shaunt Posted November 29, 2010 Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/tag/AM_0.html Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted November 29, 2010 Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 will it be good idea ? to copy them ?? just in case it will be deleted soon.. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
shaunt Posted November 29, 2010 Author Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 will it be good idea ? to copy them ?? just in case it will be deleted soon.. Definitely. And there is much more in the Turkey files regarding Armenia. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted November 29, 2010 Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 just look at this yerevan and Ankara are in top 10 http://public.tableausoftware.com/views/Cablesbyorigin/CablesbyOrigin Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted November 29, 2010 Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 http://www.google.com/search?q=site:cablegate.wikileaks.org+&sourceid=navclient-ff&rlz=1B3GGLL_enUS386US386&ie=UTF-8&hl=#sclient=psy&hl=en&rlz=1B3GGLL_enUS386US386&source=hp&q=site:cablegate.wikileaks.org+armenia&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=&pbx=1&fp=573da4ec7e15bdf2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted November 29, 2010 Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 http://cablegate.wik...0ANKARA302.html C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TUSUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S SINIRLIOGLU REF: ANKARA 263 Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. © Summary: During February 18 "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu: -- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process; -- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM Malaki; -- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist PKK; -- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus reunification talks, and; -- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile defense. End Summary. IRAN ---- ¶2. © Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course. Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international community's unity and determination. "We'll keep the door open to engagement," he stressed. A visibly disheartened Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a growing threat: "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus." ARMENIA ------- ¶3. © Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate" his government's domestic political calculations regarding ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover. Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied ANKARA 00000302 002 OF 005 Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling of the protocols: "He doesn't trust us." IRAQ ---- ¶4. © Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending "to get out of control." "He is preoccupied with his political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued, the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also "throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia dominance there. "We want a free, transparent and fair election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the sectarian divide." ¶5. © After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500 million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several Iraqi communities together into a common project. The creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more important for its politically unifying effect than its economic impact. ¶6. © Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I Commanding General Odierno's recent visit. He hoped for the early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leadership harboring in northern Iraq: "We want the KRG to understand that working with us is important." ISRAEL ------ ¶7. © Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with Israel. Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral, but general." He attributed increasing regional country frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process, especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals. He contended the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will recover." Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good." He noted the MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting between the two prime ministers on the margins of an international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks, "which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008 military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can make an important contribution to the Peace Process. ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005 SYRIA ----- ¶8. © Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. He said a shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for their unlikely alliance. "Now, their interests are diverging." Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and further isolate Iran. EU, CYPRUS and GREECE --------------------- ¶9. © Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: "A wider audience is watching this." ¶10. © He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency regarding the island's reunification talks: EU "membership makes them invulnerable." Greek Cypriots, he said, want the world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in ¶2004. They pretend relations between the island's two communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty, it's been an international issue for 50 years. Talat's cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react. Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island's Turkish community would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC "president" in April. He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations. ¶11. © Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running disputes. He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute financial crisis. Based on Papandreou's response, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with Greece soon. AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA ------------------------------- ¶12. © Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with praise for Turkey's military, training and development contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to focus on three Afghan challenges: "the marriage of Wahhabism and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of 5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU's criticism of Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. "We would like the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership. He urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation with the EU on security issues through NATO. ¶13. © Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems. He said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed, Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake. He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate enthusiasm. ¶14. © Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari, remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior officers' patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive player. ¶15. © Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan. Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau. BOSNIA ------ ¶16. © Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end, Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian "genocide." The United States and Turkey have "agreed to disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans." BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO ---------------------------------- ¶17. © Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country's relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009 POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed to be done, Ildem said. ¶18. © Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the ANKARA 00000302 005 OF 005 POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit was selected. "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and Merkel." Ildem complained high-level positions should be part of NATO reform: "We missed an opportunity with the selection of the Assistant Secretary General." Sinirlioglu added: "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we trusted you." MISSILE DEFENSE --------------- ¶19. © Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we hope to have more conversations on missile defense bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council. Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be highlighted to justify PAA. ¶20. (U) Participants: Turkey Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International Security Affairs Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence and Security Affairs Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the Americas Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas United States Undersecretary William Burns Ambassador James Jeffrey Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow Bridget Brink, NSC Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor Tamir Waser, P Staff Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker ¶21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable. Jeffrey "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey" Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted November 29, 2010 Report Share Posted November 29, 2010 S E C R E T ANKARA 000126 SIPDIS FOR BACKGROUND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR TU AF PK IR IZ IS AMSUBJECT: SECRETARY GATES' TURKEY BILATERAL VISIT: SCENESETTER Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (a,b,d) ¶1. (S) PM Erdogan welcomed President Obama's reiteration of support to the fight against the PKK during the December 7 meeting in the Oval Office, but the Secretary should expect questions about how we will operationalize that commitment as plans to withdraw from Iraq move forward. A key issue will be how to reduce the gap between the time when the U.S. is no longer able to provide ISR support and when we will be able to help Turkey acquire its own capability. On missile defense, we will look for the Secretary's help in advancing our work with Turkey to persuade the Turks to allow a key radar system to be based here. The Turks are struggling to define what they will need in terms of NATO political cover to lessen the high cost - both in terms of domestic politics and in relations with Iran - that Erdogan's government believes it will have to pay should they agree. ¶2. (S) Although our agenda with Turkey is broad and complex, the following issues are likely to come up during the Secretary's trip: "Need To Raise" ---------------- - Our commitment to continue sharing real-time intelligence to support Turkey's counter-PKK fight, but caution that the process for Turkey to acquire an armed UAV system from the U.S. will be long and complex. (para 3-5, 14) - The need for a NATO BMD system with Turkey's participation and the Iranian threat against NATO interests. (para 6-9) - Appreciation for Turkey's efforts on Afghanistan/Pakistan, particularly for its new commitments to training security forces. (para 10-11) - Appreciation for support to OIF/OEF through Turkey's territory, including the Incirlik Cargo Hub; easing transit of non-lethal mil cargo shipments from Iraq to Afghanistan. (para 12) - Our advocacy support for Raytheon and Sikorsky on sales of air defense systems and utility helicopters (para 13). "Be Ready To Respond On" ------------------------ - Pressure for direct U.S. milops against the PKK (paras 5) - Turkish requests for 24/7 Predator coverage of the Turkey-Iraq border to counter PKK operations and activities (para 5). - Turkish requests for immediate delivery of AH-1W helicopters (para 15) Counter - PKK Operations: Still Turkey's Top Priority --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶3. © Turkey's counter-terrorist efforts against the PKK have evolved in the past year and have expanded beyond military action alone. Although the government's renamed National Unity Project (initially called the "Kurdish Opening") was not fully developed when launched and appears to be moving slowly, the government has increased social and economic support to ethnic Kurds in southeast Turkey, dramatically broadened the rights of Kurds to use their own language, and increased educational opportunities as well. It is post's view that the military success against the PKK, supported by our intelligence-sharing operation, has given the civilians the political space to explore this opening and to deal directly with Masoud Barzani and other Iraqi Kurds. Turkish military operations against the PKK continue, however, and on October 6, 2009 Parliament extended the government's mandate to conduct cross-border operations against the PKK in Iraq for another year. Turkey's leaders have learned from us and from their own experience that only a whole-of-government approach will succeed against the PKK insurgency. ¶4. © Our November 2007 decision to share operational intelligence was a turning point for the bilateral relationship, and President Obama's declaration before the Turkish Parliament in April 2009 and during his oval office meeting with Erdogan in December 2009 of our continuing commitment to support Turkey's fight against the PKK were warmly welcomed. Our cooperation has helped to improve the bilateral relationship across the board, particularly by making it difficult for PKK terrorists to use northern Iraq as a safe haven. We can never reiterate enough our continuing committment, as President Obama did effectively with PM Erdogan in December. ¶5. © Nevertheless, Turkish causalities are still occurring. Turkey still looks for more support, and will press us for more concrete action before the U.S. completes its withdrawal from Iraq. CHOD Basbug will likely repeat the GOT's request for laser-designation of targets and/or direct U.S. operations against the PKK. In December, PM Erdogan also asked POTUS for 24-hour Predator coverage. At present we provide approximately 12-hour coverage, with an occasional surge to 24 hours to support specific Turkish operations, such as against High Value Targets. A move to 24-hour coverage is not easy due to resources requirements elsewhere; however, we may be able to provide a few weeks of 24-hour coverage during crucial spring months, and are working with TGS to determine exactly where and when it would be most useful to do so, and what assets the Turkish military would employ if additional UAV support is made available. Missile Defense ---------------- ¶6. (S) The Turks asked us to postpone a return visit from Ellen Tauscher, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, as they are still considering how best to respond to our request to base an AN/TPY-2 and (potentially) other MD assets in Turkey. While some of the Turks' technical questions remain unanswered, the key questions are now political. During his meeting with President Obama, PM Erdogan said that such a system must be implemented in a NATO context to diminish the political cost that his government will likely bear, both in terms of domestic politics and in Turkey's relations with Iran. The ball is now in the court of the civilian leaders here to determine just "how much NATO" will be enough for them politically; NATOs inability to fund an "interim capability" makes it harder for us to show parallel development of a NATO BMD system with PAA. Erdogan is concerned that Turkey's participation might later give Israel protection from an Iranian counter-strike. ¶7. (S) We have made the point to the Turks that a decision to not base the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey is essentially a decision to opt out of missile defense coverage for Turkey; this would not be a political consequence, but just a fact based on physics and geometry. It is important to make this point again (gently) with PM Erdogan, but also underscore that we value Turkey's participation and will try to "NATOize" the system, if Turkey will tell us how much NATO would be enough. ¶8. (S) Behind all this, we fear, is a manifestation of both the Turkish government's, and to some degree the Turkish public's, growing distancing from the Atlanticist world view now that most dangers for Turkey are gone. While Turks are not naive about Iran (see below), MD places them in a pickle, forcing them to choose between the U.S./West and a Middle East "vocation" - which, while not necessarily includes coddling Iran, requires palpable space between Turkey and "the West." Iran ---- ¶9. (S) Turkey understands and partially shares U.S. and international concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions, but is hesitant to use harsh language in public statements, in part due to its dependence on Iran as an energy supplier and as a trade route to Central Asian markets. It has worked quietly with us to prevent some proliferation-sensitive shipments to and from Iran. Turkey's top civilian and military officials may have come to the conclusion that a military strike against Iran would be more harmful for Turkey's interests than Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capability; they believe international pressure against Iran only helps to strengthen Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. PM Erdogan himself is a particularly vocal skeptic of the U.S. position. However, Turkey did press Iran (albeit quietly) to accept the P5 plus 1 Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) offer and FM Davutoglu had been personally engaged in trying to rescue the TRR deal, which would have removed a significant portion of Iran's lowly-enriched uranium stockpile. As a current member of the UNSC, the Turks would be very hesitant to support sanctions against Iran. We need nevertheless to encourage PM Erdogan to support UN actions if Iran does not comply with Iran's international obligations while underscoring that we view Iran's program as a serious threat to NATO interests in Europe and would like to see a non-military solution (including Turkish participation in NATO BMD). Afghanistan/Pakistan ---------------------- ¶10. (SBU) Turkey has been a dedicated partner in Afghanistan. It has commanded ISAF twice since its inception and again took command of RC-Capital in November. Turkey leads PRT Wardak and plans to open a second PRT in Jawzjan (also covering Sar-e-Pol) in mid-2010. Turkey has sponsored the "Ankara Process" dialogue, one of several efforts to encourage constructive communications between Kabul and Islamabad, and is a leading participant in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. It hosted a trilateral summit on January 25 and a Afghanistan Regional Summit (including all of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors as well as select other countries including the U.S.) on January 26, just prior to the January 28 London Conference on Afghanistan. ¶11. © Turkey pledged significant aid to both countries: USD 200 million to Afghanistan and USD 100 million to Pakistan, as well as USD 1.5 million to the ANA. There are 1750 Turkish troops in Afghanistan, and Turkey has four OMLTs currently in Kabul and, since December, pledged two more OMLTs and one POMLT. Because of its culture, history and religious orientation, as well as Foreign Minister Davutoglu's strategic ambition, Turkey is well disposed to act as an agent of the international community's goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010, Turkey has pledged to offer 6-8 week trainings for up to a brigade's worth of Afghan military and police personnel in Turkey and will establish a training center in Kabul capable of training up to 600 ANSA personnel at a time. Retrograde through Turkey ------------------------- ¶12. (S) Turkey's agreement to allow us to use its territory, facilities and airspace has been essential to our ability to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We now look to expand current capabilities to transit materiel from Iraq to join up with the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan. CENTCOM logisticians, working with us and our EUCOM Office of Defense Cooperation, seek to take advantage of improved commercial ties between Turkey and Iraq to move non-lethal equipment across Turkey to join the NDN. We are working to expand our current retrograde agreements to minimize the time and bureaucracy involved, and to expand permissions to allow non-lethal military equipment, including armored transport vehicles. Advocacy for U.S. Defense Industry ---------------------------------- ¶13. © We much appreciate SecDef's help in advocating for U.S. firms competing for key projects in Turkey, and hope he can raise both Sikorsky's and Raytheon's cases in person. Sikorsky's "International Blackhawk" proposal holds remarkable benefits. This deal represents a new level of industrial partnership; Sikorsky guarantees that it would build in Turkey - for sale outside of Turkey - one Blackhawk for each one the GOT builds and buys for itself; this is a boon of hundreds of millions of dollars for the Turkish economy. On Air Defense, Raytheon's PAC-3 is competing in a tender for Turkey's air defense. Raytheon also seeks to take advantage of Turkish industry's ability to co-produce complex systems with us and would produce systems for sale in the UAE and elsewhere. The benefit to Turkey's economy from such co-production would likely exceed USD 1 billion. Technically and operationally, there is no system which can compete with the PAC-3, but Turkey's Defense Ministry seeks to broaden competition to include lower-cost options from Russia and even from European producers. Raytheon often asks us to remind the Turks that a decision on requests for support on Missile Defense should not necessarily affect a decision on PAC-3. UAV's, Attack Helicopters, and Intel Surge ------------------------------------------ ¶14. © Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own ISR capability to replace the US assets currently being used in anti-PKK operations. President Obama told PM Erdogan in December that we support Turkey's request to acquire armed Reaper UAVs. Nevertheless, approval for armed Reapers is complicated due to Hill concerns. We have explained this to the Turks. However, even if those could be overcome, the delivery pipeline for these systems is long, and Turkey's leaders have sought reassurance that we will not pull our intelligence support until they can replace it. While we are working to enhance Turkey's ISR capabilities, we have not made this commitment to date. ¶15. © Bad GOT procurement decisions led Turkey to a severe shortage of dual engine, high altitude attack helicopters, which it desperately needs to fight the PKK. PM Erdogan raised this issue with the President in December 2009; SecDef should expect this issue to be a top priority in meetings with Minister Gonul and with GEN Basbug. The Turks took SecDef's May 2009 letter to provide up to four AH-1W helicopters each in 2011, 2012 and 2013 as a firm commitment, and now have asked us to advance that date to 2010. They do not accept our explanation that these aircraft are simply not available from our inventory, as they believe they have -- just like the U.S. -- "troops in contact" and need the close tactical support. While SecDef should make no commitment, we should also explore whether we can persuade Taiwan to sell or lease some of its own AH-1W aircraft now that Taiwan is taking delivery of Apaches. Support For The US-Turkey-Iraq "Tripartite Security Dialogue" --------------------------------------------- ---------------- ¶16. (S) SecDef's visit will take place just as USFI's GEN Odierno will have left. We expect that GEN Odierno's visit will give a political boost to the U.S.-Turkey-Iraq Tripartite Security talks. Turkey's civilian leaders are taking heat from their domestic political opposition for pressing the "Kurdish Opening" while casualties from PKK attacks continue. They hope to use GEN Odierno's visit to show that their whole-of-government approach against PKK insurgency is producing results and that it has the support of senior USG officials in Iraq. ¶17. (S) Trilateral meetings continue regularly and a new Tripartite operational office in Erbil, established to share counter-PKK intelligence was established over the summer. The most recent tri-lat meeting took place in Baghdad in December, followed by a joint Turkey-Iraq visit in Erbil. The Turks remain frustrated that, in their view, the KRG is not doing enough to combat the PKK. The Turks remain shy in sharing intelligence data; they are not convinced that they can trust Iraqi/Kurdish individuals to keep information concerning operations secret. Turkish officials have become more strident in their calls for KRG officials to take action against the PKK. The cooperation that does exist is a step in the right direction; however, it will need to improve significantly prior to the U.S. pullout of Iraq. CHOD Basbug and PM Ergodan want the U.S. to put more pressure on the Iraqis - and particularly Masoud Barzani - to take actions to cut PKK supply and logistics lines in northern Iraq. We should stress the need for more trust and collaboration between Turkey and Iraq, eventually on Turkish CBOs. Absent greater cooperation, we could see significant bilateral problems post-2011, to include Iraqi claims of Turkey's violation of its sovereign territory. Northern Iraq -------------- ¶18. © Turkey will not consider any alternative to the political unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, but has become more flexible on how it engages "the local authorities of northern Iraq" (how Turkey refers officially to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)). Turkey's policy remains focused on the government in Baghdad, but its outreach to the KRG is expanding. This outreach is reinforced by the continued dominance of Turkish products and investments in the KRG's healthy economy. Armenia ------- ¶19. (S) The signing of the Protocols to reestablish Turkish-Armenian relations and open the common border in Zurich on October 10 was a landmark for the region. However, neither Turkey nor Armenia have taken steps toward ratification; the GOT argues that progress toward withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani provinces surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh is a pre-condition. (Note: This was not/not part of the agreement, and not a position the U.S. supports. End note.) Future relations will nevertheless still be heavily linked to the 1915 "Armenian genocide" issue. Any U.S. determination of the events of 1915 as "genocide" would set off a political firestorm in Turkey, and the effect on our bilateral relationship -- including political, military, and commercial aspects -- would be devastating. Israel ------ ¶20. © While the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish General Staff agree with us that a strong Turkey-Israel relationship is essential for regional stability, PM Erdogan has sought to shore up his domestic right flank through continued populist rhetoric against Israel and its December 2008 Gaza operation. His outburst at Davos and the last-minute cancellation of Israel's participation in the Fall 2009 Anatolian Eagle Exercise (a multilateral Air Force exercise which had US, Turkey, Italy, and Israel as planned participants) were the most noticeable examples of this rhetoric, which we and his staff have sought to contain. The latest incident, a snub in early January of the Turkish Ambassador by Israeli Deputy Foreign Minster Danny Ayalon, almost caused the GOT to both recall its Ambassador and cancel the visit of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. However, the very public row was resolved with an Israeli apology and Barak's visit on January 17 helped to stem the downward spiral for now. Nevertheless, we assess that Erdogan is likely to continue anti-Israel remarks and the issues will continue to cast a shadow on the TU-IS bilateral relationship. Political Environment --------------------- ¶21. © PM Erdogan's Islamist-leaning Justice and Development (AK) Party remains Turkey's strongest political party, but its poll numbers are slumping, and it continues to fear an erosion of its political base from more conservative/Islamist parties. Civilian-military relations remain complex. Chief of Staff General Basbug has worked out a modus vivendi with PM Erdogan, but the long-running struggle between Turkey's secularists (with the Army as its champion) and Islamists (represented by the government) naturally puts them at odds. Erdogan has the clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug has seemingly learned to live. Alleged past military involvement in coup contingency planning or even deliberate generation of internal chaos remains political theme number one and preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their respective underlings. Public trust in the military is starting to decline, the result of several very public on-going investigations into the alleged planning against the government. Jeffrey Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted December 2, 2010 Report Share Posted December 2, 2010 WikiLeaks-ը դե՞մ, թե՞ հանուն Ամերիկայի [ 2010/12/02 | 14:24 ] հասարակություն, քաղաքականություն Ինգա Մարտինյանhttp://hetq.am/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/wikileaks_1.12.10.jpgWikiLeaks կայքի հրապարակած ԱՄՆ պետքարտուղարության գաղտնի փաստաթղթերը քաղաքագետ Երվանդ Բոզոյանը համեմատում է սեպտեմբերի 11-ին ԱՄՆ-ում տեղի ունեցած ահաբեկչական գործողությունների հետ եւ ասում, որ դա ակնհայտ ԱՄՆ-ի ներկա վարչակազմի դեմ ուղղված քայլ էր: Ի տարբերություն սեպտեմբրի 11-ի, երբ եղան զոհեր, այս պարագայում մարդկային զոհեր չկային, և դժվար թե հնարավոր լինի, որ Օբաման կամ Քլինթոնը կարողանան կոնսոլիդացնել հասարակությանը այս ակտի հանդեպ: «Օբամայի վարչակազմի հեղինակությունը անկում կապրի ոչ միայն աշխարհում, այլեւ ԱՄՆ-ում, անընդհատ կհիշեցնեն, որ հենց նրա օրոք դա տեղի ունեցավ»,- ասաց քաղաքագետը: Ե. Բոզոյանի խոսքերով` սա Միացյալ Նահանգների վարկանիշին հասցված մեծ վնաս էր, և այս քայլով գործող վարչակազմը հսկայական բարոյական վնաս է ստացել, ինչը կարտացոլվի նաեւ դիվանագիտական ճակատում: «Երբ աշխարհում լինում է մեկ գերտերություն, դա աշխարհին դուր չի գալիս, գերտերություն լինելը մեծ պատասխնատվություն է, երկիրը պետք է կարողանա այն մինչեւ վերջ տանել»,- ասաց քաղաքագետը: Տեղեկատվական անվտանգության մասնագետ Տիգրան Քոչարյանն այլ կարծիքի է: Նա նշում է, որ WikiLeaks-ում հրապարակվածը ԱՄՆ-ի վարկանիշին չի «խփում», քանի որ այն, ինչ հրապարկվեց, բոլորը գիտեին. «Այն տարբերակը, որ դա կարող էր կազմակերպել Ամերիկան, հնարավոր է եւ տրամաբանական: Այն, ինչ գտնվում է ԱՄն-ի շահերի ոլորտում, տեղադրվում է: 607 փաստաթուղթ է տեղադրվել, եւ դեռեւս չկա մի փաստաթուղթ, որը կհարվածի ԱՄՆ-ին»: Նրա խոսքերով` սկսվել է տիպիկ ամերիկյան PR, որով ամբողջ հանրությանը պահում են սպասումների մեջ, քանի որ Ամերիկայի հեղինակությունն ընկնում է, և սա մատ թափ տալու նման է: «Թուրքիային տեղն են դնում, քանի որ Էրդողանին ասում են, որ դու շվեյցարական բանկերում հաշիվներ ունես, մի շարք երկրներին ասում են` խելոք մնացեք: Պարսկաստանի մասին փաստաթղթերը հսկայական թիվ են կազմում: Խորացնում են Մեդվեդև-Պուտին տարբերությունը: Մեզ դա ձեռք է տալիս: Քանի դեռ մեր մասին բան չի հրապարկվել, կարելի է ասել` խեղճացել են: Էրդողանի, Ալիեւի մասին ահագին նյութ կա, Ադրբեջանի մասին ինֆորմացիան շատ շահեկան էր հենց Աստանայից առաջ»,- ասում է Տիգրան Քոչարյանը: Նրա խոսքերով` ինչքան ուշ սկսեն փաստաթղթերը երեւալ, դրանով կհաստատվի որ այդ փաստաթղթերը կեղծված են, ավելի ճիշտ կլիներ, որ հրապարակվեին բոլորը, իսկ օրական 50-100 փաստաթուղթ տեղադրելով` տպավորություն կստեղծվի, որ մանիպուլյացիայի են ենթարկում հանրային կարծիքը: Տեղեկատվական անվտանգության մասնագետը չի ժխտում, որ հնարավոր է հրապարակվելիք փաստաթղթերի մեջ լինեն նաեւ Հայասատնի, ինչպես նար հայ օիլգարխների մասին տեղեկություններ: Ավելին, եթե Հայաստանը շատ մերձենա Իրանի հետ և դեմ գնա Ամերիկայի շահերին, ապա մի փոքր փաստաթուղթ նախ կհրապարկեն` որպես զգուշացում: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted December 2, 2010 Report Share Posted December 2, 2010 Wikileaks, the Georgian War and Javakhk [ 2010/11/30 | 12:59 ] society politicsAccording to confidential reports made by the U.S. Embassy in Georgia, August 2008, the war between Georgia and Russia was first started by Moscow. The reports were part of the massive Wikileaks dump of the other day and were reprinted in the Financial newspaper based in Tbilisi. The reports also noted that the Millennium Challenge Grant financed highway between Tbilisi and Samtakhe-Javakhk was used to ferry out refugees, foreigners and diplomats from the war zone. One of the reports also deals with details of the relations between RA Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandian and the Georgian foreign Minister. On August 15, Georgian FM Tkeshelashvili refused to meet with Nalbandian when his plane made a transit stop in Yerevan. The foreign minister later stated that he had been directed to immediately return to Georgia. In another report, the Armenian Ambassador urged Georgian officials to widely publicize that the Russian Air sorties striking inside Georgia have not emanated from Russian air bases in Armenia. Another report deals with shipments being held up from entering Armenia: “Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibjanian — acting on behalf of the vacationing foreign minister — urgently called in Charge d’Affaires first thing the morning of August 11 to solicit assistance in freeing cargo shipments which he said Georgian authorities were holding up. He said that some 30 railroad cars of grain, diesel fuel, and kerosene (jet fuel), were being held up by Georgian officials at the Georgian-Armenian border crossing point of Sadakhlo-Bagratashen, and an unspecified volume of cargo was likewise being held up at or near the port of Poti. The implication was that Georgian authorities were at least considering commandeering these kinds of critical staple goods for Georgian national needs during the crisis. Gharabjanian asked for U.S. help in persuading Georgian authorities to allow Armenian-bound shipments to pass freely onward to Armenia. Armenian authorities are quite concerned about meeting their own critical food and fuel needs in the event of a protracted crisis in Georgia, given that a majority of Armenia’s food and fuel consumption is imported via Georgia. Gharibjanian noted that Armenia could face serious shortages, especially in diesel fuel, jet fuel, natural gas, grain, and sugar. He noted that natural gas imports via the Russia-Georgia-Armenia natural gas pipeline have already been interrupted (see paragraph 4), and Armenia is functioning off of its stored natural gas reserves. (NOTE: Post has learned from prior natural gas supply scares that Armenia’s reserve storage capacity contains sufficient gas to supply Armenia’s normal consumption for anywhere from three to six weeks, depending on season. Post is checking with local experts to obtain updated estimates, based on how close to capacity the Armenian reserves were when the current crisis started and current consumption estimates.” Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
MosJan Posted December 2, 2010 Report Share Posted December 2, 2010 WikiLeaks: Washington and Ankara Scramble for Cover [ 2010/11/29 | 14:00 ] Feature Stories politicsBy Minas Kaynakjian Revelations of U.S. duplicity hold lessons for Armenians One of the biggest news stories to hit the pages of the international press during the past week was about the pending WikiLeaks disclosure of U.S. “classified” documents that has prompted the State Department into a damage control frenzy mode. Of particular importance to Armenians are those documents dealing with foreign policy issues involving Washinton and Ankara. Armenians need to take note. Those in the know state that this next round of potentially embarrassing leaks will dwarf the amount of material WikiLeaks disclosed in July regarding the war in Afghanistan (70,000 reports) and in October regarding the Iraq war (400,000). Of special importance to Armenians is the fact that the London-based daily al-Hayat has reported that the soon to be released files show that Turkey has assisted al-Qaeda in Iraq and that the United States, in turn, has helped the PKK, a Kurdish rebel group that has been waging armed struggle against successive Ankara governments. Politics makes strange bedfellows seems to be the order of the day if these allegations prove to be correct. Let’s put all of this into some context. The U.S. State department has classified the Kurdish Workers’ Party as a “terrorist” organization. The same goes for al-Qaeda. These pre-leaks have gotten the major players to cry foul and issue all the traditional denials. Deborah Guido, a spokeswoman for the U.S. embassy in Turkey, has told Hurriyet that Washington “has never been nor will ever be in support of the PKK. Anything that implies otherwise is nonsense.” Over the years, the U.S. has been sending military, technical and intelligence assistance to Ankara, purportedly to be used against PKK operations in Turkey. The question now is – has it all been a ploy? For its part, here’s some reaction from Ankara: “Turkey has never given support to any terrorist organization. Fighting against terror is our priority and we don’t make differentiations between terrorist organizations. Turkey has launched many operations against al-Qaeda,” a Turkish Foreign Ministry official told Hurriyet. And, in an attempt to downplay any allegations that the U.S. has been covertly aiding Ankara’s nemesis, the PKK, the same Turkish official noted that, “Turkey and the U.S. are carrying out an efficient cooperation in the fight against the PKK.” Mutual denial from both Washington and Ankara. Did you expect anything else? Despite all the talk about transparent government as a prime building block of democratic rule, it seems that all nations have little and big secrets they’d rather hide from their respective publics. Regardless of how this next round of WikiLeaks disclosures pans out, are their some lessons that we Armenians can cull? I can suggest the following points for further discussion. * The role of the USAID and other United States backed or supported agencies engaged in democracy development and civic society building in “transitional” societies like Armenia. Such agencies and their programs abound in Armenia and we seem to take their “sincerity” and “non-alignment” at face value. Do they have ulterior political motives? If so, to what extent should they be trusted? * To what extent has the present Armenian regime been co-opted by Washington? Is there a tacit agreement between Washing and Yerevan in which the United States will turn a blind eye towards human rights violations in Armenia in lieu of unnamed political and strategic favors? * Has the Armenian opposition grossly miscalculated the sincerity of various European and American initiatives in fostering democratic reform in Armenia? * Are the efforts of Armenian lobbying groups in the diaspora directed at successive U.S. administrations regarding Genocide recognition misdirected, given that Washington can never be trusted? A final note on official “leaks” and transparent government operation: Here in Armenia, there has been a near total official lock-down of information regarding the recent rash of deadly incidents in the RA and Artsakh military that have lead to the deaths of soldiers. Yerevan, just like Washington and Ankara, raise the spectre of threats to national security as an argument against public disclosure of such “classified” information. In reality, do such “national security” concerns outweigh the public’s rights to know the truth of what their governments are doing in their name? Can we afford to be as disingenuous and duplicitous when it comes to the lives of Armenian citizens? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Aratta-Kingdom Posted August 25, 2011 Report Share Posted August 25, 2011 Something about/in this report doesn't look right. It reads "-- Armenia has no preconditions to establishing relations and opening borders. All bilateral problems and issues, including Genocide, can be discussed once relations are established." If that is true, inchi Bryzan ambogj or anckacrec Yerevanum u porcec pressuri mijocov protocolneri storagrman@ masnakcen? Vorn er patjar@ haykakan koghmi vra jnshum banecnelu? ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ WikiLeaks publishes Armenian president’s letter to Premier Erdogan August 25, 2011 | 14:30 WikiLeaks published a cable of U.S. Embassy in Yerevan containing the letter of the then president Robert Kocharyan to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Armenian News-NEWS.am posts the full text. “Dear Prime Minister, I’ in receipt of your letter. Indeed, as two neighbors, we both must work to find ways to live together in harmony. That is why, from the first day, we have extended our hand to you to establish relations, open the border, and thus start a dialogue between the two countries and two peoples. There are neighboring countries, particularly on the European continent, who have had a difficult past, about which they differ. However, that has not stopped them from having open borders, normal relations, diplomatic ties, representatives in each other’ capitals, even as they continue to discuss that which divides them. Your suggestion to address the past cannot be effective if it deflects from addressing the present and the future. In order to engage in a useful dialog, we need to create the appropriate and conducive political environment. It is the responsibility of governments to develop bilateral relations and we do not have the right to delegate that responsibility to historians. That is why we have proposed and propose again that, without pre-conditions, we establish normal relations between our two countries. In that context, an intergovernmental commission can meet to discuss any and all outstanding issues between our two nations, with the aim of resolving them and coming to an understanding. Sincerely, Robert Kocharyan” The following is the text of the MFA non-paper (original in English) that accompanied the above diplomatic note: -- The content of the letter President Kocharyan received from Prime Minister Erdogan is not new. The call for historians to discuss the ‘events of 1915’ is a call that has been made by every single Turkish administration each time they are confronted with strong signs of international interest and attention to the Genocide and issues having to do with recognition. -- This is the first time that this kind of proposal has been presented in writing, from the highest level. Therefore, President Kocharyan has responded to Prime Minister Erdogan, even though we have serious concerns about their seriousness and sincerity. -- Our concerns are caused by several factors: -- First, the letter appeared in the Turkish press before it arrived in Yerevan; -- Second, it was immediately distributed in the US Congress with the clear implication that the process of ‘rapprochement’ and ‘reconciliation’ are underway and that any US action (such as a Congressional resolution) are unnecessary; -- Third, the Turkish penal code still penalizes citizens for using the term ‘genocide’ in the Armenian context. Indeed, two current court cases against writer Orhan Pamuk and publisher Ragip Zaraoklu are still pending. -- Fourth, the Turkish Parliament held hearings in mid-April on the Armenian issue and issued a statement not only confirming their own revisionist efforts, but also blatantly calling on third countries (such as the UK) to revisit, review and revise their own archives. -- Nevertheless, President Kocharyan’s letter reiterated the Armenian position: Armenia is ready to discuss any issue, at the intergovernmental level. The ideal way to do that would be to have diplomatic relations. Even if that is not immediately achievable, there can still be some normalcy in relations, open borders, easy communication and travel between our two countries and our representatives. -- Armenia has no preconditions to establishing relations and opening borders. All bilateral problems and issues, including Genocide, can be discussed once relations are established. -- Turkey uses three different excuses to explain their maintaining closed borders. One is Armenia’s insistence on Genocide recognition. (Armenia’s response is that genocide recognition and remembrance is a moral issue that cannot be dropped, but Armenia does not make such recognition or remembrance a precondition to relations.) -- The second excuse is that Armenians have not reaffirmed Turkey’s territorial integrity. (Armenia’s response is that the Kars treaty which defines the current border between Armenia and Turkey has neither been revoked nor renounced. Further, since independence, no Armenian official has made any territorial claims of Turkey.) -- The third excuse is the still unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. (Armenia’s response is that this is a problem with a third country, and is unrelated to our bilateral relations.) -- We fervently hope that Prime Minister Erdogan will respond positively to President Kocharyan’s proposal to normalize relations, so that we can address the most complicated problems. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Harut Posted August 26, 2011 Report Share Posted August 26, 2011 Something about/in this report doesn't look right. It reads "-- Armenia has no preconditions to establishing relations and opening borders. All bilateral problems and issues, including Genocide, can be discussed once relations are established." If that is true, inchi Bryzan ambogj or anckacrec Yerevanum u porcec pressuri mijocov protocolneri storagrman@ masnakcen? Vorn er patjar@ haykakan koghmi vra jnshum banecnelu? ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ this has always been official yerevan's stance, with the exception of the genocide being a "discussion point"... Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Aratta-Kingdom Posted August 29, 2011 Report Share Posted August 29, 2011 What Armenian Catholicos Wrote to US President Barack Obama http://www.epress.am/en/2011/08/29/what-armenian-catholicos-wrote-to-us-president-barack-obama.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+EpressNewsEN+%28Epress.am+News%29 In Dec. 2009, His Holiness Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, sent a letter to the US Ambassador to Armenia addressed to US President Barack Obama regarding the issues concerning ethnic and religious minorities in the Republic of Georgia, according to a Wikileaks cable released Aug. 26, 2011. In the letter, His Holiness Karekin II states that he wishes to bring to Obama’s attention the “unacceptable situation” regarding the status of religious minorities in Georgia, noting that the situation has worsened since the collapse of the Soviet Union. “As head of the Armenian Church, our unfortunate experience over the past two decades leads us to conclude that nothing in the religious sphere within Georgia has changed for the better since the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, religious life in the Republic of Georgia today “except within the Georgian Orthodox Church” is more restricted, repressed and intolerant for ethnic and religious minorities. “After numerous years of effort and countless unsuccessful attempts to work with the Georgian government and the Georgian Orthodox Church to regulate the Armenian Church diocese and communities in Georgia, we are forced to formally bring to your attention the unresolved issues regarding: 1) the lack of legal status for religious minorities in Georgia; and 2) the Georgian government’s refusal to return church buildings and church properties. We require your decisive assistance to compel the Georgian authorities to live up to their international obligations, among which are the fostering of an environment where all Christian churches, as well as religious organizations of other faiths, can operate normally and have their human rights respected and protected,” the letter reads. The Armenian Catholicos then cites an example of an Armenian church in Georgia that collapsed due to neglect. “The most recent example of the Georgian government’s indifference and wanton neglect resulted in the collapse two weeks ago of the historic St. Gevork of Mughni Armenian Church (built in 1356) in Tbilisi, Georgia; which is the second church we have lost in this manner. This has caused great indignation among our people and Church.” His Holiness Karekin II ends the letter by expressing hope that the US government “will implement the necessary steps to positively affect this unacceptable situation.” Note, in Jul. 2011, the Georgian parliament approved amendments to the Civil Code that conferred legal status to religious groups in the country. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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