The Real Enemy Of Russia Is Not Islam

[Armen]

Before expanding a company one has to make sure that the current management is stable enough first.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

This kind of somes up what I wrote in that lengthy post Skhara Hate you Eve

[Armen]

Mark Milke: Mark Milke Reports

www.HoweStreet.com (http://www.howestreet.com/)

 

September 14 2004

West didn't create Lenin . . . or bin Laden (edit: A.S.)

Calgary Herald, Monday, September 13, 2004

Page: A10

Mark Milke

 

During the Cold War, few scholars in Soviet studies aroused more ire

than Richard Pipes with the exception of another historian, Robert

Conquest. Both men infused their historical scholarship with moral

reasoning, e.g., that Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin's actions and

ideology belonged in the same ethical category as Adolf Hitler.

 

Curiously, while few hesitated to call Nazis evil, any such description

applied to the Soviet elite -- leaders who also starved, tortured

and executed mass numbers of citizens -- met with fierce reaction,

at least in academia. In part, the reaction came because some blamed

western troubles for the U.S.S.R.'s existence (i.e., the First World

War undermined the czar). Others argued its excesses were our fault

(it was claimed the West's early anti-Soviet position drove Lenin to

extremes) and some in the West simply preferred Soviet socialism to

western capitalism.

 

Naturally, then, to claim that Hitler and Lenin/Stalin differed not

a whit on a moral level and in their approach to political dissent

-- blood will be shed until there is no more dissent -- put fellow

travellers of the Soviet Union on the defensive.

 

Thus, notes Pipes in his recent memoirs, Vixi-Memoirs of

a Non-Belonger, there was a deep divide in western academic

thought. Pipes stressed Cold War leaders were not pawns driven by

deep historical forces beyond their understanding or control, but

moral agents capable of choice.

 

This view was opposite that of most Soviet specialists and most

staffers in the U.S. State Department and the CIA. Not surprisingly,

those from the "Foggy Bottom" also assumed Russian leaders, policies

and the Soviet Union itself were a permanent reality. Predictable

recommendations naturally followed from such assumptions, including

the caution that modified Russian policies were the most the West

could press for, but never a counter-revolution and certainly never

the end of the Soviet state.

 

The underlying reason for that latter view, writes Pipes, is that

intellectuals often look for grand theories to wholly explain the

world and especially politics (Marx's economic determinism being

just one example). In contrast, the Harvard professor argues there

is no grand narrative, no preordained pattern by which history works

itself. Many forces are at play, including human choice, economics,

egos and even accidents.

 

Thus, Pipes is not sympathetic to the Henry Kissinger "realist"

view, if by that one means great forces are at play with which humans

cannot tamper. Instead, Pipes, whose own Jewish family chose to flee

Poland in late 1939, asserts that human decisions can be historically

consequential. As it concerned the 1917 Revolution, Pipes writes it

"was not nature acting on nature, nor humans acting on nature, nor

nature acting out on humans, but humans acting on humans and as such

crying out for judgment."

 

It is not that countries and cultures don't have recognizable patterns

-- Pipes himself argues that the Soviet Union was an extension of

Russian czarist imperialism -- but that such tendencies are not

deterministic. And that means individuals, especially leaders who

wield power, have choices.

 

It is this willingness to assign men and women responsibility for

Soviet genocides, gulags, the secret police, deliberate famines,

summary executions and everyday repression that made the Harvard

historian such a thorn in the side of those who instead preferred

the art of Soviet apologetics. Pipes dissents. "As I was expressing

judgment of historical events, I felt no need to apologize for it,

since I was not dealing with inevitable natural phenomena but with

the consequences of deliberate human actions that, as such, were open

to moral condemnation," he writes.

 

On a practical political level, then, if choice exists and is

consequential, it means that western leaders could increase the

pressure, hasten the implosion of the U.S.S.R. and end the Cold War,

something Pipes argued for in the 1950s and what Ronald Reagan did

three decades later amidst much hand-wringing at home and abroad.

 

Pipes's reminder about the possibility of human choice in history

is yet relevant in more recent foreign policy disputes. On modern

terrorism, one side -- a la apologists for Lenin's post-1917 murderous

excess -- asserts that terror is mainly a reaction to western policies

and not a fundamental disagreement with who we are. In this view,

Osama bin Laden is a bastard creation of past western wrongs, perceived

or real.

 

That bin Laden is a self-created fanatic with his own moral options is

downplayed by those in this camp. Also in this corner (though without

the blame-the-West tack) are those who think Middle East politics are

largely unchangeable, too rooted in capital-H history and culture to

significantly change.

 

And then there are the new non-conformists (Pipes's son and Islamic

expert Daniel Pipes is among them) who argue that historical "end

chapters" are yet to be written, the content of which will depend

more on present choices made by leaders, whether in Riyadh, London

or Washington.

[Armenian Highlander]

Russian air base in Armenia ready to open fire at NATO planes

 

Channel One TV, Moscow 4 May 04

 

Presenter Back in Soviet times airborne troops stationed in

Transcaucasia served as a reliable defence of the country's southern

borders. In the mid-1990s Russia's airspace in the area was left

without any defence. Armenia alone met Russia halfway and allowed for

the Russian Airborne Troops to remain on its territory.

 

Correspondent Aleksey Artemyev Fighters at the Russian air base

Erebuni have six minutes and not a second more to take off for a duty

flight and intercept a target that has illegally entered Armenia's

airspace. The end of the runway and the border with the neighbouring

country are separated by a distance of 15 km. The neighbouring country

is Turkey, a NATO member state, with a great number of air bases

stationed on its territory, including those belonging to the USA.

 

Two years ago Russian pilots cut short an attempt by a high-speed spy

plane to enter Armenia's airspace from Turkey. One should always be on

alert here. All interceptors on combat duty here are equipped with

four air-to-air missiles. The two bigger ones are located closer to

the fuselage and are capable of hitting a target within a distance of

up to 80 km. The two smaller ones are intended for close combat, they

are capable of hitting any target within 30 km. The equipment is

completely ready for combat.

 

NATO intelligence is monitoring the Russian air base in Armenia round

the clock. Two sites for direct tracking are situated on a slope of Mt

Ararat. The Turkish Air Force are trying to have every Russian pilot

under control.

 

Valeriy Ded, captioned as fighter pilot We do not normally meet them

in the air. At times we spot them on our radar screens, both on board

and on the ground. They know every pilot of ours, our voices, if not

our names.

 

Correspondent The Erebuni air base is part of the Russian air defence

complex situated in Armenia, the only one remaining in Transcaucasia,

protecting Russia's southern borders. The main air defence forces are

located high up in the mountains, not far from Gyumri, formerly

Leninakan. There are four launch pads for air defence missile systems

Kub and S-300 there.

 

We were the only TV crew that was given a chance to film a Russian air

defence command post on alert duty. Unidentified officer This facility allows

us to see the sites where the air defence batteries are stationed as well as

the sectors they are facing. We can give them the whereabouts of a target

to hit.

 

Correspondent This radar station is able to operate within a radius of

300 km. The nearest NATO airfields in Turkey are situated at a

distance of about 200 km. In other words, the Russian command post is

able to spot any plane takeoff from any of the airfields.

 

Aleksey Gorskiy, captioned as commander of the combat command and

control division In May 2001 we began our test alert duty. We did not

have a right to open fire at trespassers. The Turks used to fly along

the border all the time. After the alert duty started in earnest in

October ?2001 , in other words when we were allowed to open fire, they

hardly ever appear here now.

 

Correspondent All the Russian air defence divisions stationed in

Armenia are working in close coordination with each other. In everyday

life pilots and anti-aircraft gunners are rivals. The air base is

proud of its unique barracks, containing fish water tanks,

mantelpieces and even a small zoo of their own. Meanwhile, the air

defence system command division claims that they have the best cook

and cuisine.

[Armenian Highlander]

http://members.fortunecity.com/whitepride1/whitepride/whitepride/images/picoftheweek_l_jpg.jpg

 

Armenia in Russia's Embrace

 

The Moscow Times

Wednesday, Mar. 24, 2004. Page 10

 

By Kim Iskyan

 

Armenia is one of a small and dwindling number of former Soviet republics

that assuages, rather than aggravates, Russia's hurt ego in what used to be

its geopolitical backyard. While the special relationship between Russia and

Armenia is hardly new, its increasing intensity holds important implications

for the smaller country's future, as well as for the balance of power in the

Caucasus and throughout what remains of Russia's old sphere of influence.

 

Goodwill between Armenia and Russia has deep historical roots and is

sustained by Russia's recent role as Armenia's protector. Russia is the ace

up Armenia's sleeve against feared aggression by Turkey, Armenia's

historical enemy, and as a deterrent to a renewal of the war between Armenia

and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorny Artsax (during which

Russia supplied critical military assistance to Armenia). As a consequence

of the war, both Turkey and Azerbaijan blockade their borders with Armenia.

 

Armenia plays eager host to a few Russian bases and a few thousand Russian

troops, who patrol Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran. During the

Georgian political crisis in November 2003, the Russian and Armenian defense

ministers signed agreements deepening their military cooperation, and, a few

days later, then Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called Armenia

"Russia's only ally in the south."

 

Indeed, Georgia appears increasingly determined to remove itself from the

Russian orbit, particularly after the recent crisis in Adzharia. And Russian

relations with Azerbaijan, never particularly warm, remain dominated by oil

concerns. Armenia is one of the relatively few former Soviet republics where

Russian troops are welcomed and where they don't have to rub shoulders with

the U.S. military, such as in Georgia or Kyrgyzstan.

 

On another front, Russia has staged what appears to be a benign takeover of

a number of Armenia's economic arteries.

 

Virtually the entire Armenian energy sector is under Russian control,

following the transfer last year of the management of Armenia's critical

nuclear power plant, and six hydroelectric plants, to UES as part of a broad

equity-for-debt deal. Armenia receives its natural gas from Russia via

Armrusgazprom, which is 45 percent owned by Gazprom. Rostelecom is a

possible buyer of Armenia's telephone monopoly. Russian financial

institutions, often under ethnic Armenian management, are slowly moving into

Armenia's banking and insurance sectors. And with Russia one of Armenia's

largest trade partners, the health of the Armenian economy is closely linked

to that of Russia's, as the slowdown following the 1998 financial crisis

demonstrated.

 

Russia is the gray cardinal of the Armenian political scene, in contrast to

the meager influence it exerts on domestic politics in most other CIS

countries. Prior to Armenia's February 2003 presidential election, President

Robert Kocharyan made a pilgrimage to Moscow to receive the blessing of

President Vladimir Putin; some analysts viewed the transfer of Armenia's

energy assets to Russia as a quid pro quo for Putin's continued support.

 

Indeed, the Armenian government is highly vulnerable to any disruption --

inadvertent or otherwise -- of the flow of energy resources from Russia, and

works hard to stay in the good graces of the Kremlin.

 

The close links between powerful members of the Armenian diaspora in Russia

and Putin spurred rumors recently that Putin, now freed from the distraction

of getting re-elected, might become more involved in Armenia's domestic

political scene to solidify Russia's position in Armenia. In the meantime,

Kocharyan seems to be taking a page out of Putin's handbook on

authoritarianism, tightening the state's grip on the media, stifling dissent

and otherwise trying to limit the scope for the evolution of a credible

opposition.

 

Armenia's official foreign policy is to foster amicable relations without

picking favorites -- a rational policy for a small, isolated nation flanked

by unfriendly neighbors in an unstable region. Armenia leverages the

political clout of the Armenian diaspora in the United States and, to a

lesser degree, the European Union, to win governmental aid and assistance.

It also hedges its military bets by participating in NATO Partnership for

Peace exercises and lending quiet support to the American war on terror.

 

U.S. and EU concerns in the region are focused on the politics of oil and

pipelines in Azerbaijan and the Caspian area more generally -- with changes

in Georgia now also jockeying for the limited attention that the West allots

to the Caucasus. Meanwhile, efforts to deepen relations with southern

neighbor Iran (such as through the construction of a natural gas pipeline)

receive frosty glares from the West and a mixed reception from Russia.

 

Russia is home to roughly 1.8 million Armenians -- compared with the

official, and inflated, figure of 3.2 million inhabitants of Armenia

proper -- who send home remittances of roughly $110 million every year

(equivalent to 4 percent of GDP), according to the Armenian Foreign

Ministry. Not surprisingly, there is no stigma attached to speaking Russian

in Armenia, unlike elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc.

 

Armenian dependence on Russia is steadily deepening, binding Armenia's

future -- for better or for worse -- all the more tightly to Russia. And as

Russian influence in the CIS continues to erode, its role in Armenia serves

as a pleasant, if Lilliputian, reminder of what it once had.

Edited September 16, 2004 by Armenian Highlander

[Armenian Highlander]

Itogi.ru:Transcaucasia / Armies of the World

 

No. 42(322)

October 26, 2002

 

Among the multitude of armed formations, which have sprang up

in the post-Soviet sphere, the Defense Army of Artsax turned

out to be one of the most battle worthy.

 

Today people are starting to forget about Nagorno-Artsax. But

this small and strongly crisscrossed land, lost in the Caucasian

heights, which by population size is second to any Moscow region

(according to the latest information the population of NKR is

only 145,128), played a colossal role in recent history. It was

exactly here that the physical deterioration of the last world

empire started. It was also here that the first war developed

in the post-Soviet sphere, which put under the doubt the very

idea of the existence of such a community of people as the Soviet

People. After begetting a hurricane, Artsakh - the historical name

of Nagorno-Artsax - was destined to vanish from the political

map of the world: the Azeri side had a massive military and

economic superiority. But thanks to its army, Nagorno-Artsax

not only survived, but also enlarged its own borders...

 

While getting ready to go to Artsax, it was not our goal to

identify who is to blame in conflict, which flickers to this

day. We were interested exclusively in "technical" issues: how

was it formed and according to what principles does the army of

the state function, which instead of official borders has front

lines and is not accepted de-jure anywhere.

 

More Than Guerrillas

 

There is no need to explain to the participants of enforcement

of a "constructive order in Soviet Transcaucasia" who are the

fedayees. Armed with anything they could get their hands on and

unclear who they were controlled by, the bearded guerrillas

(partisans) stood against a no less exotic Azeri fighting

force. In the beginning stages, military weapons were a big rarity

here and the character of the military actions was very similar to

gang fighting on a city level using common makeshift weapons. In

those times Soviet generals didn't hide their contempt towards

this "wild war" and its participants. Up to the point when blood

still wasn't being shed in abundance and humor on military themes

wasn't too dark, in many headquarters spread throughout

"smoldering" Caucasus, the Artsax conflict was referred to as

the battle between shepherds and cattle breeders.

 

The irony was present even when the fighting sides transferred

into tanks and planes, when instead of gradoboykas (Translator's

note: guns used for agricultural purposes) they started using

frontline artillery - as the military warehouses and equipment

in the region turned out to be more than sufficient. True, in

Moscow they still hoped that these "peoples' military

specialists" will never be able to adapt the modern military

hardware which they inherited after the division of Soviet

Union. But the hopes were dispersed when the so-called Artsax

War, which in Artsakh is considered Patriotic, went according

to all rules of military art.

 

Nevertheless, in Stepanakert we expected to see some "illegal

armed formation" with bearded fighters and an "amusing" ministry

of defense, reminiscent of the chancellery of a mechanized

infantry regiment in the best case scenario. Reality turned out

to be completely different.

 

They don't wear beards in the NKR Army any more. It is not

outlawed, but it is also not encouraged. The outward appearance

is clean cut - the camouflage is sawn on the local fabric from

Greek material, thus strikingly resembling NATO. And if we put a

Russian soldier next to one from Artsax, the visual comparison,

unfortunately, won't be in our favor. At the least, we didn't

see a single soldier with a pitiful appearance, the likes of

which are abundant even in Moscow. People wear the uniform with

dignity here, even women and instructors of military-sporting

schools: 70 percent of the population directly or indirectly

are considered potential "military assets".

 

Big Little Army

 

The military budget of NKR is an impressive 20 percent of

GDP. These kinds of spending percentages are not permissive,

neither in the United States nor Russia. But to make up for

it, in the past ten years, gone like a moment, they created

here a well functioning military structure: infantry, armored,

rocket-artillery forces, air defense forces, rear logistical

services and all the necessary military services including,

a reconnaissance battalion and a special forces unit formed on

the base of national guard.

 

>From the Soviet Army, AOK (Translator's note: Russian acronym for

Defense Army of Artsax) differs only in size and in the absence

of Strategic Missile Forces and Navy. "But if the almighty had

gifted us with a sea, we would also indulge ourselves with a

Navy," as they joke in the Artsax Ministry of Defense. In any

case Artsax already has an air force, even if they don't like to

advertise it. They even have an anti chemical-warfare subdivision.

 

In reality, here they know not only the appropriate place for

a joke, but also the appropriate time. They warned us still

in Yerevan that Artsax Armenians are not only the most kind

hearted but also the most warlike: from the four famous Soviet

Armenian marshals, three were from Artsax. People here, as is

appropriate for the highlanders, are serious with a no-nonsense

character. If the decision is taken that everybody must go through

military service, everybody does it, regardless of the position

of the parents, two years from start to finish.

 

One more stipulation: the military unit, to which new conscripts

are assigned to, must be at least fifty kilometers away from

his place of residence. This rule can't be sidestepped even by

the head of NKR. Once, out of kind heart, he tried to petition

the Defense Minister on behalf of somebody, but got the answer:

"I don't deal with these kinds of issues."

 

Ohanian's Line

 

We should assume that the Defense Minister of NKR doesn't

contradict his commander-in-chief all the time. But in any case,

even for the president it is hard to pressure his military

minister so easily. The point is that General-Lieutenant Seyran

Ohanian is not simply a bureaucrat in uniform, but one of the

thirteen national heroes, whom people respect no less than

general director of AVPK "Sukhoy" (Sukhoy, famous Russian fighter

and attack plane design bureau) Michail Pogosian, who also has

Artsaxi roots.

 

Seyran Ohanian has marched from cadet to battalion commander in

the Soviet Army. He served in the military group in Germany,

Kirovabad, then in 336th Stepanakert Mechanized Infantry

Regiment. He says that when the time came to make a choice, he

went to defend his smaller homeland, as he would probably do if

he had to, the socialist Fatherland. He was in the command of a

regiment, afterwards, during the heaviest fighting, he commanded

the Mardakert front. He didn't leave the battlefield even when he

was badly wounded and lost a leg. But in 6 months, he was back

fighting and after signing of the ceasefire, he kept himself

busy by building military fortifications. He spent his days and

nights in the field, and worked at such a pace, that even people

with two legs couldn't keep up with him. It was with his active

participation that the military training center, of which even

the elite Moscow facilities can be jealous, was built from zero.

 

They almost worship their commander in AOK. For example, the

massive system of defensive fortifications, which today similar

to Maginot Line encircles the entire borders of Artsax, is

unofficially called Ohanian's Line. During the war, they say,

Azeris were offering one million dollars for the head of the

commander of Mardakert front.

 

Soviet School

 

At the time of our visit, on General Ohanian's work desk there

was a book by Marshal Shtemenko, "General Headquarters in

War Years". "We take all that is positive from the experience

of the Soviet Army and are actively filtering out all that is

negative." By the way, the 200 thousand strong army of Azerbaijan,

as is known, is energetically reorganizing according to the

Turkish style. Even their military step is Turkish nowadays.

 

Today, Soviet style (one regiment - one defense region) regiments

of AOK are countered by two Azeri corps, each with five-six

brigades. Brigades are formed by six to eight battalions. But

if opportunity comes, the breakthrough attack will be carried

out by the elite units, including the Marines, which are now in

the rear and are carrying out intense military training under the

direction of Turkish instructors - who are not the worst military

specialists in the world. That is why the "euphoria of victory",

ruling now in Stepanakert, seriously concerns Artsax command.

 

Today Azerbaijan's army is several-fold larger in number, than

the armed forces of Armenia and NKR together. But in Artsax,

they think that these forces are not sufficient to break through

the Ohanian's Line so easily. Besides, here they prepare for

the possibility of war in real terms: exactly once a week, no

matter what, soldiers and officers of Artsakh conduct live-fire

training exercises in the field. They are also replenishing their

supplies of armaments, even though in the 'pyramids' (armories)

there are still war-time machine guns. But the main problem is

the officer cadres.

 

>From three thousand officers of AOK only forty have served in

the Soviet Army. Three hundred more went through training in

Yerevan military academy and in Russian establishments of higher

learning. Recently Boris Davidov, commander of 4th regiment,

graduated with honors from All-Military Academy in Moscow. In

the peaceful past Davidov was the graduate of Timiriazevsk

Academy. Behind the shoulders of the Deputy Defense Minister

lieutenant-colonel Aleksan Aleksanian are the Polytechnic

Institute and the academic courses "Vistrel" (Shot). Students

from Azerbaijan don't neglect Russian military academies either,

but as Moscow instructors communicated to "Itogi", officers from

Artsax are working harder than all the others.

 

In Soviet times there was an axiom: if three Armenians served in

a subdivision at the same time, it meant a guaranteed disorder

and brothel in the whole stationed division, if there were more

Armenians - an utter lawlessness would ensue. In simple terms, it

was thought that it would be impossible to create a regular army

purely "comprised of Armenians", because it was thought, these

people were spoiled by the warm climate and abundance of food and

wealth. For AOK this axiom turned out to be false. At one time,

Alexander Lebed (famous Russian General and elected governor of

Krasnoyarsk, who brokered ceasefire in the first Chechen War),

who visited Artsax after the war, acknowledged, that the

battle readiness of AOK is higher than the Russian Army, and

there is more order. It was not hard to compare the two, because

the military life and methods of training are almost identical.

 

Flying Russian Style

 

During the war Artsaxis shot down several dozen Azeri planes and

helicopters and unfortunately, one of their own MiGs. Following

that, they themselves would joke bitterly: "After that military

loss the Armenian Air Force was reduced exactly by a half". In the

beginning of the war the Armenian military aviation was comprised

only of two planes. By the way, that unfortunate pilot remained

alive. He parachuted and landed on the town square where he was

given a good beating until the anxious defenders of Stepanakert

figured out what had happened. Now, as the unfaltering sense of

humor of the Armenian Radio (a line of famous jokes in Soviet

Union) confirms, during every flight over the capital of NKR, he

sends advance notification to the Air Defense Forces of Artsax,

which are part of Armenia's Air Defense Forces, and thus part

of CIS'.

 

It is not a secret that the planes of Azeri Air Force were

manned mainly by Russian and Ukrainian crews, who were flying

for money of course. Some of them were captured. Participants

of the Artsax War say that they could visually tell when the

planes were flown by Russians: the bombs were released not on

populated areas but in the mountains. One of them even landed

his plane on the Armenian side. He didn't become national hero

of course, but he got some applause for making some money and

in the process not harming fellow Christians.

 

In Soviet official circles it was thought that Armenian and

Azeri Mafia, which didn't agree on the divisions of spheres of

influence, were at the source of the Artsax conflict. Today

on both sides they are sure that the politicians are to blame

for everything. But whether we like it or not, we have to admit

that this conflict also has religious roots. A very good

example: at one time, Shamil Basayev (infamous Chechen warlord)

along with his unit took part on the side of the Azeris, and as

they tell it here, he barely escaped being captured. At the same

time Armenians were getting the help of Kozaks, many of whom

lost their lives in Artsax. Because of this - spiritual -

cause, the command of AOK thinks it is advisable to develop an

institution of military chaplains.

 

On the Border Clouds Are Menacing...

 

"We have won only due to our high spirit!" - says General

Ohanian. In the beginning the defense detachments of Artsax had

no military experience, no weapons - the main military warehouses

were on the Azeri side, furthermore just before their pullout,

the Soviet Interior Troops carried out a thorough combing of

Artsax. That is why they were fighting practically with bare

hands and trophies, until they secured supplies from Russia

(remember the scandalous and criminal cases about arms shipments

of Pavel Grachev's times). Monte Melkonian, (Armenian born in

Lebanon and Harvard graduate) the legendary in Artsax commander

of 2nd regiment, used to make his subordinates account for

destroying enemy tanks instead of capturing them intact.

 

Experience came later. And now, the opponents of the NKR Defense

Minister are arguing that the military training should be built

on the basis of their own military traditions. Seyran Ohanian

prefers a compromise: own military experience plus classic Soviet

military tactic. According to his opinion, the next war will be

different - more professional. Here is how they picture the future

battles in Stepanakert. Before, they thought that with the start

of the hostilities the first line of trenches will be taken by

the experienced reservists and the new recruits will take the

second line of defense. The thinking was that the "old timers"

will not dare to retreat. General Ohanian thinks differently:

in order to facilitate the merging of experience and training,

reservists and new recruits should be mixed in one unit. There is

no talk about creation of a fully professional Army on the base

of AOK due to the simple fact that they don't have enough people.

 

... If we ignore the sniper war that hasn't ceased in the

last eight years, the Artsax frontlines look peaceful

enough. Commander of 4th regiment colonel Boris Davidov asked

only one thing of us, to follow the main rules of common sense,

don't stand out and move fast in the open spaces. And that is

what we ended up doing being accompanied by the peaceful noises

of grasshoppers.

 

According to Artsax reconnaissance, there were intense ground

works on the other side of the frontlines at night and in the

morning Azeri positions became closer. In some areas two opposing

armies are separated only by fifty meters. A tank can cover

that distance in one swing. But colonel Davidov is sure that his

subordinates will hold: "You can't run from a submarine!" Really,

Artsaxis have nowhere to retreat.

 

Source: http://www.itogi.ru/paper2002.nsf/A...21_13_2330.html

Edited September 16, 2004 by Armenian Highlander

[bellthecat]

As far as the Turkish destroying alll the planes.... Now this is stictly hypothetical  at this point.....  Armenia will not be so stupid and unprepared to allow Turkey to launch a major attack and not ready herself.  Those jets will be scrambled, and they would intercept the Turks.

 

You are living in a fantasy world if you believe that. Turkish tanks could be in the heart of Yerevan before a single Armenian plane had left the ground. Armenia is impossible to defend in a conventional war since its territory has no depth. In such a situation, planes are nothing but expensive playthings for generals and to be used for fly-overs for silly politicians.

[bellthecat]

E.g. I am sure Turkey has its planes somewhere deep in territory, like near Erzerum or something...

 

Their main airbase is in Erzincan, actually.

Erzurum is where most of the foot-soldier grunts are based.

[Armen]

You are living in a fantasy world if you believe that. Turkish tanks could be in the heart of Yerevan before a single Armenian plane had left the ground. Armenia is impossible to defend in a conventional war since its territory has no depth. In such a situation, planes are nothing but expensive playthings for generals and to be used for fly-overs for silly politicians.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

What conventional war Steve?

[Armenian Highlander]

You are living in a fantasy world if you believe that. Turkish tanks could be in the heart of Yerevan before a single Armenian plane had left the ground. Armenia is impossible to defend in a conventional war since its territory has no depth. In such a situation, planes are nothing but expensive playthings for generals and to be used for fly-overs for silly politicians.

 

As a former military personnel who has been to Turkey on NATO exercises; as a person who has studied military history and doctrine for many years; as a personal who assesses the geo-political situation within the Caucasus with objectivity; I can unequivocally state 'yet' again - I am still waiting for you to say something smart.

[Armenian Highlander]

TURKISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AZERBAIJAN AND THE FOREIGN MERCENERIES DURING THE KARABAGH WAR

 

The book by the Armenian historian Hayk Demoyan titled “Artsax drama - hidden Acts” (Yerevan, Caucasian Center for Iranian Studies, 2003) presents and analyzes documents and evidence concerning Turkish military assistance to Azerbaijan, as well as revealing the recruitment of Chechen and Afghan mercenaries by Azerbaijan during the 1991-1994 Karabagh war. Based on Armenian, Russian, Turkish, French, Azeri and American sources, as well as the archives of the Nagorno Artsax Republic’s State Department of National Security, Demoyan’s book reveals certain intriguing facts.

 

By 1991-92, Turkey had organized a number of secret air operations in order to transfer military equipment and ammunition to Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Turkey embarked on a program of training for Azerbaijani officers and soldiers in military schools located in the territories of both Turkey and Azerbaijan. However, Ankara showed a certain degree of caution regarding the issue of directly supplying the Azerbaijani forces with military hardware and logistics, caution bred from the fear that Turkey’s clandestine action, namely, supplying the Azerbaijani armed forces with armaments, produced in Turkey or via NATO depots, could be exposed. Thus, Ankara provided the Azeri’s mainly with Soviet made weapons captured from the Iraqi Army after the Gulf War, as well as weapons imported from the former German Democratic Republic's army stores.

 

Concurrently, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), in close cooperation with the Azerbaijani branch of the ultra-nationalistic Turkish organization “Grey Wolves” -which numbered over 15 thousand members-, began to implement meticulously planned activities. The Turkish branch of the organization started to recruit and post volunteers to special military bases of the Third Turkish field army, and then complete their further transfer to Azerbaijan. In the summer of 1992, when the situation along the Nakhichevan section of the Armenian-Azeri border became strained again, the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish ground forces Muhittin Fisunogli declared that, “all necessary preparations are made and the army is waiting for the order to proceed to action.” As a response to that declaration the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), Marshal Shaposhnikov, warned that the intervention of a third party in the conflict would lead to the outbreak of the Third World War.

 

1993 was a very decisive year for the Karabagh conflict. Turkey did its best to exert some influence on the resolution of the conflict in favor of Azerbaijan. Besides the fact that Turkey officially closed its border with Armenia on April 3, 1993, it also signed an agreement with Azerbaijan on the supply of light weaponry and the training of Azeri military specialists, blatantly violating the OSCE decision (February 1993) which prohibited any military supply to the zone of the Nagorno-Artsax conflict. Thanks to the revelations of former Ambassador of Greece to Armenia, Leonidas Chrisantopoulos, it became known that in October 1993 Turkey tried to use the parliamentary crisis in Russia in order to make incursions into Armenia. According to information from French intelligence sources, corroborated by the US Ambassador to Armenia, there was an agreement reached between the then speaker of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov and Turkish PM Tansu Ciller that, in the case of an anti-Yeltsin fraction success, Khasbulatov would allow Turkey to execute a small-scale incursion into Armenia.

 

Curiously, the territory of the non-recognized Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was also used for the recruitment of foreign mercenaries and military instructors. Through the initiative of English Lord Erskin and Turkish businessman Mustafa Mutlu, foreign and Turkish mercenaries were transferred to Azerbaijan. According to the Turkish and European press, in return for this service, the Azeris were obliged to deliver oil to Great Britain for 150 thousands US dollars per year. The territory of the TRNC was not chosen coincidentally, in so far as the jurisdictional scope of resolutions of international organizations does not extend to the territory of the non-recognized republic.

 

Also, Demoyan re-established the hidden links between the Azerbaijani government, Chechen and Afghan authorities, as well as revealing the agreements concluded between them concerning the supply of mercenaries to the Azeri armed forces. In early June 1992 the number of Chechen mercenaries in Artsax totaled approximately 300. They had been recruited on the basis of a military agreement signed between Azeri and Chechen authorities regarding the supply of human resources from Chechnya in exchange for military supply from Azerbaijan. After heavy losses Chechen fighters left Artsax battlefields, partially in connection with Inter-Chechen and Chechen-Russian problems...

[Armenian Highlander]

Agency WPS/DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)

August 27, 2004, Friday

 

ARMENIA BUILDS UP ITS MILITARY MIGHT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE DEEPENING CRISIS IN THE RELATIONS WITH AZERBAIJAN THAT THREATENS WITH FULL-SCALE WAR

 

by Samvel Martirosjan (Yerevan)

 

The Russian-Armenian military cooperation develops quite dynamically.

Not long ago, Russia lent a sympathetic ear to Armenia's request

concerning training of up to 150 officers. Complicated situation in

the Caucasus forces the authorities of Armenia to pay unfeigned

attention to national defense. According to official data alone, the

2004 Armenian state budget allocated almost $82 million for military

needs, an almost 10% rise against war spending in 2003. Estimates of

the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London) show that

in 2002 Armenia was the CIS leader in the arms spending to GDP ratio

- 6.4%, an equivalent of $162 million.

 

The CIA claims that as far as this particular parameter is concerned,

Armenia is the 11th in the world; it spent $135 million on its army

in 2001. When the closed parliamentary hearing of fulfillment of the

2003 budget was over not long ago, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh

Sarkisjan said that arms spending would be increased next year

again. Sarkisjan refused to elaborate but said that the Armenian

national army was initiating a program of rearmament.

 

It should be noted that the population of Armenia, not exactly a

wealthy country, does not object to these measures taken by national

leaders. The population is perfectly aware of the undeclared war with

Azerbaijan that is under way. Serious clashes are regularly reported

in the areas where Armenian and Azerbaijani troops face each other;

shots have been fired by sharpshooters for a decade (ever since the

cease-fire on the Artsax front was signed). Moreover, official

Yerevan positions itself as a guarantor of security of Artsax.

 

Turkey is another potential enemy. Diplomatic relations with Turkey

have never been established. Ankara is still blocking the border with

Armenia and pursuing an openly anti-Armenian policy. Sociologists of

the Armenian Center of National and Strategic Studies discovered that

47.5% respondents in Armenia believe that the war with Azerbaijan may

be resumed within five years, and 7% more expect a Turkish aggression

within the same span of time.

 

Figures

 

Armenian national army is considered one of the most combat ready in

the Caucasus. These days, it is over 60,000 men strong. According to

the CIA, there are 810,000 men in Armenia aged 15 to 59 and almost

650,000 of them are fit for combat. Most experts say, however, that

mobilization resources of Armenia amount to 300,000 men, i.e. almost

10% of the total population (over 3.2 million).

 

Under the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, in 2001 Armenia

declared 102 T-72 tanks and 204 armored vehicles (most of them

infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers). With the

military hardware the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe does not

apply to, Armenia has up to 700 armored vehicles. Its artillery

comprises 225 pieces of 122 mm and larger calibers including 50

multiple rocket launchers.

 

The Armenian Air Force includes five SU-25 ground-attack aircraft,

one MIG-25, 35 helicopters (the latter include twelve MI-24 attack

helicopters), and 3,000 servicemen. Yerevan intends to build up this

component of its Armed Forces. Not long ago, Defense Ministry of

Slovenia proclaimed the sale of ten SU-25s to Armenia (nine SU-25K

one-seaters and one SU-25UBK two-seater). The consignment will cost

Armenia $1 million. Armenia bought two IL-76 military transports from

Russia not long ago. The transports were bought at Russian domestic

prices and made it to Armenia together with Defense Minister of

Russia Sergei Ivanov.

 

Armenia builds up its Air Force in the hope of making it a match for

the Azerbaijani, but its antiaircraft defense is considered the best

throughout the Caucasus. Armenian antiaircraft defense comprises an

antiaircraft missile brigade and two regiments armed with almost 100

antiaircraft complexes of various models and modifications (Osa,

Krug, S-75, and S-125). Numerical strength is estimated at about

2,000 servicemen. Armenian antiaircraft defense developed in a hurry

in the war over Artsax when Azerbaijani Air Force regularly and

energetically bombarded Armenian trenches and settlements both in

Artsax and in Armenia's own border districts. There was nothing

Armenia could do about it then. By 1993, however, it already had a

formidable antiaircraft defense in Armenia itself and in the Republic

of Nagorno-Artsax. Its deployment cut Azerbaijani advantage in the

sky to the minimum.

 

These days, the Armenian skies are controlled by Armenian and Russian

antiaircraft defense units on joint combat duty since 1999. There are

at least 30 MIG-29 fighters and a regiment of S-300s quartered on the

territory of Armenia.

 

Allies in the Organization of the CIS Collective Security Treaty

 

Armenia is a member of the Organization of the CIS Collective

Security Treaty. As such, it participates in all events organized

within its framework. In any case, Russia is Armenia's oldest and

traditional ally. Ever since the regaining of sovereignty, the tandem

of Moscow and Yerevan has served as one of the few examples of bona

fide military-political cooperation in the Commonwealth. There is

practically no discord between Russia and Armenia in this sphere.

 

Russia and Armenia together defend the Armenian airspace or, rather,

the southern border of the Commonwealth. Armenian borders with Turkey

and Iran are manned by almost 2,000 Russian bodyguards who serve

shoulder to shoulder with their Armenian counterparts. Yet, it is the

102nd Military Base in Gyumri that is Russia's major outpost in

Armenia. Unlike Tbilisi or Baku, official Yerevan never brings up the

subject of withdrawal of the Russian troops. When Sarkisjan is asked

the question, he never answers believing it a rhetoric question.

Armenian society regards the Russian troops as a covering force

defending it from the Turkish aggression.

 

Until recently, the 102nd Military Base had 74 tanks, 17 battle

infantry vehicles, 148 armored personnel carriers, 84 artillery

pieces, up to 30 MIG-23s and MIG-29s, and a regiment of S-300

antiaircraft complexes. In the last eighteen months, however, a great

deal of military hardware was moved there from Georgia. Armenia gave

the land and objects used by the 102nd Military Base over to Russia

and covers some communal services.

 

Officer training is another sphere of Russian-Armenian military

cooperation. In the first years of sovereignty when Armenia did not

have military educational establishments of its own, officers of its

army were trained in Russia. Even now when Armenia has a military

college on its own territory, the Armenian officer corps honors the

tradition and is trained at Russian military educational

establishments. On a visit to Armenia in late May, Ivanov said that

600 Armenian servicemen are being trained in Russia. "Armenia asks

for the permission to send 150 servicemen to Russia in 2005, and

Russia gave its consent," Ivanov said.

 

It seems that Moscow and Yerevan do not plan to stop. The first

meeting of the joint Russian-Armenian government panel for

military-technical cooperation will take place this autumn. According

to Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Russian factories will participate

in the Armenian program of military hardware modernization. He even

said that Russia is prepared to supply the necessary spare parts an

equipment.

 

Belarus is another ally of Armenia in the Organization of the CIS

Collective Security Treaty. The two countries signed a treaty in

2002. Under the document, Armenia will receive light weapons, armored

vehicles, ordnance, and optical devices in return for spare parts and

gadgets for military hardware. Armenia also intends to have its heavy

military hardware upgraded at Belarusian factories. Lieutenant

General Sergei Gurulev, Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian

Armed Forces, says that the Armenian-Belarusian military contacts

"become systematic and deliberate."

 

Do not forget NATO

 

Greece is Armenia's best ally in the Alliance. Greece and Armenia

share ancient ties and a common enemy - Turkey. Armenian officers are

trained in Greece. Every now and then Athens puts into motion

military aid programs. In 2003, the two countries signed another

military cooperation accord under which Greece will up the number of

Armenian servicemen trained at the military and military-medical

academies in Athens.

 

Armenia became a peacekeeper in February. It sent 34 servicemen to

Kosovo where they became an element of the Greek contingent. Armenian

servicemen in Kosovo are paid by the Greeks.

 

Yerevan has been shifting towards NATO lately, mostly within the

framework of the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program. Cooperative

Best Effort exercise (the first one where Russia was represented) was

run on the territory of Armenia in 2003.

 

Armenian cooperation with NATO is mostly declarative for the time

being, but the United States - the country steadily upping its clout

with countries of the region - has far-reaching plans with regard to

Yerevan. In early 2003, the Pentagon announced several major military

programs in the Caucasus. Washington's military aid to Armenia in

2004 will amount to $5 million even though the US Administration

intended to restrict it to $2 million at first. Armenia and the

United States signed a military-technical cooperation accord in

April. Some articles in the American media imply that the accord

specifies the use of Armenian airfields by the US AF.

 

Proclaiming complementariness as its foreign political doctrine,

official Yerevan never misses a chance to advance its contacts with

Washington. When the war in Iraq was under way, Armenia remained

neutral. It neither supported the war and America's action nor

condemned them. These days, however, the parliament and government of

Armenia are working on the legislation that will enable Yerevan to

send servicemen to Iraq. The Cabinet already endorsed the decision of

the Defense Ministry to subscribe to the memorandum "On the command

and settlement of issues in connection with activities of the

international division in the forces of coalition in Iraq". At first,

Armenia will probably send 10 de-miners and 3 doctors and some trucks

to Iraq.

 

Moreover, Armenia even permitted the United States to modernize its

communications, one of the most vulnerable items. Yerevan expects to

get communications means from American companies. The deliveries will

be paid for by the White House (the sum amounts to $7 million).

Commenting on it, Sarkisjan said that Russia is quite understanding.

"We are allies. It means that the strengthening of one partner will

benefit the other," said Sarkisjan. "We initiated the process a year

ago, and I found our Russian colleagues quite understanding." He said

that from military cooperation with the United States Armenia

expected to up combat potential of its own army.

 

So, Armenia ups its military might against the background of the

deepening crisis in the relations with Azerbaijan, the crisis that

threatens to deteriorate into another full-scale war. It should be

noted as well that in any conflict the Armenian national army may

count on servicemen from Artsax. In fact, the Artsax army even

leaves the Armenian behind in some parameters. Artsax armed

formations cannot match the Armenian army in manpower (about 20,000

servicemen and mobilization resources at 60,000 men), but they are

certainly ahead of Armenia in heavy military hardware: 316 tanks, 324

armored vehicles, 322 artillery pieces of calibers over 122 mm, 44

multiple rocket launchers, and the antiaircraft defense system that

performed flawlessly in the hostilities in the 1990's.

 

Translated by A. Ignatkin

 

Source: http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg92385.html

[bellthecat]

As a former military personnel who has been to Turkey on NATO exercises; as a person who has studied military history and doctrine for many years; as a personal who assesses the geo-political situation within the Caucasus with objectivity; I can unequivocally state 'yet' again - I am still waiting for you to say something smart.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

I wait for you to do likewise!

[bellthecat]

What conventional war Steve? 

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

To be serious (sorry!) the same sort of war that most of Armenia's generals fought back in 1917-1921, pretending that they led a fully trained and equiped European army capable of fighting a European-style war.

 

I don't for a moment think that Turkey ever will attack Armenia, but if it was ever to be considered it would not be the threat of fighting Armenia's armed forces that would deter a Turkish invasion, it would be the prospect of facing the day after day, month after month, year after year resistance from every person in Armenia. That's what's now happening against America in Iraq.

[gamavor]

Wrong! Turks were very close to attack Armenia in 1992-1993. The detergent factor then was Russia, still probably so. However, Armenia should build a strong and mobile Army, which exactly should be the reason why Turks should be prevented from such malicious thoughts.

 

Plus I think a war between Armenia and Turkey is inevitable. And it won't be conventional!

Edited September 16, 2004 by gamavor

[gamavor]

You are living in a fantasy world if you believe that. Turkish tanks could be in the heart of Yerevan before a single Armenian plane had left the ground. Armenia is impossible to defend in a conventional war since its territory has no depth. In such a situation, planes are nothing but expensive playthings for generals and to be used for fly-overs for silly politicians.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

Steve I think you are better historian than military expert!

[Armen]

To be serious (sorry!) the same sort of war that most of Armenia's generals fought back in 1917-1921, pretending that they led a fully trained and equiped European army capable of fighting a European-style war.

 

I don't for a moment think that Turkey ever will attack Armenia, but if it was ever to be considered it would not be the threat of fighting Armenia's armed forces that would deter a Turkish invasion, it would be the prospect of facing the day after day, month after month, year after year resistance from every person in Armenia. That's what's now happening against America in Iraq.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

Steve, Turkey was on its knees already if not for Lenin's help to Kemal. Turkey was torn apart on two fronts simultaneously. The Caucasian Turkish army was non-existent after the Sardarabat battle. If not for Lenin and the Bolsheviks there would never be a Turkey at present (Greeks were also deep in Turkish territory). So it was not military victories that saved Turkey then.

Turkey should always be prepared for a war on at least two fronts (Caucasus, Middle East agaisnt Iran) and one simultaneous (Kurdish) big rebelion. If they get into that situation they'll never get out of it because there is no Lenin anymore.

So, they will not attack Armenia you're right.

I think you're also correct in saying that they would fear long term involvement and gurilla war more than a fast campaign with one or two big battles.

[Armen]

Turks were very close to attack Armenia in 1992-1993. The detergent factor then was Russia, still probably so.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

I also think the detergent is Russia but doesn't Turkey have a bigger problem in Middle East? The possibilities of creation of Kurdish state is their worst nightmare.

[Twilight Bark]

Steve, Turkey was on its knees already if not for Lenin's help to Kemal. Turkey was torn apart on two fronts simultaneously.

Turkish army was nonexistent long before that. Turkey became a player in the East mainly because the Armenian "army" lost its nerve, and the soldiers (almost entirely from the "East") felt that "this is not our war; this is not our country" about "western Armenia". They couldn't get out of there fast enough, tripping over each other. In effect they defeated themselves. The more supplies they left behind, the stronger the Turkish army became, and the higher their morale got.

 

The Caucasian Turkish army was non-existent after the Sardarabat battle.

Sardarabad battle proved that Turks could be stopped in a major battle. However, it neither destroyed the rest of the Turkish army, nor did it have a real impact on the politics of the situation. All had been decided right before the victory.

 

If not for Lenin and the Bolsheviks there would never be a Turkey at present (Greeks were also deep in Turkish territory).

Perhaps. But the reason Turkey, instead of Armenia, became a focus of aid and support was because Armenians didn't show any strength and resolve in Eastern Anatolia when they had the chance. Sure Mustafa Kemal and Karabekir put on a fake "communist" pretense, and duped the bolsheviks. But the reason they became relevant was because Armenians let them. In any case, I keep reading on the forum "there would be no Turkey". Why is it that so many here would be happy to see no country left for the ethnic Turks of the time (whatever their origins, they wouldn't fit into any other identity). A Turkey that covered most of Anatolia except for the Aegean coast, a part of Pontus and the core Armenian provinces would have been a fair result. If you are not going to lower yourself to the depths that they lowered themselves, longing for "no Turkey" is silly.

 

So it was not military victories that saved Turkey then.

True, but probably not in the sense that you are implying. There was no real victory on the Eastern front. Only an Armenian defeat.

 

As for a war in the future, Armenia should be prepared for it, but only to prevent it, not fight it. It doesn't take a military genius to know that it would be disastrous for all involved. If Turkey ever attacked, it would mean that they no longer fear the political consequences, which further implies that a "permanent vacation" either in neighboring countries or in the afterlife is how they would be planning to deal with Armenians in the aftermath of a war. It's crazy to contemplate a "beneficial war" for Armenia. Insane.

 

As for preparedness, what Swiss used to do seriously (and nowadays not so seriously) would be a good model to start from as far as the human resources part. And the infrastructure should be completely decentralized and put underground whenever it is possible. Micropower (rather than one or several big power plants) for electricity, enough "strategic oil reserves", and fiber-optic communication network are a few things that come to mind.

[Armen]

East mainly because the Armenian "army" lost its nerve, and the soldiers (almost entirely from the "East") felt that "this is not our war; this is not our country" about "western Armenia".  They couldn't get out of there fast enough, tripping over each other.  In effect they defeated themselves.  The more supplies they left behind, the stronger the Turkish army became, and the higher their morale got.

 

Armenian army lost its nerve because of political disagreements and because of communist propaganda and agitation among the officers. Its was an officer's duty to boost the morale of a sheperd from Abaran and explain to him that Mush is an Armenian land.

 

Sardarabad battle proved that Turks could be stopped in a major battle.  However, it neither destroyed the rest of the Turkish army, nor did it have a real impact on the politics of the situation.  All had been decided right before the victory.

 

This did not contradict my point. And I agree with that.

 

Perhaps.  But the reason Turkey, instead of Armenia, became a focus of aid and support was because Armenians didn't show any strength and resolve in Eastern Anatolia when they had the chance.  Sure Mustafa Kemal and Karabekir put on a fake "communist" pretense, and duped the bolsheviks.  But the reason they became relevant was because Armenians let them.  In any case, I keep reading on the forum "there would be no Turkey".  Why is it that so many here would be happy to see no country left for the ethnic Turks of the time (whatever their origins, they wouldn't fit into any other identity).  A Turkey that covered most of Anatolia except for the Aegean coast, a part of Pontus and the core Armenian provinces would have been a fair result.  If you are not going to lower yourself to the depths that they lowered themselves, longing for "no Turkey" is silly.

 

No one could dupe bolsheviks because they never tursted anyone. Its was much much easier for them to send the 11th Red Army to Anatolia and defeat the remnants of Turkish forces than organise supply of equipment and gold to the Kemalist governement. I think the roots of this agreement are a theme of a separate discussion.

I don't want "no Turkey" and I agree with you. My "there would be no Turkey" did not imply that I wouldn't want them to have a piece of land although it may sound like that.

 

As for a war in the future, Armenia should be prepared for it, but only to prevent it, not fight it.  It doesn't take a military genius to know that it would be disastrous for all involved.  If Turkey ever attacked, it would mean that they no longer fear the political consequences, which further implies that a "permanent vacation" either in neighboring countries or in the afterlife is how they would be planning to deal with Armenians in the aftermath of a war.  It's crazy to contemplate a "beneficial war" for Armenia.  Insane.

 

Agree.

 

As for preparedness, what Swiss used to do seriously (and nowadays not so seriously) would be a good model to start from as far as the human resources part.  And the infrastructure should be completely decentralized and put underground whenever it is possible.  Micropower (rather than one or several big power plants) for electricity, enough "strategic oil reserves", and fiber-optic communication network are a few things that come to mind.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

Very good recommendations

[bellthecat]

Wrong! Turks were very close to attack Armenia in 1992-1993. The detergent factor then was Russia, still probably so.

 

I am taking about now, and for the next generation or two. Obviously I am not talking about 100 years from now because nobody can predict that far ahead. Nor am I talking about 12 years ago. I was in Igdir in the summer of 1993, and saw with my own eyes the Turkish military build up on the border.

 

Steve

[bellthecat]

Steve, Turkey was on its knees already if not for Lenin's help to Kemal. Turkey was torn apart on two fronts simultaneously. The Caucasian Turkish army was non-existent after the Sardarabat battle. If not for Lenin and the Bolsheviks there would never be a Turkey at present (Greeks were also deep in Turkish territory). So it was not military victories that saved Turkey then.

 

Was this the same on-its-knees army that four months later had marched all the way to Baku and captured it? Sardarabat was a victorious battle, not a victorious war - let's not forget that the treaty that Armenia signed with Turkey shortly after the battle resulted in an even smaller republic that that of 1919. Most of the Turkish army was still intact (and with the capacity to get re-inforcements - something Armenia could not get) but busy elsewhere.

 

If Turkey's defeat of Greece was not a military victory than what was it? Though in some sence you are correct, since if the allies had helped Greece then maybe they would not have been defeated. So it was allied inactivity that saved Turkey. But since Greece had advanced against allied advice, why should that help have been expected.

[Armen]

Was this the same on-its-knees army that four months later had marched all the way to Baku and captured it? Sardarabat was a victorious battle, not a victorious war - let's not forget that the treaty that Armenia signed with Turkey shortly after the battle resulted in an even smaller republic that that of 1919. Most of the Turkish army was still intact (and with the capacity to get re-inforcements - something Armenia could not get) but busy elsewhere.

 

I am not saying it was on it knees because Armenian army defeated it. It was because it had to fight on three fronts. Though it had capacity to fight...see below...

 

If Turkey's defeat of Greece was not a military victory than what was it? Though in some sence you are correct, since if the allies had helped Greece then maybe they would not have been defeated. So it was allied inactivity that saved Turkey. But since Greece had advanced against allied advice, why should that help have been expected.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

It was the political victory that resulted in that military victory. The inactivity of allies and the enormous Bolshevik help (arms and gold) should tell you something about who were Bolsheviks again.

Edited September 18, 2004 by ArmenSarg

[gamavor]

If Turkey's defeat of Greece was not a military victory than what was it? Though in some sence you are correct, since if the allies had helped Greece then maybe they would not have been defeated. So it was allied inactivity that saved Turkey. But since Greece had advanced against allied advice, why should that help have been expected.

style_images/master/snapback.png

 

Steve, WW I was one bloody mess, not only in terms of military actions but rather betrayal and affiliation. Armenians served in her Majesty forces and by their own (Brits) testimony were great soldiers. Armenians fought in French Legion with same rate of success. Now tell me WHY? Only to be stabbed in the back by who? The once that were suppose to be our allies. The once that wanted to partition Turkey and in the same time turned their backs to us as allies and embraced Turkey? Why?

[Armenian Highlander]

RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN MILITARY COOPERATION POSES THREAT TO SECURITY IN SOUTH CAUCASUS - AZERBAIJANI DEFENSE MINISTER

 

The Azerbaijani Defense Minister was quoted not too long ago as saying: Russian-Armenian military cooperation has begun to pose a "real threat" to the entire South Caucasus. "The movement of a considerable amount of military equipment withdrawn from Georgia into Armenia seriously worries Baku. "Such actions by Russia are destabilizing the situation in the region, which is already fragile," the Defense Minister said. "This problem has existed for the past few years and has an extremely negative impact on the situation in the South Caucasus," the Defense Minister further stated.

 

He further recalled that "the problem of the unsanctioned supply of Russian weapons worth over $1 billion to Armenia between 1993 and 1996 has still not been resolved." Baku "has more than once asked Russia to solve this problem," the Defense Minister said. "However, we do not see any actions from Russia in response. Moreover, over the past few years Russia has supplied additional modern weapons to Armenia and a new large aviation group has been formed," he said. According to the information provided to him, he said, a considerable amount of the Russian weapons and military equipment supplied to Armenia "is later moved to Azerbaijani lands (Nagorno Karabagh) occupied by Armenia."

[ED]

AH, you have posted same post in 3 deferent threads, what does this post have to do here in this thread? Just post once in an appropriate thread please.