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Armen

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  1. Also, old school was "Erebouni" carpet but nowadays girls prefer only those from Gafesjian
  2. Old school style doesn't work in Holland
  3. Apeldoornse Courant, The Netherlands November 6, 2004 [English follows: translated exclusively for ANN/Groong] Armenier wil trouwen met ontvoerd meisje(17) van een onzer verslaggevers - GRONINGEN - Een 17-jarig meisje uit Oost-Groningen, dat tegen haar wil in een woning in Assen werd vastgehouden, is door de politie bevrijd. Vier Armeense mannen zijn gearresteerd. Het meisje was op klaarlichte dag in de stad Groningen in een auto getrokken en meegenomen. Omstanders hadden gezien dat het meisje zich verzette en om hulp schreeuwde. Toen de politie arriveerde, was de auto al met hoge snelheid weggereden. Op straat werd een tasje aangetroffen met daarin de identiteitspapieren van het meisje dat over zowel de Nederlandse als Armeense nationaliteit beschikt. De politie kwam de ontvoerders snel op het spoor via het kenteken van de auto, dat door omstanders was genoteerd. Enkele uren later werd het meisje in een woning in Assen aangetroffen, waar ze werd bewaakt door een 19-jarige Armenier. Die zei met het meisje te willen trouwen. Omdat in Armenie uithuwelijken niet ongebruikelijk is, wordt de rol van de ouders van het meisje onderzocht. The English Translation: An Armenian wants to marry a kidnapped girl (17) by one of our reporters GRONINGEN - A 17 year-old girl from East Groningen, who was detained against her will, was set free by the police. Four Armenian men have been arrested. Witnesses saw the screaming girl being forced into a car and taken away at high speed. A bag left at the scene established the girl's identity, who has both the Armenian and Dutch nationality. Witnesses who made a note of the car's registration plate, helped police quickly solve this kidnapping. The girl was found at an accommodation in the city of Assen, where a 19 year old Armenian was guarding her. Apparently, the motive of this kidnapping is to facilitate an arranged marriage.
  4. Yes, I am tense today. And I am sorry as well. I spend to much time in front of this PC I guess. Actually, if you could expian what is that piece of software doing I would much appreciate. I am totaly cluless on this.
  5. Siamanto, I think somehow Domino would explain me the whole thing more productively. Why do you care to reply to messages that are in no way adressed to you. My "laundry" joke was in line with the whole thread. If you're begging to be pissed off believe me it is easy to do but I don't have the mood.
  6. Domino, I have no idea what is this all about. If I would have the slightest idea I may consider joining. The only thing I know is that this has something to do with laundry. Apart from that this is all Chinese for me. I mean WU, Seti, folding ... I don't know what you guys are talking about.
  7. Lot of valid questions, which I will take time to think about. I have answers to some of them. But the Taiwan Relations Act is still there
  8. http://www.vic-info.org/images/taiwanrap.gif
  9. In case of war the control of channels becomes vital and cricial. However, in peaceful times there is always lot of maneuvring around channels. In Taiwan;s case there also exists the factor of Taiwanese Straits being the easies and direct way of oil and goods transportation from and to Japan from the Indian ocean. When China started shooting missiles into the Taiwanese Straits in March 1996 to prevent the Taiwanese public of electing a nationalist president (and the succeded) the business life in all Far East virtually stopped for two weeks or so. Also, the state of Sigapour was created with deliberation to keep any country (Malasia and Indonesia particularly) of aqcuiring dominating status over the Malaca Straits. I would also mention that Turley has always used Bosfor as a asset to skillfuly manipulate Russia. At some point they even increased the viability of Baku-Cheihan by closing Bosfor for some days under some environmantal pretext.
  10. U.S. has made a stratagic commitment by the Taiwan Relations Act (see here: http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/taiwact.htm). Note the relevant points in Sec. 2: The U.S. official policy is to agree every peaceful agreement by the sides and prevent forceful resolution of the problem by Beijing. This is a well known commitment by the U.S. If the U.S. changes it to favor Beijing it will be an obvious "sell out" and will incease China's role in the region to a status of a regional dominating power. The Hong Kong situation was different legaly. There was a document signed between China and Britain giving the right of sovereignity over Hong Kong to the UK for 99 years. When that period ended China claimed it rights over the territory. Hong Kong has never been independent. On the contraty, Taiwan had a seet in the UN until 1971 when its seet was given to China, in return to a secret US-China alliance against the USSR (Nixon vist, Kissinger negotiations etc.). But it has been very hard for the U.S. to move any further from Taiwan because of the Taiwanese lobby in the Congress as well as strong Pentagon interest to sell weapons to Taiwan. MJ, you're right in predicting the further reforms in China and Taiwan's subsequent realization that it is not worth the fight because they are escencially Chinese. But this all will happen if the current deadlock is resolved. Democratic system sometimes has negative impact on a peace process. And this is the case in Taiwan right now. If the nationalists would not be voted into power both in 2000 and 2004 (this last election being questionable) I would agree with you. Japan's situation is different from Armenia. Japan has an already developed economy and it cannot decrease its capacity (I am sure there is an academic term for this in economics) without a huge social cataclizm. To the contrary Armenia's development was never tied to increasing amount of oil needs because the nuclear plant fuels the limited industrial "growth". Japan has always been very sensetive to political pressures resulting from its oil needs. Althought it has a big reserve of oil and gaz, a single speculation of possible unstability in oil and LNG delivery will galvanize its price in Japan anytime. Japan has built lot of nuclear plants because of this. Nonetheless, they still have huge dependence on oil and gaz deliveries. Japanese government will not be permitted by its business to put the price of oil in Japan in any other country's hands. If the Asean Free Trade agreement advances in a way where Japan has an equal say that may happen. However, in any scenario of economic balance with China, Japan will seek to develop its military (or rather to display because it is there) capability in full fledge which will mean that the U.S. is out of the region as a seller of security. I agree with this.
  11. That is the problem. Leaving Taiwan at unease makes them search for alternative partners and ways. Moreover, Taiwan's current government are extreme nationalists, who are advocating the "Taiwanesation" of the Taiwan (as opposed to Chinese sentiments of the former Kuomingdang), which makes China go ballistic. The 2008 Beijing olympics are gradually forming a subconscious threshold for solveing the problem in all the three capitals. Also, Taiwan's current presidnet clearly understands that if Taiwan has a chance to make the move to independence the window of opportunity is the two years prior to the olympics becuase Beijing will have the international constranits of extreme military actions because of largesacle preparation to make the 2008 olympics a show of China's comeback to the world stage as a global civilization. So, Taiwan's current elite has tremendous pressure of effective decision-making. Moreover, they clearly understand that at some point the U.S. may choose to sell them out. This makes them move closer to Japan, which acts as an independent player in this situation. By selling out Taiwan U.S. will compromise all its credibility as a reliable ally in the region, which will force other regional U.S. allies to chose China more for their security arrangements. This will inevitable move China into a central position in Asia, which U.S will not tolerate because China is not going to act like a U.S. regional proxy as e.g. Britain does in Europe. So, the situation may go the wronge way. Althouth this last few years the Bush administration was very skillful in handelling the situation. The Russian - Japanese pipeline has a very high political motive. (Actually, it was to be built to China by Yukos, but Yukos was removed from the contract). China lobbied havily to get the pipeline but didn't get it and was very much frustrated by the fact that Japan got primary role in the project by commiting to pay a large sum. The Chinese wanted the pipelinge to pass through their territory so that they control the access. But Japan reversed the direction to the port of Nakhodka where Japan, Korea and China will have an equal access. This shows exactly how much Japan is worried by the increasing role of China in the region. As for the Japanese capabilities, I believe they have the means to defend themselves agaist any country without the U.S. assistance if they have an independent access to oil. Currently, the U.S. and Singpour contol the Asian access to Middle East oil by controling the Malaca channel. Russia will be a junior partner only if its positions in the Caucasus are kept relatively large. Large enough to keep calm the population. If it is out of Caucasus I don't know what will be the reaction. It may go either way. We may well see another revolution. I agree, Europes role is going to diminish if they do not reverse the current course of events.
  12. The U.S. - China alliance has a very high probability, as you noticed in the long run. However, for the time being numerous think tanks, both the U.S. and the Chinese governments, as well as those concerned in the business world are "praying" to see the Taiwan issue get resolved. At this moment Taiwan issue has reached a very dangerous threshold. The deepening of U.S. - Chinese relations is impossible without this solution. Also, if U.S. formes this allience, it will inevitably lose Japan as an ally, which will revise its constitution and become a full fledged military player. A counter Russo-Japanese alliance (note: the Russian - Japanese oil pipeline project) is possible in this case. This will bring Eurasia back to the traditional situation of European - Japanese cooperation through Russia with Europe being a less active player. Also, the European invetments in Chinese economy (German and Freinch inparticular) are significant enough to prevent China from direct conforntation with EU. Recent visit by Chirac to China comes to prove this. However, if the Taiwan issue is resolved the cooperation between U.S. and China will gain another momentum. In this case all the existing big projects will be realized in high speed.
  13. I agree. I would add that this deal (and the article) is more a political manifestation than a possibility of an economic reality. There are a number of similar deals like Kazakh-Chinese pipeline, Russian - Japanese oil project in Far East, Russia - India - Iran ( the so-called North - South project) that exists because of the larger geopolitical game in the region. The interseting part however is that China has finally trown the glove and is fully entering the Great Game. Let's see if the U.S. will be able to pick it up with uncertainty in Iraq and hostile Europe.
  14. One little addition. "China" is a woman in its essence.
  15. Agence France Presse -- English November 5, 2004 Friday 12:56 PM GMT NATO chief tells Azerbaijan to turn page in relations with Armenia BAKU NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Friday told Azerbaijan to "turn a page" in its relations with arch rival Armenia, its Caucasus neighbor with which it remains in a state of war. "At a certain stage you'll have to turn a page," de Hoop Scheffer said as he continued a tour of the Caucasus. De Hoop Scheffer spoke as he prepared to fly out of oil-rich Azerbaijan, where he met with President Ilham Aliyev, to neighboring Armenia to hold talks with its President Robert Kocharian. The former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, over Nagorno-Artsax, an ethnic Armenican enclave in Azeri territory. A cease fire agreement was signed in 1994 with Nagorno-Artsax effectively remaining in Armenian hands, but with Baku still claiming rights to it. The two sides have yet to sign a peace treaty and formally remain in a state of war. In September, Azerbaijan refused to let officers from Armenia take part in NATO-sponsored war games on its territory. The games were called off as a result. "These kind of activities should be accessible for anybody and everybody," De Hoop Scheffer said Friday. "My advice would be if there is Armenian representation, what is a better way ... to discuss these fundamental problems. Let the Azeri voice be heard also in the presence of (Armenians)." The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan killed an estimated 35,000 people and displace close to one million. Years of negotiations chaired by the so-called Minsk group -- chaired by France, Russia and the United States and operating under a mandate from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- have failed to find a solution and today no transport or communication lines link the two neighbors. Nagorno-Artsax "is a big problem which has created a lot of suffering already for much too many years and which urgently needs a solution," De Hoop Scheffer said. The NATO chief arrived in Baku from neighboring Georgia, where he met with President Mikhail Saakashvili, who aims to join the alliance within four years.
  16. ArmenPress Nov. 5, 2004 US DISAPPROVES OF AZERBAIJAN'S MOTION BAKU, NOVEMBER 5, ARMENPRESS: The US ambassador in Azerbaijan, Rino Harnish, said his government disapproves Azerbaijan's initiative to include an item on the occupied Azerbaijan territories on the UN General Assembly's session. "The official Washington is against this idea," the ambassador was quoted as saying by ATV television. He said the US sees a solution to the Karabagh conflict through regular peaceful talks between the parties. The ambassador also said the official Baku has to make a concrete decision concerning the participation of Armenian parliament members in a NATO seminar in Baku, adding that Azerbaijan's failure to do so would mean its failure to respect the principle of inclusiveness.
  17. NATO chief rules out plans on bases in Azerbaijan Turan news agency 5 Nov 04 BAKU "I have had productive meetings with the Azerbaijani leadership, including tete-a-tete talks with President Ilham Aliyev, and I am very pleased with the results," NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said opening his news conference at Baku airport before leaving Azerbaijan. The subject of the talks was plans for further cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan in the light of the Individual Partnership Action Plan. "We have exchanged opinions, now both we and you have a big home task which needs to be seriously worked on," the secretary-general said. He said that the sphere of cooperation ranged from projects within the framework of restoring the Great Silk Road and environmental protection to scientific research. "The Artsax problem was also discussed, but it is known that NATO is not engaged in this issue and is not going to be involved. NATO respects Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, but it is up to the OSCE Minsk Group to deal with the settlement of the problem, and the alliance does not interfere in this process," Scheffer said. Asked about whether he had discussed the holding of a seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Baku and the possible presence at the event of Armenian MPs, Scheffer answered affirmatively. "NATO principles are widely known, and I think that they will be put into practice. This means that every participant in the Partnership for Peace Programme can take part in all projects within the framework of the programme, and in this seminar as well," the secretary-general said. As for the cancellation of the Cooperative Best Effort 2004 exercises in Baku in September [2004], Scheffer said: "I made this decision after a telephone conversation with Ilham Aliyev". "NATO is not planning to set up military bases in Azerbaijan," Scheffer said, commenting on reports in a number of western media in this regard. As for the Individual Partnership Action Plan with Azerbaijan, this is "a very expanded programme" that envisages serious reforms in the army and the defence system in general, as well as ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights.
  18. NATO not to be involved in Artsax settlement, Scheffer says in Armenia Mediamax news agency 5 Nov 04 YEREVAN NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in Yerevan today that "the alliance has no intention or ambition to settle the Nagornyy Artsax conflict". Mediamax news agency reports that the secretary-general said this at a briefing on the results of his meeting with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that although "NATO is in favour of a swift solution to this conflict, which has been dragging on for too long, we think that the main role in the peace process should be played by the OSCE Minsk Group". Jaap de Hoop Scheffer also gave a negative answer to a question about NATO's possible involvement in ensuring the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. He said that "stability and security in the region are important factors for the work of pipelines, but this does not mean that NATO intends to play any active role in this process".
  19. NATO chief hails ties with Armenia Mediamax news agency 5 Nov 04 YEREVAN NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in Yerevan today that "relations between NATO and Armenia are developing very well". The secretary-general said this at a briefing on the results of his meeting with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, Defence Minister Serzh Sarkisyan and Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan, Mediamax news agency reports. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that Armenia has taken a very important step, having expressed its readiness to sign the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. The NATO secretary-general pointed out in this connection that Armenia itself should define its priorities and submit them to NATO for examination. In any case, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed "the IPAP will be a product of the Armenian side". Talking about his visit to all three South Caucasus countries, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed that "NATO has no intention of competing with any country or international organization in this region".
  20. Note to Europe Bush's Win Was No Fluke By James K. Glassman Posted: Friday, November 5, 2004 ARTICLES Wall Street Journal Europe Publication Date: November 5, 2004 During his first term, Europe saw George W. Bush as a fluke. He had won in 2000 without a majority, gaining the White House chicanery or outrageous luck, and he had been a disaster as president. Surely, given the choice of the urbane John Kerry, Americans would not re-elect this hick. But, of course, they did. Tuesday, Mr. Bush won a second term by four million votes, becoming the first president since Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 to gain re-election while picking up seats in both houses of Congress. In the Senate, the Democratic leader was defeated and Republicans widened their lead to 10 seats from two. Mr. Bush won despite 1,000 American deaths in Iraq, an economy that is generating new jobs at a tepid pace, a faltering performance in the presidential debates and the nearly unanimous opposition of the media. It was a triumph, and Europeans needs to recognize that its effects will probably endure. The Republican party of Ronald Reagan, which followed a half-century of Democratic dominance in American politics, is consolidating its power. The best advice I can give Europeans is: Live with it! President Bush is no fluke, and there's no wishing him away. The good news is that Mr. Bush isn't devious or unpredictable. He's entirely open and obvious. A major theme of his campaign was that he does what he says. For example, in March 2001, he rejected the Kyoto Protocol on climate change as "fatally flawed." For nearly four years, Europeans have acted as if Mr. Bush didn't believe what he said, or that they could apply enough moral suasion to change his mind. Won't happen. A smarter policy would have been to find a new approach to mitigating the possibility of global warming--one with a sounder scientific basis and a lower economic cost. Bribing Russia to join Kyoto is not going to sway George Bush one inch. The caricature of President Bush the unilateralist is inaccurate. He went to the United Nations before invading Iraq, and he assembled an international coalition to fight the war. But Europeans should recognize that Mr. Bush scored points in the campaign when he derided Sen. Kerry's suggestion that the U.S. needed a permission slip from the U.N., France and Germany before defending itself, and Bush went out of his way during the debates to criticize the International Criminal Court. Americans don't want to pull out of the U.N.; to the contrary, they want it to be effective. A survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 87% of the public favors "working through the United Nations to strengthen international laws against terrorism." Expect, however, that the administration will take a close look at U.N. institutions like the World Health Organization, which, with heavy support from American taxpayers, revel in attacking U.S. policies and businesses. But hasn't Mr. Bush been hypocritical? It's true that, during the first term, he let expediency in domestic politics influence decisions in international economics. I'm thinking of the steel tariffs he imposed in March 2002 and lifted two years later. Don't expect that sort of cynicism in the second term--since Mr. Bush can't run for a third. Instead, anticipate that Mr. Bush will push hard to open new markets and to lower barriers in the United States. He has no doubts about the benefits of free trade. The American economy is growing roughly twice as fast as Europe's. President Bush's re-election will put more pressure on EU leaders to consider adopting more business-friendly policies; it is evident that Bush's embrace of free, competitive markets, low taxes and light regulatory touch underpin the U.S.'s widening comparative advantage in the biotech and pharmaceutical sectors. In fact, the greatest challenge Mr. Bush poses to the security of European leaders is not in foreign policy but in economics. The president's top goals in the second term are to overhaul the U.S. tax and Social Security systems. If he succeeds, the gap between America's growth rate and Europe's will widen, and political pressure in Europe for free-market reforms will grow. Jeremy Rifkin, an American polemicist of the left, has just written a book that extols the "European Dream"--the good life of long vacations and "sustainable development." But this is precisely wrong. Europe is living in a fool's paradise, with huge demographic imbalances, untenable health care systems, rising crime, and high unemployment. Economic growth of 1 percent or 2 percent a year can't support the welfare state politicians have promised, and Europe can't possibly afford the economic costs that an adventure like Kyoto entails and they will have to address the heavy cost-burden of "health care for all." My own guess is that, over the next few years, the complacent EU nations (such as Germany and France) will be pushed hard by the aspiring EU nations (such as Ireland and Poland) to build a Europe that looks more like George Bush's America. And it won't be a fluke. James K. Glassman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
  21. http://www.atimes.com Middle East China Rocks the Geopilitical Boat TEHRAN - Speaking of business as unusual. A mere two months ago, the news of a China-Kazakhstan pipeline agreement, worth US$3.5 billion, raised some eyebrows in the world press, some hinting that China's economic foreign policy may be on the verge of a new leap forward. A clue to the fact that such anticipation may have totally understated the case was last week's signing of a mega-gas deal between Beijing and Tehran worth $100 billion. Billed as the "deal of century" by various commentators, this agreement is likely to increase by another $50 billion to $100 billion, bringing the total close to $200 billion, when a similar oil agreement, currently being negotiated, is inked not too far from now. The gas deal entails the annual export of some 10 million tons of Iranian liquefied natural gas (LNG) for a 25-year period, as well as the participation, by China's state oil company, in such projects as exploration and drilling, petrochemical and gas industries, pipelines, services and the like. The export of LNG requires special cargo ships, however, and Iran is currently investing several billion dollars adding to its small LNG-equipped fleet. Still, per the admission of the head of the Iranian Tanker Co, Mohammad Souri, Iran needed to purchase another 87 vessels by 2010, in addition to the 10 already purchased, in order to fulfill the needs of its growing LNG market. Iran has an estimated 26.6-trillion-cubic-meter gas reservoir, the second-largest in the world, about half of which is in offshore zones and the other half onshore. It is perhaps too early to digest fully the various economic, political and even geostrategic implications of this stunning development, widely considered a major blow to the Bush administration's economic sanctions on Iran and particularly on Iran's energy sector, notwithstanding the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) penalizing foreign companies daring to invest more than $20 million in Iran's oil and gas industry. While it is unclear what the scope of China's direct investment in Iran's energy sector will turn out to be, it is fairly certain that China's participation in the Yad Avaran field alone will exceed the ILSA's ceiling; this field's oil reservoir is estimated to be 17 billion barrels and is capable of producing 300 to 400 barrels per day. And this is besides the giant South Pars field, which Iran shares with Qatar, alone possessing close to 8% of the world's gas reserves. To open a parenthesis here, until now Tehran has been complaining that Qatar has been outpacing Iran in exploiting its resource 6-1. In fact, Iran's unhappiness over Qatar's unbalanced access to the South Pars led to a discrete warning by Iran's deputy oil minister and, soon thereafter, Qatar complied with Iran's request for a joint "technical committee" that has yet to yield any result. For a United States increasingly pointing at China as the next biggest challenge to its Pax Americana, the Iran-China energy cooperation cannot but be interpreted as an ominous sign of emerging new trends in an area considered vital to US national interests. But, then again, this cuts both ways, that is, the deal should, logically speaking, stimulate others who may still consider Iran untrustworthy or too radical to enter into big projects on a long term basis. Iran's biggest foreign agreement prior to this gas agreement with China was a long-term $25 billion gas deal with Turkey, which has encountered snags, principally over the price, recently, compared with Iran's various trade agreements with Spain, Italy and others, typically with a life-span of five to seven years. Thus some Iranian officials are hopeful that the China deal can lead to a fundamental rethinking of the risks of doing business with Iran on the part of European countries, India, Japan, and even Russia. Concerning India, which signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran initially in 1993 for a 2,670-kilometer pipeline, with more than 700km traversing Pakistani territory, the Iran-China deal will undoubtedly give a greater push to New Delhi to follow Beijing's lead and thus make sure that the "peace pipeline" is finally implemented. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to Russia, which has as of late been dragging its feet somewhat on Iran's nuclear reactor, bandwagoning with the US and Group of Eight (G8) countries on the thorny issue of Iran's uranium-enrichment program. The Russians must now factor in the possibility of being supplanted by China if they lose the confidence of Tehran and appear willing to trade favors with Washington over Iran. Russia's Gazprom may now finally set aside its stubborn resistance to the idea of entering major joint ventures with Iran. Iran appears more and more interested to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and form a powerful axis with its twin pillars, China and Russia, as a counterweight to a US power "unchained". The SCO comprises China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. China, Russia and Iran share deep misgivings about the perception of the United States as a "benevolent hegemon" and tend to see a "rogue superpower" instead. Even short of joining forces formally, the main outlines of such an axis can be discerned from their convergence of threat perception due to, among other things, Russia's disquiet over the post-September 11, 2001, US incursions in its traditional Caucasus-Central Asian "turf", and China's continuing unease over the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; this is not to mention China's fixed gaze at a "new Silk Road" allowing it unfettered access to the Middle East and Eurasia, this as part and parcel of what is often billed as "the new great game" in Eurasia. Indeed, what China's recent deals with both Kazakhstan (pertaining to Caspian energy) and Iran (pertaining to Persian Gulf resources) signifies is that the pundits had gotten it wrong until now: the purview of the new great game is not limited to the Central Asia-Caspian Sea basin, but rather has a broader, more integrated, purview increasingly enveloping even the Persian Gulf. Increasingly, the image of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a sort of frontline state in a post-Cold War global lineup against US hegemony is becoming prevalent among Chinese and Russian foreign-policy thinkers. For the moment, however, the Iran-Russia-China axis is more a tissue of think-tanks than full-fledged policy, and the mere trade interdependence of the US and China, as well as Russia's growing energy ties to the US alone, not to mention its weariness over any perceived Chinese "overstretch", militate against a grand alliance pitted against the Western superpower. In fact, the Cold War-type alliances are highly unlikely to be replicated in the current milieu of globalization and complex interdependence; instead, what is likely to emerge in the future are issue-focused or, for the lack of a better word, issue-area alliances whereby, to give an example, the above-said axis may be inspired into existence along geostrategic considerations somewhat apart from purely economic considerations. Hence what the SCO means on the security front and how significant it will be hinges on a complex, and complicated, set of factors that may eventually culminate in its expansion, from the current group of six, as well as greater, alliance-like, cooperation. It is noteworthy that in Central Asia-Caucasus, the trend is toward security diversification and even multipolarism, reflected in the US and Russian bases not too far from each other. In this multipolar sub-order, neither the US is capable of exerting hegemony, nor is Russia's semi-hegemonic sway without competition. In the Caspian Sea basin, for example, Kazakhstan has opted to take part in several distinct, and contrasting, security networks, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace program, the Commonwealth of Independent States' Collective Security Organization, the SCO, and membership in OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Kazakhstan is not, however, an exception, but seemingly indicative of an expanding new rule of the (security and strategic) game played out throughout Central Asia-Caucasus. Economically, both Kazakhstan and Russia are members of the Central Asia Economic Cooperation Organization, and all the Central Asian states are also members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which was founded by the trio of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Certain economic alliances are, henceforth, taking shape, alongside the budding security arrangements, which have their own tempo, rationale and security potential. Concerning the latter, in 1998, the ECO embarked on low security cooperation among its members on drug trafficking and this may soon be expanded to information-sharing on terrorism. Also, Iran has also entered into low security agreements with some of its Persian Gulf neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The SCO initially was established to deal with border disputes and is now well on its way to focusing on (Islamist) terrorism, drug trafficking and regional insecurity. Meanwhile, the US, not to be outdone, has been sowing its own bilateral military and security arrangements with various regional countries such as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as promoting the Guuam Group, which includes Azerbaijan and Georgia, formed alongside the BTC (Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan) pipeline as a counterweight to Russian influence. Consequently, the overall picture that emerges before us is, as stated above, a unique multi-trend of military and security multipolarism defying the logic of Pax Americana. In this picture, Iran represents one of the poles of attraction, seeking its own sphere of influence by, for instance, entering into a military agreement with Turkmenistan in 1994, and, simultaneously, exploring the larger option of how to coalesce with other powers in order to offset the debilitating consequences of (post-September 11) unbounded Americanization of regional politics. A glance at Chinese security narratives, and it becomes patently obvious that Beijing shares Iran's deep worries about US unipolarism culminating in, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, unilateral militarism. Various advocates of US preeminence, such as William Kristol, openly write that the US should "work for the fall of the Communist Party oligarchy in China". Unhinged from the containment of Soviet power, the roots of US unilateralism, and its military manifestation of "preemption", must be located in the logic of unipolarism, thinly disguised by the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq; the latter is, in fact, as aptly put by various critics of US foreign policy, more like a coalition of the coerced and bribed than anything else. But, realistically speaking, what are the prospects for any regional and or continental realignment leading to the erasure of US unipolarism, notwithstanding the US military and economic colossus bent on preventing, on a doctrinal level, the emergence of any challenger to its global domination now or in the future? The strategic debates in all three countries, Russia, China and Iran, feature similar concerns and question marks. For one thing, all three have to contend with the difficulty of sorting the disjunctions between the different sets of national interests, above all economic, ideological and strategic interests. This aside, a pertinent question is who will win over Russia, Washington, which pursues a coupling role with Moscow vis-a-vis Beijing, or Beijing, trying to wrest away Moscow from Washington? For now, Russia does not particularly feel compelled to choose between stark options, yet the situation may be altered in China's direction in case the present drift of US power incursions are heightened in the future. The answer to the above question should be delegated to the future. For now, however, the quantum leap of China into the Middle East and Caspian energy markets has become a fait accompli, no matter how disturbed its biggest trade partner, the US, over its geopolitical ramifications. Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and "Iran's Foreign Policy Since 9/11", Brown's Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003. He teaches political science at Tehran University.
  22. http://www.hzh.am/05.11.04.html Read my discussion with MJ. Than read the article above. I thought it is only my feeling. Seems like it is general.
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