Jump to content

Citizenship Granted To Two Armenian Men Convicted


MosJan

Recommended Posts

U.S. CITIZENSHIP GRANTED TO TWO ARMENIAN MEN CONVICTED OF PLANNING TO BOMB THE TURKISH CONSULATE IN PHILADELPHIA

 

YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 7. ARMINFO. On September 6, A federal appeals court ruled Tuesday that a judge did not err in granting U.S. citizenship to two Armenian men convicted more than 20 years ago of planning to bomb the Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia. According to Monterey Herald, the decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ends a long struggle by Viken Hovsepian and Viken Yacoubian, who plotted to bomb the consulate in retaliation for the massacre of Armenians by Turks in 1915. The Turkish government denies a massacre occurred.

 

Federal law currently forbids convicted terrorists from becoming citizens. But anyone convicted of an aggravated felony before November 1990 can be granted citizenship if they have been ''of good moral character'' for five years prior to their application, Millen said. The men, who have been out of prison since the early 1990s, now have doctorates, have renounced violence and volunteer many hours a week in the Los Angeles Armenian-American community, said Mathew Millen, an attorney who helped handle the immigration portion of their case.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

U.S. CITIZENSHIP GRANTED TO TWO ARMENIAN MEN CONVICTED OF PLANNING TO BOMB THE TURKISH CONSULATE IN PHILADELPHIA

 

YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 7. ARMINFO. On September 6, A federal appeals court ruled Tuesday that a judge did not err in granting U.S. citizenship to two Armenian men convicted more than 20 years ago of planning to bomb the Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia. According to Monterey Herald, the decision by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ends a long struggle by Viken Hovsepian and Viken Yacoubian, who plotted to bomb the consulate in retaliation for the massacre of Armenians by Turks in 1915. The Turkish government denies a massacre occurred.

 

Federal law currently forbids convicted terrorists from becoming citizens. But anyone convicted of an aggravated felony before November 1990 can be granted citizenship if they have been ''of good moral character'' for five years prior to their application, Millen said. The men, who have been out of prison since the early 1990s, now have doctorates, have renounced violence and volunteer many hours a week in the Los Angeles Armenian-American community, said Mathew Millen, an attorney who helped handle the immigration portion of their case.

style_images/master/snapback.png

If i ever have to stand in trail, I would wish it would be in the United States.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

some info >>>

 

Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

 

 

Tuesday, October 1, 2002

 

 

 

Page 1

 

 

 

Ninth Circuit Overturns Ruling Granting Citizenship to Armenians Involved in Consulate Bomb Plot

 

 

 

By KENNETH OFGANG, Staff Writer/Appellate Courts

 

 

 

A federal judge should not have granted citizenship to two local men in an effort to prevent the government from deporting them for their involvement in a terrorist plot 20 years ago, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled yesterday.

 

Senior U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer abused her discretion by granting naturalization petitions by Viken Hovsepian and Viken Yacoubian, Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain wrote for the court, without requiring them to exhaust administrative remedies. Judge Andrew Kleinfeld concurred, but Senior Judge Dorothy W. Nelson dissented.

 

O’Scannlain acknowledged that Hovsepian, who holds a USC doctoral degree in international relations and manages a hedge fund, and Yacoubian, the principal of a private Armenian school in East Hollywood, “have lived exemplary lives and have become pillars of their communities since their release from prison.” But it is not up to the courts to determine whether that outweighs the seriousness of their crimes, he said.

 

“Judicial sympathy only functions within prescribed parameters of the law,” he said.

 

Pfaelzer ordered that both men be granted citizenship in 1999, 14 years after she sentenced them to federal prison camps for plotting to blow up the Turkish consulate in Philadelphia in 1982. Efforts to remove the two Lebanese citizens from this country were described by the judge during an earlier hearing as “nothing short of lunacy.”

 

The FBI linked the two to the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide, which the bureau blamed for the killing of 21 Turkish diplomats, including the Turkish consul killed in Los Angeles in 1982.

 

The group advocated violence against Turks in retaliation for the killing of 1.5 million Armenians in the early part of the last century and the refusal of modern-day Turkey to accept responsibility. The Turkish government calls the figure “grossly erroneous” and attributes the deaths of Armenians in that period to “intercommunal” political, rather than ethnic and religious, conflict.

 

The bomb plot of which Hovsepian and Yacoubian were convicted was exposed after the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued a warrant to tap Hovsepian’s telephone.

 

A co-conspirator was able to get the bomb on board a Los Angeles to Boston flight in October 1982, but was arrested upon landing. The FBI, which seized the bomb, contended that had it been detonated, it would have likely killed thousands of people.

 

Pfaelzer expressed some sympathy for the defendants at the time of sentencing, saying that while their crimes were serious and merited incarceration, the men were “basically of good character.” She rejected calls by federal prosecutors for lengthy sentences, and issued a “judicial recommendation against deportation” for both defendants, who are permanent U.S. residents.

 

Under pre-1990 immigration law, a JRAD, as it was known, constituted an absolute bar to deportation based on the underlying conviction. But Congress provided in Sec. 602© of the Immigration Act of 1990 that aliens convicted of certain offenses, including unlawful possession of a destructive defense, were deportable even if “the facts…occurred before the date of the enactment of this Act.”

 

That section did not specifically refer to JRADs, and Yacoubian sought to enjoin his deportation on the ground that the JRAD remained a bar. Pfaelzer agreed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in 1994.

 

Both men sought to block deportation through a variety of civil, criminal and administrative proceedings, including motions to vacate or “correct” their underlying sentences. Pfaelzer agreed that the new immigration law rendered the original sentences unjust, and ordered the men resentenced and their convictions expunged under the Federal Youth Corrections Act—which the judge found applicable because the men were less than 26 years of age when they committed the crimes.

 

The appellate panel, however, ruled that Hovsepian could not be resentenced under the FYCA because the judge made a specific finding at the time of sentencing that youthful offender treatment was not appropriate. And while the government conceded that Yacoubian’s conviction could be expunged because no such finding was made as to him, the court held that it was not up to the district judge to determine whether the expunged conviction may be used as a basis for deportation.

 

That issue could be addressed by the INS on remand, the judge suggested in a footnote.

 

Nelson, dissenting, said the majority “did not make sense” in concluding that the district judge lacked discretion to grant the naturalization petitions. Since the INS did not rule on the applications within 120 days of the initial interviews, she said, the operative statute left it up to Pfaelzer to decide whether to rule on the petitions in the first instance or remand to the INS.

 

O’Scannlain acknowledged that the INS had breached the 120-day limit. But judicial discretion in such cases is not unlimited, he said, concluding that remand is required because the agency’s delay in ruling was not of undue length and was due largely to the reluctance of the applicants to answer questions about their activities since release from prison and the pendency of the other legal proceedings.

 

The case is United States v. Hovsepian, 99-50041. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Date of Second En Banc Opinion: September 6, 2005
Second En Banc Opinion: 2005 WL (9th Cir. September 6, 2005)
Status: Affirmed district court’s ratification of its administration of oath of allegiance and the swearing in of appellees as United States citizens. First en banc opinion reversed the district court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings limited to reconsideration of the applicants’ eligibility for naturalization. Mandate was issued June 4, 2004 and recalled April 18, 2005.
Members of En Banc Court: Mary M. Schroeder, Dorothy W. Nelson, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Michael D. Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, Susan P. Graber, M.M. McKeown, Ronald M. Gould, Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon, Richard R. Clifton
Issue(s): These actions relate to the government’s prosecution of Viken Hovsepian, Viken Yacoubian and Karnig Sarkissian for conspiring to blow up the Turkish embassy in Philadelphia, and the government's efforts to deport them. Potential issues may include whether the district court erred: (a) in requiring the Immigration and Naturalization Service to grant Hovsepian's and Yacoubian's applications for naturalization; (b) in granting Hovsepian’s motion to re-sentence him under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (“FYCA”); and (c) in rendering Hovsepian’s and Yacoubian’s conviction records inaccessible for any purpose other than when necessary to a bona fide criminal investigation.
Holding: Whether a person has the subjective intent to deceive in order to obtain immigration benefits is a question of fact. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that appellees possess good moral character consistent with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 and 1427(a), or that appellees did not intentionally provide false testimony.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

 

In September of 1982 the FBI, as part of an investigation of Armenian terrorist groups, obtained authorization from the United States Foreign Surveillance Court (USFSC) under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to place a wiretap on Viken Hovsepian's telephone in Santa Monica, California. From conversations intercepted by the wiretap, the FBI learned that Berberian, along with Viken Hovsepian, Karnig Sarkissian, Viken Yacoubian, and Steven Dadaian, was a participant in a plan to take violent action against the Honorary Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia.

 

The FBI's wiretap intercepted four conversations between Berberian and Hovsepian to arrange meetings between the two men. In one conversation, Berberian indicated he did not wish to discuss matters over the telephone; in two of the conversations, the two men spoke in code.

 

In October of 1982 Berberian purchased a wooden H-block, a circuit tester, and a Timex watch which he delivered to his co-defendants at the Armenian Church. When driving to the church, Berberian circled the blocks as if checking for a tail. Returning home that evening, Berberian parked, then walked to the sidewalk

 

 

Page 238

and checked up and down the street. A few minutes later, he drove away, made a U-turn, and returned home. Forty-five minutes later, he circled the neighborhood in his car as if looking for possible surveillance units.

 

On October 21, the USFSC authorized continuation of the wiretap because they believed a bomb or components thereof were being transported from Los Angeles to Boston on a Northwest Orient flight on which Dadaian was a passenger. FBI agents ran the luggage accompanying the flight through an x-ray scanner and detected part of a bomb in a suitcase. They opened the suitcase and found all the components necessary for a bomb, including a timing device composed of a wooden H-block, a circuit tester, and a Timex watch later identified as those purchased by Berberian.

 

After indictment, Berberian and the other defendants unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence from the FISA wiretap and to compel disclosure of an ex parte in camera submission of classified information made by the government. Thereafter, Berberian's trial was severed from his codefendants'. Berberian and the government stipulated to excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act. Subsequently, the government appealed the court's quashing of the government's subpoena of Dadaian as a witness. This court affirmed the quashing of the subpoena. United States v. Berberian, 767 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.1985).

 

Berberian's counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the stipulation concerning excludable time and requested that the court dismiss the case for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Judge Pfaelzer denied the motion, recused herself, and transferred the case to Judge Real for trial.

 

On the first day of his trial, Berberian moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Berberian guilty of conspiracy to bomb and of aiding and abetting transportation of an explosive device. He timely appealed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Sufficiency of Evidence of Conspiracy to Bomb

 

This court will overturn the conspiracy conviction for insufficient evidence only if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it appears no rational jury could have found the essential elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1348 (9th Cir.1986).

 

Once existence of a conspiracy has been established, evidence of only a slight connection to the conspiracy is necessary in order to convict any one defendant of knowing participation in it. United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1809, 94 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987); United States v. Hobson, 519 F.2d 765, 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931, 96 S.Ct. 283, 46 L.Ed.2d 261 (1975). Proof of a particular defendant's connection to the conspiracy can be established by circumstantial evidence. Disla, 805 F.2d at 1348.

 

Berberian concedes the existence of a conspiracy, but he argues the evidence shows he was merely a messenger or unknowing instrument of the conspirators. However, the record shows Berberian had four telephone conversations with Hovsepian, was concerned about possible surveillance, and purchased items that were included in the bomb. From such evidence a reasonable jury could have inferred, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Berberian knowingly helped create a bomb which would be used to blow up the Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia.

 

Berberian also argues that since interstate transportation is an element of the target offense of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(d), the government must present proof Berberian knew the bomb would be transported across state lines. That argument lacks merit. The knowing use of interstate facilities is not ordinarily an essential element of substantive offenses of interstate travel. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 831 F.2d 1479, 1485 & n. 8 (9th Cir.1987) (knowing use of interstate facilities is not part of

 

 

Page 239

the mens rea component of a Travel Act offense absent statutory language requiring such intent when there is no congressional purpose that would be furthered by such a requirement and absent unfairness in criminalizing the unknowing use of interstate facilities when the defendant is knowingly engaged in unlawful activity); United States v. Muza, 788 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (8th Cir.1986) (government did not have to prove a defendant accused of conspiracy to commit arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i) had actual knowledge the tavern was used in interstate commerce because interstate nexus in criminal statutes is most often solely for the purpose of conferring federal jurisdiction); Hobson, 519 F.2d at 769 (when defendant accused of conspiring to elude a federal officer in violation of federal law, scienter as to the federal nature of the offense is not required under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 371 and 373).

 

B. Sufficiency of Evidence of Aiding and Abetting the Transportation of the Explosive Material

 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence that Berberian aided and abetted transportation of an explosive, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if the jury could have found the essential elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See Disla, 805 F.2d at 1348. An abettor's criminal intent may be inferred from attendant facts and circumstances and need not be established by direct evidence. United States v. Reese, 775 F.2d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir.1985).

 

First, Berberian argues there is no evidence he aided in or knew of the interstate transportation of the bomb. That argument lacks merit. Scienter as to the interstate transportation element of federal offenses is not ordinarily required. Stafford, 831 F.2d at 1485 & n. 8; Muza, 788 F.2d at 1312; Hobson, 519 F.2d at 769.

 

Second, Berberian argues there is no evidence that he aided and abetted in criminal acts concerning "explosive material," as specified in Count II. Berberian reasons his purchase of an H-block, Timex watch, and circuit tester connect him with an "explosive device" but not with "explosive material." That argument lacks merit. Any explosive can be broken down into non-explosive parts; therefore, it is logical to assume explosive material includes all components of a bomb, including a timing device.

 

C. Speedy Trial Act

 

We review the district court's disposition of a Speedy Trial Act issue for clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to application of legal standards. United States v. Henderson, 746 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir.1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 321, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). The parties cannot stipulate to a waiver of the protections of the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 433-34 (1st Cir.1984). However, a defendant who seeks dismissal cannot wait until trial to assert a Speedy Trial Act violation. The statute provides, "[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3162(a)(2).

 

On appeal, Berberian contends he did not waive his right to dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act. He argues that his oral request for dismissal, made on the first day of his trial, February 11, 1986, relates back to his Speedy Trial Act motion of November 1984 made before Judge Pfaelzer. However, in Berberian's calculations in support of his February 11, 1986 motion, he includes delay after the interlocutory appeal of the district court's quashing of the government's subpoena of a co-conspirator. Some of this delay occurred more than a year after Judge Pfaelzer denied Berberian's 1984 Speedy Trial Act motion. Under such circumstances, Berberian was required to make a new and timely pretrial motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. Certainly, it is fallacious for Berberian to argue that the nonmeritorious 1984 motion is being "renewed" by his oral motion on the day of his trial. Accordingly, we conclude Berberian waived

 

 

Page 240

any right to have his case dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act. We need not reach the merits of his motion.

 

D. Reassignment to Chief Judge Real

 

Berberian contends his case should be retried because Judge Pfaelzer's reassignment of the case to Chief Judge Real violated his right to due process and did not conform to General Order 224 of the Central District of California. Berberian's position lacks merit.

 

Retrial for violation of local rules on assignment of judges is not warranted unless the defendant can show prejudice. E.g., United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1982) (transfer of a case will not be invalidated on appeal unless the defendant succeeds in showing a pervasive climate of partiality or unfairness due to the transfer); United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 230 (9th Cir.1978) (a transfer not in conformity with a local rule is not grounds for reversal when neither appellant was able to demonstrate how he was prejudiced); United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 857, 95 S.Ct. 105, 42 L.Ed.2d 91 (1974) (unless prejudice by the second judge is manifested at trial, the accused is assumed to have received the fair trial to which due process entitles him).

 

The reassignment issue arose as a collateral matter to the Speedy Trial issue. Judge Pfaelzer ordered the time from November 10, 1983, to November 6, 1984, excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, finding that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(8)(A), the ends of justice were served by allowing Berberian to sever and have his case tried later from that of his co-defendants. Judge Pfaelzer also ordered excluded the time from August 28, 1984, to September 25, 1984, finding that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv), the interests of justice were served by allowing Berberian a continuance necessary to provide him with continuity of counsel. Finally, Judge Pfaelzer ordered the time period between September 25, 1984, and November 6, 1984, excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(3)(A) and (B) because the government's explosive experts were in Beruit, Lebanon, investigating the bombing of the United States Embassy and were unavailable for trial. Judge Pfaelzer's findings under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 were made pursuant to Berberian's representations in the parties' stipulation as to excludable time that justice would be served if Berberian could sever his case and delay his trial in order to ensure continuity of counsel, allow Berberian's counsel to narrow the issues for Berberian's trial and concentrate exclusively on the evidence relevant to Berberian's defense, and avoid any prejudice to Berberian that may have resulted from the ongoing trial of the other four co-defendants.

 

When Berberian's trial counsel requested that Judge Pfaelzer vacate his stipulation and dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial, Judge Pfaelzer told trial counsel, "I do feel that you lack integrity." She recused herself stating, "For the reason I have just stated to you, I do not feel that I should sit as a judge in this case and I am going to give it to the Chief Judge." She stated Berberian could go to trial tomorrow with Judge Real. The record does not show the condition of the trial calendar of either judge. We assume Judge Real was ready to try the case even though for other reasons the trial was delayed.

 

On appeal, Berberian claims the reassignment was punitive and violated due process. However, a litigant takes the risk a judge will rule in a manner consistent with the litigant's request. To the extent Judge Pfaelzer's reassignment was made to protect Berberian's asserted rights under the Speedy Trial Act, he has no basis to complain. Berberian has not shown prejudice nor even argued his trial was in any way unfair. Thus, the reassignment did not violate his right to due process.

 

When Judge Pfaelzer recused herself and stated she was reassigning to Chief Judge Real, Berberian objected to the reassignment to Judge Real. He did not ask that the case be randomly reassigned by the clerk's office as contemplated by General Order 224. Thus, Berberian did

 

 

Page 241

not preserve for appeal any issue with respect to his claim of right to random reassignment under the local rules.

 

E. FISA Wiretaps and Ex Parte In Camera Material

 

Berberian contends the FBI's FISA wiretap was illegal and the district court should have disclosed material the government submitted to it ex parte and in camera. Berberian adopts the arguments as made in his co-defendants' briefs on these two issues. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the district court's decisions on the validity of the FISA wiretap and the propriety of the ex parte in camera submissions. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.1988). That opinion is controlling on the FISA and ex parte in camera issues.

 

The district court is AFFIRMED.

 

http://www.jurisearch.com/newroot/caselink...no=851+F.2d+236

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
×
×
  • Create New...