Government Seeks To Shrink Key Armenian Lake

[MosJan]

Government Seeks To Shrink Key Armenian Lake http://www.armenialiberty.org/images/photo/Sevan6.jpg

By Karine Kalantarian

 

The National Assembly began debating on Wednesday government plans to lower the rising water level of Armenia’s ecologically vital Lake Sevan which have met with fierce resistance from environment protection groups.

 

The government wants to do that by increasing by 46 percent the volume of water flowing out of Sevan into the river Hrazdan that feeds a cascade of hydro-electric power plants and the fruit-growing Ararat Valley south of Yerevan. It says the measure is needed for better irrigating lands cultivated by tens of thousands of local farmers.

 

Critics insist, however, that its main purpose is to save villas and holiday hotels, many of them owned by government-connected individuals, that have sprung up on the shores of the mountainous lake over the past decade. Those properties are at growing risk of being submerged by a substantial rise in Sevan’s level that began in 2000 in line with a government effort to reverse a dangerous shrinkage of the country’s main water reservoir.

 

Sevan’s level has risen by 54 centimeters to almost 1,900 meters in the past year alone. Under a special law on Sevan adopted in 2001, it was supposed to rise further in the coming years.

 

A government-drafted amendment to the law debated by the parliament would raise the maximum annual amount of water that can be pumped out of the lake from 240 to 360 million cubic meters. The government already had the National Assembly raise the legal ceiling from 170 million cubic meters earlier this year.

 

As lawmakers discussed the bill dozens of environmentalists and members of other civic groups gathered outside the parliament building to protest against what they see as a massive blow to Sevan and Armenia’s entire ecosystem. “The irrigation season is coming to an end,” said Sona Ayvazian of the Armenian affiliated of the ant-corruption watchdog Transparency International. “There are only two more months left. What are they going to do with those extra 120 million cubic meters during that time?”

 

“The bill stems from the interests of persons doing business on the shores of Sevan,” Ayvazian charged.

 

Knarik Hovannisian, an environment protection expert with the UN office in Yerevan, also expressed concern as she watched the parliament debates. “By lowering Sevan’s level we would change Yerevan’s climate,” she said. “We are already having a negative climate change and should on the contrary be concerned with further raising Sevan’s level in order to make our climate milder.”

 

The criticism was echoed by not only opposition parliamentarians but some of their pro-government colleagues. Vahan Hovannisian, a leader of the governing Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), said the authorities have had enough time to clear Sevan’s picturesque shoreline of houses and other structures. “Why didn’t we save money to re-route roads, to rebuild bridges, and to prevent the construction of buildings on the coast?” he asked during the parliament debates, questioning the official rationale for increased use of the lake’s water.

 

[MosJan]

“Georgian planning flaws led to campaign failure”

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Richard Giragosian August 18, 2008

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http://hetq.am/uploaded/image/articles/2008/08/0808-geo_army.jpg Georgia made an over-confident assumption of its combat capabilities and underestimated the scale of the Russian response, argues Richard Giragosian

 

With the announcement of a ceasefire agreement on 13 August, a five-day conflict between Georgian and Russian forces effectively ended, although Russian troops seemed slow to cease all hostilities and complete their withdrawal from Georgian territory. The conflict was triggered by a large-scale Georgian assault on the break-away region of South Ossetia on August 7, which the Georgian side argued was a move in response to several days of sporadic cross-border attacks and mortar fire against Georgian positions. As Georgian forces entered South Ossetia and initially seized the capital Tskhinvali in attempt to subdue the separatist region, Russian forces responded with an overwhelming show of force, deploying substantial armoured forces and ground troops and quickly establishing air superiority. http://hetq.am/static/images/frontend/i_print.gifprintable version

 

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Although the relatively brief duration of open hostilities now seem to have ended, the campaign has significantly decimated Georgian military capabilities and has raised new questions over the viability of both Georgia’s long-time aspirations for NATO membership and its hopes to retake its two break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as spurring a sharp deterioration in Russian-U.S. relations.

 

Although the initial 7 August Georgian offensive to retake the break-away region of South Ossetia was triggered by a series of provocations, ranging from the shootdown of several Israeli-produced Georgian unmanned arial vehicles (UAVs) to an influx of new Russian peacekeepers and equipment in May, the Georgian military strategy was significantly flawed from the start, based on an underestimation of the Russian response and an inadequate threat assessment.

 

The Georgian offensive opened with an infantry assault against South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali, situated is in a valley surrounded by Georgian-populated villages, with an open terrain conducive to armoured and mass infantry penetration. The thrust came after a preparatory artillery attack from Georgian positions with fire support capabilities including target-oriented and concentrated fire, and including a mortar barrage and launch of notoriously imprecise truck-mounted GRAD multiple-barreled rocket launchers.

Although politically in line with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s consistent threats to restore his country’s territorial integrity, in strictly military terms, the offensive was the first-ever test of the U.S.-trained Georgian troops.

 

Georgia’s first tactical blunder was also its most serious strategic setback. The rebel South Ossetia region borders the Russian region of North Ossetia and is connected by the Roki Tunnel, which is the sole reliable passage through the Caucasus Mountains. While the strategic significance of the Roki Tunnel is enhanced by its role as the region’s only reliable external link, Georgia’s apparent failure to recognize its inherent vulnerability as the only effective land route for a Russian advance was a glaring oversight, if not disastrously fatal decision for Georgian military planners. The failure to even attempt to impede or constrict this land route gave Russian forces secure and unopposed access and greatly reduced the danger of over-extended supply lines.

 

 

The Russian Response

The Russian response was both rapid and overwhelming and, as the first military offensive beyond Russia’ borders since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its severity was unexpected. The Russian campaign was spearheaded by its 58th Army, which as the centerpiece of Russia’s already volatile Caucasus Military District, is regarded as the best trained and most combat-ready unit of the Russian Army. Initially formed in 1995 specifically for operations in Chechnya, the 70,000-strong 58th Army is based in the nearby North Ossetian capital Vladikavkaz and consists of 609 tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 125 artillery pieces, 190 Grad and Uragan volley-fire rocket launchers, and 450 anti-aircraft guns. It is also endowed with its own air support of 120 combat aircraft and 70 helicopters.

 

Following the deployment of an elite paratrooper battalion and smaller special forces unit (“spetznaz”), an infantry force of 15,000 and 150 tanks and heavy self-propelled artillery pieces were immediately deployed to South Ossetia. With the Georgian failure to close the Roki Tunnel connecting South Ossetia to North Ossetia within Russia proper, neither the initial deployment nor subsequent lines of communication or supplies faced any threat.

 

The second stage of the Russian campaign opened a new front in northwestern Georgia, as Russia deployed 1,000 airborne forces from three assault companies to Abkhazia, Georgia’s larger and second separatist region. Landing in ships from the Russian port of Novorossiisk, this force established a bridgehead and assumed positions along Abkhazia’s Black Sea coast, moving quickly to prepare to challenge Georgian positions in the Upper Kodori Gorge, a valley strategically dividing Abkhazia from Georgia proper. This force was also tasked with securing the road to Abkhazia to prevent any attempt by Georgian units to reinforce its positions.

 

Russia’s land campaign then moved well beyond the objectives of securing South Ossetia and Abkhazia and pushed through to secure a perimeter security zone within Georgia proper. An essential element of this plan was to decimate fundamental Georgian military capabilities by pursuing retreating Georgian units, destroying as much heavy equipment as possible and by specifically targeting all Georgian military facilities and bases, even those not involved in the conflict, in order to disrupt Georgia’s military critical infrastructure. This targeting of Georgian military infrastructure included successful air attacks on the Georgian bases at Kojori, Senaki, home to the 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, and Gori, where artillery and tank brigades are stationed, as well as against Black Sea port facilities at Poti, the Marneuli and Vaziani airfields, and the Tbilaviamsheni aviation plant outside of Tbilisi, the site of a factory producing and testing Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets.

 

 

Russian Air Dominance

But the most significant Russian advantage was its ability to rapidly assume air dominance, bolstered by its effective countering of the Georgian air defence network by targeting Georgian command and control and leveraging coordinated electronic warfare and cyber-attacks. With only 9 Su-25 and 9 L-29 aircraft, the Georgian Air Force was quickly overwhelmed and the Russian runway-targeted bombing of each of Georgia’s military bases was especially effective.

 

In terms of air defence, consisting of S-125 (SA-3 'Goa') air-defence systems and reportedly one S-200 missile system, Georgia's early victories of downing at least seven Russian aircraft (Russia had confirmed the loss of four aircraft as JDW went to press) ended with the Russian targeting of radar installations and the country's P-18 air surveillance radars.

 

Russia was able to quickly establish air superiority owing to the Georgian Air Force's poor state of readiness and its outdated and obsolete aviation, air defence and air surveillance assets. Another crucial Georgian liability was its Air Surveillance Command, which, while being theoretically capable of coordinating with air-defence units, is not electronically integrated in the air-defence network and must communicate by telephone or two-way radios.

 

 

Russia’s Display of Naval Power Projection

Seeking to impose a naval blockade of Georgia’s Black Sea ports in part to deter any arms shipments from Ukraine, the Russian Black Sea Fleet mobilized its Moskva cruiser, the Smetlivy patrol boat, and several escorts and began patrolling the Abkhazian coast on 10 August. On the same day, the Russian ships encountered four guided-missile boats approaching from Georgian territorial waters. The Russian naval force allegedly responded to “a series of dangerous maneuvers” with the Smetlivy firing a warning shot in the direction of the patrol boats, which was reportedly ignored, prompting the Russian ships to sink a Georgian patrol boat and scattering the others.

 

The engagement was the first and last naval confrontation of the conflict, mainly due to the inferiority of the Georgian Navy, which has retained a minimal capability of port defence and maritime patrols. Despite its nine principal ships, the Georgian Navy has been seriously neglected in favor of the development of a U.S.-backed Coast Guard. Moreover, the Navy also suffers from poor crew readiness and inexperience, exacerbated by years of under-investment and limited opportunities to train at sea.

 

Thus, the combined deficiencies of Georgian naval and air capabilities has meant that the country failed to have adequate resources to ensure the comprehensive and effective defence of its airspace and territorial waters even prior to the conflict.

 

 

Cyberwar

Cyberwarfare has long been a feature of conflicts in the Caucasus region, ranging from cyberattacks on Russian websites during the Chechen conflict to an Armenian-Azerbaijani exchange of cyberattacks related to the Nagorno-Artsax conflict. Similarly, Georgian state-affiliated websites were effectively targeted and overwhelmed by sophisticated denial-of-service (DOS) cyberattacks from the very start of the conflict.

 

The cyber campaign, modeled on the coordinated cyberattacks that targeted Estonian government websites in April and May 2007, initially disrupted Georgian government domains before expanding to attack Georgian media websites and even the Azerbaijani “Day.Az” news agency website that reportedly provided pro-Georgian coverage of the conflict. Most notably, one successful cyberattack that hacked the Georgian Foreign Ministry website featured the posting of digitally doctored images of Georgian President Saakashvili, prompting Polish President Lech Kaczynski to offer his official website for use by the Georgian government.

 

 

Conclusion

In light of the combination of fundamental tactical shortcomings and serious strategic blunders in the Georgian campaign to retake South Ossetia, it seems clear that the flaws in Georgian military planning were based on two key factors: an over-confident assumption of its own combat readiness and capabilities, as well as by a serious under-estimation of the scale and scope of the Russian response.

 

The first of these factors, an over-estimation of Georgian capabilities, is rooted in the U.S.-run $64 million “Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) and the subsequent Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme (SSOP). Yet despite the seemingly impressive U.S. effort, even after several years of training and equipping, the Georgian military essentially remains divided between four light infantry brigades, consisting of U.S.-trained group of comparatively well-paid, professional servicemen, and a much larger, poorly-trained conscript force plagued by low morale and inadequate pay.

 

Moreover, neither U.S. programme was ever aimed at enhancing the combat readiness or offensive capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. Designed as a flexible, time-phased training initiative, GTEP was never aimed at providing the Georgian military with offensive capabilities, but merely provided training and equipment for 2,600 Georgian Army and Interior Ministry forces using company infantry tactics with the intended goal of acquiring limited counter-terrorism capabilities. Similarly, the goal of the U.S.-run Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme was merely to prepare select Georgian units for deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

 

While the limited value of the U.S. military assistance did not seem to lower Georgian confidence, the second factor of under-estimating the Russian response was rooted in Georgia’s mistaken threat perception. Specifically, Georgia’s strategic assessment, reflected in its three guiding plans, the National Security Concept, National Threat Assessment and National Military Strategy, each disregarded any direct threat from Russia, stating that there was “little possibility of open military aggression against

Georgia,” and defining “the probability of direct aggression” against Georgia as “relatively low.”

 

And perhaps most importantly, the actual state of readiness of the Georgian armed forces suggests that although the Georgian offensive may have been more than adequate against local forces in South Ossetia, they faced insurmountable challenges when confronted by a much more combat-capable and over-powering Russian force. Thus, Georgian deficiencies from not being able to wage or defend against large-scale combat operations involving a major armed force, lacking any combined-arms experience or training, and from having insufficient logistical support and inadequate air defences, combined to doom Georgia’s operational goals in South Ossetia from the very start.

 

 

REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

Order of Battle (pre-conflict)

 

http://hetq.am/uploaded/image/articles/2008/08/0808-georgia.jpg

 

Sources: Jane’s Sentinel Georgia Country Risk Assessment; U.S. Georgia Defence Assessment, September 2005.

________________________

¹ Cobra Light Armored Personnel Carriers belong to the Georgian Ministry of Interior.

² Also known by the NATO designation SA-3 “Goa.”

³ Also known as the SA-5 “Gammon.”

⁴ Georgian Naval power is limited to point defense and limited sea control, with the development of the Coast Guard as the higher priority.

 

Jane’s Defence Weekly

15 August 2008

 

 

[MyTerrain]

I hope the so-called government knows what they are doing because Sevan is essential to Armenias's economy.

[MosJan]

The Nature Minister’s Private House on the Shores of Sevan

 

Lena Nazaryan October 27, 2008

 

 

A few months ago, when the Armenian government was debating the permissible amounts of water that could be drawn from Lake Sevan, the press was full of reports that the agreed upon 360 million cubic meters of water to be extracted wasn’t needed for agricultural irrigation usage but rather to save the numerous property sites of government officials from the rising lake’s waters.

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At the time, government officials and National Assembly Deputies labeled such allegations as ridiculous and without merit.

 

 

http://hetq.am/uploaded/image/articles/2008/10/1008-sevan.jpg

 

 

The private house pictured here on the shore of Lake Sevan, with its numerous annexes, belongs to Aram Harutyunyan, the Minister of Nature Protection. (The photo depicts only a portion of the private compound). Construction on the house began this year and renovation work is still continuing. The house is located on the road that leads from the village of Shorzha to the Artanish Nature Preserve, a few meters removed from the shoreline. Sources close to “Hetq” claim that one year ago the house site was a part of the Artanish Preserve lands and that it was detached from the Preserve’s boundaries after a decision passed by the government.

 

Read more on the issue in the next edition of “Hetq”

[MosJan]

karj asats Aghvesin Havab@ni Pahak en drel

[hyethga]

"Government Seeks To Shrink Key Armenian Lake"

 

lol, how many other "key" lakes does Armenia have?