The Economist
Feb 5 2004
SURVEY: ISLAM AND THE WEST
The next war, they say
Aug 4th 1994
Are Muslims and the people of the West doomed to perpetual
confrontation? Not if they both see that this is a moment for change,
argued Brian Beedham in 1994
THIS survey is different from most surveys in The Economist. It is
not about a country, an industry, a financial organisation or
anything else that can be described and measured with some degree of
precision. It is about an idea: perhaps the only idea of its kind in
today's world.
The idea, Islam, ignores the frontier that most people draw between
man's inner life and his public actions, between religion and
politics. It may be the last such idea the world will see. Or it may,
on the contrary, prove to be the force that persuades other people to
rediscover a connection between day-to-day life and a moral order.
Either way, it denies turn-of-the-century western conventional
wisdom. This survey is an exploration of the misty territory of
religio-political conviction.
If that sounds dreamy, think again. One of the commonest prophecies
of the mid-1990s is that the Muslim world is heading for a fight with
other parts of the world that do not share its religio-political
opinions: above all, worry nervous Europeans, a fight with Europe. On
current evidence, this is by no means impossible.
In Europe, Bosnian Muslims have for more than two years been brutally
harried by Serbs who are theoretically Christians. On the border
between Europe and Asia, Christian Armenians have thumped Muslim
Azeris, admitted with rather more provocation, and Jews and Muslims
still shoot each other in Palestine. Farther east, Muslims complain
of the Indian army's brutality to them in Kashmir, and of Indian
Hindus' destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in 1992. Such experiences
tend to make Muslims think the world is against them. If it is, then
they are against the world. Hence the xenophobia that gets foreigners
murdered by Koran-quoting terrorists in Algeria and Egypt. Islam, as
Samuel Huntington, a professor at Harvard University, has put it, has
bloody borders.
It was Mr Huntington who provided the intellectual framework for the
fear of a confrontation between Islam and the West. In a widely read
article about a coming "clash of civilisations" in Foreign Affairs in
the summer of 1993 he argued, correctly, that the nation-state is no
longer the primary unit of international relations. Just as
correctly, alas, he assumed that competition and conflict are not
about to disappear from men's relations with each other. So the
competition and the conflict will have to be worked out at another
level—chiefly, says Mr Huntington, among the larger units known as
cultures or civilisations, each consisting of groups of countries.
Here comes the contest of the giants.
As a general thesis, this may be true enough; but, of the eight
civilisations that Mr Huntington lists, four or five do not really
fit his definition. Latin America is not fundamentally different from
the western culture that brought it into being, as both parts of its
name suggest. The same can be said, with little more hesitation,
about the Slavs of the Orthodox Christian tradition, who are
admittedly different from the Protestant and Catholic West but
probably not enough to be called a separate civilisation. With one
more degree of hesitation, that also applies to Japan and its
connection with the Chinese culture to its west. The culture of
India's Hindus is indeed sui generis, but Hinduism is not—and
probably never will be—a player on the world stage. And Africa, as Mr
Huntington himself seems to admit, is not really in this league.
The three prime numbers
There are in fact only three reasonably clear contenders in Mr
Huntington's advertised clash of civilisations. The first is the
West, the Euro-American culture that is the product of the
Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and is the
begetter of modern capitalism and democracy.
The second is the Confucian culture, the body of ideas that has grown
up around the Chinese language and the habits of public life that are
said to belong to the Chinese region. But this has its qualification.
Those supposed Confucian habits of public life—a cheerful respect for
authority on the part of the governed, based upon the assumption that
Confucian governments honestly use their authority for the benefit of
those they rule—may be no more than a polite fiction. The history of
the Chinese-speaking world contains at least as much selfishness and
brutality on the part of the rulers, and at least as much dumb
suffering on the part of the ruled, as the history of any other part
of the globe. The idea that there is today a special understanding
between governors and governing in eastern Asia is largely
self-protecting propaganda by the men in power in Beijing, Singapore,
Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere.
The third contender is Islam. This does genuinely stand alone. There
is good reason why the culture of the Muslim world is regarded by
many people as the West's only real ideological competitor at the end
of the 20th century. Unlike the Confucians—and even more unlike Latin
Americans, Slavs and Japanese—Islam claims to be an idea based upon a
transcendental certainty. The certainty is the word of God, revealed
syllable by syllable to Muhammad in a dusty corner of Arabia 1,400
years ago and copied down by him into the Koran.
As a means of binding a civilisation together, there is no substitute
for such a certainty. Moreover—and this is not happening anywhere
else—new recruits are flocking to join this claim to certainty.
Whether it is because of the repeated defeats inflicted upon Muslims
by the outside world, or because of the corrupt incompetence of most
of their own governments, the past 25 years have seen a huge growth
in what outsiders call Islamic fundamentalism. Muslims themselves
hate the phrase, but it is not inaccurate. A large number of people
who feel ashamed of the past few centuries want to show they can do
better. To do that, they need to rediscover a sense of identity. And
to do that, they turn back to the Koran. You can call it a revival,
or a resurgence; but it is also a return to the foundations.
This is what has set scalps tingling in other parts of the world,
especially among Europeans. They see the Last Ideology on the march.
A Muslim crescent curls threatening around the southern and eastern
edges of Europe. A new cold war could be on the way. And it may not
stop at being a cold war.
The writer of this survey is not convinced. It is true that some
Muslims are behaving ferociously these days, and that on the southern
shore of the Mediterranean, in particular, some ugly things are
taking shape. It is also true that Europe and Islam have had a rough
time together in the past. That rough time included two penetrations
by Muslim armies deep into Europe, the largely incompetent European
counter-attacks called the crusades, and the absorption of virtually
the whole Muslim world into various European empires in the 19th and
early 20th centuries. It is not a good-neighbourly story. But past
enmities and present bad temper need not be the premises of a
syllogism that is bound to end: therefore, new war between Islam and
the West.
For one thing, these two civilisations have more in common with each
other than either has with the Confucian world or the Hindu one, or
most of the rest of the Huntington culture collection. Both have
their origins in religions that believe in a single God (and any
westerner who asks what that has to do with modern life needs to
think about what made the West as it is today). Few westerners
believe that God dictated the Koran, and no Muslim believes that
Jesus was the son of God. Those are important disagreements, but they
sit alongside a large number of shared convictions. A Muslim and a
westerner both believe, more clearly than most other people, in the
idea of individual responsibility. They can exchange opinions about
the nature of good and evil, or property rights, or the preservation
of the environment, in something like a spirit of brotherhood.
It is even tempting to wonder whether Islam's bloody clashes with
Europe in the past could have been avoided had geography and history
been a little kinder. Of course, religion was one of the things that
drove these two peoples into battle with each other, especially in
the early days when the Arabs pushed up to Poitiers and the crusaders
lumbered to Jerusalem. But religion was never the entire explanation
for such clashes.
These were two young cultures, full of energy and eager to show what
they could do; and in the world of that time, between Muhammad's
death in 632Ad and the capture of Louis IX of France in Egypt during
the seventh crusade in 1250, they had nobody to unleash their zeal on
but each other. The rest of the world was still largely a blank to
them. Had they lived in today's many-peopled world—or been separated
from each other by sea or desert, so that they could not so readily
march and counter-march—their religious differences might not have
had such bloody results. But self-assertion and propinquity did their
work, with the usual results.
The difficulty with neighbours
The trouble is that propinquity and self-assertion are still at work
today. The proposition of this survey is that there is no insuperable
reason why Muslims and westerners cannot live peaceably with each
other. It will take sensible handling by both sides, and some
re-examination by both of their present ideas about the world. In
particular, Muslims will need to find a way of adjusting their habits
to three specific requirements of modern life. There is no fatal
obstacle to this; nothing in the essentials of either civilisation to
make harmony impossible.
The hope contained in that proposition has even survived the Iranian
revolution of 1979. Iran is the chief home of the Shias, the always
quarrelsome 15% minority of Muslims who broke away from the Sunni
majority way back in the early days of the faith. Iran's
revolutionaries started out as snarling enemies of the West. They can
still growl, and bite. But time, and the sobering experience of
government, have made them noticeably milder in their foreign policy
as well as in what they do at home. They do not destroy the belief
that, in the long run, Islam and the West can co-exist.
Unfortunately, in the shorter run—meaning within the next year or
so—something may happen in North Africa that could throw at least a
temporary spanner into the works. This is the highly probable
collapse of the present government of Algeria, and its replacement by
a singularly intransigent bunch of Islamic rebels, fundamentalists of
the most bloody-minded sort. A series of mistakes—first by the
generals running Algeria, then by most of the West's
governments—seems likely to bring to power in Algiers a group of men
who will, for a time, be very hard to deal with. They are for good
reason angry both with the corruptly authoritarian regime they will
be replacing and with the West for having supported that regime, even
when it had plainly been rejected by the Algerian people.
If this happens in Algeria, the effects will spill over into other
parts of North Africa, and maybe even farther into the Islamic world;
and a familiar cycle will begin all over again. Anti-western anger on
one side of the Mediterranean will provoke anti-Muslim resentment on
the other, which will further feed that anti-western anger. Europe
and Islam will, for a period, be at it again.
Three articles later in the survey will look at the three things
Muslims need to do (and in some countries are already doing) to move
confidently into the 21st century. They are, in rising order of
difficulty, coping with a modern economy, accepting the idea of
sexual equality, and, hardest of all, learning to absorb the
principle of democracy. But first a closer look at that swelling
thunder-cloud on the southern coast of the Mediterranean.
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