Implications of the recognition of the Genocide by Turkey an

[MJ]

The traditional Armenian ideology claims, at least implicitly, that the recognition of the Genocide as an act committed by the government of Ottoman Turkey implies a host of consequences in the range from a monetary retribution to a return of historic Armenian lands. I invite all of us start a discussion on what are such opinions based on.

[edg]

I think that the return of historic Armenian lands is just out of question. People who believe that this type of demand will be fullfilled by Turkey are waisting their time. On the other hand I can see how monetary retribution could take place. Then again it would require an enourmous amount of research and compilation of data.

[MJ]

But what International or other Law would that retribution be based on?

[edg]

MJ, was there some type of monetary retribution made to Israel, and if there was maybe they can follow similar steps in the decision of the retribution basis.

[MJ]

Edg,

 

I think that the resolution of the condemnation of the Jewish Holocaust and the subsequent retributions to the state of Israel and the Jewish organizations have evolved under different circumstances. Germany had lost the war, and had been brought to its knees. The winners wanted to punish Germany. The retributions to Israel have been based on discretionary rulings, and not on International Law, if I understand it correctly. If I am wrong, I would appreciate someone pointing me to the universal Law that may exist, to which I have not been exposed.

 

In International rulings of such scale, there has to be a precise logic based on International Law, to which the alleging party (in this case us) has to follow, and based on which the case has to be built. We all are familiar with the UN Resolution of the Genocide. Overall, the International Law speaks very ambiguously about reparations of the guilty party. However, it doesn't specify the character of reparations, which implies that by in large, the character of reparations may be defined by the party found guilty. If I understand correctly, the reparations may range in a very wide spectrum - from moral reparation, economic reparation to territorial reparation. Even after the condemnation of the Genocide, and the definition of the form of compensation, the International community has no leverages to make Turkey to comply with its resolutions. As you know, there are UN resolutions in place for a dozen of years regarding the occupation of Cyprus, regarding the occupation of West Bank, regarding even the circumstances surrounding Karabagh, etc. By in large, UN is a moral court, and it has no real leverages. True, every now and then, some world power may use the UN as an umbrella to implement some kind of agenda.

 

But one thing that I have to warn you about is that for more than hundreds of years, Armenians have had the naivety (read stupidity) of "calculating" somebody else' political and geopolitical interests, convincing them that it is in their interests to liberate Armenia, and have claimed that they are just stupid, and they don't understand their own good. As you may trace, the consequences of such moronizm beginning from the Armenian Kings to the Political organizations of the last century, at least, has been millions of innocent Armenian lives. I wonder if there is anything in our history that may teach us some kind of lesson?

 

I will speak on this subject more, depending on the progress of the topic.

[edg]

Thanks for the explanation. The bottom line is that even if Turkey recognized the genocide no type of retribution will be paid. The only satisfaction in this case would be an emotional one.

[MJ]

Yes, only I would call it moral satisfaction, rather than emotional.

[edg]

Agree, moral satisfaction is the better description.

[Berj]

As many on this forum have stated the issue of return of historic Armenian lands is out of question, and the only part of the lands that could be an issue discussed within the framework of International Law are Kars, Ardahan and Surmalu. The discussion over Kars, Ardahan and Surmalu, can have a favourable outcome for the Armenian side if the Bolshevik Government of Russia (1917-1924) which signed the Kars and Moscow treaties on Sovit Armenia's behalf, will be brought to trial by Russia itself.

As MJ has mentioned, the resolution of the condemnation of the Jewish Holocaust and the subsequent retributions to the state of Israel and the Jewish organizations became possible because Germany had been brought to its knees. And I would add to this, brought to its kneen simultaniously by 2 allied (at that time) superpowers, the US and the USSR.

Imagine what will happen if the issue of the Armenian Genocide will be discussed in Lahey (Hague Int'l Criminal Court). According to their processings of such cases they will assign a group of international criminalists to study the matter on the spot (p.e. Der El-Zor dessert). The international criminalists will probably find 1 mln. sculs and sckeletons with no marks of alleged killing on them. How can they prove that these people were intentionally killed if they were killed by a sword (which in the most of cases can't be proved on a sckeleton or scul) or starved to death (can't be proved in any case).

[alpha]

The discretionary case by case rulings applied in Jewish Holocaust can be applied to Armenian Genocide also. When Turkey was brought to its knees at the end of World War I; as a retribution for Genocide Armenia was awarded by the Treaty of Sevres and 87 thousand square kilometers of land. I guess we did not use the end of World War I to our advantage, and lost more lands (Kars, Ardahan, Surmalu). Now it’s too late to think about missed opportunities. Turkey is in financial disaster so we can not expect any financial retributions from them. Second of all we need an economically stable Turkey as our neighbor. Hefty fines on Turkey will completely cripple Turkish economy, make Lira even cheaper, and will flood Armenian market with even more Turkish products. The only positive aspect for recognition of genocide is reconciliation of relations between Turkey and Armenia. I’d much prefer to see relations between Armenia and Turkey normalized. At least it has to be similar to relations between Greece and Turkey. At this stage in international affairs world community is reluctant to see change of borders. (Kurdistan and Kosovo are great examples of this). The normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey will make Turkey less pro Azeri and will help in pro Armenian solution of Artsax problem.

[Berj]

That's why Ataturk is considered to be a great politician. Turkey was on its knees at 1920 Sevres treaty. So he switched sides from the West to the Bolshevik Russia and back several times. To fully understand what happened between 1920-1923, one must understand who were the Bolsheviks and why did they help Turkey with gold and armour in its struggle against the West without having control over Turkey's government of that time. That's not because they had hopes that Turkey might become soviet. Russia was back on its geopolitical track only when Stalin came to power in 1924.

 

Its realy hard to discuss the situation in Trascaucasus without mentioning Russia.

 

If Turkey wants to have friendly Caucasus, the only thing to do is to make Armenia feel safe, completely safe. Considering the past, I doubt they can do that. I think Turkey will again switch to the Russian side (that's Turkeys traditional move) if Armenia desides to reject the Russian military assistance and security cooperation. So, what I say is, that when chosing between recognition of Armenian Genocide or becoming a partner of Russia, Turkey will chose the second, for a short time. And between these side switchings another 1mln Armenians will die or at least they'll leave from Transcaucasus.

[alpha]

Turkey can not afford to switch from West to Russia. Its economy is too weak and too dependent on Europe. In addition, it’s a member of NATO, and has contractual obligations to its partners. Russia is too weak and in a foreseeable future can not be a competitor to West. How can Russia be a superpower if the GDP of Russia is almost the same size as the GDP of South Korea? It can not afford to sustain most of the military complexes, and in a decade or so most of its military arsenal will be considered obsolete. So pro-Russian orientation is not an option for Turkey. The only way it can change its pro-western orientation is if a revolution similar to Iranian occurs in Turkey. Outside of a few cities in the West (Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara), most of the Turkish public is still religious and can easily be manipulated by mullahs. With economic struggles continuing people will eventually get dissatisfied of the status quo established by Ataturk eighty years ago, and will opt for a change. Religious and nationalist groups can easily manipulate the dissatisfied Turkish public. West can be portrayed as a scapegoat for their troubles, just like it’s done in Iran.

 

I think it will work to the advantage of Turkey to have normal relations with Armenia. Turkey is not a strong country as most of Armenians think. It’s extremely weak and unstable (the military has overthrown the president six times in the last forty years). The only thing that keeps it together is its ability to leverage its geographic location. With the collapse of Soviet Union it has lost some of that significance. If peace is established in the Middle East then it will become even less significant. Normalization of relations with Armenia will help Turkish economy to some extend. Eastern Anatolia is underdeveloped and is in shackles. By opening the borders it will enable the flow of products and will boost the development of Eastern Anatolia. Opening of Kars-Gumri railroad will make transportation of Turkish goods to Central Asia and Transcaucasus cheaper. The development of Eastern Anatolia will narrow the gap between Eastern and Western Turkey. I personally think Turkey is currently a prisoner of its short sighted policies of early 90’s. Unlike Armenia it’s foreign affairs are not balanced.

[alpha]

The interview of Vardan Oskanyan reiterates my earlier posting that Turkish foreign policy in the region is completely unbalanced.

 

"TURKEY'S REGIONAL POLICY TODAY IS GRANDIOSE AND PRETENTIOUS"

Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan's exclusive interview to Mediamax agency

 

Last updated:

April 28, 2001

 

- Mr. Minister, what is your assessment of Armenian-Turkish relations today? Is there any activity?

 

- It is unfortunate, but true, that Armenian-Turkish relations today are - if we don't say non-existent - then completely unsatisfactory. I say unfortunately because today those relations could have been on a wholly different plane, had Turkey not adopted the wrong policy regarding Armenia in 1991-92.

 

The fundamental obstacle for future Armenian-Turkish relations is our lack of trust in Turkey, as well as the fact that we are not hopeful that Turkey will become our reliable partner. Given the events of the beginning of the 20th century, Turkey had the opportunity, following Armenia's independence, to open a new page in the relations between our two peoples. However, by choosing today's policy - which is categorically anti-Armenian in its leaning - they further aggravated the distrust factor. Nevertheless, taking into consideration that we live together in the same region as neighbors, we are open to the possibility of improved relations, and we do take steps in that direction. Today, there is some mid-level official dialogue, there are contacts between representatives of non-governmental organizations, as well as businessmen. Despite the absence of bilateral political dialogue, we still think the process is positive.

 

- Can we say that today, we are closer to establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey than 7 or 8 years ago?

 

- It's hard to say whether we are closer or not. However, I would not say that Armenian-Turkish relations are worse than they were in the past due to our current policies. It is simply that the policy of the past - which avoided controversial issues in order to demonstrate good will, and make it possible for the Turkish leadership to display a more constructive approach toward Armenia and establish the normal foundations for the development of relations - was not fruitful. The advantage of our policy is that today, Turkey has an even greater interest and need to enter into a dialogue with Armenia; the international community, and the US in particular, is making even greater efforts to see that the two countries explore and resolve their common issues through dialogue. The other good thing is that by raising the issue of the Armenian Genocide publicly, broad-based discussions are taking place in Turkish society, which necessarily means that the Turkish public is becoming aware of Armenian perspectives and approaches.

 

- What then is Armenia's reaction to Turkish Foreign Minister Cem's proposal that an Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish meeting take place to discuss the resolution of the Artsax conflict? When that suggestion was made, representatives of Armenia's Foreign Ministry announced that Yerevan was negatively disposed toward that proposal. Some time later, in a meeting with Kahan Soyak, you stated that "Armenia considered the Cem proposal with interest."

 

- Let me make two corrections. First, the proposal suggested a trilateral - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey-meeting not to address issues relating to the Artsax conflict, but regional issues. And second, Armenia did not react negatively to the proposal. Rather, it was deemed impossible since there are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, since the latter continues to carry out a blockade of our country and has adopted clearly pro-Azerbaijani positions. We believe that these circumstances do not allow Turkey to serve as even a neutral mediator; thus any meeting would be ineffectual.

 

-How do you explain the recent and frequent statements by US officials, that in the resolution of the Nagorno Artsax conflict, Turkey has no role to play as mediator? Do those statements carry a message for Turkey or Armenia?

 

- Here, we should distinguish between Turkey's role of mediator in the negotiations process, and Turkey's possible indirect positive input toward the speedy resolution of the conflict. I've just elaborated on its role as mediator. For obvious reasons, they cannot have any positive input into the process. But until the issue is resolved, Turkey can - through its positive engagement, that is by removing the blockade, and by adopting a more even-handed approach regarding the conflict - expand Armenia's security options, decrease our concerns about certain issues, and thus make possible a compromise solution of the conflict. In other words, as a result of Turkish policy today, Armenia is forced to insure itself against the possible deterioration of Armenian-Turkish relations, thus placing greater demands on security. We are convinced that if over the last decade we had had good-neighborly relations with Turkey - independent of the existence of the Nagorno Artsax conflict - today, the Nagorno Artsax conflict would either have been resolved, or we would have far greater opportunities to find a quick solution.

 

- In your opinion, doesn't the international campaign for Genocide recognition seek to exclude Turkey from the Nagorno Artsax resolution process?

 

- That is not our objective. Even though we are convinced that Genocide recognition and the Nagorno Artsax resolution are on different planes, still, the two issues are fundamentally related as are the processes. For example, Turkey's recognition of the Armenian Genocide can have serious positive consequences on security guarantees for the people of Nagorno Artsax. In any case, we think that that the Nagorno Artsax conflict is about the right of the people of Nagorno Artsax to self-determination, and the recognition of the Armenian Genocide aims to reestablish historical justice, and this has not only pan-Armenian significance but also universal.

 

-Is it possible that Turkey's extreme emotional response to the fact of international recognition of the Genocide may have serious consequences for Armenia?

 

- It is possible there may be certain additional problems, but not serious consequences. Today, the Turkish blockade has already ceased to be effective in terms of adversely affecting Armenia's economy. During these ten years, Armenia has accommodated itself to the conditions created by the blockade. I believe that the Turkish threats against us would have been more effective if borders had been open during these last eight years. The potential closing of open borders would have given us greater pause than the non-opening of already closed borders.

 

- What are the chances that the US House of Representatives will return to the matter of Genocide recognition, and what results might be expected?

 

- I'm certain that this year, too, the Armenian community will bring that issue to the Congress. It's difficult to predict the results. In the final analysis, the decision of the French Senate will serve as a positive example to the US Congress and other countries' parliaments. The lesson to be learned there is that Turkish hysteria lasted all of two weeks. And today, Turkey is requesting French support in dealing with the international financial organizations in order to come out of its economic crisis. After all, Turkey is far more dependent on the G-7 countries, than any one of them is on Turkey.

 

- Don't you think that Armenian public opinion is not ready for normal relations with Turkey, and that this can be a serious obstacle that official Yerevan is overlooking?

 

- First let me say that we view with great seriousness our public opinion, not just regarding Turkey but all of our foreign policy. As for our relations with Turkey, I believe that a majority of our population desires normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, so long as that does not come at Nagorno Artsax's expense, or at the cost of defending our historic and current rights.

 

- Today, Turkey is in a serious economic crisis. Might that circumstance lead it to somewhat modify its regional policies? And, is it possible that Turkey's crisis may affect the economies of the region?

 

- Unfortunately, Turkey's regional policy today is grandiose and pretentious.That is rooted in their search to establish their identity and other issues.Today, Turkey has serious problems with most of its immediate neighbors. This policy was clearly evident in Turkey's reaction when France and other countries' parliaments began looking into the matter of Genocide recognition. And because such behavior has deep roots, we don't believe that today's crisis will lead to a more unassuming approach in their regional policy. Especially since the cause of this economic crisis is political, and at its base is the battle between those who wish to leave behind such traditions and those who wish to continue them. In any case, that economic crisis can affect only those countries which have serious economic ties to Turkey, and especially if they have large quantities of imports or exports.

 

- Notwithstanding the recent statement of the Georgian Foreign Minister made while he was in Armenia recently, military and political cooperation between Ankara and Tbilisi is growing. Especially taking into account the announcement already made that the Marneuli military airport is being used by Turkish planes. In the absence of Armenian-Turkish relations, does such Georgian-Turkish cooperation potentially become destabilizing?

 

- We have frequently said that Turkish-Georgian military cooperation concerns us and, we believe, can fundamentally disrupt the regional equilibrium.Armenian-Georgian relations are the link which serves as the fundamental guarantor of the region's, albeit fragile, stability, and which does not allow the establishment of divisive lines in the region. That equilibrium may be disrupted if the Georgian-Turkish military cooperation deepens, and if Georgia gradually and even unnoticeably becomes more and more dependent on Turkey, and perhaps unknowingly, is pulled into the formation of a Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis, thus becoming involved in the Turkish and Azerbaijani policy to isolate Armenia.

[MJ]

Your analysis was a pretty good one, Alpha.

[alpha]

Turkey should be a case study in order to avoid creation of a dysfunctional society. Eighty years after creation of Republic it's still going through growing pains and instability. This is an interesting article from Economist and Financial Times that show in what dire situation is our western Europe. I just wish Armenian military learns its lessons and doesn't meddle in politics.

 

Turkey’s real crisis

May 16th 2001

From The Economist Global Agenda

 

Turkey’s accident-prone government has grudgingly pushed through enough economic reforms to secure a new loan from the IMF. But the roots of the country’s problems remain political, not economic.

 

THE IMF gave the go-ahead for its third bail-out of Turkey in two years on May 15th. Indeed, by one reckoning (the difference between overhauling an economic programme and starting a new one is, after all, a fine one), it will be the eighteenth time the IMF has ridden to Turkey’s rescue. To secure the latest $8 billion loan, Turkey’s normally sluggish parliament passed no fewer than nine important new laws in less than a month. But all these reforms will do little to address the underlying cause of Turkey’s endless crises: chronic political instability. Indeed, within the next few weeks, the Constitutional Court is due to rule on a prosecutor’s request to close the Virtue party, the main Islamist opposition group and the third-largest party in parliament. If it does so, Turkey’s markets might take fright once more, setting the stage for the nineteenth nervous breakdown.

 

 

For the moment, however, all eyes are on Kemal Dervis, Turkey’s respected and popular economic tsar. The government recruited him from the World Bank in March, after Turkey’s second big financial crisis in four months caused the IMF’s previous stabilisation programme to collapse. For a time, that programme had gone well, as the government reined in its deficit, inflation and interest rates fell, and the economy boomed. But inflation, although falling, still exceeded the pre-ordained amounts by which the government devalued the Turkish lira each month (the so-called “crawling peg” , leading to a gradual overvaluation. That, coupled with worries about financing both the government deficit and a growing import bill, caused interest rates to start creeping up again. Several of Turkey’s banks, unprepared for this reversal and addled by corruption, failed. A timely loan from the IMF and a government pledge to sort out the banking sector staved off a run on the lira for a time. Yet by February, further market ructions forced the government to abandon the crawling peg—and with it its chief mechanism for quashing inflation.

 

 

 

EPA

Daunting times for Dervis

 

 

The latest package tries to pick up where the last one left off. But this time around, the IMF has insisted on more legislation being adopted up-front, including an all-important banking law passed on May 11th, which includes particularly stiff, retroactive measures against the crooks who did so much to bring on the previous crises. Critically, the Turkish lira now floats freely, leaving Mr Dervis a little bit more room for manoeuvre. But not much: should he fail to hold the government to its austerity targets and thus keep the budget deficit down, the markets will doubtless get jittery once again.

 

 

Economics v politics

 

But the government—a creaking coalition of left- and right-wing nationalists and economic liberals—may not stay in office, let alone stick to its spending targets. With each crisis, it pulls itself together long enough to stave off total catastrophe, before reverting to internal squabbling. Both the past two big financial crises were triggered by rows within the government over corruption investigations. Signs of renewed complacency are already cropping up: just last week, one of the three coalition partners held up a crucial privatisation law, citing fears of a fire-sale of strategic assets to foreign profiteers. Mr Dervis himself admits that the chief failing of all the past IMF programmes was the lack of politicians willing to identify themselves with them, push them through and, by extension, take responsibility for their failure. Not one government minister has resigned over the collapse of the latest programme, despite unprecedented public protests at the ensuing economic upheaval.

 

Indeed, Turkish politicians get away with behaviour that would be unthinkable elsewhere. One member of parliament died of a heart attack in January while being accosted by a group of his colleagues. Another, dubbed “the spinning top”, has switched parties six times to stay on the gravy train. A different party has topped the vote at each of the past four elections, as voters desperately search for a better alternative. Both the military and the president (who is a former judge with no party affiliation) regularly best all politicians in opinion polls. Many Turks dismiss them all as hopeless rascals.

 

 

 

Reuters

Is the star fading?

 

 

But the truth is a little more complicated. Turkey’s politicians behave irresponsibly because the system encourages them to. The constitution, cooked up under military rule, forbids any attempt at “placing the government of state under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect”—a fair definition of party politics. These restrictions are regularly invoked: the courts have banned some 35 parties over the past 40 years. Nor do the banned groups come from the extremist fringes of Turkish politics: Virtue, the party currently under threat of closure, won a fifth of the seats in parliament at the last election. Its precursor, Welfare, was the largest party in parliament when it was banned—just months after being harried out of government by Turkey’s meddling generals.

 

 

Such constant upheaval has created a fractured and unrepresentative constellation of parties, and thus an unresponsive political system. Governments are always rickety coalitions, ever fearful of imminent elections and thus catering to the shortest of short-terms. Much of the business of governing is left to the bureaucracy, and much policymaking to the military. The present government had started making tentative steps to return power to the politicians, but the constant need to patch up the economy has distracted it. In the long run, however, the economy will not prosper without a more stable political system.

 

From Financial Times

 

Winning Turkey's trust

Kemal Dervis fears his reforms could be derailed by vested interests, say Leyla Boulton and Martin Wolf

Published: May 14 2001 18:29GMT | Last Updated: May 14 2001 21:49GMT

 

 

When the International Monetary Fund approves a fresh $8bn bail-out for Turkey on Tuesday, it will be betting its money on Kemal Dervis, the new economy minister. The money is essential to the strategy he has drawn up, together with the IMF, to save his country from hyperinflation or default.

 

Yet the 52-year-old former World Bank economist is the first to admit that his combination of tough fiscal discipline with radical structural reform could be derailed by what he euphemistically calls "vested interests and rent-seeking mechanisms". So why should anybody gamble on chances that he will continue to prevail within a three-party coalition widely believed responsible for the collapse of Turkey's previous IMF-backed disinflation programme?

 

Mr Dervis responds that a lack "of co-ordination and of ownership" was the biggest weakness of the previous reform effort, which had been led primarily by civil servants, not ministers. He was offered his current position after persuading Bulent Ecevit, the prime minister, whom he had advised in the 1970s, that Turkey needed "one minister with an overall view", able to explain reforms and "ask for public support".

 

The new minister's success in public relations is clear. Opinion polls suggest he is trusted by 59 per cent of the population. Mr Dervis attributes this support to the depth of the crisis. The twin shock of a surge in domestic interest rates to levels still exceeding 100 per cent and a 40 per cent devaluation demonstrated the perils of the "extreme interwovenness of politics and economics".

 

"The general feeling is: let's fix this," says Mr Dervis. His structural reforms - ranging from privatisation to the strengthening of independent regulatory bodies - are intended to stop politicians from abusing state-owned assets in order to win votes and distribute favours to cronies.

 

"This message of 'let's separate politics from economics, let's not have a rent-seeking system, let's fight corruption' is an extremely popular one," he claims. Mr Dervis cites the advice he received from a small farmer near the southern city of Antalya. "He said two things. One was, 'catch the people who wrecked the banks and put the money in their own pockets'. The second was, 'don't tell us things are fixed until they are really fixed'."

 

The minister has received the support of several important constituencies, such as the armed forces. Even the business community, which previously sought "to obtain rent-granting licences or actions by the government", has backed Mr Dervis while continuing to insist on a reshuffle in the rest of the cabinet. The minister detects a generalised "willingness among people to put their personal agenda a bit in abeyance because they realise that if they persist, everything will fall apart".

 

Yet success will depend heavily on the depth and duration of the recession, since the target of a primary fiscal surplus (surplus before interest payments) of 5 per cent of gross domestic product this year assumes that the economy will contract by no more than 3 per cent.

 

Mr Dervis is optimistic that there will be a strong recovery. Apart from the competitive exchange rate resulting from the devaluation, other forces in favour of arecovery include the flexibility of Turkey's labour force and private sector companies. "If interest rates decline rapidly after foreign financing kicks in, which is what we hope will happen, a lot of blockages in the real sector can be resolved," says Mr Dervis.

 

He expects a recovery in the second half of the year to be driven by tourism and exports, which were already up 10 per cent in dollar terms in April compared to the previous year.

 

Nevertheless, "if the economy remains in the kind of contraction it is in now, if the growth rate is minus 6 per cent rather than 3 per cent, I think it will be hard to keep the fiscal targets," he concedes. This, in turn, will undermine confidence by making it impossible to reverse the dynamics of public sector debt, which is likely to hit 78 per cent of GNP by the end of this year - up from 60 per cent last year, largely because of the one-off cost of the bail-out of the banks.

 

The more fundamental doubt is whether the government - described by one businessman in Istanbul as "mediocrities surrounded by non-entities" - will implement the reforms once the IMF has committed itself to new funding for Turkey. On this, the omens are mixed.

 

Both before and after an interview with the Financial Times late last week, Mr Dervis was engaged in a more than merely symbolic battle with Devlet Bahceli, leader of the National Action Party, the second largest coalition partner, over the privatisation of Turk Telekom, the state-owned fixed-line monopoly.

 

According to Turkish press reports, the ultra-nationalist Mr Bahceli accused Mr Dervis of representing the interests of the IMF rather than fulfilling his mandate, which was "to persuade the IMF" to support Turkey.

 

Declining to discuss either the personalities or the parties arrayed against him, Mr Dervis says: "There is no doubt that the success of this programme will depend on the social-political dynamics of support. The biggest danger for this programme is that the vested interests will derail it. The degree of support is such that there is a good chance it will work and I believe that, quite rightly, the inter-national community as always is phasing its support, [because] it wants to see results."

 

Mr Dervis for his part is adamant that he would quit at the first sign of any backtracking by the government. "I would resign. I would not stay." The fact that he has nothing to lose, as he himself puts it, enables him "to take risks that people who are desperate to keep their jobs cannot take".

 

If his programme succeeds, it will transform the country. If it fails, it will be perceived as the failure of others. Either outcome could even open the way for a big change in Turkey's political landscape, including a role for Mr Dervis.

 

Although he denies harbouring political ambitions, he has made no secret of his political views since returning to Ankara. "Many people said it was a mistake but I did declare when the press asked me that I am basically a social democrat," he says. "I always have been. I believe in the market economy but I also believe in the regulatory role of the state." The immediate question, though, is whether Turkey is able to become a modern European state.

[Berj]

http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg31821.html

 

Turkey: No foreign policy change should be expected for financial support -

minister

 

Turkish news agency Anatolia

17 May 2001

 

Ankara

 

Foreign Minister Ismail Cem said on Thursday [17 May] that a change in

Turkey's foreign policy can be made only with parliament's will, government's

decision and the Turkish people's approval.

 

"Some circles should not fall into the error of an expectation of even a

little change in Turkey's foreign policy on account of the money they lent.

However, we have not seen even an implication so far," he said.

 

Addressing the Parliamentary General Assembly as a response to Oya Akgonenc,

a deputy from the [opposition] Virtue Party (FP), Cem said that the so-called

Armenian genocide allegations were being used as a weapon against Turkey with

political purposes. "It is not true that any reaction has not been shown

against these allegations. All ministries of the state and its relevant units

are carrying out every kind of work. Nobody should build high hopes and

labour under a delusion. It is out of the question for Turkey to give

concession to such nonsense," he said.

 

Stressing that Turkey can't be just an onlooker towards a mistake like the

acceptance of Greek Cypriot administration's European Union (EU) membership,

Cem said, "in such a situation, we do what is necessary to protect the

interests of Turkey and the [self-styled] Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC). Besides, what we will do does not have a limit."

 

Cem said that there were points that Turkey became late in democratization

but it was trying to overcome those deficiencies on its will.

 

Noting that the EU brought the issue of making use of NATO's capabilities to

the forefront regarding the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI),

Cem said, "If NATO will give such an opportunity to the EU, it should protect

the rights of non-EU allied countries like Turkey." "There has been a

considerable development in our relations with the EU. Now, the ball is in

our court. Two financial issues were solved as a result of our talks with the

Commission for Enlargement. We were asking a 450m dollars of project loan

from the Special Action Fund and we obtained it. Turkey reached the point of

receiving 450m million dollars. The European Investment Bank has a 8.5bn

dollars of source allocated to candidate countries. This is the cheapest loan

in the world. Turkey's private sector or state had the opportunity to get

this source by bringing their projects," he said.

[ThornyRose]

MJ, one thing I want to note is that, although Germany was the defeated at the end of World War II as it had been in World War I, I think the Allies tried not to punish it, attitude-wise. After all, it was the “punishment” of the Treaty of Versailles (adding insult to injury) and the Germans’ “falling low” in their own eyes that spurred Hitler to power. I have heard it said that the world community knew that you should not adopt such policies as to punish the defeated and cause a strong reaction on their part but try to set them straight and on the road, get them to participate and regain dignity. Indeed, the way Germany has developed and its people relatively docile, this time contrary to the prior, is evidence of this – not because they were defeated twice and hence had to gulp down frustration. Sure, Germany was not allowed to deny its responsibilities - but the "punishment," I think, is the wrong word.

I do not know of Germany’s retributions to Israel; I do know that it has paid surviving victims and their families. Any info on Germany and Israel? It does not strike me meaningful given Israel never was a party to the events/incidents, setting its nonexistence at the time aside.

 

I have to admit I am impressed by some of the views that show recognition of practicality over theory – Turkey’s situation, what is possible and what is stretching, how to make the best of all possibilities, etc., in contrast to what I see on some boards. I like it here. And it is not because it strokes my feelings for my country. Honest to heart.

 

Iran? You guys, come on. Sure, fundamentalists are a concern for us in that they harm our people and make us lose time, but, heck... As long as the army is there (and as long as it weeds out “scum” within them) no radical groups can do anything. It is these and not the religious folk we have to fear. No 20% of the country can reverse our direction that easily – that is the way it should be if we as individuals and as groups know how to look out for our interests (not quite yet – or am I mistaken? I hope so) and are able to confirm our rights. Our people are getting better informed, constantly. [secularism is the only way you can protect the rights of atheists, Muslims, Christians, etc., at the same time.] One thing about the army, though... I seem to get the feeling that people think that since the population is unable to fend for itself, the army, the protector against external enemies only, should sit back and watch. It is supposed to be the equivalent of people’s will, this possible disorder. I disagree. It takes lesser amount of resources to maintain and continue a system than it takes to dismantle and refurbish one – does it not? Anyway... That is off topic.

[MJ]

Thorny,

 

Without a specific research, I cannot provide any evidence of Germany’s retributions to the State of Israel. If I have stretched the truth in this respect, I would be ready to retract my arguments along those lines. However, my understanding is that Germany has not only paid retributions to the survivors of the Holocaust, but also the Jewish Organizations. Additionally, what means a Holocaust/Genocide survivor? Are these only the ones directly survived, or are the children/grandchildren of the survived also entitled to some kind of retribution as a matter of principle?

 

As a matter of rationality, in my personal opinion, which may or may not be shared by many, the potential “retributions” should not be pursued as a constitution of punishment and compensation. I think more creative and mutually beneficial solutions could be structured provided some kind of ingenuity from both sides. But this kind of structure may be discussed only if the problem is recognized and discussed in its entirety, i.e. not only a problem for the Armenian people and state, but also of Turkish.

 

I didn’t follow your arguments about Iran, though suspect that you were replying something that you have read in this thread, which I couldn’t find after glancing through.

[ThornyRose]

The only way it can change its pro-western orientation is if a revolution similar to Iranian occurs in Turkey. Outside of a few cities in the West (Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara), most of the Turkish public is still religious and can easily be manipulated by mullahs.

by alpha.

As for what I think about retribution, there are genocide survivors (directly) and there are those that are entitled to their inheritance, the children and/or grandchildren. Therefore, the living descendents are to gain any form of retribution their ancestors would have had. I think this is pretty basic.

 

About Jewish organizations, I don't know. Maybe it was to compensate for having shut them down? Maybe to aid in re-organization of the community?

 

And, yes, recognition of the problem is the beginning of it all... However, it is going to take so much more for this, given the current situation. What will it take to change it? I honestly do not know.