Many-mind Theory

[DominO123]

I was wondering what I could post to restart a discussion, so here it comes, I start a thread about the many-minds theory , I have decided to quote from the book: "The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds" by Jeffrey Alan Barrett

 

Any comments?

 

 

pp. 192-197

 

The many-minds theory

 

AL's solution to the mindless-hulk problem is to suppose that every sentient physical system, every observer, is associated with not a single mind but rather a continuous infinity of minds (AL 1988: 206). Each mind is supposed to evolve exactly as described in the single-mind theory; there are just more of them associated with each observer (Albert 1992: 130). Each of an observer's minds evolves independently of his other minds, but in such a way that a mind's own beliefs about its own past mental states are typically reliable. Whenever a measurement is made, some of an observer's minds will become associated with each branch of the wave function that describes the observer as getting a definite result. Since the norm-squared of the coefficient on each term in the determinate-belief expansion of the wave function determines the probabilities for a particular mind being associated with that term, one might naturally take the norm-squared of the coefficient on each term to determine the measure μ of the continuous infinity of an observer's minds associated with that term. And if one believes that another observer reported that he also got x-spin up, for example, there will typically be at least some of that observer's minds which did in fact get x-spin up, and it is these minds that one is talking to. It is as if every hulk has been given a mind; indeed, many.

 

One might think of each of an observer's minds as representing a different perspective or view of the physical world. But while each mind sees a single, determinate, and consistent series of events, the global observer, as a collection of minds, has many mutually incompatible experiences. If an observer begins in an eigenstate of being ready to make an x-spin measurement of a system in an eigenstate of z-spin, all of the observer's minds will end up with determinate beliefs concerning the result of his observation, but not the same determinate beliefs. Here, with probability one, half of the observer's continuous infinity of minds would end up believing that the result was x-spin up and the other half would end up believing that the result was x-spin down.

 

AL describe their many-minds theory as follows:

 

The individual minds, as on the [single-mind theory], are not quantum mechanical systems; they are never in superpositions. This is what is meant by saying that they are non-physical. The time evolution of each of the minds on the [manyminds theory] is, just as on the [single mind theory], probabilistic. However, unlike the [single-mind theory], there are enough minds associated with the brain initially so that minds will end up associated with each of the elements of the final superposition. An infinity of minds is required since a measurement or a sequence of measurements may have an infinite number of outcomes. Furthermore, although the evolution of individual minds is probabilistic, the evolution of the set of minds associated with [a particular observer] is deterministic since the evolution of the measurement process is deterministic and we can read off from the final state the proportions of the minds in various mental states. ( AL 1988: 207)

 

It is important to be clear here about exactly what is evolving in a deterministic way and what sort of supervenience the many-minds theory provides. One might distinguish between at least three types of mental states in the theory. Call the state of one of an observer's minds a local mental state. Local mental states evolve randomly (but in a memory-preserving way) according to the dynamics described by the single-mind theory and do not supervene on observers' physical states. Call the state of all of an observer's minds his complete mental state. This state tells us which minds are in which local states (we are assuming with AL that minds have transtemporal identities). It also evolves randomly as the local mental states of each mind evolves. These states do not supervene on observers' physical states either. Finally, call the measure of an observer's minds associated with each term in the determinate-belief-basis expansion of the wave function the observer's global mental state. It is only the observer's global mental state that one might expect to evolve in a continuous deterministic way and to supervene on his physical state (though it might happen, since the dynamics of each mind is stochastic, that all of an observer's minds jump to a single branch. But events like this would be expected with probability zero).

 

Despite its inherent craziness, AL argue that the many-minds theory has several advantages over other interpretations of Everett and other versions of quantum mechanics generally. First, unlike the bare theory, the many-minds theory is 'in accord with our very deep conviction that mental states never superpose' ( AL 1988: 208). None the less, AL argue that it remains true to Everett's fundamental idea that the timeevolution of the entire universe and every physical system is completely and accurately given by the linear dynamics: 'There is no need to postulate collapses or splits or any other non-quantum mechanical physical phenomena' (208). The reason that physical is emphasized here, of course, is that the many-minds theory supposes the existence of nonphysical entities, the observer's minds, whose local states are not determined by the global quantum-mechanical state, and it is these nonphysical entities that exhibit what one might call nonquantum mechanical behaviour. On the other hand, it seems that Everett really did believe that mental states evolve in a fundamentally different way than physical states. He repeatedly said that, on his formulation of quantum mechanics, while the evolution of the universal quantum-mechanical state is always linear and deterministic, the evolution of subjective appearances is random and probabilistic. The many-minds theory also provides a particularly natural way to make sense of Everett's claim that, at the end of a typical measurement, while in one sense there is only one physical observer, in another sense there are many observers with mutually incompatible experiences: if we count physical systems in the many-minds theory, there is only one observer; but if we count minds, then there are many with mutually incompatible experiences.

 

Another virtue of the many-minds theory is that 'the choice of basis vectors in terms of which the state of the world is expressed has no physical significance' ( AL 1988: 208). AL take this to mean that the many-minds theory avoids the preferred-basis problem. This is not to say that the many-minds theory has no preferred basis-after all, the determinatebelief basis acts as a sort of preferred basis in the theory. While one might say that this basis has no physical significance and that it consequently plays a more modest role than the preferred basis in the splitting-worlds interpretation (it does not, for example, determine once and for all what physical properties are determinate), the determinate-belief basis plays an important empirical and explanatory role in the theory. One must, for example, appeal to the determinate-belief basis in order to specify the transition probabilities for a mind to go from one mental state to another. More generally, without explicitly specifying the preferred basis, the many-minds theory has no explicit mental dynamics. And since the preferred basis is nowhere explicitly specified, one might argue that the many-minds theory is at best incomplete. 6

 

AL also argue that the many-minds theory encounters no special problems in interpreting probability: 'Probabilities are completely objective, although they do not refer to physical events but always to sequences of states of individual minds' ( AL 1988: 208). Since each mind follows a random trajectory with probabilities given by the mental dynamics, one should eventually expect the memories of almost all of an observer's minds, in the norm-squared measure, to exhibit the usual quantum statistics. Further, on the sort of mental dynamics that AL have in mind, probabilities are, as in the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics, the result of fundamental stochastic events.

 

AL also claim that the many-minds theory's dynamical laws can be expressed in a local, Lorentz-covariant form, which means that the manyminds theory meshes well with relativity ( AL 1988: 209-10). What they have in mind here is that since one can read off the global mental state of an observer from the universal wave function, and since the evolution of the wave function can be expressed in a covariant form, so can the global mental dynamics.

 

Finally, AL consider the many-minds theory to have a decided advantage over the single-mind theory because the many-minds theory allows an observer's global mental state to be uniquely fixed by his physical state. As they describe the deal, 'We have purchased supervenience of the mental on the physical at the cost of postulating an infinity of minds associated with each sentient being' ( AL 1988: 207). In the end, however, one might take the price to be too high considering what one gets. 7

 

Consider the type of mental supervenience that the many-minds theory provides. If one wants mental supervenience, one presumably wants the mental state that one is capable of introspecting right now, the mental state that one has epistemic access to, to supervene on one's physical state. I believe that I have a more or less definite mental state characterized by a single set of more or less consistent beliefs. But the many-minds theory tells me that I (global) am associated with an infinite set of minds that most likely have wildly contradictory beliefs and whose mental states I (local) generally cannot know. What comfort is it supposed to give me that my global mental state supervenes on my physical state when I don't even know what my global mental state is? If one wants supervenience, then one presumably wants one's local mental state, the state that determines one's experiences and beliefs and the only state to which one has epistemic access, to supervene on one's physical state. And in the many-minds theory my local mental state does not supervene on my physical state.

 

That each observer is associated with a continuous infinity of minds is at least counter-intuitive. Being counter-intuitive is not a fatal flaw in a theory, but one might eventually decide that associating each observer with an infinity of minds costs more than it's worth. If someone is worried about the mindless-hulk problem, then supposing, without any possibility of empirical support, that every hulk has at least one mind associated with it does not seem to me to be the sort of thing that should resolve the worry. Rather, the many-minds theory has an ad hoc flavour to it. It looks as if minds were added just to give hulks mental states--and they were.

 

The difference between a many-worlds theory (like the many-threads theories at the end of the last chapter) and a many-minds theory (like AL's) is not that great. It really just amounts to a difference in what sort of facts one takes as being determinate. On a many-worlds theory physical records and thus local mental states are determinate, and on a many-minds theory it is only local mental states that are determinate. If one had a successful many-minds theory, then one could always convert it to a many-worlds theory. By doing so, one could solve the mindless-hulk problem and eliminate the mind-body dualism to which AL are committed at the cost of introducing the determinate-belief property as a preferred physical property. A many-minds theory with the completely random mental dynamics that were discussed first would convert to something like Bell's Everett (?) theory but where one considers all possible trajectories and, rather than position always being determinate, it would be belief that is always determinate (belief here is supposed to be the physical property that if determinate would make all observers' beliefs determinate). AL's many-minds theory would convert to a many-worlds theory where the physical property that determines one's beliefs is always determinate and each world evolves independently of the others in a random, but memory-preserving, way similar to the evolution of beliefs predicted by the standard collapse theory.

 

 

 

------

 

6 Like Albert and Loewer, Lockwood's many-minds theory also requires a preferred basis where every observer has determinate beliefs. Each Everett branch then can be described by a product of a determinate-belief state and the corresponding relative state of the composite system containing the observers. Also like Albert and Loewer, Lockwood argues that there is no 'objectively preferred basis': 'For a many minds theorist, the appearance of there being a preferred basis, like the appearance of state vector reduction, is to be regarded as an illusion. And both illusions can be explained by appealing to a theory about the way in which conscious mentality relates to the physical world as unitary quantum mechanics describes it' (1996: 170).

 

7 Again, an observer's global mental state does not necessarily supervene on his physical state. The mental state of each of the observer's minds is a random function of his physical state and independent of the states of his other minds, and his global mental state is determined by the local mental states of all of his minds. Consequently, it could happen, although it would be extraordinarily unlikely, that all of the observer's minds, for example, become associated with a single branch in the determinate-belief expansion of the wave function. I do not take this lack of strict supervenience as a serious problem, but if one is worried about it, one could guarantee strict supervenience by changing the theory. Rather than have each mind evolve randomly, associate one mind with every possible memory-preserving trajectory through an observer's determinate mental states, let it μ* be the product measure on the set of minds generated by the Albert and Loewer measure μ on minds at a time, and take μ* as determining the probability that a local observer will find himself associated with one of the minds (μ* would play the same role in this theory as the measure over trajectories with reliable records in the many-worlds theories discussed earlier). Here the wave function would strictly determine the global mental state of the observer and how it evolves.

[DominO123]

Hey Sasun, I'm waiting your comment.

[Sasun]

OK dude, but first explain me what is the "mindless-hulk problem" that the article is trying to solve

[DominO123]

OK dude, but first explain me what is the "mindless-hulk problem" that the article is trying to solve

Why I knew you would come up with such an answer?

[DominO123]

OK! Here is the explanation, I will use the book because you will claim that as usual you did not understood what I wrote if I were to explain it to you.

 

It refers to the problems brought by the single-mind theory(by excluding the MWT possibility)

 

 

The single-mind theory

 

If one takes the linear dynamics to be universally true, as Everett insisted, then the physical state of an observer and his object system after a measurement will typically be an entangled superposition of the observer having recorded mutually contradictory results, and there will be nothing in the quantum-mechanical state that picks out a single, determinate measurement result. Consequently, if one wants a complete description of the state of affairs to pick out a determinate result, then one must add something to the usual quantum-mechanical state. If one understands the measurement problem as a problem in accounting for the determinate experiences and beliefs of observers, then the most direct way to solve the problem would be to stipulate that observers always have determinate mental states. A complete specification of the state, then, would require one to supplement the usual quantum-mechanical state with a description of the mental states of all observers.

 

The single-mind theory is a sort of hidden-variable theory, but instead of taking positions as always determinate, one takes mental states as always determinate. While in Bohm's theory one might worry that making positions determinate may not ultimately explain our determinate experiences and beliefs, there is no such worry here. By making mental states always determinate, one automatically accounts for the determinateness of our experiences and beliefs (assuming that mental states determine both experiences and beliefs), and if these mental states evolve in the right way, then the theory will be empirically adequate. While one might complain that this solution of the determinate-experience problem is cheap, it is none the less effective.

 

Let M be an observer, and let BM[x](t) represent that M believes x at time t. The single-mind theory requires only a partial correspondence between physical and mental states. It is assumed that there is generally a physical state ψM[x](t) that implies that M believes x at time t, BM[x](t). But it is also an important feature of the theory that BM[x](t) does not necessarily imply that the quantum-mechanical state is ψM[x](t). It is this second feature that allows an observer's physical state to be a complicated superposition of physical states corresponding to mutually contradictory beliefs concerning the outcome of a specific measurement while his mental state is always one where he has a determinate belief corresponding to exactly one element of the superposition. Since ψM[x](t) entails BM[x](t), one might think of this physical state as an eigenstate of belief; in this case, an eigenstate of M believing x. Similarly, one might suppose that it is always possible to represent the universal state as a superposition of states that describe M as having different but determinate beliefs, and that M's mental state is always associated with exactly one of the terms in such an expansion. 2

 

The physical state always evolves in the usual linear way, but in order to have a complete theory, we also need to specify a mental dynamics. Perhaps the simplest mental dynamics would be one like the configuration dynamics in Bell's Everett (?) theory, where the probability of M's current mental state being BM[x](t) is fully determined by the current physical state alone and is always equal to the norm-squared of the component of the universal state that describes M as currently believing x. One might picture the mental state of an observer as randomly jumping from branch to branch of the determinate-belief superposition, paying no heed to where it was last, in such a way that the probability of it being associated with a particular branch is always equal to the norm-squared of the amplitude of that branch. This is the single-mind analogue of the evolution of position in Bell's Everett (?) theory.

 

If M measured the x-spin of a system S initially in an eigenstate of z-spin, then, by the linear dynamics and by what it means to be a good observer, M would end up in a superposition of belief eigenstates corresponding to getting mutually incompatible results:

 

ψM + S(t1) = 1/√2 [ψM[↑]∣↑〉s + ψM[↓]∣↓〉s]. (7.1)

 

Here one component of his physical state describes him as believing that the result was x-spin up and the other describes him as believing that the result was x-spin down. On the single-mind theory, however, M's mental state would end up associated with exactly one term in the post-measurement superposition--in this case, there would be an even chance that M's post-measurement mental state would be BM[↑](t1) and that it would be BM[↓](t1). If M repeats his measurement, then ideally he would end up in the physical state

 

ψM+S(t2) = 1/√2 [ψM[↑, ↑]∣↑〉S + ψM[↓,↓]∣↓〉S]. (7.2)

 

And on the simple mental dynamics described above, there would again be an even chance of getting each result. This means that there is an even chance that M would end up in a mental state where he believes that he got x-spin down as the result of his second measurement even when he in fact got x-spin up as the result of his first measurement. But if M does get a different result for his second measurement, he will falsely 'remember' getting precisely that result for his first measurement: if M ends up believing that he got x-spin down for his second measurement, his mind will also be associated with a branch of the wave function where he believes that he got x-spin down for his first measurement regardless of what he actually got. So even if the mental dynamics is a random function of the observer's current physical state alone and if the observer's memories were consequently unreliable concerning even his own past mental states, the observer would never notice ( Fig. 7.1 ). The linear dynamics, the properties of a good observer, and the relationship between mental states and physical states would conspire to make it impossible for an observer to tell that his experiences were in fact pathologically discontinuous. Indeed, on this dynamics, just as in Bell's Everett (?) theory, an observer would almost always judge that his measurement results exhibited the usual quantum statistics.

 

Also, just as in Bell's Everett (?) theory, the fact that an observer's records of past events would be unreliable makes it difficult to say how the observer could have any empirical justification for accepting any dynamical law, even the single-mind theory's dynamics, if this version of the single-mind theory were true. In order to avoid the problem of empirical coherence, one might want to specify a mental dynamics where the current mental state is a function of both the current quantum-mechanical state and past mental states. While they do not provide a complete mental dynamics, Albert and Loewer want their dynamics to have this property of reliability. 3 What they in fact use is a mental dynamics that mimics the empirical predictions of the standard collapse theory in so far as this is possible. The intuition is that a mind sticks with a branch in the determinate-belief decomposition of the global state until a measurement occurs in that branch. The mind is then assigned to a new branch just as if the physical state really was described by the branch that it was on and a collapse occurred with the probabilities given by Born's rule. The observer's new mental state will typically be one where his memories are reliable. While this is not a complete mental dynamics, they are sure that one can cook up a dynamics that will make the single-mind theory both empirically coherent and empirically adequate ( Albert 1992: 129).

 

AL do not like their single-mind theory because it does not generally predict that mental states would supervene on physical states since even a complete description of the physical world would fail to determine the mental state of an observer. The physical state ψM+S(t1), for example, is consistent with either BM[↑](t1) or BM[↓](t1). AL describe this type of nonphysicalism as 'especially pernicious', and they tell us that it is this lack of mental supervenience that leads them to consider the many-minds theory ( AL 1988: 206). As Albert put it:

 

the dualism of this sort of picture is . . . pretty bad. On this proposal (for example) all but one of the terms in a superposition [like those above] represent (as it were) mindless hulks; and which one of those terms is not a mindless hulk can't be deduced from the physical state of the world, or from the outcome of any sort of experiment; and it will follow from this proposal that most of the people we take ourselves to have met in our lives have as a matter of fact been such hulks, and not really people (not really animate, that is) at all! (1992: 130)

 

The problem, then, is this: when I make observations and then compare notes with a friend, his mind and my mind will each be associated with some term in the determinate-belief expansion of the global state, but not necessarily the same term. Suppose that my friend (F) and I (M) both make perfect x-spin measurements and end up in the physical state

 

ψM+S(t2) = 1/√2 [ψM[↑]ψF[↑]∣↑〉S + ψM[↓]ψF[↓]∣↓〉S]. (7.3)

 

Suppose, however, and this is entirely possible given the mental dynamics that AL describe, that my mental state ends up associated with the first term in the superposition and I get x-spin up, and that my friend's mental state ends up associated with the second term and he gets x-spin down. Since the mental dynamics is supposed to be memory-preserving, in so far as is possible, when I ask my friend what he got as the result of his x-spin measurement, my mental state will end up associated with a branch where I still believe that I got x-spin up, but because of the correlation between my physical state and my friend's, this will also be a mental state where I believe that he told me that he also got x-spin up. I might conclude, from what I heard, that my friend believes that he got x-spin up, but this would be false. While I am getting what I take to be perfectly clear answers to my questions, these answers have nothing at all to do with the actual mental state of my friend, and I am consequently not talking with my friend at all. To the extent that I am talking with anyone, I am talking with a mindless hulk. And my friend will find himself in a similar situation ( Fig 7.2 ). Indeed, while observers might believe that they talk with each other routinely, since the physical state does not do much to constrain the mental state of an observer and since observers fail to have direct epistemic access to each other's mental states, it would typically be impossible to figure out what anyone else actually believes. So while the single-mind theory can account for each observer's experiences in an empirically adequate way, it makes real communication between observers impossible and thus describes a sad and lonely world, unless one takes comfort in the company of mindless hulks.

 

One solution to the mindless-hulk problem would be to change the mental dynamics so that all minds end up associated with the same branch of the wave function (written in the determinate-belief basis). The idea here is that since the time-evolution of my mental state already depends on my past mental states to provide for reliable memories, one might as well have it also depend on other observers' mental states to provide for genuine communication between observers. When I get x-spin up, then all other observers become associated with the branch that determines the outcome of my observation ( Fig. 7.3 ).

 

This solves the mindless-hulk problem, but on this modified singlemind theory the result of my measurements might instantaneously determine the outcome of measurements made by a distant observer (in an EPR experiment, for example, where one thinks of each observer's mind as having the same location as his body). Note that this is not the case on AL's mental dynamics since on their dynamics each mind evolves independently of all other minds. In an EPR experiment, on AL's mental dynamics, each observer would end up believing that his results and his friend's results were statistically correlated in such a way as to violate the Bell inequalities, but they would as a matter of fact not know what the other observer's results were. What each thought the other said his results were would be determined by the term that their own mind ended up associated with, and since we know from the bare theory that most terms, in the norm-squared measure, will exhibit the usual EPR correlations, and since this measure represents the probability of an observer's mind ending up associated with each term, with high probability an observer's mind will eventually be associated with a term that exhibits the usual EPR correlations. 4

 

While one might not like the nonlocality (more specifically, the lack of Lorentz-covariance) of the modified mental dynamics where the evolution of each mind depends on the current state of other minds Oust as the evolution of a particle's position depends on the positions of other particles in Bohm's theory), when compared with other options for solving the mindless-hulk problem, it may not seem so bad. 5

 

 

 

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2 This explanation of the determinacy of experience requires one to adopt a theory of mind where an observer's mental state is well-defined at an instant. Matthew Donald ( 1996) has argued that such an assumption is implausible. It seems to me, however, that if one was willing to go along with Everett's dispositional account of mental states initially, then one should be willing to go along with the assumption that a mental state is well-defined at an instant (since dispositions are well-defined at an instant). If one wants an account of mental states in terms of mental processes, then more work needs to be done, but the problem does not seem to me to be insurmountable. First, instead of the determinate-belief basis, one might try choosing the preferred basis to be whatever basis makes a mental process determinate, then show that the mental dynamics generates sequences of process states that can be identified with the observer having a determinate mental state.

 

3 See Albert ( 1992: 126-9) and Loewer ( 1996). I shall discuss this second paper later in this chapter.

 

4 There is a close relationship between the AL single-mind theory and the bare theory. Since the probability of a mind being associated with a particular term on AL's mental dynamics is equal to the norm-squared of the coefficient on that term and since the bare theory's general limiting property tells us that as the number of experiments gets large almost all of the terms, in the norm-squared measure, in the determinate-belief expansion of the state describe situations where an observer's results exhibit the usual quantum statistics (including the joint and conditional statistics and the statistical correlations with other observers' results), an observer on the single-mind theory will almost always believe that his own results and the results of his colleagues exhibit the usual quantum statistics. Even though, because he has most likely been talking to mindless hulks, he will not actually know what the results of his colleagues were (because his colleagues' minds are most likely associated with other terms in the determinate-belief expansion).

 

5 Lockwood raises a nonlocality objection to the proposal of solving the mindless-hulk problem by fiat: 'The possibility of actually meeting mindless hulks can perhaps be ruled out by fiat. For one could stipulate that the stochastic evolution takes place under the constraint that living bodies, as they manifest themselves within a single Everett branch, are required either all to be ensouled, or all to be mindless hulks. That, however, would call for a nonlocal coordination of the various mind evolutions, and thus undercut what is one of the major motivations for adopting a no collapse, no hidden variables view, in the first place' (1996: 175).

 

6 Like Albert and Loewer, Lockwood's many-minds theory also requires a preferred basis where every observer has determinate beliefs. Each Everett branch then can be described by a product of a determinate-belief state and the corresponding relative state of the composite system containing the observers. Also like Albert and Loewer, Lockwood argues that there is no 'objectively preferred basis': 'For a many minds theorist, the appearance of there being a preferred basis, like the appearance of state vector reduction, is to be regarded as an illusion. And both illusions can be explained by appealing to a theory about the way in which conscious mentality relates to the physical world as unitary quantum mechanics describes it' (1996: 170).

 

7 Again, an observer's global mental state does not necessarily supervene on his physical state. The mental state of each of the observer's minds is a random function of his physical state and independent of the states of his other minds, and his global mental state is determined by the local mental states of all of his minds. Consequently, it could happen, although it would be extraordinarily unlikely, that all of the observer's minds, for example, become associated with a single branch in the determinate-belief expansion of the wave function. I do not take this lack of strict supervenience as a serious problem, but if one is worried about it, one could guarantee strict supervenience by changing the theory. Rather than have each mind evolve randomly, associate one mind with every possible memory-preserving trajectory through an observer's determinate mental states, let it μ* be the product measure on the set of minds generated by the Albert and Loewer measure μ on minds at a time, and take μ* as determining the probability that a local observer will find himself associated with one of the minds (μ* would play the same role in this theory as the measure over trajectories with reliable records in the many-worlds theories discussed earlier). Here the wave function would strictly determine the global mental state of the observer and how it evolves.

Edited March 25, 2004 by Fadix

[DominO123]

BTW Sasun, even if you might not believe me, my theory was NOT plagiated from that book.

[Sasun]

BTW Sasun, even if you might not believe me, my theory was NOT plagiated from that book. 

OK Domino jan, this time I promise I will read both of the articles, but I am busy right now.

What theory of yours are you referring to?

 

P.S. This shouldn't encourage you to post more lengthy articles though

[DominO123]

OK Domino jan, this time I promise I will read both of the articles, but I am busy right now.

What theory of yours are you referring to?

My Belief theory of course... living in the Universe you believe in... the multiple mind theory proposes just that if we extrapolate from it.

[DominO123]

BTW, take your time Sasun.

 

I would as well want to know TB and Sip opinion about it... is it not nice?

[Sasun]

Eh Domino, it looks like I haven't kicked your butt in a long time, as a result you are bringing such articles (I wish there was an icon for butt-kicking)

 

I tried to read them but without much success, I have to admit it is really late and I am sleepy so I didn't make much effort. But maybe you could help me....

 

Here is a challenge for you Domino boy, explain in 4-5 short, correctly spelled and clear English sentences each of the following.

 

1) Single mind theory

2) Many-mind theory

3) How multi-world theory is related to many-mind theory

 

You can't use any formulas or make references to the articles that I didn't understand, or any other such articles. Each of your failures will earn me more butt-kicking coupons

[hyebruin]

yes! Domino please do explain briefly what each means "in your own words" as they say in school!

 

i find this thread very interesting....but those articles are soooo long...i'lll try and read them

[Sasun]

Domino, you see there is more interest in you theories now, and that from ladies

[hyebruin]

well, they're not "his" theories! and i've always been interested and intirigued by some of the theories Domino posts.... i've been a "lurker" you can say! reading silently!!

 

seriously though these theories are bigger than all of us put together and i'm afraid if you get too caught up in it...it is INEVITABLE!!!! that the physical shall turn into something metaphysical at some point!!! after you're done breaking down atoms and subatomic particles...what are you left with?? probabilities of "matter"/wave patterns spinning and dancing around...and the more you observe them, the more they are changed and shaped by the observer...it becomes meta-physical...it's beyond physics and comprehension (at least at this point in history)

 

science in its absolute purest form is a spiritual experience!

 

shallow minds will be quick to jump and argue otherwise, but if you think about the underlying force that drives the principles of physics and chemistry and biology and all the complex biochemical reactions in the human body and in other living things you can't help but be awestruck by the beauty and the pattern that exists in all things...everything from the mating habits of bees to the wonderous molecular properties of water to the mysterious cognitive functions of the brain and the senses....i can go on and on...

 

one example that illustrates this principle is the Ph.D. degree...ever wonder why it is called that? doctor of PHILOSOPHY? because at the highest level of any discipline that's all that you can do! you can "philosophize" so to say... you have all these theories and probabilities (backed up by statistics) and anyone who knows anything about statistics knows that nothing is absolute! and there's always a certain amount of chance or uncertainty in studies and findings...THUS!! all we're left with are theories that are 'highly probable' or 'highly improbable'... and also the 'what if's' that lead to more questions for research and study...life is one big learning experience

[Sasun]

science in its absolute purest form is a spiritual experience!

I agree with this statement

[DominO123]

Hmmm... OK!!! Will see how I will explain that, but in 4 lines I think it is impossible.

[Sasun]

Hmmm... OK!!! Will see how I will explain that, but in 4 lines I think it is impossible.

Domino, not 4 lines, but 4-5 sentences. Each sentence could be up to 3 lines. So you see you got 15 lines there dude