Reality Of Karabakh War

[joseph parikian]

Artsax issue

 

TRUTH AND REALITY OF Artsax WAR

 

Azerbaijan Made Additional Weapons Purchases in Ukraine and Turkey, and Hired Some 2,500 Mercenaries in Afghanistan

 

In April 2003 British NGO Safer World, funded by British and other European government agencies and foundations, published a study entitled "The Caucasus: Armed and Divided - small arms and light weapons proliferation and humanitarian consequences."

 

The study includes individual sections on Armenia and Nagorno Artsax both authored by Gagik Avagian of the Yerevan-based Cooperation and Development NGO and Azerbaijan by Arif Yunusov of the Baku-based Institute for Peace and Democracy, as well as an overview by Maxim Pyadushkin of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

 

The study focuses on proliferation of former Soviet Army's weapons in the Caucasus, and in the process debunks the widely held belief of "Russian support for Armenia" during the NK war. Some of Pyadushkin's key arguments include: During the division of Soviet military property in 1992, overseen by the Russian government, Armenia was at a disadvantage because fewer Soviet forces were based in Armenia than in either Georgia or [especially] Azerbaijan. According to Yunusov, by late 1991, Soviet army units in Azerbaijan, excluding the airborne division, held 309 tanks, 599 other armor, and 387 pieces of artillery; in all 15% more than in Armenia. Soviet air forces based in Azerbaijan had 124 combat aircraft, 50 transportation aircraft and 24 combat helicopters; [there were virtually none in Armenia]. Baku had a garrison of 11,500 soldiers at Salyan barracks and a Higher Military School. Together with 6000 sailors at the naval base at Nargin, there were 62,000 Soviet military personnel in Azerbaijan, which included 12,000 ethnic Azeris. Armenia inherited two out of three army divisions stationed on its territory (most of the third division remains under Russian control to date) and no Air Force units; Azeris inherited nearly all of the equipment of the four army and one airborne division, parts of the four Air Force units, as well as a portion of the Caspian fleet.

 

Armenia received about 500 wagons (one wagon equals 38m3) of ammunition, with Azeris receiving 11,000 wagons, more than 20 times as much. According to Yunusov, Azerbaijan inherited 7,000-wagon strategic ammunition depot at Giliazi/Sumgait (which was fully acquired by the field commander Suret Husseinov who bribed the local Russian commander), two district depots at Agdam and Nasosny with 1,100 each (Aghdam depot, inc. 728 wagons with artillery shells, 245 wagons with missiles and 131 vagons with small arms ammo, was inherited by Azeris for free) and four divisional depots at Guzdek, Ganja, Lenkoran and Nakhichevan with 150-200 wagons.

 

Azerbaijan received one and a half times more small arms (machine guns, grenade launchers, etc.; according to Yunusov at least 90,000 in all) than Armenia and Georgia together. According to Avagian, the Armenian side experienced shortages in weapons and ammunition throughout the war, with some military operations conducted just to capture arms from the Azeris.

 

Azerbaijan received considerably more than its share of heavy arms under CFE limitations set at 220 tanks, 220 other armor and 280 artillery; while Armenia, at least initially, received considerably less. According to Col. Ayaz Mamedov, late Azeri Gen. Baba Nazarli in mid-June 1992 [at the time of the Azeri offensive in NK] bribed the commander of the 23rd division (Ganja) Gen. Yuri Pakhomov to acquire the division's entire arsenal together with tank crews. According to the Azeri Defense Ministry, by August 1992 Azerbaijan received 307 tanks, 449 other armor, 130 mortars, 33 MLRS "Grad", 2,000 machine guns, 57,000 submachine guns and 17,000 pistols. According to Russian commanders, in total Azerbaijan inherited 325 tanks, 789 units of other armor, and 458 pieces of artillery. According to Yunusov, in spite of the huge arsenal it inherited, Azerbaijan made additional weapons purchases in Ukraine and Turkey, and hired some 2,500 mercenaries in Afghanistan (while most of them went on to fight in Chechnya and Yugoslavia, at least 400 stayed in Azerbaijan after the war leading to increase in the Islamic Jihadi activity in Azerbaijan).

 

Russia and individual Russian commanders are believed to have sold additional weapons to Armenia, NKR and Azerbaijan during and after the war, although no concrete figures are available. According to Avagian, Nagorno Artsax made direct purchases from Russian military units stationed throughout the FSU and some Armenian officers claim that NKR army's weapons holdings are kept secret even from Yerevan.

 

By mid-92, 40,000 people had been mobilized into the Azeri army, more than half of them deployed in Artsax. Additionally there were 4,000 in OMON and 7,000 in mostly XCP volunteer detachments. In September-October 1992, Elchibey amnestied 701 criminals (including murderers and rapists), willing to fight in NK. According to then Interior Minister Hamidov (quoted in Zerkalo, 28 June, 2002), 60 of them were killed in action, 120 were wounded and over a dozen decorated with government awards. However, a large number of those released deserted leading to increase in crime rate. In mid-93, Aliyev disbanded 33 pro-Elchibey battalions, numbering up to 7,000 people.

 

Prepared by Tatoul Hakobian

 

 

 

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http://www.azg.am/start.pl?lang=EN&num=2004052801

[THOTH]

Much of this is good info - but there are certain inaccuracies and I think the support given to Armenain forces is in fact pretty well known - over & covert (and is ignored by this study/claimed to be debunked...but I don't think so...) . But what is not mentioned is that the majority of Armenian/NK heavy armor, APCs and such was in fact obtained through capture and refurbishment of Azeri (poorly operated) equipment.