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Thoth, bin Laden was supported by the US along with other mujaheddins in Afghanistan. This has been well known and I remember having seen CNN and other programs about it. However, bin Laden was not a particularly known figure, he was pretty much just another anti-Soviet guy at that time. When the Russians left Afghanistan the US abandoned Afghans and Arabas fighting against Russians. After that bin Laden grew and became a loose canon.
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A couple of weeks ago WSJ had an interesting article about Armenia. I thought some of you might be interested. I think Kim Iskyan makes a great point about Diaspora's help. Diaspora's role should be to promote structural reforms, not infraastrucuture development. Structural reforms will lead to infrastructural development, but not the other way around. Has any of you asked why we don't have our "Saakashvili". Why does our nation lack charismatic leaders (like LTP was in early 90s).

 

Why Can't Armenia

Be More Like Georgia?

 

By KIM ISKYAN

 

YEREVAN -- The recent "rose revolution" in the Caucasus nation of Georgia, in which an energetic new government replaced a corrupt post-Soviet regime, has sparked hope that change in neighboring Armenia may be on the horizon. But the prognosis for any significant shift in Armenia's political and economic tectonic plates -- via either a Georgian-style democratic coup, or the more mundane toil of measured and deliberate reform -- is poor at best, to the detriment of the prospects for democracy and prosperity in the long term.

 

That said, Armenia is now an island of relative stability in a volatile region, and it punches well above its geopolitical and economic weight. Neither an oil producer (like Azerbaijan) nor an energy corridor to Europe (like Georgia), nor a member of the Axis of Evil (like neighbor Iran) -- Armenia's importance rests in the strategic necessity for both Russia and the U.S. to have a friend in the rough Caucasus neighborhood. Turmoil in Armenia could upset the delicate balance of power in the region, and in turn trigger renewed tension with Azerbaijan (and, possibly, Azerbaijan's ally, and NATO member, Turkey) over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Artsax. Additionally, the lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora -- more than twice as many Armenians live outside the country as within its borders -- ensures that Armenian concerns remain on the radar screen of local politicians, particularly in the U.S.

 

Yet Armenia's strategic importance also means that its big-brother allies are willing to overlook a deep economic and political malaise. On the surface, the country's macro-economy appears vibrant: GDP grown for 10 consecutive years, including a 14% jump in 2003, and exports have nearly tripled since 1998. But Armenia's economic growth has been off a very low base, as GDP shrank by more than 50% in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has yet to reach 1990 levels of GDP per capita. Moreover, implementation of micro- and macro-level reforms critical to ensuring the sustainability of economic growth has been woefully insufficient. The 51% of the Armenian population mired in poverty has barely benefited from economic growth. As a Nov. 2001 World Bank study noted: "The last several years have not brought…noticeable improvements in living standards for the majority of the population."

 

The blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey of their borders with Armenia, a consequence of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Artsax, cripples trade and investment. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment in Armenia is faltering, amounting in 2001 to $70 million, less than a third of its 1998 level. Massive injections of developmental funds from the U.S. government, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and an alphabet soup of other donors -- enough to make Armenia one of the largest recipients of foreign aid on a per capita basis -- have obscured the facts of economic mismanagement and rampant corruption. Armenia's central bank recently forecast that GDP growth would fall to 7% in 2004, in part because this year Armenia is not slated to receive a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank, and because a large-scale $165-million philanthropic foundation endowed by Las Vegas billionaire Kirk Kerkorian just ended.

 

Compounding matters has been the migration since 1990 of roughly 20% of Armenia's population, including many of its best-educated citizens. (True migration levels may in fact be significantly higher, as the Armenian government is widely believed to inflate the country's population figures -- officially 3.2 million -- so that developmental aid is not reduced.)

 

 

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The government of President Robert Kocharian has taken credit for the improvement in the economic environment that its policies have done little to promote. Widespread allegations that a small number of well-connected ministers control the country's most lucrative businesses fuels popular cynicism toward the government.

 

But it may be years before a critical mass of disgust with official corruption -- which played a key role in the overthrow of former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze -- develops in Armenia. Mr. Kocharian won re-election early last year in elections characterized by government control over the media, ballot-stuffing, widespread intimidation, discrepancies in vote counts and a range of other irregularities that deeply damaged the population's remaining faith in the democratic process.

 

Mr. Kocharian has managed to stay in power since 1998 partly because (unlike Mr. Shevardnadze's administration in Georgia) the Armenian government has -- with a little help from its foreign friends -- for the most part been able to provide for the most basic needs, such as heat, light, and water, of its citizens. He also doesn't hesitate to suggest that Azerbaijan might try to take advantage of any sign of disharmony in Armenia's hard-line stance toward Nagorno-Artsax, of which Mr. Kocharian previously was president -- a sure-fire way to silence any nascent opposition on the issue.

 

But Mr. Kocharian has also benefited from the deep divisions in the Armenian opposition. It is led by Stepan Demirchian, the son of a Brezhnev-era party boss who basks in the reflected glow of his late father's popularity -- but didn't inherit his charisma or political savvy. In contrast to new Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, much of the Armenian opposition is perceived to be more interested in having its turn at the trough, rather than focused on bringing about real change.

 

Armenia's ace in the hole is its diaspora, which sends back home remittances equivalent to upwards of 10% of GDP, ensures that Armenia continues to receive developmental funds, and provides critical expertise to and investment in the Armenian economy. But the priorities of the Armenians abroad -- such as Turkish recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide, and for funding one-off infrastructure development projects that do little to support long-term economic growth and development -- often conflict with the present-day realities and needs of the country. And private diaspora aid in effect supports the current political regime.

 

Impetus for change is unlikely to come from the U.S. (and the Armenian diaspora lobby there), which is more concerned with stability than with reform. For a different set of reasons, Moscow is for now happy to continue politically and militarily support for the pliable Mr. Kocharian, particularly as Russia looks to increase its focus on Armenia as its primary outpost in the volatile Caucasus.

 

Georgia's revolutionaries are just starting the hard work required to benefit from the political perfect storm that brought them to power. But Armenia is a long way from even beginning the process of change.

 

Mr. Iskyan is a freelance journalist and consultant based in Yerevan, Armenia.

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Thank you for the article, Alpha. I like Kim Iskyan's writings. He always has some fresh thinking.

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Why we can't have a Saakashvili?

I think because we love sarcasm, skepticism and individualism. An honest, straitforward guy will never make a leader among Armenians, because honesty and straitforwardness is equal to fooleshness in Armenian mind. Our leaders need to be "shustri" or "zharpik".

In Armenia an Armenian girl will never fall for straitforward Armenian guy. When we want to serve in the Army, it's always considered "harifutyun" by our friends, especially girlfriends and mothers.

In short, "a Sahakashvili" would arouse only sarcasm and skepticism if he would emerge in Armenia today.

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