Armenian-Georgian relations

[Guest]

Siko,

 

It is good to hear from you this kind of mentality. I commend you.

 

Please share with is what Armenian politics Georgians dislike?

 

I know that there is tension between the Georgians and the Armenians of Javakhetia. I can see where it may come from. But how about the Armenians in Tbilisi? Are they also causing problems to Georgians?

 

As far as the history is concerned, you can trace that our opinions coincide in this regard, too. I also don’t think that the history has any validity beyond academic conversations. You can trace such statements of mine in this forum, in particular, as it pertains to Armenian-Georgian relations.

 

Our desire in our days is the stable peace and prosperity in our troubled region.

 

We have had discussions in this forum to extend our hands to our Georgian brethren, and develop an atmosphere of mutual trust, and provide a prototype of peace and friendship. One of our members, Ararat, is currently building a Web site, to bring together all people who are interested in peace in Caucusus.

 

We do really want peace

 

 

[This message has been edited by MJ (edited October 22, 2000).]

[Guest]

Hi MJ,

 

It is great to hear attitudes like that.

 

Regarding to your question, I gues I oversimplified the matter.

 

Problems as I see them:

1. Georgians opose the political orientation of Armenia.

2. Armenians that live in Georgia are considered loyal to geopolitical viewpoints of Armenian Republic - some are considered as present troublemakers and some as potential ones.

3. There is a problem of reliance on each other - or a problem of "backstabing views" - Armenia is upset about the blokade - Georgia with direct involment of Bagramian Batalion in Afxazian War.

4. Georgians accuse Armenians that they (the ones in Javaxeti - in particular) do not consider themselfes as Georgian citizens (they are neglecting Georgian laws, constitution etc.), those Armenians accuse Georgians that they do not want to accept them as their citizens with full rights (mostly the Armenians in Tbilisi).

 

Everything is very complicated

 

Regards Siko Janashia

[Guest]

Dear Siko,

 

Let me give you my cut on the four points you have mentioned.

 

1. My understanding is that talking about the orientation of Armenia, you are referring to the pro-Russian orientation. My thinking is that ideally, we would like not to have pro-Russian orientation, and be totally pro-Armenian. But our circumstances are very complex. Between the two evils – Russia or Turkey, we choose the least of the evils. Now, for the Georgian circumstances I understand that the perception of the least evil may be different. By the way, we Armenians are unhappy about Georgia’s orientation in this matter But we also recognise that Gerogia’s circumstances are different, and Georgia’s leaning towards Turkey, more than twowards Russia is not directed at Armenia, but this is what is deamed by the Georgian governemnt and the people to be the right thing for Georgia.

 

Armenia tries to conduct balanced politics between Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US. It is very complex, because the interests of the regional and international superpowers clash in our area, and we are not really a factor in settling the regional geopolitics. As a result, we feel that we cannot afford being hostile with Russians, because we know the consequences. We are cought between fire and rock.

 

2. One of the primary geopolitical views of Armenia, and not just as a slogan, but in actions, implies a strong interest towards Georgia’s political and other stability. The subsequent Armenian governments have always tried to restrain the aggressive elements of Georgian Armenian population. They have always urged Armenians in Georgia to be loyal citizens of Georgia. Why do you think Armenians, who for centuries have loved Georgia, and have contriubuted in Georgia as if it is their own country, would like to be disloyal to Georgia in our days. In the past I have met Armenians from Tbilisi, who have indeed claimed that they are viewed as second category citizens in Georgia – whether at work or on the street. They were telling stories of presure by certain elements in the Georgian society to abendon their houses, and leave Georgia. I have had a feeling that they have seen the Russians to be the gurantors of their security and property in Tbilisi, and especially in Akhalkalaki. And the events of late 80’s and early 90’s have provided them with some grounds to adhear to such perseption. I think it is the obligation of the Georgian people to demonstate to their Armenian population that they are equal citizens, and opt for their loyalty. This issue is closely related to your point 4, I believe.

 

 

3. Please give us some details about the Bagramian Battalion in Abkhazian War. I personally have no information regarding this Battalion and its activities.

 

4. It is closely related to the point 2, answer, I think.

[Guest]

Hi,

 

By the information that I have so called Armenian Bagramian Batalion has fought against Georgians in Abkhazia together with Abkhazs, Russians, Chechens and Cossacks. This information is not of couse official one My information on the role of Armenians in Abxazia is based on the eyewitnesses of the war and postwar period.

 

I think the problem is that Georgians Armenians, Abkhazians, Chechens, Ossetians, Azeris etc. should have common interest - the strong and stabile Caucasus - that is only to be reached if all these countries will cooperate from the neutral geopolitical viewpoint. Independence from outside influence and dominance is to be reached only in neutral cooperation. So let us discuss what is hindering this

 

Talk about what our goverments are doing now will lead us into repeating accusations - so I would suggest to avoid this.

 

Regards Siko Janashia

[Guest]

Dear Siko,

the obstacle to a stable peace in Transcaucasia is a creature called Turkey, dog of USA.

 

 

------------------

http://www.CyberIran.com/music/persian/beh...di_nazinazi.ram

[Guest]

OK, Siko. Let's talk about the elimination of the barriers, then.

 

Cheers,

Martin

[Guest]

Interesting, per my information, the population of a couple of Armenia villages has been massacred by the Abkhaz gorillas during the unrest.

 

I wonder if any Armenians have faught aginst the Abkhaz and Osetinian gorillas alongside with the Georgians?

[Guest]

Hi MJ,

 

I am sure that there have been Armenians that have fought with Georgians - well there were some russians who fought against abxazians too but that does not say anything

 

About the barriers. To eliminate them:

1. we need to become stronger economically - without cooperation its hard to imagine. Without foreighn "help"? - I think its still managable.

2. May be we will need to form some kind of political organization too - something like GUUAM

 

Regards Siko Janashia

 

[This message has been edited by siko_j (edited October 22, 2000).]

[Guest]

Dorudebi Iranyar,

 

I would not want to talk in this tone - calling the nations or countries dogs etc.

 

Pativicemit Siko Janashia

[Guest]

Siko,

 

We have had such discussions in this forum. Some of the members have come up in the past with similar proposals. I am sure, tomorrow, when they come across our exchange, they will jump in.

 

How do you see forming a political alliance in Caucasus? What would its format be?

 

P.S. I noticed the word "Pativicemit" in your previous posting. I suspect it means "with respect." If yes, then we share the same word in both languages - "Pativ" in Armenian means respect,honor.

 

 

[This message has been edited by MJ (edited October 22, 2000).]

[Guest]

Siko,

 

Get used to it. Iranyar has very strong opinions on some nations and races.

[Guest]

quote:

---

Originally posted by MJ:
Siko,

Get used to it. Iranyar has very strong opinions on some nations and races.

---

It's not all about nations or races. It's about the Geopolitical behaviour of some states. In this case Turkey hich is an agressive fascist state and is the marionett of USA.

[Guest]

Dear Participants!

I suggest for international talks use another discussion board: http://caucasus.cjb.net/

Tell me please your opinion

Thanx

Ararat

 

Siko_j my greetings to you and welcome to our board.

 

 

[This message has been edited by Ararat (edited October 23, 2000).]

[Guest]

See you there

 

P.S. If Siko and others agree, you may want to copy our exchange to that site, so that we don't start from zero, there?

 

[This message has been edited by MJ (edited October 23, 2000).]

[Guest]

Hi MJ

Ok lets move this discussion to other forum,

 

By the way how do you say with respect or with "Pativ" - ?

 

Pativicemit Siko Janashia

[Guest]

Siko,

 

It is not customery to say "pative" under the signatures at the end of the letter in Armenian. We use the equivalent word "Harganqov."

 

 

 

[This message has been edited by MJ (edited October 23, 2000).]

[Guest]

Georgia, Armenia coordinating customs regulations

 

Kavkasia-Press

5 Nov 00

 

Tbilisi, 5th November: Issues relating to the coordination of the

customs regulations of the two countries were discussed at a

meeting between Georgian Minister of State Gia Arsenishvili and

visiting Armenian Finance Minister Levon Barkhudaryan today.

 

Georgian Finance Minister Zurab Noghaideli told Kavkasia-Press

after the meeting that already in November, a joint bilateral

commission would begin to work on the issue and draw up an

agreement to be endorsed subsequently by the two governments.

"Although it is rather difficult to draw up such documents, experts

from the two countries will try their best to bring their positions

on the issue closer and draw up a single document," Noghaideli

said.

 

Armenia has already appealed to Georgia to maintain the current

25-per-cent discount on customs tax for its transit goods passing

through Georgia's territory.

 

At today's meeting, the Armenian finance minister spoke about the

need for making joint investments and establishing joint

enterprises. This will boost the economies of the two countries,

Barkhudaryan said.

 

 

[This message has been edited by MJ (edited October 23, 2000).][/b]

[Guest]

THE NEWSLETTER OF THE LECTURE SERIES PROGRAM

 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DECEMBER 13, 1998

 

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Contemporary Armenian-Georgian Relations

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

NIKOLOZ NIKOLOZISHVILI

Ambassador of Georgia to RA

 

" There is no tradition of conflict, at any level, in the relations between Georgia and Armenia."

 

The theme of relations between Armenia and Georgia is so broad that it is hardly possible to cover all its aspects in one lecture. This is especially so because it is impossible to speak about these relations without highlighting certain historically developed traditions in the relations between the two peoples. These relations should also be viewed within the context of the ongoing processes in the region. It should not only include the southern part of the Caucasus, but the whole Caucasus, the CIS, Central Asia, Iran and Turkey. This consideration should be done in the light of the co-operation among the countries and political subjects of the whole area.

 

The Historical Tradition

I will first speak about the political background that has, without doubt, a great impact on the present relations of our countries. Historically, both Armenia and Georgia -the people of Armenia and Georgia- have been forced to struggle to be able to maintain and develop their cultural and national identity. This has, of course, left a trace on the traditions of our relations. It has created a psychological perception of a common fate and mutual responsibility towards each other. From a purely political perspective, it could not but be converted to an awareness of a complete unity of strategic interests. Both countries ultimately see survival as a strategic interest in this complicated and inter-linked world. In the Middle Ages, if survival implied cultural, linguistic or even ethnic survival, now it deals with the building up of a stable, national state.

 

I especially underlined the historic tradition to immediately draw a first (and appropriate) conclusion. There is no tradition of conflict, at any level, in the relations between Georgia and Armenia. On the contrary, there is a traditional awareness of the commonality of our national fates. We acknowledge the interrelation between the two nations, their co-operation, mutual support, and a mutual cultural enrichment. This is an important fact and not unique; though History has many conflicting examples of the relations of culturally and ethnically close nations -- to say nothing of other, sharper issues.

 

 

"...The world community sees the Southern Caucasus as a unified geopolitical and economic area>"

Based on the above, we can state that even if not crucial, today, the historical tradition is a very important fact for the development of relations between our countries. Without taking it into consideration, it is useless to try to conceive or to completely understand the development of Armenian-Georgian relations at the end of the second millennium after Christ's birth, in the rapidly changing world of our times.

 

When speaking about the historical tradition, we cannot overlook the fact that at different times in history, our peoples have been destined to be within one and the same country, or under one and the same rule. Georgia and Armenia have been part of the territory of first, the Russian Empire, then of the Soviet Union. For several reasons, I would call the Soviet period as one of the most important. Primarily, because it was not long ago that we became independent and now we are building independent countries primarily by changing the Government structures that we have in place. While once again possessing the foundations of independence (state frontiers, an army, a national currency), it is justified and reasonable to try to retain the best, more exactly, the most useful, that recently joined us, primarily in the economic sphere. It is known that the degree of co-operation in the Soviet Union was much higher than it is now even among the countries of the European Union. But it should at once be stated that the economic co-operation of Georgia and Armenia within the USSR was based on an essentially different concept than the economic integration of two independent countries given different fiscal systems, economic characteristics, and taxation laws. Nevertheless, it is an enabling tradition, and there is nothing that can block our way to integration and mutual enrichment.

 

Before I pass on to the next issue, I would like to draw your attention to another important tradition influencing our relations. For millennia, Georgian and Armenian communities have lived not only as neighbors but also side by side together on the same territories. For example, in Tbilissi and in other parts of Georgia, Armenian and Georgian communities are mixed. This has an enormous impact on the relations, culture, and ethics of Armenians and Georgians.

 

 

Relations in the Context of Ongoing Regional Processes

The Southern Caucasus has always played a significant role in the stimulation and development of processes evolving in Eurasia. Most importantly, this is the crossroads where the West is linked to the North and the South. Unfortunately, sometimes, this has had adverse consequences for our peoples.

"...Nor does Armenia want to isolate itself from the processes evolving in the region."

At the end of the twentieth century, the increased interest of industrial and post-industrial countries toward the natural riches of the Caspian basin became a very important geopolitical factor. The concept of the Eurasian corridor, however, is not only limited by the construction of an energy bridge of oil and gas pipelines.

 

The TRACECA project developed under the auspices of the European Union envisages a broader specter of communication. Recently, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Mr. Armen Darbinian participated in a conference on the new "Silk Road" held in Baku. The declaration on further development of cooperation between the two countries signed on November 20, 1998 by the Armenian and Georgian Presidents demonstrates the readiness of the two countries to cooperate within the TRACECA Project. It reaffirms their positive attitudes toward global and regional integration processes. Furthermore, the same declaration shows that the countries are determined to co-operate within the framework of the newly established Black Sea Economic Cooperation. This is an international structure that, I believe, has wonderful prospects.

 

Undoubtedly, the development of processes in the whole of the Caucasus is also very important. All the four countries of the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia) have signed the Kislovodsk Declaration that sets forth the principles of relations in the Caucasus.

 

As to our regional bilateral relations, we are greatly concerned with the situation in Mountainous-Karabagh. During a recent official visit to Georgia, the President of Armenia, Robert Kocharian said that Georgia managed to keep a neutral stance in the conflict. I think it necessary to refer to a point of the Declaration on Co-operation. It reads:

 

"The parties underline that and declare that the priority direction of bilateral relations is the quick settlement of some major regional issues and conflicts hampering the endeavors of the two sides to be included in international structures. In the meanwhile, the parties affirm their commitment to the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, non-violation of borders, and non-interference in internal affairs."

 

As to co-operation in the implementation of specific projects, there already is an agreement to reconstruct the Ayrum-Sadakhlo railroad, the Yerevan-Gyumri-Khashuri-Batumi and Vanadzor-Ayrum-Tbilissi highways. A bilateral working group has been created to decide on the possible participation of Armenian companies in the construction, reconstruction, and launching of the cargo terminals of the ports of Poti and Batumi.

 

I specifically mention these things to stress that Armenia is already actively involved in the construction and development of the Eurasian transportation corridor, based exclusively on its own interests. I consider, therefore, that opinions voiced in some places about Armenia being isolated or having isolated itself, as being groundless. Armenia cannot be isolated. Nor does Armenia want to isolate itself from the processes evolving in the region. I am positive that the future relations of our countries will develop not only bilaterally, but also within the broader framework of the pan-Caucasian process - the more so, as our countries have started to integrate themselves into European structures, including those of collective security.

 

 

Economic Co-operation

Recently, trade and economic relations between our countries have become noticeably active. In 1997, the trade balance of Georgia with Armenia can be characterized by the following indicators: exports from Georgia were worth US$ 18,942,000, while imports amounted to US$ 20,803,000. In the six months of 1998, exports totaled US$ 8 million, imports – US$ 3 million. In many respects, the cargo turnover and volume of trade do not reflect our countries' potential. Further efforts will be needed to invigorate it. An Armenian-Georgian inter-governmental committee on trade and economic issues has already started to work, although the committee needs to energize its activities.

 

Our relations are successfully evolving in the sphere of energy. The energy systems of our countries operate in a parallel regime. Discussions are underway on the possible construction of a new, high-voltage electric power line.

 

The Caucasus, including Georgia and Armenia, has bright prospects for the development of tourism. The relevant structures of our countries are taking measures to create favorable conditions for a unified development and introduction of the tourist industry in the framework of the Silk Road Project.

 

 

Javakhk

We are confident that the development of friendly relations between the two countries create conditions enabling us to reach new levels of bilateral relations, based on equality, fraternity, independence, mutual interest, and respect for each other's sovereignty. Some fundamental documents mention that the Armenian side welcomes the activities of the leadership of Georgia aimed at creating favorable conditions to meet the national and cultural requirements of Armenians living in Georgia, including those in collective settlements. We have a sensitive attitude towards this issue and are prepared to support the maintenance of the cultural heritage of the Armenian community in Georgia. On the one hand, it has maintained close links with Armenian culture and on the other hand, it has contributed greatly towards the development of Georgian culture.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

 

 

- Do you consider the relations between Armenia and Georgia to be balanced?

 

- Absolutely so. It was confirmed during Armenian President Robert Kocharian's visit to Tbilissi in November 1998. The document adopted during that visit asserts that the two countries' steps are balanced in both the political and the economic spheres.

 

-You have headed an independent newspaper. As a person well aware of mass media, how do you evaluate the present situation of the independent Armenian press?

 

- The emergence of independent and outspoken newspapers in the post-soviet period is indeed very welcome. I closely follow the Armenian press, both in Armenian and in Russian. Of course, the existence of an independent press is evidence that the ongoing democratic processes in our countries are irreversible and we are committed to democratic principles. We are doing our best to strengthen relevant structures.

 

- On 15 November, there was a film on Armenian national television about Armenian churches in Georgia. It showed that in Georgia there is a lack of responsibility with respect to the Armenian cultural heritage. When will that attitude change? When will Armenian cultural properties be returned to the Armenian community? Isn't that a violation of human rights?

 

- Unfortunately, in our days, not only are Armenian cultural objects ruined but also those of Georgian culture and the culture of other peoples living in Georgia. I emphasize – unfortunately! If, during the last years of soviet rule, the preservation of historical buildings was at the highest level, now we do not have the necessary resources to be able to preserve these monuments in a proper way. However, I cannot agree with the opinion that it is state policy. In cases such as this, it is necessary to differentiate activities of individual people from state policy.

 

- Excuse me, but President Shevardnadze personally participated in the consecration of the Georgian church built in Khojivank, where many graves, including those of many members of the Armenian intelligentsia, were destroyed. How can you claim that this is not policy?

 

- Often people offer the erroneous opinion that the present authorities of Georgia destroyed Khojivank. The issue of Khojivank needs to be presented as it is. The graveyard of Khojivank was destroyed in 1937 and there not only Armenians but Georgians and representatives of other nationalities were buried. Later, a park was created there. As concerns the Armenian Pantheon (where about three dozen remarkable Armenians are buried), it remained intact even in the thirties. Now a church is constructed on the territory of the park where the destroyed graveyard used to be.

 

- Mr. Ambassador, do you think that the same model of settlement may be used in both the Karabagh and Abkhazia conflicts?

 

-This is a common topic of conversation. We think that the same method will not work. Every conflict has its specific origin that needs to be taken into consideration together with historic and contemporary facts. The Karabagh, Abkhazian, South-Ossetian, North Caucasian conflicts are all different. The same model cannot be applied to resolve all of them.

 

- What is the attitude of the Georgian Government toward the humanitarian and economic assistance extended to the Armenian community living in Georgia by Armenians of the Diaspora?

 

-It can only be appreciated and it is still continuing.

 

- What do you think about migration from Javakhk?

 

- There is an ongoing migration process from Samtskheh-Javakheti just as from other regions of Georgia, and Armenia. It is mostly accounted for by social issues.

 

- On 1 October 1998, the President of Georgia signed a document on a new checkpoint in Ninotsminda. Passage from Javakhk to Armenia, and in the opposite direction, without an entry visa is forbidden.

 

- Such a decree has really been signed. But the way it is explained is wrong. It used to be a checkpoint even before that decree. Quite simply, just as for Sadakhlo-1 and Sadakhlo-2, Guguti and Ninotsminda have been given the status of international checkpoints by presidential decree. As to entry visas, Armenia and Georgia's relations are such that no visas are required. Armenians and Georgians are free to pass from one country to the other.

 

- Each time that signs of destabilization emerge in Javakhk, officials in Georgia and Armenia refer to what they call certain forces outside of the two countries that are interested in destabilization. Which are these groups, in your opinion?

 

- Forces that do not want our countries to be independent, powerful, and to develop. I am positive that neither Armenia nor Georgia wants to have another conflict.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

 

Nikoloz Nikolozishvili

was born on 9 May 1965, in Tbilissi. Finishing secondary school in 1982, he entered the Department of Classical Philology of Tbilissi State University. He graduated in 1988.

From 1986 to 1988, he studied Grabar (Classical Armenian) at Yerevan State University.

From 1988 to 1993, he worked at Tbilissi State University.

Between 1993 and 1995, he was Editor-in-Chief of the independent "Iveria-Express" newspaper.

From 1991 to 1995, he studied at Tbilissi Seminary, specializing in the History of Christian Culture.

He was appointed Chairman of the Youth State Department of Georgia from 1995 until March 1998 at which time he was appointed Ambassador of Georgia to Armenia.

http://www.aua.am/aua/extens/lectures/23_e.htm

[Guest]

NEWS BRIEFS

 

Armenia, Georgia Map Out Closer Cooperation

 

The governments of Armenia and Georgia agreed on Saturday to give a

fresh boost to their relationship through a greater focus on economic

links which they said are not developing fast enough. Prime Minister

Andranik Markarian and his visiting Georgian counterpart, Minister of

State Gia Arsenishvili, acknowledged after talks in Yerevan that some

of the bilateral agreements "are not realized in full" and pledged to

work out "effective mechanisms for their implementation."

 

An Armenian-Georgian inter-governmental commission on economic

cooperation will meet in May for that purpose. "The Parties noted the

importance of the historical ties between the Armenian and Georgian

peoples, expressed satisfaction at the current level of relations

between the two states and stressed the need for further deepening the

mutually beneficial cooperation," the two premiers said in a joint

statement.

 

Arsenishvili arrived in the Armenian capital earlier in the day for a

one-day working visit. He met with President Robert Kocharian and

Catholicos Garegin II before heading back to Tbilisi. The Georgian

delegation comprised heads of the two Armenian-populated

administrative districts making up the southern Javakhetia region.

 

Transport and energy were singled out as the areas where the two

neighboring states should engage in "more active contacts." Much of

Armenia's external trade has been conducted through the Georgian Black

Sea ports of Poti and Batumi since the outbreak of regional conflicts

in the early 1990s which cut off its traditional trade routes. The

Armenian minister of transport and communications, Yervand Zakharian,

told RFE/RL last month that Yerevan will push for a 50 percent

reduction in transit fees for its cargoes passing through Georgian

territory. It was not clear whether the two premiers discussed the

issue.

 

Markarian and Arsenishvili said they reached agreement on launching

"consultations" on harmonizing customs and tax legislation and

continuing efforts to demarcate all sections of the Armenian-Georgian

border. Among the issues to be tackled by the bilateral commission is

the repayment of Georgia's debt to Armenia, which Armenian officials

says totals $25 million, including $4.5 million for earlier

electricity supplies. The bulk of the debt involves Georgian

compensation for the theft and loss in the early and mid-1990s of

energy resources bound for Armenia.

[MJ]

Imperial Outpost

 

Defining Russia's relationship with Georgia's isolated Akhalkalaki. from

EurasiaNet.

 

by Anatol Lieven

22 March 2001

 

The mainly Armenian-populated Georgian region of Akhalkalaki has never

declared independence from Georgia, or even autonomy within Georgia. But

then, one might say that it has never really needed to. Isolated in its bowl

of mountains, linked to Georgia by only two atrocious roads, Akhalkalaki is

already very much a world unto itself.

 

The local currencies are the Russian ruble and the Armenian dram. So rare are

Georgian lari that vendors in the bazaar are extremely vague about the

exchange rate. The Georgian language is rarely heard, and hardly even taught

in the schools, if only because the Georgian Education Ministry's lack of

funds has gravely limited the supply of new textbooks. The television watched

is Russian or Armenian.

 

Above all, there is absolutely no presence of the Georgian armed forces. The

last time they tried even to enter the region was in August 1998, when a

Georgian force attempted to hold exercises in the region and was turned back

by a crowd that blocked the road, alleging that this was a ploy to establish

a permanent--and in their view, highly undesirable--Georgian military

garrison.

 

Instead, Akhalkalaki remains home to a Russian military base, with the slogan

"To Defend the Interests of the Russian State" emblazoned defiantly on the

wall outside its main gate. Akhalkalaki's position on the Turkish border, and

on a natural route from Turkey into the southern Caucasus, has long made the

area a strategic prize. A ruined medieval castle lies just outside town and

was used by the Ottoman Turks as a fortress. The Russian Empire establisheda

strong garrison there; in Soviet times the base in Akhalkalaki was the

headquarters of a powerful group of forces that confronted those of NATO's

Turkey a few miles away across the border.

 

Today, the vast majority of those forces have gone. Under the renegotiated

flanking provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Russia

reduced its forces in the region still further over the course of last year,

withdrawing sixty tanks and more than four hundred armored vehicles from

Georgia. In October 2000, 76 armored vehicles were moved from Akhalkalaki

across the border into Armenia. However, the Akhalkalaki base remains home to

up to 3,000 Russian soldiers and is one of four Russian bases to remain in

Georgia.

 

Moscow sees the retention of at least a residual military presence in Georgia

as essential to secure its lines of communication to the Russian forces

stationed in Armenia, and more widely as a way of limiting U.S. and Turkish

influence in the southern Caucasus. The Georgian administration of Eduard

Shevardnadze, backed by the United States and to a lesser extent the Western

Europeans, has long pressed for their withdrawal. At the Istanbul summit of

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in November

1999, Russia agreed to withdraw two of these bases, at Vaziani near Tbilisi

and Gudauta in Abkhazia, by July of this year--though Moscow is still trying

to negotiate continued use of the airfield at Vaziani.

 

However, concerning the other two bases, at Batumi in the autonomous republic

of Ajara, and at Akhalkalaki, Russia is pressing the Georgians to grant a

15-year lease, in return for a reduction in Georgia's $179 million gas debt

to Russia--a deal which would resemble the one struck with Ukraine over

Sevastopol in 1996. The Georgians, for their part, have offered a three-year

lease.

 

This position may make some sense as a negotiating counter, but if it is

based on a belief that in three years Georgia could take over the base, it is

very unrealistic. In fact, nobody with whom I spoke in the Akhalkalaki

region--Georgian officials included--thought that there was the slightest

chance that Georgia would be able to replace the Russian army even in the

medium term, or that Tbilisi either could or should exert any kind of direct

pressure to get the Russians to leave.

 

This is because of the extreme weakness of the central Georgian state, but

even more importantly because of the rock solid support of the local Armenian

population of Akhalkalaki for a continued Russian presence. Literally every

single person with whom I spoke on the streets and in the bazaar wanted the

base to stay indefinitely. One reason given was continued fear of Turkey. The

local population suffered severely under Turkish occupation in 1918 and also

received many refugees from the massacres of Armenians in Turkey during the

First World War.

 

PROPAGANDA

 

Local Armenian belief that Turkey is a serious threat, and that only the

Russian army has ever been able to fight off the Turks, are doubtless

assiduously stoked by covert Russian military propaganda. However, those

beliefs also have deep roots in history and are passionately held. In the

words of Artur, a local teacher, "Turkey is less than 30 kilometers from

here, and the Georgian army doesn't exist. If the Russians leave, who will

protect us in the last resort? We don't want to see Georgian soldiers here

one day, and then Turks the next."

 

As to relations between ordinary Georgians and Armenians, these have remained

peaceful (with rare and limited exceptions) but there is considerable

underlying tension. Armenians fear a return of the Georgian ethnic chauvinism

of the early 1990s, and point to the historic role of anti-Armenian feeling

in Georgian nationalism. Georgians, for their part, were angered by the

rebellion of the Artsax Armenians against Azerbaijan, and even more by the

support of Armenians in Abkhazia for the Abkhaz side in the war of 1992-93,

when the "Bagramian battalion" (named after the Armenian Marshal of the

Soviet Union) fought on the Abkhaz side.

 

The attachment of local people to the Russian base in Akhalkalaki is

increased by the fact that (according to varying figures I was given) between

30 and 40 percent of its soldiers are in fact local Armenians. Due to the

distinguished role of Armenians in the Russian and Soviet armed forces, local

recruitment applies not just (as in Tajikistan) to the rank-and-file, but

also to the officer corps. Those soldiers hold Russian as well as Georgian

and sometimes Armenian passports.

 

Their presence underlines what is by far the most important reason for the

desire of local people to keep the base--its crucial economic role in a

deeply impoverished region. It is simply the only major economic entity still

working. In the 1980s, this was a modestly prosperous area. Today, the meat

and chicken processing plants, dairy, clothes factory, furniture works,

cement works, printers, and shoemakers are all closed. The railway,

established briefly toward the end of Soviet rule, has been torn to pieces

for scrap.

 

Electricity is better than in most of Georgia, because it is provided by

neighboring Armenia--but it is still extremely limited and unreliable. Other

than smuggling across the border from Armenia (drugs and other goods often

coming originally from Iran and points east), the Russian base is by far the

biggest employer, responsible for supporting a quarter or more of the local

population. It also provides medical care, at least for informal fees, and

brings in goods from Russia, which are resold in local markets. The United

States has pledged $10 million to help Russia withdraw the bases, but the

local population in Akhalkalaki does not expect to see any of this.

 

WHO TO IMITATE?

 

In the words of Ararat Essoyan, chairman of the more moderate local Armenian

political group, the Union for Reform and Democracy, "Our organization is for

integration into the world economy; but the actual state of our economy today

is such that withdrawal of the base would have a catastrophic effect, and

this in turn could have dangerous results politically." He warned that this

could change the present sullen acceptance of Akhalkalaki's status into a

demand for autonomy--as demanded by the more radical local group, Virk--or

even separation. Essoyan's point about the economic situation was emphasized

by the fact that most of the interview was conducted by candlelight, in the

only room of his party headquarters that could even be partially heated.

 

That opinion was echoed by Malkhaz Khoshtaria, the deputy Georgian

presidential representative for the region of Javakhetia that includes

Akhalkalaki, speaking in his (also unlit and freezing) office in the town of

Akhaltsikhe. "At present, the base plays an absolutely vital economic role.

Before we can even think of closing it, we will need to have implemented a

serious development program to replace it, beginning with a new road," he

said. "I was posted for three years in Akhalkalaki before coming here, and I

wrecked two cars on that terrible road…And Armenian fears of the Turks also

have to be taken into account, especially given the state of our Georgian

army." He and other Georgian officials spoke of the risk that even if the

Russians were to withdraw, they would leave behind a heavily-armed

paramilitary group of local ex-servicemen, which would pose an even greater

threat to Georgia. At the moment (unlike in other parts of the Caucasus)

there is no open presence of illegal guns or armed volunteers in Akhalkalaki,

and Moscow can be held accountable for any actions of its troops.

 

In these circumstances, it would seem on the face of it sensible for Georgia

to imitate Ukraine five years ago and seek to strike a deal with Russia fora

longer-term lease for the Akhalkalaki base, rather than stick rigidly to its

existing demand. In return, Georgia could gain certain economic benefits and

reduce Russian pressure in other areas. However, various factors are working

against this. The level of mutual distrust between Georgia and Russia is now

so great that Georgian officials fear that any concession to Russia, far from

bringing even temporary relief, will only encourage demands for further

concessions. On some of these--like allowing Russian troops to use Georgian

territory for attacks on Chechen fighters--Tbilisi simply cannot afford to

yield.

 

Then there is the hope that some future disaster will so weaken Moscow's

position that Russia will in fact have to yield to Georgia's demandto close

the bases--or at least offer better terms in three years' time--especially if

the West gives Georgia strong support. Finally--like the bizarre demand fora

share in the Soviet Union's worthless overseas assets, only now being

abandoned by the Shevardnadze administration--the demand for the early

closure of the bases has become such a shibboleth of Georgian politics that

any government that abandoned it could be subject to an extremely damaging

domestic attack.

 

What all these points--and American approaches as well--ignore, however, is

the immense underlying strength of Russia's position in Akhalkalaki, and the

complete inability of Georgia to do anything about it for the foreseeable

future. At least if Georgia strikes a deal, it may get something. If it

sticks to existing demands, then there is a good chance that in fifteen years

the Russian army will still be in Akhalkalaki to stay, and Georgia will have

received nothing.

 

--

 

Anatol Lieven is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace in Washington D.C. He covered Georgian events for The

Times (London) in the early and mid-1990s, and visited the country for

research in December 2000.

 

This article originally appeared on EurasiaNet, a website that provides news

and analysis on political, economic, environmental, and social developments

in the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as in Afghanistan,

Iran, Mongolia, and Turkey. The website also offers a variety of other

features including: hundreds of links; an extensive research database; book

reviews; newsmaker interviews, and a discussion forum.

[Paul bunyan]

WHY ARE WE GIVING THIS PEOPLE SO MUCH USA MONEY WHICH THEY WONT' PAY BACK/?

I read in Groong some time ago that

there was a big celebration in Georgia

honoring their famous hero Josep Djugashivili or 'Stalin' one of history greatest killers no small number of georgians died because of him they are receiving almost as much money as Armenia gets so that they can become the US/turkey handpuppet in the caucausus to pressure Armenia into confoming to the US insanely foolish

pro azeri 'peace plan' its unbelievably and tranparently moronic

words can be seen in the HYEFORUM READ IT this is the 'peace plan' the US wants Armenia to fully accept and obey

it makes you wonder how much if anything georgia and their turkey friends will pay back to the US taxpayer

[MJ]

I tend to disagree.

 

Georgians, by in large, hate Djugaishvili/Stalin. There may be a small group of Georgians worshiping him, though, primarily in the city of the birthplace of Stalin. Additionally, I can assure you, there would be a similar social group of Armenians worshiping Stalin, too.

 

As to being puppet, I think the Georgians can claim with the same (and perhaps more) degree of validity that Armenia is Russia's puppet, therefore, the same question from the point of view of American taxpayers may be posed to Armenia.

[alpha]

Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 1998

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THE QUESTION OF JAVAKHETI

Voitsekh Guretski*

 

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Armenians are the second largest ethnic group and the most numerous ethnic minority in Georgia. Mainly they live in Tbilisi and also in Javakheti - a province in the southern part of Georgia, lying against the borders with Turkey and Armenia, where Armenians make up over 90% of the population. Beginning from the early 90's, when Georgia became engulfed in total chaos, problems have emerged in the relations between the authorities in Tbilisi and several of the political organisations in Javakheti. To this day, jurisdiction of the centre is considerably limited in Javakheti, yet following the experiments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the central authorities prefer to refrain from any radical actions in this region. The situation is made more complex by the presence of the Russian military bases in Javakheti and the problem of Meskhetian Turks seeking to repatriate to Meskheti(1), from where they were forcefully deported in 1994. The future of the province will most probably be determined by the (now developing) new geopolitical order in the South Caucasus, the major determining factors of which are the new communication routes and pipelines.

 

Introductory notes

 

Historically, Armenians in Georgia were engaged chiefly in commerce and craftsmanship and, respectively, lived predominantly in the cities, principally in Tbilisi. According to the results of the 1897 census, Armenians made up 18.7% of the population in the Tiflis province, 25% in the Tiflis district and almost 75% in the city of Tiflis(2). In those days, Armenians owned the largest enterprises and wholesale storages warehouses, and also the biggest capital. Besides, they played an important role in the city's cultural life, which at the end of the last century, before Baku oil boom began, was Transcaucasia's busiest and most important centre.

 

Armenians have compactly resided in Southern Georgia for almost 170 years. When after the war with Turkey (1828-1829) Russia obtained the Black Sea coast from the Kuban to Poti and the largest portion of the Georgian provinces of Meskheti and Javakheti, the Armenians living on the Turkish territory began to massively resettle to the territories of the Russian empire. It was during this process that Armenians settled in the Akhalkalaki district (Javakheti), where they soon outnumbered indigenous Georgians; in 1903, the majority of 54,816 people living in 150 villages of the district were Armenian). After 1829, 2,536 Armenian families resettled to the neighbouring Meskheti (centre-the city of Akhaltsikhe) from Erzerum, while smaller groups of their compatriots had lived there earlier as well; in 1913, 41,873 Armenians lived in the Akhaltsikhe district (16,499 in the city, the rest in 16 Armenian villages).On the eve of the Bolshevik coup, Armenians amounted to as much as 82% of the entire population of the Akhaltsikhe district.(3)

 

Under the Soviet rule, the share of ethnic Armenian population in the Georgian SSR slowly, albeit systematically declined, forming the average of 10% (still maintaining the second place numerically after the Georgians). In 1926, Armenians made up 11.5% of the population of the Georgian SSR, 11% in 1959 and 9% in 1979. Armenians constituted 34.1% of the population of Tbilisi in 1926, 21.5% in 1959 and 12% in 1989. (4) According to the 1989 census, 437,211 Armenians lived in Georgia (8.1% of the total population). Their majority (roughly 150 thousand, i.e. 12% of the city's population) lived in Tbilisi and also in Abkhazia (about 75 thousand, i.e. 14.6% of the population of the Abkhaz ASSR).(5) The largest group, however, ( about 200 thousand) lived in Javakheti (over 90% of the population) and Meskheti (about one third of the population).

 

Administratively, Javakheti is divided into two districts - Akhalkalaki (covering 1,235 square km and home to the population of 69,103) and Ninotsminda (covering 1,353 square km and the population of 37,895)(6). On the whole, the province with 2% of the country's population, occupies 3.7% of the country's entire territory. The city of Akhalkalaki has 15,192 inhabitants and the city of Ninotsminda (former Bogdanovka)- 6,944. In the past eight years since the last census, the region's ethnic composition has altered - the number of ethnic Russians living in some of the villages in the Ninotsminda district close to the Armenian border declined (these were Old Believers, chiefly Dukhobors and Molokans whose ancestors settled in the Transcaucasus way back at the beginning of the 19th century; some of them decided to return back to Russia). In terms of ethnic composition, Javakheti remains a purely Armenian region - even the most reserved Georgian sources estimate the number of Armenians at 91.3% of the population(7), while Armenians themselves claim that this figure is as high as 97%.

 

Meskheti is divided into four districts: Akhaltsikhe (covers 1,010 square km and has 54,822 inhabitants), Adigeni ( 799.5 square km and 21,282 inhabitants ), Aspindza ( 825.3 square km and 13,432 inhabitants), and Borjomi ( 1,189 square km and 38,973 inhabitants). The province (of Meskheti) occupies 5.5% of Georgia's entire territory and accounts for 2.4% of its population. The population of the district centres is as follows: Akhaltsikhe - 24,650, Adigen - 1,239, Aspindza - 3,783, Borjomi - 17,764. A number of Russians left Meskheti in the recent years, as did approximately 700 Ossetians after the conflict broke out between Georgians and Ossetians(8). Armenians make up one third of the Meskheti population. Their number in the Borjomi district, however, is lower than in the Akhaltsikhe district. On the whole, Armenians constitute approximately 40% of the population in Meskhet-Javakheti.

 

In the night November 14-15, 1944 Meskhetian Turks(9) , more than 115 thousand people, were deported from South Georgia, predominantly from Meskheti(10) (man, who fought in the war shared their fate later). All of them were forcibly transferred to the Central Asia, chiefly to Uzbekistan. Later, unlike many other deported peoples, Meskhetian Turks were not allowed to return home The explanation the Soviet authorities offered was the absence of the technical means to arrange the repatriation, and those who returned spontaneously to Meskheti were sent back. Even those who tried to visit their native lands as tourists were denied the right to do so.

 

After the Soviet Union fell apart, the bid of the Meskhetian Turks to return home was obstructed by the authorities of the independent republic. The new Georgian Government under Zviad Gamsakhurdia offered Meskhetian Turks to either register as Georgians or settle elsewhere outside the region (other than Meskheti). This testified to the official policy of “Georgianisation of the state(11). Today Georgian authorities declare their readiness to resolve the problem, yet point to several pertinent issues. In July 1996, pursuant to the decree by President Shevardnadze, the state commission on the matters of the Meskhetian Turks was created. The then National Security Minister Shota Kviraia stated that return of the Turks to the lands bordering with Turkey and Armenia would give the “interested parties with their own strategic interests in the Caucasus an opportunity to use the “Meskhetian card . Kviraia also linked the question of the Meskhetian Turks with the increasing propaganda of Islam in Georgia(12). Official Tbilisi is apparently mindful of the unpredictable reaction of the Georgian Armenians to the repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks.

 

Geographical conditions distinguish Javakheti and Meskheti from the rest of the country. Because of the harsh climate, the former is often called “Georgia's Siberia : in winter the temperature here drops to minus twenty degrees and snow may not melt for six months. Javakheti sits on an elevated mountain plateau surrounded by extinct volcanoes and the region is often shaken by earthquakes. The city of Akhalkalaki is situated at the altitude of 1,750 above sea level, while several villages in the Ninotsminda region are located above the altitude of 2,000 metres. In the 19th century Javakheti was a place of exile. The largest part of Meskheti - the cradle of Georgia's statehood - is located in the Akhaltsikhe hollow whose slopes are covered with apple trees, vineyards, and wild forests. Further up, as in Javakheti, there are alpine plains. For permanent residence Javakheti and Meskheti are not very popular in Georgia.

 

Javakheti during Perestroika and Gamsakhurdia's rule (1985-1991) and the beginning of Shevardnadze's rule.

 

Javakheti is the least invested part of Georgia. There are too few roads and railways and the existing ones are in poor repair and the city infrastructure is underdeveloped. One of the reasons for this, apart from the huge discrepancies between the centre and the peripheries typical for all former Soviet Republics, was the expansion at the end of the 50's of the frontier zone along the Turkish-Soviet border to 78 kilometres into the country (in other places this zone was 7 to 27 kilometres wide). The special heightened regime of control in the frontier zone (where the visa to enter was only issued to those invited by the residents of the zone), with the exception of part of Javakheti, was exercised on the entire territory of Meskheti up until the beginning of Perestroika(13). The local Armenians perceived this also as a policy designed to limit their contacts with Armenia. Only in the second half of the 80's when tensions began in the Nagorno-Artsax, the Government of the Georgian SSR adopted a program of the social and economic development of the population in Javakheti. This, perhaps, was an attempt to prevent possible turbulences in Javakheti against Tbilisi.

 

The events in Nagorno-Artsax catalysed the creation of the Armenian national movement in Javakheti. The two regions have much in common: they are located in the republics neighbouring Armenia, close to the Armenian border, where Armenians represent an overwhelming majority of the population. When the first armed clashes occurred in Artsax, many volunteers from Akhalkalaki and adjacent villages hastened to help Artsax Armenians (first volunteers went there as early as in March,1988). Filaret Berikyan, who for the period of four years was in charge of Artsax issues on behalf of the Government of Armenia, notes that Armenians in Javakheti have a keen sense of national identity: “There were many of them in Artsax, they even created their own units (14). Along with the increase in the number of volunteers, a large number of weapons was supplied to Javakheti. These weapons remain there in private possession to this day. Some argue that the province is the most heavily armed part of Georgia after Abkhazia.

 

In 1988 the national-popular movement Javakhk (the Armenian for Javakheti) was created whose influence rapidly grew among the local Armenians. The official goals of the organisation was the preservation of Armenian cultural heritage, science and history of Armenia in local schools, protection of national institutions and also the development of the region. According to David Rstakyan, one of the Javakhk leaders and Chairman of the Coordinating Council of the public and political organisations of Javakheti, initially Russians, Georgians and Greeks too were among the Javakhk leaders. Only after Gamsakhurdia came to power, did the organisation assume the role of a protector of the rights of the region's Armenian population “frightened by the threats on the part of the Georgian nationalists (15). From the very beginning, however, the goal of Armenians in Javakheti was at least to obtain autonomy, if not to unite with the region with Armenia.

 

The centrifugal aspirations of Armenians (as well as Abkhaz and Ossetians) had from the very start been supported by Moscow. The aim of their policy was to maintain control over Georgia which then resolutely strove to gain independence, yet being weakened by those centrifugal movements, was forced to seek help in the Kremlin. In its turn, Yerevan tried to quell the secessionist aspirations of Armenians in Javakheti. Armenia wanted to avoid fight on two fronts and realised that in the event of conflict with Georgia, it would find itself virtually blockaded (the borders had already been sealed by Azerbaijan and Turkey). Both processes (Russia's support of the centrifugal trends in Javakheti and opposition of these trends by Armenia's official leadership) intensified in the subsequent years.

 

During Gamsakhurdia's rule, Javakheti was beyond the jurisdiction of the centre. The most serious conflict between Tbilisi and Akhalkalaki concerned prefects (the position introduced by the president. The borders of the prefectures coincided with those of regions): Armenians refused to accept three consecutive prefectual candidates sent from the capital because they were Georgian. This was done in the following manner - the armed crowd gathered in front of the administrative building in Akhalkalaki, and did not let candidates from Tbilisi into the building. The protests were organised by Javakhk. David Rstakyan offers the following explanation: “Prefectures were introduced in the period of transition from totalitarianism to democracy, but we considered that they led to dictatorship as they consolidated the executive power. We attached critical importance to the nationality of the prefect since in a non-democratic state with no civil society and where no fair rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution, the fate of a nation is contingent upon individuals serving in this position. We did not trust the central authorities and therefore wanted an Armenian to be their representative in Akhalkalaki. Georgia to this day remains a non-democratic state, although a certain positive signs have appeared(16).

 

Before Tbilisi agreed to make some concessions, the Provisional Council of Representatives governed the region. According to Tigran Karakhanyan, Secretary of the Akhalkalaki City Assembly and member of the Javakh movement “The Council was set up in the conditions of a political vacuum that emerged after we rejected the prefects imposed by Tbilisi . In February 1991 each of the 64 villages of the Akhalkalaki region elected their representative and eight representatives were elected by the city. Of these the Council (of Representatives) of 24 people was created. The Presidium of seven (among whom one Georgian was a beau geste to Tbilisi) was the working body of the Council. David Rstakyan: "The Council of representatives was not a constitutional organ, but the existing law did not allow us to safeguard our own interests. The Council of Representatives was to function until the office of the prefect was fully manned (all he vacancies filled)". Rstakyan and Karakhanyan do not conceal that the Council which declared itself dismissed on November 15, 1991 when the man at last accepted by the Armenians became the prefect was under full control of Javakheti(17).

 

At that time, several incidents took place in Javakheti which could have resulted in armed clashes: the armed residents of the Akhalkalaki region did not allow the National Guard to enter their territory, disarmed the unit loyal to Zviad Gamsakhurdia that intended to return to the capital via Javakheti after having accompanied the president fleeing to Armenia after the coup in Tbilisi. One of the meetings of the Council of Representatives voted on Javakheti's independence, however, the idea failed to receive the majority vote in the Council(18). According to the Javakh Armenians, all their actions were purely defensive in nature and were a response to Tbilisi's faulty policy vis a vis ethnic minorities.(19)

 

During Gamsakhurdia's presidency the question of the frontier zone re-emerged. Under the new law, the zone was 21 km in width along the entire border. The law, already as a legal act of the independent Georgia was approved by the State Council. According to Tigran Karakhanyan this was against the interests of the Armenian population: “In the frontier zone embracing a large part of our region to the city of Akhalkalaki, building of houses is prohibited. Imagine a family which lives on the border with Turkey and which has five or six children. We have families with many children. Where will they live once the children grow up? This law has nothing in common with international norms (20) According to Filaret Berikyan, Gamsakhurdia intended to settle Georgians in the frontier zone, he encouraged the Georgian population to settle in Meskheti and Javakheti, including the places where the Old Believers in the Ninotsminda district with the aim of creating a Georgian buffer between Armenia and Armenian-populated Javakheti.(21)

 

On March 10, 1992 the Military Council governing Georgia was transformed into the State Council and Eduard Shevardnadze became its chairman. During the first four years of his rule the centrifugal trends in Javakheti did not diminish (the most serious crisis occurred in 1994 when the Head of State sent his representative to Akhalkalaki). Due to the weakness of the centre, the region remained virtually independent from Tbilisi.

 

The war in Abkhazia exacerbated the situation in Javakheti: first, most Armenians living in Abkhazia supported the Abkhaz which provoked anti-Armenian sentiments in Georgia. Second, Russia that supported the Abkhaz and Ossetian separatism, could instigate analogous conflict in Javakheti. According to Mamuka Areshidze, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on the Matters of the Peoples of the Caucasus, Russia did attempt to incite an armed conflict in Javakheti: such an attempt presumably took place in the autumn, 1993 at the most difficult time for Georgia after the defeat in Abkhazia and Zviad Gamsakhurdia's return to Georgia (22). The Javakh leaders, however, deny this allegation, although they admit their close collaboration with the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki (many Armenians of Javakheti work at the base). David Rstakyan asserts that if outside forces had attempted to enter Javakheti then, they would have encountered the adequate response . He may be referring to the Mkhedrioni fighters who in 1993-94 terrorised Georgia, yet they had never crossed the border of the Akhalkalaki district. In 1995, after the parliamentary and presidential elections in Georgia, the situation in the region began to stabilise.

 

In the elections of November 5, 1995 Javakheti voted for Eduard Shevardnadze's Citizens Union, Aslan Abashidze's Union of Revival and also for Jumber Patiashvili, the communist candidate and Shevardnadze's main contender in the presidential elections. David Rstakyan who ran for the parliament and had his confidants in the polling precincts, alleges that Patiashvili won in the city as well as in rural areas, later however, the results were falsified and Shevardnadze emerged as a winner.(23)

 

On the Status of Javakheti

 

The Constitution of Georgia adopted on August 24,1995 states that the administrative-territorial arrangement of the country based on the principle of the separation of powers shall be determined after the full restoration of Georgian jurisdiction on the entire territory of the state (Article 2, paragraph 3)(24). This has not been achieved yet. Though, for more than three years now, the new administrative arrangement of the country is being formed. Pursuant to Decree No 237 of 1994 of the Head of State, the institution of Representatives in the regions was introduced (this administrative-territorial unit is of a higher order than the regions remaining from the soviet system, corresponding to the historical provinces of Georgia).

 

The territories settled by the Armenians were included in the region of Samtske-Javakheti (or Meskhet-Javakheti) embracing the historical Meskheti and Javakheti (six districts). Gigla Baramidze was appointed the State Representative. According to a member of the Javakhk movement, creation of the region within such borders is aimed at counterbalancing the Armenian majority in Javakheti, since in Samtskhe-Javakheti Armenians no longer represent the overwhelming majority.

 

Several days after the issuance of Decree No 237, T. Karakhanyan chaired the Akhalkalaki City Assembly session. At the session protests were voiced that the Decree threatened the rights of the Armenians, besides for even the most trivial things one would have to travel to Akhaltsikhe, the capital of Samtskhe-Javakheti. Dissatisfaction was also caused by the fact a Georgian was appointed as the State Representative which was reminiscent of the conflict involving the prefects. Many members of the Assembly believed that under such circumstances declaration of independence was the only alternative.(25)

 

D. Rstakyan argues that creation of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region is anti-constitutional. First, the Presidential Decree of 1994 provided creation of the institute of the State Representative(s) and not creation of the regions, and, second, the change in the administrative arrangement should be effected through a referendum.

 

In 1997, members of the Javakh began to collect signatures under the document of the following content: “Dear Javakhks! The Coordinating Council of the public and political organisations of Javakheti, in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 67 of the Constitution of Georgia (no less than 30 thousand electors have the right of legislative initiative),(26) are organising the collection of signatures for the discussion in the Parliament of the following issues:

 

1.discontinuation of the process of creation of the anti-constitutional region of Samtskhe-Javakheti;

 

2. upon the passage of the chapter of the Constitution on the territorial arrangement of the country, to grant Javakheti the respective status of the administrative-territorial unit within the framework of the Georgian Constitution.(27)

 

According to D. Rstakyan, 12,000 signatures were collected before September 1997 in the Ninotsminda district and 30,000 in the Akhalkalaki district. D. Rstakyan alleges that the process of the collection of signatures was obstructed by police and special services. “There were cases when police went to the homes and threatened people, saying we intended to use the signatures for other purposes abridging the text of the appeal. One representative of the special services came to me and said that indeed the Constitution provided the collection of signatures, yet a special permission was required for that. (28)

 

Leaders of the Javakh declare that their aim is not uniting Javakheti to Armenia or the independence of the region. “We will not follow suit of the Nagorni-Artsax says D. Rstakyan and clarifies that the movement only aims to secure the rights for the local Armenians compatible with the rights of ethnic minorities in a “civilised world and also to provide guarantees that would ensure that these rights would be observed. Rstakyan considers the article of the Georgian Constitution on the “cultural autonomy and giving Javakheti a status of the subject of the future federation to be the best guarantor. The Georgian press, however, regularly writes about “the fifth column of Javakheti blaming the Javakh leadership in separatist aspirations. Although harshly critical in tone, these publications have historical foundation: apparently, the Javakhk did not altogether renounce the idea of the secession of the province from the centre and still sustain this idea as one of the alternatives for the future .(29) According to David Rstakyan, however, “an administrative-territorial unit within Georgia is only required in order to have Armenian schools and have conditions which would be conducive to pesuing the Armenian way of life. Georgia is a member of the UN and therefore the same standards of the protection of national minorities must be observed here as are accepted by other democratic nations. Of course, Georgia has its specificities and one can argue about the concrete forms in which the cultural autonomy shall be exercised: we could work out a draft and submit it to the Parliament for consideration. Unfortunately, at present the Georgian government is ignoring us, and this is not a normal situation. We do not oppose Georgia's political system, we do not call for war or strife, and yet we are prevented from the collection of signatures. This compels us to doubt the sincerity of attitude toward us. (30)

 

It cannot be ruled out that ignoring the demands of the Armenians by the Georgian authorities can lead to civil disobedience. The paramilitary organisation “Parvents (the Armenian name of lake Paravani in Javakheti) is a serious proof that Javakheti is preparing for different options. According to M. Areshidze, weapons that Parvents possesses initially belonged to the Russian base and were used in Nagorni-Artsax.(31)

 

The existence of paramilitary organisations in Georgia are confirmed by the Deputy Minister of Defence General Guram Nikolaishvili: pursuant to the temporary agreement on the status of the Russian bases on the territory of Georgia (reference is to the first agreement which Russia did not ratify and the next agreement was not ratified by Georgia -V.G.) we agreed to the bases if Russia fulfilled three conditions: to guarantee Georgia's territorial integrity; to assist in the building of Georgia's national army; to disarm and dismantle the armed groups on the Georgian territory which were not part of either Georgian or Russian regular armies. None of these conditions have been met. Today we control Javakheti, but we encounter certain difficulties. (32)

 

The activities of Javakhk are supported by the majority of Javakheti's Armenian population. Officially the movement has 5,000 members. There are differences within the movement regarding the strategy of activity, though this is concealed and the organisation pretends to be monolithic. The most radical members of the Javakh or those who are under the influence of the Armenian party of Dashnaktsutsyun demand that the province be united with to Armenia (officially this party does not exist in Georgia). There is also a pro-Georgian wing in the Javakhk represented by those close to the MP from Javakheti and his brother, the prosecutor of the region (in the Parliament elected in 1995, Armenian minority has four MPs one from each - the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts and two from Tbilisi elected by proportional representation through the party list of the Citizen's Union of Georgia) and also those from the entourage of the head of the region. According to M. Areshidze, representatives of the most extreme wings of the Javakhk do not play a significant part in the movement.(33) It must be noted also, that Russia and Armenia try to excercise influence on the Javakh.

 

The Georgia authorities have no definite idea as to “what must be done in Javakheti . Partially, this is due to the ongoing disputes regarding the model of the state. These disputes between the advocates of centralisation and federalisation have been underway ever since the declaration of Georgia's independence. The former, being the overwhelming majority, are prepared to accept a special “federative status of Abkhazia and Ajara alone (some also of the South Ossetia). They argue that federalisation threatens Georgia with dismemberment as it encourages other ethnic minorities (primarily Armenian in Javakheti and Azeris in the Marneuli region) and also such sub-ethnic groups as Mengrelians and Svans to seek autonomy from the centre. In their turn, the federalists argue that in the situation where Georgians only constitute about 70% of Georgia's population, national minorities are compactly settled and the provinces differ considerably from one another (Mengrelians and Svans speak their own languages), the only way to preserve the country's integrity would be to grant the provinces wide rights. Shevardnadze is apparently inclined to this letter conception. In September 1997 the President instructed M. Areshidze , supporter of federalism to prepare a draft law on the national minorities. Evidently, the passage of this law will not be smooth and painless for the supporters of centralism.(34)

 

The absence of concrete responce of the official Tbilisi authorities to Armenia's propositions and the Javakhk activities can be explained by their desire to avert another secessionist war after wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: having been confronted with Abkhaz and Ossetian separatism, Georgia “chooses to be cautious with regard to its southern part with the Armenian population, Russian military and a border with Armenia .(35) The impression is created that for tranquillity and peace, Tbilisi for the time being reconciles to the fact that it does not control part of its own territory (something similar is happening with regard to Ajara). But Tbilisi can only pursue such policy while the state structures are being strengthened on the one hand, and new transport communication routes are being developed on the other. Then these issues will have to be resolved.

 

Socio-Economic Situation in Javakheti

 

In Javakheti there are still no signs of growth evidenced in Georgia's economy recently: privatisation has not begun, and not a single kilometre of the roads, the worst in the country, has been repaired, numerous industrial enterprises continue to be idle. The living standards in Javakheti are lower than in the rest of Georgia. In the 90's the province has been neglected, the necessary infrastructure is absent, unemployment is high. At the end of 1997 only 20% of the former employees worked in the local cannery.

 

Rstakyan and Karakhanyan claim that Tbilisi is intentionally ignoring the province. They blame the central authorities for removing equipment of the idle enterprises and allowing the looting of the property of bankrupt collective farms. According to them, not a single dollar from the credits and targeted financing received by Georgia has gone to Javakheti, and the ministry officials sent western investors to other parts of the country (especially Tbilisi and Rustavi). The province has no lobby in the capital as MPs from Javakheti occupyed pro-governmental position.(36)

 

Despite the fact that Tbilisi continues to pursue the policy of non-interference in the affairs of Javakheti, and by doing so finds itself in a deadlock, as if conceding to the demand of the province's autonomy. Leaders of the Javakhk declare that when they achieve the status of a subject to the Georgian Federation for Javakheti, they would immediately attract investment and the life of the population would improve.(37) According to the federalists, in order to avoid tensions in the nearest future caused by dire material difficulties that the population is experiencing, the central authorities must invest in Javakheti as much and as soon as possible. It must be noted, however, that in the given situation of the absence of full control of Tbilisi over Javakheti, taking such steps entails great difficulties and requires extreme flexibility.

 

The population of Javakheti predominantly live cultivating private plots and shuttle trade with Turkey, some are engaged in supplying petrol to Armenia, others in the extraction of stone (which mostly ends in Turkey; apart from uncontaminated environment, the chief resources of the province are: marble, bazalt and construction stone). Few of the residents found jobs in small private enterprises: bakeries, filling stations, shops.(38) Officially, unemployment is low, but reliable data are absent. Unemployment benefit is eight Lari (approximately $6.15), while a kilogram of pork on the food market in Akhalkalaki costs 4.5 Lari. The shortage of jobs compels many to go abroad, mostly in Russia. Many also leave for permanent residence to Armenia(39).

 

Along with Georgian Lari, Russian rouble is also in circulation in the province. Roubles are supplied to the market by the military from the Russian base that are paid in roubles. In most of private shops and restaurants Lari is accepted with reluctance. These difficulties in the circulation of the Georgian national currency is evidence that the military base is the largest and most important “enterprise in Javakheti. In summer of 1997, the Georgian president signed Decree No 348 “on the circulation of the national currency Lari on the territory of Georgia and on urgent measures to establish Lari as the only legal payment tender (40). The Decree directed ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to agree with relevant bodies of the Russian Federation the issue of payment of the salaries to the military serving on the Russian bases in Georgia in Lari. The Representatives in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli (with the Azeri majority) were instructed to create special commissions monitoring the circulation of the national currency in their respective regions.

 

Armenians from Javakheti do not speak Georgian, but Georgians there speak fluent Armenian. Leaders of the Javakhk consider that this has to do with the ethnic composition of the provinces and doubt the success of the state program of teaching the state language to the non-Georgian population(41). Most of the children in Javakheti go to Armenian schools. The Ministry of Education of Georgia approved that the history of Armenia be taught there, and the text-books for this purpose are sent from Yerevan on the basis of inter-governmental agreement. After leaving school, young people as a rule continue higher education in Yerevan's universities and other institutes of higher learning and some study at the Armenian faculty of Tbilisi Pedagogical Institute. A branch of Yerevan University opened in Ninotsminda, Akhalkalaki receives Armenian TV and the newspaper Javakhk is published occasionally. According to Filaret Berikyan, Javakheti's Armenians enjoy full cultural autonomy(42), however, Rstakyan indicates that the number of Armenian schools is inadequate and emphasises the absence of the guarantees for the protection of the rights of Armenians.(43)

 

Javakheti in the Context of Regional Policy

 

Ever since regaining independence, Georgia has striven to play the role of a bridge between the west and the former soviet Central Asia and serve as a transport corridor for the transportation of the Caspian oil and gas and be a factor of stability in the Region. The conflict in Nagorno-Artsax enhanced Georgia's role: when Armenian-Azeri border remains sealed, overland communications of Armenia with Russia and Azerbaijan with Turkey are carried out through Georgia. Striving towards independence from Russia and western orientation have been the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy. Following the defeat in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia was forced to join the CIS and agree to have Russia's military presence. Under the new circumstances, Shevardnadze's aim became to maintain balance in the contacts with two groups of states: Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and the West, on the one hand, and Russia, Iran and Armenia on the other. Georgia managed to preserve good relations with all these countries(44). An agreement was reached between the EU and the governments of France, Georgia and Armenia on the rehabilitation of the road Poti - Khashuri - Borjomi - Akhaltsikhe - Akhalkalaki - Gyumri - Yerevan - Megri (a town on the Armenian-Iranian border). The Minister of Transport and Communications of Armenia Genrik Kochinyan informed the Parliament of Armenia on this on September 11, 1996(45). Georgia simultaneously pursued the policy of integration with the West. Shipping Caspian oil is linked with western investment which would allow her to conduct policy independently from Moscow. In 1996 Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine signed an agreement on the cooperation in the field of construction and exploitation of the transport corridor between them in close cooperation with Uzbekistan and with the view of creation Tashkent-Baku-Kiev axis. The construction of the Eurasian corridor and also the rail-link Kars-Tbilisi(46) are additional signals of the weakening of Russia's control over the region. Investment in oil requires political stability, but Russia may attempt to destabilise the situation.

 

Russia has already exerted pressure on Georgia through supporting the separatists and also by imposing its own military presence. From time to time, Russia used these two methods by placing Russian military bases in the places of compact settlement of ethnic or religious minorities. This is the case in Ajara where the Russian Army has a base and leases a military port. The situation is similar in Javakheti (base in Akhalkalaki and Russian border guards on the border with Turkey). If Kremlin decides to preserve South Caucasus in the zone of its influence at any expense, it would try to trigger a conflict in Javakheti. Such conflict would seriously damage Tbilisi's transport plans and would potentially lead to the cooling of relations between Georgia and Turkey.(47)

 

Events involving Russian base in Akhalkalaki (base No 62 is part of the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus)(48) proves that such option is acceptable for Russia. Irakli Batiashvli, former head of Georgia's national security service alleges that the motorised infantry division positioned on the base helped in 1994-96 in the illegal shipment of Russian weapons to Armenia through Georgia.(49)

 

The majority of military at the Akhalkalaki military base are local Armenians who adopted Russian citizenship (varios sources estimate their share at 70-90%). The base in Javakheti is, perhaps, the most important employer for the local population. In addition, part of the population earns their living from trade with the military. D. Rstakyan stresses the excellent relations between the command of the base and the Javakh movement (there exists a position of the Deputy Commander in the field of work with the local population which has no analogy in other Russian units neither outside, nor within Russia).(50)

 

According to Rstakyan, if the Georgian Government demands the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Georgia, the local population would protest, as the base for them is a guarantor of their security. “We are afraid of Turkish aggression. Turks have at every opportunity assaulted us. It was them who in 1915 exterminated 1.5 million Armenians. Georgia is a small country which cannot insure our protection from the Turks. We would agree to the withdrawal of the base only when the world community provides guarantees of protection from the Turks and even in that case we would prefer that the Russian stay since we, the Armenians are Russophils. According to Karakhanyan, the Akhalkalaki military base is strategically more important than the base of Gyumri in Armenia, as it is a counterbalance against Turkey - the NATO member and therefore it is a factor of stability in the region. Karakhanyan notes that Javakhks are in a sense hostages of Moscow and Russia uses us as a bargaining chip, but we have no other option .(51)

 

Yerevan does not support the idea of Javakhk separatism, despite the fact that Armenians are involved. At any price, it tries to quell the situation in Javakheti, as the conflict in the province would put Armenia in a difficult situation: damaging of the relations with Georgia - the only neighbour apart from Iran whose border is not sealed - would mean shutting off of overland communications via Georgia to the Black Sea and would also put hundreds of thousands of Armenians living in Tbilisi and other parts of Georgia in a difficult situation. Armenia confronted with Azerbaijan and blockaded by Turkey, cannot afford this. Yerevan is also against the idea of Javakhk that the region of Javakheti must be a separate entity under Georgia's new administrative division and prefers Samtskhe-Javakheti region. This region (specifically its Meskheti part) borders with Ajara with which Armenians have exceptionally good relations (according to some Georgian politicians, better than between Batumi and Tbilisi). Any other administrative division would hamper Armenia's access to the sea.

 

In late spring 1997 presidents of Georgia and Armenia, Shevardnadze and Ter-Petrossyan met in Javakheti. The joint communiqué stated that the right of local Armenians for cultural autonomy are observed and there are no problems with regard to national schools. The Armenian leader emphasised that attempts to destabilise the situation in Javakheti would not be supported by Yerevan.

 

The Dashnaktsutyun party is one of the most influential political forces in today's Armenia (the party was established in Tbilisi 1890). After the Bolshevik coup, the Dashnaks worked in emigration and they have great influence among the Armenian diaspora.

 

Uniting Javakheti with Armenia is in the program of Dashnaktsutyun: “Armenian lands indicated in the Sevr Agreement (the peace agreement of August 10, 1920 -V.G.), also Nakhichevan, Akhalkalaki and Artsax regions should be part of the united Armenia.(52) Activists and co-thinkers of the Dashnaks are among Armenians of Javakheti, although no one officially admits this.

 

It is quite likely that comments in the Georgian press regarding Javakhk separatism are inspired by the official Tbilisi: being cautious about radical steps in the province and knowing Yerevan's position (under Ter-Petrossyan), Tbilisi wants to resolve the situation in the country's south with the hands of Armenians. Two years ago after the Congress of the Javakhk, Tbilisi newspapers wrote that the Dashnaks dominated the leadership of the movement. Since Dashnaktsutyun was an opposition party in Armenia, these publications could have been aimed at prompting Yerevan to excert pressure on the Javakhk. Perhaps with this goal in mind, one of the Georgian newspapers reported in August, 1997 about Rstakyan's meeting with Levon Ter-Petrossyan where, reportedly, the date for holding a referendum in Akhalkalaki on the independence of Javakheti was set. According to Rstakyan, he has never met Ter-Petrossyan.

 

All that is related with the return of Meskhetian Turks to Javakheti will affect the situation in Javakheti. So far, however, this question remains purely theoretical.(53)

 

 

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NOTES:

 

 

* Voitsekh Guretski - post-graduate student of the Academy of Sciences of Poland

 

Under the current new territorial arrangement of Georgia, Meskheti and Javakheti are united in one region of Meskhet-Javakheti. The other name of the region is Samtskhe-Javakheti. These territories were formerly part of the Samtskhe-Saatabago principality.

 

The same censusestablished that Armenians made up 2.3% of the population in the Kutaisi province (The Russian empire devided Georgia into two provinces - the province of Tiflis and the province of Kutaisi). Overall, Armenians accounted for 9.2% of the entire Georgian population. Refer to: B. Baranowski, K. Baranowski, Historia Gruzii, Wroclaw, 1987, pp.170-173; Y.D. Anchabadze, N.P. Volkova, The Old Tbilisi, the City and itsDwellers in the 19th Century, Moscow, 1990, p.33.

 

Miroslava Zakrzewska-Dubasova, Historia Armen, Wroclaw, 1990, pp.168-179; The Issue(Case) of Armenia. Enciclopedia. Edit. K.S. Khudaverdyan, Yerevan, 1991, A.Melkonyan, article "Akhalkalak", pp 67; A. Melkonyan, article "Akhaltska", pp 67-68

 

Refer to Anorzej Maryanski, Przemiany Ludnosciowe w GSRR, Warszawa -Krako, 1995, pp.185-191

 

According to the census of 1989, 76,541 Armenians (14.6% of the population) lived in Abkhazia

 

Data for 1989

 

Newspapers Eri (in the Georgian language), April 10,1991 and the Russian language Panorama Nedeli (panorama of the week), No.32, 1997 cite 2.5% of Georgians in Javakheti

 

Informetion on the refugees from Georgia's regions. Official note of August 15,1996 of the acting Chairman of the Migration Service of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania

 

Meskhetian Turks - a mystery for ethnologists. The present article does not deal with the theory of their origin, yet it must be noted that they are mentioned in the works of Herodotus and Strabo and both Turkish as well as Georgian elements participated in the ethnogenesis of this people. According to the census of 1989, 207.5 thousand Meskhetian Turks lived in the Soviet Union. Refer to: The Peoples of Russia, Enciclopedia, edit. V. Tishkov, Moscosw, 1994, article Y. Broiso, I. Prokhorov "Turk-Meskhetians", pp.342-344

 

Refer to Vadim Tutunik's "Turks from Meskhetia: Yesterday and Today. This is How it Was." National Repressions in the USSR. 1919-1952. Repressed Nations Today. Editted by Svetlana Aliyeva. Vol. III, Moscow, 1993, pp. 145-163.

 

IBIDEM.

 

Nodar Broladze, "Meskhetian Turks are awaiting the opportunity to return. Propaganda of the ideology of islamic fundamentalism is preventing the repatriation." Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 135, July 25, 1996.

 

Meskhetian Turks consider that the 78 km. frontier zone was created with the aim of preventing their return to the native land. Refer to V. Tutunik p. 155.

 

Interview with F. Berikyan. Interviewer V. Guretski. Yerevan, August 28, 1997.

 

Interview with G. Karakhanyan. Interviewer V. Guretski.

 

Interview with G. Karakhanyan. Interviewer V. Guretski.

 

IBIDEM.

 

According to D. Rstakyan, voting on the independence of Javakheti was a response to President Gamsakhurdia's statement during his visit to Akhaltsikhe that Armenians are guests in Georgia. This statement was regarded in Javakheti as the official policy targeted against ethnic minorities. Rstakyan claims that with the exception of this incident, independence was never mentioned "even at rallies"

 

Rstakyan maintains that bloodshed was averted by the "Javakh" which at that time was in full control of the situation in the province. According to Rstakyan,, the conflict would have occured if the Georgia units had crossed the border of the Akhalkalaki district (this is how war was unleashed in Abkhazia)

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan

 

Berikyan maintains that the Merab Kostava Foundation tried to persuade the Old Believers to leave Georgia and purchased their houses

 

V. Guretski's interview with M. Areshidze, Tbilisi, August 15,1977

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan

 

The Constitution of Geogia adopted August 24,1995. "Svobodnaya Gruzia", November 7, 1995

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan

 

Under the Georgian Constitution, the right of legislative initiative is vested in the president, members of the Parlament, parliamentary factions and commissions, supreme representative bodies of Abkhazia and Ajara or 30,000 electors

 

Leaflet "Dear Javakhks"

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan. Karakhanyan says that despite the region's "unconstitutional" nature, the formation of its governing bodies is underway where predominantly ethnic Georgians are employed. He claims that most of them, including the drivers are from Tbilisi which increases budget expenditures. Accorging to Karakhanyan, the total salary of the emplyees of the regional (local government) structures amounts to 40 thousand USD, which is almost equal to the pensions fund of the Akhalkalaki district.

 

Interview with M. Areshidze

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan

 

Interview with M. Areshidze

 

Interview with G. Nikolaishvili. Tbilisi, September 7, 1997.

 

Interview with M. Areshidze.

 

IBIDEM

 

A. Kukhianidze "Armenian and Azeri Minorirties in Georgia. On Georgia's Internal and Foreign Policies", Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Eurasia. Book I. Central Asia and Caucasus. (Edited by A. Malashenko, B. Coppiters, D. Trenin). Moscow, Ves Mir Publishing House, 1997, p. 180; The following excerpt from Revaz Sakvarishvili's article should be quotted: "A new conflict is looming is the south of Georgia. Armenian population of the region is demanding autonomy"; The Segodnya newspaper reported on September 6, 1996 that "The Georgian leadership does not want to admit the problem (Javakheti-V.G.). Apparently with two unresolved conflicts, Georgia fears the third one".

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan.

 

According to D. Karakhanyan, joint Georgian-Armenian and Georgian-Russian enterprises could operate in Javakheti, using the equipment from the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki. For obvious reasons, the Georgian authorities have no interest in such "joint-ventures".

 

Many local Armenians work at the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki.

 

According to Areshidze in addition to the absence of jobs, excessive population of Javakheti due to the overpopulation represents one of the major reasons for emigration.

 

Svobodnaya Gruzia, August 12, 1997.

 

Refer to Givi Inasaridze's "teaching Georgian will be enhanced in Samtskhe Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli", Svobodnaya Gruzia, September 6, 1997.

 

Interview with Berikyan.

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan.

 

Georgia is closer with Azerbaijan due to the Transcaucasus transportation corridor and simillar problems related with the loss of part of their territories. Because of this Georgia and Azerbaijan both give priority to the principle of "territorial integrity" over the principle of "the right of nations to self-determination." On the other hand Georgia tries to maintain good relations with Yerevan and it managed to remain neutral vis a vis the Artsax conflict.

 

Refer to the Lragir newspaper, September 14, 1996; Transcaucasian Media Project. Annotated Daily Headlines of the Transcaucasian press. - Compiled by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) in collaboration with the VERTIC-IWRP Media Resourse Center in Tbilisi. September, 1996

 

This railway, besides the motorways through Batumi and Akhaltsikhe, is a reponse to the increse in the trade with Turkey, currently the largest trading partner of Georgia; it would also have great significance for Armenia.

 

Jacek Cichocki, "Rosyjskie zaangazowanie militarne na Zakaukaziu", Analizy, Osrodka studiow wschodnich, No 19, 16.06.1997. The author writes that "Russia's military engagement in the Transcaucasus will in the first place depend on the results of the fight between the power elites in the Kremlin who uphold different conceptions of the policy of the state regarding foreign investment. In the event of opening up of the post-Soviet "geopolitical space" to foreign investors, the role of the military factor in the policy of Russia with regard to the states of the South Caucasus would probably be weakened. If the Russian elite recognises keeping the CIS countries in the zone of Moscow's influence to be its principal aim, Russia would attempt to undertake a number of military actions in the region"

 

One can say that there is no legal basis for the presence of Russian troops in Georgia. During the visit of the then Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev to Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to the Russian bases, but the agreement with Russia has not been ratified by the Georgian Parliament

 

Giorgi Dvali, "Georgia corrects the geopolitical list. For this Shevardnadze travelled to Armenia", Komersant -Daily, May 6,1997. On the shipments of the Russian weapons to Armenia, refer to: Jacek Cichocki

 

Interview with M. Areshidze

 

Interview with Rstakyan and Karakhanyan

 

Programme of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation "Dashnaktsutyun"

 

The Turkish press often writes about the Meskhetian Turks, emphasising that their return home would lead to the escalation of anti-Turkish sentiments among Armenians in Georgia and hightening of tensions in the region. Refer to :"Javakhk Union President's Comments on Article of Turkish Newspaper", Yerevan Times, 21 August,1997