I R A N

[Yervant1]

Oct 12 2021

Azerbaijan-Iran tensions risk pulling Turkey into possible confrontation

• Turkey Abroad
• Oct 12 2021 12:15 Gmt+3
• Last Updated On: Oct 12 2021 12:16 Gmt+3

Azerbaijan and Iran have become locked in a war of words after they held competing military drills next to their common border over the past few weeks.

Any sharp military escalation risks drawing in Turkey, Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), said in comments during the latest episode of Ahval’s Turkey Abroad podcast.

Azizi said that the chances of military hostilities breaking out between Azerbaijan and Iran remained low, but lingering tensions following last year’s war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh are bubbling to the surface.

Much of Iran’s anger towards Azerbaijan has revolved around the latter’s detention of Iranian truckers in Nagorno-Karabakh and disrupting their trade with Armenia.

Iranian military and political officials have not been shy about underscoring their defensiveness towards Azerbaijan in recent days by pointing to Azerbaijan's close military relationship with its chief rival, Israel.

Before and during the military drills in its northwest, Iranian politicians and military figures, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, warned that the presence of outside military forces in the South Caucasus was unacceptable to Tehran.

Turkey’s strengthened position in the South Caucasus, strengthened by increased military support for Azerbaijan, has not escaped Iran’s concerns, said Azizi. Despite pledges of regional economic cooperation that would include Iran, Turkish firms have assumed the lion’s share of reconstruction projects in Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving Tehran out in the cold.

In the run-up to Iran’s military drills and in their aftermath, Turkey has joined Azerbaijan in its military exercises together with Pakistan.

Azizi says that the joint military maneuvers “do not help bring stability in the region” from Iran’s perspective and the involvement of Pakistani troops could be seen as a precursor to inviting other outside powers to the region.

Iran sees the involvement of Turkey and Pakistan as violating Azerbaijan’s commitment to international law on the Caspian Sea that forbids military activities by non-littoral states, he said.

Azizi said that Iran does not place Turkey on the same level as Israel as a security threat, and its close bonds with Azerbaijan are nothing new. However, he argues that rivalry with Turkey is taking a broader strategic context and Iran sees Ankara in a stronger position regionally after the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Azizi says that Turkey’s aspirations to serve as a transit route for East-West trade via projects such as China’s One Belt One Road initiative put it into direct competition with Iran’s own interest in playing a similar role.

Ankara’s push for energy cooperation in the Caspian Sea, together with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, to fulfill long-held aspirations of developing its gas transit role to Europe also rankles Iranian decision-makers, he said.

To address its concerns in the South Caucasus, Iran has recently turned to Russia for diplomatic support. Last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian traveled to Moscow to raise concerns about what Tehran fears is a changing geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus that threatens it.

After the meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed the importance of the 3+3 format that includes the countries of the South Caucasus as well as Turkey and Iran, but added that Moscow was "opposed to building up military activity in the region or conducting any exercises of a provocative nature" without naming any country.

Azizi said that Iran was also careful not to specifically refer to Turkey’s role. He chalked the omission up to a desire to continue balancing its multifaceted relationship with Ankara, but said relying on Russia was the “only way” for Iran to exercise influence in the Caucasus.

 

https://ahvalnews.com/iran-turkey/azerbaijan-iran-tensions-risk-pulling-turkey-possible-confrontation

[Yervant1]

Oct 12 2021

Iran and India opt for Armenia instead of Azerbaijan for regional connectivity project
by PAUL ANTONOPOULOS

000

Azerbaijan, with the backing of Turkey and Syrian mercenaries, were the undisputed victors of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War after reclaiming most of the territory from Armenian control. It was expected that with most of Nagorno-Karabakh under Baku’s control, new trade and transportation corridors would open and ensure that Azerbaijan became an indispensable connectivity hub in the Caucasus. Although there is a possibility for a trade corridor with Turkey to open and extend into the Turkic heartland of Central Asia, Azerbaijan’s hostile and aggressive posture has also meant that India and Iran are looking elsewhere to engage with Europe economically.

On Monday, a BBC journalist quoted the chairman of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, Alireza Peymanpak, as saying: “Two alternative Iran-Eurasia transit routes will replace Azerbaijan’s route. First opens in a month via Armenia after [the] end of repair work, and the second via sea by purchasing and renting vessels.”

Peymanpak was referencing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a major economic project that is 7,200-km long and comprises of rail, road and water routes aimed at reducing travel time and costs. It will also boost trade between Russia, Iran, Central Asia, the Caucasus, India and Europe. Not only is this route 30% cheaper and 40% shorter than the current route, but it also serves as a geopolitical tool to further isolate Azerbaijan as its relationship with Iran and India deteriorates.

The original INSTC route runs through India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia. Baku made massive investments to improve their own local infrastructure to accommodate for the necessities of the INSTC, completing roads, railways, bridges and tunnels. However, despite their economic commitment to be a key player in the INSTC, Azerbaijan’s ideological guide has led to a cooling of relations with Iran and India.

Azerbaijan in recent times has become increasingly vocal in condemning India’s policies towards Kashmir in support of Pakistan. It is recalled that in January, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Pakistan issued a joint declaration to support each country’s respective ambitions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, and Kashmir. Although their trilateral relations have always been strong, they have been conducting joint military exercises more regularly since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, including directly on the Iranian border. It could suggest that the alliance was emboldened by victory in Nagorno-Karabakh and could now be more willing to use war to achieve its goals.

Due to Baku’s overconfidence after last year’s victory, it has not hidden away from demanding more territory. Territorial demands are not just over the bulk of Armenia, but also Iran’s northwest Azeri-majority region. Although Tehran and Baku traditionally have cordial relations, the calling of greater territorial conquests and the blatant display of Israeli military equipment in Azerbaijani possession has broken trust, with war between the two countries seemingly not far away.

The Indian reaction to the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan trilateral nexus has been swift. As India is also an emerging economy with a huge market and potential, even ultra-conservative monarchist states like Saudi Arabia have significantly cut their funding to radical Islamist organizations in Pakistan to successfully find a balance with India. With the exception of Qatar, traditional jihadist financiers across the Arab States in the Persian Gulf have stopped money flows as they now prioritize developing their economies and modernizing infrastructure.

In this way, Pakistan is increasingly seen as more of nuisance because of its chronic insistence on exporting jihadists, an image that Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are trying to break away from. With the Arab states less focussed on perceived global Islamic issues like Kashmir, it is unsurprising that trade with India has skyrocketed – trade between India and Saudi Arabia amounted to $33.09 billion in 2019-2020, whilst between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia it was only $1.7 billion in 2019.

Due to the increasing hostilities by the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan nexus, India and Iran announced that the INTSC from next month will begin running through Armenia instead of Azerbaijan to reach Russia. Baku believed that it could balance an aggressive foreign policy whilst being an indispensable state in connectivity projects. Instead, it finds itself increasingly isolated with no friends besides Turkey and Pakistan, and only cordial ties with Georgia and Russia.

With the Turkish lira once again breaking its record against the U.S. dollar on Monday, Turkey has extremely limited capacity to once again deal with another military front in the Caucasus, especially as it is seemingly preparing for a new operation against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria. This effectively means that if Azerbaijan was to provoke another war in the region, it is unlikely that Turkey can offer the same support it did against the Armenians, especially if fighting against Iran.

None-the-less, due to the increasing instability instigated by Azerbaijan in the region, it is becoming an unreliable partner for countries to put trust in it to be a transportation-trade hub. In this way, Iran and India are now hinging on Armenia for regional connectivity as they aim to isolate Azerbaijan from such corridors. If the pan-Turkic corridor fails to materialize, Azerbaijan through its own actions turned its potential of being an indispensable transportation-trade hub to being isolated from ambitious regional projects aimed at improving connectivity – and this is to Armenia’s advantage as the two massive regional powers of Iran and India will more closely build relations with it.

READ MORE: Iran and Azerbaijan on the brink of war but it is unlikely to boilover.

https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/10/12/iran-and-india-opt-for-armenia/

[MosJan]

[Yervant1]

Armenpress.com

Potential Chabahar Port-Black Sea link through Armenia expected to increase turnover with Iran to billions of dollars

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10:55, 14 October, 2021

YEREVAN, OCTOBER 14, ARMENPRESS. The government of Armenia is working intensely to resolve the issues related to the Armenia-Iran road communication, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan told Tasnim News Agency in an interview.

Grigoryan said the Armenian government seeks to complete the alternative road by yearend.

“We can say that this is generally a short-term issue. But there is another, more important project. In late September the Armenian government approved the North-South’s Sisian-Iranian border road project. This project is worth more than 1 billion dollars and will entirely change the region’s infrastructures. By implementing this program we also have in mind the idea of becoming a key infrastructure hub linking the Chabahar Port with the Black Sea. From this perspective we can say that this project will give great opportunity to increase trade turnover between Armenia and Iran,” Grigoryan said.

While currently the turnover between Armenia and Iran is in the hundreds of millions of dollars, Grigoryan says the figure should soon pass 1 billion dollars. Grigoryan noted that this will enable to increase the trade turnover to several billion dollars in the future. He said that Armenia and Iran have a broad circle of a positive agenda in bilateral relations.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

 

 

https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1065546.html?fbclid=IwAR0eQLebRbv03pfQPnoY8Xy_in3_A52ZCVwFqx77ahr_K1CfLmW53KSmP_U

[Yervant1]

LinkedIn Pulse

Oct 15 2021

THE ZANGEZUR CORRIDOR: Iran’s Gateway To Europe Or Turkey’s Highway To Turan

• Published on October 15, 2021

Ara Joseph Sarian

Senior Advisor/Analyst Experienced in Risk/ Security & Justice Sector Crisis Management to Effectuate Nation-Building Strategies.

During the last several weeks, a little-known twenty-seven-mile-long border between Armenia and Iran has become the epicenter of a potential conflict between Iran and Azerbaijan that portends the onset of the much-anticipated effort by Israel and the West to prevent a nuclear Iran from becoming a reality.

The fallout from Israel’s objection to Iran’s nearing the development of a nuclear capability is the underlying though not the primary cause of the recent friction at Armenia’s border with Iran. As America begins to retrench from the Middle East wars, the overarching regional conflict between Iran and Israel is now shifting over to Azerbaijan and Turkey insisting on taking over Armenia’s borderland contiguous to Iran in violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity. This locus recently coined as the “Zangezur Corridor” would create a land link between Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave located at Armenia’s West to mainland Azerbaijan on Armenia’s East. Strategically, this will allow Turkey – a close ally, an ethnic and linguistic relative of Azeris— to expand its economic reach and political influence through an unobstructed land route that extends from its European border in Eastern Thrace to the Caspian Sea and over to its ancestral lands of Central Asia that border China. This expansion would effectively lay down the foundations of Turkey’s long-envisioned Turanian empire.

The takeover of the Zangezur Corridor has equal, if not more important, economic and geopolitical benefits for Turkey. Back in 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the opening of China’s silk road –a brand new double trade corridor set to reopen channels between China and its neighbors in the West: most notably Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. What makes this plan, also known as the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), critical to understanding the Zangezur Corridor conflict is the fact that the silk road is designed to traverse through Turkey on its way to Europe while circumventing Armenia. Avoidance of Armenia becomes a pivotal geopolitical advantage to China’s competitors.

It is politically well established that China and India are Asia’s major adversaries. Within this complex geopolitical backdrop, China, Pakistan, and Pakistan’s close ally, Turkey including Azerbaijan have developed an unholy alliance against the competing forces of India and Iran. While not necessarily adversarial, as in China-Iran relations, these alliances are real and relevant within the context of the larger economic realities presented by the silk road.

To countervail the effects of the silk road, India has planned an alternative economic trade route of its own to prevent its isolation and compete against China. India’s proposed road to the European market must by necessity circumvent countries that are in alliance with the Chinese plan; namely, and most relevantly within the context of the Zangezur conflict, Turkey and Azerbaijan, which are in solid partnership and political and ideological alliance with India’s perennial nemesis, Pakistan.

This political polarization leaves India with the only alternative option of shipping its goods to Iran via the Arabian Sea and into the Persian Gulf. The goods will then traverse Iran by land to cross the Armenian border of Zangezur –the only friendly route available to reach the Black Sea ports of Georgia to be shipped across to the shores of Europe.

To prevent India from using Iran as its transit hub, Turkey, through its surrogate Azerbaijan has decided to capture the Zangezur Corridor to monopolize the economic trade routes to Europe. By capturing the corridor, Turkey and its client state, Azerbaijan, almost completely encircle Armenia, leaving the border of an unreliably neutral Georgia as Armenia’s only outlet to the outside world. The result is a landlock that foretells a bad omen reminiscent of the days Armenians were subjugated to the whims of their Ottoman overlords.

Azerbaijan has had close diplomatic, economic, and defense industry ties with Israel since relations began in 1992. During Azerbaijan’s war with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region last year, Baku — heavily backed by the Turkish military — deployed Israeli-made Kamikaze (IAI Harop) drones on the battlefield, which when coupled with the highly advanced Turkish Bayrakdar drones caused major havoc on Armenian forces.

Taking advantage of his victory over the defeated Armenian forces, Aliyev, who seems to be in a state of euphoric stupor, appears to be under the spell of his Turkish overlords, who stand to gain the most out of appropriating the Zangezur Corridor. Turkey’s rush to force Armenia to buckle under the pressure and deliver the corridor before it manages to recover from its military defeat is its strategy to strike while the iron is hot and before Western powers begin to intervene for an equitable peace deal.

A series of provocative events directly aimed at pressuring Armenia to give up its Zangezur Corridor with Iran as a pretext to simply link up the two separate parts of Azerbaijan was perceived as a tacit diversionary setup to deny Iran access to Armenia. By forcefully acquiring the Armenian borderland with Iran (i.e., the Zangezur Corridor), Iran would then be alternatively forced to ship the goods through the Turkish/Azerbaijani-acquired Zangezur Corridor to move India’s products to Europe. This would make Turkey and Azerbaijan the beneficiaries of both the Chinese silk road and its Indian counterpart. Iran’s reaction to this is that it will not tolerate any geopolitical or map changes in the Caucasus that would subordinate Iran’s interests to those of its Turkic neighbors.

The intensity of Azerbaijan’s provocative events of recent weeks caused the percolating years-long developments to erupt and enflame relations that had remained dormant for years.

The first signs of provocation began when Turkey, true to its tried and tested methods in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, sent its Syrian Islamist Jihadi terrorists to fight alongside the Azeris against the Armenian forces in last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh war. After the war, Jihadis never left the area. Azerbaijan and Turkey gave the Jihadi terrorists and their families incentives to begin settlements in the region. The precedent of surrounding Iran with settlements of Jihadis of the Sunni denomination of Islam who consider Shiites heretics did not sit well with Iran’s Shia leaders.

Tensions continued to mount between Tehran and Baku when Azerbaijani forces began to block, fine, and in a couple of instances detain, Iranian truck drivers on the Goris-Kapan Highway in Armenia’s Syunik Province where Azerbaijan had managed to occupy a strip of that Armenian land during the Karabakh war. Upon Iranian protest, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev began delivering tirades and in an insulting move displayed a doctored poster of the assassinated Iranian commander of the Quds Force Qasem Soleimani to further provoke Iranian ire.

Tehran took Aliyev’s shenanigans as an affront to Iran’s sovereignty and its right to protect its citizens against unlawful levies and in some instances arrest of its citizen while transporting goods to stranded Armenians in the Artsakh region of Nagorno-Karabakh. In a move to escalate tensions, news emerged that an Azerbaijani assassin allegedly hired by Iran sought to kill wealthy Israeli businesspeople in Cyprus.

To further inflame the situation, Azerbaijan conducted a naval exercise allowing members of the Turkish military to join its naval forces in the Caspian Sea, triggering condemnation from Iran asserting that the exercise violated norms excluding non-bordering countries from deploying forces on Caspian waters.

Having had enough and sensing ulterior motives, Iran began holding large-scale military exercises near the borders of Azerbaijan.

THE UNDERLYING CAUSAL CONNECTION OF THE CONFLICT

The twin fundamental causes that underly the eruption of this conflict is: (A) Iran’s near completion of its nuclear weapons program that Israel considers to be an existential threat to Israel; and ( the existence of known, but officially denied, Israeli military and intelligence bases in Azerbaijan conceivably to facilitate the launching of attacks and offensives against Iran and its nuclear facilities from a closer distance than Israel. Iran expresses “serious concerns” about Israel’s presence in the Caucasus as tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan mount over Baku’s ties with Israel, a major arms supplier.

The crescendo effect of these progressively worsening developments along Iran’s Armenian border has led Iran to mobilize forces and hold military drills close to its northwestern borders with Azerbaijan amid lingering tensions following Azerbaijan’s 44-day war with Armenia last year. In response, Azerbaijan and Turkey launched a joint military drill starting on Wednesday, the 6th of October – an ominous event reminiscent of last year’s drills that took place before the invasion of the Karabakh region.

The ace in the hole in this ongoing conflict is Putin’s role and influence in driving the forces and events that led to the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the unfolding developments and cascading reactions since the end of its kinetic phase. Russia is in the mode of making calculated concessions to Turkey to lure it away from NATO. Albeit adversaries in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, Russia, in an unprecedented move, allowed Turkey to establish a limited foothold in the Caucasus at the cost of facilitating the Armenian defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh by default.

To allay Turkey’s disappointment in denying its full integration into the Caucasus and to further alienate Turkey from the West, Putin offered Turkey the sale of the second tranche of its S-400 missiles and the free rein to capture its grand prize –the Zangezur Corridor. A prize from which Russia could also economically benefit as the two countries would secure a direct land-based passage through the borders between Russia and Azerbaijan to conduct trade.

Washington’s relative silence regarding the latter developments and particularly the anticipated purchase of the additional S-400 missiles from Russia may be a calculated measure awaiting the evolution of the Iran/Azerbaijan conflict that may draw Turkey into the fold. As the United States scales back its commitments throughout the Middle East, as recently manifested in Afghanistan, its reliance on regional partners will only increase. And in the wake of an impending nuclear Iran, the U.S. may very well be encouraging its surrogates Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan to accomplish its objectives. Such a war, sparked by the joint effort of Turkey and Azerbaijan to dispossess Armenia of its Zangezur border with Iran, however, will set the entire Middle East region on hell-fire that will create a tsunami of refugees that will engulf Europe with turmoil and chaos or even wars for decades to come.

In 2019, the United States kicked Turkey out of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program after NATO ally Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 air defense system. The reason the Turks were expelled from the program was that the Russian hardware poses a threat to the security of the technology included in the Lockheed-Martin-made F-35.

And yet, a UK-based Arabic news site Elaph has reported citing a senior Israeli source that two advanced Israeli F-35 stealth fighter jets have been ‘permanently stationed’ in Azerbaijan. The report, published on 2 October, comes at a time of rising tension between Azerbaijan and Iran, with Iran threatening Azerbaijan and accusing it of hosting Israeli forces. If the S-400 indeed poses a threat to the security of the technology included in the F-35 when both weapons are concentrated in the same hands, how can one reconcile the fact that the anti-Iran protagonists in possession of the F-35 slated for use against Iran also have the possession and capacity to use Turkey’s S-400 missiles? It begs the question, could the F-35 be compromised in a quid pro quo exchange? Or do we trust our allies so much that we are willing to take the risk? Or perhaps the U.S. has already retrofitted the F-35 to prevent its vulnerability from the S-400.

Though Azerbaijan denies any Israeli presence on Azeri soil, the denial appears to be specious as this is not the first time reports of Israeli jets in Azerbaijan have emerged. In 2012, Foreign Policy magazine cited four senior American diplomats and military intelligence officers as saying that the U.S. believed Israel had been granted access to an airbase in Azerbaijan. It is well established through other sources including the 2009 U.S. Embassy cable leaks via Wikileaks that Israel and Azerbaijan enjoy close relations, with Israel selling billions of dollars worth of military equipment to Azerbaijan, including sophisticated drones that were heavily relied on to destroy Armenian forces in the 2020 Karabakh war.

But Russian pundits have a different take on the situation. They believe that neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan is in a position to engage Iran in an all-out war that could wreak havoc and devastation with an uncertain outcome. Pakistan is under Chinese influence and thus not inclined to directly participate in a war against Iran unless sanctioned by China.

If by some ill-advised move Turkey decides to attack Iran, it will have some very serious problems with Russia that could lead to its defeat, say the Russians. Moreover, Turkey does not have a unified popular front in support of a war with Iran as Iran does. Despite its various ethnic populations, including some twenty-plus million Azeris, Iran can mobilize its population around its religious Shia faith.

What Russian pundits do not consider is that after its latest adventurism in the region, Turkey is now standing on a slippery slope. Its recent announcement to purchase additional Russian S-400 missiles has further alienated the United States. News of requesting to purchase 40 US-made F-16 fighter jets from the United States,

which some suspect might well be a gambit to set the stage for warplane negotiations with Russia, comes as a classic play of both ends against the middle just days after Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced his government was planning to expand defense ties with Russia. This, while recognizing Crimea as Ukrainian territory seems to unsettle Russia. Russia knows that such recognition is meant to secure Turkey with military bases in the Ukraine, which Russia interprets as a further NATO intrusion upon its near abroad security belt. Regardless, Russia plays along knowing that luring Turkey away from NATO – by offering it, a heretofore denied, limited but concrete access to the Caucasus and a realistic opportunity to manifest its fledgling Pan-Turkist vision— is well worth it. But for Turkey to play both ends of the political chess game cannot but ultimately undermine its strategy.

To minimize the chances of an internal collapse and prevent a general uprising of its ethnic Azeri population that could trigger a copycat effect encouraging the remaining Arab, Baluchi, and Kurdish ethnic groups to take advantage of the opportunity to secede from Iran, Iran devised a strategic rallying cry uniting all Iranians behind the struggle to defeat the Israeli Zionist aggressor. Characterizing the conflict as an anti-Israel crusade triggers the mechanism that could draw universal allegiance to the cause regardless of ethnic affinities. This clever maneuver is a prophylactic measure aimed at drawing the loyalty of the Azeri population who could otherwise empathize with and decide to unite with their Azerbaijani kin.

RUSSIA/TURKEY LONG-TERM STRATEGIC VISION

Iran is the only geographic barrier that impedes the joint long-term ambitious plan of Russia and Turkey to spread their otherwise unilaterally unachievable influence across the Middle East, the Mediterranean basin, and over to South and South East Asia and Africa.

Notwithstanding Israel’s overt policy to destroy or diminish Iranian hegemony over it and the region, there is more reason to believe that the ultimate purpose of instigating and provoking Iran into war is to carry out a Russia/Turkey collusive plan of neutralizing Iran through a blitzkrieg operation. The plan hinges on whether Iran takes the bait. Turkey, including its Syrian Jihadi and Pakistani units, and Azerbaijan with the direct support of Israel presumably attack from the north/northeast of Iran while Pakistan strikes from the southeast. Meanwhile, Russia moves in to close the Armenia/Iran border to lock Iran within its territory and prevent it from activating India’s planned trade route to Europe. The by-product of this collusive plan, however, would likely trigger internal strife and spark secession movements with grave consequences for the entire region and the world. The probability of this collusive plan going into effect could very much be on the table despite the October 13, 2021, Azerbaijan and Iran agreement to de-escalate tensions through dialogue. Iran’s refusal to stop production of a nuclear bomb and/or Russia’s pressure forcing Armenia to allow Azerbaijan and Turkey the right to use its territory through the Zangezur Corridor may quickly reverse that process and spark a war. The collateral beneficiary of this war would, of course, be Israel – a plausible protagonist but not likely the architect.

Minding the fact that for the first time, an Indian Foreign Minister has just visited Armenia, it remains to be seen whether India will proactively take action to countervail the Russia/Turkish/Azerbaijani hostile plans in the region and protect its stake in its planned trade route to Europe through Armenia’s North/South Highway.

Trapped between the claws of the Russian bear, Armenia, with limited sway in conducting a free and independent foreign policy, will need all the diplomatic leverage it can muster from India to protect its Zangezur Corridor. Despite its desire to deepen its relations with India, Armenia will not overtly antagonize Russian interests for fear that the latter may allow a greater calamity than the Karabakh war to devastate the Armenian nation while the rest of the world turns a blind eye as it did during the 2020 war. The 2020 Karabakh war has taught the Armenians the bitter lessons of betrayal by a so-called untrustworthy Russian ally who sold them out when the going was tough. They have learned that history repeats itself and that they are just as all alone as they were during the Genocide of 1915 facing the overwhelming power and enemy forces who have for centuries ravaged their nation.

Ultimately, if Western powers decide, in the interest of preserving their geostrategic leverage, to undermine the ambitious plans of Russia and Turkey, the blitzkrieg strategy against Iran will fail. Only then will we know that the Zangezur Corridor will serve Armenia’s economic future through the India/Iran trade route to Europe; otherwise, Armenia’s loss, to say nothing of outright violation of its territorial integrity, will be Turkey’s gain, not only in monopolizing the transit of both the Chinese and Indian trade routes to Europe but also by offering it the opportunity to inaugurate its long-cherished dream of a Pan-Turkic federation. Notwithstanding the outcome, Russia will still emerge as the clear winner.

Ara Joseph Sarian

Senior Advisor/Analyst Experienced in Risk/ Security & Justice Sector Crisis Management to Effectuate Nation-Building Strategies.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/zangezur-corridor-irans-gateway-europe-turkeys-highway-sarian/

[Yervant1]

Tehran Times, Iran

Oct 17 2021

Deciphering Azerbaijani president's provocations against Iran

1. Politics

October 16, 2021 - 20:40

TEHRAN – Is Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev sleepwalking into a conflict beyond his country’s capacity? Observers in the region gave intriguing answers to this question.

Ever since the sudden eruption of tensions between Tehran and Baku, many pundits and officials in Iran warned about the malign influence of foreigners on the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In the beginning, it was “third-parties” but as Azeri officials went further in their hostile statements against Iran, it became clear what third-parties exactly means. Initially, Iranian officials sought to defuse tensions with Baku through diplomatic channels, the favorite way of Iran in addressing misunderstandings with Azerbaijan.

To this end, Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Seyed Abbas Mousavi held several rounds of talks with Azeri officials in Baku in a bid to de-escalate tensions. But the Azeris took a step further and brought the spat to the media. In the meantime, several Azeri lawmakers made provocative remarks against Iran.

Again, Iranian officialdom avoided a war of words. Instead, some Iranian lawmakers responded to their Azeri counterparts.

But when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev jumped in, Iran found itself in a position to respond to Azeri provocations. But even when Iran decided to respond, it did so quite diplomatically.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian spoke over the phone with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov. During the conversation, the chief Iranian diplomat underlined the need for mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries and stressed that Iran and Azerbaijan must prevent misunderstandings in their relations and it is worthwhile to continue their ties in the right and growing direction quickly.

Meanwhile, many Iranian commentators and officials politely warned that tensions between Baku and Tehran could only serve the interests of Israel, which seeks to turn Azerbaijan into a forward base for its malign activities against Iran.

In fact, some Iranians blame the whole episode on Israel’s provocations. Abdollahian told Bayramov that Tehran and Baku have enemies and the two sides should not give the enemies the opportunity to disrupt relations between the two countries.

Aliyev continued to make controversial remarks against Iran despite Iranian warnings that Israel stands behind the tensions. Tragically, the Azeri president even moved to vindicate Israel while continuing his hostile remarks against Iran.

In the lasted move, he accused Iran of collaborating with Armenia in drug trafficking via Nagorno-Karabakh territories when they were under Armenian occupation, an accusation that drew a strong response from Iran.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh strongly rejected the “astonishing” new allegations made by Aliyev against Iran at the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States, calling them fabricated.

Again, Iran warned of an Israeli role in the drama. Khatibzadeh said such media accusations are only in the interests of the Zionist regime to affect the brotherly relations between the two nations of Iran and Azerbaijan.

Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani implicitly reiterated the same warning. Writing on Twitter, Shamkhani described as “false” Aliyev’s allegation on Iran’s involvement in drug trafficking.

“Ignoring the neighborhood principles & making false statements can’t be a sign of a tact. Accusation against a country that the world recognizes as a hero in the fight against drugs has no effect other than invalidating the speaker's words. Beware of the devil's costly traps,” he tweeted.

So far, Iran has sought to brotherly resolve the dispute which lasted more than expected. But it seems that there are invisible hands prodding Aliyev into prolonging his war of words against Iran. But why?

A Russian expert says Baku is escalating tensions with Iran in a bid to ramp up pressure on it as part of the West’s pressure campaign on Tehran to resume the stalled Vienna nuclear talks over the 2015 nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The expert, Dmitry Solonnikov, who is the director of the Institute of Contemporary Development in Russia, put the Baku-Tehran tensions into the broader context of the current state of play between Iran and the West.

“If there was no statement that Iran is about to build an atomic bomb…, then this confrontation between Azerbaijan and Iran would not have taken place now,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.

If true, this assessment proves that Aliyev is dragging his country into an ill-advised confrontation that will cost his country dearly.

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466096/Deciphering-Azerbaijani-president-s-provocations-against-Iran

[Yervant1]

News.am, Armenia

Oct 17 2021

Armenia Iranologist: Iranian propaganda field has put Azerbaijan president’s regime in corner

10:55, 17.10.2021

Yesterday, the dictator of Baku dared to gossip about the joint alleged involvement of Armenia and Iran in the illegal trafficking of drugs. Iranian studies specialist Vardan Voskanyan, who is also a member of the opposition Homeland party of Armenia, on Saturday wrote this on Facebook.

"Today, the entire Iranian propaganda field has simply put the [Azerbaijani president] Aliyev regime in a corner, also publicizing various information (including from the US State Department website) about Azerbaijan itself being involved in drug smuggling," Voskanyan added.

https://news.am/eng/news/667877.html

Edited October 18, 2021 by Yervant1

[Yervant1]

Oct 22 2021

How Azerbaijan’s anti-Iran policies are backfiring

Meanwhile hawks in Washington are encouraging President Ilham Aliyev to stoke tensions with Tehran.

OCTOBER 22, 2021

Written by
Eldar Mamedov

The hope for de-escalation of tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan following last week’s phone call between their foreign affairs ministers, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Jeyhun Bayramov respectively, has so far proved to be short-lived.

At a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States a few days after the call, Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev accused Iran of using the Nagorno-Karabakh region for drug trafficking to Russia and Europe, without producing any proof. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs pushed back against what it called “Aliyev’s astonishing claims.”

Adding fuel to its anti-Tehran campaign, the regime in Baku detained a number of Azerbaijani Shiite clerics considered “pro-Iranian,” including a former imam of the Baku Djoumah (Friday) mosque Ilgar Ibrahimoglu and Sardar Babaev, the main redactor of the religious website maide.az. Both Ibrahimoglu and Babaev studied in Iran, but while the former was released after a long and detailed interrogation, the latter has been formally charged with treason — a charge that, if the past treatment of religious activists is any guide, is likely to result in a long imprisonment and torture. Baku will also use the case to bolster its credentials in the United States and Europe as a bulwark against Iranian-backed “Islamic extremism.”

These latest incidents strongly suggest that, at least for now, Aliyev is unwilling to dial down tensions with Tehran. Baku’s military success against Armenia has clearly emboldened him to openly challenge its southern neighbor as well. When Iran conducted large scale military drills near the borders of Azerbaijan, its conventional arsenal was widely dismissed on Azerbaijani pro-government websites as no match for Azerbaijan’s Israel- and Turkey-powered high-tech equipment. Aliyev counts on Ankara’s and Tel Aviv’s continued military and diplomatic support as a sufficient deterrent against Tehran.

Israel’s support, in Aliyev’s calculation, should also translate into Washington’s — all the more so when the prospects of reviving the Iran nuclear deal remain uncertain and U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken is warning of “other options” should diplomacy fail.

In this context, as Iran’s relations with its traditional rivals in the Persian Gulf — Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates — are slowly thawing, Azerbaijan is emerging as an alternative staging ground for anti-Iran activities. In fact, since the renewal of the hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, an array of Washington think-tankers sought to expand the conflict to Iran, in hopes that Iranian Azerbaijanis would play act as a stalking horse in fulfilling these hawks’ old dreams — optimally the dismemberment of the country along ethnic lines, or, at least the fostering of armed secessionist movements that would force Tehran to turn inward. Either outcome would be seen as a major win for Israel, Iran’s arch-foe — a key motivation for this group of pundits. With tensions between Tehran and Baku rising, these hawks see that goal within their reach. And Aliyev seems to think that the possible benefits of cozying up to Israel and United States outweighs the risks and costs of angering Iran.

Yet Aliyev’s confidence seems misplaced and counterproductive. Iran’s military exercises near Azerbaijan’s borders were not designed as a preparation for invasion, but rather to get Baku’s attention to Tehran’s displeasure with what it sees as the former’s unfriendly policies. While Iran spent much of the past decade wrestling with the challenges in the Persian Gulf, it paid relatively little attention to the Caucasus. However, Iran has proved to be a highly adaptable, low-cost practitioner of asymmetrical warfare. One sure consequence of Aliyev’s bravado is that Tehran will now focus on strengthening its deterrence against Azerbaijan.

One relatively cost-effective tactic traditionally employed by Tehran to that end is to build up proxies. During the recent tensions with Baku, reports emerged about the creation in Azerbaijan of Hüseynçilər, or Husseynites, after a martyred Shiite imam. It attracted attention with a signature logo of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s elite security force, on its banner. Hüseynçilər, however, for now seem to be more about media hype than a real force.

This is because Azerbaijan presents a different landscape from the countries where Tehran has successfully cultivated proxies, such as Lebanon or Iraq. While nominally majority Shia, the decades of Soviet atheism, followed by a heavy emphasis on secular Turkic nationalism during the independence years eroded Azerbaijan’s connection with Shiism. In fact, the Aliyev administrations — both Ilham and his father and predecessor Heydar — welcomed the spread of Sunnism in the country as a way to distance Azerbaijan from Iran and bring it closer to Turkey. Pro-Turkish sentiment has been greatly reinforced after Azerbaijan’s victory in the war against Armenia.

The government also adopted a somewhat more sophisticated approach to the pockets of committed Shiite believers who still live in the country. While in the past it leaned heavily on repression, it now coopts prestigious religious leaders in an effort to create a sort of national-Shiism, i.e. a variant of faith that is politically pro-state and independent of Iran. One such example is the sheikh Shahin Hasanli, who started in the 1990s as a member of a radical Khomeinist society, and now is part of the official religious establishment. In the midst of the crisis with Iran, Hasanli explicitly distanced himself and fellow Azeri Shiites from Tehran. Rumors in Baku have it that he might replace the current chair of the Board of Caucasus Muslims, a state body in charge of “official Islam,” which is seen as too close to Iran.

Yet there remain a not insignificant number of people in the country disaffected by the corruption and socio-economic inequalities that have grown all too obvious under the Aliyevs’ dynasty. While victory in the war can overshadow these concerns for a while, that won’t last forever. With the secular opposition decimated by Aliyev, it is quite conceivable that, at least to some extent, the discontent will acquire a religious-political form, providing some opening to Tehran in the long run.

Over-emphasizing the Pan-Turkist aspect in its struggle with Tehran is also backfiring on Baku. Stressing the Turkic origins of some of the historical Iranian dynasties, like the Safavids and the Qajars, is not an argument for secession from Iran, as some ideologues in Baku would have it, but rather reinforces the Iranian Azeris’ connection with Iran.

In fact, the recent Baku-Tehran flare-up rekindled the long-dormant view in Iran of the Caucasus as a renegade province cleaved away from it in the 19th century by the Russian empire. The rise of Iranian nationalism, in both its religious and secular forms, is another long-term consequence that Aliyev and his supporters failed to foresee. One of its implications is that Tehran has already started pivoting to Yerevan, thus ironically making Baku’s claims of its pro-Armenian tilt a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, Iran decided to use Armenia, rather than Azerbaijan, as its conduit for North-South trade, a project into which Azerbaijan has invested a big deal as a ticket to its post-oil prosperity.

While such projects are more of a long-term nature, Iran already possesses its ultimate conventional deterrent: its missiles whose range covers Azerbaijan’s entire territory. Iran has demonstrated its ability to strike with precision on Saudi oilfields, despite Riyadh’s close security relationship with the United States. Admittedly, such a strike would signify a massive escalation and invite retaliation, possibly with the participation of Turkey, so the threshold for undertaking it would be extremely high. However, Iranian leaders have amply demonstrated in the past that, if pushed into a corner, they would not hesitate to lash out at their perceived enemies. Thus, Aliyev’s newfound pugnacity and provocation towards Iran risks undermining Azerbaijan’s long-term security.

This article reflects the personal views of the author and not necessarily the opinions of the S&D Group and the European Parliament.

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/10/22/how-azerbaijans-anti-iran-policies-are-backfiring/

[Yervant1]

Tehran Times, Iran

Oct 24 2021

Iranian trade delegations visit Armenia seeking expansion of ties

1. Economy
   

October 24, 2021 - 12:5

TEHRAN – Two Iranian trade delegations have visited Armenia over the past month to explore avenues of mutual cooperation in various areas including plastic, polymers, agriculture, and foodstuff with Armenian counterparts, Iran’s commercial attaché in Yerevan announced.

“During their visit, the delegations examined the export potentials and barriers to trade cooperation between the two countries,” IRNA quoted Akbar Godari as saying on Friday.

According to the official, one of the mentioned delegations was comprised of businessmen and traders active in the polymer and plastics industry while the other one was mainly focused on agriculture and foodstuff areas.

During their visit, the polymer and plastics delegation met with the Iranian Ambassador to Yerevan, Abbas Badakhshan Zohuri, to discuss geopolitical issues, the importance of the Armenian market, the country’s trade-related laws and regulations, as well as issues related to mutual coproduction, Godari said.

“Chairman of Iran-Armenia Joint Chamber of Commerce Hervik Yarijanian, in a meeting with the Iranian delegation, emphasized the development of trade between the two countries and noted that the existing obstacles are hindering the growth and development of mutual exports and trade,” he added.

One of the requests of the businessmen in the meeting with Yarijanian was to exchange trade delegations while holding exhibitions in Iran, Godari said.

The agriculture and foodstuff delegation also met with the Iranian ambassador in Yerevan and also held talks with Yarijanian.

During their visit, they also visited some of Armenia’s major markets and held B2B meetings with their Armenian counterparts.

Earlier, Yarijanian had said that Iran-Armenia trade has fluctuated up to $500 million in recent years.

“By launching Moghri free zone in Armenia, next to the Aras free zone in Iran, the volume of exchanges between the two countries can be increased,” he stressed.

According to the official, the trade between the two countries can be increased to over $1.2 billion in less than a year.

EF/MA

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466272/Iranian-trade-delegations-visit-Armenia-seeking-expansion-of

[Yervant1]

Tehran Times, Iran

Oct 25 2021

Iran reaches agreement with Armenia on new transport routes

1. Economy
   

October 25, 2021 - 15:39

TEHRAN - Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) Mehdi Mirashrafi said good agreements have been reached with Armenia on the development of customs cooperation as well as the use of alternative routes for the transport of goods.

Mirashrafi who visited Moscow on Sunday to attend an international customs conference noted that Iran has diversified its international routes so that no single route could impose a limitation on the country’s international trade.

Earlier this month, Deputy Transport and Urban Development Minister Kheirollah Khademi had announced an agreement between Iran and Armenia for establishing new transit routes, as the two countries are facing problems in trade exchanges through Azerbaijan.

“The alternative transit route for Iranian trucks in Armenia will be asphalted within the next month, and there will be no need to use the previous route which passes through Azerbaijan and requires us to pay tolls to the country,” Khademi said.

Azerbaijan is controlling and claiming ownership for approximately 20 km out of a 400 km route between Iran and Armenia and has imposed strict regulations on Iranian drivers which are posing major problems for them passing through the 20-kilometer section of Armenia’s Goris-Kapan Road including paying tolls levied by Azerbaijani border guards.

Mirashrafi further pointed to the positive talks held with the members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) during the conference, saying: “The volume of trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union has taken an upward path, and with the agreements reached, we will soon see a leap in trade relations with the member countries of this union.”

Referring to the importance of land crossings for the export and import of goods between Iran and Russia, the official said: "Completing the maritime and road infrastructure and providing more customs facilities, especially in the Caspian Sea region, can increase trade [between the two countries]."

In addition to ground roads, Iran has routes in the Caspian Sea through Ro-Ro ships to Azerbaijan Republic, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, Mirashrafi added.

EF/MA

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466319/Iran-reaches-agreement-with-Armenia-on-new-transport-routes

[Yervant1]

Jamestown Foundation

Oct 27 2021

Tensions in Tehran-Baku Relations: Iran’s New Transit Routes in Armenia and the Caspian Sea Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 163 By: Vali Kaleji

October 27, 2021 07:32 PM Age: 18 hours

Although many observers assumed that the recent uptick in tensions between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan (see EDM, October 6) would die down following the telephone calls between Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov (Al Jazeera, October 13), subsequent public remarks by the latter country’s President Ilham Aliyev again incensed Tehran. In his comments at an October 15 session of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Aliyev mentioned that Azerbaijan “has blocked a drug trafficking route from Iran through [the] Jabrayil district of Azerbaijan to Armenia and further to Europe” (Azernews, October 15). In reaction to this statement, Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani said that, “Ignoring the principles and requirements of the neighborhood and making false and unconstructive statements is not a sign of good faith and prudence” (Mehrnews, October 15). Weeks earlier, responding to an interview the Azerbaijani president gave to the Turkish outlet Anadolu Agency, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Saeed Khatibzadeh, declared, “Aliyev’s remarks are surprising because they come at a time when Tehran and Baku have good relations based on mutual respect and there are normal channels through which the two sides can talk at the highest level” (Anadolu Agency, September 28).

The recent antagonism between Tehran and Baku has had several consequences, including, notably, pushing Iran to seek out alternative transit routes to reach Armenia (and Georgia) as well as Russia. The catalyst was the Azerbaijani government’s decision to place restrictions on Iranian trucks traveling via the Goris–Kapan highway—a key segment of the main land route that links southern and northern Armenia and is part of a 400-kilometer road network stretching from Norduz, Iran, to the Armenian capital. Much of this highway straddles a disputed section of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border (see EDM, May 18, June 21) or turns deeply into Azerbaijani territory outright. Following the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020), roughly 21 km of that Soviet-era road in Armenia’s Syunik region, has been under Azerbaijani control.

Disputed area of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Goris-Kapan road. Red: Armenia. Blue: Azerbaijan. White Lines: Lachin Corridor. Purple: Karabakh under Russian peacekeeping force. (Source: Ana-Press)

Since early 2021, Azerbaijan has been setting up border guard posts and erecting signs reading “Welcome to Azerbaijan” on its sections of the highway and, on August 25, blockaded a section of it for nearly 48 hours. The situation was resolved with the help of Russian border guards, who patrol the Armenian side of the border (EurasiaNet, September 7). After these developments, Azerbaijan’s State Customs Committee stated that Iranian vehicles traveling along the Goris–Kapan highway are subject to a “state duty [$130] for the issuance of a permit regulating international road transport in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan” (Customs.gov.az, September 13). Iranian truck drivers protested, saying that their destination was Armenia and not the Republic of Azerbaijan; moreover, they already have to pay a toll at the Norduz-Moghari Border Gate, on the border between Iran and Armenia, so they should not need to pay again. The vehement opposition and resistance of some Iranian drivers led to two arrests by Azerbaijani forces, further straining relations between Tehran and Baku.

Goris-Kapan highway (Source: topcor.ru)

In response, the Iranian government decided to define alternative routes to prevent the disruption of Iranian transit and trade with Armenia, Georgia, Russia and the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The first alternative land corridor is the Tatev–Aghvani route, which entirely bypasses Azerbaijani territory. Iran has announced it would complete the unfinished portion of this road inside Armenia. And a technical delegation led by the head of Iran’s Construction and Development of Transport Infrastructures Company, Deputy Minister Kheirollah Khademi, visited Armenia to discuss completion of the Tatev–Aghvani route. Moreover, Iran has offered financial and technical support to Armenia, which plans to build a 550 km North–South Road Corridor that will traverse the entire country, beginning at the Iranian-Armenian border, but, critically, not cross into Azerbaijani territory (Fars News, October 4). Of course, it should be noted that the Tatev–Aghvani road was used prior to the recent developments along the Goris–Kapan highway. However, the Tatev–Aghvani route is notorious for its steep slopes and narrow passes that trucks have a difficult time traversing, particularly in rainy and snowy conditions. As such, the governments of Iran and Armenia hope to wholly reconstruct and improve the safety of this highway, specifically with truck transit in mind.

North-South Road Corridor in Armenia (Source: upgyumri.org)

Iran’s second reaction to the Azerbaijani restrictions placed on the Goris–Kapan highway was to strengthen the Caspian Sea as a maritime alternative to the north-south land route across Azerbaijan to Russia. Thus, the director general of the Gilan Ports and Maritime Organization, Hamidreza Abaei, noted, “The destination of [iranian] trucks carrying export goods is mainly Russia; a small number of trucks have Armenia and Azerbaijan as their final destinations. Given the problems created by Azerbaijan for Iranian trucks, the best-case scenario would be that all Iranian trucks reach Russia or Armenia directly by sea” (Eghtesad Online, October 6). To achieve this, Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization (TPO) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) on cooperation in launching Caspian Sea shipping lines from Iran to Russia and Kazakhstan. Accordingly, in the first phase, six lines will be launched from the northern ports of Iran to the ports of Astrakhan and Makhachkala in Russia, as well as the port of Aktau in Kazakhstan as of October 23. In the second phase, by the end of the current Iranian calendar year (late March 2022), the number of these lines will increase to eight (Port News, October 15).

If the land corridor is important for Iran’s trade and transit with Armenia and Georgia, the maritime route is crucial for Iran’s transit and trade with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. In particular, negotiations are underway to convert the Iran-EEU Preferential Trade Agreement into a free trade agreement, which is expected to take effect in November 2022. Tehran is worried that its ability to increase the volume of trade with the EEU, especially Russia, will be hampered by restrictions on the land transit routes across the Caucasus.

The outcome of the Second Karabakh War inadvertently brought to the fore old and new tensions and disputes between Iran and Azerbaijan. If these remain unresolved, they threaten to derail ongoing planning and development on multiple strategic, trans-border transit projects, including the North-South International Transit Corridor (Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia) as well as the completion of the Rasht–Astara railroad—the sole remaining rail piece of this corridor. In contrast, progress on the Tatev–Aghvani road promises to strengthen bilateral relations between Iran and Armenia, which were somewhat damaged during the Second Karabakh War, as well as facilitate the development of the Persian Gulf–Black Sea Transit Corridor via Armenia and Georgia.

Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies in Tehran, Iran.

https://jamestown.org/program/tensions-in-tehran-baku-relations-irans-new-transit-routes-in-armenia-and-the-caspian-sea/

[Yervant1]

Iran Front Page

Oct 28 2021

Armenian denies withdrawing from border region

By

IFP Editorial Staff

-

October 28, 2021

Armenia’s prime minister denies media reports that the country has withdrawn forces from Syunik a province bordering Iran. Nikol Pashinian was responding to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s claim about the so-called Zangezur corridor before parliament.

Pashinian said there has been no change in the posture of the Armenian troops in Syunik province.

He added, “Our border guards have been serving in the posts since December 2020”. The denial from Pashnian comes after repeated claims by Azerbaijani officials about the Zangezur corridor near the Iranian border.

Aliyev has threatened to capture the corridor by force and in violation of the UN Charter. Azeri officials stand accused of causing tension over “Zangezur” through resorting to propaganda after the country signed a truce with Armenian in November 2020, ending their 44-day bloody war.

They claim that during the ceasefire talks, Azerbaijan Republic and Armenia agreed on carving out a swath of land linking Nakhjavan to Azerbaijan.

This is while the 9-point agreement does not make any reference to the issue. Only Article 9 says Armenia has agreed to open closed routes for transportation between Azerbaijan’s west and Nakhjavan.

The wording does not say anything about the creation of a corridor which would eliminate the border and deprive Iran of access to Armenia’s transit route.

Obviously, Baku is making an effort to insinuate its own narrative and interpretation of Article 9 of the truce deal through resorting to propaganda.

https://ifpnews.com/armenian-denies-withdrawing-from-border-region

[Yervant1]

Tehran Times, Iran

Oct 31 2021

Armenian president hails ties with Iran

1. Politics

October 31, 2021 - 21:36

TEHRAN — Emphasizing that his country's relations with Iran as a neighbor have always been good, the Armenian president has said what happened during the war in southern Armenia in 2020 was directly related to Iran.

"Iran is our neighbor. What happened during the war in southern Armenia is directly related to Iran. This section is on the border with Iran, it would be surprising if Iran did not say anything about it in general," Armen Sarkissian told Russia's RBK television, ISNA reported on Saturday.

The Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia fought over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories. Fighting began on September 27, 2020, and lasted for more than 40 days.

Regarding the reasons behind Armenia's good relations with Iran in comparison to a year ago, Sarkissian noted: "First of all, I do not agree with you. Iran-Armenia relations have always been good. Unlike Turkey, the Iranian government has provided financial support for the preservation of Armenian cultural and religious centers."

On the view that relations have become closer after the war, the Armenian president answered, "Iran is our neighbor. What happened during the war in southern Armenia is directly related to Iran. This section is on the border with Iran, it would be surprising if Iran did not say anything about it in general."

With regard to Iran's concerns in the face of Turkey's measures, Sarkissian highlighted that Iran had the right to be worried about many things, so it was their right to express their views and the neighbors must listen to it.

“Iran-Armenia relations have always been good.”

"God willing, other players in the region will hear the same views. The point is that after the war, many began to say that during the war it was very difficult to get international support from various organizations and governments that actively supported the idea of ending the war."

Of course, there were countries that were very friendly, like France, which was worried about the war, the Armenian president stated.

But, he said, other European countries were not active and “now after the war, everyone has started talking actively.”

Though Iran said the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan should be respected by Armenia, the Baku government has adopted an unfriendly approach toward Iran and made accusations against Iran and Yerevan.

Contrary to the Caspian Sea legal regime, Azerbaijan also invited Turkey and Pakistan for a joint maneuver in the sea.

Azeri President Ilham Aliyev went too far in his anti-Iran rhetoric. On October 15, he claimed that Iran and Armenia have been using the Nagarno-Karabakh territory for years to smuggle drugs to Europe."

“After restoring its 130-kilometer border with Iran, which was under Armenian control for 30 years, Azerbaijan stopped the illegal trafficking of narcotics from Iran to Armenia and on to Europe through Azerbaijan’s Jebrail district,” Aliyev claimed during a virtual summit of the former Soviet republics.

At the same virtual meeting, Armenian Prime Minister Nicole Pashinyan rejected the allegations. “I want to point out that we have been very closely cooperating with Iran’s law-enforcement bodies and very productively fighting against drug trafficking,” said Pashinian.

Shortly after Aliyev's remarks, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said the allegations by the Azeri president are “astonishing”.

The Armenian prosecutor's office has issued a statement on the joint Iranian-Armenian fight against drug trafficking, saying the allegations by Aliyev were "baseless".

The prosecutor’s office stated that in 2020, thirteen criminal cases were filed against drug trafficking on the Iranian-Armenian border and 14 people were charged. The statement also said that in the first nine months of 2021, 12 cases were investigated and 24 people were charged.

At the end of the statement, the prosecutor's office said: "All this information confirms that the accusations made by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, have nothing to do with reality and are fabricated. These allegations, which lack real data and are intended to discredit Iran and Armenia, have been doomed to failure from the outset. These accusations are to hide the fact that Azerbaijan itself is a transit country for drug trafficking."

On October 19, the Iranian director of headquarters for the fight against narcotics, Eskandar Momeni, urged Azerbaijani officials to respect the public opinion and to see the position of Iran in the fight against narcotics trafficking.

“Despite the cruel sanctions, our efforts to combat drug trafficking have intensified and we call on other countries to cooperate in this regard,” he emphasized.

Aliyev failed to produce any proof of his allegations that Iran is helping Armenia to smuggle drugs to Europe.

Iran is the leading country in the fight against narcotics worldwide.

According to the UN Office, the Islamic Republic's continuous efforts to combat narcotics trafficking came up with the seizure of more than 90 percent of opium, 70 percent of morphine, and 20 percent of world heroin.

Despite the conditions caused by the coronavirus outbreak and the imposition of harsh sanctions against the country, with the efforts of anti-narcotics police in 2020, drug detection increased by 41 percent.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, about 3,800 Iranian security forces have been martyred and about 12,000 wounded or disabled in the fight against drug trafficking.

The UNODC has praised Iran’s efforts to fight against narcotics trafficking on the occasion of International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.

The organization also officially announced that the world’s first place in the discovery of opium, heroin, and morphine belongs to Iran.

According to UNODC, Iran remains one of the major transit routes for drug trafficking from Afghanistan to European countries and has had a leading role at the global level in drug-control campaigns.

UNODC World Drug Report 2020 estimates that in 2018, 91 percent of world opium, 48 percent of the world morphine, and 26 percent of the world heroin were seized by Iran.

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466543/Armenian-president-hails-ties-with-Iran

[Yervant1]

Press TV, Iran

Nov 1 2021

Iran starts free trade talks with EAEU in Armenia

Monday, 01 November 2021 6:38 PM [ Last Update: Monday, 01 November 2021 6:38 PM ]

An Iranian trade delegation starts talks with the EAEU in Yerevan to reach a deal on free trade.

Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) have started three-day talks in the Armenian capital to discuss a potential free trade deal between the two sides, the official IRNA news agency has reported.

The Monday report said that a delegation led by officials from the Trade Promotion Organization (TPO) of Iran had started talks with EAEU representatives in Yerevan to see how the two sides can go beyond a preferential trade agreement that was signed two years ago.

It said all five members of the EAEU, namely Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus, are represented in the talks with the Iranian delegation which includes officials from the Iranian government and high-profile figures from the country’s private sector.

TPO’s head of international and trade contracts affairs Mir Hadi Seyyedi said that Iran and the EAEU had previously held seven rounds of virtual meetings to discuss the potential free trade deal.

“It is expected that an agreement can be reached in Yerevan meeting on many unresolved issues,” said Seyyedi, adding that the two sides will meet again in Tehran on December 6 to discuss tariff issues.

Iran to sign free trade deal with Syria in November: TPO chief

Iran’s trade minister will travel to Syria in late November to sign a free trade deal with the country.

He said that the two sides have reached an initial agreement to extend free trade arrangements to 80 percent of goods covered in the preferential trade deal signed in November 2019.

Figures published by the Iranian customs administration (IRICA) in July showed that trade with the EAEU had accounted for some 4.6% of Iran’s total trade in the year to late March.

Trade with Russia, which reached nearly $2.61 billion in value terms, had accounted for 77% of Iran’s exchanges with the economic bloc over the same period, according to the same IRICA figures.

https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2021/11/01/669729/Iran-free-trade-talks-EAEU-bloc

[Yervant1]

Armenpress.com

Armenian, Iranian General Prosecutors reach agreement on jointly withstanding new challenges

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21:44, 1 November, 2021

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 1, ARMENPRESS. The Prosecutors General of Armenia and Iran, recording the achievements, have reached agreements to jointly withstand new challenges, ARMENPRESS reports the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Armenia Arthur Davtyan said in an interview with the Public TV, referring to the recent visit of the Prosecutor General of Iran Mohammad Jafar Montazeri to Armenia.

“Among these agreements, I attach great importance to the joint will to clear the region from terrorists, to the need to fully implement the legal mechanisms, about which he, my Iranian counterpart, spoke very clearly. Back in the first days of the war, when we already received the first factual information about the presence of mercenary terrorists in the region, especially in the southern part of Artsakh, taking into account also our partnering relations, I informed my colleague about it, because it was the border area with Iran. There were reasonable doubts and risks that the terrorists recognized no borders, there could be any movement. This was appreciated by my colleague, and the necessary preventive measures were taken. Today, they also have clear facts about the activities of terrorists in the region and the area I mentioned, and their existence today, and the need to fight against this evil through joint legal mechanisms was recorded”, Davtyan said.

 

 

https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1067033.html?fbclid=IwAR3n9NboTZ5qxtbvbLxVyTf5okj7NO2LTakDhImId1X9MpJ3xDbK_7FYl-E

[Yervant1]

Tehran Times

Nov 6 2021

3+3 format on Karabakh: The best way forward

1. Politics

November 6, 2021 - 21:37

TEHRAN – With tensions in the South Caucasus subsiding by the day, diplomatic contacts between the countries of the region take on a renewed importance in terms of avoiding misunderstanding.

Over the past few days, several meetings and phone conversations were held between officials and diplomats from the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, and Iran, marking a remarkable rise in diplomatic interactions involving the key stakeholders of the South Caucasus region.

Of all the statements resulting from these interactions, remarks by Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Alexei Overchuk during his visit to Armenia stood out as the most important development in the region.

Overchuk met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and discussed a number of issues, particularly the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

It seems that the most important issue discussed by Overchuk and Pashinyan was the opening of transit links in the region, especially those connecting Azerbaijan with the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

During the meeting, Pashinyan complained that “Azerbaijan is trying to impose its perceptions on the commission” tasked with following up on the statements of November 9 and January 11, which refer to the unblocking of all transport and economic ties in the region.

“Armenia should get road and railway communication routes through Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan should receive railway and road communication routes through Armenia, including one connecting Azerbaijan to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic,” Pashinyan told Overchuk, according to ARMENPRESS.

The Russian official, in turn, pointed to the transport links in the region and said that Azerbaijan and Armenia, together with Russia, have reached a “very good understanding” of the links.

Overchuk then uttered something for the first time in public: the links would be under the jurisdiction of countries using them.

“The roads remain under the jurisdiction of the countries through which they pass,” he said.

This has once again raised alarm bells in Tehran which has repeatedly warned that it accepts no change in the international borders in the Caucasus region.

The Russian official did not openly say that the transit links between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan would be under the jurisdiction of Baku. But it goes without saying that Azerbaijan would be the first country to use them. So, did Overchuk mean that Armenia would give away its border with Iran? There is no clear answer yet.

And this ambiguity is another reason for Russia, as the lead mediator in the region, to work closely with all countries involved in the Caucasus region, including Iran, which shares borders with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and is concerned that changes in Armenia’s southern border would come at an irreversible geopolitical cost for it.

This may explain Iran’s quick diplomatic moves on Saturday to get support from the region’s stakeholders for reviving a regional platform called 3+3 format that includes Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia and their three big neighbors- Russia, Turkey, and Iran.

The format was proposed by Russia in early October but has since been shelved. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian expressed support for the format during his Saturday phone conversations with his Russian and Azerbaijani counterparts.

During conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Amir Abdollahian said, “Iran supports regional talks in the format of 3+3 or other formats upon which all sides agree in order to resolve the disputes in the region and to expand regional cooperation.”

He reiterated this message in the conversation with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, underlining that “Iran supports regional talks in the format of 3+3 or other formats and believes regional problems can be resolved using regional mechanisms.”

But despite the Iranian insistence, differences between Azerbaijan and Armenia are being addressed in a trilateral format rather than the 3+3 one. And the trilateral formant seems to have not ensured the interests of all the stakeholders.

Overchuk said he held 8 meetings with his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts, with the last meeting being held on October 22. “Based on these data, after the 8th session of the joint working group held on October 22, it seems to us that we will reach concrete solutions,” he said.

And these solutions have apparently resulted in giving Azerbaijan full control over Iran-Armenia borders.

https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/466752/3-3-format-on-Karabakh-The-best-way-forward

[Yervant1]

Public Radio of Armenia

Nov 6 2021

Sovereignty and territorial integrity will be respected: Russia comments on so-called “Zangezur Corridor”

November 6, 2021, 13:11

1 minute read

Unblocking of regional transport routes will open up additional perspectives for Armenia and Russia in the realization of the “North-South” project, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement ahead of the anniversary of the trilateral statement signed by leaders of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan on November 9, 2020, TASS reports.

The Ministry reminded that as a result of eight sessions of the working group under the co-chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, a report was presented describing specific rail and road routes to restore communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan with access to transport communications of neighboring countries, which, it said, will increase transit attractiveness of the region and will attract additional investment.

“It is important, especially in light of the media reports on the situation around the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor,’ that all participants of the trilateral working group have agreed that all unblocked and newly created transport routes will operate on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states through which they pass,” the Ministry stated.

 

https://en.armradio.am/2021/11/06/sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity-will-be-respected-russia-comments-on-so-called-zangezur-corridor/

[Yervant1]

EurasiaNet.org

Nov 19 2021

Perspectives | Iran-Azerbaijan: A new cold war? The short-term crisis between the two neighbors has dissipated. But in the longer term, relations have gotten a lot more complicated.Eldar Mamedov Nov 19, 2021

The Khodaafarin Bridge on the Azerbaijan-Iran border. (president.az)

As tensions subsided following weeks of saber-rattling and hostile rhetoric, the foreign ministers of Iran and Azerbaijan had a November 5 phone call in which they blamed “ill-wishers” for trying to exploit “recent misunderstandings between the two neighbors,” as the Iranian readout put it.

But the short-term rapprochement and blame-shifting only serves to obscure larger shifts in the relationship: While the war games and insults have abated, diverging geopolitical choices continue to pull Baku and Tehran in opposite directions, augmenting the risks of periodic eruptions in the future.

Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war against Armenia, achieved with Turkish and Israeli support and Russian acquiescence, convinced Baku that its military-diplomatic strategy was vindicated and that there is little reason to alter it. Iran, by contrast, was sidelined by the war: Its peace plans proposed during the fighting elicited little interest in Baku, and Tehran has been unhappy about post-war developments, particularly by its arch-foe Israel’s expansion of its foothold on Iran’s northern borders.

With its newly consolidated alliances and fresh military confidence, Baku felt it could largely ignore its southern neighbor’s concerns. That explains the arrest in September of two Iranian truck drivers transiting Azerbaijani-controlled land en route to Armenian-controlled parts of Karabakh. While the incident could have been resolved through quiet backroom diplomacy between the two capitals, Baku chose to send a public message to Tehran that it won’t tolerate what it saw as encroachments on its sovereignty. That triggered unprecedented Iranian military exercises next to the Azerbaijani border.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev tried to put on a brave face but couldn’t hide his surprise and unease about Tehran’s escalations. While pro-government websites responded to the crisis by extolling the might of Azerbaijan’s armed forces, military confrontation with Iran – a country with eight times the population – clearly is not in Baku’s interests. All the more so because even Baku’s main ally, Turkey, is unlikely to fight a war with Iran on Azerbaijan’s behalf.

In recent years relations between Turkey and Iran have been on a downward spiral in several areas. The South Caucasus is one of them, as Tehran resents Ankara’s expanding reach there, most of all its rising influence in Baku. Both sides, however, have been mindful not to let things deteriorate too badly and have taken steps to de-escalate. On November 15, Iran Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian shared his “delight” at hosting his “brother” and Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in Tehran. That visit was reportedly a precursor to a visit to Tehran by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during which some kind of roadmap for future relations is expected to be discussed.

Even if such a document were to be signed, it likely wouldn’t drastically change the current trajectory of Turkish-Iranian relations. With political Islam receding in Turkey, and conservative nationalism resurgent, Ankara will continue to bolster its alliance with Baku while trying to expand its influence further east into the Turkic republics of Central Asia.

That explains Turkey’s support for a transportation route linking it with Azerbaijan (what Baku calls the “Zangezur corridor”) through Armenia, potentially cutting off Iran. But preserving channels of dialogue can make the differences between Ankara and Tehran more manageable. Turkey also realizes that, should relations sour further, Iran can leverage its ties with the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) against Ankara. Policymakers in Baku would be wise to realize the limits of the Turkish support in any potential future conflagration with Tehran.

Azerbaijan’s close relations with Israel represent a different set of variables. Baku strongly benefited from Israel’s military technology, particularly drones, during the war with Armenia. Pro-Israel organizations also are a mainstay of Baku’s lobbying efforts in Washington directed, in no small degree, to neutralizing the rival Armenian lobby and blunting human rights criticisms. In exchange, Azerbaijan is expected to continue providing a platform for Israel’s intelligence activities aimed at Iran.

Meanwhile – already after the latest Baku-Tehran spat cooled down – the state-run Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy is proudly hosting a member of a group of Washington pundits who openly advocate for Iran’s dismemberment on ethnic lines because that, in their view, would benefit Israel. In this context, given the bellicose statements from Israeli officials concerning Iran’s nuclear program and the uncertainty surrounding the revival of the multilateral agreement that held it in check, Tehran continues to see Azerbaijan as a potential staging ground for an Israeli military attack.

This growing threat perception is leading Iran to build up its deterrence against Baku. Recently, the influential website Iranian Diplomacy, linked to former high-ranking diplomat Sadeq Kharrazi, published an article criticizing the government’s purported “appeasement policy towards Ankara and Baku” and calling for a more robust defense of “Iran’s national interests in the north.”

In practical terms, one immediate way of doing so is for Iran to pivot towards Armenia. Many in Baku saw the recent trucking spat as ending in Azerbaijan’s favor, as Iran committed to banning its trucks from travelling to Nagorno-Karabakh. The reality, however, is more complex: While Tehran indeed conceded on that issue, it also has made it clear that it will henceforth prefer Armenia, rather than Azerbaijan, as its conduit for north-south trade, thus depriving Azerbaijan of some potentially lucrative business opportunities.

Resurgence of irredentism

Other Iranian moves could be even more fraught for Azerbaijan. Iran’s efforts to cultivate pro-Iranian constituencies, primarily through Shiite religious organizations, have not yet borne fruit. Few in Azerbaijan are attracted to the Iranian system of governance, and not all devout Shiites are pro-Iran.

But over decades of international ostracism, Iran has developed highly adept skills of asymmetric warfare. The fact that Tehran today lacks any credible proxies or allies in Azerbaijan does not mean that it won’t keep trying. Iran will simply adapt to a strategic landscape that is different from Lebanon or Iraq, where the “proxy strategy” has so far proved more successful.

Internal developments in Azerbaijan and Iran, meanwhile, are contributing to a deepening of the divide between the two nations.

Authorities in Baku have been using the crisis with Tehran to launch a crackdown on alleged “Iran sympathizers” in the country, by closing down a number of Shiite religious websites and detaining some prominent Shiite clerics, even though the evidence of their pro-Iranian activity is flimsy at best. Meanwhile, the state-affiliated media continue to accuse Iran in harsh terms of meddling in Azerbaijani affairs.

While in Azerbaijan there has been a resurgence of irredentism inspired by the thought of “reunifying” the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the northern Iranian provinces largely populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis and known to nationalists as “southern Azerbaijan,” in Iran a countervailing movement also has gained momentum.

From this angle, it is Azerbaijan that must be reunified with the “Iranian motherland” after being forcibly incorporated into the Russian empire in the 19th century. These views have gained fresh prominence in Iran, especially on the level of public discourse. The influential reformist daily Shargh is instrumental in disseminating them. But such views are not limited only to reformist circles, as Iranian nationalism is increasingly serving as a glue around which different segments of the population can rally.

With both Baku and Tehran digging in on their current foreign policy trajectories, and public attitudes in both countries increasingly seeing each other through an adversarial lens, both neighbors appear destined to continue on this collision course for the foreseeable future.

 

Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament. This article reflects his personal views and not necessarily the opinions of the S&D Group and the European Parliament.

https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-iran-azerbaijan-a-new-cold-war

[Yervant1]

Iran Front Page

Nov 25 2021

‘Iranian companies ready to boost presence in Armenia’

By

IFP Editorial Staff

-

November 25, 2021

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian has described the Iran-Armenia relations as strong and progressing during a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan.

During the phone call, the two top diplomats exchanged views over different issues including bilateral ties, economic cooperation, the Joint Economic Commission of the two countries, regional and international developments.

Amir Abdollahian expressed satisfaction with the growing trend in the Tehran-Yerevan relations over the recent months. He underlined the importance of expanding cooperation between the two sides in the political, economic and other fields.

Iran’s foreign minister said Iranian companies are ready to boost their presence in Armenia and expressed hope that the Join Economic Commission of Iran and Armenia will convene as soon as possible.

The top Iranian diplomat also said the Islamic Republic will not accept any change in the borders of countries in the region.

Amir Abdollahian also voiced concern over the recent hostilities in the Caucasus region and urged restraint and respect for territorial integrity of countries.

The Armenian foreign minister also referred to the proposed roadmap of relations between Iran and Armenia which was emphasized during his recent visit to Tehran. Mirzoyan said Yerevan is ready to hold the Joint Economic Commission and expand trade ties with Tehran.

He thanked the Islamic Republic for its support of the territorial integrity of countries and stressed Armenia’s resolve to boost relations in all fields with Iran.

Iran and Armenia have enjoyed good political and economic relations. Armenia recently built a transit route for Iranian trucks after the Azerbaijan Republic imposed levies on vehicles using another road that passed through

https://ifpnews.com/iranian-companies-ready-to-boost-presence-in-armenia

[Yervant1]

News.am

Nov 28 2021

Iran President: Any change of political geography of the region will incite further tension

20:18, 28.11.2021

The ceasefire in the Caucasus will symbolize the start of a new chapter for development and integration in the region. This is what President of Iran Ebrahim Raisi said in his speech at the Summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization in Ashgabat, IRNA reports.

“Taking into consideration the new conditions in the Caucasus, Iran believes the restoration of the traditional routes and ease of trade turnover and movement of passengers may contribute to the growth and development of the Economic Cooperation Organization in three decades. We also believe any change of the political geography in the region will not contribute to stability in the region, but it will prepare ground for tension in the future,” he stated.

“The cooperation between countries of the Caucasus will be hinged on mutual respect and maintenance of the territorial integrity of the countries, and the international rules will help ensure peace and stability,” the Iranian president emphasized.

According to him, stability in the Caucasus and the establishment of interregional cooperation such as the creation of the Persian Gulf-Black Sea international corridor will help accelerate the trade-economic exchange between member states of the Economic Cooperation Organization.

https://news.am/eng/news/674728.html

[Yervant1]

Panorama, Armenia

Dec 22 2021

Tehran will not tolerate any territorial change in the region, member of Iranian Majlis says

The Secretary of Armenia's Security Council Armen Grigoryan received on Wednesday the members of the Iran-Armenia Parliamentary Friendship Group of the Iranian Majlis, who are paying a working visit to Armenia.

As the press service at the Security Council reported, at the beginning of the meeting, a member of the Standing Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy of the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadi Bigash thanked Grigoryan for the opportunity to meet. In his turn, Armen Grigoryan, welcoming Mr Bighash, emphasized that the Armenia-Iran friendly relations have been developing intensively lately.

In his speech, Mahmoud Ahmadi Bilash emphasized the role of the South Caucasus for Iran. In particular, he stressed that regional stability and security, inviolability of borders are red lines for Iran, and Tehran will not tolerate any territorial change in the region. In this context, Armen Grigoryan noted the red lines of Armenia. He underlined the imperative of starting an "era of peace" put forward by Armenia, which coincides with Iran's foreign policy priorities. The Secretary of the Security Council also highlighted the launch of the Yerevan-Nakhichevan-Julfa railway, emphasizing that it will lead to the economic development of the region's countries.

At the end of the meeting, during the meeting the interlocutors stressed the need for continued cooperation in various fields, the source said.

https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2021/12/22/Iranian-Majlis-Armen-Grigoryan/2617942

[Yervant1]

Jan 3 2022

Closer Iran-Armenia Ties to Ensure Security: Raisi

Tasnim
4th January 2022, 00:37 GMT+11

TEHRAN (Tasnim) - Promotion of cooperation and economic relations between Iran and Armenia would serve the interests of all parties and contribute to regional security, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said.

- Politics news -

In a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan on Monday, Raisi stressed the need for the development of economic and trade ties between the two neighbors.

"Enhancement of cooperation and economic exchanges between Tehran and Yerevan would fulfill the interests of all parties and definitely contribute to security," the Iranian president said.

He also pointed to the delicate situation in the Caucasus region, saying, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's principled policy is to support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of countries."

Reaffirming Iran's support for Armenia's sovereignty over its territories and roads, the Iranian president welcomed the progress in the negotiations between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, adding, "We hope that the other problems between the two countries would be also settled peacefully within the framework of the international principles and laws, and that we'd witness peace, stability and security in the region."

For his part, Pashinyan briefed the Iranian president on the process of negotiations about the situation in the Caucasus.

He also highlighted Armenia's determination to promote economic interaction with Iran and step up the activities of the Economic Cooperation Joint Commission.

The premier expressed confidence that closer cooperation and coordination between Armenia and Iran would help them take major steps for stabilizing regional peace and security.

https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/272090589/closer-iran-armenia-ties-to-ensure-security-raisi

[Yervant1]

News.am

Armenia - Jan 27 2022

Iran cut off natural gas supply to Turkey because of Armenia, says Turkish journalist

11:35, 27.01.2022

Turkish journalist Cem Kucuk sees Armenia as the reason for the cutting off Iranian natural gas supply to Turkey.

According to the Internethaber website, Kucuk stated that Iran is concerned about a rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, and this is why it stopped supplying natural gas to Turkey—and which has created chaos in Turkey.

https://news.am/eng/news/684041.html

[Yervant1]

Press TV, Iran

March 12 2022

Iran agrees to host Azerbaijani corridor bypassing Armenia

Saturday, 12 March 2022 6:43 PM [ Last Update: Saturday, 12 March 2022 7:49 PM ]

Photo published by Azerbaijan’s official Azertac news agency shows President Ilham Aliyev meeting an Iranian delegation led by transportation minister Rostam Qassemi in Baku on March 12, 2022.

Iran and Azerbaijan have agreed to build a transport corridor that links the Caucasian state to its exclave of Nakhchivan bypassing Armenia through the Iranian territory.

Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency said in a Saturday report that Tehran and Baku had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on building the 55-Kilometer Zangezur-Nakhchivan highway through Iran.

The MoU was signed between Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev and visiting Iranian transportation minister Rostam Qassemi.

However, details of the project published in the Azerbaijani media showed that the link connecting Zangezur in west Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan will be in the form of a corridor that runs just five kilometers from the border between Iran and Armenia and will include railways, roads and electricity transfer facilities.

Baku had been seeking to set up a similar corridor to Nakhchivan through the Armenian territory in return for granting access to Armenia to a corridor that connects the country to Karabakh region inside Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani president hails regular Baku-Tehran political talks, calls for stronger bilateral cooperation

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev praised the regular political negotiations between Baku and Tehran, calls for stronger bilateral cooperation between the two neighboring countries.

The idea has been mooted periodically since the end of a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in July 2020. However, it has been rejected by Armenia while getting a cold reception from Iran.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said in a Saturday meeting with with Qassemi that the corridor between Zangezur and Nakhchivan through Iran will become a major transit route in the region.

Aliev’s foreign policy advisor Hikmat Hajiyev also described the signing of the MoU on the project as a historic event.

“Armenia’s policy of blockade of Nakhchivan over many years will be ceased thanks to the implementation of this project,” Hajiyev was quoted as saying by Azerbaijan’s official Azertac news agency.

https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/03/12/678446/Iran-Azerbaijan-corridor-Nakhchivan-MoU-signing

[Yervant1]

NEWS.am

Armenia - April 17 2022

General Heydari: Zionist regime was present in Karabakh war, next to one of conflicting sides

11:00, 17.04.2022

The eastern borders of the country are completely secure, we constantly monitor the movements of the Zionists, General Heydari, commander of the Ground Forces of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran said, Tasnim reported.

"In the Karabakh war, in an important and strategic region of the Northwest, we received information by order of the Commander-in-Chief that the illegal Zionist regime is present in one of the countries on the side of the conflict and intends to change the geopolitics of the area. We declared two important and strategic conditions; first, we will not allow the geopolitics of the region to be changed, and second, the Zionist regime must leave the region, and these two conditions have been met, and we continue to monitor the Zionist movements," he noted.

https://news.am/eng/news/696996.html