China's new war on corruption
By Tian Jing
HONG KONG - Last year, when the Chinese government proudly unveiled a satellite telemetry scan to map the country as part of its new, much-heralded space program, the results stunned even the country's most seasoned leaders. The scan uncovered vast amounts of farmland being converted across the country for illegal uses.
That in turn has kicked off another of China's massive anti-corruption campaigns to find out who was profiting from misuse of the land. So far, three ministerial-level leaders have been arrested and investigations are being conducted throughout the country. These allegations have reached into the party leadership and the Bank of China as well as local and provincial governments all across the country.
"Ever since the late 1980s, the [illegal] land transfer has incurred a conservatively estimated annual loss of more than 10 billion yuan [uS$1.21 billion], a figure larger than the losses caused by smuggling," according to a government report about the issue.
On January 12, Premier Wen Jiabao issued a stern memo concerning the corruption of China's land market. An urgent teleconference was then held by Tian Fengshan, the then minister of Land and Resources, on February 20 demanding the cleanup of the land market. The ensuing anti-corruption campaign is the biggest since 2000, when, according to Wei Jianxing, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, 132,447 corrupt officials were punished. That included 17 ministerial-level officials and more than 4,400 petty bureaucrats.
Tian Fengshan, who was dismissed on allegations of corruption in October, is the third ministerial-rank official to be unseated this year, following the downfall of two provincial party secretaries: Liu Fangren of Guizhou and Cheng Weigao of Hebei, who were also accused of corruption.
It remains to be seen how far the anti-corruption campaign will go. However, the government publicly says it is ready to eliminate all black sheep, including those in high positions. For a senior official in charge of land resources such as Tian to be axed for land graft, in the Chinese political context, it seems to be an indication of the intensity of this round.
Premier actively pursuing the case
Certainly, Wen Jiabao appears to have put his prestige on the line to pursue the case. Before his removal, Wen ordered Tian to collect statistics on China's national land development status that show that, in 10 provinces, among the 3,837 development zones throughout the country, only 232 were authorized by the State Council and 1,019 by provincial authorities. Up to 68.7 percent of the gross 300,000 hectares of development zones proved to be unauthorized. Illegal approvals have even resulted in the occupation of and transaction of lands earmarked for development zones.
Wen issued two urgent orders in three days in July prohibiting further approval of land utilization and demanding the cleanup of illegal land use and transactions. He launched an investigation on July 31, titled, in the usual stilted Chinese government bureaucratese, the Conference Call on Further Restoring the Order of the Land Market.
Since August 8, 10 investigative panels appointed by the central government have taken joint superintendence over 31 agrarian markets. Although the probe is routed through a variety of government agencies, it is clear that Wen is pulling the strings, in what amounts to the first test of his premiership over corruption. His predecessor, Zhu Rongji, was famous for his outrage over corruption, flinging bureaucrats into jail or before the firing squad without fear or favor.
Illegal land enclosures are widely known across China. But metropolitan areas, especially Beijing and Shanghai, the nation's political and economical capitals respectively, have suffered most. According to a story in the March 11 Economic Observer, "Currently there is not much land left in Shanghai since land in the downtown areas has all been divided, and only Pudong, the district with the most astonishing development pace, still sees many scalpers speculating in land."
Details of illegal expropriation
The story also revealed the procedures for illegally enclosing land. First, it said, illegal developers would get their hands on city zoning plans from compliant officials in government departments. Then they would start to expropriate land now in farms on which the government intended to transfer ownership.
Speculators typically need permission from both local governments and city planning departments to obtain the land. But since land sales bring huge profits, local officials usually collude with scalpers. For example, a bidder typically needs only pay 1 million yuan to obtain a plot later auctioned for 10 million yuan.
Officials then delay the actual date of the land handover by putting off the issuance of necessary permissions such as those for land usage and construction until scalpers drive up the price through many rounds of circular reselling. The transferred land can thus avoid confiscation by the government, which in its effort to fight illegal occupation, has set a policy of confiscating land enclosed more than two years earlier but left idle and undeveloped.
Although central governments have rigid inspection procedures governing the usage of vast plots, local officials can always find loopholes. "Officials and land buyers will divide them into many small parts and report to the government for approval. Actually they are reunited as a whole," the article stated.
Of deeper concern, in August, the Beijing Youth Daily published an unnoticed article from Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, which reported on an enclosure case in Hangzhou involving 2,400 hectares (36,000 mu, or Chinese acres) from 1999 to 2002. Hangzhou, as everyone in China knows, is a city that neighbors Shanghai, an area in which former president Jiang Zemin and his aides had the greatest political influence. The report therefore implied Jiang's cliques' involvement in the land enclosure.
All these lands were left undeveloped while "In the downtown, the land price for developing properties soared to the highest level - 18 million yuan per mu in an auction the year before last," the Beijing Youth Daily reported.
Property magnate runs into trouble
Another difficult case erupted in May after Shanghai residents accused the property mogul Zhou Zhengyi of profiteering on the purchase of their lands. There is a delicate interaction between Premier Wen's anti-land enclosure campaign and this case.
Complaints against Zhou were first lodged at the Shanghai Courthouse by local residents who claimed that Zhou defrayed only part of the contracted compensation for demolishing their abodes after purchasing the land beneath. The outraged plaintiffs staged a protest demonstration before the Shanghai Municipal Government, only to be detained and told to shut up.
They were not easily tamed. Some 200 protesters rallied again before the municipal government building, three of whom appealed to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) in Beijing, China's top anti-corruption authority. The story began to surface in international press reports as well.
The Shanghai government finally answered press questions on September 5 when a spokesman confirmed that Zhou was in jail and that the government would spare no effort to assist investigations from Beijing. Since then, there has been little progress, despite the CDIC's findings that unknown persons in the state banking system had endorsed huge dubious loans to Zhou's projects.
Allegations have been printed that Zhu's wife, Mau Yupin, who is also the chairwoman of Hong Kong-listed Shanghai Merchants Holdings Ltd, boasts an unusual connection with Jiang Zemin's son as well as the brother of a member of the CCP Central Committee, which is impeding investigations. Certainly, there are ties to Liu Jinbao, vice chairman and chief executive of the Bank of China in Hong Kong, who was suddenly removed from his post and recalled over allegations of irregularities in loans in Hong Kong and Shanghai given to Zhou. Liu before his arrest was also a high-ranking CCP official.
By confiscating two of the three plots of land under contention that were bought by Zhou, and by passing the former tycoon's case on to Beijing's jurisdiction, the entire Shanghai government is trying to de-link itself from the scandal. Within a month of the first press conference, a spokesman from the municipal authority told the press again that no government official had been involved in Zhou's case.
Reformers are arrested
Then, on June 22, ominously enough, the Shanghai government confirmed that Zheng Enchong, a renowned barrister who has represented up to 500 families involved in land-grab cases in Shanghai, and who was representing the plaintiffs in the Zhou case, had been imprisoned for "theft of state secrets".
Although some barristers have offered to defend Zheng, a source worried that some officials of the Shanghai government have declared in private that they are determined to prevent Zheng from ever "making trouble" again. Zheng, according to the source, is doomed to be convicted and placed under probation, in order to disbar him forever in accordance with China's constitution. A verdict in his case was scheduled to be handed down on October 28. However, no verdict has been announced.
In addition, Human Rights in China (HRIC) said it had learned that Hong Kong activist Shen Ting, who also was involved in protests by Shanghai residents displaced by redevelopment schemes, was seized by Beijing police, who took her money, airplane tickets and travel documents, making it impossible for her to return to Hong Kong. Nonetheless, some parts of the government continue to move forward. On September 1, Wang Guangtao, China's minister of construction, declared that "problems of non-standardized house relocation and property administration have infringed upon the legal interests of consumers and even incurred group protests and appealing, disturbing the market order. The State Council has therefore called for restructuring and regulating the property market, which has been listed as a particular task this year."
A September 4 report in the Guangdong-based Southern Weekend also commented that the practice of protesting directly to higher level authorities (ie, bypassing their immediate authority) should be protected. However, the Shanghai Morning Post said on October 22 that the government had arrested seven protestors, allegedly for intruding in governmental institutions and disturbing the peace, after they had gone to Beijing to petition in the case.
The growing controversy spurred a commentary in the October 24 Guangming Daily (web version) that citizens' rights of appeal to higher authorities should be guaranteed as constitutionally protected.
A whistle-blower's ordeal
The amount of trouble a whistle-blower can get into is considerable. The lawyer Zheng Enchong is one such case. Another involves Guo Guangyun, age 61. As a result of reporting illegal the activities of Cheng Weigao, the Hebei party secretary who has been dismissed, Guo and some 20 members of his family have suffered considerable persecution. Though already sacked, Cheng has not stood trial and his family members remain beyond justice. Guo and his family are still living in terror.
During eight years of attempts to expose Cheng and an associate, Li Shanlin, Guo was almost killed on two occasions. He was once beaten up and was the target of a traffic accident. A frequent visitor to Shijiazhuang Chinese Medicine Hospital, Guo complains that he suffers from chronic conditions including hypertension, diabetes and heart disease. He has told reporters he began to suffer from these conditions while in detention for attempting to bring Cheng to justice.
Fortunately, he said, most people undergoing re-education in the center and its staff knew for sure that Guo was treated unjustly and worked to protect him from harm.
Guo has been at it a long time. He entered Tongji University in 1961 and graduated in 1966 but was dispatched to a rural area for labor reform for nearly five years after he was labeled a counter-revolutionary figure during the Cultural Revolution, waged by Mao Zedong.
Given his background as a member of a poor family, a political advantage in this era, he was transferred later to the Jinzhou Planning and Construction Bureau of Hubei province, and then the Planning and Construction Committee of Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei province in 1973.
Fourteen years later, he was ultimately promoted to director of the Construction Department and head of the Construction Standardization Bureau, in charge of reviewing and approving all the design and construction schemes of the entire city.
Guo was uncomfortable with the alleged corruption of Li Shanlin, his immediate boss, who is currently behind bars. He sent an anonymous letter to Cheng Weigao, party secretary of Hebei in 1994. Instead of going after Li, Cheng harbored him. Guo found out later that Li was Cheng's loyal partisan.
On August, 1995, Guo sent materials titled, Cheng Weigao and Li Shanlin are the chief culprits of deteriorating the provincial construction market, to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) in Beijing and to the Hebei provincial Procuratorate - only have them relayed to Cheng, who identified Guo after handwriting analysis.
As a result, Guo's house was searched and he was sent to a re-education-through-labor center for two years. Through the efforts of his wife, Guo finished his re-education at end of 1996, one year earlier than scheduled. He continued to accuse Chen and his family members of wrongdoing, in 1997 beginning to sign his and his wife's names to the letters. During eight years of struggle, Guo wrote hundreds of letters, hoping the authorities would take action.
Guo's efforts eventually paid off. In 1999, the Central Inspection Working Group on Three Emphasis Education, a movement to stress theoretical study, political awareness and the good conduct of party members, visited Hebei. Yin Fatang, the person in charge of the group at that time, told South Weekend, an outspoken Guangzhou magazine, that an old cadre had mentioned Guo's case in a colloquium and suggested it was closely related to Cheng.
However, Cheng's responses were much faster. Answering questions from the group, he did not directly make explanations to those charges from Guo. Instead, he argued that such an issue simply should not be dealt with in that session of the movement.
Talking to the weekly, Yin sighed, "Cheng is simply too powerful. Ordinary people dare not touch him. Wei Jiangxing, secretary of CDIC, sent out two orders to inspect him, yet was still unheeded."
Guo's report finally began to be heard by the CDIC, which spent a week listening to him in April 2000. Guo was freed from the labor reform sentence and allowed to resume his Party membership with the warning that the punishment remained on his slate. Unsatisfied, he continued to protest.
Finally, at the beginning of 2003, Cheng attended a CCP preliminary meeting and was removed from his post. Participants say Cheng left the city by train the same night. But the CDIC had collected sufficient evidence against him.
On August 9, Guo was cited as a truth-teller who had faced punishment and was listed as instrumental in the CDIC's decision depriving Cheng of his party membership, an unprecedented move for the party's disciplinary apparat.
Although belated justice finally appeared, Guo says Cheng Muyang, the son of Cheng Weigao, is said to be offering a reward for his death and that of his family. Guo insists on the anonymity of his family members and receives press interviews alone.
Windows of South, another Guangzhou monthly, quoted an anonymous scholar from Peking University as saying, "Leaders [in China] have too much power, with no regulation or limit." A provincial party secretary has the ability to dismiss junior governmental officials, decline legal demands to have him testify or be investigated and to order the police to imprison a citizen and even appeal for a court conviction.
This is a screenshot of the bureaucratic arena in China. As many domestic media experts put it, the "opportunity cost" is too high to report corruption cases, an explanation for the difficulty of eradicating corruption in China.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)