PROTOCOLS

[Z'areh]

OK, ladies and gentlemen. Since a new Genocide resolution has been introduced in US Senate, the Turkish ambassador has expressed his "regrets", where is the Armenian ambassador in the US, what does he have to say? Where is the Armenian foreign ministry, what does it have to say? Where is the Sarkisian? Wasn't he the one who "guarantied" that in no way does the Protocol question the reality of the A.G.? When do you think official Yerevan is going to say something about the Senate resolution? as was the case before, Oskanian, and/or the President's office always supported such initiatives.

 

OK, President Sarkisian, put your money where your mouth is, and let's hear those supportive words?

 

 

I"m all ears !!!!!!!

 

Oh, by the way, listen to Al Jazeera's interview with Davutoglu, to hear how he expects any historical sub-commission to agree with his views on this issue.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Boghos]

The interview with Davitoglou is interesting but what he says is totally predictable, no?

As expected Armeno-turco relations are conditional on settling the Karabagh issue. Are there better alternatives to the one being currently pursued?

[Z'areh]

The interview with Davitoglou is interesting but what he says is totally predictable, no?

As expected Armeno-turco relations are conditional on settling the Karabagh issue. Are there better alternatives to the one being currently pursued?

 

 

What Davutoglu says is indeed predictable, but every passing day he seems to be saying more, and more. More important than that is what the Armenian Foreign Minister is not saying.........Where is he by the way?

 

It is official now, the Protocols are conditioned by the satisfactory resolution of Karabagh conflict. I need not remind you what "satisfactory" means. It is also official that any success on discussions on A.G. will be determined by the Turkish side. Here also I need not remind you what "success" means, and how Turkey is going to direct those "discussions".

 

So are there alternatives? What alternatives are being sought here. Alternatives between what and what? Are we talking about opening borders at all coast? If that is the case then Artsakh is finished, so then let's not beat around the bush and declare it officially. If it isn't, then yes there are alternatives, and one of them is quite simple: demand the opening of the illegally closed borders, period.

 

Such a clear and "uncompromising" demand on our part would not have been so punishing after-all, because it is becoming clear every day that the borders will not be opened anyway.

 

So, Boghos, what alternatives are you talking about?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Boghos]

Was there any chance that establishing relations with Turkey wouldn't be conditional on resolving the Karabagh question? I really doubt it and expressed such concept previously. Most articles against the protocols state that Armenia is giving up everything and getting nothing in return. I fail to see the evidence of such hysterical claims. Were the Armenian authorities to answer every single typical nationalist Turkish statement they would do nothing but that. Mind you, I am no supporter of the current government to put it mildly. I think and have said so several times that they are a disgrace, but that doesn't mean that dealing with Turkey and Azerbaijan is not desirable. It is. I remain convinced that good thing will come out of these protocols. One is mistaken in the belief that these negotiations were done between Sargsyan and the Turks but I will rest here and wait for the facts to unfold. The other mistake is to believe that the current status of Karabagh and the relations with Turkey make any sense. They don't. We cannot play 3 monkeys here. Edited October 28, 2009 by Boghos

[Z'areh]

Was there any chance that establishing relations with Turkey wouldn't be conditional on resolving the Karabagh question? I really doubt it and expressed such concept previously. Most articles against the protocols state that Armenia is giving up everything and getting nothing in return. I fail to see the evidence of such hysterical claims. Were the Armenian authorities to answer every single typical nationalist Turkish statement they would do nothing but that. Mind you, I am no supporter of the current government to put it mildly. I think and have said so several times that they are a disgrace, but that doesn't mean that dealing with Turkey and Azerbaijan is not desirable. It is. I remain convinced that good thing will come out of these protocols. One is mistaken in the belief that these negotiations were done between Sargsyan and the Turks but I will rest here and wait for the facts to unfold. The other mistake is to believe that the current status of Karabagh and the relations with Turkey make any sense. They don't. We cannot play 3 monkeys here.

 

Do you mean conditional on resolving the Karabagh question "properly" ?

 

 

The current status of Karabagh and relations with Turkey makes no sense, I cannot disagree. However, the whole existence of Armenia is a fluke, and makes no sense either, we should have been wiped out long ago. Alone in Twentieth century twice, within 30 years, we came to the brink. One was 1915 and the other 1945 post-WWII Stalin policy of revoking ASSR status into two autonomous Republics to have been divided between Georgia and Azerbaijan. The population in Armenia had fallen below 1 million and in Stalin's view this made the SSR status of Armenia dysfunctional. Only through Mikoyan's and numerous then-Soviet Armenian officials' quick actions literally saved the nation, by invoking repatriation. I say this because nothing about Armenia is a straight-forward line or has been an easy nation building process.

 

I also dislike playing three monkeys, but you ask if there were any chances that relations with Turkey wouldn't be conditional on resolving Karabagh question. My short answer is Yes, I believe the relations with Turkey could be achieved without Karabagh. I can expand if you want. As I can expand on the issue of Genocide. To me, both are national security issues and a defeat in any one of these two is a total defeat for Armenia that threatens her existence, again! This is not a "sensationalistic" statement, just the reality of who we are and who our neighbors are. I would change my opinion had Armenia been located today between Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

 

Danger looms only when there is incompetence in leadership and their inapt actions usually end in disaster, instead of calling it the way it is we tend to blame "outside" forces, or on higher Superpowers with their games. It is only despotic leadership, who represent only themselves and their immediate surroundings, that fall prey to these games and turn themselves into toys, willy-nilly.

 

Sarkissian and company: a true case in point.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited October 28, 2009 by Z'areh

[Boghos]

Do you mean conditional on resolving the Karabagh question "properly" ?

 

 

The current status of Karabagh and relations with Turkey makes no sense, I cannot disagree. However, the whole existence of Armenia is a fluke, and makes no sense either, we should have been wiped out long ago. Alone in Twentieth century twice, within 30 years, we came to the brink. One was 1915 and the other 1945 post-WWII Stalin policy of revoking ASSR status into two autonomous Republics to have been divided between Georgia and Azerbaijan. The population in Armenia had fallen below 1 million and in Stalin's view this made the SSR status of Armenia dysfunctional. Only through Mikoyan's and numerous then-Soviet Armenian officials' quick actions literally saved the nation, by invoking repatriation. I say this because nothing about Armenia is a straight-forward line or has been an easy nation building process.

 

I also dislike playing three monkeys, but you ask if there were any chances that relations with Turkey wouldn't be conditional on resolving Karabagh question. My short answer is Yes, I believe the relations with Turkey could be achieved without Karabagh. I can expand if you want. As I can expand on the issue of Genocide. To me, both are national security issues and a defeat in any one of these two is a total defeat for Armenia that threatens her existence, again! This is not a "sensationalistic" statement, just the reality of who we are and who our neighbors are. I would change my opinion had Armenia been located today between Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

 

Danger looms only when there is incompetence in leadership and their inapt actions usually end in disaster, instead of calling it the way it is we tend to blame "outside" forces, or on higher Superpowers with their games. It is only despotic leadership, who represent only themselves and their immediate surroundings, that fall prey to these games and turn themselves into toys, willy-nilly.

 

Sarkissian and company: a true case in point.

 

 

Dear Zareh,

 

Thanks for a most interesting and enlightened answer. I think you make several important points. I completely agree with what you seem to suggest: if we had a really capable and savvy leadership we could get a much better deal. But we don't. On the other hand international conditions allow for some kind of resolution. You also point to geographic determinism, I agree, and that's why in part I think that a deal is a positive because now we have the guarantors of such process in place. This may not be the case in the future. I see it as a window and you see it as door trap. It is probably a bit of both. It is quite unfortunate that Armenia cannot benefit from it small state status as it is usually the case. Two of its neighbors are intent on simply destroying it, that is essentially the question.

 

I would very much like you to expand on Turkey and the Genocide issues. Thank you again.

 

[Em]

http://hetq.am/en/politics/20043/

 

 

The Current Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Serious Flaws Abound

 

 

By Professor Vahakn Dadrian

 

There are three elements in the new Turkish initiative calling for attention:

 

1. The protocol on establishing diplomatic relations stipulate"commitment…for the principles of…territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers." It also requires "the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law." In other words the stipulation is based on the latter part of the paragraph whose basis is a misconstrued, if not faulty, interpretation of a definition of what it calls "relevant treaties of international law."

 

The fact is, however, that "international law" was seriously encroached upon by the signing of these "relevant treaties." Involved are here: 1. The Treaty of Moscow, signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921 between RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) on the one hand, and (Kemalist) Turkey, on the other. The other, no. 2, the Treaty of Kars, was signed some seven months later, i.e., on October 13, 1921, between (Kemalist) Turkey, on the one hand, and the three Soviet Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other, with the participation

of RSFSR. The cardinal fact is that Ankara's Kemalist Turkey, the signatory of these twin Treaties, at that time, was not a legitimate, functioning government; rather, it was a rebel, improvised governmental set-up in contest with a then legitimately functioning government in Istanbul, then the official capital of the Empire, and ruled by a

legitimate Sultan.

 

Consistent with this fact, in a series of governmental as well as court-martial decisions, this legitimate authority on May 24, 1920, issued a death verdict against Mustafa Kemal (Takyimi Vekay-i no.3864), and 12 days later, June 6, 1920, six of the latter's cohorts, including Ismet (Inonu), were likewise court-martialed in absentia and were condemned to death. Whether or not Sultan's government was popular, or its policies were deemed prudent or wise at the time, are issues that are irrelevant here. What is paramount and incontestable, however, is the fact that the Sultan was then the sole legitimate and superordinate authority of the Ottoman Empire — in contrast to the rebel character of the Kemalist government. Accordingly, any agreement, convention or treaty signed with such a government is under international law illegitimate, hence invalid.

 

Thus, from the vantage point of "international law," the Treaties of Moscow and Kars are bereft of legality and can, therefore, not be treated as legitimate instruments of negotiations. Moreover, the Moscow Treaty is additionally illegitimate by any standard of international law, for the reason that the RSFSR (Soviet Russia) was then not recognized by any nation-state, it then had almost the same status as the revolutionary, rebellious Kemalist regime. (It was only in 1922 when Germany, as the first nation-state, granted de-jure recognition of the Union at Prapallo). As if these legal deficiencies were not enough, Soviet Armenia, on the insistence of the Ankara government's representatives, was excluded from the negotiations in Moscow thatculminated in the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921, these Turkish representatives had adamantly objected to inclusion in thesenegotiations of any Armenian representative. As a result, the lack of evidence of Armenian participation is one of the most signal features

in the protocols of this Treaty. It should be noted in this connectionthat one of the three Turkish delegates, who prevailed in Moscow for the final drafting of this Treaty, was Colonel, later in the Turkish

Republic, Major-General, Sevket Seyfi (Duzgoreu).

 

One of the foremost organizers of the Armenian Genocide, Seyfi distinguished himself in the task of recruitment, mobilization and deployment in the provinces of Special Organization's killer bands, mostly convicted criminals especially selected and released from the empire's prisons for this task, they played a major role in the implementation of the genocidal scheme. As to the ensuing Treaty of Kars, again it was the leaders of RSFSR, which assumed responsibility for prevailing upon the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics to accommodate the Turks, their feeble efforts of some opposition notwithstanding. That treaty in fact materialized as an extension and reconfirmation of the preceding Moscow Treaty thanks to the exertions of the dominant Bolsheviks. It is painful to point out once more the rather treacherous conduct of a certain Budu Mdivani, a Georgian, serving as a communist mediator between the military defeated agonizing Armenians who had welcomed him, and the arrogant, victorious Turks. Instead of serving the interests of his Russian masters in Moscow, he secretly tried to collude with the Turks, urging Kazim Karabekir, their military commander, not to be satisfied with the Arax River as a new frontier between Armenia and Turkey, but rather to push beyond that river deep into Armenia. (Kazim Karabekir, ISTIKAL Harbimiz, the 1969edition. Istanbul, Turkiye Publishers, p. 952)

 

2. The protocol no. 2 dealing with the theme of "Development of

Relations between Armenian and Turkey" seductively starts as item no. 1

with a promise to "open the common border within 2 months after the

entry into force of this Protocol." Then, under items no. 2 and no. 3

come the two most critical issues preventing the bulk of the Armenian

people from considering reconciliation. Through them, the unrepentant

heirs of the Great Crime of 1915 are once more seeking to railroad the

central issue by way of indirection, covert language and resort to

alluring, seductive techniques. The Armenian government should declare

unequivocally, if not emphatically, that there is nothing to "examine

scientifically" with respect to the matter that covertly but

allegorically is called "the historical records." These records" have

been subjected to criminal investigation by a Turkish military Tribunal

in the pre-Kemalist, postwar Turkey, 1919-1921. Relying on a vast

corpus of authenticated, official Turkish wartime documents, this

Tribunal, demonstrated that these "records" were nothing but a

repository of incontestable evidence of a gigantic crime, a centrally

organized mass murder enacted against the bulk of the Ottoman Empire's

own Armenian citizens. The bill of charges, the key indictment, replete

with specific documentary material that constituted the Tribunal's

evidence-inchief renders the resulting series of Verdicts an

irrevocable evidence of the comprehensive scale of the wartime

extermination. The prosecutors were Turks, the judges were Turks, and

equally, if not most important, most of the witnesses were Turks,

including the high-ranking military officers. Likewise, the

court-martial proceedings were based on Ottoman Turkish domestic penal

laws.

One would think that a government driven by a sense of Justice would

above all tackle these court proceedings in its quest for truth and

justice. But, remarkably, there is not only silence about them, but

complete silence about the disappearance of the respective trial

records following the capture of Istanbul by the Kemalists in the Fall

of 1922. The proposal of enlisting commissions to "study" the problem

and "formulate recommendations," has all the sly elements of purposive

procrastination, of a gimmick to inject uncertainty, ambivalence, and

above all pressure for, ultimate compromise. We see here the use of

standards of a "give and take" culture that often determines the

outcome of such "commissions" and "sub-commissions," presumably

consisting of people knowledgeable about the Ottoman language. Perhaps

the most unusual and, therefore, in a sense, bizarre aspect of this

whole protocol, a feature of decades-long official Turkish posture, is

the idea that, the Turks, identified with the perpetrator camp, would

visit a vis-à-vis those representing the victim of population, and

negotiate as co-equals. Underlying this vagary of sheer power play is

the fact that Turkey, whether officially or unofficially, is still

irrevocably committed to a posture of denial as far as the key element

of the crime is concerned, namely, a state-sponsored and

state-organized mass murder against her Armenian citizens.

Indeed, Articles 300, 309, but especially 301, of Turkey's current

Penal Code, will as long as they are in effect, continue to legitimize

and even extol this posture.

3. Given the track record of the Turkish politicians, the heirs of an

established and centuries-old Ottoman tradition, it is difficult to

resist the temptation to label this entire initiative a clever

stratagem to lure the Armenian government into a trap. There is not

only a scheme of prolongation of the diplomatic traffic in an

atmosphere of continuous uncertainty, as far as a final outcome is

concerned (Abdul Hamid skilfully used this tactic when confronting the

European Powers, which were pressuring him to finally implement the

so-called Armenian Reforms — in Turkish it is called Ovalamak), but

also an underlying design to promptly wrest from the government of

Armenia, a long-cherished concession: the formal recognition of the

existing borders between Armenia and Turkey. Secondly, there is

Turkey's looming goal of joining the European Union. Turkey needs to

preserve the appropriate façade of conciliatoriness that is but

expected of a candidate worthy of becoming an integral part of a

civilized Europe. When reinforced by the possession of significant

strategic assets and the leverage of distinct military power, however,

such facades can prove very functional.

The situation becomes even more enigmatic, if not outright deceptive,

when taking into account the pervasive current linkages between the

republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Knowing the intensity of the

latter's frustrations if not fury, in relation to Armenia, and Turkey's

significant dependence of Azeri oil, not to speak of other kinship

ties, are we to believe that the Turkish Republic earnestly and

honestly is prepared to cement new ties with Armenia that by definition

are bound to hemorrhage its relationship with Azerbaijan?

Even though Armenia is, and for the foreseeable future, will remain,

more or less isolated, and in some respects even economically

handicapped, there is such a thing as the principle of essential

national priorities and, consequently, the eternal need for

circumspection and exigent vigilance.

Professor Dadrian is the director of Genocide research at the Zoryan

Institute.

 

 

[Em]

http://hetq.am/en/po...095/#more-20095

 

Maybe One of the Biggest Blunders in Armenian History

 

Dr. Levon Marashlian

 

Professor of History

Glendale Community College

 

Normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is a natural and necessary goal but the road to that good goal President Serzh Sargsyan has embarked on, with the signing of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols on October 10, will undermine Armenia's long-term national interests, impede efforts to move Turkey closer to recognizing its responsibility, and violate the Diaspora's fundamental right to participate in the formulation of policies involving the legacy of the Armenian Genocide. A careful reading of the Protocols makes it clear that Armenia is being pressured to sacrifice too much, by paying a terribly high price for an open border—and this at a time when Turkey, America, Europe, and Russia need the border opened as much, if not more, than Armenia does.

 

Proponents of the Protocols have been repeating like a broken record that there are no preconditions. "No, and again, no," Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian exclaimed before the National Assembly on October 1. But Nalbandian's spoken words blatantly contradict the printed words in the protocols. If we exclude the possibility that he and other proponents are lying, the only way to understand their weirdly unbelievable denial is to apply the following twisted logic: from the moment one side accepts the other side's preconditions, then we can pretend that they are no longer preconditions—now they are mutually accepted terms of agreement. It's a primitive game. Yet the end result is the same: one side indeed has accepted the other side's preconditions.

 

The Protocols contain at least two major, long-standing Turkish preconditions: establishing a history commission and confirming the 1921 Treaty of Kars. The euphemistic wording in the document fails to camouflage the transparent reality. Insisting that there are no preconditions insults the intelligence of everyone concerned.

 

Precondition: The History Sub-Commission

 

In response to accusations that "we are calling into question the fact of the Armenian Genocide, that we are obstructing the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide," Nalbandian declared: "No, and once again, no." Nalbandian fails to understand that the process put into motion by the Protocols, the mere existence of a history sub-commission to conduct "an impartial and scientific examination of the historical records and archives," and the overall tone of the Protocols, signals to the world that the Armenian government considers it acceptable to help organize and participate in an official study during which the other side will call into question the fact of the Genocide. This signal will be exploited.

 

One of the consequences will be that when independent scholars and Diaspora organizations continue efforts for genocide education and international recognition, their task will become more difficult because the Turkish government and some third parties, some US Congressmen for example, armed with or misled by the impression of progress being made, will have the excuse to say that recognition efforts are not necessary for now, since Armenia and Turkey already are working on resolving the controversy themselves. In diplomacy and public opinion, impression is often more important than reality.

 

Historians and other experts appointed by Yerevan to the sub-commission will want to discuss consequences of the Genocide and will try to rebuff efforts by the "Turkish side" to negate the veracity of the Genocide. And if the sub-commission does fall into the trap of such a debate, the "Armenian side" likely will prevail inside the meeting room. Nevertheless, the process can still be a victory for Turkey outside the room—so long as the process continues—because Turkey's central objective probably is not be to reach a consensus in the sub-commission that it was not a genocide, but simply to muddy the water even more, to hinder the pursuit of international recognition as we near the year 2015. Turkey will try, but may not expect to "win" the academic argument in the sub-commission. And eventually Turkey might suffer a little public relations setback if its insincerity is exposed. Still, Turkey will have succeeded in obstructing, perhaps for years, the increasingly successful momentum generated by decades of dedication, sacrifice, sound scholarship, and public advocacy.

 

The Ottoman government slaughtered and starved the Armenian people to death. Today's Turkish government seeks to stall and "study" the Genocide's history to death.

 

Exploiting the Protocols' process to delay recognition is not something that might happen. It already has happened. This year, all the factors were in place for President Barack Obama to recognize the Genocide. Then the blow came on April 6 in Turkey: "I want to be as encouraging as possible around those negotiations which are moving forward and could bear fruit very quickly very soon. And so as a consequence, what I want to do is not focus on my views right now but focus on the views of the Turkish and the Armenian people. If they can move forward and deal with a difficult and tragic history, then I think the entire world should encourage them."

 

What we now recognize as the Protocols gave President Obama the opportunity to renege on his strong campaign promise. Twisting the knife in deeper, the State Department pressured Yerevan to agree to have the "Roadmap" to the Protocols announced two days before April 24. Widespread outrage was the reaction among Armenians to this cruel humiliation by Washington and the scandalous capitulation in Yerevan.

 

Precondition: Confirming Kars

 

"Personally, I am proceeding to solve problems," President Sargsyan declared in his unpersuasive opening statement to Armenia's political parties on September 17. Then he asked a question: "If we have closed any door for the solution of any problem, I ask you to tell me what door we have closed."

 

The doors the Protocols seem to close are right in front of him. "Confirming the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law" is a pivotal sentence in the protocols. It is obvious how Ankara and most other interested parties will interpret that sentence. Yusuf Kanli wrote in Hurriyet on September 15 that "for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has agreed to recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the Kars treaty, though there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars treaty." Such a "recognition by Armenia is no less than declaring it has no territorial claims from Turkey" and that "it has turned a cold shoulder" on the Diaspora's "land claims from Turkey." Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also said the sentence referred to Kars (and the Treaty of Moscow) when he presented the Protocols to the Grand National Assembly on October 21.

 

Although this will likely become the conventional wisdom, there may be alternative ways to interpret the Protocols' sentence. In his address to the nation before the scheduled signing ceremony in Zurich, President Sargsyan, apparently spurred by the widespread protests in Armenia and the Diaspora, announced for the first time an interpretation that gives the impression that he thinks this door is still cracked open: "The issue of borders between Armenia and Turkey is a question to be solved in line with international law. The protocols do not say any more than this." Did he offer this alternative interpretation because he believes in it, or to lull critics into complacency? In either case, whatever his strategy is, the way he is executing it is dangerously risky.

 

This brings to the fore the question of legitimacy versus possibility. It is safe to say that virtually all Armenians want international and Turkish recognition of the Genocide and believe that claims are historically legitimate, in principle. Some believe, however, that it is wishful thinking to expect anything material from Turkey, especially territory, although recognition is essential and feasible. Some believe the maximum is possible. According to a middle-ground view, it is no longer realistic to expect the maximum Turkey owes, no matter how legitimate the claim, but nevertheless, there are alternative, innovative, creative, flexible, unprecedented compromise options that, under certain circumstances sometime in the future, may be palatable for Ankara in view of certain concurrent dividends for Turkey.

 

Whichever view Armenians may hold, it is a certainty today that the legitimacy of claims is confronted by the appearance of impossibility—yet there are important questions:

 

1) If it is true that receiving something material can never be a possibility, why is that in 2005 the Turkish National Security Council ordered that access to Ottoman land records be restricted because of concern that these documents may become "material for ethnic or political exploitation"? 2) Why is it that one of the first things Turkey did after Armenia gained independence in 1991 was to demand that Yerevan confirm Kars? 3) Why did Turkey want an implicit reference to Kars in these protocols? 4) Why is that Turkey is not satisfied with the routine acknowledgment of the existing border that Armenia already granted when it joined the United Nations? 5) Why is it that Turkey refuses to have normal relations with Armenia while simultaneously allowing for the existence of a territorial dispute collecting cobwebs in an old file cabinet in a dusty back room, like the over 100 members of the UN that have normal relations and open borders even though they still have territorial disputes?

 

It is ironic that Abdullah Gul, Recep Tayip Erdogan, and Ahmet Davutoglu appear to understand the historical legitimacy of Armenian claims more than Serzh Sargsyan, Tigran Sargsyan, and Edward Nalbandian.

 

The closing doors President Sargsyan asked about are the complex possibilities of Armenia securing an equitable degree of justice for the Genocide sometime in the future—admittedly a daunting task. Evidently he does not see these doors because, from a "realistic" perspective, such possibilities do not seem to be in the realm of feasibility. Therefore, since it will never be possible to get an adjustment of the border anyway, he may be thinking, it is better to confirm Kars now, in order to benefit today from an open border.

 

On the other hand, concerning properties, he mentioned in his April 23 Wall Street Journal interview the idea of putting on the table the issue of thousands of "historic Armenian monuments." But it seems he does not see that the door hinged to the territorial issue is hinged to other doors, which are hinged to recognition of the Genocide as well as property claims, including his own stated interest in churches and other cultural treasures.

 

There is reason to believe that the reason behind Turkey's denial is not only national pride and Turkish identity, but also a concern over the possibility (however slight) of material consequences arising out of recognizing one of the greatest crimes against humanity. Confirming Kars can weaken Armenia's negotiating position regarding other (non-territorial) issues that are also vital for the Armenian people.

 

Recognition and Justice are Directly Connected to Armenia's Future

 

Protocol Promoters like to say that although we must never forget the Genocide, we need to focus on Armenia's present and future. Protocol Promoters do not seem to share the belief that securing recognition with restorative justice is directly connected to Armenia's present and future.

 

The Genocide is the pivotal reason why Armenia is in the precarious predicament it is in today. Mismanagement, greed and corruption since 1991 are also reasons of course, but the colossal human, cultural, territorial, and material loss suffered as a result of the Genocide is the main factor. The primary purpose of the deportations and massacres and the invasion of Armenia in 1920 and the imposition of the crushing treaties of Alexandropal, Moscow, and Kars, was to eliminate entirely or to cut the Armenians and Armenia down to unsustainable levels, to reduce the Armenian people to insignificance in the region.

 

The result today is that if Armenia remains constricted by its current resource base, population size, and geopolitical situation, it will remain perilously vulnerable and dependent on foreign aid and remittances from the Diaspora, which probably will not be enough to develop sufficient prosperity to reverse the alarming demographic trend and ensure its national security. An open border may be a net gain for the economy, but will it be enough to produce the degree of prosperity and security to save the country from being independent in name only? All Armenians must hope so, but based on the evidence available today, banking on that hope is a shaky gamble.

 

Without a major augmentation of its preparedness for self-preservation, Armenia can get along for some time with outside support, but its future does not look bright. To overcome this reality which, again, is mainly a consequence of Turkish policies from 1915 to 1923, to increase Armenia's chances of survival as a viable state, it is extremely important to find an equitable solution to the Genocide issue. In any event, even if getting justice is an impossibility, it does not negate the fact that it is a necessity for boosting Armenia's ability to survive with dignity and security.

 

This issue is also related to millions of personally innocent Turks who are unjustly forced by their dishonest government to be burdened by the albatross of a dishonorable denial. The Turkish people deserve from their government a meaningful atonement for the Genocide. A simple apology, however, would be only a hollow halfway measure which would carry with it little sincerity, and would not be in the spirit of true reconciliation, when Turkey's refusal to consider restorative justice maintains the consequences of the crime and perpetuates Armenia's poverty and precarious situation.

 

International Pressure and National Pride

 

President Sargsyan deserves some sympathy for the powerful outside pressure he has been facing. But in response to the diplomatic pressure and interrelated physical dangers, especially Russia's ability to freeze, starve, and otherwise strangle Armenia, was he and Nalbandian (and previous policymakers) armed with the most effective arguments for linking what is good for Armenia with what is good for Russia and other countries?

 

America, Europe, and Russia expect to benefit greatly from an open border—a nice little Armenian carpet they are getting virtually for free, over which they can carry cargo and energy. Turkey especially will benefit, in many ways. Yet Turkey's only real contribution to the deal is to open a border that Turkey itself chose to close in 1993, which Turkey would be required to open anyway, as part of its bid for EU membership. Armenia, meanwhile, is being required to forfeit its potential options in the future for augmenting its ability to survive, its honor and dignity, its ability to claim its right to justice for a catastrophic atrocity that U.S. Army General James Harbord, in 1919, called "this most colossal crime of all ages."

 

With more skillful diplomacy, coordinated with the under-utilized capabilities of the Diaspora, Armenia's negotiators might have been able to leverage their country's position to get a better deal—because at this moment in history, at least for now, Armenia has a monumental moral cause of historic dimensions that is globally respected, and also a piece of real estate that powers in the East and West consider valuable for their own interests.

 

But Armenian governments have failed, starting with Levon Ter Petrosyan, continuing with Robert Kocharyan, and now with Serge Sargsyan (whom I favored over Ter Petrosyan in the 2008 election, not knowing he would move toward Ter Petrosyan's policy regarding Turkey). Yerevan has failed, for example, to develop the most effective arguments in defense of Armenia's national interests in general and toward the Karabakh conflict in particular, while its performance in media and public relations has been mediocre.

 

And now the Armenian people have come to this—the threshold of an ignominious defeat that may be remembered, depended on the outcome, as one of the greatest blunders in all of Armenian history: "By inviting Turkey's President to Armenia and initiating this whole process, my purpose has been to open a window of opportunity for Armenia and Turkey to normalize bilateral relations, to show that the nation that experienced the devastation of Genocide, and the Armenian state, resolute and faithful to its people's pain, has enough strength to be the first to extend a hand and to point out the senselessness of moving against the course of world development." How sad.

 

Imagine a case of two families in the same neighborhood. It would be so demeaning that the leaders of the descendants of the victims of murder, rape, torture, and theft of their family's land, heritage, property, precious heirlooms, and even countless numbers of its children, would want to be "the first to extend a hand" to the leaders of descendants of the murderers, rapists, torturers, kidnapers and thieves who continue to deny their ancestor's crimes, who even claim that the victimized family itself was guilty, who continue living in relative luxury enjoying the fruits of the plundered property, while the victims' descendants still suffer in a little corner of the neighborhood, in relative poverty, and denied access to the best road in the vicinity.

 

And that's not all. As if they did not get enough in the Protocols, Turkish leaders have been adding insult to injury by making not-so-veiled threats that they will not open the border until Armenian forces withdraw from strategically critical regions and until the Karabakh conflict is settled. Yet Sargsyan has been insisting that Karabakh is not a precondition of normalizing relations. In the Wall Street Journal on October 7, Prime Minister Erdogan contradicted Sargsyan, pushing him into an embarrassing position by declaring that "although the Armenians sometimes say this agreement has nothing to do with the Azeris, there is in fact a relationship." Erdogan even intervened in Armenia's internal affairs by advising Armenia's President on how he should relate to his own people: "Armenia should not allow its policies to be taken hostage by the Armenian diaspora."

 

Adding more insult to injury, it was revealed just before the signing ceremony that Davutoglu's after-signing statement included a reference to pre-conditions. This was an overbearing over-reach which was like pouring salt on the open wounds of Armenia's assaulted pride. This brazen, in-your-face poke in Sargsyan's eye was too much even for Armenia's timid government. Nalbandian correctly backed off from signing. During the ensuing three-hour delay, Mrs. Clinton wooed and cajoled Nalbandian into surrendering to a compromise, she took him for a ride in her car to the signing ceremony, where neither side delivered closing remarks.

 

As the ink was drying on the paper, the expressions on the faces made clear who won and who lost. The smiles of satisfaction and grins of glee on the faces of the diplomats standing behind the signing desk showed no sympathy for the discomfort of their poor Armenian colleague—whose face, in stark contrast, appeared to express a mixture of chagrin, stress, sadness, and perhaps anger that he was struggling to suppress. Nalbandyan looked like a beaten man, signing under political duress. Davutoglu's beaming smile, meanwhile, reflected triumphant happiness over the near-maximum success of his government's skillful and pushy diplomacy.

 

And it is to this haughty and unrepentant republican government, successor to the imperial government responsible for the destruction and robbery of the Armenian people, that Armenia's government wanted to be "the first to extend a hand." Instead of "enough strength," Yerevan is showing too much weakness. Yerevan is groveling on the world stage while Ankara is imposing pre-conditions and conditions that are the diplomatic equivalent of raping Armenia again and shoving her government's face into the mud. It's a national disgrace.

 

The Legacy of Today's Policy

 

Armenia's rulers seem determined to go ahead with ratification—like a train speeding down a mountain toward the edge of a cliff. During the negotiations that led Armenia to this historic precipice, if only President Sargsyan had acted more in the spirit of the man I met in happier days in May 1994. Now, after the fateful signing, it will be more difficult to advance the position that, whereas Yerevan has remained true to its long-standing policy of welcoming normal relations and open borders without any preconditions from Armenia's side, Turkey's side is imposing preconditions and conditions that insult the memory of over a million victims of the Genocide, preconditions and conditions that will undermine in the future the independent existence of impoverished little Armenia, and that, consequently, it is Turkey—big, powerful, wealthy—that can afford more flexibility.

 

In the end, Serzh Sargsyan, Edward Nalbandian, Tigran Sargsyan, Artur Baghdasaryan, Heghine Bisharyan, Arsen Ghazarian, Galust Sahakyan, Edward Sharmazanov, Vasgen Manukyan, other members of the National Assembly, and all other Armenians who favor the Protocols, should think of how they will appear in history. Will they be remembered as strong or weak? As smart or foolish? As proud or pathetic? As patriots or profiteers? Will their children and grandchildren be proud or ashamed of their names? The President in particular needs to ask himself what his own legacy will be in 5, 10, 50, or 100 years. Will Serzh Sargsyan be praised by future generations of Armenians, or will he be cursed?

[Arpa]

Who invented the concept of “DAMAGE CONTROL”?

Who invented the adage of “locking the barn door after the horse was stolen”?

WE have been “practicing” both for over a 100 years, no make that 1000 years,. I said “practicing”, a not so idle word. We have not yet mastered the art of either, we are miserably failing in “damage control” and the “barn door” is still wide open. The thieves are still not only stealing our horses, also our esheks.

Now, Mr. Nalbandian is just waking up from a comatose stupor after so many months, trying to “damage control”. Where was he when mehmet was inserting those pre-conditions? What pre-conditions did he insert? Did he read those so called “protocols”? Did he understand them? What language does he speak? Obviously not English and furkish! Aside from the fact that his surname is perso-furkish! Does he speak Armenian??? Has anyone heard him speak Armenian?

The irony here is that we are talking about “opening the borders” and “closing” the barn door.

===

ARMENIAN FM: WHY DID WE SIGN TWO PROTOCOLS IF WE ARE NOT GOING TO RATIFY AND IMPLEMENT THEM?

 

/PanARMENIAN.Net/

02.11.2009 10:54 GMT+04:00

 

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Armenia's foreign minister has rejected Turkish

calls for concessions in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange

for the historic rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara.

 

Speaking to Reuters late on Friday, Edward Nalbandian said negotiations

between Turkey and Armenia were over and both sides were obliged to

move quickly to establish diplomatic relations and open their border

under accords signed this month.

 

"Why did we sign two protocols if we are not going to ratify and

implement them?" Nalbandian, 53, said in an interview in the Armenian

capital, Yerevan.

 

"I think the whole international community is waiting for quick

ratification and implementation and respect for the agreements which

are in the protocols," he said.

 

"If one of the sides will delay and create some obstacles in the

way of ratification and implementation, I think it could bear all

the responsibility for the negative consequences." Nalbandian said

the Armenian-Turkish thaw and the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations were

"two separate processes."

"This is not only the Armenian approach but the approach of the

international community," he said, adding that negotiations between

Turkey and Armenia were over. "Negotiations were finalised at the

beginning of February."

 

Mediators from the United States, Russia and France say they are making

progress towards a peace deal on Nagorno-Karabakh in talks between

Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan and Azerbaijan's Ilham Aliyev.

 

But Nalbandian played down talk of an imminent breakthrough. There

is a "positive dynamic", he said. "But to say that tomorrow or in

one month's time or in a very short period of time we will come to

the agreement, I don't think this is very serious."

Edited November 2, 2009 by Arpa

[MosJan]

 

U.S. SENATE MAJORITY LEADERS CALLS ON CLINTON TO MEET WITH ARMENIAN AMERICAN LEADERS

• 
  Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has formally shared the reservations of the Silver State's Armenian community regarding the dangers of the recently signed Turkey- Armenia Protocols with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA). In an October 30, 2009 letter to ANCA-Nevada activist Razmig Libarian, the Senate leader reported that he had recently written to Secretary Clinton to pass along the concerns of his state's citizens of Armenian heritage, and to encourage her to meet directly with the national leadership of the Armenian American community regarding the state of Turkey-Armenia relations. In his letter to Secretary Clinton, dated October 20, 2009, Senator Reid wrote: "I am sure you are aware that this agreement has raised concerns in the Armenian community inside the United States. I have received many letters from Nevadans who do not support the creation of an international commission to examine the historical record on the genocide and who believe that the agreements are unfair to Armenia. Given the serious nature of the community's concerns, I felt it was important to raise them directly with you. The commission is particularly sensitive to the Armenian-American community since the Armenian genocide has never been recognized by Turkey." Despite the high profile of Armenia-Turkey ties in the Obama-Biden Administration's foreign policy agenda, neither President Obama nor Secretary Clinton has met with the Armenian American community leadership.

[MosJan]

http://www.azatutyun...video/4024.html

 

Հատվածներ Լեւոն Տեր-Պետրոսյանի ելույթից

 

Հայաստանի առաջին նախագահ, ընդդիմադիր ՀԱԿ առաջնորդ Լեւոն Տեր-Պետրոսյանը իր ելույթում նախագահ Սերժ Սարգսյանին կոչ արեց հրաժարվել «օտարներից լեգիտիմություն ստանալու նպատակով» հայ–թուրքական հարաբերություններում անհարկի զիջումներից:

[Z'areh]

US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon: “It will be difficult for the Turkish parliament to ratify the protocols signed with Armenia unless there is improvement in Nagorno Karabakh conflict,”

 

 

I think with this comment the only thing left for our dilettante president and his amateur foreign minister is to resign and new elections held. Instead, what we'll hear from these two stooges and their cohorts is insistence that "there is nothing about Artsakh in these protocols"

 

These people are not nation-leaders they are mammonist myemoons.

 

 

 

,

Edited November 14, 2009 by Z'areh

[Yervant1]

ALONG THE BEATEN TRACKS OF AZERBAIJANI MASS MEDIA OR HOW MILLIYET MISQUOTED PHILLIP GORDON

 

ArmInfo

2009-11-16 16:09:00

 

ArmInfo. Philip H. Gordon, assistant secretary of state for Europe

and Eurasian affairs, who was on an official visit to Ankara to

organize the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to Washington

in early December, voiced a statement regarding normalization of the

Armenian-Turkish relations and the Karabakh conflict.

 

Turkish Hurriyet Daily and Today's Zaman reported that Gordon

reiterated the official stance of Washington on the given issues

which was repeatedly voiced also by the US Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton.

 

The above Turkish newspapers reported Phil Gordon as saying that the

signing of the Protocols "really is a historic process and from which

both sides could benefit immensely." "We don't link the two issues

because we think that they are both, that Turkey-Armenia normalization

is important and a good thing in its own right. It shouldn't be linked

to anything else and we also support Nagorno-Karabakh settlement

because we think it would benefit both parties and it doesn't need to

be linked to anything else. So we are actively working as co-chairs

of the Minsk group on the Nagorno-Karabakh solution, regardless of

anything else: So for the same reason we want to promote reconciliation

between Turkey and Armenia we want to promote it between Armenian

and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, to be engaged from that process

and it's difficult if it wasn't then it wouldn't be stuck where it

is for so long."

 

However, the Turkish Milliyet has probably resolved to follow the

beaten tracks of Azerbaijani Mass Media for some reasons known only to

it. In joy of Azerbaijani mass media, Milliyet distorted the statements

by the American official. Thus, Milliyet reported Gordon as saying

that "approval of the recently signed Turkey-Armenia agreement on

normalizing ties in the Turkish parliament is complicated without

progress in settling the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Upper

(Nagorno) Garabagh."

 

It is not worthy to say that Azerbaijani mass media, in advance of

each other, have disseminated just this last option of Gorgon's words,

which they undoubtedly liked more. It is obvious that Azerbaijani

journalists did not strive to understand how much these words meet

reality, and could the functionary of such a high level make such

statements, which have nothing in common either with the officially

voiced position of Washington or Gordon's statements voiced earlier,

including during the press- conference in Yerevan, in June of the

current year. He said that there should be no pre-condition in the

matter of normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations. It is a

separate process and should not be linked to any process including

settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict. The Armenian-Turkish

relations should be established within the reasonable terms, he said.

 

The American Embassy in Armenia gave Arminfo full version of Gordon's

words regarding the issues that interest us. To note, Gordon watched

the Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh processes separately.

 

Here is the excerpt from US Embassy Transcript: A/S Phil Gordon: That's

another important set of issues. Let me take them up separately. On

Turkey-Armenia we are very pleased that the countries reached

this historic agreement on Oct. 10th. Signing the two protocols on

normalization of relations and development of relations.

 

This really is a historic process and from which both sides could

benefit immensely. We applaud the courage and vision of the leaders

on both sides. We know this wasn't easy. There is lot of opposition

in Turkey, there is lot opposition in Armenia and yet the leaders

were insightful enough and bold enough to make the case that this is

in their interest and go and sign the protocols. We supported that

process and we applaud their agreement to do so. We would like to

see it move forward. The protocols have been referred to Parliaments

for ratification and obviously they need to be ratified before they

are implemented. If they can be ratified and implemented then this

can lead to open borders, more trade, prosperity and peace among

neighbors. So, that's why we are so strong, we are supportive of this

process. Now, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue you raised, you are right to

say that Turkish leaders have said that they see the prospects for

ratification dim unless there is progress in Nagorno-Karabakh. We

don't link the two issues because we think that they are both,

that Turkey-Armenia normalization is important and a good thing

in its own right. It shouldn't be linked to anything else and we

also support Nagorno- Karabakh settlement because we think it would

benefit both parties and it doesn't need to be linked to anything

else. So we are actively working as co-chairs of the Minsk group on

the Nagorno-Karabakh solution, regardless of anything else. It would

benefit both sides -- that's a conflict that led to many thousands

of deaths and displaced persons and current tension and closed borders.

 

So for the same reason we want to promote reconciliation between Turkey

and Armenia we want to promote it between Armenian and Azerbaijan and

Nagorno-Karabakh, to be engaged from that process and it's difficult if

it wasn't then it wouldn't be stuck where it is for so long. But they

are too, the leaders are talking to each other. In any negotiation

people drive hard bargains, but we think that the reality that both

sides would benefit from a settlement gives us some optimism that a

settlement can be reached and that would really be historic progress

for the region if both of those things could move forward in the

near future.

 

The above excerpt shows that the American diplomat made no radical

statement that was not voiced by official Washington before.

 

Disseminating unverified reports is the work style of both Azerbaijan

and some Turkish mass media. So, one should not be surprised at such

lack of competence.

[Z'areh]

When any high-level American official utters the words "solutions will benefit both sides" and then says "they are not linked" it is like one statement canceling the other.

As much as Azeri or Turkish media distort official's words to serve their own purpose, the Armenian media seem to pretend to be blind on double-talk. They see one part of a statement, but are hopelessly unable to read between the lines, better yet unable to "hear" what is NOT being said by such high level American official. I did not hear Philip Gordon condemn the words of either Davutoglu nor Erdogan who, on a daily basis refer to the ratification of the protocols on conditions of Armenian capitulation on Artsakh. The only comment he could muster up was: "yes I know they say that". That's it.

 

We can scream as loud as we want saying "There is no link between the two in the protocols", but when linkage is put forward by Turkish top officials, they take the form of official government position. Just let's remind ourselves how much importance we give to US presidents for them just to utter the words "Armenian" and "Genocide" together in a sentence during a speech. Why? because it takes the form of official stance, but we willy-nilly brush aside the words of Erdogan or Davutoglu and the President, Gul. How much higher do you want to go to hear "official" statements for Armenians or the US to react?

 

I do not trust American official's stance in this issue and to me there is a lot of double-talk. But I do agree that Azeri/Turkish media have put "extra" words in Gordon's mouth. Why then Armenian media such as News.am, Panorama.am, Panarmenian.net and other media they all report it as a fact?

Edited November 17, 2009 by Z'areh

[MosJan]

Հայաստանի երկրորդ նախագահ Ռոբերտ Քոչարյանը հեգնանքով է արձագանքել անցած շաբաթ ընդդիմադիր Հայ ազգային կոնգրեսի ակտիվի ժողովում իր քաղաքական հակառակորդի` Հայաստանի առաջին նախագահ, ընդդիմության առաջնորդ Լեւոն Տեր-Պետրոսյանի հնչեցրած մեղադրանքներին:

 

Քոչարյանը, ով նախագահի լիազորությունները վայր դնելուց ի վեր հազվադեպ է հանդես գալիս հրապարակային ելույթներով եւ մեկնաբանություններով, «Մեդիամաքս» գործակալությանը հղած հայտարարությունում, մասնավորապես, ասել է. - «Տեր-Պետրոսյանի մենտորությունն ու ինքնասիրահարվածությունը ծանր տպավորություն է թողնում»:

 

Նոյեմբերի 11-ի իր ելույթում Լեւոն Տեր-Պետրոսյանը «անտեղի» էր համարել Սերժ Սարգսյանի դեմ ուղղված «հայդատական քննադատությունը»` հայտարարելով, որ հիշյալ ուժերի կողմից Հայաստանի այժմյան նախագահին վերագրվող սխալ քայլերը` Թուրքիայի նկատմամբ տարածքային նկրտումներից հրաժարումը, Հայոց ցեղասպանության հարցով պատմաբանների հանձնաժողով ստեղծելու առաջարկին համաձայնություն տալը եւ հայ-ադրբեջանական բանակցություններից Ղարաբաղի դուրս մղումը, կատարվել են Քոչարյանի օրոք:

 

«Իմ հասցեին արած մեղադրանքներն այնքան աբսուրդային են, որ իմաստ չկա կանգ առնել դրանց բովանդակության վրա՝ դրա իսպառ բացակայության պատճառով», - իր պատասխան մեկնաբանությունում ասել է Քոչարյանը` հավելելով, թե ընդդիմության առաջնորդի բոլոր ելույթներում իր անվան հիշատակումների փաստը հիշեցնում են մի քանի ամիս առաջ Աֆրիկայում որսի ժամանակ իրեն հանդիպած մի եվրոպացու, ով աֆրիկյան խոշոր կենդանիների որսի սուր դեպքերի` առյուծների, ընձառյուծների, ցլերի եւ փղերի ուժի, ճարպկության եւ վտանգավորության մասին տարբեր պատմություններին ամեն անգամ հոգոցով արձագանքել է, թե իր համար ամենավտանգավոր եւ ուժեղ կենդանին արջն է, որը «5 տարի առաջ որսի ժամանակ նրան բավական ջարդել է»:

 

Քոչարյանը, սակայն, որեւէ կերպ չի հստակեցրել իր դիրքորոշումները հայ-թուրքական հաշտեցման կամ ղարաբաղյան բանակցային գործընթացի շուրջ:

 

«Հավանաբար, ես ինչ-որ կերպ ոգեշնչում եմ Տեր-Պետրոսյանին, քանի որ նա ինձ հաճախ է հիշում»,- իր հայտարարությունում կարծիք է հայտնել Հայաստանի երկրորդ նախագահ Ռոբերտ Քոչարյանը:

[Em]

Armenian Consul General to Defend Protocols on Debate Panel

 

 

Date: Thursday, December 17, 2009

Time: 7:30pm - 9:45pm

Location: Merdinian Auditoium

Street Add: 13330 Riverside Dr.

Sherman Oaks, CA

 

The panel will be moderated by Dr. Richard Hovannisian and the panelists will include Armenian Consul General Grigor Hovhannisyan, Dr. Razmig Shirinian, and Dr. Joseph Kechichian. The event is open to the public and everyone in the community is highly encouraged to attend.

[Em]

Armenian Consul General to Defend Protocols on Debate Panel

 

 

Date: Thursday, December 17, 2009

Time: 7:30pm - 9:45pm

Location: Merdinian Auditoium

Street Add: 13330 Riverside Dr.

Sherman Oaks, CA

 

The panel will be moderated by Dr. Richard Hovannisian and the panelists will include Armenian Consul General Grigor Hovhannisyan, Dr. Razmig Shirinian, and Dr. Joseph Kechichian. The event is open to the public and everyone in the community is highly encouraged to attend.

 

 

Having attended this event tonight, I have to say it is disheartening to continually witness how divisive and clueless our people can be.

[Z'areh]

Having attended this event tonight, I have to say it is disheartening to continually witness how divisive and clueless our people can be.

 

Unfortunately,Ditsuhi, there will always be a segment in our diaspora society that will always agree blindly with the government of Armenia, any ruling government in power. And they will accuse all who are against the policies of a ruling administration (whoever they may be) as being against the "Motherland". This was the case during Soviet times, continued during Levon Ter-Petrossian's reign and is now continuing with Sarkisian's regime.

 

The truth of the matter is the only power source these segments can count on is the government of Armenia which compensates the dwindling number of supporters these segments enjoy, and also automatically means the support of the Holy See of Etchmiadsin. This is especially true in the US and Canada. I have also seen it here in Montreal, where leaders of groups who have always aligned themselves with the ruling governments of Armenia, have made fools out of themselves by publicly endorsing the protocols, while privately admitting that they have not read the details. One such leader even stood up and chastised those who were against the Protocols as being "unpatriotic". The fact that ARF was against the Protocols was good enough for this person to be "for" the Protocols.

 

In Lebanon, where all segments attract relatively healthy numbers of supporters, they stand together in denouncing these Protocols.

 

"divisive and clueless" is indeed a sad state of being, whether due to ignorance or self-imposition.

[Em]

Unfortunately,Ditsuhi, there will always be a segment in our diaspora society that will always agree blindly with the government of Armenia, any ruling government in power. And they will accuse all who are against the policies of a ruling administration (whoever they may be) as being against the "Motherland". This was the case during Soviet times, continued during Levon Ter-Petrossian's reign and is now continuing with Sarkisian's regime.

 

The truth of the matter is the only power source these segments can count on is the government of Armenia which compensates the dwindling number of supporters these segments enjoy, and also automatically means the support of the Holy See of Etchmiadsin. This is especially true in the US and Canada. I have also seen it here in Montreal, where leaders of groups who have always aligned themselves with the ruling governments of Armenia, have made fools out of themselves by publicly endorsing the protocols, while privately admitting that they have not read the details. One such leader even stood up and chastised those who were against the Protocols as being "unpatriotic". The fact that ARF was against the Protocols was good enough for this person to be "for" the Protocols.

 

In Lebanon, where all segments attract relatively healthy numbers of supporters, they stand together in denouncing these Protocols.

 

"divisive and clueless" is indeed a sad state of being, whether due to ignorance or self-imposition.

 

 

 

Not an expert on their politics nor their approach to Sarkisian matter (for? against? wavering? confused?), yet the ARF is attempting to raise a socially conscious and nationalisitic youth . Private Armenian schools, annual visits to the homeland, and of course the full entrenchment of their psyches on the AG issue. One could question the approach, yet I am glad that on some level they are raising Armenians whilst their counterparts are kids who are only Armenian by name and barely speak the language.

 

I just was baffled at talk of creating an "independent Diasporan gov't and leader". One comment which resonated throughout the two hours or so was in relation to "the wedge" that the Protocols and the Sarkisian administration's recent attempts were creating between the natives and the Diaspora- to which Keshishian replied that current events are bringing things to light which have lain dormant or ignored for some time. So the questions: where do we go from here and why doesn't the RoA gov't take Diaspora's views and interests into consideration are valid, but to be juvenile and just get up there and rant ad nauseam about hatred for the current gov't was a bit disappointing to say the least.

 

Re the Protocols, minus the precondition of Artsax, et al. and "giving up Sis and Masis", and if I really divorce emotion out of the equation, I don't see valid reasons for all this hysteria. It is a logical and vital next step. I just wonder if we aren't selling ourselves short? But then Armenia has always been much like a naive woman....will not elaborate on that.

 

 

 

 

[Arpa]

BEWARE!!!

There is a wolf inside every “sheep” and a snake under every pebble.

http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pub/images/wolf-in-sheeps-clothing1.jpg

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/12/photogalleries/biggest-cobra/images/primary/longest-cobra-pictures-1.jpg

Forget the proctocols. We are talking about the “coffee commission” now.

Sourj and khorvats diplomacy again??

http://savvytraveler.publicradio.org/show/features/2001/20010330/feature2.shtml

I wish I could remember which song it was sung during another era where the refrain went “eghbyr dardzan Hayastan -asserbogjan”.

We also know what a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” is. Now let us see what this other popular adage means and where it comes from.

---

http://images.buycostumes.com/mgen/merchandiser/19721.jpg

-What is to pull the wool over someone’s eyes mean?

 

-The wool refers to a powdered wig. To pull the wool down over a man's eyes is to temporarily blind him. It is an Americanism, dating to the 1830s.

---

Now let’s see how a wolf in sheeps’ clothing a potential “eghbayr” is “pulling the wool” over our eyes, pretending to engage in dialogue while it is in fact two monologues recited in turn. See highlights below where he says they call it the “Big G“, we call it a “tragic calamity”. He is forgetting one important ingredient- “They call it khash, we call it kelleh pac*a”.

Let’s call this “sourj and khorvats duplicitous deception” (diplomacy?).

====

http://hetq.am/en/region/23710/

Turkey-Armenia Protocols Signed – But What About Trust?

[ 2009/12/26 | 12:35 ] region

The following article appeared in today’s issue of Hurriyet Daily News. It was written by İrem KÖKER, a Turkish journalist who recently participated in a conference of journalists from the two countries organized in Yerevan by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation.

Of the worst places to lose your passport, Armenia would no doubt top the list for Turks. The reason is simple: There are no diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia and, thus, no diplomatic mission.

Turks would also need to build good stamina to endure the late night/early morning flight schedules, along with the artificial jet lag due to the two-hour time difference between Turkey and Armenia – a country we could enter on foot, at least in theory.

On the other hand, it is one of the best destinations. Beyond the closed borders and controversial issues that still cloud relations, there lies a vast realm of shared history, art and culture.

Putting aside the extended hours of bargaining on carefully worded diplomatic documents, a Turkish person might as well feel at home walking down the streets of Yerevan.

The most constant reminder of these commonalities is unquestionably the cuisine. Just a glance at the menu in any restaurant and you’ll soon realize there is no need for translation.

There is “mantı,” “baklava,” “Adana kebab” and “Urfa kebab,” all cooked by millions of grandmothers and grandfathers from Anatolia. You can even have your “Armenian coffee,” which is identical to the good old “Turkish coffee.”

The shadow of ‘Ararat’

As every nation who once lived or still lives on Anatolian land, Armenians also claim that all these meals are genuinely Armenian.

It is not only the food but also the language: The number of common words is enough that one could try to write a short story using only them.

It is not hard to find people in Yerevan who can speak Turkish. The older generation either lived in Turkey or spoke Turkish as a common language with their elders at home. It is also widely spoken or learned by the younger generation since Yerevan State University offers Turkish language courses.

The Armenian capital, Yerevan, is located under the shadow of Mount Ağrı, Turkey’s highest mountain, or Ararat, as Armenians call it.** On a clear day in Yerevan, one can easily see the majesty of Ararat, which is holy for Armenians and can be seen in the names of the restaurants and the best brand of cognac, the country’s national drink.

Despite the commonalities between Armenians and Turks, sometimes even the presence of a common language may not be enough to chase away the sorrows and pains of the early 20th century. There is a sour taste because those events scarred the memories of people on both sides of the border. There is also a gulf between the perspectives, perceptions and interpretation of the events by the two people, thereby maintaining the deep division.

Turkey has long been under fire for not confronting its past, yet even the faintest suggestion of opening up the 1915 events for discussion is a big taboo and arouses anger among Armenians.

From the most hawkish nationalists to the most dovish moderates, every Armenian rules out being part of the debate on defining and labeling the painful incidents of 1915. For them it is “genocide” or, as they call it, the “great calamity,” ruling out any questioning.

Perceptions differ

Even during a friendly conversation, if you dare say the “Armenian thesis,” you receive an angry reaction: “There is no such thing as arguments,” an Armenian who lived in Turkey said. “The genocide is a reality. Go outside: You won’t be able to see a single person on the streets whose ancestors were not subject to the genocide.”

Armenia claims up to 1.5 million Armenians were slaughtered in orchestrated killings in 1915. Turkey rejects the claims, saying that 300,000 Armenians, along with at least as many Turks, died in civil strife that emerged when Armenians took up arms, backed by Russia, for an independent state in eastern Anatolia.

This divide also jeopardizes a key component of the protocols aimed at normalizing the relations between the two countries signed in October. According to the protocols, a sub-commission is expected to be established to discuss “the historic dimension to implement a dialogue with the aim of restoring mutual confidence between the two nations.”

Turkish experts believe this is an important achievement for Ankara as it has long pressed for the establishment of a commission that will investigate what really happened in 1915. But this article echoes in a completely different fashion in Yerevan.

Armenian officials say it is premature to talk about the issues that will be discussed by the sub-commission. Diplomatic sources and analysts say the issue of whether the 1915 incidents were genocide will not even be discussed since the commission will operate under the a priori notion that the genocide exists.

Historians also back the idea but said they would definitely avoid the commission if they were to receive an offer to participate.

After spending four days in Yerevan attending a meeting organized by the Yerevan-based Eurasia Partnership Foundation and Istanbul Kültür University’s Global Political Trends Center, one realizes it requires more than protocols and commissions to restore confidence and trust between two nations that have much in common.

The most realistic assessment of the recent situation of bilateral relations and meetings was made by an Armenian-American analyst:

“The protocols are just the beginning of the normalization process, not reconciliation. The latter will take longer.”

He is right that the reconciliation will take longer, maybe a generation or two… on both sides of the last closed border of Europe

** You’d better believe it! You SOB-SOT-SSO! When is the last time the average stanbuli or ankara-li saw the Majestic Masis Ler???

We will get back our Sacred Masis. You go sit on a minaret at aya sofia!!!

Also se how he is playing with words like “kebab/dolma” and other sh*t. I mean faeces/feces.

PS. Some of us may not have noticed how I spell “proCtocol” with an extra C in te middle. Look up a dictionary to see what it means.

PPS. Also see stories about how thw ATA/American furkish assn is promising scholarships to Diasporans to go study (read brainwashed) at furkish universities.

[Arpa]

Do our so called diplomats knoe how read, beside the label on a bottle or two of vodka/oghi, until the day after? Where were they when those "proctocols" were being written? At the "proCtologist"? And now they come back with a "pain in the procto/ass/voritsav"

Osman the LIAR? How about "yalanchi sarma"?

Show is Over… The Protocols are Dead!

By Harut Sassounian • on January 26, 2010

The show is finally over! The international community is no longer buying the endless Turkish excuses for refusing to ratify the protocols. Armenian officials, who naively believed that Turkey would open its border and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, are beginning to question the Turks’ sincerity and contemplating the possibility of the protocols’ collapse.

 

Now the blame game starts! Whose fault is it that the protocols are not being ratified? In my view, the Turks are the ones to be blamed for deceiving the international community all along. It was never the intention of the Turkish leaders to carry out their publicly stated plans to normalize relations with Armenia. They were simply engaged in a ploy to obstruct what they believed to be President Obama’s solemn pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide, and to facilitate Turkey’s admission to the European Union (EU), since open borders are one of the key prerequisites for EU membership.

 

Without taking a single positive step, Turkey created the false impression of reconciling with Armenia, thereby dissuading Obama from using the term “genocide” in his April 24 statement. Turkish leaders also succeeded in exploiting the protocols to generate favorable worldwide publicity for their country.

 

During long and difficult negotiations, Turkey demanded that in return for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations, Armenia withdraw from Karabagh (Artsakh), set up an international commission to study the facts of the genocide, and acknowledge the territorial integrity of Turkey.

 

After Russia, the United States, and Europe applied intense pressure on both sides, Armenia and Turkey made a series of compromises. Armenia reluctantly agreed to establish an ambiguous “historical commission,” which was not explicitly linked to the genocide. Armenia also had to accept a reference in the protocols to prior international treaties that confirmed Armenian territorial concessions to Turkey, but did not specifically mention the capitulatory Treaty of Kars. Furthermore, the protocols included a clause that called for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, implying that Armenia could no longer support Artsakh, because that would be construed as interference in Azerbaijan’s domestic issues.

 

Since the protocols signed on Oct. 10 did not fulfill all of Turkey’s demands, its leaders started threatening not to ratify the protocols or open the border with Armenia until the Artsakh conflict is resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor. In other words, Turkey was trying to make up for any deficiencies in the protocols by holding their ratification hostage to its precondition on Artsakh.

 

The ratification of the protocols became even more complicated when Azerbaijan began to threaten its “big brother” Turkey for considering the opening of the border with its archenemy, Armenia. The Azeris wanted the Turkish blockade to continue until Armenia was forced to acknowledge Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction over Artsakh. The Azeri threat of raising natural gas prices to Turkey and redirecting some of its oil to Russia made Turkish leaders even more reticent to consummate their agreement with Armenia.

 

To appease Azerbaijan, Turkey demanded that Russia, Europe, and the United States pressure Armenia into making concessions on Artsakh. This Turkish request, however, fell on deaf ears. The international community realized that the attempt to simultaneously resolve two thorny issues—the Artsakh conflict and the Armenia-Turkey protocols—would lead to solving neither one.

 

Realizing that hardly anyone outside Turkey and Azerbaijan was supporting their demands on Artsakh, Turkish leaders set their sights on another convenient scapegoat: the Constitutional Court of Armenia. Although the Court decided on Jan. 12 that the obligations stipulated in the protocols complied with the constitution, it also issued several clarifications and limitations that restricted the Turkish government’s loose interpretation of the protocols.

 

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu brazenly threatened to abandon the protocols outright, unless the Armenian Constitutional Court “corrected” its decision—an impossible task under Armenian laws. The U.S. State Department quickly sided with Armenia, rejecting the Turkish claim that the Constitutional Court’s ruling contradicted the “letter and spirit” of the agreement. Of course, the State Department’s true intent was to forestall the Armenian Parliament from adding any reservations on the protocols at the time of ratification.

 

Since the chairman of the Armenian Parliament had already announced that he would not take any action until the Turkish Parliament ratified the protocols first, the ball is now in Turkey’s court. The protocols have been collecting dust in Ankara ever since they were submitted to the parliament on Oct. 21, 2009. The foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey had stated in their joint announcement of last August that the protocols should be ratified “within a reasonable timeframe.” Armenian officials recently reminded Turkey of that loose deadline, adding that Armenia would be forced to take unspecified counter-actions should Turkey not ratify the protocols by February or March, at the latest.

 

At this juncture, neither Armenia nor Turkey is willing to back down from its recalcitrant position. Should Turkey’s leaders remove Artsakh and the Constitutional Court as preconditions, they would risk not only losing Azerbaijan as an ally, but would seriously jeopardize their party’s majority in next year’s parliamentary election. Similarly, Armenia’s leaders can neither give up Artsakh nor “correct” the ruling of the Constitutional Court. No amount of outside pressure can therefore force the two governments to reverse course. That is why I believe the protocols cannot be resuscitated.

 

Turkey came very close to deceiving Armenia and the rest of the world with these infamous protocols. Fortunately, they failed before causing lasting damage to Armenia’s national interests.

Edited January 31, 2010 by Arpa

[Yervant1]

TURKS AGAIN WORRY...

 

NOYAN TAPAN - ARMENIANS TODAY

FEBRUARY 17, 2010

ANKARA

 

ANKARA, FEBRUARY 17, NOYAN TAPAN - ARMENIANS TODAY. The Turkish

parliamentarians who visited Sweden expressed concern with the bill

on recognition of the Armenian Genocide that again appeared in the

Swedish parliament.

 

The Swedish parliament plans within two weeks to put to vote a bill

on recognition of the genocide committed by Turks against Armenians

and Assyrians.

 

According to Turkish media, the delegation led by Chairman of

Turkish parliament's Committee of Foreign Relations Murad Mercan

warned the Swedish side that if the mentioned resolution is adopted,

difficulties will emerge in the Turkey-Sweden relations and will

hinder the ratification process of the Armenian-Turkish protocols by

the Turkish parliament.

[Em]

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15549523

 

 

 

Zero progress

 

Relations are growing frosty again

Feb 18th 2010 | ANKARA | From The Economist print edition

 

http://media.economist.com/images/20100220/201008EUM959.gifWHEN the Turkish government signed a deal with Armenia last October, it looked like a clear achievement for its policy of “zero problems” with its neighbours. The old foes agreed to establish relations and open their common border, which had been sealed by the Turks in 1993 in solidarity with Azerbaijan, during its nasty war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mainly Armenian enclave. The deal offered the hope of burying the ghosts of the past by setting up a joint committee of historians to investigate the mass slaughter of Ottoman Armenians in 1915.

 

But ancient enmities are not so easily cast off. Just a day after the deal was signed, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said that it could not be implemented until Armenia withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh, which it has occupied since the war. No matter that the agreement made no mention of the conflict.

 

Now Turkey is throwing a fresh tantrum. The Armenian constitutional court recently approved the agreement on the grounds that it satisfied the founding principles of the state, which include seeking worldwide recognition of the 1915 tragedy as genocide. Fearing any such moves, Turkey has demanded that the court retract its reasoning. Many think the Turkish government, squeezed between proud nationalists at home and outraged Azerbaijanis abroad, is seizing on the Armenian court’s word to justify its qualms. Armenia has sent the deal to parliament for approval.

 

Turkey looks isolated. America, its most important ally (and the deal’s biggest backer), has taken Armenia’s side. Russia argues that Turkish-Armenian relations should not be linked to Nagorno-Karabakh, a view shared in Washington.

 

Yet the deal is not universally backed in Armenia. In making its judgment, the constitutional court may have been responding to hardline nationalists, who are furious that their government has agreed to recognise Turkey’s borders. (They claim that parts of eastern Turkey belong to an Armenian “historical homeland”.) The president, Serzh Sargsyan, has now declared that ratification will be held up until the Turkish parliament votes on the deal.

 

America is watching closely. If the deal collapses, the way would be left open for Congress to pass a resolution recognising the 1915 killings as genocide, something it has long threatened. This in turn could trigger anti-American feelings in Turkey strong enough to leave Ankara feeling that it has no choice but to retaliate. One option would be to kick the Americans out from the strategically located Incirlik airbase.

 

The comfort is that ordinary Turks and Armenians are ignoring their leaders and building friendship on their own terms. Turkey’s privately owned Su TV recently launched an Armenian-language news programme. And business between the two countries, despite their closed border, is growing daily, via Georgia.

 

 

[Em]

Reiterating that statement (threat?) in every single editorial or piece written relative to Turkish-Armenian issues is irking me!

[Arpa]

Reiterating that statement (threat?) in every single editorial or piece written relative to Turkish-Armenian issues is irking me!

Is "blackmail/Sev namak/Սեւ Նամակ" a furkish word? Some in Washington DC may think so.

And how about "threat"? Is that a variation of the furkish "treat/furkish delight"? How about "furkish taffy/furkish dolma/tolma/FULL of gaka"?

Please everyone. Stop using that furkish word for "stuffed eggplant/zuchini/ddmik" . The Armenian word for it "smbouk lits" or "LITS" for short.

Edited February 19, 2010 by Arpa