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Iran, Armenia in new gas transfer talks

 

Oil and Gas Journal

Jan 6 2001

 

Iran's Deputy Oil Minister for Gas Affairs, Hammad Mohammad-Nejad,

said Friday his country may export gas to Armenia, according to a

report from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' news

agency.

 

A 1995 agreement between the two countries foundered after Armenia

could not finance the $2 million section in Iran. Also, Armenia

had to repair and extend an existing line in its territory.

 

Speaking in Tehran, Mohammad-Nejad said the Armenian government had

formed a "tripartite committee comprising Iran, Armenia, and

Greece" and was seeking foreign capital to complete the unfinished

work on the project.

 

He said a Greek engineering company's feasibility study for a 1-5

bcf/year pipeline favored construction.

 

Mohammad-Nejad said Iran would fill the line with domestic gas or

surplus imports from Turkmenistan.

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Investors face hurdles in tapping Kazakhstan's riches

 

South China Morning Post

01/06/2001

 

Kazakhstan is rich in oil and gas but reaping the harvest is far

from simple - as Damien McElroy reports from Almaty In the shadows

of the great mountain ranges of Central Asia, a new Great Game is

afoot.

 

 

A century after Rudyard Kipling first coined the phrase to describe

the battle for supremacy in the region by the emissaries of the

Tsar and the King Emperor, the diplomatic and commercial interests

of foreign powers are again clashing in a race to exploit the

remote region.

 

This time, the quarry is massive reserves of oil and gas, and the

predators are a diverse combination of governments and oil

companies - British and Russian interests are pitted against those

of Beijing, Washington and many others.

 

Central Asia's oil reserves span a handful of countries but the

pivot on which fortunes will turn is Kazakhstan, a vast land of

steppe, lakes and seas with oil and gas resources that are among

the greatest in the world.

 

Estimates of the exact extent of Kazakhstan's oil reserves vary

wildly but one official document recently stated the country had 40

billion barrels of oil and 180 trillion cubic feet of gas.

 

Getting the reserves out of the ground will be difficult - a lot of

the oil lies beneath the turbulent Caspian Sea and is highly

sulphurous - while another equally large challenge lies in getting

it to consumers.

 

Most analysts, however, forecast the country will earn billions of

dollars every year from oil exports. Earlier this year President

Nursultan Nazarbayev, whose country this year increased production

by a third to 800,000 barrels a day, forecast output would rise to

eight million barrels a day by 2015 - "or about the same as Saudi

Arabia".

 

Output is dominated by the Tengiz field, which is controlled by

Chevron in a consortium which includes Exxon Mobil and Kazakhstan

itself.

 

A second massive field at Karachaganak, held by BG, Agip, Lukoil

and Texaco, is said to contain gross reserves totalling 2.4 billion

barrels and 16 trillion cubic feet of gas.

 

Chinese firms have development rights over Aktobe oil field.

 

Overshadowing these three is the Kashagan field on the Caspian

Shelf, which is being developed by a consortium of Phillips

Petroleum, Agip, BG, BP, Statoil, Exxon Mobil, Shell and

TotalFinaElf.

 

According to Bill Zempolich, the project's chief geologist, the

field is massive: "Preliminary results suggest the Kashagan field

is one of the largest discoveries made in the past 30 years."

 

The wildest estimates put recoverable oil in the field at 30

billion barrels.

 

Just tapping the oil beneath the surface is, however, only half the

game.

 

The rest is to ensure that the right pipeline is built to carry

Kazakhstan's oil and gas to the right market. As things stand,

Russia is ahead of the field in the pipeline race. The Caspian

Pipeline Consortium is building a pipe to carry more than 500,000

barrels of oil a day from the Caspian to the Russian port of

Novorossiisk on the Black Sea. The pipeline, which is backed by

Kazakhstan, Oman, Russia and 10 oil companies, is expected to start

operating this year.

 

Two alternative projects are challenging the Russian attempts to

monopolise the supply lines out of the Caspian area.

 

Least viable in the eyes of Western observers is a Chinese-built

pipeline to pump 400,000 barrels of oil 3,000 kilometres in its

direction. But with China expected to import four million barrels

a day by 2010 and the country pressing ahead with a US$14.5 billion

pipeline from west to east China, the economics of bringing oil

overland from the Caspian to Shanghai may not be as questionable as

is assumed. The third option is a new pipeline from Baku, in

Azerbaijan, through Armenia and Georgia to the Turkish port of

Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.

 

It is an alternative with fervent support in Washington, which does

not want to cede a stranglehold over the supply of Caspian oil to

the Russians.

 

Nevertheless, the scheme has struggled to secure the commercial

backing needed to guarantee a 2004 launch.

 

There is also another hurdle facing potential investors - the

pervasive corruption in the Kazakhstan leadership.

 

The potential oil bonanza has enabled a small clique comprised

mainly of friends and family of Mr Nazarbayev to exploit the

ambitions of international oil firms for personal gain.

 

The United States' FBI has claimed that Mr Nazarbayev and his

former prime ministers got US$35 million channelled by the

Washington-based lawyer James Giffen via shell companies registered

in the British Virgin Islands and a Lichtenstein-based foundation

on behalf of three United States' oil companies - Mobil, Amoco, and

Phillips Petroleum. Mr Giffen, who has been adviser to the

Nazarbayev government for all the biggest oil deals it has

concluded, has rejected the allegations as being "without

substance".

 

US Department of Justice and Swiss Government investigations into

the transactions are continuing.

 

Whatever the outcome, it is common knowledge the president's stake

in the oil industry is deep.

 

His eldest son-in-law, Timur Kulibaev, is probably the leading

figure in the Kazakhstan oil industry, having moved from the

vice-presidency of state-owned giant Kazakoil to head the pipeline

operator of Kaztransoil.

 

Since arriving at Kaztransoil, Mr Kulibaev has raised its pipeline

line fees by 50 per cent and used the additional revenue to expand

into other areas of the oil industry.

 

A second son-in-law is just as powerful.

 

In addition to heading the KGB's successor organisation in Almaty,

Rakhat Aliev has business interests ranging from hotels to oil.

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I think the Power Supply is going to become another powerful leverage of pressure in the region.

_____________________________________________

 

Acute electricity shortage in Georgia on Orthodox Christmas day

 

Georgian Radio

7 Jan 01

 

The energy crisis is continuing in the country. At the moment only

the power generating unit number nine is being run at the

AES-Mtkvari thermal power station. The power generating unit

number 10 is still off. The Georgian capital is receiving 120 MW

electricity from Armenia. Electricity supply from Russia to

Georgia has been cut off.

 

This morning, no electric power has been supplied to the Tbilisi

underground train system.

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Baku-Ceyhan: Time to take a deep breath

By Dr. Ferruh Demirmen

 

TURKISH Daily News

11 Jan. 2001

 

Feature Stories

 

As far as Baku-Ceyhan, the CI and CEIP reports convey basically the same

message. The remarkable thing about the two reports is that they contain

very little that is new

 

The basic tenet of the CI report is that Washington was unwise supporting

Baku-Ceyhan, that the pipeline, by passing Russia and Iran, was damaging US

relations with these countries and is not in the US' national interest. The

report asserts that Baku-Ceyhan is built on economic fallacies, and that

market forces alone should determine the energy routes from the Caspian

region

 

The premise of the CEIP report, that American interests are best served with

a closer cooperation with Russia, that the United States does not have vital

interests in the Caucuses and Central Asia and it should avoid rivalry with

Russia in this region, that the energy routes from the Caspian region should

not exclude Russia and Iran, with a view to a 'genuine' multiple route

policy

 

Headlines in the Turkish newspapers last week carried alarming news about

the Baku-(Tbilisi)-Ceyhan oil pipeline project. The general tone was that

the project had received a serious blow.

 

What precipitated this sudden gloom was the appearance in the press of two

recent reports critical of Baku-Ceyhan issued by the Washington think tanks.

The Cato Institute (CI) and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

(CEIP), coinciding with the announcement that U.S. President-elect George W.

Bush had nominated Spencer Abraham, a confirmed Armenian sympathizer, as his

next energy secretary.

 

The two reports made policy recommendations to the incoming Bush

administration, among them was in regards to the energy matters of the

Caspian region.

 

In addition to being a supporter of the Armenian causes, and an antagonist

of Turkey, Mr. Abraham, the defeated senator of Christian Arab descent from

the state of Michigan, had called Baku-Ceyhan a "dream project" while

serving in Congress during 1994-2000.

 

Some commentators opined that Baku-Ceyhan was seriously set back, or that it

might now be routed via Armenia rather than Georgia.

 

Well, as much as these political developments may have looked ominous at

first thought, in reality they do not signal a basic shift in the

Baku-Ceyhan equation. It is time to step back, take a deep breath, and

reflect on what the new developments mean for Baku-Ceyhan. It's the same old

song in the reports.

 

As far as Baku-Ceyhan, the CI and CEIP reports convey basically the same

message. The remarkable thing about the two reports is that they contain

very little that is new. The basic tenet of the CI report is that Washington

was unwise in supporting Baku-Ceyhan, that the pipeline, by passing Russia

and Iran, was damaging U.S. relations with these countries and is not in the

U. S.' national interest. The report asserts that Baku-Ceyhan is built on

economic fallacies, and that market forces alone should determine the energy

routes from the Caspian region.

 

Likewise, the premise of the CEIP report are: that American interests are

best served with a closer cooperation with Russia, and the United States

does not have vital interests in the Caucuses or Central Asia. It should

also avoid rivalry with Russia in this region. The energy routes from the

Caspian region should not exclude Russia and Iran, with a view to a

"genuine" multiple route policy. The report goes on to argue that the new

Bush administration should withdraw its political and financial support of

Baku-Ceyhan, which the authors suggest may make sense at a later date for

exporting Kazakh oil. It also recommends support for the Baku-Novorossiysk

(via Russia) and Baku-Supsa (via Georgia) as options, and hence the use of

the Marmara Straits, to transport Azeri oil. These are old arguments that

have been repackaged with a new wrapping and label.

 

Other analysts and American think tanks, among them the Center for Strategic

International Studies (CSIS) in a report published last August, had similar

advanced arguments, some highly critical of the Clinton administration. More

significant, are the representatives of certain oil companies. Notably Exxon

and Chevron, have been making much the same arguments, though without

delving into strategic issues. It was only last September that Chevron's

Vice Chairman Richard Matzke, gave a speech at a luncheon in Houston, and

boasted about Chevron's accomplishments in developing the Kazakh Tengiz

field. The plan to export the crude via Novorossiysk, with Russia's full

participation, his view that the risk of a tanker-traffic accident in the

Bosporus had been exaggerated, and it was time for the Clinton

administration to ease or lift the U. S.' Iran sanctions to enable U.S. oil

companies to operate in that country. Chevron last month attempted to bid

for the massive South Pars gas development project in Iran, but had to back

off under pressure from Washington. The Iranian government has reportedly

extended the deadline for submitting bids until the end of January,

presumably to give Chevron another chance under the Bush administration. If

the American oil giants Exxon and Chevron were looking for support of their

positions outside the oil industry, they could not have found better allies

than the CI and CEIP reports. Russia and Iran must also be thrilled with

these reports.

 

False premises

 

Apart from being old stuff, some of the premises contained in the CI and

CEIP reports are false, or at least highly questionable. The assertion made

by the author of the CI report, Stanley Kober, that Baku-Ceyhan is based on

economic fallacy, is an argument of which validity is long past. To drive

his point home, the author uses quotes from several sources going back to

1997 and 1998. As we have noted on several occasions recently (e.g. TDN,

Oct. 19-20 & Dec. 19, 2000), the reserves portfolio in the region and world

oil price developments over the past year make Baku-Ceyhan economically

viable. Mr. Kober claims that hydrogen fuel cells will soon replace internal

combustion engines as the power source for cars, and that Baku-Ceyhan,

several years down the road, does not merit pursuing because it would

outlive its usefulness. This is a myopic view of what lies ahead in the near

future. While the technology to convert hydrogen to energy is proven (and it

is already used on a very limited basis), it will be decades before

hydrogen-based energy replaces carbon-based energy on a massive, commercial

scale.

 

The CEIP report states that the Caspian oil reserves, at current estimates,

make up only 2 percent of the global oil reserves and therefore, not

important. That would be like saying, some 30-35 years ago, that the

expected oil reserves in the inhospitable North Sea are a small fraction of

the then world oil reserves, or that the deep-water reserves being searched

currently in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coasts of East Africa and Brazil

are a tiny fraction of the current world oil reserves, and therefore should

be ignored. Such an argument would be almost laughable in the oil industry.

Among others, the argument overlooks the fact the vast majority of the world

oil reserves are held by national oil companies, which are monopolies, and

that the West needs independent resources for its energy security and to

counter monopolistic fixing of oil price in world markets.

 

To put it in better perspective, proven Caspian oil reserves, at the low end

of the estimated range, are comparable to those in the North Sea and the

United States (including the Gulf of Mexico), and has the potential to

increase many fold. If the currently estimated reserves in the Kashagan

field alone are confirmed, the proven Caspian oil reserves will roughly

equal those of the North Sea and the United States put together. That is no

mean amount. The report also overlooks the region's vast gas resources, the

preferred form of carbon-based energy now and in the near future. Proven

Caspian gas reserves compare with those in North America.

 

The report argues that there is no real support for trans-Caspian oil and

gas pipelines from the energy companies or the nations involved, ignoring

Shell's continued interest in the trans-Caspian gas project and Kazakhstan's

desire to see Baku-Ceyhan extended to Aktau on Kazakhstan's Caspian coast.

In the CEIP report, it is also argued that the Caspian oil and gas reserves,

being in a landlocked area, and some involving undersea exploitation away

>From an open sea, would be difficult and slow to exploit.

 

There is truth in this argument, but that does not mean that the reserves

should be left undeveloped. The argument overlooks the oil industry's

resilience to environmental and location difficulties, its ability to

innovate or deal with technical challenges and to cut costs, and its

determination to find and exploit oil and gas resources where there is

economic incentive. For this, the industry needs political stability, an

investment and a legal-friendly environment, and of course the right oil

price.

 

In the Caspian region, the political and legal frameworks, while not ideal,

do not pose a serious risk to investors, and many oil companies, large and

small, have taken stakes in exploration and development of hydrocarbon

resources in the region. In any case, risk is endemic to the oil industry.

The real challenge in the Caspian region is finding transport routes that

are attractive from economic and other points of view. The recommendation

made in the CEIP report, that the United States should support "genuine"

multiple routes in the Caspian region, in particular those transiting

Russia, is merely engaging in rhetoric. The United States has long promoted

multiple export routes for Caspian oil and gas, and it has never excluded

Russia from such routes. The endorsement given by the United States to the

Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, and its support of the less

publicized Balkan route or its variants, all involving transit through

Russia, are examples.

 

The United States, with Turkey's misguided blessing in 1995, even supported

the Novorossiysk option for "early" Azeri oil -- an option that later came

to haunt Turkey, and continues to do so at present. What the United States

expected but has not received from Russia is a measure of reciprocity, as

manifested by Russia's steadfast opposition to Baku-Ceyhan and its more

subtle opposition to Turkmen and Azeri gas imports direct to Turkey.

 

The assertion made in both the CI and CEIP reports, that the United States

should withhold its political and financial support from energy transport

projects, including Baku-Ceyhan, in the Caspian region, also falls short of

the mark in its implication. The role that the United States has played with

such projects has been in the form of lending political support and acting

as a facilitator. The United States has not provided or promised any direct

financial support for these projects, and it will certainly not subsidize

them. The United States has maintained, rightly, that these projects should

stand on their own economic merits. While the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation (OPIC) and U.S. Exim Bank are government agencies and stand

ready to assist with the financing of Baku-Ceyhan. They are guided in their

decisions primarily by economic considerations. They are self-sustaining

agencies and their operations are at no net cost to the U.S. taxpayer. Their

charters prohibit them from supporting projects that are not economical. The

underlying tenet in both the CI and CEIP reports, that market forces alone

should determine energy export routes, is an idea that is no longer

universally accepted even in market-driven economies.

 

Major European oil companies have adopted the principle that in addition to

market considerations, safety, environmental factors and concerns for

community welfare should play a role in the project selection and

definition. Furthermore, we have witnessed instances in the past when the

proponents of unfettered free enterprise engaged in hypocrisy when it suited

their purposes. These were the occasions when the proponents urged the U.S.

government to intervene (e.g. by pleading with OPEC governments) in world

oil markets when the world oil prices soared to uncomfortably high levels

for the consumer.

 

More fundamentally, both the CI and CEIP reports strain credulity in the

observation that the United States has no vital interests in the Caucuses

and Central Asia, and in the recommendation that the United States should

maintain a low profile in this region so as to avoid rivalry with Russia.

Such a recommendation goes against the grain of the foreign policy

objectives in the previous U.S. administrations since the breakdown of the

Soviet Union in 1991. It would be tantamount to "throwing the towel,"

tacitly encouraging Russia to reclaim its historical control over its "near

abroad." It is hard to imagine any future U.S. administration, even a

nonintervention one, adopting this policy.

 

In fact, judging from Mr. Bush's foreign policy and national security

advisors, the new administration will probably adopt a more assertive, less

accommodating policy towards Russia than did the Clinton administration.

More about the reports. A curious situation with the CI and CEIP reports is

that the Turkish news media took notice of these reports rather late. The CI

report was released in Washington on Oct. 31, and Reuters reported the gist

of the report in a news release. This author briefly mentioned this report

in one of his articles (Cumhuriyet, Dec. 8, 2000, p. 2) as an example of

vitriolic attacks being made outside Turkey against Baku-Ceyhan, when the

Turkish press was reporting rather rosy news about the project following the

signing of documents with the newly formed Baku-Ceyhan sponsor group. As for

the CEIP report, it was released on Dec. 7 at a press conference held at the

Carnegie Endowment in Washington, and Reuters again reported it.

 

It is hard to understand why these two reports caught the Turkish media's

attention rather belatedly. It is hoped that those in the Turkish

government, who are involved with Baku-Ceyhan, are better informed. It is

also noteworthy that, unlike the Cato Institute, CEIP, as a think tank, is

usually associated with Democratic causes in terms of policy initiatives.

(Two Democratic luminaries, Senator Bill Bradley and William J. Perry, sit

on the Board of Trustees).

 

It was also evident from the press conference held at Carnegie that the nine

experts who wrote the report did not have full consensus on the conclusions

contained in the report. Abraham's appointment was not a turning point.

While the nomination of Spencer Abraham as Mr. Bush's energy secretary is

not a reassuring development for Turkey, it is unlikely that it will cause a

major shift in the U.S. energy policy in the Caspian region, in particular

in its support for Baku-Ceyhan. Mr. Abraham, whose nomination caught

Washington by surprise, has little experience in energy matters, not the

least in the intricacies of the world energy scene.

 

In the Congress, he co-sponsored a bill aimed at abolishing the very

department he will now likely lead. He does, however, endorse Mr. Bush's

call for oil and gas exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in

Alaska, and his role in the next administration will be mainly pushing

legislation in that direction. He will more than likely be a steward rather

than a real policy maker in the Department of Energy.

 

Following his nomination, Mr. Abraham in fact commented that his

responsibility as the next energy chief would be to open up the "vast"

domestic oil and gas resources to exploration. (This policy shift will

result in the flight of some of the American investment capital from the

Caspian region to the United States). As for Mr. Abraham's close ties to the

Armenian causes, it is well to keep in mind that in his new job Mr. Abraham

will represent U.S. national interests rather than the narrow,

prejudice-filled interests of a political lobby. In his new capacity, Mr.

Abraham is expected to act as a statesman rather than a lobbyist.

 

Besides, Baku-Ceyhan also has foreign policy, commerce and defense

implications that would be outside the purview of Mr. Abraham. While Mr.

Cheney, the vice-president elect, argued in the past for lifting of U.S.

sanctions against Iran, in his new government capacity he, too, will have

different priorities than when he was the chief of the giant oil-services,

Halliburton company.

 

Besides, given the current political unrest in the Middle East, any sudden

shift in U.S. policy towards Iran will likely meet stiff resistance from the

powerful U.S. Jewish lobby. Lifting of the Iran sanctions, if any, under the

Bush administration will likely be gradual and selective, i.e., allowing

U.S. oil companies to participate in new projects in Iran but without

reversing the status quo on oil and gas transport projects in the Caspian

region. The next U.S. administration, including Mr. Abraham, will also

realize that rerouting Baku-Ceyhan to go through Armenia at this stage is

totally unrealistic. Neither Azerbaijan nor Turkey would agree to such a

change, it would make a mockery of countless negotiations conducted to date,

and it would set back the project in terms of completion date.

 

Besides Azerbaijan, the principal beneficiary of the project, the oil

companies, cannot afford any significant delays. This does not mean that

Armenia may not be involved in another Caspian energy project in the future.

For this to happen, however, the requisite political climate must first be

nurtured and the Armenian lobby should cease its relentless smear campaign

against Turkey. No cause for alarm, but ...

 

To conclude, in our judgment neither the CI and CEIP reports, nor Mr.

Abraham's nomination as the new U.S. energy secretary, are cause for alarm

for Turkey insofar as Baku-Ceyhan. Prudence would dictate to remain calm,

and wait for clear policy pronouncements from the new Bush administration.

We suspect these pronouncements will not herald a basic shift in current

U.S. policy.

 

In fact, if the latest press reports are correct, Ambassador Elizabeth

Jones, the special U.S. envoy for the Caspian region, has indicated that the

Bush transition team shares Clinton administration's policy objectives in

the Caspian region. This certainly is a positive sign. Having said this, it

does not mean that Turkey will necessarily have a cozy relationship with the

Bush administration. Mr. Bush's misguided endorsement of Armenian causes

during his candidacy -- to attract financial support from the Armenian lobby

-- has the markings of a friction in the making with Turkey. The so-called

"Armenian genocide" resolution will likely be reintroduced in the U.S.

Congress next month, and the Armenian lobby, trying to capitalize on its

efforts during the presidential campaign, is now egging on Mr. Bush to

support the resolution.

 

How Mr. Bush will respond remains to be seen. Another possible source of

friction with the United States is the policy towards Iraq. There are

rumblings from the Bush foreign policy and national security circles that

Mr. Bush may try to overthrow Iraq's strongman Saddam Hussein. Although we

think the Bush administration will eventually refrain from such a course of

action -- the 1990 coalition against Iraq has all but disappeared -- the

ghosts of the Gulf War may win over cool heads, and an attempt of some kind

may be made.

 

Turkey, which is trying to normalize relations with Iraq, would be unwilling

to give a helping hand to the United States, and the relations between the

two countries may sour. Turkey -- to the disappointment of the United States

-- has designated an ambassador to Iraq. What next for Turkey? For Turkey,

insofar as Baku-Ceyhan, "steady it goes" should be the motto. Recent

political developments should not discourage or detract it from the project,

but the country should remain on alert. Problems, opportunities and

recommendations relating to the project as previously outlined by us (e.g.

Cumhuriyet, Oct. 20 & Dec. 8, 2000; TDN, Oct. 19-20 & Dec. 19, 2000)

currently remain intact, except for the following:

 

* A direct investment in the project, to give confidence to the investors,

is now even more important than before. It is almost unimaginable that a

government that has decided to rescue bankrupt banks, some run by corrupt

cronies of ex-politicians, to the tune of more than $10 billion could not

come up with, say $500 million, to finance a project of major strategic

interest to the country. It may be noted, in this context, that the CPC

pipeline, which will be operational this summer, is owned by the Russian and

Kazakh governments 24 percent and 19 percent, respectively.

 

* Turkey should form a lobbying group for Baku-Ceyhan abroad, the sooner the

better. There are indications that some "dark forces" are working against

Baku-Ceyhan in the background.

 

About the author: Ferruh Demirmen is an international petroleum lecturer and

consultant in Houston, Texas. He retired from Royal/Dutch Shell and holds a

Ph.d. in geology from Stanford University.

 

 

-----------

Copyright 2001, Turkish Daily News. This article is

redistributed with permission for personal use of Groong readers.

No part of this article may be reproduced, further distributed or

archived without the prior permission of the publisher. Contact

Turkish Daily News Online at http://www.TurkishDailyNews.com for

details.

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quote:
Originally posted by BTac:
Is the Medzamor power plant still operating? If so when will it be shut down? What are the chances of Armenia being left in complete darkness again like in the early nineties?


Medzamor is still operating. But there is a significant pressure from US to shut it down in few yearsm I think in 2004, if not mistaken.

Itn my view, it would be the biggest mistake of Armenia to shut it down. In fact, I think Armenia needs another nuclear power plant.
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quote:
Originally posted by MJ:
Medzamor is still operating. But there is a significant pressure from US to shut it down in few yearsm I think in 2004, if not mistaken.




The U.S. claim is that it presents a great danger to the people living in the region because it does not meet the necessary safety standards.

[This message has been edited by BTac (edited January 12, 2001).]
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The safety of the Madzamore nuclear plant has been confirmed several times by the corresponding commissions of European Union. In fact, Medzamore is the safest nuclear plant (due to the money spent on its upgrading) among all former USSR nuclear plants.

 

The reluctance of the US to accept this fact is, in my view, motivated by the desire not to see Armenia to have access to nuclear materials. It is known that nuclear plants are capable of producing enriched uranium, which is one of the most important ingredients of nuclear bombs.

 

I am far from advocating Armenians development of nuclear weapons. It would be a fatal mistake for Armenia, in my view. However, I think it is of utmost importance to Armenia to facilitate further the expansion of the nuclear energy base, and belonging of to the family of "nuclear states."

 

Building of a nuclear plant is a very expensive proposition. But once it is built, it is one of the least expensive ways of generating power. Additionally, the nuclear power is one of the environmentally cleanest mechanisms of generation of power, assuming no leaks, obviously.

 

 

 

[This message has been edited by MJ (edited January 12, 2001).]

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Don't quite understand what's the catch...

_____________________________________________

 

© 2001 Transcaspian Project

 

Armenia, Align With the West!

 

YEREVAN, Jan 12, 2001 -- Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan

Oskanyan has conducted a concluding press-conference in Yerevan and

outlined the priorities of Armenian diplomacy in 2001.

 

Armenia has for the first time voiced its intention to become an

equal member of the European Community in the end of the past

millennium. In experts' opinion, shared by Armenian authorities as

well, Yerevan's European bet "is likely to be of declarative nature

and is invoked to point out Armenia's desire to take an active part

in all political and economical processes, more or less affecting the

Large Caucasus region. Apparently, Yerevan is not going to apply for

the EC membership officially right now, though it has reserved the

right to do it at any moment.

 

It is symptomatic, that Yerevan, having announced its desire to

become an equal member of the expanding "European family", in the

person of its Foreign Affairs Minister has ventured to make a number

of loud statements being of a great importance for the EC. Thus,

Vardan Oskanyan has pointed out that Turkey, claiming for soon

joining the EC, does not have a chance to achieve its "blue European

dream" without acknowledging the fact of genocide against Armenians

in 1915 - 1923 and normalization of relationship with Armenia. The

latter, however, is still ready to establish a constructive dialogue

with Ankara without any prior conditions, Mr. Oskanyan has stressed.

 

In the beginning of the new millennium and 2001, Yerevan plans to

boost its regional influence and to strengthen its geopolitical and

geoeconomical positions in the Large Caucasus by implementing the

project of the Armenia - Iran gas pipeline. By the way, the Armenian

minister has marked, that it is Iran which remains by the key

regional partner of Yerevan.

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INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS PRAISE METSAMOR SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS

 

Environmental safety standards at the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant in

Metsamor received praise this week from the members of the Atomic Energy Security Council (AESC). The Council, composed of nuclear scientists from 17 countries, serves as an advisory body to the Armenian government. AESC Chairman Adolf Bierkhoffer of Germany rates as "very good" the maintenance work carried out at the station mainly through financing by the European Union and United States.

 

Metsamor is the only nuclear plant in the world that has been reactivated following a long shut-down between 1989 and 1995. Its reactivation was a major factor in alleviating a severe energy crisis that Armenia suffered in the early 1990s. Last year the plant accounted for over a third of all electricity generated in the country.

 

The Armenian government earlier agreed to decommission Metsamor by 2004, but only if alternative energy sources are found. Bierkhoffer said the plant can be kept operational beyond that year as long as further safety measures are implemented.

 

(Source: RFE/RL Armenia Report 1-9)

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Turkey fears waning US backing for Ceyhan link

By Bill Sellars, Istanbul

 

Energy Day

January 15, 2001

 

Turkish authorities are concerned that American support is waning

for the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project to carry Caspian

Basin oil to Turkey's Mediterranean coast.

 

There are fears that the incoming Bush Administration will instead

work to improve ties with Russia and Iran by backing plans to

transport the main flow of Caspian energy through these two

countries.

 

A series of reports from Washington-based think tanks have

questioned the economic viability of the 1,750 km long pipeline,

estimated to cost some Dollars 2.3bn.

 

A further complication is seen in the appointment of Spencer

Abraham as president-elect George W. Bush's energy secretary.

 

Abraham, while an US senator, backed a proposal condemning Turkey

for the alleged genocide of Armenians during the First World War

and is perceived in Ankara as no supporter of Turkey or its energy

aspirations.

 

Abraham has been reported in the Turkish media as supporting a

route through Iran to Basra for the flow of Caspian oil.

 

lUS energy crisis greets Abraham - Page 15

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Armenia: Power generation up 4 per cent in 2000

 

Snark

17 Jan 01

 

Yerevan, 17 January: The amount of electricity generated in

Armenia increased in 2000 due to the growth of the economy and

completion of the construction of the new Ashotsk-Ninatsminda

110-kV electricity transmission line, said Armenian Energy Minister

Karen Galustyan at a session presided over by Prime Minister

Andranik Markaryan.

 

According to him, it was possible to ensure the stability and

reliability of the country's entire energy complex despite last

year's drought and low water levels, as well as the four-month

stoppage of the Armenian Nuclear Power Station for routine

preventive repairs.

 

During the stoppage of the Armenian Nuclear Power Station, 12

measures were carried out. They were financed by the US Department

of Energy and the European Union to a total value of 29m dollars;

thanks to them, the level of security at the Armenian Nuclear Power

Station was considerably increased.

 

In 2000, the level of the collection of funds for electricity

generated amounted to 88.5 per cent, which virtually corresponds to

the 1999 level. According to operational data, consumers were

supplied with electricity to the value of 83.3bn drams last year.

Of this amount, 74.1bn were actually received, including 69.2bn

from internal consumers and 4.9bn from external consumers. The

debts to the energy complex owed by consumers of drinking water,

whose arrears accounted for 10bn drams as of 1 December 2000, are a

serious problem. Instead of the 3.9bn drams that the heat supply

system was to pay to energy companies, 1.8bn drams were actually

received; 1.4bn of them were budget subsidies. A total of 60bn kWh

of electricity were produced in the reporting year, and this was

4.22 per cent higher than in 1999. Technical losses from

high-voltage lines accounted for 347.1m kWh or 5.8 per cent. A

total of 4,600 electricity meters were installed.

 

The volume of gas supplies to Armenia last year amounted to 1.4bn

cu. m., which was 11.4 per cent higher than the 1999 level. At

the beginning of 2000, 89,230 people were being supplied with

natural gas, however, by the end of the year, this figure had

increased to 101,300. 1 dollars is 555 drams

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Caspian Oil is Good for Armenia,

Melconian Argues in Armenian Forum

 

Princeton, N.J. (3 March 1999)—Caspian oil pipelines represent "a millennial opportunity" for Armenia and Karabagh, argues Melcon G. Melconian, a widely respected oil industry analyst. Melconian makes his case in an article in the current issue of the journal Armenian Forum.

 

Melconian’s essay appears alongside an informative report on Caspian oil supplies. The report is by Onnic Marashian, the distinguished editor emeritus of Platt’s Oilgram.

 

Marashian’s Report

 

Onnic Marashian notes that the Caspian Sea basin has been "promoted as the next Persian Gulf." In promoting the Caspian, however, host governments and the Clinton Administration have used "grossly inflated" numbers.

 

Marashian makes distinctions between potential, possible, probable, and proven reserves and emphasizes that not all reserves are "recoverable." He argues that "the public relations hype inspired by geopolitics deliberately confused these geological distinctions." He supports his case with numbers and evaluations issued by various disinterested sources.

 

A further hurdle to Caspian oil supplies is the high cost of transporting Caspian oil, along with declining oil prices worldwide, Marashian writes. He acknowledges, nonetheless, that after all is said and done, Azerbaijan is still going to export a good deal of oil.

 

Melconian’s Analysis

 

Melcon G. Melconian’s article takes up the question of what all this means for Armenia and Karabagh. Melconian zeroes in on the question of reliability: "Reliability of oil supplies to world markets is the single most important consideration in oil companies’ investment and operating decisions," he writes.

 

Melconian notes that the oil pipeline routes supported by the West are within Armenia’s "gaze." He argues that "inasmuch as this strategic juxtaposition may convey a threatening aspect," it puts Armenians in a strong negotiating position. It effectively gives Armenians the power "to guarantee security of the pipeline routes." Without such a guarantee, oil companies will not have the reliability they require.

 

Melconian’s analysis flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that Azerbaijan’s oil resources represent an unmitigated disaster for Armenia. Karabagh is continuously advised to be "rational and realistic" and to settle immediately on unfavorable terms. Armenians are given dire warnings that Azerbaijan, as it becomes wealthier, will use its wealth to destroy Karabagh. Armenian commentators have been particularly concerned about the U.S.–supported pipeline route through Turkey.

 

Melconian’s emphasis on reliability is a reminder that oil-exporting states cannot afford to engage in warfare. Azerbaijan needs peace at least as urgently as Armenia and Karabagh do. By raising these issues, Melconian’s essay sheds light on the foundations of Armenia’s and Karabagh’s foreign policies.

 

The two articles appear in the Autumn 1998 issue of Armenian Forum: A Journal of Contemporary Affairs.

 

Vincent Lima

http://www.gomidas.org/forum/af3oil.htm

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EU Contributes to Construction of Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline

Tehran Times January 27 2001

 

TEHRAN -- Azerbaijan Republic's unofficial news agency Media Press announced on Wednesday that the European Commission, the executive organization of the European Union, is ready to allocate three million euros for technical assistance for the construction of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline. The news agency wrote that construction of the first 40 kilometers of the pipeline, joining Magri to Gajaran, is planned to be complete by the end of the current Christian year.

 

The Iran-Armenia gas pipeline will be 141 kilometers in length and will cost 120 million dollars. The capacity of the primary transfer of the pipeline has been declared to be one billion cubic meters of natural gas.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Construction of Armenia-Iran gas pipeline to begin this year: Yerevan

Agence France-Presse

 

01/25/2001

 

YEREVAN, Jan 25 (AFP) - The construction of a gas pipeline that would transit Iranian gas to the former Soviet republic of Armenia will begin this year, Armenian Energy Minister Karen Galustyan said Wednesday. The 140-kilometre (48-mile) pipeline should cost some 138 million dollars and should be completed within months, Galustyan said. Armenia will begin the construction by building a section of the pipeline between its southern towns of Megri and Kadzharan, a project worth some 26 million dollars.

The exact price for Iranian gas supplies was not yet determined, the minister said. An international consortium -- including Russia's gas giant Gazprom, France's Gas de France, Iran's National Gas Company and Armenia's energy ministry -- will be created for the building of the pipeline. Iran has the world's second largest reserves of natural gas after Russia.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Pipeline Construction Date Still Uncertain After Armenia-Iran Meeting

 

01/25/2001

 

Senior Armenian and Iranian government officials, who wrapped up a major five-day meeting in Yerevan late Wednesday, set no specific date for starting the construction of a gas pipeline linking the two states despite reaffirming their strong interest in the project. Armenian Energy Minister Karen Galustian, who co-chairs a bilateral commission on economic cooperation, declined to state precisely when construction work will get underway, saying only that the two sides are gradually overcoming all remaining obstacles. "It is envisaged that construction will begin this year and be completed within the shortest possible period of time," Galustian told reporters at the end of the commission's meeting. "There is no need to publicize more details here." Each country will be responsible for its section of the 140 kilometer pipeline, he added. Most unanswered questions revolve around funding for the Armenian share of the project, with Yerevan hoping to raised most of the money from the European Union in return for closing down the Metsamor nuclear power station in the next few years. The EU has recently allocated three million Euros for technical and legal preparations for launching the project. A representative of the European Commission in Yerevan, Sebastien Dubost, told RFE/RL that energy officials from the EU and Armenia will meet soon to work out terms of Brussels's participation in the undertaking. The situation will become clearer by "mid-February," he said. Deputy Foreign Minister Armen Martirosian said that "Brussels is very actively participating in the preparations." According to Galustian, the "first phase" of construction work on Armenian territory, covering some 40 kilometers of a rough mountainous terrain, is estimated to cost $26 million. He said an additional $70 million will be needed to boost the capacity of the Armenian section of the pipeline.

 

Another sticking point is the price of Iranian gas, which is much higher than what Armenia pays for Russian gas deliveries. Iranian officials said late last year that Yerevan and Tehran will agree on it after the pipeline is brought on line. But Martirosian, who is also involved in the negotiations, said last week that the pipeline's construction will not start until the price dispute is resolved. The meeting of the Armenia-Iran commission produced no agreement on the issue, with Galustian saying that "negotiations are still going on. "Originally intended to serve as an alternative source of energy for resource-poor Armenia, the pipeline in question has acquired a geopolitical dimension. The two governments, as well as some EU officials, support the idea of extending the gas link to Georgia's Black Sea cost from where the Iranian fuel could reach Europe. EU energy officials now view Iran as a potentially strategic supplier of energy resources. "We look at the pipeline not just within the Iran-Armenia framework but also hope that it could be extended westwards," Martirosian said.

 

Energy matters featured large during the session of the ad hoc body comprising senior officials from various Iranian and Armenian government agencies. They agreed in particular to continue feasibility studies on building a hydro-electric power station on the Arax river that marks the border between the two states. Galustian claimed that unspecified private companies from third countries are taking an interest in the project. "We have been working with a number of major firms that are interested not only in financing the plant's construction but also in owing a share of its stock," he said. In addition, it was announced that Armenia and Iran will nearly double seasonal swaps of electricity in which they have engaged since connecting their power grids several years ago. The head of the Iranian delegation, Finance and Economy Minister Hossein Namazi, told reporters that government experts will also look into the possibility of opening a facility in Armenia to refine Iranian crude oil.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Armenian official says work to start within a year on pipeline from Iran

Associated Press Newswires 01/24/2001

Armenia's energy minister said Wednesday that construction would begin this year on a natural gas pipeline to the Caucasus Mountains country from neighboring Iran.

Energy Minister Karen Galustyan said at a news conference that the project would cost dlrs 96 million and would be completed in what he called the shortest

possible time.

A consortium to build the pipeline, to run through the town of Megri in southern Armenia, is planned among Russia's Gazprom natural gas company, France's Gas

de France, the Armenian energy ministry and Iran's national gas company, Galustyan said.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

European Union To Assign 30 Million Euro For Preparation Of Documentation For Iran-Armenia Gas Pipeline

THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS REPORT January 22, 2001, Monday

 

Sebastian Dubost, program coordinator of the Armenian office of European Union, reports that European Union plans to assign 30 million Euro for preparation of

technical and legal documentation for the project of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline construction. Dubost adds that European Union approves the project, despite

that highly-paid lawyers will be required for preparation of its legal documentation. Nonetheless, stresses Dubost, European Union is ready to bear these expenditures.

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President recieves Armenian foreign minister

 

thr 057

 

Iran-Armenia-President /POL/

 

Tehran, Feb 4, IRNA -- President Mohamamd Khatami said on Sunday that

Armenia is the link between Asia and Europe and cooperation with

Armenia on transport, energy and gas guarantees bilateral as well as

regional interests.

In a meeting with Armenia Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan,

President Khatami said that piping Iranian gas to Armenia would open

a new chapter in Tehran-Yerevan relations and would be a factor of

stability in the region.

The president expressed pleasure with the direct talks between the

Armenian and Azeri presidents (held in Paris on January 26) on the

settlement of Artsax issue and said that the Islamic Republic of

Iran is ready to mediate between the two countries.

"We hope that through bilateral resolve and goodwill, Armenia and

Azerbaijan will settle their 13-year dispute over Artsax and will

foster peace," President Khatami said.

He called for developing regional cooperation and removal of

misunderstandings without reliance on external forces and said that

all the regional states including Russian Federation are required to

adopt an appropriate plan for progress and security of the region.

Oskanyan appreciated Iran's foreign policy in the region and said

that Iran has contributed to regional stability.

He briefed the president on the latest developments on the peace

talks on Artsax and hoped that Armenia and Azerbaijan would reach a

settlement on Artsax in the year 2001.

The Armenian foreign minister said that the Iranian gas pipeline

to Armenia would be the line of peace and security and called for

boosting economic cooperation including transport and building Gajeran

bridge situated between Iran and Armenia.

Oskanyan conveyed greetings of Armenian President Robert Kocharyan

to President Khatami and offered felicitations of Armenian president

and nation to the Iranian government and nation on the anniversary of

victory of the Islamic Revolution.

Artsax conflict broke out in 1988 in which 35,000 people died in

six years of fighting between Azaerbaijan and Armenia.

A ceasefire was reached in 1994. France is mediating between the

two countries as part of a process organized by Minsk Group of

Vienna-based organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) formed in 1992.

SS/AH

End

::irna 05/02/2001 20:18

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Iran-Armenia improved ties affect fate of regional states

 

IRNA (Iran)

Feb 4, 2001

 

Tehran, Feb 4, IRNA -- Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan in

a meeting Saturday with Secretary of Iran's Supreme National

Security Council Hassan Rowhani said improved ties between Iran and

Armenia would influence the developments taking shape in the

region.

 

Stressing the need to boost the bilateral cooperation between Iran

and Armenia, he said the boosted ties between the two states could

also contribute to the security situation in the region.

 

Rowhani said said Iran and Armenia could consider the cooperation

in the area of the energy and export of energy from the region as

part of the long-term bilateral economic ties.

 

Pointing to the prime importance of the stability and calm in

Armenia and in the region, he called upon all the countries to

contribute to the security and stability in the region.

 

He said the restoration and safeguarding of the peace and calm in

the southern Caucasus is top on Iran's foreign policy.

 

The Armenian foreign minister praised the exhaustive efforts done

by Iran to reinforce the peace and security in the region. He said

Armenia would not join the NATO adding that the county would hold

deliberations with Iran on the security issues.

 

He said the resumption of ties between Iran and the United states

would surely affect the fate of the regional states and would

contribute to the peace and security in the region.

 

Rowhani stated that the presence of the foreign powers in the

region would enfeeble the regional countries while calling upon all

the countries in the region to cooperate with each ther to promote

the regional security and stability.

 

As for the resumption of ties with the United States, he said the

Clinton Administration had committed many mistakes in its policies

toward Iran adding that the new U.S. government should not follow

the erroneous policies of the previous American administration.

 

The Armenian official in the meeting extended an invitation to

Rowhani to pay a visit to Armenia.

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  • 2 weeks later...

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

PRESIDENT BUSH AND CASPIAN OIL

 

Central Asia/Caucasus Institute

BIWEEKLY BRIEFING

Wednesday, February 14, 2001

 

Dr. John C.K. Daly

 

>From day one, the Bush administration was forced to place energy issues on

its agenda. Between California blackouts and OPEC cutbacks, Washington has

had to confront these issues head-on with a policy that will both mollify

voters and provide for national security in a period of daily oil imports of

10.5 million barrels. Caspian oil is high on the list of "quick fixes." Its

non-OPEC output gives the West additional leverage over OPEC policy. The

administration's dilemma is that any action it takes, while it may pay off

in the short term, will jeopardize longer-term American interests in the

Caspian region.

 

BACKGROUND: The issue of the eventual route of the Main Export Pipeline will

force America to adjust its policies towards Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Whichever nation is rewarded the route will leave two extremely discontented

losers in a contest worth hundreds of millions of dollars in annual transit

fees. In the last year under Putin, Russia has moved forcefully to reassert

its influence over Caucasian and Central Asian energy reserves. Putin's 9-11

January visit to Baku with four hundred "advisers" is the obvious sign of

this. In return for Azeri commitments to oil shipments to Novorossiisk,

Putin can hold out the role of "honest broker" over Nagorno-Artsax and use

Russian "influence" to smooth the succession issue when it eventually

arises.

 

Kazakhstan's options for autonomy are even more limited as the CPC pipeline

to Novorossiisk is due to begin shipments in July and Russia owns 24% of

CPC. Russia remains Kazakhstan's largest trading partner, with an annual

turnover of more than $2,500,000,000. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan remain

dependent on energy revenues; oil currently provides Baku with about 65% of

its exports and Kazakhstan about 25%. It is telling that, while applying for

OPEC observer status, Kazakhstan stated earlier this month that it would not

reduce exports even if OPEC did.

 

Russia is willing to apply pressure to retain control of the flow of "early

oil" which is evidenced by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov's comments to EU

leaders in early October that, in return for Russian commitments to

twenty-year gas guarantees, Russia would expect the EU to drop its support

for Baku-Ceyhan. The problem with the "northern option" is that the exports

will exit the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits, already averaging more than

1,400,000 bpd. In 2000, the Turkish Marine Undersecretariat recorded that

89,640 cargo ships passed through the Straits. The CPC pipeline will by some

estimates triple the tanker traffic in the Bosporus.

 

IMPLICATIONS: Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem has stated that Ankara

will never allow the Turkish Straits to be turned into an "oil pipeline."

The Turks want construction of the Baku-Ceyhan line, which the oil companies

have resisted underwriting due to cost. Eight oil companies in AIOC have

begun a $26 million study on the feasibility of the Baku-Ceyhan route that

is expected to be completed in May. This study will be followed by a year

long $100 million study and upon completion a final decision will be made.

If the United States opts for routes other than Baku-Ceyhan, it is unclear

what Turkish reaction will be.

 

If the Bush administration abandons Baku-Ceyhan, it will abandon Turkey,

America's staunchest Muslim Middle East ally. Turkey feels that its

unwavering support of NATO and UN policy in the Middle East deserves reward.

Ankara estimates that it has lost more than $35,000,000,000 in supporting UN

sanctions against Iraq. American arms sales to Turkey average $800 million

annually while Turkey's military inventory is 80% American. Turkey is

already frustrated with European reluctance over its EU application and a

denial of Baku-Ceyhan could further alienate Ankara.

 

The oil companies have made clear their preference for an Iranian route, and

it is here that the new administration seems to be most flexible. Secretary

of State Powell has already undertaken a review of existing sanctions,

ordering his staff to compile a list of all sanctions imposed by the

American government, an action that clearly pleases many businessmen. The

National Association of Manufacturers estimates in a 1997 study that

sanctions annually cost the American economy $15-19 billion. Before he was

chosen as Bush's vice-presidential running mate, Dick Cheney also spoke out

against America’s sanction policies on a number of occasions, particularly

those against Iran, which he labeled "a mistake."

 

CONCLUSIONS: The Bush administration's dilemma is that any action it takes,

while it may pay off in the short term, will jeopardize longer-term American

interests in the Caspian region and in the Middle East. The decision on oil

routes will be heavily influenced several upcoming events. In May, there are

the Iranian presidential elections. In August, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act

(ILSA), imposed in 1996, runs out. The Bush administration may well decide

simply to allow it to lapse, in order for American energy companies to have

a more level playing field. The final issue to be resolved is whether it is

diplomatic, military or economic interests that ultimately drive American

regional policy.

 

For Ankara, the only certainty is that during "business as usual," loyalty

is a minimal factor. US President Bush is under pressure to redeem pledges

he made last February, to the nearly million-strong Armenian-American

community, to honor the "Armenian genocide." A congressional resolution on

the issue was withdrawn under executive concern last October. Should such an

action be taken, it could seriously harm American-Turkish relations. Turkey

might not only cut its arms purchases, but also ignore sanctions on both

Iraq and Iran. This would ultimately deal American regional policy and

influence a death blow.

 

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. John C. K. Daly received his doctorate from the School of

Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London in Russian and

Middle Eastern Studies, and is a scholar at the Middle East Institute,

Washington.

 

Copyright 2001 The Analyst

All rights reserved

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Sea Change in the Caspian?

Stratfor

02/15/01

 

By Aaron Ortiz E-mail to a friend

 

Summary

 

Caspian Sea countries, eager to exploit the sea's economic resources,

may soon form a coalition designed to solve border issues and move

toward dividing the Caspian Sea among them. Collaboration, however,

might not continue past the immediate issue, border demarcation in the

Caspian Sea, because of competing national interests.

 

Analysis

 

The presidents of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and

Turkmenistan will hold a summit in March in the Turkmen city of

Turkmenbashi. Deputy foreign ministers from each country are already

working out details and possible areas of cooperation, according to

IRNA. Among the items on the agenda is a reported Russian initiative

to create a five-sided Caspian Sea forum, through which the five

littoral nations can discuss common issues.

 

The Caspian Sea, a landlocked body of water surrounded by Azerbaijan,

Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan, potentially holds oil and

gas reserves valued in the billions of barrels and trillions of cubic

meters, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency.

 

But competing territorial claims on oil and gas fields have limited

production, exploration and exploitation of the Caspian's mineral

resources. The fall of the Soviet Union created three new states:

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Previously, only the Soviet

Union and Iran shared the Caspian Sea. Now there are five, each

wanting as much of the seabed as possible.

 

Now the littoral states may believe they can form a roundtable - one

that may ultimately lead to a division of the Caspian and its

resources. Following that, however, regional tensions and competing

national interests could limit additional avenues for cooperation.

 

Talks between Russia and Iran, two countries with different views

concerning the Caspian Sea's division, may have led to the new

grouping. In January, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev visited

Iran to discuss improving ties. According to an unnamed Iranian

source, the defense minister also discussed repartitioning of the

Caspian Sea, reported the London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat Dec. 29.

 

Russia has been active elsewhere. In January, Moscow and Baku reached

common ground in solving competing territorial issues. Russia conceded

to a demarcation of the Caspian seabed based on a modified median line

to be determined later. This agreement mirrored a 1998 agreement

between Kazakhstan and Russia. The crux of these agreements was that

each state had exclusive rights to mineral resources in its sector of

the seabed, while the waters were to be jointly administered. This is

a significant modification of Russia's previous position that Caspian

resources should be shared evenly.

 

While the forum's creation signals the littoral states are willing to

discuss Caspian issues, other issues concerning regional security can

keep them apart. The Caspian forum is unlikely to come to a

territorial agreement in the near term.

 

Russia has proven similar arrangements can produce meaningful

results. For example, Russia in 1996 spearheaded the formation of the

Shanghai Five, which comprised China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia

and Tajikistan. This regional grouping originally convened to resolve

border issues, namely demarcation of the border with China.

 

Having solved border and other interstate issues, the Shanghai Five

took on the additional task of regional security. But competing

national agendas interfered with their cooperation. For example,

differences between Russia and China over Afghanistan exposed rifts

within the forum. If the group expands, additional members - such as

Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - will

exacerbate existing fissures.

 

Much like the Shanghai Five, the "Caspian Five" should eventually

achieve success on border issues and lead to the exploitation of

resources in the Caspian Sea. But it will face similar complications

to the Shanghai Five. Afghanistan's war affects Iran, Russia and

Tajikistan. The Chechen conflict affects Azerbaijan. Additionally,

conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan involve Russian and Iranian

interests. These regional conflicts have the potential to divert the

new Caspian forum once immediate border and economic issues are

resolved.

 

Aaron Ortiz is an analyst for Stratfor.com, the leading provider of

global intelligence over the Internet.

 

Posted February 12, 2001.

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The Guardian (UK)

March 5, 2001

 

The new Great Game

 

East and west are jockeying for influence in the Caucasus. The prize

is oil and gas

 

Richard Norton-Taylor

 

A new and potentially explosive Great Game is being set up and few in

Britain are aware of it. There are many players: far more than the

two - Russia and Britain - who were engaged a century ago in imperial

rivalry in central Asia and the north-west frontier.

And the object this time is not so much control of territory. It is

the large reserves of oil and gas in the Caucasus, notably the

Caspian basin. Pipelines are the counters in this new Great Game.

 

There are plans for pipe-lines through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey,

Iran, Bulgaria, Macedonia - and Albania. Traditional rivalries

between east and west are complicated by other threats - from Chechen

separatists, Kurds, Albanian guerrilla groups, the dispute between

Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Artsax and, throughout the

region, Islamic groups whose activities are causing deep concern to

Moscow, Tehran and Washington alike.

 

"In addition to instability and conflict in the Caucasus and parts of

central Asia, there is a longer-term fear that Russia may rebuild its

military capabilities, perhaps under a strongly nationalist regime,"

notes Paul Rogers, professor of peace studies at Bradford University,

in his recent book, Losing Control. Such a fear he adds, "rarely

recognises the significance of a near-endemic Russian perception that

Nato expansion and US commercial interests in the Caspian basin are

part of a strategic encroachment into Russia's historic sphere of

influence".

 

This is the region both west and east have their eyes on. It is rich

in untapped oil and gas while US reserves are running down, China is

desperate for more oil, and no one outside the Gulf wants to rely on

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Iraq - which have the biggest oil reserves.

 

Oil is the bait as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran - and Nato - jockey

for alliances, power and influence in this highly combustible but,

for most people, little-known, region.

 

The EU is now getting in on the act. "The European Union cannot

afford to neglect the southern Caucasus. Georgia, Armenia and

Azerbaijan form a strategic corridor linking southern Europe with

central Asia," Chris Patten, the European external relations

commissioner, and Anna Lindh, the Swedish foreign minister, told

Financial Times readers last month before the first high-level EU

visit to the region. "There is perhaps as much oil under the Caspian

sea as under the North sea and a huge amount of gas there and in

central Asia - good news for energy-hungry Europe," they said.

 

Soon after the EU visit, Georgia's president, Eduard Shevardnadze,

welcomed European and US support for the "Great Silk Road idea". The

plan, backed by Washington and American oil companies, including

Chevron, is for a pipeline taking Turkmenistan and Kazakh oil to

Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, through Tbilisi, the Georgian capital,

and through eastern Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

 

Russia is desperate to maintain oil flows through its territory. Iran

wants a pipeline running from the Caspian due south. China wants one

going due east.

 

There is also a plan, backed by the US, for a pipeline running from

the Bulgarian Black sea port of Burgas through Macedonia to the

Albanian Adriatic port of Vlore. The idea is for Caspian oil to be

shipped to Burgas by tanker from the Black sea ports of Novorossiysk

in Russia and Supsa in Georgia.

 

A feasibility study for this ambitious project - due to be

operational by 2005 - is being undertaken by Ambo, a company

registered in the US, with, say the Bulgarians, the support of

Texaco, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, BP Amoco, Agip and TotalElfFina. It is

"very probable" the project will go ahead, a Bulgarian spokesman said

last week. It is a "safer" way to take the oil.

 

While the US and Nato - and now the EU - hold out the prospect of

untold wealth for the Caucasian states of the former Soviet Union,

the west will also have an important economic stake in Albania and

Macedonia. The US already seems to take the view that all Serbs are

bad and all Albanians good. The implications for Kosovo, a Serbian

province with an overwhelming ethnic Albanian population, and for

Macedonia, with armed groups from Kosovo stirring up trouble among

the ethnic Albanian population, are potentially immense.

 

The fight over pipeline routes involves gas as well as oil. Russia

wants to supply gas to Turkey; as does Iran, Russia's ally against

the Taliban in Afghanistan and a country Russia is supplying with

nuclear know-how.

 

For Britain there is an added factor in this jigsaw puzzle of

rivalries and alliances. By 2020, the Ministry of Defence noted in a

recent report on the "future strategic context for defence", the UK

could be importing 90% of its gas supplies. "The main source of

supply," it added, "will include Russia, Iran, and Algeria." Iran's

gas reserves, say analysts, are second only to Russia's.

 

"All options are on the table", says the Foreign Office, adding that

Britain has no problem from the "political point of view" with Iran's

oil pipeline plan. Watch this space.

 

richard.norton-taylor@guardian.co.uk

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  • 4 weeks later...

Power Politics in the Caspian http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/SDI.nsf/web/Caspian

 

by Emily Van Buskirk

Kennedy School Update

 

What are the major U.S. and Russian interests in the Caspian Region?

Security experts, scholars, and current and former U.S. and Russian

officials discussed the answer at a conference sponsored by the Caspian

Studies Program in October.

 

As American officials at the conference noted, the U.S. wants to promote

the sovereignty, independence, security, and economic development of the

newly independent nations in the region. Additionally, American policy

is attempting to contain trafficking in drugs and weapons and to deny

Iran strategic gains in the region, due to its support for world

terrorism and its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

 

According to U.S. officials, these interests are not meant to threaten

or alienate Russia. However, the U.S. and Russia have developed a

rivalry in the Caspian Region during the past ten years that some

conference participants even called a "mini Cold War." Why is this?

 

One reason is the competition over energy resources and pipeline routes,

heightened by the fact that pipelines are thought to have geopolitical

significance. Those involved in the Caspian include the five Caspian

abutters (Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan), plus

the United States, Georgia, Turkey, China, Armenia, and others.

 

Despite their avowed efforts toward cooperation, Russia and the U.S.

have tried to win over allies in the region (and the states have

attempted to pull allies in) and have sometimes exacerbated conflict in

the volatile area. The competition in the Caspian makes for strange

bedfellows. Two of the competing lines of cooperation are

Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran and Washington-Baku-Ankara.

 

The conference participants stated that the main reason for the

increasing sense of competition in the region was miscommunication.

Russia perceives U.S. efforts to increase its own gains in the region as

impinging on Russian security, and U.S. efforts geared at Iran are often

erroneously interpreted as moves against Russia. Washington's promotion

of an export route from Baku through Tbilisi to the Turkish port of

Ceyhan, for example, is perceived by Russia as an attempt to diminish

its influence in the region.

 

Russia, however, has a greater ability and higher commitment to pursue

its interests in the region because of its close geographic location,

strong economic ties with the former Soviet states, and its military and

security stake in the region.

 

Conference participants noted that the U.S. should be aware of Russia's

concerns and interests. The participants recommended heightened

communication and dialogue on the Caspian between Moscow and Washington

in order to prevent further misinterpretations.

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Artsax Settlement - Germany's Version

 

Transcaspian Project

2 April 2001

 

By Albert Freedman

 

YEREVAN, The geopolitical intrigue around the Nagorno-Artsax settling,

which in many respects predetermines the development throughout the

Transcaucasian region, is reaching a decisive stage.

 

The majority of experts believe, that it is at this spot of the post-Soviet

area that all the powerful global forces, including those of the European

Union, come into most intensive collision with each other. The position of

the European "heavyweight" - Germany - expressed at the semi-official level

by the former German Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe, proves to be rather

typical in this connection.

 

He considers, in particular, that the whole Western world should force Russia

to denounce the policy of manipulating its former South-Caucasian satellites.

Moreover, the former German minister thinks that Europe should put an end to

extremely destructive tendency of establishing confronting axes in the

region, constituted by the geopolitical alliances of Russia - Armenia - Iran

(the North - South axis) and Central Asia - Azerbaijan - Turkey - Ukraine

(the East - West axis).

 

Which is significant, the German politician believes that Yerevan is

currently playing an important role in ruining this antagonistic system by

carrying out complementary and balanced foreign policy, promoting

geopolitical tolerance in the region. In this light, Germany should make

Turkey soften its antagonistic policy towards Armenia, Ruehe regards. At the

same time, official Berlin should assure Teheran that the West is not

interested in infringement of its positions in the South Caucasian region,

the former head of the German defense department considers.

 

The only thing to do with the current complicated political and economical

situation in the three Transcaucasian countries is to establish

Transcaucasian international economic zone and develop efficient mechanisms

of regional cooperation, the former German Defense Minister considers. The

Transcaucasian economic zone would become a separate unit of all-European

economical space, which, in turn, should be closely integrated into the

European union market, Ruehe believes. At the same time the German politician

underlines, that the Transcaucasian counties are unlikely to be admitted as

full members of the European Union or NATO. The structure of the "European

family" should be heterogeneous, but preciously limited.

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  • 2 weeks later...

Mr. Bush's Caspian Diplomacy

 

Editorial

 

The New York Times

April 16, 2001

 

Although President Bush has spoken sourly of his predecessor's enthusiasm for trying to solve foreign conflicts, he met recently with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, two nations locked in a seemingly intractable ethnic dispute. Mr. Bush's involvement in negotiations over Nagorno-Artsax - an ethnic Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan - is undoubtedly in part due to the extensive oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region. Nevertheless, it is a welcome move, which we hope signals that Washington will remain engaged with troubled regions of the globe.

 

In close coordination with Armenia, residents of Nagorno-Artsax went to war to break away from Azerbaijan when the Soviet Union disintegrated.

Ethnic Armenians now effectively run Nagorno-Artsax and occupy an area around it and a corridor connecting the enclave to Armenia. The 800,000 Azeris driven out of the area live in miserable refugee camps around

Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has maintained a blockade against Armenia, where the dismal economy has provoked the emigration of nearly half the nation. The Armenian community in America, in turn, persuaded Congress to prohibit American aid to Azerbaijan.

 

Past talks have foundered on disagreement over Nagorno-Artsax's legal status. Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president, says he would allow the region wide autonomy if it remained part of Azerbaijan. Armenia and

Nagorno-Artsax seek full independence for the enclave. But some Bush administration officials now seem optimistic that Armenia may become more flexible. They express hope that Armenia's president, Robert Kocharian, a

Nagorno-Artsax native who was leader of the enclave, could convince Armenians - and especially the powerful military - to abandon their claim for independence should he determine to.

 

A major reason for Mr. Bush's involvement is that peace would speed the development of the Caspian oil fields and the construction of a pipeline to carry the oil from Azerbaijan to the West. The favored route would avoid Russia, where the oil flow could be hostage to political events, but it is

nevertheless seen as vulnerable because it passes very near to Armenian-controlled territory. In a region dominated by Russia, and by British and French oil companies, Mr. Bush no doubt hopes to increase American influence. It is welcome that he is doing so by furthering the

possibility of peace.

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  • 1 month later...

Wednesday May 16 5:16 PM ET

Energy Glance

 

By The Associated Press,

 

Some recommendations expected to be in President Bush (news - web sites)'s energy task force report on Thursday:

 

Production:

 

-Ease restrictions on oil and gas development on public lands.

 

-Open 8 percent of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska.

 

-Ease permit process for refinery expansion and construction.

 

-Speed license procedures for hydroelectric dams and geothermal plants.

 

Power Plants:

 

-Streamline approval process for siting power plants.

 

-Give government authority to take property through eminent domain for power lines.

 

-Provide tax breaks for developing clean coal technologies.

 

-Ease regulatory barriers, including clean air rules to make plants more efficient.

 

Nuclear:

 

-Adjust regulations to speed relicensing of reactors and licensing of new plants.

 

-Speed up process to ensure disposal of nuclear waste.

 

-Urge a national nuclear waste repository.

 

-Give tax breaks for purchase of nuclear plants.

 

-Reauthorize law that limits industry liability from a nuclear accident.

 

Renewable Energy:

 

-Provide tax credits to encourage development of energy plants that use organic waste, or biomass.

 

-Continue tax credits for wind energy generation.

 

-Give tax credit of 15 percent for homeowners who purchase solar panels.

 

Conservation:

 

-Give tax credit for purchase of high-mileage, hybrid gas-electric vehicles.

 

-Provide tax benefits and regulatory relief for co-generation plants that produce both heat and electricity

 

-Expand federal Energy Star program to include not only businesses but schools, homes and hospitals.

 

Other:

 

-Review policy of economic sanctions with Iran to foster energy development.

 

-Spur U.S. participation in Caspian Sea oil and gas development.

 

-Step up diplomatic efforts to expand oil production in Latin America, Asia and Caspian Sea nations such as Azerbaijan.

 

-Review whether to increase flexibility in the web of regional ``boutique'' gasoline blends that industry says contributes to supply shortages and price spikes, while maintaining clean-air standards.

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