Pick A Turkish Video And Bust It

[Armat]

Here is a small project worth doing.There are lot of denialists videos on UtUbe and I would like you have time to pick one and start tearing it apart and once done post them at Turkish forums!I am going to start with this

 

It has very dramatic sound effects and everything looks convincing that is to people who are unaware of the subject.It makes Armenians look like Nazi war machine.

Here is my rebuttal.

 

 

Armenian Genocide is an undisputed fact recognized by Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Vatican City and Venezuela. Although part of the United Kingdom, Wales also officially recognizes the Armenian Genocide.

The European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the International Center for Transitional Justice, based on a report prepared for TARC, the International Association of Genocide Scholars, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the World Council of Churches, the self-declared unofficial Parliament of Kurdistan in Exile, and the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal.

Turkish persistent campaign of denial has reached in absurd pinnacle where it emulates the saying "bigger your lie more convincing it is"(Joseph Stalin) Utube denialist videos are new arena where this denial has proliferated.

 

On this particular video with dramatic sound effects one gets the impression Turks were the victims and the entire world was conspiring against them and Armenian rebels portrayed as massive army capable of killing 530 thousand Turks!Claimed in the Video. The absurd lie is easily dismissed since according to most credible historians including Turkish put the figure around 500 thousand dead on the entire eastern front which was at war with Russia.Turkish losses were as a result of their initiation of war on Russia on the winter of 1914 by Enver's ill planned attack resulted thousands dead including 30 thousand simply frozen to dead.

Simple math does not add up either.In order for Armenian rebels to kill 530 thousand Turks they at least had to be in numbers close to 500 thousand soldiers.There are no documentation or evidence to support this blatant lie.

This is a clear example of shooting in the dark and hoping it hits something and in this case it hits a hot air balloon.

Edited November 7, 2007 by Armat

[ED]

jan axper jan, axper unem ashxarh chuni

[HyeFedayis]

This article totally bashes Erdogan! by experts like Ackam.

 

http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washin...s.aspx?id=68245

[MosJan]

jan axper jan, axper unem ashxarh chuni

 

Pastoren menq 2 qeri unenq ??

[DominO123]

Armat, the best reply to those movies are movies with the same titles.

[Arpa]

Has anyone else noticed that the only two words they know are "dashnak" and "asala". Which of those words describe the Armenian nation/people?

[Armat]

Pastoren menq 2 qeri unenq ??

I think we should make more movies ourselves!! I also think we should build a web site countering all the garbage at tallarmeniantail site.These Turks practically worship that site.

Official looking Genocide sites don't do anything in general against deniers.We need a guerrilla style hit them on the head Sites!!!

 

[Armat]

Armat, the best reply to those movies are movies with the same titles.

I think we should make more movies ourselves!! I also think we should build a web site countering all the garbage at tallarmeniantail site.These Turks practically worship that site.

Official looking Genocide sites don't do anything in general against deniers.We need a guerrilla style hit them on the head Sites!!!

 

I like that idea too.

[DominO123]

I think we should make more movies ourselves!! I also think we should build a web site countering all the garbage at tallarmeniantail site.These Turks practically worship that site.

Official looking Genocide sites don't do anything in general against deniers.We need a guerrilla style hit them on the head Sites!!!

 

I like that idea too.

 

Armat, for me to work on such a huge project I have to replace the work I am doing on the internet right now (e-commerce), I mean monetary. It is a lot of work and I can't afford to do that anymore, really can't, I have to live. The author of tallarmeniantale is financed by ATAA and has done various works for them.

 

The only way I will be jumping in this is if I replace the e-commerce while I am doing that. It is one thing browsing hyeforum helping people while on the internet and working on another thing at the same time, and jumping in another project.

 

If many are interested, I can write a work on lulu and sell it, by covering different authors and the trash on the internet. The work could be used for a site by whomever want to run such a site. But the interest should be there, if I write it, I want to be sure that it will be bought. If people are interested, I'd need proofreader or two who would share parts of the profits.

 

 

[HyeFedayis]

I'd buy it, and help promote it on popular sites like Huliq.com

[nairi]

Why are we wasting our time on a bunch of teenagers on Youtube? Have we not proven enough? Has the world not proven enough? Have Turks themselves not proven enough?

 

Can we move on? There are more pressing issues at hand, such as the survival of our homeland.

 

As long as Armenia is an insignificant country, no one will care enough about us. The recent scandal in the United States should be very telling.

[Takoush]

It is a good idea; but someone or someones have to devote a lot of effort, time and money towards a project that yes it would make more people in the US and around the world to believe in our cause and the truth; but anyone who is more literate and know history and what's really going on will know.

 

I honestly think it is even more important for us at these critical times to look towards our existing homeland and all the poor people in there that are struggling day to day; because there are the very rich who in most part stole money from here and there (thanks to corruption), and then there is a greater number of the population that cannot even send their children to school that they have to beg or work on the streets for menial jobs nor have a warm meal to feed their families.

 

Also at these times we have to see that Artsax is accepted by major world councils and countries, and it is finally ours, attached to RofA. Lets look towards our newly born homelands and devote all our brains and time to these very vital and important matters.

 

 

 

 

 

Edited November 9, 2007 by Anahid Takouhi

[hagopn]

Why are we wasting our time on a bunch of teenagers on Youtube? Have we not proven enough? Has the world not proven enough? Have Turks themselves not proven enough?

 

Can we move on? There are more pressing issues at hand, such as the survival of our homeland.

 

As long as Armenia is an insignificant country, no one will care enough about us. The recent scandal in the United States should be very telling.

 

as always, you're right on this issue, always right.

[Nikephoros_Phokas]

I have been thinking about making a site to counter the Turkish official history by bringing out some of the scholars that are not in bed with the Ankara regime. I do not want a popular site but rather a site where people do something besides useless banter, like post excerpts from historical works or scan them in. Something like a website to brige the gap between the general public and historical works that can be considered dangerous to the lies of Turkish official history.

 

Below is : Astourian, Stephan H. 1999. "Modern Turkish Identity and the Armenian Genocide:From Prejudice to Racist Nationalism" From the book Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide

 

http://www.datafilehost.com/download.php?file=92bb6176

File: 23-49AstourianTurkishIdentity.zip

Size: 2.77 MB

 

I scanned it into GIF images. I want to see if some Armenian will meet me halfway by OCRing it in. I would do it myself but A.) it takes additional time compared to the long time I took to scan it in, B.) like I said I want to find people who will do more than engage in useless chatter, like take time to OCR something in.

 

If someone does OCR it in, do not bother if your software cannot handle foreign characters(like mine) because there are lots of Turkish words. Also do not discard the page numbers, so the resulting text is easy to cite. If you do OCR it in or are willing to help me by OCRing such works then PM me.

 

I am getting on inter-library loan:

Vryonis The Turkish State and History: Clio Meets the Grey Wolf

Heyd Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp

 

I am just one man, I cannot scan and OCR so much.

Edited December 27, 2007 by Nikephoros_Phokas

[Ashot]

I have been thinking about making a site to counter the Turkish official history by bringing out some of the scholars that are not in bed with the Ankara regime. I do not want a popular site but rather a site where people do something besides useless banter, like post excerpts from historical works or scan them in. Something like a website to brige the gap between the general public and historical works that can be considered dangerous to the lies of Turkish official history.

 

Below is : Astourian, Stephan H. 1999. "Modern Turkish Identity and the Armenian Genocide:From Prejudice to Racist Nationalism" From the book Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide

 

http://www.datafilehost.com/download.php?file=92bb6176

File: 23-49AstourianTurkishIdentity.zip

Size: 2.77 MB

 

I scanned it into GIF images. I want to see if some Armenian will meet me halfway by OCRing it in. I would do it myself but A.) it takes additional time compared to the long time I took to scan it in, B.) like I said I want to find people who will do more than engage in useless chatter, like take time to OCR something in.

 

If someone does OCR it in, do not bother if your software cannot handle foreign characters(like mine) because there are lots of Turkish words. Also do not discard the page numbers, so the resulting text is easy to cite. If you do OCR it in or are willing to help me by OCRing such works then PM me.

 

I am getting on inter-library loan:

Vryonis The Turkish State and History: Clio Meets the Grey Wolf

Heyd Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp

 

I am just one man, I cannot scan and OCR so much.

If you need everything in Microsoft word format i will be more than happy to do it, after I come back from Arizona, I am taking off in 5 hours and will be back by midnight!!!

[Nikephoros_Phokas]

I would rather plain text, infact I just uninstall MS Office. The article is good, but I am shocked that someone replied positively so fast. Your software should allow to output into Clipboard. I know Abby Finereader 8.0 Professional does. But my version does not support other languages really and will strip out accent marks and diacritics of which this article has many.

 

The Greeks participating on forums that I posted similar requests to, except I scanned in from The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom Of September 6-7, 1955, And The Destruction Of The Greek Community Of Istanbul. and none of them replied. The stupid chirping cicadas.

 

 

[Ashot]

I would rather plain text, infact I just uninstall MS Office. The article is good, but I am shocked that someone replied positively so fast. Your software should allow to output into Clipboard. I know Abby Finereader 8.0 Professional does. But my version does not support other languages really and will strip out accent marks and diacritics of which this article has many.

 

The Greeks participating on forums that I posted similar requests to, except I scanned in from The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom Of September 6-7, 1955, And The Destruction Of The Greek Community Of Istanbul. and none of them replied. The stupid chirping cicadas.

You need it in notepad you will get it in notepad, no problem, Give me 2 days... By friday evening it will be ready...

[Nikephoros_Phokas]

What OCR software do you use?

 

Also since Ashotna voluntereed do not OCR it in anyone else, but you free to download it. I have plenty more books I scan from like especially The Dhimmi: Jews & Christians Under Islam because for example many Turks always repeat:

 

"How come if we are so intolerant we did not kill all the Christians or Armenians earlier."

 

And that book by Bat Ye'or best answers such a stupid claim using instead of conjectures the muslim tradition of jurisprudence.

 

 

[Ashot]

What OCR software do you use?

 

Also since Ashotna voluntereed do not OCR it in anyone else, but you free to download it. I have plenty more books I scan from like especially The Dhimmi: Jews & Christians Under Islam because for example many Turks always repeat:

 

"How come if we are so intolerant we did not kill all the Christians or Armenians earlier."

 

And that book by Bat Ye'or best answers such a stupid claim using instead of conjectures the muslim tradition of jurisprudence.

Abby Finereader!!!

[DominO123]

I don't think you can get away from Abby Finereader professional for this kind of stuff, there are opensource alternatives which can do more than English, but their user interface (if we can call it that) are awful and difficult to manage.

[Nikephoros_Phokas]

I use Finereader 8,0 but a version that is not international, it can only OCR English. I need to get the International Version so hopefully I can OCR some Greek texts.

[Ashot]

Below is : Astourian, Stephan H. 1999. "Modern Turkish Identity and the Armenian Genocide:From Prejudice to Racist Nationalism" From the book Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide

http://www.datafilehost.com/download.php?file=92bb6176

File: 23-49AstourianTurkishIdentity.zip

Size: 2.77 MB

A l B*

Modern Turkish Identity and the Armenian Genocide

From Prejudice to Racist Nationalism STEPHAN H. ASTOURIAN

 

A Michel Baumont

 

 

 

The Turkish nationalist ideologies that emerged in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century entailed two concomitant and interrelated processes: the exclusion of non-Muslims from the nation, by various degrees of violence combined with both legal and informal discrimination, and the construction of a modern Turkish identity. This exclusion was rooted in the pre-existing, widespread prejudice against those groups, of which Ottoman idioms, sayings, and proverbs best suggest the scope and virulence. A better understanding of the transition from prejudice to racist nationalist theories could shed much light on the worldview, values, and behavior of the Ottoman Turks when the empire faced European imperialism, territorial losses, financial bankruptcy, and significant socioeconomic transformations. Not only could such an understanding explain why large-scale massacres and the genocide of the Armenians characterized the end of that state (1870s-1923), it could also elucidate the reasons why these massacres were acceptable to broad segments of the Turkish and Kurdish population who often participated en masse in the violence.

 

Some Theoretical Considerations

The meaning of sayings and proverbs about non-Muslims and Armenians cannot be understood in isolation. They form clusters of words that are embedded in a social structure and sociopolitical worldview or, at a semantic level, in meaning systems. Thus, the representation of "the non-Muslim" or "the Armenian" in those linguistic expressions also defines the self-perception of "the Muslim Turk," along with his or her normative expec¬tations about "the non-Muslims" or "the Armenians" and how they should behave. Not only do the discourse types to be studied reproduce subject positions in society, they also naturalize them. Thus, this naturalization of subject positions shapes the socialization of these subjects and defines their available social identities—in this case for non-Muslims in general, the Armenians in particular. Naturalization, then, is a weapon in the struggle to legitimize power.1

To be sure, the social power that sociologists and political scientists analyze is a relation between people, rather than a relation between texts or meanings. "But it is always a mediated relationship, and cannot exist without the signifying systems that constitute it. So it is also possible to say that power is also an effect of discourse, if 'discourse' has a general sense equivalent to 'semiosis' (the process of construction and circulation of signs)."2 The Ottoman words, idioms, sayings, and proverbs about non-Muslims and Armenians constitute just such an effect of power.

In the symbolic interactionist perspective on which this essay relies, race or ethnoreligious prejudice can be better understood by studying "the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others."3 That process, which is collective, defines another racial or ethnoreligious group and, by contrast, ends up characterizing one's own. As Herbert Blumer puts it, "it is the sense of social position emerging from this collective process of characterization which provides the basis of race prejudice."4

Four types of feeling seem always to characterize race prejudice in the dominant group. First, there is a feeling of superiority, which is demonstrated in the tendency to disparage "qualities" attributed to the subordinate group. Greediness, deceit, stupidity, and other such debasing traits usually figure among those qualities. Second, there is a feeling of distinctiveness, to the effect that the subordinate outgroup is essentially alien. Thus, its exclusion is justified. According to Blumer, these two feelings do not constitute prejudice by themselves. Third, there exists a sense of proprietary claim, a feeling of entitlement to exclusive or prior rights. These exclusive claims could pertain to some occupations, professions, or positions of power in the government, the legal system, and the army; to the ownership of various types of property including choice lands; or to the display of symbols of various kinds. Although this sense of proprietary claim is particularly strong in race prejudice, it does not explain its appearance. Indeed, such proprietary claims existed in societies displaying no prejudice, for example in various feudal or caste societies. Blumer contends that "where claims are solidified into a structure which is accepted or respected by all, there seems to be no group prejudice."5

The fourth feeling is a suspicion, apprehension, or fear that the subor¬dinate outgroup is intent on threatening the superior status of the dominant group in the present or the future. This is indeed the most important feel¬ing, for race prejudice stems precisely from the impression—whether well founded or not—on the part of the dominant group that the subordinate group is "getting out of place." Thus, "the source of race prejudice lies in a felt challenge to this sense of group position" and racism tends "to emerge and develop when racial stratification is under challenge and the position of the dominant group is being threatened."6 The emergence of anti-Armenian prejudice in the Ottoman Empire took place precisely in such a context, from the period of reforms known as the Tanzimat (1839-76) onward.

Throughout history the power discrepancy among groups coming into contact has been the main determinant of their relations, be they racial (defined in a biological or phenotypical sense) or ethnoreligious groups. Thus, this essay uses the term "race" in the context of broadly defined "race relations," that is, situations in which groups endowed "with distinct identities and recognisable characteristics" live together in a conflicting relationship in which "ascriptive criteria are used to mark out the members of each group." According to John Rex, "true race relation situations" occur "when the practices of ascriptive allocation of roles and rights referred to are justified in terms of some kind of deterministic theory, whether that theory be of a scientific, religious, cultural, historical, ideological or sociological kind and whether it is highly systematised, or exists only on the everyday level of folk wisdom or in the foreshortened factual or theoretical models presented by the media."7

 

The Ottoman Context

The period of reform and centralization known as the Tanzimat, or "Reorder¬ing," put an end to the existing paternalistic type of intergroup relations, whereby both the inferior and superior groups internalize the subservient status of the subordinate community, and led to the emergence of racism. In¬deed, the two imperial decrees central to this era, the Hatt-i Sherif-i Gulhane (the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber), promulgated in 1839, and es¬pecially the Hatt-i Humayun (the Imperial Rescript) of 1856 polarized the relations between the dominant and subordinate groups by putting forward the concept of Ottomanism (Osmanhlik), namely, equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. This principle of equality undermined the established relations of power and paved the way for a potential end to the supremacy of the ruling element, the Muslim Ottomans in general and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Turks in particular. Ahmed Jevdet ***** (1822-95), the distinguished Ottoman historian and jurist, aptly captured the deep Muslim resentment against the newly proclaimed Hatt-i Hiimayun: "Many among the people of Islam began complaining thus: 'Today we lost our sacred national rights [hukuk-i mukaddese-i milliyyemizi] which were earned with our ancestors' blood. The Muslim community [millet-i islamiyye], while it used to be the ruling religious community [millet-i hdkime], has [now] been deprived of such a sacred right. For the people of Islam, this a day to weep and mourn'."8

During the Tanzimat era many Armenians reached high positions in the Ottoman government in such fields as foreign affairs and finances. None, however, wielded decisive power; rather, they mostly owed their positions to their technical, financial, or linguistic skills and to patron-client relationships. On the whole, they were excludedfiomdecision-making positions in the ministries of war and foreign affairs and the grand vizierate.9 In addition, even the wealthiest Armenians, such as the members of the amira class (bankers and industrialists-technocrats serving the Ottoman state), lacked real power in the Ottoman financial and economic administration. They had even less power in the Ottoman political sphere, so that the author of a seminal dissertation on the amiras concludes that his study "lends strong support to the theory of the supremacy of the political over the economic in pre-modern states, a theory which. . . has been extended to apply to states in transition from pre-modern to the industrialized stage."10

Perception of reality, however, is sometimes more important than reality itself in shaping people's actions. In the eyes of the Muslim Ottomans, it mattered little that the Tanzimat had not devolved substantial power on non.-Muslims. In the long run, Muslim Ottomans felt that the Tanzimat decrees and laws would undermine their superior status as members of "the ruling religious community," thus, in effect, turning the world upside down. Ziya *****, one of the so-called "Young Ottoman" writers of the Tanzimat era, gave an early expression to the feeling of upheaval on the part of the Turkish Ottomans in his Zaferndme §erhi (Commentary on the epic of victory). In this satirical poem criticizing the failures of the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali, or the offices of the central government, including the grand vizierate) during the crisis with Greece over the possession of Crete (1868), he waxed ironic about Grand Vizier Ali ***** and his policies:

If but God's plan assists in his project

The Gypsies' place will soon be in the Grand Vizier's seat

Only for the Jews he has made an exception

Since from amongst Greeks and Armenians he has [already] nominated

marshals and balas To perfection has he [clearly] brought the system of equality of rights."

The feeling of entitlement to exclusive rights by the Turks and their apprehension that former subordinate groups were "getting^ out of place" could hardly be better, and more bitterly, expressed. From those feelings stemmed Turkish racism, which also functioned to legitimize the inferior status of the non-Muslims in general and the Armenians in particular.

None perhaps was more concerned, not to say obsessed, with the perception that Armenians were overstepping the boundaries of their position in society, being ungrateful and disloyal to the empire, and constituting a danger to its territorial integrity than Sultan Abdulhamid n (1876-1909). His reign was characterized by an attempt at reverting to the traditional society which was crumbling under the impact of the Tanzimat, of the European economic penetration of the empire, and of the numerous Ottoman defeats and territorial losses since the 1770s. Indeed, in view of the widespread op¬position among Turkish Ottomans to the doctrine of Ottomanism and in order to muster the support of the Muslim Ottomans in general, Abdulhamid II em¬phasized the utmost importance of Muslim unity'and superiority within the empire and of Pan-Islamism without. As a supplement to anti-Westernism, attachment to the past was officially promoted.

The debates leading to the promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution on December 23, 1876, the apex of the Tanzimat era, give a good idea of public opinion among Ottoman Turks. These debates emphasized themes such as anti-constitutionalism and the natural inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. They stressed that the sovereign's rights should not be curtailed by any constitutional restrictions. Many also wanted to add the attribute of sacredness to the asserted caliphal function of the sultan. The editorial introduction to an Arabic treatise on statecraft, presented at that time to Abdulhamid, captures how anti-constitutionalist ulema (the learned men of Islam) and the sultan himself viewed the traditional Islamic state.

Every person knew his position and rank (makam and mertebe) and would not transgress the limits assigned to him. He would obey those above him, and would not attempt to compete in station, value, administration, or government with those above him. In this way, the affairs of the world and of human beings would reach the hierarchies of aims delimited by divine wisdom, by prophetic

§eriat and by rational [?] traditions, and attain the peace and prosperity of the realm.. . . The man in the highest rank was the one possessing the required virtues, and as long as he ruled in justice, the graces of God continued to favour him.'2

In view of such ideas, it comes as little surprise that Sultan Abdiilhamid dissolved the newly elected Ottoman Parliament on January 31, 1878, dis¬missed on February 5,1878 Grand Vizier Midhat *****, who had inspired the constitution, and then suspended the constitution de facto. In those actions, he enjoyed the support of "the great mass of the people—with all their beliefs and superstitions, and also their sense of honor and decency." Besides, not only was he backed by "the Ulema, the ministers, and the intellectuals," but also by the " 'men of religion'—serifs, seyyids, nakibs, and amirs— genuine or spurious, representing either traditionalism or obscurantism."13 Midhat *****, not unlike Fuad *****, an earlier minister of foreign affairs and grand vizier of the Tanzimat period, was accused of serving the interests of the "infidels" and of being one of them.14 But, what did it mean, in the Ottoman Turkish mind, to be an "infidel"?

 

The Collective Image of Non-Muslims and Armenians

Whereas the writings of Ottoman scholars and statesmen quoted above suggest how the elite reacted to the emancipation of non-Muslims, a selection of idioms, sayings, and proverbs sketches the mentality of the Turkish Ottoman masses in relation to their inferiors.

Disloyalty characterizes the ghiaour's relations with others. "Fidelity from a ghiaour, healing from poison" (Gdvurdan vefa, zehirden sifa) goes a proverb, which suggests that loyalty from an unbeliever is as likely as recovery of one's health from taking poison.15 Disloyalty is matched by ingratitude: "to a ghiaour, kindness does no good? (Gdvura iyilikyaramaz), for whatever you do he is ungrateful.16 Ungratefulness is one of the es¬sential meanings associated in Arabic with the triliteral, consonantal root kfr, meaning "to be an infidel," "not to believe," "to be ungrateful." Two Ottoman Turkish words, based on Arabic derivations from that root, asso¬ciate the meaning of "unbelief' with "ungratefulness."17 Shemseddin Sami's nineteenth-century Ottoman Turkish dictionary defines the first one, kdfir, as "one who forgets the kindness he has experienced, who does not under¬stand [or appreciate] kindness."18 It also defines the compound k&fir-i nimet as "ungratefulness."19 The second word, kiifran, also meant "ingratitude," whereas its compound kufran-i nimet referred to "ungratefulness toward a benefactor."20 The ghiaours' ingratitude reaches an apex in the Turkish perception that "the infidel weeps over our wretched state of affairs" {Kafir tiglar bizim ahval-i perisanimiza).21 What makes this proverb particularly strong and bitter is irony, the macrostructural rhetorical figure on which it is based. That figure is reinforced by a microstructural trope, the antiphrasis concerning "weeps over" (aglar), which means the opposite of its literal meaning ("rejoices over") and reveals the irony of the whole proverb.22

In view of these characteristics of the ghiaours, friendship with them was excluded: "From amongst ghiaours, it is impossible [or, wrong] to make friends" {Gdvurdan dost olmaz).23 Although it makes a difference whether either "impossible" or "wrong" applies in this case, the ambiguity of olmaz, which allows both meanings, makes the proverb polysemous, and thus better. A related proverb states that "it is impossible to make pelt from swine and friends with ghiaours" (Domuzdan post, gdvurdan dost olmaz). Not only is the rhymed terseness of this proverb remarkable, but so is the parallel between swine and infidels. As the Quran forbids the consumption of pork, extremely negative connotations have been associated with domuz in Turkish culture. In Ottoman times, domuz connoted "filth," "obstinacy," and "cruelty," and it appeared in highly insulting expressions.24 It is no coincidence that most of these characteristics also constituted the salient attributes of the ghiaours. A variant of the previous proverb sheds some light on one of its meanings. It goes thus: "It is impossible to make pelt from the skin of swine and friends from old enemies" {Domuz derisinden post olmaz, eski dusmandan dost olmaz).25 Obviously, "ghiaours" and "old enemies" are structurally interchangeable in these proverbs. On the whole, friendly relationships with the infidels being excluded, coexistence with them seems to be viewed only in terms of domination or hostility, a clear negation of Ottomanism.

One proverb, perhaps either foreboding or reflecting the Turkist eco¬nomic nationalism of the period from 1908 to 1914 and the then Turkish boycotts of foreign and non-Muslim enterprises and shops, suggests that "he who works for the ghiaour will bear his sword as well" {Gdvurun ekmegini yiyen gdvurun kilicim (alar [geker, kusamr, sallar]).26 Clearly, this proverb is in keeping with the theory and policies of Milliiktisat (National economy) which aimed at ridding the Ottoman economy of its non-Muslim bourgeoisie and replacing it with a Turkish middle-class on the eve of World War I and during it.27 The gist of this proverb is that non-Muslim economic power should be ostracized. On the other hand, the Turkish masses and conservative elements were very reluctant to accept and adopt European inventions, especially technology, which they viewed as the creations of unbelievers. Thus, they were commonly called gdvur icadi ("ghiaour's invention" or

"invention imported from the West").28 In some regions, Cilicia in particular, the Turkish and Turcoman peasantry called some of those inventions, such as tractors, the creation of the devil.

Undoubtedly, all of the proverbs about the ghiaours apply to the Armenians; however, some proverbs were more specific to them. What do they tell us about Turkish perceptions of the Armenians? "Intriguer like an Armenian" (Ermeni gibi gammaz), goes one proverb.29 This perception is confirmed by another that states that "trickery [characterizes] the Armenian as procuring [or pimping] does the Greek" (Ermeniye muzewirlik, Ruma pezevenklik).30 Endowed with these negative traits, the Armenian is devoid of more desirable ones: "Spiritual knowledge in the Armenian, and [physical] might in the Jew do not exist" (Ermenide irfan, Yahudide pehlivan olmaz).31 In some regions of the empire, there also existed "the Armenian illness" (Ermeni hastahgi) which referred to "avarice," presumably a typical attribute of the Armenian character.32

Resentment against Ae emerging Ottoman elite of Armenian origin or faith, against their "getting out of place," is best captured in two proverbs. "The Armenian grandees" (Ermeni kibari), goes the first one, which in fact is a derogatory reference to the "Armenian parvenus" of the Tanzimat period and their alleged ostentatious arrogance.33 The other states: "Converted to Islam from the Armenian faith, nouveau riche" (Ermeniden donme, sonradan gorme). In case one might miss the meaning of the proverb, Shinasi, the great nineteenth-century Ottoman intellectual, gives its French equivalent: // n'y a rien qui soit plus orgueilleux qu 'un riche qui a ete gueux ("Nothing is more arrogant than a rich person who used to be a beggar").34

The study of proverbs reveals a hierarchy in the objects of Turkish prejudice and racism, a ranking of sorts of the most despised or hated non-Turkish communities. By the end of the nineteenth-century, the Armenians were ahead of the Greeks and Jews in that ranking because they had under¬gone a "Renaissance" (Zartonk) and "emancipation" in the second half of the century. The Armenian Question had been internationalized from 1878 on, and the Turks envied the commercial successes of some urban Armenians. Thus, despite the-fact that 70 percent of the Ottoman Armenians Were poor peasants, derogatory stereotypes with an economic coloration were frequent. "One Greek cons two Jews, and one Armenian cons two Greeks," reported a German traveler who fully agreed with this view.35 Another German traveler and student of things Ottoman expatiated on the nature and intensity of this prejudice: "But why, then, are the Armenians so hated? The main reason is the commercial talent of the Armenian race. The Armenians are born merchants. Their skills and craftiness in all trades are superior."36

Ernst Jackh, a German Turkophile scholar who visited Cilicia in 1909, asserts that Armenians were known in the maritime and commercial cities of the Middle East for their "avaricious greed." Sayings like 'Two Greeks equal an Armenian, and an Armenian equals two devils" were supposed to describe Armenians best. He went on to say that one of the causes of the Hamidian massacres, including those of 1909 in Cilicia, was precisely an attempt at weakening Armenians politically and economically.37

Clearly, prejudice against the Armenians had many causes other than the economic ones, but the latter were significant in important maritime and trading cities. There, as some Armenians had welcomed western culture and technology and were performing remarkably well in the economy, they were perceived as symbols of western modernity and exploiters. As a result, they were demonized.

 

"Exclusive" Ideologies and Turkish Identity

Not only do denigrating stereotypes legitimize domination and justify ha¬tred, in most cases of racial and ethnic polarization they also "dehumanise the antagonist and prepare the ground for collective slaughter."38 These stereotypes, combined with "a fantasy of power or redemption or salvation" ■crystallized in a "guiding ideology," result more often than not in deadly outcomes.39 indeed, such ideologies are often highly rationalized variants of the more popular stereotypes. They usually exclude the despised, dominated group from the nation-and provide the dominant group with a megalomaniac sense of national or racial greatness as well as a delusory vision of world hegemony. Turkism and Pan-Turkism fulfilled all of these functions.

Turkism and Pan-Turkism

The emergence of Turkism, the ideological core of Turkish nationalism, led to a shift from ethnoreligious racism to a more biological version of it, for Turkism centered uporrthe concept of race (cins or irk).40 The three^ major thinkers who shaped Turkism and Pan-Turkism were Yusuf Akchura or Akchuraoghlu (1876-1935), Moiz Cohen, alias Munis Tekin Alp or Tekinalp (1883-1961), and Ziya Gok Ahrfl 876-1924).

As early as his famous article titled "Three Types of Policy" (March 1904), Akchura was in favor of constituting "a Turkish political nationality [Turk milliyet-i siyasiyesi] founded on race [irk]."41 He elaborated further on tKIs idea in numerous articles published in the periodical Turk Yurdu (Turkish homeland) beginning in November 1911. By 1914, he defined the concept of Turkish political nationality as that of belonging to "a race, a language, a tradition," that is, Turkism.42 On the outbreak of World War I, Akchura participated in the creation of the Pan-Turkic "Turco-Tatar Committee" (1915) and got involved in a number of Pan-Turkic activities.

Tekinalp proposed two plans for the realization of Turan, the asserted homeland of all Turkic peoples and the symbol of their future unity in a mighty state. The "minimum" plan "would consist of setting up a relatively easy-to-achieve 'small Turan,' from Istanbul to Lake Baykal. . . and from Kazan to Mongolia." This was to be but a stage, however, toward the "maximum" plan which "would involve the establishment of 'Great Turan,' from the frontiers of Japan to the Scandinavian mountains and from the Arctic Ocean to the Tibetan Plateau."43 The logic behind these irredentist designs was a vision of the future: "Ours is the age of nationality and race. To~the extent that nationality even is coming to an end, the age of race is arriving."44 The means to achieve "Great Turan" was what Tekinalp called "New Genghizism"—a reference to Genghis Khan's methods of conquest— to be carried out by the Ottoman Turks:

 

Turan will be saved!

—But how and with what?

—How and with what? Very simple: with iron and with fire! The iron of our swords and the fire of our thoughts will conquer and free Turan!45

 

Throughout his life, Tekinalp was also consistent in preaching the Turk-ification of all non-Turkish minorities living in the Ottoman Empire and subsequently in Kemalist Turkey.46

The most influential thinker, however, was Mehmed Ziya, known under his pen name of Ziya Gok Alp, who, from 1909 to 1918, was a member of the secretive Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the party that ruled the Ottoman Empire for most of that period. As the main ideologue of that organization, he was among a handful of leaders who formulated the values and provided the vision that led the empire to enter World War I. He deemed the basis of morality to be total and unquestioning service to the nation, which he conceived as strictly limited to Turkish-speaking Muslims.47 The territory of the Turks, however, was to be larger than the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, as he suggested in one of his poems, "Turan":

 

Fatherland for the Turks is neither Turkey, nor yet Turkestan Fatherland is a great and eternal country: Turan.48

On the outbreak of World War I, he stated the aims and methods of the Ottoman Empire in no uncertain terms.

The land of the enemy shall be devastated, Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan.49

Despite these writings, Taha Parla, the author of a monograph on Ziya G6k Alp's thought, claims that many "have taken literally the Turkist and Turanist myths, legends, slogans, and figures of speech he used in a number of poems he published especially between 1910 and 1915." Parla believes that "the cultural myth" should not be mistaken with "Turanism, the racist and irredentist brand of Turkish nationalism," which allegedly does not appear in Gok Alp's prolific "theoretical or political articles and essays."50

Gok Alp's theoretical treatises on which Parla relies were written after the Ottoman defeat in World War I shattered the Turanist projects of the CUP and made them look Utopian. In addition, they were written during the ascendancy of Mustafa Kemal, who had little patience with irredentist ideas that could endanger his alliance with the Bolsheviks and, therefore, his struggle for the independence of Turkey.51 What about Gok Alp's views before and during the war?

G6k Alp was then somewhat of a visionary who announced a "New Life" (Yeni Hayat) for the Turkish race. In contradistinction with the purport¬edly decaying Europeans, the Turks would strengthen themselves by starting "a new civilization" endowed with "genuine values" and characterized by economic achievements:

[This "New Life"] will show that the civilizations of Europe were based on rotten, sick, putrid foundations. These civilizations are condemned to decline, annihilation. The genuine civilization is the Turkish civilization which will start only with the development of the New Life. The Turkish race, unlike other races, has not been corrupted by alcohol and dissipation. The Turkish blood has been steeled, rejuvenated in glorious battles.

Convinced of the superiority of the Turks, he did not hesitate about asserting that "the supermen whom the German philosopher Nietzsche imagined are the Turks. The Turks are the 'new men' [yeni insanlar] of every age." Gok Alp held these ideas throughout the war. He first published these views in July 1911 and saw fit to include them six years later in the first installment of a series of essays titled "What is Turkism?"52

A famous Turkish journalist, who during the war was an assistant professor of sociology at Constantinople University where Ziya Gok Alp was then professing the same discipline, reports that "for him [G6k Alp], Pan-Turkism was a monomania." The World War, which he "sincerely welcomed," was "a means of realizing Pan-Turkish dreams." The Unionist leaders were "those dreamed-of men of action who could translate his theories into deeds." In view of his intellectual stature and membership in the Central Committee of the ruling party, "the military leaders let him become almost an intellectual dictator."53 Actually, Gok Alp did not hide his irredentist Turanian opinions during World War I. In a testimonial to the publication in 1915 of Tekinalp's Tiirkismus und Pantiirkismus in Weimar, he writes:

Turan is no illusory fatherland. The Turkic tribes which live next to each other in Asia will gather under the Turkish flag and form a great empire. Turan is the fatherland of Greater Turkey [Grossturkentum]... . Turan is the Ideal of a "realite sociale," born of the Turkish national consciousness. Those who consider it a Utopia are themselves living in a Utopian world.. . . "L'ideal se realise" ["The Ideal is being realized"]. This is our kismet [destiny].54

As late as April 1918, Gok Alp propounded that the Turkic peoples of Russia should succeed in freeing themselves and forming independent governments. Delegates from those governments to a subsequent congress should choose a supreme leader who would receive the title of Sahibkiran ("Lord of the fortunate conjunction [of planets]"), which centuries earlier ulema had bestowed upon Timur Lenk. The Sahibkiran, who could also be called a Miinci ("Savior"), would be the supreme military leader of Turan, the federation of these Turkic peoples. He would establish his general headquar¬ters in some place of his choice in the Caucasus, Turkestan, or Kazakhstan. In many ways reminiscent of the ideal fascist leader, the Sahibkiran should be a charismatic and dignified hero, who would concentrate absolute civil and military powers in his hands. Turan would have an official common language, Ottoman Turkish, which would unite all its Turkic peoples.55 It would seem that the SahibkiranJjQk Alp had in mind, in 1918 at least, was none other than Enver *****, the war minister and leader of the military wing of the Committee of Union and Progress who also happened to be a leading perpetrator of the Armenian Genocide. In a poem titled "Enver *****," Gok Alp celebrated the greatness of the man. Its conclusion reads:

 

History teaches thus: "All great conquerors

Are like their people inspired by God."

Today the people is like you joyful [because of good news]

But what is clear to you is vague to them:

The secret voice of God coming from the heavens

The glad tidings that "The Turks are at last being liberated."56

Ideologies, like Turkism and Pan-Turkism, have consequences and intellectuals involved in the highest political bodies, like Ziya G6k Alp, have responsibilities. Indeed, Enver Behnan §apolyo, his biographer and disciple, reports that, as a member of the ruling central committee, Gok Alp "investigated very carefully the question of minorities, in particular the question of the Armenians in Anatolia. As a result, the Armenian deportation [tehcir] took place."57 Gok Alp was thus directly guilty of the Armenian Genocide, for the word tehcir is but a cipher in Turkish historiography for that event.

The Theory and Policies of Milli Iktisat (National Economy)

Whereas Turkism and Pan-Turkism excluded the Armenians from the nation, the theory and policies of Milli iktisat aimed at eliminating them, along with the Ottoman Greeks, from economic activities. Indeed, Gok Alp's "solidarism," opposed as it was to the liberalism of the Manchester School in the economic sphere, paralleled his collectivistic tendencies, which rejected liberalism and the free will of the individual in the political sphere. Influenced by Durkheim and the Pan-Germanist Friedrich List, Gok Alp disapproved of class struggle and propounded peaceful economic cooperation among various classes, on condition that they belong to the same homogeneous ethnic group, namely, Turkish. In this regard, he argued that the division of labor in the Ottoman Empire—Turkish soldiers and bureaucrats versus Greek and Armenian traders and artisans—had brought about a "mutual parasitism." According to him, this division of labor between Turks and non-Turks was not genuine, for the groups lacked a "common conscience." As a matter of fact, the realization of "national solidarism" (milli tesaniid) required the existence of a community endowed with such a "common conscience." Thus, Gok Alp concluded, the "national economy" could be materialized with its inherent organic division of labor only if the Turks undertook by themselves all kinds of economic activities.58

To create a strong Turkish state based on a Turkish bourgeoisie was, in a nutshell, the crux of his thought. Indeed, as the Turks had been deprived of "economic classes" (iktisadi simflar), those involved in important trading, financial, or "industrial" activities, they were unable to establish a strong state. Gok Alp, however, had a grand vision. The Turks would soon be "more modern" than the non-Muslims in all the professions they would engage in. Whereas the non-Muslims were "unwavering imitators" of Europe, the

Turks would "produce the life of a new civilization" endowed with "genuine values." The Turks "would not [merely] deign to accept the arts and crafts"; rather, they would "directly start factories" and would dominate the seas with "the very best merchant-ships."59 In a famous nationalistic poem portraying the ideal, enlightened "fatherland," Gok Alp also suggests that "fatherland" is where "maritime arsenals, factories, steamers, trains belong to the Turk."60 Although he argued that the Turks should control the economy of the empire in the near future, he also stressed that they were de facto the bulwarks of the Muslim world and of "Ottomanness" against "cosmopolitanism," a reference to the non-Turks and Europeans both inside and outside the empire. "The Turkish nationality [Tiirkliik] is the genuine point of support of the Muslim world [hlamiyet] and of Ottomanness [Osmanhlik] against cosmopolitanism."61

If non-Muslim Ottomans were a hindrance to Turkish control of the economy, so was "laissez-faire" liberalism. Indeed, Gok Alp argued that the dominance of the Manchester School of political economy in the Ottoman Empire prevented the development of "economic patriotism" by promoting "cosmopolitanism." How could the spirit of "economic patrio¬tism" be developed among the Turks so that they should spawn a national bourgeoisie, which in turn would constitute the foundation of a strong state? With somewhat circular reasoning, Gok Alp stated that "for economic conscience to become patriotic, I gather it was necessary for the state to follow the policy of the national economy!"62 In this view, Armenians were identified with liberalism both politically, because of their reformist and decentralizing aspirations, and economically, because of their prominence in circles supporting "laissez-faire" and of their achievements in international trade. In short, they incarnated cosmopolitanism at its worst.

In the same vein, Tekinalp stressed the utmost importance for Turks to improve the economic condition of their country, to control its economy, and to develop entrepreneurial skills with the support of the state.63 Tekinalp's portrayal of the Turks as victims of the Greeks and Armenians, mixing fantasy with Pan-Turanian dreams, economic nationalism, and a modicum of historical analysis, is particularly striking. Suggestive of a mood of revanchist bitterness, his depiction shows the links between milli iktisat, Turkism, and Pan-Turkism:

 

On the other hand, the Christian population of Turkey has been consistently progressing, partly by means of privileges too easily granted, and partly by their own initiative, and they are ousting the real owner of the country more and more from their heritage. Two nations, pressing upon them from either side, have succeeded in driving the old "conquerors" more and more into the interior of the country. The Greeks from the sea and the islands have taken possession of the harbours and coast towns of Anatolia, and pressed the Turks further and further back into the salt steppes of the interior. The Armenians, who, thanks to their friendly relations with England, have become very rich, have cut off their retreat. The Turk is such a miserable wretch that he has forgotten the plains of Turania, without even having been able to assure his footing in the country he has conquered. He was so convinced of his power that he omitted to build bridges between his old and new homes, bridges between the different conquered territories.64

Akchura, for his part, emphasized the historical role of the bourgeoisie, which he viewed as being nationalistic by essence. Arguing that the kingdom of Poland lost its independence at the end of the eighteenth century because its middle class was made up of Jews and Germans only, he called on the Turks to develop a capitalistic bourgeoisie that would assume the role so far played by the Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Levantines. To class struggle, he opposed, as did Gok Alp, solidarism and corporatism.65

The impact of those ideas is clearly attested by the Turkish boycott of Greek Ottoman shops during the negotiations between the Ottoman Empire, Greece, and the European powers over the Aegean islands (from the end of 1912 to the beginning of 1913). Without any clear political reason, that boycott was extended to the Armenians and other non-Muslim groups. A similar boycott took place during and in the wake of the Balkan Wars (1912— 14).66 These boycotts were the first applications of milli iktisat. As Tekinalp put it, they "caused the ruin of hundreds of small Greek and Armenian tradesmen," and he added:

The systematic and rigorous boycott is now at an end, but the spirit it created in the people still persists. There are Turks who will not set foot in foreign shops unless they are certain that the same articles cannot be purchased under the same conditions in the shops of men of their own race, or at least of their own religion. This feeling of brotherhood has taken firm root in the hearts of the people all over the empire.67

Some eyewitnesses of that period aptly describe the frenzy bent on racist ostracism that took over the Turkish masses: "Newly opened restaurants, coffeehouses and barbershops everywhere bore the name of Turan, or some other racistic name."68

Milli iktisat resulted in Turkish control of the economy and the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie during World War I. Insofar as the Armenians were concerned, the main mechanism for such a transformation was the state-sponsored plundering of Armenian properties, whether urban or rural, consequent upon the Armenian Genocide. As one Turkish scholar puts it cautiously, "during the war years, political factors played also a role in the fact that some business sectors came into the possession of Turkish-Muslim notables: Muslim-Turkish entrepreneurs filled the voids generated by the 'Armenian deportation'."69 In the countryside, on the other hand, whereas big landlords and the emerging class of "middle peasants" acquired a good share of the lands vacated by the Armenian peasants, Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus settled on the rest.

On the Uses of Racism

Turkish racism served many purposes. Stereotyping elevated Turkish self-esteem by degrading the outgroup, that is, the ghiaours, including Armeni¬ans.70 There was even perhaps a part of "projection" in the Turkish racism toward the ghiaours. Some derogatory proverbs that in the 1850s referred to the Turks themselves—"The Turk's wisdom comes later" or "They gave a Turk the title Bey, first he killed his father"—ended up referring to the non-Muslims on the eve of World War I.71 By then, "Turk" was no longer a derogatory adjective and Turkishness had become the positive identity of the former Turkish-speaking Muslim Ottomans. The emergence of a proud Turkish identity was a significant achievement of the Turkists, for it paved the way to the formation of the Turkish nation-state after World War I.

The founder of ethno-psychoanalysis points out that negative form¬ulations—in this case the stereotypical perception of the non-Muslims and the Armenians—often reflect a historical process leading to ethnic differen¬tiation and the formation of a positive ethnic identity. Turkish nationalism constituted that positive identity. Its genesis was clearly linked with this racist process of ethnic differentiation in relation not merely to the "cosmopolitan" ghiaours but also to non-Turkish Ottomans such as the Kurds and the Arabs.72 As a radical rejection of Ottomanism, Turkism excluded the ghiaours from the nation and denied the identity of the Kurds, thereby promoting a racially and culturally homogeneous nation: modern Turkey.

The self-identification of most Turkish-speaking Muslim Ottomans as Turks occurred in great part between 1908 and 1914. The emancipation of the non-Muslims and Armenians gained substantial momentum during these seven years as a result of the restoration in 1908, with important additions, of the Ottoman constitution of 1876. In the Ottoman Empire, much as in the United States and South Africa, a more biological form of racism emerged at a time when the dominant group (the Turks) felt that their position was most threatened.73

There were, however, a few major distinctions with the American and South African situations. For one thing, biological racism in the Ottoman Empire coincided with the redefinition in racial terms first and foremost of the identity of the dominant, and not the dominated, group. For another, biological racism emerged in the context of a multiethnic, multiconfessional empire crumbling at full speed. It led to the extermination or expulsion of the subordinate group from the remnants of the empire rather than to its intense exploitation. Finally, nationalism and biological racism were combined with an irredentist ideology, Pan-Turkism. In this perspective, the location of the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia was considered a barrier between Turkish Anatolia and the Turkic peoples living in the Russian Empire, from today's Azerbaijan to Central Asia. The elimination of this hindrance played no small part in the execution of the Armenian Genocide.74

On the whole, the main purpose of racism was to counter the trans¬formation of the traditional order and the emergence of a society based on rational, universal norms, for such a society would have given rise to competitive race relations and consequently to irresistible non-Muslim and Armenian advances in the economic, social, and political realms. The Turks felt deprived of what they considered to be theirs naturally: their superior power in the empire.

Most Turks and Turkists explained the perceived Armenian superiority in the economy by attributing it to the vicious and cunning character of the Armenians, to their artificial "imitation" of Western culture, or to the putative support they enjoyed from the British. Thus, these Turks avoided examining the causes for Turkish economic inferiority in the nature of the Ottoman state, its class structure, its economic practices, its guilds, and by the nineteenth century the backwardness of that state in education. The direct result of Turkish economic envy and inferiority complex was indeed the widespread looting, combined with the forced expropriations and sham auctions of Armenian properties, that went on after the various massacres, including those of 1895-96 and 1909.75 Pillage was, therefore, both an incentive and a reward for the pogroms. The theoretical formulation of this sense of economic envy and inferiority was milli iktisat and the practices stemming from it, including the state-sponsored, forced expropriation of Armenian properties during World War I.

Racist theories (Turkism and milli iktisat) constituted the apex of the hostility already manifest in stereotypical idioms, sayings, and proverbs. As intellectualized expressions of enmity, these theories formulated solutions to the ills the stereotypes had vaguely diagnosed. Turkism, Pan-Turkism, and to a lesser extent milli iktisat, were also forms of "national compensation" and "national idealization."76 They made up for the feeling of frustration, jealousy, inferiority, or decline underlying the stereotypes of the dominant group. Whereas Turkism aggrandized and idealized the Turkish character and past and offered the prospect of a homogeneous new civilization, Pan-Turkism promised a glorious and powerful future. As for milli iktisat, it announced a world in which the Turks would be efficient entrepreneurs, and Turkey a modern industrial country. Gok Alp, eager to boost the badly damaged Turkish self-esteem in economic matters, contended even that the Turks would not be mere imitators of Europe, like the much despised but more economically and technologically advanced Armenians and Greeks, but would build a new civilization based on "genuine values." All these promises and hopes failed the test of reality to a great extent. Turkism did rid Turkey of its Armenians, but it resulted in defeat and huge territorial losses. Pan-Turkism remained a mere dream. Although milli iktisat brought about Turkish control of the economy and the development of a Turkish bourgeoisie, it also led to Unionist profiteering and large-scale corruption, massive inflation, failure of most of the "nationalized" enterprises formerly belonging to non-Muslims, misery for most Turkish wage-earners and small farmers, and overall economic decline.77

Finally, the formulation of racist theories combined with the boycotts of non-Muslim shops and the formation of exclusive organizations, such as the associations of Turkish small industries and workers, or cooperative societies of Turkish consumers, point to "the increasing aggregation of a population into exclusive groups.... At the subjective level, aggregation is associated with heightened salience of sectional identity, and with increasing perception in terms of antagonistic racial or ethnic interests. At the objective level, it is expressed in the growth of exclusive organisations, in the superim-position of lines of cleavage, and in the rapid escalation of local and specific disturbances to the level of general, nationwide intersectional conflict."78 Tension ran high in the fall and winter of 1914 and local clashes multiplied in the provinces. Against this background of racism and aggregation into hostile groups, there would be no intersectional conflict, however, but a genocide.

The main consequence of Turkish Ottoman racism was the Armenian Genocide, which marked the "ejection" of the Armenians from the empire. The genocide was not irrational. First and foremost, it made possible the for¬mation of a homogeneous Turkish nation and the realization of Pan-Turkish goals. It also was rational from the economic viewpoint dear to world-systems theory, for it constituted an opportunity for the forcible expropriation or phony sale of Armenian properties. To be sure, these expropriations were a fiasco. As one scholar puts it, the Armenian "companies were given to the new Muslim entrepreneurs, who in many cases proved incapable of making a go of them, deprived as they were of overseas contacts, markets and management skills."79 The United States consul in Aleppo put it more tersely: "one does not become a trader by killing a trader."80 Nonetheless, the expropriations resulting from the genocide ended up creating a small Turkish bourgeoisie from among the Turkish artisans, small traders, and provincial landlords affiliated with the ruling party. Finally, both Talat ***** and Enver *****, the two most powerful leaders of the CUP, cared little about the negative economic consequences of the Armenian Genocide.81 This fact shows the primacy of political over economic considerations in its commission, among the top decision-makers at least.

 

Notes

1. Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (1989; reprint, New York: Longman, 1991), 106.

2. Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress, Language as Ideology, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 1993), 158-59.

3. Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," Pacific Socio¬logical Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1958): 3.

4. Ibid., 4.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 5; William J. Wilson, Power, Racism, and Privilege: Race Relations in Theoretical andSociohistorical Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 42.

7. John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, 2d ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 160. For a survey of the concepts of "racism," see Robert Miles, Racism, Key Ideas Series (London: Routledge, 1989), 41-68. Miles stresses the biological dimension of racism. According to him, "the distinguishing content of racism as an ideology is, first, its signification of some biological characteristic(s) as the criterion by which a collectivity may be identified" (Ibid., 79). For essays presenting a broad spectrum of views on race and ethnicity, see John Rex and David Mason, eds., Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

8. Cevdet Pasa, TezAkir (Memoranda), I, ed. Cavid Baysun, 2d ed. (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1986), 68. In this study, most proper names, geographical names, and administrative terms are transliterated in the text itself, but left in their original Turkish alphabet in the notes and bibliography. The names of twentieth-century Turkish authors of secondary sources, articles, or monographs about Ottoman history are not transliterated. Longer quotations in Turkish, such as full sentences, are spelled in the Turkish alphabet. Ottoman expressions, names, or terms have been assimilated to modern Turkish orthography. With a few exceptions, the orthographic reference for this chapter is Redhouse Yeni Turkce-ingilizce Sozltik (New Redhouse Turkish-English dictionary), 2d ed. (Istanbul: Redhouse Press, 1974). 9. Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 207-8.

9. Hagop Levon Barsoumian, "The Armenian Amira Class of Istanbul" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University), 215,220.

10. Ziya Pasa, Zaferndme Serhi (Commentary on the epic of victory) (Istanbul: 1289/1872-73), 14,86. The reference to the Jews means that none of them had yet been promoted to the rank of marshal or bala. Bala was the highest grade, after vizier, in the civil register of the Ottoman Empire. As for the Gypsies, they were considered as the group least able to establish a government and to preside over it. In the Balkans, Gypsies who had converted to Islam would still have to pay the poll tax imposed on non-Muslims, for they were viewed as schismatics bent on straying from the precepts of the law on ritual and moral matters. See Angus Fraser, The Gypsies (1992; reprint, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 175-76. Hilmar Kaiser drew my attention to the special position of Muslim Gypsies in relation to taxation.

11. As quoted from the introduction of the Ottoman Turkish translation of Shihab al-Din Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Abi al-Rabi, Kit&b suluk al-mdlik ft tadbtr al-mamdlik (Istanbul, 1878), in Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 238. See ibid., 232-70 for the currents of thought during the Hamidian period.

12. Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey, 258.

The term serif originally meant a descendant of the Prophet through his grandson Hasan, seyyid a descendant through his other grandson Husayn; in time these descendants came to constitute an officially recognized religious aristocracy, whose leaders were called nakibs. The amirs were chieftains or tribal princes; they no longer represented any genuine descent or relationship. Arab shaikhs also occupied a special place with Abdiilhamid. The shaikhs or patriarchs of the orthodox religious orders came mostly from Syria, Arabia, and North Africa. Some had great reputations as astrologers, necromancers, and sorcerers.. . . The presence of these men served to symbolize the link between the Caliph and the Muslim umma. (Berkes, 258)

Umma refers to the community of the Muslim believers.

14. Ibid., 236. See also "Fuad *****'s Political Testament," in J. Lewis Farley,

Egypt, Cyprus and Asiatic Turkey (London: Trubner and Co., 1878), 244. This

text has also been published in modern Turkish by Engin Deniz Akarli, trans, and

ed., Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanli Sadnazamlanndan Ali ve Fuad Pasalartn

Siyasi Vasiyyetndmeleri (The Tanzimat with documents: The political testa-

ments of the Ottoman grand viziers Ah and Fuad *****s) (Istanbul: Bogazici

Universitesi Matbaasi, 1978), 7. For decades there has been a debate about

whether Fuad ***** did write a "political testament." The best study on that

question asserts that, even if Fuad ***** did not write the testament, he may have

inspired or dictated it to one of his close collaborators. The testament may also have been written by someone who knew him well. On the whole, however, one can "accept it as a second-hand if not a first-hand expression of Fuad's views." See Roderic H. Davison, "The Question of Fuad Pasa's 'Political Testament'," Belleten 23 (January 1959): 119-36.

15. Metin Yurtbaji, A Dictionary of Turkish Proverbs (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1993), s.v. "Loyalty"; E. Kemal Eyiiboglu, On Uctincu Yuzyildan Gunumiize Kadar Siirde ve Halk Dilinde Atasdzleri ve Deyimler (Proverbs and idioms in po¬etry and popular language from the thirteenth century until now) (Istanbul: N.p., 1973), 1:101; Mustafa Nihat Ozon, Ata Sozleri (Proverbs) (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 1956), 132; Feridun Fazil Ttilbentci, Turk Atasdzleri ve Deyimler (Turkish proverbs and sayings) (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1963), 172.

16. Kerest Haig, Dictionary of Turkish-English Proverbial Idioms (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1969), 96. This proverb was also recited to me by my aunt and my mother.

17. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J. M. Cowan, 3d rev. ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Spoken Language Services, 1976), s.v. "kafara."

18. §hemseddin Sami, Kdmus-i Tiirki (The Turkish dictionary) (1899; reprint, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1989), s.v. "kafir."

19. Ibid. See also James W. Redhouse, A Turkish and English Lexicon (1890; reprint, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1974), s.v. "kyafir."

20. Kdmtis-i Tiirki, s.v. "kiifran." See also Redhouse, Lexicon, s.v. "kyufran." Redhouse defines "kiifran" as "callous denial or contempt of a favor" and translates the compound kufran-i nimet as "ingratitude, base ingratitude." For an interesting use of that compound in Ahmed Cevdet Pasa, Tarih-i Cevdet (Cevdet's history) (Istanbul: 1271/1855-1856), 1:244, see J. Deny, Grammaire de la langue turque (dialecte osmanli) (1921; reprint, Wiesbaden: Dr. Martin Sandig, 1971), 671. The expression kufran-i nimette bulunmak also means "to be ungrateful; not to appreciate (a favour); to act callously." See A. Vahid Moran, Tiirkge-ingilizce Sozliik (Turkish-English dictionary) (1945; reprint, Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1971), s.v. "kiifran (kufran-i nimet)."

21. Ahmed Vefik Pasa, Miintahabat-i Dur&b-i Emsal (Anthology of proverbs) ([istanbul]: N.p., [1871]), 225.

22. For the concepts of "microstructural," "macrostructural," "irony," "figure," "trope," and "antiphrasis," see Georges Molinie, Dictionnaire de rhetorique (Paris: Le livre de poche, 1992).

23. Huseyin Kizim Kadri, Turk L&gati (Turkish dictionary) (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1945), 4: s.v. "gavur."

24. Kdmtis-i Turki, s.v. "domuz"; Redhouse, Lexicon, s.v. "donuz," "domuzlan-maq," and "donuzluq."

25. See Nikolai A. Baskakov et al., Turetsko-Russkii Slovak (Moscow: Russkii Iazyk, 1977), s.v. "domuz." The word "it," which means "dog" but is also commonly used as an insult with the meaning of "cur," "brute," or "swine," appears in similar proverbs.

26. Yurtbasi, A Dictionary of Turkish Proverbs, s.v. "Loyalty"; Eyiiboglu, Siirde ve Halk Dilinde Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 1:101; Turk Dil Kurumu, comp., Bdlge Agizlannda Atasdzleri ve Deyimler (Proverbs and idioms in regional dialects), with introduction by Omer Asim Aksoy (Ankara: Ankara Univer-sitesi Basimevi, 1969), 122; Redhouse Cagdas Tilrkge-ingilizce Sdzlugu (Red-house contemporary Turkish-English dictionary) (Istanbul: Redhouse Yayinevi, 1983), s.v. "gavur."

27. Stephan H. Astourian, "Genocidal Process: Reflections on the Armeno-Turkish Polarization," in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 69-71.

28. H. Fathi Gozler, Omekleriyle TUrkgemizin Agiklamali Buyiik Deyimler Sozlug'u [A-Z] (Great dictionary of our Turkish idioms explained with examples) (Istanbul: inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1975), 169; E. Kemal Eyiiboglu, On Ugiincii Yiizyddan Gunumuze Kadar Siirde ve Halk Dilinde Atasdzleri ve Dey¬imler (Proverbs and idioms in poetry and popular language from the eleventh century until now) (Istanbul: N.p., \915),2A%6; Redhouse YeniTurkge-ingilizce Sozluk (1974), s.v. "gavur"; and Redhouse Cagdas TUrkge-ingilizce Sdzliigu,. s.v. "gavur."

29. Ibrahim §inasi, DurOb-i Emsal-i Osmaniyye (Ottoman proverbs), 3d ed. (Der-saadet [istanbul]: Matbaa-i Ebuzziya, 1302/1886-87), 49; Ali Seydi, Ali Resad, Mehmed Izzet, L. Feuillet, eds., Musawer Ddiret iil-Madrif (Illustrated ency¬clopedia) (Dersaadet [istanbul]: Kanaat, 1332/1913), 1: s.v. "Ermeni"; Eyiibo¬glu, Siirde ve Halk Dilinde Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 1:93; Tulbentci, Turk Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 156; Ozon, Ata Sdzleri, 119.

30. This proverb was reported to me by my aunt.

31. Eyiiboglu, Siirde ve Halk Dilinde Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 1:92; Tulbentci, Turk Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 156; Ozon, Ata Sdzleri, 119. Ahmed Vefik ***** gives a more cryptic variant: Ermeniden irfan, Yahudiden pehlivan ("From the Armenian refinement and from the Jew might [cannot be expected]"). See his Miintahabdt-i Durub-i Emsal, 36. §inasi's variant is also slightly different: Ermenide irfan Yahudide pehlivan bulunmaz ("In the Armenian refinement and might in the Jew cannot be found"). See his Durdb-i Emsal-i Osmaniyye, 49.

32. Bdlge Agizlannda, 308.

33. Ahmed Vefik Pasa, Miintahabdt-i Duriib-i Emsal, 36; Tulbentci, Turk Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 156.

34. §inasi, Durub-i Emsdl-i Osmaniyye, 48-49, and Musawer Ddiret iil-Madrif, s.v. "Ermeni." For the proverb without the French equivalent, Eyiiboglu, Siirde ve Halk Dilinde Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 1:93; Tulbentci, Turk Atasdzleri ve Deyimler, 156; Ozon, Ata Sdzleri, 119.

35. Alfred Korte, Anatolische Skizzen (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1896), 62. For a broader view of the extent of such prejudice, see ibid., 53-59.

36. Heinrich Gelzer, Geistliches und Weltliches aus dem turkisch-griechischen Orient (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1900), 246.

37. Ernst Jackh, Der aufsteigende Halbmond: Beitrdge zur tiirkischen Renaissance (Berlin: Leo Kuper, The Pity of It All: Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 282.

38. Israel W. Chamy, How Can We Commit the Unthinkable ? Genocide, the Human Cancer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 323-24.

39. Cins (Jins) was mostly used in the nineteenth century to refer to "race." See David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 23, 26, 48, 54-55, 102 for its use by early Turkists. For the concept of irk, see Francois Georgeon, Aux origines du nationalisme turc: YusufAkgura (1876-1935) (Paris: Editions ADPF, 1980), 26-27; Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 20, 41-42, 49, 68, 75. Some of the examples given by Arai show that the concept of "race" (irk) came to be confounded with that of "nation" among some Ottoman intellectuals.

40. See the French translation of "Three Types of Policy" in Georgeon, Yusuf Akcura, 95, 98. A recent English translation of this essay distorts the meaning of this quotation by rendering it as "a policy of Turkish nationalism based on ethnicity." See David Thomas's translation in H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Reader: The Rediscovery of History (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 103. "Tiirk milliyet-i siyasiyesi" does not mean "a policy of Turkish nationalism," neither does irk mean "ethnicity." It is indeed interesting to note that both Georgeon and Thomas are not comfortable with translating irk into "race," an idea of which the connotations have been understandably disturbing since the Holocaust. Thomas chooses to translate irk into "ethnicity," whereas Georgeon translates it into "race" but explains that it refers in fact to what anthropologists call an "ethnie." The fact is that the best Ottoman Turkish dictionary of the end of the nineteenth-century indicates that irk means "race." See Sami, Kdmus-i Tttrki (1899), s.v. "irk." On the other hand, the words closest to the meaning of "ethnic group" in the 1890s were iimmet (plural iimem) and kavim; see Ch. Samy-Bey Fraschery, Dictionnaire frangais-turc, 2d rev. ed. (Constantinople: Mihran, 1898), s.v. "ethnique," "ethnographe," and "ethnographie." In 1912, a Turkist ideologue, Ahmed Aghayef (Aghaoghlu), used the expressions ilm-i ensab-i beser ("science of the relationships [or, genealogy] of mankind") to refer to "ethnology" and ta'rif-i ahval-i milel ("description of the conditions of peoples") to refer to "ethnography." Thus, beser (mankind, man) and milel (plural of "millet" which means "nation," "people," or "religious community") were also used to refer to ethnic groups. "Nationalism" was then rendered by kavmiyet. See Ahmed Agayef, "Turk Alemi" (The Turkish world), part 4, Tiirk Yurdu 1, no. 5 (July 17, 1328 [1912]): 136. By the second half of the 1910s, kavim referred to the French word "ethnie." See its use by Ziya Gok Alp, " 'Turan' nedir?" (What is "Turan"?), YeniMecmua 2,no. 31 (February 8,1918): 82. Irk has kept its meaning of "race," as well as of "blood," "lineage," and "vein," since the turn of the century. See Moran, Turkge-ingilizce Sozluk (1945); Hony, A Turkish-English Dictionary, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Redhouse Yeni Turkge-ingilizce Sozluk (1974); and Redhouse Cagdas Turkge-ingilizce Sozlugii (1983). As a matter of fact, irkgi means "racist," irki

42. Georgeon, YusufAkgura, 26. This definition of "milhyet" appears in A. Y. [Yusuf Akcura], "1329 Senesinde Turk Diinyasi" (The Turkish world in the year 1913), Turk Yurdu 6, no. 3 (June 3, 1330 [1914]): 2098.

43. Jacob M. Landau, Tekinalp: Turkish Patriot, 1883-1961 (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut, 1984), 26. These ideas are developed in Tekin (Moiz Cohen), Turan (Istanbul: "Kader" Matbaasi, 1330 [1914-15]), 113-26.

44. Tekin, Turan, 138. His irredentist views are also expounded in Tekin Alp, Tiirkismus und Pantiirkismus (Weimar: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915).

45. Tekin, Turan, 138,143. For a slightly different translation which omits a phrase, see Landau, Tekinalp, 111-1 A.

46. For the Ottoman period, see Landau, Tekinalp, 22; for the Republican era, see Tekin Alp, Turklesdirme (Turkification) (Istanbul: "Resimli Ay" Matbaasi, 1928), in particular his "ten commandments," which include "Turkify Your Names!" (65).

47. For his conception of morality as total service to the nation, see his poem Vazife (Duty), which he first published in 1915 and then republished with slight changes in his collection of poems titled Yeni Hayat (New life) (Istanbul: Evkaf-i islamiyye, 1918), n.p.

48. Gok Alp first published this poem in Salonika in 1911. "Turan" was later included in the volume of poetry titled Kizil Elma (The red apple) (Istanbul, 1330 [1914—15]). My translation is based on the text in Enver Behnan §apolyo, Ziya Gdkalp: Ittihat ve Terakki ve Mesrutiyet Tarihi (Ziya Gok Alp: Union and progress and the history of the constitutional period) (Istanbul: Giiven Basi'mevi, 1943), 206-7.

49. This couplet, written "in the first months of the war," is from his poem "Kizil Destan" (The red epic) as translated in Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gdkalp (London: Luzac and Company and The Harvill Press, 1950), 128.

50. Taha Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gdkalp 1876-1924 (Lei¬den: E. J. Brill, 1985), 34-35,61,135n. 53. This work originated in a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University in 1980.

51. On the two periods in Ziya Gok Alp's thought, before and after World War I, see Zarevand (Zaven and Nartouhie Nalbandian), United and Independent Turania: Aims and Designs of the Turks, trans. Vahakn N. Dadrian (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 48^19.

52. These opinions first appeared in "Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kiymetler" (New life and new values), Geng Kalemler 2, no. 8 (July 26,1327 [1911]), as reproduced in Ziya Gok Alp, Makaleler (Articles), ed. Suleyman Hayri Bolay (Ankara: Basbakanhk Basimevi, 1982), 2:40-46. Ziya Gok Alp included this essay in his series titled 'Turkculuk Nedir?" (What is Turkism?), Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 25 (December 27,1917): 482-85.

53. Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 195-96. On the full support that Gok Alp enjoyed on the part of Talat, Enver, and Jemal *****s, the leading triumvirate of the Committee of Union and Progress during World War I, and his special intellectual status, see §apolyo, Ziya Gdkalp, 78-79.

54. See Gok Alp's testimonial in Tekinalp, Turkismus und Pantiirkismus, 109-10.

55. Ziya Gok Alp, "Rusya'daki Turkler Ne Yapmali?" (What ought the Turkes of Russia to do?) Yeni Mecmua, 2, no. 38 (June 4,1918): 233-35. For a summary, see also Tank Zafer Tunaya, Tiirkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 3: ittihat ve Terakki: Bir Qagvn, Bir Kusagm, Bir Partinin Tarihi (Political parties in Turkey, vol. 3: Union and progress: The history of a period, a generation, a party) (Istanbul: Hiirriyet Vakfi Yayinlan, 1989), 320-21.

56. See "Enver Pasa" in Yeni Hayat, n.p. See also Tunaya, Tiirkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, 111,321.

57. §apolyo, Ziya Gdkalp, 108.

58. For this analysis of Gok Alp's economic thought in relation to the non-Turks, see Zafer Toprak, Tiirkiye'de "MilliIktisat," 1908-1918 ("National economy" in Turkey, 1908-1918) (Ankara: Yurt Yaymlan A. §., 1982), 32, and 30-35 for a broader summary of his economic views. On solidarism and Gok Alp, see Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, 140-48. Also Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gdkalp, 106-16. Parla tends to underplay the importance Ziya Bey assigned to heavy industries. On specific aspects of the "national economy," see Zafer Toprak, "II. Mesrutiyet'te Solidarist Diisunce: Halkcihk," (Solidarist thought in the second constitutional period: Populism) ToplumveBilim 1 (Spring 1977): 92-123, andidem, "Tiirkiye'de Korporatizmin Dogusu" (The birth of corporatism in Turkey), Toplum ve Bilim 12 (Winter 1980): 41^19.

59. For the quotations, see Ziya Gok Alp, "Turkculuk Nedir?" 484. On the lack of Turkish "economic classes," see Gok Alp, "Turklesmek, islamlasmak, Muasrr-lasmak" (Turkification, Islamization, modernization), Turk Yurdu 1, no. 2 (March 7,1329 [1913]): 333.

60. See his poem "Vatan" (Fatherland), in Yeni Hayat, n.p.

61. Gok Alp, "Turklejmek, islamlasmak, Muasrrlasmak," 1:334.

62. Ziya Gok Alp, "iktisadl Vatanperverlik" (Economic patriotism), Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 43 (May 9,1918): 323.

63. Tekin Alp, Turkismus und Pantiirkismus, 35-40. See also J. M. Landau, "Munis Tekinalp's Economic Views Regarding the Ottoman Empire and Turkey," in Os-manistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vanco BoSkov, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: Otto HarraBowitz, 1986), 94-103.

64. Tekin Alp, Tiirkismus und Panturkismus, 61-62, as translated in Landau, Tek¬inalp, 133.

65. See A. Y. [Akcura Yusuf], "1329 Senesinde Turk Dunyasi," 2102-04 and A. Y. [Akcura Yusuf], "iktisad" (Economy), Turk Yurdu 12, no. 12 (August 2, 1333 [1917]): 3521-23. For a French translation of the most important sections of these articles, see Georgeon, Yusuf Akgura, 128-30; for an interpretation, 58.

66. Zafer Toprak, "islam ve Iktisat: 1913-1914 Musluman Boykotaji" (Islam and the economy: The Muslim boycott of 1913-1914), Toplum ve Bilim no. 29/30 (Spring-Summer 1985): 179-99.

67. Tekin Alp, Tiirkismus und Panturkismus, 39, cited in Landau, Tekinalp, 122.

68. Zarevand, United and Independent Turania, 74. Confirmation can be found in Tekin Alp, Tiirkismus und Panturkismus, 37-38.

69. Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli iktisat," 57. Parla puts also the matter in somewhat diplomatic terms. He states that the creation of a "national bourgeois class" resulted from "the collaboration of the nationalistic bureaucracy with a national commercial bourgeoisie to expropriate and replace Levantine and minority mercantile groups." See Parla, The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gdkalp, 110. Words and expressions like "expropriation" and "filled the voids" do not convey a clear sense of what happened, namely, state-sponsored plundering. For some examples, see Astourian, "Genocidal Process," 71-72.

70. On stereotyping, its nature, and functions, see Rupert Brown, Group Processes: Dynamics within and between Groups (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 231-45.

71. The proverbs are in Ahmed Vefik Pasa, Muntahab&t-i Durub-i Emsal, 102. In psychiatry, projection is "an ego defense or mental mechanism operating out¬side of and beyond conscious awareness through which consciously disowned aspects of the self are rejected or disowned and thrown outward, to become imputed to others." See H. P. Laughlin, The Ego and Its Defenses, 2d ed. (New York: Jason Aronson, 1979), 221. In cases of projection, "the other person thereby becomes a mirror, in thus unwittingly reflecting back the consciously disowned emotional feelings" (ibid., 226).

72. Georges Devereux, "L'identiuS ethnique: Ses bases logiques et ses dysfonc-tions," in Ethnopsychanalyse complementariste (Paris: Flammarion, 1985), 165-211.

73. For the United States and South Africa, see Wilson, Power, Racism, and Privilege, 104-5,168-71.

74. Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981), 52-53.

75. Baron Wladirnir Giesl, Zwei Jahrzehnte im Nahen Orient (Berlin: Verlag fur Kulturpohtik, 1927), 119. See also Malcolm MacColl, "The Constantinople Massacre and Its Lesson," Contemporary Review, November 1895, 754-55. For 1909, see Astourian, "Genocidal Process," 63-66.

76. Compensation is an ego defense or mental mechanism, operating

outside of and beyond conscious awareness, through which the in-

dividual seeks to offset, to make up for, or to "compensate" for his deficiencies or defects. These deficiencies may be actual, or may be so imagined to varying degrees.. .. Idealization is an ego defense or mental mechanism operating outside of and beyond conscious awareness through which a person, group, nation, family or some other object is overvalued and emotionally aggrandized. This dynamism is often marked by an attachment of attention, interest, and significance to a particular love-object which has become exalted, overestimated, and overvalued. Idealization is the process through which one sets up or creates an ideal. Persons, positions, situations, possessions, and goals can thus become regarded as ideals or as idealistic. (Laughlin, The Ego and Its Defenses, 18, 123)

77. For the economy, see Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War, 107-67,290-96; Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 130-31; Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli Msat," 346-51. See also Feroz Ahmad, "War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908-18," Review: Fernand Braudel Center 11, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 274-83. Ahmad's overview is perhaps somewhat optimistic in its assessment of the period.

78. Kuper, The Pity of It All, 257.

79. Ziircher, Turkey, 130.

80. As quoted in Johannes Lepsius, Rapport secret sur les massacres d'Armenie (1916; reprint, Beirut: Hamaskaine, 1968), 296.

81. Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau s Story (Garden City, N.Y.: Dou-bleday, Page, 1918; reprint, Plandome, N.Y.: New Age Publishers, 1975), 338, 348.