative to Rustavi-2, which played on the

impulsive instincts of poorly educated youth to revolt against

alleged "corruption."

 

After years of personal conflict, Abashidze found a common language

with Shevardnadze, when the President of Georgia, realizing the

menace to his own career and to the Georgian nation,

tried - unsuccessfully - to crack down on Rustavi-2 TV. Abashidze's

Agordzineba (Revival) Party was the only political force that came

out into the streets of Tbilisi to protect the President, and the

city's industries, from Saakashvili's crowds. Abashidze's own TV

channel, Ajara TV, strongly opposed the National Movement, labelling

it as "fascist."

 

Within Ajaria, Abashidze is the undisputed authority. The 93% vote

for the Revival Party, questioned by "independent" mass media, is

regarded by informed Russian observers as probably genuine. Ajaria

has a functioning physical economy and relatively acceptable standard

of living - lower than in Moscow, but higher than anywhere else in the

Caucasus.

 

In 1992, Abashidze did not allow Gamsakhurdia's paramilitary squads

to enter Batumi, and established his own army. However, he did not

separate himself from Georgia like the leadership of Abkhazia (where

the central authorities have next to no power), though Ajaria's port

facility, fruit plantations, and vast trade operations with Turkey

gave him the perfect opportunity to do so. Instead, he has tried to

influence the rest of Georgia with the example of his economic

success, probably hoping to inherit power on a national level,

through a legitimate election. Abashidze's efforts to establish his

party with organizations in all the districts of Georgia, were

evidence of that.

 

Through the Mayor of Batumi, an ethnic Abkhaz, and a number of his

military aides, Abashidze had established his own relations with

influentials in breakaway Abkhazia. It was no surprise that after he

and Shevardnadze shook hands in Summer 2002, Abashidze acquired

special responsibility for Georgian-Abkhaz diplomacy.

 

While Aslan Abashidze, step by step, was developing a scenario for

the reunification of Georgia, Saakashvili, and the TV channel created

for him by George Soros, were threatening Abkhazia with a new war,

simultaneously slamming Abashidze as a potential "dictator." His

behavior reminded Abashidze of the late Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who

eliminated Abkhazia's autonomy, triggering a separatist war eagerly

exploited by organized crime, with its traditional interest in having

quasi-independence for the area and complete control over the Sukhumi

port.

 

As soon as the opposition declared its victory, forcing Shevardnadze

to resign, Abkhazia and South Ossetia confirmed their independent

status, while Abashidze, as he had warned in advance, closed the

borders of Ajaria to Georgian forces.

 

The effect of Soros' activity is always the same. As we well know

from the experience of Eastern Europe, anywhere his foundation was

rooted, anti-industrial "indigenist" movements raised their heads,

including the movement for separation of Transylvania from Romania.

Separatism of this kind is habitually tied up with a decay of the

real economy, to be replaced with a post-industrial "smuggling

economy," to the profit of the international drug trade. No wonder

Abashidze's economic success is something ideologically unacceptable

for George Soros. And it will be no shock, if the banners with

Crusader crosses will soon be seen along the road to Batumi - this time

with weapons.

 

Guns, Drugs, and Flowers

"It is not a velvet revolution," Abashidze said in his Nov. 24

interview, broadcast by Ajara TV. "Velvet revolutionaries don't turn

upside down party offices, as these guys from Kmara! did with the

Revival Party office in the very heart of Tbilisi, in the famous

Lagidze building. We hardly saved our co-chairman from death on

Saturday." Revival's co-chairman, Jemal Goghitidze, was not

accidentally most hated by the Kmara! guys. He had co-chaired the

press conference providing the evidence that Rustavi-2 and Kmara!

were directly financed by George Soros. Days later, Kakha Lomaya,

head of the Open Society in Tbilisi, had to confirm that the Kmara!

project "was coordinated in New York."

 

One more speaker at that press conference, Giya Topadze, head of the

Industry Will Save Georgia party, also became a target of

Saakashvili's fanatics. In a fit of "velvet revolutionary rage," they

rampaged through Tbilisi, smashing bottles of beer and lemonade

produced by Topadze's company. Woe to those who untimely mention the

name of Saint George!

 

This irrational rage, intentionally fed during months of preparations

for the coup, requires a target. In order to keep the crowd around

him during the Presidential campaign, Saakashvili will have to invent

one image of evil after another. According to Ajara's last reports,

"velvet revolutionaries" are already taking aim at local mayors, who

did not take the side of the National Movement on their way from Gori

to Tbilisi, and at the director of Tbilisi University.

 

As was easy to foresee, the ascent of a crowd waving nationalist

banners, dating back to olden times, more troublesome than glorious,

is more likely to destroy the integrity of Georgia than to reunify

the shattered country. Abashidze's closing of the borders of Ajaria

paralyzed Georgian-Turkish trade operations. Simultaneously, the

leaderships of Abkhazia and South Ossetia enforced their border

regimes.

 

In Javakheti, the Armenian-populated province, Saakashvili's ascent

is also viewed with anxiety and disgust. Javakheti's Armenian

community has close ties with Yerevan, which has found itself between

two potentially hostile regimes, and Iran, which is an official

target of the United States - of George Bush and George Soros, John

McCain and Joe Lieberman. McCain, one more "specialist" in human

rights and Kazak oil (as well as Turkmenian natural gas), visited

Tbilisi a month and a half before the coup.

 

The remaining Russian military facilities are mainly based in

Javakheti, and provide jobs for a significant part of the population.

The prospect of using this territory as a stronghold for "containing"

and eventually attacking Iran, hardly inspires the population, but it

warms the already overheated fantasy of U.S. neo-conservative and

anti-Islamic lunatics of all types. The same geopolitics suggests the

complete isolation of Armenia from any kind of support from Russia.

This isolation, in its turn, will be used for pushing the

long-discussed exchange of territories between Armenia and

Azerbaijan, designed to eliminate Armenia's border with Iran.

 

Terra Incognita

Regarding the declared plans for a natural gas route from Baku to

Turkey, the next likely target of the authors of the Georgian coup

d'état may be Turkmenistan, the major source of gas in the Caspian

basin. President Niyazov recently survived an assassination attempt.

One more obvious target is Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma. Ex-KGB

dissident Melnychenko, like a gun in the first act of a Chekhov play,

is hanging on the wall till a suitable moment.

 

A global empire is most dangerous in the period of agony. For its

real masters in the Anglo-American permanent nomenklatura, it is

desperately important to keep the American minds under control. The

coup d'état in Tbilisi will be presented there as a new victory of

democracy. The real Tbilisi may starve, but the virtual Tbilisi is

going to be presented as one more model democratic state, with no

electricity and gas, but with medieval banners, Stalin and all.

 

In his latest interview to Kommersant, Saakashvili already moved away

from the label "velvet revolution." "It is something else," he said.

"Maybe a flower revolution?" suggested a helpful author. Saakashvili

accepted the new definition.

 

Saakashvili's supporters, their brains full of Soros' populist

propaganda, are happy that their legitimate President has gotten the

Milosevic treatment - without an attempt to look at the map of the

former Yugoslavia, crumbled into small parts, some of them with a

still unclear status of statehood. Exactly such a future,

corresponding with the "divide and conquer" principle, is the most

probable future of Georgia under Saakashvili's rule. The specific

kind of business, advocated by George Soros across the globe,

benefits from unrecognized states with destroyed economies. Arms and

drug traders traditionally use such territories as their bases of

operations. Therefore, Saakashvili's easy victory and the state of

emergency in Abkhazia may be parts of the same plan.

 

Global organized crime will definitely thank Soros for his success in

Georgia's destruction. Meanwhile, the U.S. oil and gas corporations,

serving as tools in a more lucrative game, will express their

gratitude with injections of cash into the liberal empire-pushing

(Soros-funded) faction of the U.S. Democratic Party, on the eve of

the American Presidential elections. Why else was the coup d'état

needed before the scheduled change of power in Georgia, granting it,

under the cover of the "Fifth Rome," the fate of a "flower

province" - an economically doomed territory, whose citizens, instead

of going to the university, will survive by selling flowers in the

bazaars of Moscow and Istanbul?

[MJ]

The following may be of interest:

 

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC ___________________________________________________________

RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 226, Part I, 3 December 2003

 

A daily report of developments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Southwestern Asia, and the Middle East prepared by the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

 

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OPPOSITION INHERITS A COLLAPSING GEORGIAN STATE

 

By Richard Giragosian

 

The impressively peaceful transition of leadership in Georgia has generated an atmosphere of optimism that contrasts starkly with the normally tumultuous politics of the South Caucasus. The leaders of two of the main opposition groupings, the Burdjanadze-Democrats and Saakashvili-National Movement blocs, succeeded in channeling popular anger over the allegedly rigged outcome of the 2 November parliamentary ballot into demands for regime change that forced the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. This success was greatly bolstered by the opposition's prudent reliance on peaceful confrontation. But the real tests for the new leaders, and for the country as a whole, lie in controlling the chaos and containing the collapse that currently define the Georgian state.

 

The fairly rapid fall of the Shevardnadze government came as

a surprise to many, including the opposition leaders themselves. Although Nino Burdjanadze and Mikhail Saakashvili emerged as the public faces of the movement against the Shevardnadze government, there was a much broader effort involved. The breadth and depth of the movement opposing the government also marked the graduation of the country's civil society from a potential to a powerful agent for change.

 

But the explanation for such a smooth and peaceful transition lies much deeper than any public victory of civil society. The fundamental reason for such an easy transition was actually the vacuum that has existed in the country for some time. The steady collapse of the Georgian state, with a significant loss of authority and an obvious failure to provide the most basic services to its people, provided a relatively unopposed path to power. This loss of state power has been so profound and so extensive that it also resulted in a serious decrease in legitimacy. The failure of the army or the security forces to support the president at the height of the crisis further demonstrated the extent of this collapse. And it was this loss of legitimacy that accelerated the resignation of the president and paved the way for a new leadership.

 

But the very same factors that aided in the swift transition pose the most serious obstacles for the new leaders. The sheer magnitude of the collapse of the state in recent years, as reflected in the recently revealed bankruptcy of the state budget, presents the next Georgian leadership with a set of limited options. The empty state coffers, both literally and figuratively, combined with the danger of raised public expectations, demonstrate the difficulty of assuming the economic and political legacy of Shevardnadze's governance.

 

The current transitional leadership, led by acting President Burdjanadze and presidential aspirant Saakashvili, is already threatened by one concrete manifestation of this loss of state authority. Specifically, this pressure comes from Adjarian leader Aslan Abashidze. Personifying the erosion of state power, Abashidze has built a clan-based fiefdom in his southern Georgian region, withholding contributions to the central budget and exercising an increasingly potent ability to project power on the national level. His Revival Union was the second-largest faction in the parliament elected in 1999.

 

Further bolstered by the presence of a Russian military base and control over a key Black Sea port, Abashidze is in a strong position to leverage his regional power into a decisive role in determining the outcome of the next stage of Georgia's transition. In recent days, Abashidze has closed his region's borders with the rest of Georgia, threatened publicly to boycott the coming presidential elections, and conducted a series of high-level meetings in Moscow with senior Russian officials. By assuming the role of "kingmaker," Abashidze seeks to highlight his ability to either stabilize or undermine the next government.

 

The power and influence of the Adjarian leader is

complemented by the roles of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This steady devolution of power from the central Georgian government to the regions has been compounded by the external role of Russia, which has granted citizenship to much of these breakaway regions' populations. Meanwhile, in regions of southern Georgia, the majority Armenian and Azerbaijani populations are demanding greater autonomy. It is therefore becoming increasingly likely that recent events have only exacerbated the weakening of Tbilisi to the benefit of the regions.

 

This battle between the weakened central state and the emboldened regions could precipitate a return to the "warlordism" and violence of a decade ago. And although Georgia's geopolitical importance -- both as a "transit state" for the export of Caspian hydrocarbons and as a frontline state in the global "war on terrorism" -- remains constant, its current internal fragility could ultimately negate that strategic value. Thus the next stage in Georgia's difficult transition lies outside of the capital, but holds the key to the future of the country as a whole.

 

 

....................................

 

Richard Giragosian is a Washington-based analyst specializing in international relations, with a focus on security, politics, and economics.

 

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Copyright © 2003 RFE/RL, Inc.

All rights reserved.

 

_________________________________________________

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC

[PiggyWiggy]

Shvernadze running was not because his people did it...

 

Once again...the Caucusus have fallen to the Russians...

[THOTH]

MJ - thanks for the article/report - a god one..and soem food for thought...yes a great potential for warlordism and such...but certainly wasn't going to get any better with the staus quo...so why not optimism (perhaps Armenia vcould only hope for such)

 

And fro everyones info - the EIR is an arm of the Larouche organization - and thoguh they often have good/in depth info - not always presented elsewhere...they tend to the conspiratorial etc - so should be treated with some circumspection (as should any media report etc)...

[PiggyWiggy]

Have you been to Armenia THOTH?

[THOTH]

No Piggy I have not...would certainly like to one day...perhaps the 2007 Pan Armenian games will have an event for Beer drinking! ya think?