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Armen

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  1. Maral jan, can you define which insecurities are good and which ones are bad? Because the greatest insecurity that can happen to a person is love and attraction. For example if you love your son or daughter that's a very big insecurity and if you become calm and let this love go it will make you strategically more secure in life. If you call all kinds of passions (like jealousy, desire of control etc) insecurity in negative sense and "deal" with them you will be left with a piece of meat and not a human being. Everything has its degree. I think Eve had something about this in her signature...
  2. The article is totaly incompetent as far as the military equipment numbers are concerned. It is a good read though because it represents the political views of russian so called "white emigration". However, it said there are MIGs in Karabagh which is not ture. Karabagh does not have aircraft (maybe some 5-6 choppers) and it does not need aircraft. It has a sufficient air defenses thought to withstand any attack from Azeri aircraft. I think Armenia does not need any aircraft now. The 9-10 MIGs that the Russian base in Armenia has are sufficient for patrol. First of all we do not have that many pilots. Second, we do not plan attacks either agaist Azerbaijan or Turkey. Why should we buy aircraft? It is more logical to buy air defense systems like S-300 or S-400 (although Russians do not sell S-400 to any country yet as far as I know). If Turkey attacks us those 500 aircaft will be destroyed in airfields in the first hours. So we need air defense agaist them more than aircraft. If we speak about Karabagh, aircraft are almost ineffective there and in surrounding areas. Choppers are very good though. Some more K-24s (Armenia has around 10) would not be bad.
  3. Notice the Turkish - Azeri disagreements. Azeri Russian laguage media has been writing about more deep disagreements in Azeri Turkish relations. Looks like Azerbaijan is seriously changing its foreign policy priorities. Although this is only temporary...
  4. http://www.jamestown.org/ The Jamestown Foundation Wednesday, September 15, 2004 - Volume 1, Issue 85 EURASIA DAILY MONITOR AZERBAIJAN'S NATO ASPIRATIONS SUFFER A SELF-INFLICTED SETBACK On September 13 the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, U.S. General James Jones, canceled the Cooperative Best Effort-2004 exercise, which was scheduled to be held September 14-26 in Azerbaijan and involve almost 1,000 personnel from more than 20 NATO member and partner countries. The exercise was designed to provide basic training for peace-support operations at the small unit level, and to enhance interoperability among NATO member and partner countries. A major component of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, Cooperative Best Effort exercises were held successfully in Georgia in 2002 and Armenia in 2003. SACEUR took this decision after Azerbaijan rejected the scheduled participation of Armenian officers in the exercise. A statement by NATO's Supreme Command noted that all Partnership for Peace exercises are agreed and conducted on the principle of inclusiveness for all allies and partners that wish to participate; NATO therefore expressed "regret that inclusiveness could not be upheld in this case." Endorsing NATO's decision, the U.S. State Department also "deeply regretted" Azerbaijan's move as one "inconsistent with the country's stated desire to work toward closer partnership with NATO." It reminded Baku, "It is crucial that all PfP countries should be able to participate in the program" (NATO and State Department statements, September 13). As recently as his September 9-10 visit to Baku, the deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, General Charles Wald, had expressed hope that the exercise would be held successfully and bring Azerbaijan closer to NATO (Azertag, September 9, 10). Turkey's ambassador to Azerbaijan, Ahmet Unal Cevikoz, publicly advised Azerbaijan's government to allow the Armenian officers' participation. Citing Azerbaijan's commitments within NATO's PfP program in terms of hosting joint exercises and nondiscriminatory treatment of participants, Cevikoz cautioned Baku that failure to live up to such commitments would damage Azerbaijan's cooperation with NATO (Azad Azerbaijan, September 9; Trend, September 10). However, mounting public protests swayed the authorities into refusing entry to the Armenian participants. Initially confined to the radical opposition, the protests quickly spread to Baku's mainstream media and political groups. Rather than attempting to work with public opinion to contain that dynamic, the authorities embraced the protesters' line of reasoning. Their arguments held that officers from an aggressor country that seized Azerbaijani territory and evicted the local population could not be allowed to participate in an exercise on Azerbaijani soil. The radical Artsax Liberation Organization (KLO), factions of the former Popular Front, and some opposition NGOs launched a picketing campaign outside governmental buildings and NATO countries' embassies and announced plans to call mass protest demonstrations if the Armenian officers arrived. At the forefront of this campaign, ANS Television added a somewhat more sophisticated set of anti-NATO arguments, such as: Azerbaijan has done more for NATO and the West generally than these have done for Azerbaijan; the country has become "NATO's hostage"; Azerbaijan did not become independent of Moscow and the CIS only to become dependent on NATO; NATO condones Armenian aggression; and the authorities should "resist NATO's pressure" (ANS TV, September 5, 10). The political authorities appeared hesitant or intimidated. Foreign Affairs Minister Elmar Mammedyarov and his deputy, Araz Azimov, were among the few senior officials who attempted to rescue the exercise by explaining to the public that failure to host it as agreed would damage Azerbaijan's cooperation with NATO (ANS TV, September 5; AzerNews, September 10). During the second week of September, the authorities' position crumbled. First, some small pro-government parties in parliament endorsed the protests. During a September 10 meeting with Russian Ambassador Nikolai Ryabov, Defense Minister Safar Abiev publicly protested -- on behalf of the "Azeri people" as well as himself -- against Armenian participation. Ryabov responded by urging closer Russia-Azerbaijan military cooperation (ANS TV, Azer Tag, September 10). That same day, Azerbaijan's parliament adopted a statement to NATO's Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in which it "resolutely protested against the participation of Armenian officers" in the exercise and warned that it "can damage cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan" (Azer Tag, September 10). On September 11, President Ilham Aliev was quoted as declaring: "If we ask Azeris whether they want Armenians to arrive, they would say no. I do not want those Armenian military personnel to arrive either. Azerbaijan will take the necessary measures in this regard" (Turan, Itar-Tass, September 11). Baku tried several compromise solutions, such as accepting only civilian Armenian personnel for the exercise or reducing the number of Armenians to three and their status to that of observers rather than participants. For its part, Yerevan sought participation by seven Armenian officers, as well as Azerbaijani guarantees for their safety. Ultimately, on September 13 in Brussels, a meeting between de Hoop Scheffer, Mammedyarov, and Armenia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan Oskanian failed to break the deadlock. NATO promptly canceled the exercise. De Hoop Scheffer assessed Azerbaijan's position as "unacceptable from a PfP country" and a "breach of commitments." Oskanian "welcomed NATO's principled stance while regretting the missed opportunity for regional cooperation" (Mediamax, Armenpress, September 13). Azerbaijan has recently allowed the Artsax problem to undercut the country's NATO aspirations and, potentially, its relations with Washington. In 2003, Azerbaijan refused to participate in the Cooperative Best Effort exercise that Armenia hosted successfully that year with full-fledged Turkish participation. In February 2004, an Azeri officer assassinated an Armenian fellow-officer during a NATO-sponsored seminar in Hungary. The crime did not meet with unequivocal condemnation in Azerbaijan. (By the same token it led to anti-Azeri stereotyping in most of Armenia's media.) When two Armenian officers attended a June 2004 Cooperative Best Effort planning conference in Baku, KLO members broke into the conference hall, threatened the participants, and rioted in the city center. The police intervened late and ineffectively. Six KLO militants, including their leader, were then sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to five years. On September 9, President Aliev, speaking in his capacity as a citizen, described the sentence as excessive and proposed that the Court of Appeals amend it (AzerNews, September 9). Political advisers did Aliev a disservice by recommending resistance to Armenian participation in Cooperative Effort-2004. First, those advisers failed to appreciate that NATO could not allow any PfP country to decide who may or may not participate in the alliance's exercises. Second, by disrupting a NATO peacekeeping exercise, those advisers damaged Azerbaijan's own efforts to promote the internationalization of conflict management efforts in the South Caucasus with full-fledged Western participation. Third, Baku unwittingly gave some ammunition to those in NATO who would further delay the approval of Azerbaijan's Individual Partnership Action Plan. Fourth, Baku ended up looking unpredictable while Yerevan looked statesmanlike in this situation. Finally, as an overarching consideration for Azerbaijan to ponder, Armenia-NATO rapprochement could reduce Russia's leverage on Armenia, correspondingly increasing Western opportunities to shape regional security arrangements and resolution of the Artsax conflict. --Vladimir Socor
  5. Eve, just wanted to mention again that I like your avatar and don't pay attention to what Domino says.
  6. I am think for some 10 minutes already but didn't find anything smart to say except that I like you being the rabbit. Not sure where is she pointing with her fingers
  7. Armen

    Jazz

    Armat, if you liked that you will get addicted to De Phazz: http://www.de-phazz.com Not sure if you know them, but I think they are the most sophisticated ones in hip-hop jazz mixes. They also have lot of electronic blues, acid jazz... Their web-site is kinda wierd. Go to link that says heir
  8. This is all nice but Beijing and Moscow can never be allies. This group's (Yerevan, Tehran, Moscow, Beijing) existence is wishful thinking and is more like an Azeri propaganda directed towards making U.S. angry at Armenia. The geopolitical momentum for this alliance is gone. At least because of strong disagreements between Moscow and Beijing.
  9. Yes, that's 100% true, thanks! But same goes for you, so I am kind of not sure what you're asking? And even more unsure what will be your answer if I answer you However, you know I always like when black is black and white is white...So, I like you avatar.
  10. Those were Juan Cole's points, Jewish Friend. I agree with some of them...
  11. I need some more coffee you stay awake but I could try...
  12. Briliant avatar Evelina! Love it.
  13. So that everyone is free enough to post on HF all the time...?
  14. Maral you'll get people fired from their jobs
  15. Armen

    Jazz

    Some day they'll stop asking your permission Armat However, I guess they're going to be great Jazz fans and good Jazz doesn't have that much of offensive stuff.
  16. Armen

    Հայերեն

    Աշխարհի ամենակարևոր երկիրն Ավստիան ա...
  17. Armenian parliament to consider deploying 50 troops to Iraq AP Worldstream Sep 14, 2004 The Armenian parliament will soon consider plans to send about 50 troops to Iraq, lawmakers said Tuesday, a move that has raised some concern in this ex-Soviet republic. Artur Bagdasarian, speaker of the Armenian parliament, said a decision will only be taken after "serious discussion." He said debate would begin soon, but did not give an exact date. The Armenian parliament is dominated by pro-government politicians, making it likely the measure will pass. Armenian President Robert Kocharian pledged the troops during a visit to Poland last week. The Armenian soldiers _ primarily bomb disposal experts, doctors and transport teams _ would work under Polish command, joining roughly 6,500 troops from 16 nations stationed in the Polish contingent in central Iraq. Armenia has sought to portray the decision to send troops to Iraq as a way to boost ties with Europe. Critics worry that it will endanger the 25,000-person Armenian community living in Iraq. Gen. Lt. Yuri Khachaturov, a deputy defense minister, has suggested that sending troops to Iraq could "lead to problems in Armenian society and in Armenia as a whole." He insisted Tuesday that his remarks shouldn't be misinterpreted as opposition to the defense ministry or senior officials, but rather as the opinion of a person who has experienced war. The Democratic Party of Armenia, which is part of the opposition Justice bloc, called on lawmakers to reject the proposal to send troops, saying it "is against our national interests, the interest of state security and would create a threat for our countrymen, especially those living in Muslim nations."
  18. Armenian defence official denies he is unhappy about sending troops to Iraq Mediamax news agency 14 Sep 04 Yerevan, 14 September: Armenian Deputy Defence Minister Lt-Gen Yuriy Khachaturov has made a statement for the media which said the following, in particular,: "I am flatly against speculations about my words. If you conceive the words of a person who participated in two wars and his attitude to war as contradicting the will of the supreme commander-in-chief and the defence minister, then this is not true. I, Yuriy Khachaturov, have always been the soldier of this country and have proven this throughout my military service." Armenian Deputy Defence Minister Lt-Gen Yuriy Khachaturov said on 7 September that "he was not happy about the idea of sending Armenian military experts to Iraq". The general stressed that it was his "personal opinion". The deputy defence minister noted that "the Armenian servicemen and the Armenian community of Iraq might face problems".
  19. Armen

    Jazz

    http://music.msn.com/album/default.aspx?album=104600 DJ Cam is from the good times when Jazz had an affair with Hip Hop. Check out the second composition "Gangsta shit". Does anyonw know other this kind of stuff?
  20. Eurasia Insight: STRONG TIES BIND RUSSIA AND ARMENIA AT Artsax TALKS Sergei Blagov: 9/14/04 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insi...eav091404.shtml As Armenia and Azerbaijan prepare for tomorrow’s presidential summit on Nagorno-Artsax, Russia has begun to emphasize its own ties with Yerevan, prompting Baku to question the Kremlin’s role as an objective mediator for the conflict. Chances for a genuine breakthrough in the September 15 talks at the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) conference in Astana, Kazakhstan are doubtful, but both Azerbaijan and Armenia are already touting their respective inclinations for peace. On September 2, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev told reporters in the province of Naxcivan, near the Armenian border, that "[t]he fact that I have not yet abandoned negotiations on Nagorno- Artsax means that I believe in their productivity," Interfax reported. In turn, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian announced at an August 30 meeting in Prague with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov that the two sides had made progress in laying "the foundation" for the September talks, according to Interfax. But that foundation is one that Baku believes should include Russia. In August, Azerbaijan called on the Kremlin to step up its own contributions to a Artsax peace deal. Russia, long the region’s heavyweight, appears to be seen by Baku as a potentially influential counterweight to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose own peacemaking efforts via the tripartite Minsk Group have been the subject of much criticism from Azerbaijani parliamentarians and government officials. When Moscow’s response to Baku’s demand came, however, it took place at a meeting with Armenia’s President Robert Kocharian -- the sixth such in the past year. At an August 20 summit in Sochi, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that "Russia is ready to play a role of mediator and guarantor" in the Artsax conflict, but noted that "[t]here have been no breakthrough decisions." A show of Russian support could stand Armenia in good stead at the CIS talks. Speculation has recently mounted that Kocharian is prepared to return the seven Azerbaijani territories it occupies in exchange for a peace deal on Armenian-controlled Artsax. According to one recent opinion poll, that would place Kocharian at variance with nearly half of Armenia’s population -- a delicate situation for a leader who withstood weeks of opposition protests earlier this spring. In a June 25 poll by the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, 45.5 percent of Armenians stated that they believe that territories seized during the 1991-1994 war with Azerbaijan should remain under Armenian control. Meanwhile, Moscow appears ready to assist. Russia’s longtime influence in the Caucasus is already under political pressure from the US in Georgia and Azerbaijan and also under increasing economic pressure in both Georgia and Armenia from outside energy players like Iran. Even while expressing no official concern at reported US plans to establish a base in Azerbaijan, Moscow has been busy reinforcing its traditionally strong ties with Armenia. Recent military exercises between the two longtime allies appear to have sparked the sharpest concern in Baku. At a training base not far from Yerevan on August 24-28, 1,900 Armenian and Russian troops fought back an imaginary invasion and assault on Russia’s 102nd military base at Guymri. Despite assurances from Armenia’s army that the maneuvers are not directed against a third country, Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry has taken a different view. Voicing concern that Russia had held war games with "an aggressor state," Defense Ministry spokesman Ramiz Melikov has stated that the operations contradicted Russia’s role as a mediator in the Nagorno-Artsax conflict. In November 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov described Armenia as Russia’s "only ally in the South." The Russian military presence in Armenia has deep roots. A 1995 treaty gives Russia’s military base a 25-year-long presence in Armenia, while a 1997 friendship treaty provides for mutual assistance in the event of a military threat to either country. Currently, there are 2,500 Russian military personnel stationed in the country. Recent military materiel shipped to Armenia includes MiG-29 jetfighters and S300 PMU1 air defense batteries, an advanced version of the SA-10C Grumble air defense missile. Russia's Federal Border Guard Service is also deployed to guard Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran. Economic ties could also fuel Azerbaijani fears of favoritism toward its longtime rival. Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia for its natural gas and nuclear fuel supplies. In 2002, Russia wrote off $100 million of Armenia’s external debt in return for control of five state-run Armenian enterprises, including the Razdan thermal power plant. Russia’s state-run Unified Energy Systems power monopoly also controls Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power station and hydro-power plants under a similar debt repayment arrangement -- a deal that has placed 90 percent of Armenia’s energy system in Russian hands. At the same time, however, divergent interests have begun to emerge, most notably with Armenia's aspiration to limit its dependence on Russian energy supplies by building a $120 million, 141-kilometer gas pipeline from Iran to Europe. Iran reportedly has agreed to supply 36 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Armenia from 2007-2027, a plan that could undercut Russian energy companies’ own position in the Caucasus. The plan has yet to be finalized. Such a situation would appear likely to push Russia to forge even closer links with Armenia to protect its own energy interests. If so, the bid to promote Moscow as an objective mediator could be fraught with additional difficulties. In the meantime, with little time remaining before the summit in Astana, the Kremlin is playing its own cards carefully. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mamedyarov had little to show after an August 19 trip to Moscow to discuss Nagorno-Artsax other than an official statement that the Kremlin recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Kocharian was treated to similarly circumspect language at his Sochi summit with Putin. Wedged between foes Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Russian leader said, is in "a very difficult geopolitical situation." Editor’s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.
  21. I don't take it literally. I quoted it for Ara and I suppose he is well read on Nietzsche. This maximalist statement must be viewed in the context of his life, experience and personal spiritual crusade against Christian dogma. E.g. the Nazies took it literally. Nietzsche, in my opinion, is one of the true representatives of the Christian impulse of modern times. His life - along with other personalities of his type and calibre over the course of history - was an accumulation and concentration of change that happened in European (and human) psyche several times in different historical periods and constituted a spiritual breakthrough, which advanced humanity to its next stage of development. The personal tragedy and intellectual tourchers he went through at the dawn of his life reflected the spiritual sacrifice he brought to the altar of freedom...
  22. I surely did not play the role of a trigger or impetus. However, it played and it will play a role of a factor or a tool. The segment of NATO leadership involved in South Caucasus is more U.S. than anything else.
  23. This is correct. However, I am not underselling it. It is true that Russia's cultural and economic life was developed by the time WWI started. I wouldn't say that about the social activities though. You mentioned youself that those who understood the necessity of change were a minority. I would even say that they were a handful of people like Czar Alexander the Second, Prime Minister Petr Stolypin etc. who were actually assasinated by the predecessors of the Bolsheviks for the same reasons that later brought to the Revolution. The key point, in my opinion, is that they prevented the social change, the political reform that would complete the cultural and economic development you mentioned.
  24. Armen

    Հայերեն

    Փանոյան Վիտալիկ Յուրիկի
  25. Armen

    Հայերեն

    Բան ա, ասում խոսւմ էնք էլի:
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