Em

Anything that makes music. Namely, the guitar and piano. AND my fav little toy which does so many things and to which I am addicted. http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/business/consuminginterests/blog/apple-iphone-3g.jpg

Thank you for the upgrade Garik. I think the Search feature in particular is better. It's being nicer to me in this format. Job well done.

http://www.tert.am/en/news/2009/11/02/chaldranyan/ Chaldranyan’s New Film ‘Maestro’ Brings March 1 Events to the Big Screen Vigen Chaldranyan’s Maestro premiered at Yerevan’s Moscow Cinema on October 31. The theatre was more than crowded: the amount of people in attendance were twice as many as there were seats. The reason? Because the premier was not limited to the screening of the film: Armenia’s State Philharmonic Orchestra and Hover Chamber Choir, besides having direct connection with the film, gave a concert before the screening. Chaldranyan’s Maestro is about composer and violoncellist Armen Tigranyan, celebrating his 60th birthday, whose story runs parallel to the events of March 1, 2008. He sometimes comes into direct contact with the people gathered before the Opera House and later with the “crowd” gathered at Shahumyan Square, expressing what the film has to say with his position on and characterizations of the events. The maestro, played by actor Mikael Poghosyan, also personifies the “crowd” and at the end of the film he “gets furious” because of a dog’s bite. The maestro is the cellist of the state philharmonic orchestra. The orchestra with its full composition and headed by Art Director Eduard Topchyan participated in the film shooting. It is not by chance that in November 2008, Chaldranyan and Poghosyan, together with the orchestra, participated in tours in Japan, which was summed up in Chaldranyan’s documentary film. At the end of the film, they find someone to substitute the cellist in the orchestra, who continues the maestro’s Requiem rehearsals. Vache Sharafyan’s work is also for a choir, which is performed by Hover. This Requiem is finally performed as an elegy to the city, ruined after March 1 events. For the first time after March 1 events, this painful page of independent Armenia’s history appeared on the screen with documentary shots that didn’t even make it on YouTube during last year’s days where a state of emergency was declared in Yerevan. Many would agree that there’s no better way to bring “propaganda” to the people better than through mass art like cinema; something Soviet leaders did effectively during the years of social realism. How it will translate in this case, only time will tell. Tert.am

http://hetq.am/en/po...095/#more-20095 Maybe One of the Biggest Blunders in Armenian History Dr. Levon Marashlian Professor of History Glendale Community College Normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is a natural and necessary goal but the road to that good goal President Serzh Sargsyan has embarked on, with the signing of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols on October 10, will undermine Armenia's long-term national interests, impede efforts to move Turkey closer to recognizing its responsibility, and violate the Diaspora's fundamental right to participate in the formulation of policies involving the legacy of the Armenian Genocide. A careful reading of the Protocols makes it clear that Armenia is being pressured to sacrifice too much, by paying a terribly high price for an open border—and this at a time when Turkey, America, Europe, and Russia need the border opened as much, if not more, than Armenia does. Proponents of the Protocols have been repeating like a broken record that there are no preconditions. "No, and again, no," Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian exclaimed before the National Assembly on October 1. But Nalbandian's spoken words blatantly contradict the printed words in the protocols. If we exclude the possibility that he and other proponents are lying, the only way to understand their weirdly unbelievable denial is to apply the following twisted logic: from the moment one side accepts the other side's preconditions, then we can pretend that they are no longer preconditions—now they are mutually accepted terms of agreement. It's a primitive game. Yet the end result is the same: one side indeed has accepted the other side's preconditions. The Protocols contain at least two major, long-standing Turkish preconditions: establishing a history commission and confirming the 1921 Treaty of Kars. The euphemistic wording in the document fails to camouflage the transparent reality. Insisting that there are no preconditions insults the intelligence of everyone concerned. Precondition: The History Sub-Commission In response to accusations that "we are calling into question the fact of the Armenian Genocide, that we are obstructing the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide," Nalbandian declared: "No, and once again, no." Nalbandian fails to understand that the process put into motion by the Protocols, the mere existence of a history sub-commission to conduct "an impartial and scientific examination of the historical records and archives," and the overall tone of the Protocols, signals to the world that the Armenian government considers it acceptable to help organize and participate in an official study during which the other side will call into question the fact of the Genocide. This signal will be exploited. One of the consequences will be that when independent scholars and Diaspora organizations continue efforts for genocide education and international recognition, their task will become more difficult because the Turkish government and some third parties, some US Congressmen for example, armed with or misled by the impression of progress being made, will have the excuse to say that recognition efforts are not necessary for now, since Armenia and Turkey already are working on resolving the controversy themselves. In diplomacy and public opinion, impression is often more important than reality. Historians and other experts appointed by Yerevan to the sub-commission will want to discuss consequences of the Genocide and will try to rebuff efforts by the "Turkish side" to negate the veracity of the Genocide. And if the sub-commission does fall into the trap of such a debate, the "Armenian side" likely will prevail inside the meeting room. Nevertheless, the process can still be a victory for Turkey outside the room—so long as the process continues—because Turkey's central objective probably is not be to reach a consensus in the sub-commission that it was not a genocide, but simply to muddy the water even more, to hinder the pursuit of international recognition as we near the year 2015. Turkey will try, but may not expect to "win" the academic argument in the sub-commission. And eventually Turkey might suffer a little public relations setback if its insincerity is exposed. Still, Turkey will have succeeded in obstructing, perhaps for years, the increasingly successful momentum generated by decades of dedication, sacrifice, sound scholarship, and public advocacy. The Ottoman government slaughtered and starved the Armenian people to death. Today's Turkish government seeks to stall and "study" the Genocide's history to death. Exploiting the Protocols' process to delay recognition is not something that might happen. It already has happened. This year, all the factors were in place for President Barack Obama to recognize the Genocide. Then the blow came on April 6 in Turkey: "I want to be as encouraging as possible around those negotiations which are moving forward and could bear fruit very quickly very soon. And so as a consequence, what I want to do is not focus on my views right now but focus on the views of the Turkish and the Armenian people. If they can move forward and deal with a difficult and tragic history, then I think the entire world should encourage them." What we now recognize as the Protocols gave President Obama the opportunity to renege on his strong campaign promise. Twisting the knife in deeper, the State Department pressured Yerevan to agree to have the "Roadmap" to the Protocols announced two days before April 24. Widespread outrage was the reaction among Armenians to this cruel humiliation by Washington and the scandalous capitulation in Yerevan. Precondition: Confirming Kars "Personally, I am proceeding to solve problems," President Sargsyan declared in his unpersuasive opening statement to Armenia's political parties on September 17. Then he asked a question: "If we have closed any door for the solution of any problem, I ask you to tell me what door we have closed." The doors the Protocols seem to close are right in front of him. "Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law" is a pivotal sentence in the protocols. It is obvious how Ankara and most other interested parties will interpret that sentence. Yusuf Kanli wrote in Hurriyet on September 15 that "for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has agreed to recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the Kars treaty, though there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars treaty." Such a "recognition by Armenia is no less than declaring it has no territorial claims from Turkey" and that "it has turned a cold shoulder" on the Diaspora's "land claims from Turkey." Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also said the sentence referred to Kars (and the Treaty of Moscow) when he presented the Protocols to the Grand National Assembly on October 21. Although this will likely become the conventional wisdom, there may be alternative ways to interpret the Protocols' sentence. In his address to the nation before the scheduled signing ceremony in Zurich, President Sargsyan, apparently spurred by the widespread protests in Armenia and the Diaspora, announced for the first time an interpretation that gives the impression that he thinks this door is still cracked open: "The issue of borders between Armenia and Turkey is a question to be solved in line with international law. The protocols do not say any more than this." Did he offer this alternative interpretation because he believes in it, or to lull critics into complacency? In either case, whatever his strategy is, the way he is executing it is dangerously risky. This brings to the fore the question of legitimacy versus possibility. It is safe to say that virtually all Armenians want international and Turkish recognition of the Genocide and believe that claims are historically legitimate, in principle. Some believe, however, that it is wishful thinking to expect anything material from Turkey, especially territory, although recognition is essential and feasible. Some believe the maximum is possible. According to a middle-ground view, it is no longer realistic to expect the maximum Turkey owes, no matter how legitimate the claim, but nevertheless, there are alternative, innovative, creative, flexible, unprecedented compromise options that, under certain circumstances sometime in the future, may be palatable for Ankara in view of certain concurrent dividends for Turkey. Whichever view Armenians may hold, it is a certainty today that the legitimacy of claims is confronted by the appearance of impossibility—yet there are important questions: 1) If it is true that receiving something material can never be a possibility, why is that in 2005 the Turkish National Security Council ordered that access to Ottoman land records be restricted because of concern that these documents may become "material for ethnic or political exploitation"? 2) Why is it that one of the first things Turkey did after Armenia gained independence in 1991 was to demand that Yerevan confirm Kars? 3) Why did Turkey want an implicit reference to Kars in these protocols? 4) Why is that Turkey is not satisfied with the routine acknowledgment of the existing border that Armenia already granted when it joined the United Nations? 5) Why is it that Turkey refuses to have normal relations with Armenia while simultaneously allowing for the existence of a territorial dispute collecting cobwebs in an old file cabinet in a dusty back room, like the over 100 members of the UN that have normal relations and open borders even though they still have territorial disputes? It is ironic that Abdullah Gul, Recep Tayip Erdogan, and Ahmet Davutoglu appear to understand the historical legitimacy of Armenian claims more than Serzh Sargsyan, Tigran Sargsyan, and Edward Nalbandian. The closing doors President Sargsyan asked about are the complex possibilities of Armenia securing an equitable degree of justice for the Genocide sometime in the future—admittedly a daunting task. Evidently he does not see these doors because, from a "realistic" perspective, such possibilities do not seem to be in the realm of feasibility. Therefore, since it will never be possible to get an adjustment of the border anyway, he may be thinking, it is better to confirm Kars now, in order to benefit today from an open border. On the other hand, concerning properties, he mentioned in his April 23 Wall Street Journal interview the idea of putting on the table the issue of thousands of "historic Armenian monuments." But it seems he does not see that the door hinged to the territorial issue is hinged to other doors, which are hinged to recognition of the Genocide as well as property claims, including his own stated interest in churches and other cultural treasures. There is reason to believe that the reason behind Turkey's denial is not only national pride and Turkish identity, but also a concern over the possibility (however slight) of material consequences arising out of recognizing one of the greatest crimes against humanity. Confirming Kars can weaken Armenia's negotiating position regarding other (non-territorial) issues that are also vital for the Armenian people. Recognition and Justice are Directly Connected to Armenia's Future Protocol Promoters like to say that although we must never forget the Genocide, we need to focus on Armenia's present and future. Protocol Promoters do not seem to share the belief that securing recognition with restorative justice is directly connected to Armenia's present and future. The Genocide is the pivotal reason why Armenia is in the precarious predicament it is in today. Mismanagement, greed and corruption since 1991 are also reasons of course, but the colossal human, cultural, territorial, and material loss suffered as a result of the Genocide is the main factor. The primary purpose of the deportations and massacres and the invasion of Armenia in 1920 and the imposition of the crushing treaties of Alexandropal, Moscow, and Kars, was to eliminate entirely or to cut the Armenians and Armenia down to unsustainable levels, to reduce the Armenian people to insignificance in the region. The result today is that if Armenia remains constricted by its current resource base, population size, and geopolitical situation, it will remain perilously vulnerable and dependent on foreign aid and remittances from the Diaspora, which probably will not be enough to develop sufficient prosperity to reverse the alarming demographic trend and ensure its national security. An open border may be a net gain for the economy, but will it be enough to produce the degree of prosperity and security to save the country from being independent in name only? All Armenians must hope so, but based on the evidence available today, banking on that hope is a shaky gamble. Without a major augmentation of its preparedness for self-preservation, Armenia can get along for some time with outside support, but its future does not look bright. To overcome this reality which, again, is mainly a consequence of Turkish policies from 1915 to 1923, to increase Armenia's chances of survival as a viable state, it is extremely important to find an equitable solution to the Genocide issue. In any event, even if getting justice is an impossibility, it does not negate the fact that it is a necessity for boosting Armenia's ability to survive with dignity and security. This issue is also related to millions of personally innocent Turks who are unjustly forced by their dishonest government to be burdened by the albatross of a dishonorable denial. The Turkish people deserve from their government a meaningful atonement for the Genocide. A simple apology, however, would be only a hollow halfway measure which would carry with it little sincerity, and would not be in the spirit of true reconciliation, when Turkey's refusal to consider restorative justice maintains the consequences of the crime and perpetuates Armenia's poverty and precarious situation. International Pressure and National Pride President Sargsyan deserves some sympathy for the powerful outside pressure he has been facing. But in response to the diplomatic pressure and interrelated physical dangers, especially Russia's ability to freeze, starve, and otherwise strangle Armenia, was he and Nalbandian (and previous policymakers) armed with the most effective arguments for linking what is good for Armenia with what is good for Russia and other countries? America, Europe, and Russia expect to benefit greatly from an open border—a nice little Armenian carpet they are getting virtually for free, over which they can carry cargo and energy. Turkey especially will benefit, in many ways. Yet Turkey's only real contribution to the deal is to open a border that Turkey itself chose to close in 1993, which Turkey would be required to open anyway, as part of its bid for EU membership. Armenia, meanwhile, is being required to forfeit its potential options in the future for augmenting its ability to survive, its honor and dignity, its ability to claim its right to justice for a catastrophic atrocity that U.S. Army General James Harbord, in 1919, called "this most colossal crime of all ages." With more skillful diplomacy, coordinated with the under-utilized capabilities of the Diaspora, Armenia's negotiators might have been able to leverage their country's position to get a better deal—because at this moment in history, at least for now, Armenia has a monumental moral cause of historic dimensions that is globally respected, and also a piece of real estate that powers in the East and West consider valuable for their own interests. But Armenian governments have failed, starting with Levon Ter Petrosyan, continuing with Robert Kocharyan, and now with Serge Sargsyan (whom I favored over Ter Petrosyan in the 2008 election, not knowing he would move toward Ter Petrosyan's policy regarding Turkey). Yerevan has failed, for example, to develop the most effective arguments in defense of Armenia's national interests in general and toward the Karabakh conflict in particular, while its performance in media and public relations has been mediocre. And now the Armenian people have come to this—the threshold of an ignominious defeat that may be remembered, depended on the outcome, as one of the greatest blunders in all of Armenian history: "By inviting Turkey's President to Armenia and initiating this whole process, my purpose has been to open a window of opportunity for Armenia and Turkey to normalize bilateral relations, to show that the nation that experienced the devastation of Genocide, and the Armenian state, resolute and faithful to its people's pain, has enough strength to be the first to extend a hand and to point out the senselessness of moving against the course of world development." How sad. Imagine a case of two families in the same neighborhood. It would be so demeaning that the leaders of the descendants of the victims of murder, rape, torture, and theft of their family's land, heritage, property, precious heirlooms, and even countless numbers of its children, would want to be "the first to extend a hand" to the leaders of descendants of the murderers, rapists, torturers, kidnapers and thieves who continue to deny their ancestor's crimes, who even claim that the victimized family itself was guilty, who continue living in relative luxury enjoying the fruits of the plundered property, while the victims' descendants still suffer in a little corner of the neighborhood, in relative poverty, and denied access to the best road in the vicinity. And that's not all. As if they did not get enough in the Protocols, Turkish leaders have been adding insult to injury by making not-so-veiled threats that they will not open the border until Armenian forces withdraw from strategically critical regions and until the Karabakh conflict is settled. Yet Sargsyan has been insisting that Karabakh is not a precondition of normalizing relations. In the Wall Street Journal on October 7, Prime Minister Erdogan contradicted Sargsyan, pushing him into an embarrassing position by declaring that "although the Armenians sometimes say this agreement has nothing to do with the Azeris, there is in fact a relationship." Erdogan even intervened in Armenia's internal affairs by advising Armenia's President on how he should relate to his own people: "Armenia should not allow its policies to be taken hostage by the Armenian diaspora." Adding more insult to injury, it was revealed just before the signing ceremony that Davutoglu's after-signing statement included a reference to pre-conditions. This was an overbearing over-reach which was like pouring salt on the open wounds of Armenia's assaulted pride. This brazen, in-your-face poke in Sargsyan's eye was too much even for Armenia's timid government. Nalbandian correctly backed off from signing. During the ensuing three-hour delay, Mrs. Clinton wooed and cajoled Nalbandian into surrendering to a compromise, she took him for a ride in her car to the signing ceremony, where neither side delivered closing remarks. As the ink was drying on the paper, the expressions on the faces made clear who won and who lost. The smiles of satisfaction and grins of glee on the faces of the diplomats standing behind the signing desk showed no sympathy for the discomfort of their poor Armenian colleague—whose face, in stark contrast, appeared to express a mixture of chagrin, stress, sadness, and perhaps anger that he was struggling to suppress. Nalbandyan looked like a beaten man, signing under political duress. Davutoglu's beaming smile, meanwhile, reflected triumphant happiness over the near-maximum success of his government's skillful and pushy diplomacy. And it is to this haughty and unrepentant republican government, successor to the imperial government responsible for the destruction and robbery of the Armenian people, that Armenia's government wanted to be "the first to extend a hand." Instead of "enough strength," Yerevan is showing too much weakness. Yerevan is groveling on the world stage while Ankara is imposing pre-conditions and conditions that are the diplomatic equivalent of raping Armenia again and shoving her government's face into the mud. It's a national disgrace. The Legacy of Today's Policy Armenia's rulers seem determined to go ahead with ratification—like a train speeding down a mountain toward the edge of a cliff. During the negotiations that led Armenia to this historic precipice, if only President Sargsyan had acted more in the spirit of the man I met in happier days in May 1994. Now, after the fateful signing, it will be more difficult to advance the position that, whereas Yerevan has remained true to its long-standing policy of welcoming normal relations and open borders without any preconditions from Armenia's side, Turkey's side is imposing preconditions and conditions that insult the memory of over a million victims of the Genocide, preconditions and conditions that will undermine in the future the independent existence of impoverished little Armenia, and that, consequently, it is Turkey—big, powerful, wealthy—that can afford more flexibility. In the end, Serzh Sargsyan, Edward Nalbandian, Tigran Sargsyan, Artur Baghdasaryan, Heghine Bisharyan, Arsen Ghazarian, Galust Sahakyan, Edward Sharmazanov, Vasgen Manukyan, other members of the National Assembly, and all other Armenians who favor the Protocols, should think of how they will appear in history. Will they be remembered as strong or weak? As smart or foolish? As proud or pathetic? As patriots or profiteers? Will their children and grandchildren be proud or ashamed of their names? The President in particular needs to ask himself what his own legacy will be in 5, 10, 50, or 100 years. Will Serzh Sargsyan be praised by future generations of Armenians, or will he be cursed?

http://hetq.am/en/politics/20043/ The Current Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Serious Flaws Abound By Professor Vahakn Dadrian There are three elements in the new Turkish initiative calling for attention: 1. The protocol on establishing diplomatic relations stipulate"commitment…for the principles of…territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers." It also requires "the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law." In other words the stipulation is based on the latter part of the paragraph whose basis is a misconstrued, if not faulty, interpretation of a definition of what it calls "relevant treaties of international law." The fact is, however, that "international law" was seriously encroached upon by the signing of these "relevant treaties." Involved are here: 1. The Treaty of Moscow, signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921 between RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) on the one hand, and (Kemalist) Turkey, on the other. The other, no. 2, the Treaty of Kars, was signed some seven months later, i.e., on October 13, 1921, between (Kemalist) Turkey, on the one hand, and the three Soviet Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other, with the participation of RSFSR. The cardinal fact is that Ankara's Kemalist Turkey, the signatory of these twin Treaties, at that time, was not a legitimate, functioning government; rather, it was a rebel, improvised governmental set-up in contest with a then legitimately functioning government in Istanbul, then the official capital of the Empire, and ruled by a legitimate Sultan. Consistent with this fact, in a series of governmental as well as court-martial decisions, this legitimate authority on May 24, 1920, issued a death verdict against Mustafa Kemal (Takyimi Vekay-i no.3864), and 12 days later, June 6, 1920, six of the latter's cohorts, including Ismet (Inonu), were likewise court-martialed in absentia and were condemned to death. Whether or not Sultan's government was popular, or its policies were deemed prudent or wise at the time, are issues that are irrelevant here. What is paramount and incontestable, however, is the fact that the Sultan was then the sole legitimate and superordinate authority of the Ottoman Empire — in contrast to the rebel character of the Kemalist government. Accordingly, any agreement, convention or treaty signed with such a government is under international law illegitimate, hence invalid. Thus, from the vantage point of "international law," the Treaties of Moscow and Kars are bereft of legality and can, therefore, not be treated as legitimate instruments of negotiations. Moreover, the Moscow Treaty is additionally illegitimate by any standard of international law, for the reason that the RSFSR (Soviet Russia) was then not recognized by any nation-state, it then had almost the same status as the revolutionary, rebellious Kemalist regime. (It was only in 1922 when Germany, as the first nation-state, granted de-jure recognition of the Union at Prapallo). As if these legal deficiencies were not enough, Soviet Armenia, on the insistence of the Ankara government's representatives, was excluded from the negotiations in Moscow thatculminated in the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921, these Turkish representatives had adamantly objected to inclusion in thesenegotiations of any Armenian representative. As a result, the lack of evidence of Armenian participation is one of the most signal features in the protocols of this Treaty. It should be noted in this connectionthat one of the three Turkish delegates, who prevailed in Moscow for the final drafting of this Treaty, was Colonel, later in the Turkish Republic, Major-General, Sevket Seyfi (Duzgoreu). One of the foremost organizers of the Armenian Genocide, Seyfi distinguished himself in the task of recruitment, mobilization and deployment in the provinces of Special Organization's killer bands, mostly convicted criminals especially selected and released from the empire's prisons for this task, they played a major role in the implementation of the genocidal scheme. As to the ensuing Treaty of Kars, again it was the leaders of RSFSR, which assumed responsibility for prevailing upon the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics to accommodate the Turks, their feeble efforts of some opposition notwithstanding. That treaty in fact materialized as an extension and reconfirmation of the preceding Moscow Treaty thanks to the exertions of the dominant Bolsheviks. It is painful to point out once more the rather treacherous conduct of a certain Budu Mdivani, a Georgian, serving as a communist mediator between the military defeated agonizing Armenians who had welcomed him, and the arrogant, victorious Turks. Instead of serving the interests of his Russian masters in Moscow, he secretly tried to collude with the Turks, urging Kazim Karabekir, their military commander, not to be satisfied with the Arax River as a new frontier between Armenia and Turkey, but rather to push beyond that river deep into Armenia. (Kazim Karabekir, ISTIKAL Harbimiz, the 1969edition. Istanbul, Turkiye Publishers, p. 952) 2. The protocol no. 2 dealing with the theme of "Development of Relations between Armenian and Turkey" seductively starts as item no. 1 with a promise to "open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol." Then, under items no. 2 and no. 3 come the two most critical issues preventing the bulk of the Armenian people from considering reconciliation. Through them, the unrepentant heirs of the Great Crime of 1915 are once more seeking to railroad the central issue by way of indirection, covert language and resort to alluring, seductive techniques. The Armenian government should declare unequivocally, if not emphatically, that there is nothing to "examine scientifically" with respect to the matter that covertly but allegorically is called "the historical records." These records" have been subjected to criminal investigation by a Turkish military Tribunal in the pre-Kemalist, postwar Turkey, 1919-1921. Relying on a vast corpus of authenticated, official Turkish wartime documents, this Tribunal, demonstrated that these "records" were nothing but a repository of incontestable evidence of a gigantic crime, a centrally organized mass murder enacted against the bulk of the Ottoman Empire's own Armenian citizens. The bill of charges, the key indictment, replete with specific documentary material that constituted the Tribunal's evidence-inchief renders the resulting series of Verdicts an irrevocable evidence of the comprehensive scale of the wartime extermination. The prosecutors were Turks, the judges were Turks, and equally, if not most important, most of the witnesses were Turks, including the high-ranking military officers. Likewise, the court-martial proceedings were based on Ottoman Turkish domestic penal laws. One would think that a government driven by a sense of Justice would above all tackle these court proceedings in its quest for truth and justice. But, remarkably, there is not only silence about them, but complete silence about the disappearance of the respective trial records following the capture of Istanbul by the Kemalists in the Fall of 1922. The proposal of enlisting commissions to "study" the problem and "formulate recommendations," has all the sly elements of purposive procrastination, of a gimmick to inject uncertainty, ambivalence, and above all pressure for, ultimate compromise. We see here the use of standards of a "give and take" culture that often determines the outcome of such "commissions" and "sub-commissions," presumably consisting of people knowledgeable about the Ottoman language. Perhaps the most unusual and, therefore, in a sense, bizarre aspect of this whole protocol, a feature of decades-long official Turkish posture, is the idea that, the Turks, identified with the perpetrator camp, would visit a vis-à-vis those representing the victim of population, and negotiate as co-equals. Underlying this vagary of sheer power play is the fact that Turkey, whether officially or unofficially, is still irrevocably committed to a posture of denial as far as the key element of the crime is concerned, namely, a state-sponsored and state-organized mass murder against her Armenian citizens. Indeed, Articles 300, 309, but especially 301, of Turkey's current Penal Code, will as long as they are in effect, continue to legitimize and even extol this posture. 3. Given the track record of the Turkish politicians, the heirs of an established and centuries-old Ottoman tradition, it is difficult to resist the temptation to label this entire initiative a clever stratagem to lure the Armenian government into a trap. There is not only a scheme of prolongation of the diplomatic traffic in an atmosphere of continuous uncertainty, as far as a final outcome is concerned (Abdul Hamid skilfully used this tactic when confronting the European Powers, which were pressuring him to finally implement the so-called Armenian Reforms — in Turkish it is called Ovalamak), but also an underlying design to promptly wrest from the government of Armenia, a long-cherished concession: the formal recognition of the existing borders between Armenia and Turkey. Secondly, there is Turkey's looming goal of joining the European Union. Turkey needs to preserve the appropriate façade of conciliatoriness that is but expected of a candidate worthy of becoming an integral part of a civilized Europe. When reinforced by the possession of significant strategic assets and the leverage of distinct military power, however, such facades can prove very functional. The situation becomes even more enigmatic, if not outright deceptive, when taking into account the pervasive current linkages between the republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Knowing the intensity of the latter's frustrations if not fury, in relation to Armenia, and Turkey's significant dependence of Azeri oil, not to speak of other kinship ties, are we to believe that the Turkish Republic earnestly and honestly is prepared to cement new ties with Armenia that by definition are bound to hemorrhage its relationship with Azerbaijan? Even though Armenia is, and for the foreseeable future, will remain, more or less isolated, and in some respects even economically handicapped, there is such a thing as the principle of essential national priorities and, consequently, the eternal need for circumspection and exigent vigilance. Professor Dadrian is the director of Genocide research at the Zoryan Institute.

Well it most definitely looks more youth friendly. I think it will attract a certain younger demographic. We'll get used to it. Anoushik, that has been the prevailing thought in my head recently- we are creatures of habit and the familiar. Change is exciting but it's hard to let go of the known and tried.

Not just a water bottling company but also Western Armenia. Will Gagik Tsarukian buy Western Armenia? «A1Plus.am», 04:37 pm | Today | Politics "If Gagik Tsarukian wishes, he will buy the whole Western Armenia," member of the Propserous Armenia Party (BHK) Naira Zohrabian told A1+ during today's parliamentary briefing. A1+ wondered whether Turkey's concerns that Armenians might buy Turkish lands after the Armenian-Turkish frontier opening were grounded. Asked whether the Armenian leadership strives to return Western Armenia, ARF-Dashnaktsutiun Leader Vahan Hovhannisian said: "As such, the authorities can, but our authorities cannot. Besides, Turkish laws will not allow Armenian businessmen to buy lands; hence our oligarch-deputies cannot easily go to Turkey and buy lands." BHK Secretary Aram Safarian says three years ago a leading Turkish automobile company announced a tender. Russia-based Armenian businessman Ruben Vardanian expressed readiness to purchase the company for 2 milliard dollars. Turkey's Safety Council immediately called a special sitting and decided not to sell the company to the Armenian businessman as it might endanger the country's national security. Further on, Mr. Safarian recalled another example. "In the 80s a U.S.-based Armenian businessman reportedly bought a hotel in Van. After the local Turks learnt who the potential buyer was, they made him leave the area. I am confident that if any company is put up for sale in Armenia, the National Security Council and political forces will convene serious discussions on the deal. I am convinced that Armenia's legislative field needs further improvement to be able to compete with a stronger economy like Turkey's," says Aram Safarian. Leader of the Republican faction Galust Sahakian announced that "our lands will be finally returned to their real owners." http://www.a1plus.am/en/politics/2009/10/3...tional-assembly

"The report’s Index assesses countries on how well they are dividing their resources and opportunities among their male and female populations, regardless of the overall levels of these resources and opportunities." http://www.weforum.org/en/Communities/Wome...twork/index.htm http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/rankings2009.pdf Find Armenia and notice which country we fell behind.

Movses, kich xosacoghner@ aveli vtangavor en. Togh bolor@ xosen teghin u &isht barrerov.

Some walls some people can walk around or wait outside of until entry is granted. Conversely, you may need the walls and the silence and all that they entail, so you can walk away from the source. It's only when we are lost that the walls and silence seem overbearing or deafening. It's hardest to choose the path you intend to walk. In any case, time helps you find your way and it all settles. I am learning to say "it's not that serious" if only to convince myself. If it is serious then it is not only ones burden to bear and the weight will be distributed evenly. Or it becomes the pointless excersise of carrying dead weight. (I responded in a manner very telling of my personality. I have changed my approach to life and such things. Makes things easier for me. Me me me... )

Wow. I have to go to some bars when there. Sounds like fun. Was there any one place in particular?

LOL. Duq mez hetevum eq? (Hisheci Harsnacun Hyusisic film~i et mas@...) Anahit Arakelyan (Pagan/Christian)

I'm pleading the 5th on this one.

LOL. Merra. The process gets easier if you are familiar with it and you really only need one hand and one open eye to coordinate a vehicle through an intersection. (Not that I would ever do such a thing.)

Armenians Are Impossible (Lincoln Steffens describes his interview with Lawrence of Arabia as „the queerest I ever had in all my interviewing life." Apparently the man who helped create the Kingdom of Irak re­mained as mysterious in intimate conversation as he did in the press reports of his political activities. „I offer the curiosity," writes Mr. Steffens, „as I wrote it at . . the time [in Paris during the Peace Conference in 1919] and I'll have to leave it to those who read it to guess what it's all about, if anything" ) It was my interview. It was in his room, at his hotel, but I asked for it and my purpose was to learn from this Imperial pioneer something about the practical politics of Asia Minor and the Near East. And I thought I was directing the course of the conversation. It only occurred to me afterwards, with some shock, that he also had had a purpose, and that his purpose was to load me up with British propaganda for the American mandate over the Armenians. That was what I found I had. Other things, too, but I was amazed and not a little humiliated to discover that I had chiefly reasons—reasons which appealed io me, a self-determinist in theory—why we Americans should go halfway around the world to take charge of the Armenians and not only save them from the Turks, Greeks, French, Italians, British and themselves, but, somehow, to save ourselves from ourselves and them. He said, for example, that the Ar­menians were „the last word in human impossibility." They correspond, as a „race, with „the last man" in academic debate. To an under-dog fancier like me, the undermost dog among nations had, and it has, an irresistible fascination. And I said so. English humor is not like ours. It's the opposite. American, humor consists, in part, at least, in what is said; the British in what a Britisher doesn't say. This Briton obviously liked heartily what I said. I thought he was going to laugh with joy—or something; he swelled up till he looked like the British Empire; as if about to burst. But he didn't burst; he didn't laugh; he didn't say anything that showed the slightest sign of humor. All he said, after a long pause, was: „Right-o." And then, after another pause, when he had recovered his self-determination, he spoke seriously, rather dully, in fact, our American idealism. He thought it fine, I thought he thought it a bit too fine. We Americans were; too idealistic. And he thought the Armenians too practical. We were correc­tives, the one on the other, therefore; we were cure for them, they for us; both desperate cases, especially the Armenians. I gathered that he had some inex­pressible sympathy or—let me rather say—some knowledge or experience of the Armenians that gave him a human understanding for the Turks (and all the other near neighbors of the Armenians), who are forever trying to kill off this orphan race. He seemed to think that was the only thing to do to the Armenians. He didn't say so. You may observe that I do not quote this au­thority very freely. The reason is that his method was, apparently, not to say any­thing himself, but to get me to say the things he wished to have printed in such a form that he could, if necessary, deny them. So he did not say that the Armen­ians should be killed off. He only gave me the impression, at the time, that that was the sole solution of the Armenian problem; and that that was his reason for desiring us Americans to take on the job. He felt, or he made me feel, that the Turks shouldn't do it; they were too rough and ready—and not Christians. Nor the Greeks; they enjoyed it too much and were inefficient; they never finish anything, and when their aesthetic pleasure in the killing of Armenians was sated they quit. And so with all the other old rival races. They stopped work be­fore all the Armenians were dead. Even when they all went at the task together they invariably left a couple here and a couple there: Adams and Eves who, the moment one's back was turned, bred and bred and bred so that the next time one visited Armenia there were the Armenians as before, millions of them, all meek and lovely, but busy by day at business and at night secretly breeding and slyly spreading and spread­ing and— He spread all over me his Malthusian despair and such a dread of the Armen­ians that I was about to swallow whole his whole scheme, for the American-Armenian mandate when my saving American humor gave me pause. „But why should not the British do this job also? " I asked, and, to warn his sense of humor that I was striving to be not altogether final but funny withal, I smiled. In vain. He had no sense of American humor—I think. He waited for my genial grin to go away and then, when he saw I was alone again and quite serious, he answered me seriously. .; A perfect massacre of the Armenians, he reasoned, might make a scandal, if the British did it, and, he explained, though the Empire had withstood some such shocks and must, of course, withstand others, too many more just now might jar it. And the Empire should not be jarred, unnecessarily, just now. The British Empire is the beginning of world government. All our great troubles—wars, revolutions, strikes, plagues, etc. — all came from the fact that the earth as a whole was not governed as a whole. The British will end this anarchism some day. But the Empire is young as yet, comparatively small, weak and over­burdened. Think of the islands, colonies, strategic points, seas and trade routes— all the new burdens and responsibilities thrown upon the British Empire by the defeat of German Imperialism! No, The Empire must be spared for the present. Later, when the freedom of the seas is put ashore, so to speak; when British rule is extended from the wave to the land, all lands, then Great Britain could, and it would, go forth gladly to meet a shock like the one I—he said I—was proposing in Armenia; but not yet, not now; .not in the infancy of the Empire. Moreover, he conveyed, British Im­perialism, at this stage, was interested rather in natural resources than in peoples as such. The English are a prac­tical folk; not idealistic, you understand. They realize that a world government must be founded, not like „your" League of Nations, upon ideas and ideals, principles and peoples, but upon solid things—oil, ore, air, the sea. „But, " I argued (and you can see how far he was carrying me on: I argued for his country against my own). „But," I said, „there are rich lands and fat de­posits in Armenia." He was still. He was so still so long that I thought I had floored him; that he had not known about the wealth of Ar­menia. But I noticed again that tendency to swell and go to pieces. And how I did wish he would laugh! It would have relieved me and him, too, I think. But no, he didn't laugh; he didn't even smile. He just waited till he could and then he reminded me that I had heard, as he said he had, that Armenia was to be divided. The back country, where the natural wealth is, was to be cut off from the front, where there is nothing but Armenians. The American mandate was to be over the Armenians; some other ally —not the British, but another equally practical power—was to get Armenia. „But," I objected, „what is the use of the natural wealth of a country without the people to work it? Mines, oil deposits, fat lands—natural resources," I explained patiently to him, „are no good to Capital without Labor to dig and develop them. And the natives of a country are the natural labor thereof; the cheapest, the most obedient, the least organized, the best." He was bored, I could see, but he was polite; he listened, so I gave him examples one after the other, from the American as well as from the British colonies, to show him that it was a mistake to separate the people of a country from the resources of that country. They must be worked together, developed together, and—they were usually. There was no other way. I pictured to him the helplessness of the Turks or the French bankers, or any non-working people, trying to get out the riches of Armenia without the Armenians. And I would up with what struck me is a very good line. „I am crying," I cried, „not idealistically, not 'Armenia for the Armenians' but practically 'the Armenians for Armenia.'" He looked me up and down with interest, I though; as if he were getting some new view of us Americans. I had told him he didn't know us, and he had declared that he did. „Any conscious Englishman," I remember he said, „can understand any unconscious American." Just what he meant by that I don't quite see, but it was remarks like that which gave me the uneasy impression that he had got us all wrong and I had made up my mind to show him before he was through with me that we Ameri­cans are not all such sheer idealists as he and most Europeans seemed to have in­ferred from the one example of Presi­dent Willson and the 14. But he was too long and too silent in his study of me. I began to feel that he was finding some fault in me or us. Perhaps I had leaned too far toward the practical side; I re­called how he disappointed of the Armenians for that. I hedged therefore. I spoke more idealistically again and, I trust, patriotically. „If we Americans took over the Ar­menians," I declared, „we would do it for their good. We should govern them always with the idea of making them fit to govern themselves." „Yes, yes, we understand all, that," he said. But I felt that he didn't, so I went right on with my syllogism. „Well, then," I said tactfully, „you must see also that to that end: to make the-Armenians fit to govern themselves we should have to make them work. And since you cannot work a people without something to work them on, we should need the mines and the land of Armenia not to get the riches out of them, but as a training ground whereon to teach the people industry, thrift and —all the Christian virtues which go into the making of good men and good citizens." He looked puzzled, swollen. I didn't know what was the matter with him till he decided at last to express himself. „There's no lack of thrift in the Armenians." he said dryly, „and, of course, you know, that they are Christians, arch Christians?" Of course I knew that. I had merely, in my enthusiasm, forgotten it for the moment. He had me there, however, so I backed up on work and I stuck—and I stick—to work. „But," I said, „the Armenians must work. That is the secret of success whether for an individual or a nation— work, hard work. And the Armenians must have Armenia to work on." „Armenians won't work," he said „That is the trouble with your plan and that is the trouble with the Armenians. That is the trouble, really, with all these old races that have been civilized, learned the game and, having once dominated the world and worked it, have lost con­trol, gone back, as you say; or, as I say, carried on. They have gone forward logically, psychologically, physiologically. They do not care for hard labor. It is that which distinguishes them from the childlike, truly backward nations you Americans have had to do with. Primitive peoples are merely lazy. They can be forced forward, worked, developed, exploited, if you please. There is some hope for them; some use. But these forward peoples, the ex-civilized nations— they are not lazy. They are too intelligent to work for others. They are exploiters themselves, instinctive, inbred, incorrigible, hopeless. „All nations are breeding men. They talk about developing their countries, but it's the other way around: their countries are developing them. And the old nations show the kind of men the new nations are making. These old peoples are the result of evolution. You can see on the shores of the Mediterranean what you are selecting, breeding, evolving at home, now. The living among the old races here are the survivor of a civilization, commercial in character, like yours." „Ours," I corrected, to get the English into it. He drove right over me. „You new nations have got to learn from the old peoples," he repeated, „that the modern representatives of the ex-great and ex-famous nation are the inevitable, the natural products of the artificial selection of an order of society which imprisons the courageous, deports the original, depresses the mass, discourages any sort of variation; from the average of the species and preserves the meek mean, sly, shrewd and thrifty. For these are the commercially fit. The modern Greeks are the direct heirs and their unpleasant characteristics are the enduring traits descended from the ancient Greek culture—as the old Greeks actually practised it; not as the great, exceptional Greeks talked and sang; and carved it, but as the average Greeks practised it in business—the Greeks, I mean, who sentenced Socrates to death. The Egyptians as we British inherit them, are the great-great-great little grandchildren of Egyptian culture, the belated answer, to the riddle of Sphinx which their great-grandfathers raised up so beautifully out of their childlike labor. The Arab of today is .the dust-of the desert dried by the arts, the customs, the business, of ancient, glorious Arabia—'' He stopped another protest of mine, anticipating it: „The Greeks of old, and the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Turks and the rest, they had their geniuses too—their poets and artists, their generals who conquered backward peoples and captains of industry who gave them em­ployment, and they had their own Labor also. But the picked breeds, the aristocracies, plutocracies did pot last. Their descendants did not descend, they didn't even survive. The children of the successful, of the rich, of the powerful, the privileged, went to the dogs, and they will with you. And the succeeding gen­erations of Labor, overworked, underfed, dispirited and disciplined, reduced to dull slaves, died or were killed off. It was the middle class that proved and proves fit survive in that sort of organization of society, the lower middle class. So you have all the ancient world peopled now with practically nothing but business men, little business men—merchants, traders, shopkeepers, money-lenders, peddlers, non-producers. They will buy and sell, and, descended from buyers and sellers, selected through many generations of commercial competition, they do go anywhere in the world to trade; not to create, not to organize, build, plan, labor. Their brothers who did those things are the childless dead. Not only the merest, shrewdest traders live and them we find everywhere beating their way. I have meet Arabs in the Straits, Colonies, South America, — peddling, trading, getting rich. And a for the Syrians, Greeks, Armenians— „And-Jews," I suggested. He ignored me. „My old peoples," he said, „will go anywhere where there are workers to work, venturing slyly, suffering meekly, saving money, working. Yes, they work. They work as a laborer won't work. They work as only a business man will work—long, hard, close upon a narrow margin of profit. But," he distinguished, „they will not labor. They can't. They cannot see 'work for wages.' It is an instinct with them, a trait, an intelligence devel­oped as we develop pointing in a pointer dog and setting in a setter, by successful selection. They know in their blood that it is no use working for wages, even high wages if you want to get on and be rich. There is nothing, there can be nothing but a bare living in any possible wage-scale—no interest, no capital, no compound progress. They don't say this; it's too obvious to them; they live it. They are wise as only an old race can be wise—to the game. They see from the moment the open their puppy eyes, that it is absurd to labor to produce wealth. The thing to do is to I watch and wait till the wealth is produced and then somehow, to get it from the producers. And they know how to do this as an animal knows the animal business and a plant knows the vegetable business—by instinct. So they, will practise medicine, law—any profession which like a business, gets a variable share of the finished final, coined form of the commonwealth after the common people have made it. But to go out and by the sweat of the brow to dig up and manufacture the raw stuffs of the earth into marketable commodities—no. „The old peoples hate to do that and, as for your Armenians they simply won't." He rested, watching me and, seeing that I wasn't watching him, he slipped me some more of his propaganda. „The Armenians," he said, „are the most intelligent, the most perfectly selected, the most highly developed race in the world— from the civilized point of view." „The Jews," I echoed. „You spoke of them before, and I was gratified. It showed that you were getting inkling of what I was trying to say about old races. The Jews are the most familiar example to an untraveled person of an old, shrewd, intelligent people, and, yes, they are instinctive exploiters. They drive at second-hand wealth. But they will work. They hate to, but they can be made to work. And worse still, they are creative, inventive, sentimental. There are artists, philosophers, prophets among them still. They are imperfect. They are an unfinished product of civilization, about half-done. I understand why they are feared and hated; they have some of the mental superiority of race-age. But, to men­tion Jews in the same breath with the old peoples I am talking about is absurd. Why my old races drove or traded your Jews out of their own country. They can't live on the Arabs, Syrians, Egyptians. They do well in England, they get rich in France and Germany, and, of course, in the United States, they—yes, yes. But the Chinese, for example, the Chinese absorb Jews as a whale does little fishes; our own Scotch skin them alive; so do the Arabs, Turks, Greeks and, as for the Armenians— „Jews," he said, taking breath, „the Jews themselves feel about Armenians the way the anti-Semitic Europeans feel about the Jews; and so do the Greeks, Turks—all the other races that have ever had them on them. They feel that the Armenians would put them all to work. And they would. The Armenians are all that the Jews are, plus all that all the other races are—and they are Christians besides!" He halted not for words, I take it— an educated Englishman has plenty of English. It was more as if he were balking at the conclusion which he preferred to have me jump1at rather than to have it to quote from him. And when I didn't jump, he went on, dully, to give me another chance. „The Armenians," he said, „must not have Armenia, not the back lands. They woul not work them themselves, not even for themselves. They would not even do the work of organizing the work or development. They would let them out as concessions to others to manage. They want to live on the coast, in cities, on rent, interest, dividends and the profits of trading in the shares and the actual money earned by capital and labor." „There are lots of people like that," I said. „The Armenians aren't the only ones." „I see you still do not grasp my point," he said. „There are indeed others who would like to do that. The French bourgeoisie is moving in that direction, and our own English are coming to it, especially our Little Englanders of the so-called upper-class. They have that as their ideal. They would like to do noth­ing, but they can't. They are harmless. They are willing to do nothing but spend. But they do spend, you see. Even your Jews are spenders, great spenders. But your Armenians will do nothing and they won't spend. They get and they save; they sell but only to buy again and so get more and more. It takes evolution to develop such perfection of the true commercial spirit, and is a matter of degree. And the Armenians are the nth degree. I tell you that if ever the Armenians are given a fair start in the world, if they get a free hold of any corner of the earth, they will own the whole planet and work all the rest of mankind. That's what the Turks know and dread and the Greeks and—all of us who know them. And so—" He was drawing upon me for his con­clusion again—I didn't want to say it. And so I urged him on. „And so—" I said. „And so," he sidestepped, as we Americans say crudely, „and so we must divide them up, Armenia to one man­datory, the Armenians to another." „And so," I sparred, „you are for Armenia for some ally, some partner of the British capitalist and the Armenians for us Americans. All right. Two ques­tions occur: What can your ally do in Armenia without labor? And what in the world can we Americans do with the Armenians without Armenia?" „Oh," he said, „there are other peoples in the Balkans, Asia Minor, India and Africa—backward nations, really backward, nations that would labor. These can be brought to Armenia and put to work. There is no lack of labor." „So that solves the British, the practical problem," I said. „Now for the idealistic, the American problem. What are we to do with the Armenians?" He would not say. His British humor or his diplomatic caution, or—something wouldn't let him. He shied off upon the danger to Asiatic labor and European capital of having the Armenians any where near where the mines and land were being worked. „And so," I said, not without some (American) humor. „And so—" A shadow crossed his eyes, but not his voice. He spoke sunnily again of „American idealism." I was tired of hearing it awfully bored, but he liked to talk about it. And this time he changed the key of the song a little. He called us young said we were inexperienced as yet in the management of other, older race and, therefore no doubt, prone to judge harshly the colonial conduct of th British and other practical rulers whose most conscientious agent sometime found it necessary to kill and otherwise put the fear of God into the minority of a subject people in the common interests of the majority and the security of invested capital. „You don't realize," he-concluded, „how difficult and delicate a task it is to govern a strange, a foreign people." „You're wrong," I said, exasperated and I repeated my charge that he didn't know us. „You are as ill-informed about my people," I declared, „as you say we are about the Europeans, Turks, Armenians and the rest." I cited the Philippines, Cuba, the Sandwich Islands—all foreign countries which we were governing successfully. And I reminded him that we had all sort of foreigners in our very midst. The United States was not called the melting pot without reason. We had all sorts of foreigners there. We made even his Armenians labor. We did our hard job, I asserted, as well as any government on the face of the earth, no excepting the British, and to convince him that we were practical I related what I had seen done to foreign labor in New England, down South, out Wes and all over. But I happened to mention also our own natives, the American Indians. He fairly leaped at that. „That's it," he cried. „That's what I have had in mind all along. Your policy with your Indians is the one for Armenians." I was taken aback, astonished. I asked him what he thought our Indian policy had been and he said he understood that we had killed them all off—all; had we not?" I looked him over the way he ha me several times. I enjoyed doing it, too. „And so," I said after a long pause, „you think that that is what we ought come over here and to the Armenians— kill 'em all off." „No, no, no," he corrected. „How you pressman do misunderstand and misquote." He didn't mean at all to say that we should adopt massacre as a policy. He knew we would not, could not do that. Well then, what did he mean? What should we do? He would not say. He wheeled round and round like a couple of whirling dervishes; it was wearisome. ??But I got it at least. I had to say it myself, but it was right—I think. He didn't correct me. He definitely and distinctly did not mean that we should set out consciously and deliberately to wipe out the Armenians. Not at all. He merely trusted or believed that after trying everything else we would end by doing That; and doing it well, too; leaving no Adam and Eve to go on raising Cain— „But wouldn't that be a scandal?" I asked. He thought not. He reminded me that we were so idealistic and enjoyed such repute for philanthropy that we seemed to be able to do anything within reason without losing either our idealism or our good name. „There was no scandal, was there, over your Indian policy?" he asked. 'And you never ceased to think that what you did was right? You have conquered part of Mexico, you have occupied Hawaii, taken the Philippines and Puerto Rico by force of arms from Spain; ?reed Cuba and kept a mortgage on it; you have bought the Danish Islands; and you have put your Marines ashore, in central America and forgotten I them. You will soon be forced to restore order in the rest of Mexico. And yet," he said, with admiration, I thought, „you are still for self-determination for small nations. You are a small empire, and you have warned us in your Monroe Doctrine that you are going when you get ready to be a great empire. And yet you are anti-imperialists. You have just fought war against German Imperialism, and—" „So did you," I shot in. „Oh that is different," he fired back. „We are Imperialists. We frankly call ourselves an Empire and we fought honestly, for our Empire against the German's Empire. But you—you fought against empire for—self-determination." There was a point there, and he waited maliciously, I felt, for me to meet it. And when I didn't—I couldn't right off in second like that—when I didn't answer, he went on „I believe that you Americans can do whatever and not be doubted either by the world or by yourselves. There is something great, very great about that, something useful to the world. It suggests that you Americans could, and you surely would, do in Armenia proper that which has to be done there, with thoroughness; grad­ually, but completely, without missing a single or, rather, a married Armenian, and all without a scandal, without disturbing in the least your belief that you are—How shall I say?—well, not like us English or the French, Germans, Turks and I am afraid, not a bit like the Armenians." „And," he hastened to add, „some­body has to solve the Armenian problem. It seems to me to be poetic justice, good politics and sounds business to let the most idealistic people in die world take over the most practical people in the world." What was he giving me? Was this British humor? I looked at him, hard. He didn't blink. He had that puffed-up appearance I had noticed before—but, no—not a twitch. It's a strain to inter­view an Englishman, and a risk. I re­membered that he would repudiate the interview if there were the slightest „come-back." I decided to put him to the test right away. As I understand it," I said, „we Americans are a commercial culture, as the Armenians, as all these old nations were that ought to be killed off." He nodded. „They thought they were de­veloping business when they were really developing a certain variety of the human species—a race o£ business men dependent upon the productive labor of other people whom they do not now govern and who hate them because they can beat anybody at trade and live without working—liars, profiteers, parasites— the most practical brains with the most Christian ideals and manners." „You Americans talk well," he said. „No Englishman could be found to state anything like that as clearly as that." „If now we Americans could, in our present, the early state of the develop­ment of this sort of man—if we could, by governing the Armenians, see close up the practical workings of our culture; if we could understand that what we were looking at and dealing with in the Armenian of today is the American of the future—" „Of tomorrow," he corrected. „Then," I went on, „we might, fail with the Armenians, we might in exasperation, kill them all—" „Hear, hear." „We might kill all Armenians, but, we would go home—" „Cable," he suggested, „it's quicker." „Cable home," I accepted tentatively, „cable a warning to lookout: 'Look out for the crossing practical business with Christian idealism.' Too much business and too much idealism might injure both these good things and us also, as a people." „Hear, hear!" he exclaimed. „It might make of great, rich America an Armenia which the British and the Russians (of the future) would find it 'necessary' to take over as a mandatory divided into two parts: one, the United States proper for England; the other, the people themselves, for Russia." He was silent. I waited to see whether he had any sense of American humor. He waited, too, for a while and then, seeing; that I expected something, he spoke. „Your idea—" he began. „My idea!" I exploded. „Yes," he said. „That's an idea. It's a good idea, good in theory, but— It's characteristically idealistic. I am considering it practically. Do you believe really that any American governors of the Armenians would be conscious enough to see their likeness to the Americans?" „Yes English do," I retorted cuttingly. „True," he agreed thoughtfully. „We see the meaning of the Armenians to the Americans, we Imperial British do. But I doubt, I am wondering whether our Little Englanders could be brought to foresee their fate in the fate of the old nations they govern." I was beaten, helpless, flabbergasted. Fortunately he didn't see that. His eves were down. He rose, but he was thinking deeply, as he led me to the door. There he looked up. „Good-bye," he said, „I like your theory. I am afraid it won't work out in practice, but write it. It's suggestive. Write it carefully; not too clearly, and, by the way, don't quote me. I have said nothing, nothing." * Lincoln Steffens' birthplace was San Francisco. He received his education in California and at various continental universities. He is veteran newspaperman, magazine editor, and contributor. Mr. Steffens has achieved fame as an interviewer and an author. At present his "Autobiography" is being widely read. Interview From 1919, "Outlook & Independent" Oct 14, 1931 Courtesy of http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2008/05...-interview.html

This is the best one yet!

LOL. It is hilarious! Mekel ARTN~i haghortavari asatsner@ hetaqrqir eyn. Asenq te yete ch'krer, Hay azgi "halal balan" cher lini.

I would tend to agree with you, but this is more about the experience than the food. Actually, the menu is a very plain three course meal (of chicken, filet mignon or fish) that is meant to be pleasing to the majority of diners. I am notoriously picky with food, so it took real effort to just put into my mouth things i couldn't see. (Kept thinking aloud that they can pretty much serve us on dirty plates and we'd never know.)

Anoushik jan, you have the perfect temperament to teach children. They will be lucky to have you in their lives. And your type of teachers leave lasting impressions and inspire students long after they leave the classroom.

Yes, I am! Thank you?!?!?

Opaque/ Dining in the Dark I had to share my review of the most incredible dining experience I have ever had. Please go check out Opaque in Santa Monica. I will not ruin the experience with spoilers but will say that you will find yourself in a pitch black atmosphere, your eyes will wage an endless battle against the dark to see yet continually fail. It is a social experiment testing whether you can have a simple meal in an environment you cannot control since you cannot see ANYTHING. It's amazing. I promise you have never experienced anything like it. The other senses completely take center stage once you lose your main one (sight). You hear people at the next table breathing, the taste of food is exponentially magnified, you smell things farther away than usual and the conversation around you is deafening- you have to make a conscious effort to block out the others so you can hear your companion speak. I cannot stress how rare this experience was. I have no point of reference to compare it to. Highly recommend.

When I cry, it's due to deep and overwhelming emotion. Whether for happy or sad reasons, I am grateful that I feel and am able to express that feeling. People who rarely cry trouble me. I imagine they don't feel things as strongly as we do, or are so good at suppressing their emotions that the emotion is diminished or controlled- hence losing it's effect. I'm really grateful for my sensitive nature and my ability to deal with it. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I am grateful for yesterday's happiness, and I am willing to be a little sad today to equilibrate my life. Buddhist ideology. I like it.

"Hima pit lam....." Che che mi neghaci. Ughaki enqan lavn er et emoticon@ vor qez hamapatasxan@ ch'gta bayc uzum ey anpayman et mek@ kez tsuyts tam.

Sip that sounds awesome. We have 5 that must be used to control the entertainment system in living room. That is something worth the happy tears. :-)

I was searching for an appropriate emoticon to express my opinion re: your above-mentioned, and I ran across this one. It's called, "ani smiles".