The $87 Billion Money Pit It’s the boldest reconstruction project since the Marshall Plan. And we cannot afford to fail. But where are the billions really going? By Rod Nordland and Michael Hirsh NEWSWEEK Nov. 3 issue — Helmut Doll waits. And waits. Doll, the German site manager for Babcock Power, a subcontractor of Siemens, is hoping for the arrival of Bechtel engineers at the Daura power plant, Baghdad’s largest. U.S. construction giant Bechtel has the prime contract, now worth about $1 billion, for restoring Iraq’s infrastructure. That includes Daura, which should supply one third of the city’s generating capacity but today, six months into the U.S. occupation, is producing only 10 percent. “Nobody is working on the turbine,” explains Doll. “Bechtel only came and took photos. We can’t judge Bechtel’s work progress because they’re not here.” Questioned, Bechtel spokesman Howard Menaker says Iraq’s power has to be viewed as “a holistic system”—generation doesn’t have to come from a particular plant—and in recent weeks Bechtel has sent engineers to the site. He also blames the delay on more stringent—or finicky, depending on your point of view—American standards. Menaker said the Daura turbine is “covered with friable asbestos and is right now a hazardous work site.” The company says it has just completed “a protocol for asbestos abatement.” STILL, IT’S NOT easy determining why the biggest power plant in Iraq’s largest city seems to be such a low priority. Baghdad is still beset by blackouts, and so much of America’s success or failure depends on power: the economy can’t recover with-out it. The next logical place to ask is the U.S. Agency for International Development, which gave Bechtel the contract last April. Questioned by NEWSWEEK about Daura, USAID chief Andrew Natsios referred to a priority list drawn up by a coordinating committee under the Coalition Provisional Authority—the chief occupying power—and said he didn’t know where Daura was on it. His aide said the CPA would know. No, Natsios said, he thought Bechtel would know. But Bechtel’s Menaker responded: “We perform the work tasked to us by USAID. We don’t make decisions on priorities. USAID and CPA make those decisions.” Some CPA officials concede privately that the problem stems from the lack of preparation before the war. “It always comes back to the same thing: no plan,” says one CPA staffer. No doubt, reconstructing postwar Iraq is a brutally hard and hazardous task. Sabotage already has destroyed some 700 power-transmission towers. But George W. Bush, who has staked his nation’s credibility—and perhaps his presidency—on success in Iraq, has no choice but to set things right. And Daura offers a small window into problems that have become all too typical of America’s postwar morass in Iraq, a NEWSWEEK investigation shows. Iraqis like to point out that after the 1991 war, Saddam restored the badly destroyed electric grid in only three months. Some six months after Bush declared an end to major hostilities, a much more ambitious and costly American effort has yet to get to that point. It is only in recent weeks that the Coalition amped up to the power-generation level that Saddam achieved last March—4,400 megawatts for the country (though it’s since dropped back). True, Saddam didn’t have a guerrilla war to contend with, and his power infrastructure was in much better shape than the Americans found it. But he also had far fewer resources. Six months ago the administration decided to cut corners on normal bidding procedures and hand over large contracts to defense contractors like Bechtel and Halliburton on a limited-bid or no-bid basis. It bypassed the Iraqis and didn’t worry much about accountability to Congress. The plan was for “blitzkrieg” reconstruction. But by sacrificing accountability for speed, America is not achieving either very well right now. For months no one has seemed to be fully in charge of postwar planning. There has been so little transparency that even at the White House “it was almost —impossible to get a sense of what was happening” on the power problem, says one official privy to the discussions. Numerous allegations of overspending, favoritism and corruption have surfaced. Halliburton, a major defense contractor once run by Vice President Dick Cheney, has been accused of gouging prices on imported fuel—charging $1.59 a gallon while the Iraqis “get up to speed,” when the Iraqi national oil company says it can now buy it at no more than 98 cents a gallon. (The difference is about $300 million.) Cronies of Iraqi exile leader Ahmad Chalabi, NEWSWEEK has learned, were recently awarded a large chunk of a major contract for mobile telecommunications networks. All this has called into question the Bush administration’s larger agenda: inspiring gratitude and admiration in the hearts of Iraqis and other Arabs, creating a model for a troubled region. Perhaps the biggest irony for the man in overall command, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, is that he has long warned of the pitfalls of “nation-building.” “A large foreign presence,” Rumsfeld has said in criticizing previous U.N.-led efforts, means “economies remain unreformed, distorted and dependent.” Now the beleaguered Pentagon chief may be creating for himself—with U.S. companies, not the United Nations—the fate he wanted to avoid. Even many Iraqis who are grateful for liberation say they hate being a U.S. protectorate. Three months after Bush declared “Bring ‘em on,” attacks on Americans have increased from 20 to 25 or 30 a day, according to Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the U.S. military commander for Iraq. And American taxpayers are footing most of the bill for this ill will, despite some $13 billion pledged at a U.N. donors’ conference last week. The tally just through 2004, including what was spent to wage the war, will likely be at least $130 billion. U.S. officials protest, as always, that they’re getting bad press. Natsios insists electricity regeneration is on schedule. “This is the fastest and most massive reconstruction effort that has been run by any government in the last 50 years,” says Natsios, one of the most respected development specialists in Washington. “It’s faster than the Marshall Plan.” Yet even Sanchez conceded last week that his biggest concern was “the pace at which we are making progress: we need to accelerate it.” In recent weeks the CPA and USAID have declared that contracts will be competitively bid now. And, stung by congressional criticism, CPA chief L. Paul Bremer and Natsios recently installed new accountability controls. Still, world bodies such as the United Nations want more transparency. Will that mean the effort gets bogged down even further, stymied by turf fights and bean counters? NEWSWEEK’s investigation indicates that there may be just as many problems ahead, raising serious questions about the vast amounts of money Bush has demanded for Iraq with little tolerance for debate. DISORGANIZATION AND TURF BATTLES The Bush administration’s favorite statistic from Iraq is the 1,595 schools it has just finished rehabilitating. This is, after all, the human face of occupation—freshly painted walls, American know-how and generosity, all wrapped up in smiling, adorable faces. And though that number is still less than a fifth of Iraq’s 10,000 schools, it seems like amazingly fast work. The problem: many of the “rehabilitated” schools don’t look ready for the morning bell. NEWSWEEK visited five schools in Baghdad’s Camp Sara neighborhood, all of which were among those listed as rebuilt, all by different Iraqi contractors working for Bechtel. None had enough textbooks, desks or blackboards. Most had refuse everywhere, nonfunctioning toilets and desks made for two kids that were accommodating four. Even Ahmed Majid Jassim, a pro-U.S. headmaster who says that “Americans have made a great effort,” comments, “I’ve seen rebuilt schools, and this isn’t one of them.” It’s not quite as bad as the suspiciously sandy U.S. concrete that caused schools in South Vietnam to collapse in the 1960s, generating support for the Viet Cong. But the good-will project is also not creating quite as much pro-American enthusiasm as the Bushies would like. What’s the problem? A lack of accountability, it seems. One Iraqi construction engineer who worked on school projects says it’s not that Iraqi firms are corrupt and incompetent. To meet the U.S. deadline for fast refurbishment, the occupation authority set a short time frame, then Bechtel hired contractors, who in turn hired subcontractors and even sub-subcontractors. But few U.S. officials seemed to follow up with oversight. As one USAID official admits, “Saddam had better accountability” in his economic affairs, as brutal as he was, than the CPA does. Bechtel proudly points out that 102 of its 140 USAID contracts were subbed to Iraqi firms. But many of these sub-subcontractors cut corners as they tried to meet Bechtel’s very short deadline. “The original tender for our school called for air conditioners in every classroom,” said an Iraqi engineer named Marwan. Once the subcontractor got it, it was an air cooler. “Once we got it, it was a ceiling fan for $11 apiece.” At the Al Qaqa primary school, headmistress Haibat Abdul Hussein said the Iraqi contractor walked off the job shortly after starting, leaving the school a mess of construction debris and incomplete work. “I can’t deal with this anymore; I don’t even know what happened. All I know is they said the Americans told them to stop working,” she said. She planned to organize a demonstration in front of the school in protest. Similar confusion may have exacerbated the power crisis. As one USAID official describes it, it’s “a chicken-and-egg problem.” The power stations need natural gas and (to a lesser degree) oil to run, but the oil refineries and wells need power to operate. Still, there seems to have been less than full coordination between Bechtel, which is responsible for electricity, and Halliburton, which has an open-ended contract to secure fuel: Halliburton says it has not been asked to supply fuel for restarting the refineries. Disputes between U.N.- and U.S.-authorized companies also obstruct progress. At the key port of Umm Qasr, Bechtel and its subcontractors left in frustration when a Turkish company—previously contracted through the United Nations—suddenly appeared, claiming it had rights to the job. Though the port is operating, needed dredging and wreck salvage have been held up while the dispute is resolved. A British Christian aid group last week accused the CPA of not accounting for $4 billion of the $5 billion it has spent, most of which came from Iraqi oil proceeds. The lack of transparency is not surprising: the CPA and United Nations took six months to agree on an international monitoring board called for under U.N. Resolution 1483. “There’s certainly the suspicion that what the Iraqi oil is being used for right now is not to the benefit of the Iraqi people but to the benefit of American corporations,” says one of the aid group’s spokesmen, John Davison. “This is quite controversial, considering that many people around the world have been saying that ‘it’s all about the oil.’ So you would have —thought that this would be treated with a great deal of care.” Meanwhile a turf fight between USAID and the CPA has led Bremer to insist that the CPA take over the dispensing of some rebuilding contracts (though Natsios says he’s been reassured that the new CPA office “is not meant to replace USAID”). That may not solve anything: contractors in Iraq complain that the CPA’s staff consists largely of political appointees who don’t understand the process. “CPA is run by a bunch of political hacks and incompetents who have no idea what they’re doing,” said a project manager for a firm working on a major USAID contract. “Every time we turn around there’s a new order coming from CPA, ‘Do it this way—no, do it that way instead.’ It’s just unbelievable.” Privately, some CPA officials admit the staff is less than the best the United States has to offer. Right now, “we’re not talking A-team, even B-team. We’re talking C-team,” says one official with the CPA. The Bush administration denies that any major changes are afoot, but all these problems have prompted a new reckoning back in Washington: Douglas Feith, Rumsfeld’s policy chief and a key official involved in postwar planning, is no longer sitting in on reconstruction meetings, NEWSWEEK has learned, and the White House has wrested oversight from the Pentagon. .............................. The rest of the article can be read here