TURKISH-US RELATIONS EXPERIENCE PRECIPITOUS DECLINE OVER IRA

[KoRn]

Turkey Shot Itself in the Foot

by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.

Heritage Foundation

WebMemo #238

 

March 25, 2003

 

The refusal of the Turkish parliament to grant the U.S. the use of air

bases and troop transit to open the Northern front against Saddam is

likely to signal a watershed in U.S.-Turkish relations. Policy makers

in Washington and Ankara have expressed fears that the strategic ties

between Washington and Ankara will be gravely weakened.

 

Turkey is about to pay a high price for what many in the two capitals

see as the largest strategic blunder of its leaders since it sided

with the German Empire and Austria-Hungary in World War I. It will

take a lot of efforts on both sides to put this Humpty-Dumpty together

again - and a thankless and difficult task that may be.

 

After weeks of suspense, Ankara has finally allowed the U.S. Air Force

to use Turkish airspace - last weekend - for strikes against Iraq. The

Turkish government, however, failed to pass the authorization for the

use of the Turkish air bases and for transit of the U.S. Army's

Fourth Armored Division through the Turkish territory, despite the

Bush Administration offering Turkey $6 billion in military and

economic aid.

 

Explanations abound as to why Ankara shot itself in the foot, as far

as its relations with the United States are concerned. Turkish AK

(Justice and Development) Party's moderately Islamist government, led

by the newly elected Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and foreign

minister Abdullah Gul, quoted broad opposition of the Turkish public

as the main reason to limit U.S. involvement in Turkey. Some polls

said that over 90 percent of the public reject the war. The

government, however, did not impose party discipline in the crucial

parliamentary vote to allow U.S. troops to deploy, thus sending a

subtle message to the members of Parliament to vote as they like.

 

Two factors contributed to Erdogan's failure to prevent an

unprecedented crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations: First, a lack of

policy experience; and Second, a hidden agenda of broadening ties with

Islamic countries.

 

However, the Turkish political establishment lists a series of

concerns, which may be detrimental to Turkey in the future. Turkish

experts and observers stress that the leading European states are

highly unlikely to allow Turkey's accession into the expanded

European Union, while closer integration with the Muslim world,

advocated by the previous Islamist government let by Prime Minister

Necmettin Erbakan, will derail Turkey's economic and technological

progress. Thus, they say, abandonment of close ties to the U.S. is a

strategic catastrophe for Turkey.

 

Washington's policy toward Ankara may reflect a number of changes in

the future, not the least of which is the U.S. no longer seeing Turkey

as a special strategic partner, or even as a reliable ally. As Iran is

arming itself with ballistic missiles and, quite possibly, nuclear

weapons, the Pentagon may not be as happy with Turkey's participation

in ballistic missile defense programs led by the U.S. as it was only

some months ago. Further, on the technology transfer side, Washington

may lean on Israel to curb or stop the current wide ranging

cooperation between the Turkish military and the Israel Defense Forces

(IDF) and military industries on both sides.

 

For decades, Ankara counted on Washington to support it on a number of

sensitive bilateral economic and foreign policy issues, but today

Washington will be less likely to unquestionably support Turkey. As

the International Monetary Fund will disburse the $16 billion loan

package, the U.S. Executive Director at the Fund is likely to demand a

much more stringent adherence to performance criteria than in the

past. Moreover, the future economic bailouts become more unlikely,

while investors vote with their pocketbook: the Turkish stock market

crashed by whopping 20 percent since it became clear that the Erdogan

government effectively rejected the U.S. economic assistance package.

 

Geopolitically, numerous issues arise:

 

Washington will be less likely to support Turkey against Greek claims

in the AegÅan Sea.

 

The U.S. State Department may become more critical of Turkey on

partition of Cyprus, in place since 1974 due to the Turkish invasion.

American support for Turkey's accession into the EU may also be

called into question.

 

It may be more difficult to see Ankara as a balance to Moscow in

Central Asia, especially as radical Islam, not Russian

neo-imperialism, is currently viewed as the main threat in the region.

Long-standing U.S. support to Baku-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline (MEP),

including financing issues, may not be as enthusiastic as it was.

 

Issues related to the Armenian-Turkish relations are also particularly

sensitive. For years, the American-Armenian community has built its

muscle in the Congress. The Armenian lobby counts over 100 members on

both sides of the isle, many on key committees and with a powerful

political clout. Turkish experts fear that the Bush Administration

will drop its long-term resistance to classifying Ottoman atrocities

against Armenian civilians in 1915 as an "Armenian holocaust". In

2000, President Clinton personally intervened to defeat House

Resolution 596 - a draft legislation to express the attitude of the

Unites States on the Armenian alleged genocide. While that Resolution

was defeated, after the recent U.S.-Turkish friction, this may not be

the case in the future. Congressional recognition of the Armenian

`genocide' by the Ottoman authorities may become relevant if and when

reparation claims by genocide survivors or their heirs may be

launched.

 

U.S. policy makers are fuming, because they view Ankara as throwing

decades of close military cooperation to the wind. The Turkish

military, for years favorites of the U.S., seem to be unable or

unwilling to challenge their democratically elected political

masters. The anger is palpable, because the Pentagon has counted on

Turkey to facilitate the opening of a crucial northern front against

Saddam, and because of Turkey's insistence on deploying its own

troops in Northern Iraq - a step the U.S. opposes. Turkey has already

sent up to 2,500 troops into Kurdistan - allegedly to prevent

emergence of independent Kurdish state - which may distract large

Kurdish forces to guard against the Turks. Pentagon planners counted

on the Kurdish militia known as peshmerga to attack Saddam's military

and to assist the U.S. in securing northern Iraqi oil fields around

Mosul and Kirkuk. Instead, a nightmarish scenario of Turkish-Kurdish

hostilities has emerged.

 

Moreover, reported contacts between Iranian envoys and the Turkish

government further complicate prosecution of the war as the U.S. is

trying to ensure that Tehran and Ankara do not enter the fray to

partition Iraqi Kurdistan and secure the oil fields for

themselves. Such a development would dramatically complicate American

involvement in the volatile Northern Iraq.

 

Only a dramatic turnaround by the Turkish government and the military,

such as allowing the Fourth Division to move through Turkey to

Northern Iraq, and a green light to use military bases such as

Incirlik - both highly unlikely at the time of this writing - may

quickly improve the bilateral relations. Otherwise, the U.S.-Turkish

ties that were forged during the Korean and Cold War, will be set back

by decades, not years.

 

The imbroglio may end potential U.S. support for future Turkish

military involvement in domestic politics. If the Turkish military is

incapable of weighing in on a matter of vital importance to the U.S.,

why would Washington tolerate violations of democratic norms by the

military? In the long run, Turkey may be dealt with ` on case by case

basis', a senior Washington military expert and a retired

U.S. military intelligence officer said, ` but the memory of what

happened will hang like a dark cloud, slow to dissipate.'

 

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian

Studies at the Heritage Foundation. He often visits Turkey.

[khodja]

Mosjan,

 

Who is the weakened animal? Who are the lions, the hyenas, and the vultures?

[lady of grace]

Did you know that lions mate about 100-120 times a day?

[khodja]

Just like the homosexuals, eh?

[joseph parikian]

The united states was doopd by the so called iraqi oposition

the united states will enter baghdad , did any one forgut how they left Saigon with helocopters from the top of their embessy , does any one can asure me that same is not going to happen in baghdad.

[THOTH]

parik - good point - and it has been forgoten - all that can be remembered is the arcade shoot em up of 1991. I knew this would come back to haunt us (the U.S.) one day...I predict that this will be a very costly "lesson"...

[joseph parikian]

Thank you THOTH

When iraqis were asked if they read the leaflets US aeroplains droped on their cities they answerd yes but complained that they were not soft enough , you know after 12 years of starving them they could not aford bying toilet papers .

[THOTH]

quote:

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Originally posted by parik:

Thank you THOTH

When iraqis were asked if they read the leaflets US aeroplains droped on their cities they answerd yes but complained that they were not soft enough , you know after 12 years of starving them they could not aford bying toilet papers . <img border="0" alt="[babysmile]" title="" src="smilies/babysmile.gif" />

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no doubt. I actually have a few of the leaflets dropped in the first war...signed by their authors/designers no less...fairly interesting/amusing little souveiners. I'll have to see about getting some of this war's batch...that is when I can stop crying and laugh about it...