Stormig
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No, you are right, I just browsed the article. But one would have expected a comment like "the last one being 6.8" to come along with the relevant geographic information. That plant and environmentalists (including Greenpeace) running around it happen to be a decade-long story, nearly. My only expectations regarding such a plant at this point are reading plenty of dumb Laz jokes centred around the plant. I was half-serious in my "stood corrected" comment - earthquakes happen just about everywhere, but do you heed them? Certain conclusions about the "benefits" of nuclear plants notwithstanding, certainly even corrupt and incompetent Turkish establishment can't be that lame, with today's technology, can they? They've got one almost on their border, across in Armenia, to fear, and it's not even 180 km from a fault line, it is almost smack on it from anything I've read so far, no kilometer quotes, so I take it as "0" or dangerously close. (How come Greenpeace aren't there - can't take a boat and get a sun tan on land, can they? Never mind all the people living ten kilometers within range of the Metsamor plant.) It is the nuclear nature that is frightening, but if you look up literature about any controversial environmental/social issue like this, you are going to have arguments, counter-arguments, counter-counter-arguments, counter-...-counter-arguments, etc., not many of them about whether it is a time bomb or not. Certainly those who are going to run it ought to have enough savvy to decide whether taking 6.5 for 6.2 should be safe, and it should be more than just calculating how many times stronger one is from the other. Difference of one integer on the Richter scale makes it ten. Then of course there are all the probability calculations for the worst-case scenario (i.e., destructive earthquake), but if I know about these certainly others actually know how to make them. What's left is whether you trust the decision-makers or not. If they are after making contractors rich just like Bush Baby is after making his buddies in the oil industry rich (yes, I see it now, it is not about oil for the U.S., it is about oil for his buddies), then everyone is in deep crap. At some point I would like to do proper research and read up on what world practice is, what the standards are, etc., rather than rely on this "he said, she said" about this Akkuyu and Metsamor. Not that it makes a difference or is going to. If it were my decision to make, I'd not allow it, but then I'd ban all machines and we'd go back to horse-back riding (I don't even want the wheel!).
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OK I stand corrected.
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They were given the option of converting, though, so I would say that for quite a portion it was a choice to retain the religion. Sometimes I wonder what it would have been like if they had converted, even if temporarily. That unconfirmed report of Turks converting to Christianity in groups, with some of them being crypto-Armenians - they would have been in greater numbers than they are now, both on their land and with regard to population today.
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Somehow I no longer feel like it after reading Daddy Gibson's remarks about Jews. It confirms that there's something wrong with Gibson, for, although I haven't watched "The Patriot," I was told that who was portrayed as the villain there was actually a British philanthropist!? Cries of "anti-Semitism in the works" has probably aided the kookoos in question well. Jewish fanatics ought to be the best friends of these types, likewise also being the case with Turkish denialists for Armenians who pursue the recognition of the genocide, all the pubicity and all. One is not a pretty picture, though.
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http://unit.aist.go.jp/actfault/english/img/fig.1.gif
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Those earthquakes were way to the west and if memory serves 6.8 was the lesser of the two. The locations in question now are way to the east - ever heard of devastating earthquakes in Syria?
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Why yes, all the poo-pooh... Seriously, though - if I were so into the beauty competition myself, I wouldn't be a f***ing tomboy. Except for summer in the cities, of course. You're right, most of the female population that wears thin stuff in the cold of winter and walks around with a cough and headache or menstrual cramps for the so-called style is shallow.
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Whoa! Improve the CIA? Better to abolish it Chalmers Johnson Sunday, February 22, 2004 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Adm. Stansfield Turner, former director of central intelligence from 1977 to 1981, recommended in a New York Times op-ed earlier this month that U. S. intelligence operations could be improved by adding another layer of bureaucracy to what he admits is a flawed system of overlapping spy agencies, interagency rivalries and vested interests. I have a better idea: Why don't we abolish the CIA and make public, as the Constitution requires, the billions spent by the intelligence agencies under the control of the Department of Defense so that Congress might have a fighting chance in doing oversight? A few years ago, the late Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., suggested that we dismantle the agency that has so often produced catastrophically wrong national intelligence estimates. He was outraged by CIA calculations throughout the Reagan and elder Bush years that overstated the size of the Soviet economy by 50 percent and led our government into a weapons-spending spree that left us the world's largest debtor nation. According to President George W. Bush and his chief weapons inspector, David Kay, the agency has done it again, misleading the nation about the alleged menace posed by the ousted president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. Our intelligence apparatus has been flawed from the day it was created. Allegedly intended to prevent a surprise attack on our country comparable to the Dec. 7, 1941, Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, the agency was supposed to be a central clearinghouse for intelligence collected by many different bodies throughout the government -- including the military services, the signals intercepts of the National Security Agency, counterespionage by the FBI, as well as its own efforts to recruit and run foreign agents. But in fact, intelligence collecting and analysis would quickly become camouflage for a private secret army at the personal command of the president devoted to dirty tricks, covert overthrows of foreign governments and planting disinformation -- as well as efforts to counter similar operations by the Soviet Union. According to an internal CIA history, the éminence grise of secret operations in the United States and founder of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, Maj. Gen. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan "saw intelligence analysis as a convenient cover for subversive operations abroad." From our first covert overthrow of a foreign government, the ouster of the prime minister of Iran in 1953 in order to install the young shah Reza Pahlavi, the path to fame and success within the agency was in secret operations, not in writing intelligence estimates. That is certainly the pecking order I observed when I served as an outside consultant to the Office of National Estimates of the CIA from 1967 to 1973. Since the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953, the CIA has engaged in similar disguised assaults on the governments of Guatemala (1954); the Congo (1960); Cuba (1961); Brazil (1964); Indonesia (1965); Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (1961-73); Greece (1967); Chile (1973); Afghanistan (1979 to the present); El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua (1980s); and Iraq (1991 to the present) -- to name only the most obvious cases. These operations have generated numerous terrorist attacks and other forms of retaliation -- what the CIA calls "blowback" -- against the United States by peoples on the receiving end. Because covert operations are secret from the people of the United States (if not their targets), when retaliation hits, as it did so spectacularly on Sept. 11, 2001, Americans do not have the information to put it into context or understand it. As for the CIA's prewar intelligence on Iraq, the recently appointed commission of prestigious Americans to investigate its shortcomings is unlikely to be able to tell us anything we do not already know. Much of what now is clearly true could have been discovered by talking to experts perfectly willing to be on the public record or simply researched on the Internet. Sam Gardiner, a retired Air Force colonel who taught for years at the National War College and who compiled a "net assessment" of how Iraq would look after a successful U.S. attack, predicted with devastating accuracy the chaos that ensued and did so on the basis of information freely available. Who needs a CIA that so regularly underperforms in comparison to what is available on the open market? The high-security classifications of national intelligence estimates are not there to protect sources (no sources are ever mentioned in them), but to hide the incompetence and lack of serious effort that goes into producing them. If Bush had appointed an investigative commission headed by Valerie Plame (the outed CIA wife of Ambassador Joseph Wilson) and composed of such journalists as Seymour Hersh, Jim Fallows, Stephen Kinzer and Paul Krugman, its report would probably be worth reading. Short of that, I propose abolishing the agency and reducing our annual deficit by about $30 billion. Chalmers Johnson is the author of "The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic" (Metropolitan, 2004) and "Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire" (Metropolitan, 2000).
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Every Breath You Take By Craig Aaron | 2.19.04 print | email | comment On June 2, 1919, a bomber blew himself up on Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s doorstep. Neither the attacker nor his co-conspirators, who set off bombs in seven other cities that same hour, were identified. But after police found anarchist literature in the rubble, the Justice Department launched a massive roundup of foreign radicals. The Palmer Raids—named after the attorney general but coordinated by a young bureaucrat named J. Edgar Hoover—detained as many as 10,000 alleged anarchists and Communists over the next year. Doing away with warrants and any semblance of due process, the government deported hundreds of non-citizens for radical beliefs or associations with supposedly seditious groups. Defending these excesses, Palmer said that when you’re “trying to protect the community against moral rats you sometimes get to thinking more of your trap’s effectiveness than of its lawful construction.” Gripped with fear—two mail bombs had exploded the previous April and another 16 were discovered at the post office addressed to Supreme Court justices and senators—most Americans didn’t object to measures promising to protect them from bomb-throwing foreigners. Two days after the biggest raids in January 1920, the Washington Post editorialized, “There is no time to waste on hairsplitting over infringement of liberty.” Despite the hysteria, none of those swept up in the dragnet were tied to the terrorist attacks. But the Palmer Raids established what Georgetown law professor David Cole calls “leitmotifs in the history of political repression in modern America.” The targets, Cole observes in his book Enemy Aliens, were people who “might pose a potential future threat,” not those who actually had committed crimes. All of the detainees were foreign nationals who didn’t enjoy the same protections as U.S. citizens. Officials pursued these individuals via immigration rather than criminal proceedings—denying them a public trial, counsel and the presumption of innocence. And the pretext for deporting these “radicals” was nothing more than “guilt by association,” with no evidence of any violent or criminal acts. Sound familiar? The Palmer Raids bear an uncanny resemblance to the tactics used by the Bush administration to round up Arab and Muslim men after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The plot is almost identical, with John Ashcroft playing the Palmer role. As the attorney general told the Senate in December 2001: “To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve.” Yet in times of national crisis, the gaze of the government inevitably turns not toward those guilty of carrying out terrible crimes, but to innocent outsiders: racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, political dissidents and immigrants. And like Palmer and Hoover before them, there’s every indication that Ashcroft and Bush too will find themselves on the wrong side of history. ---------------------- In Enemy Aliens, Cole dismantles the arguments put forward by Ashcroft and others to justify the crackdown on non-citizens. In a scholarly but never somnolent treatise, he shows that the trade-off between the liberties of foreign nationals and citizens is an illusory double standard—which is not only counterproductive to national security, but morally wrong and constitutionally suspect. “What we do to foreign nationals today,” Cole writes, “often paves the way for what will be done to American citizens tomorrow.” This point is especially distressful considering how foreign nationals—particularly those of Arab or Muslim descent—have been treated post-9/11. From the fingerprinting of foreign visitors to the indefinite incarcerations and unremitting interrogations of the Ashcroft Raids, the war on terrorism has been waged mostly via anti-immigrant measures. Cole estimates that 5,000 foreign nationals have been detained in the Ashcroft Raids, yet not one has been charged with involvement in the attacks on the World Trade Center or the Pentagon. (Remember that alleged co-conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested before the attack.) This doctrine of preventive detention appears to be a total failure. The Justice Department still refuses to release the official number of detainees, let alone their names, leading Cole to wonder whether the real concern about secrecy “may have been not that Al Qaeda would find out what was going on, but that the American people would find out.” Harassing entire populations through abusive roundups and forced registration programs is no way to prevent terrorism. “If authorities have reason to believe there might be potential terrorists lurking in Arab and Muslim immigrant communities,” Cole argues, “it would make sense to work with the millions of law-abiding members of those communities to obtain their assistance in identifying potential threats.” Instead, the administration continues to defend its prerogative to detain foreign nationals without due process and to expel them solely on the basis of political speech or guilt by association. What’s more, the president insists on the unimpeded right to declare any person at any time to be an “enemy combatant,” revoking constitutional rights at will. It’s just a matter of time before the government’s invasive powers are extended to the citizenry. Already, the Patriot Act requires any institution or business to turn over records on individuals deemed relevant to a terrorism investigation. Authorities also have frozen the assets of a number of large Muslim charities—without a hearing or allegations of criminal conduct—simply because of their association with groups on the government’s blacklist. Cole seems optimistic that the courts will curtail the excesses of the Bush administration. A recent string of court decisions already has called into question key provisions of the Patriot Act. This spring, the Supreme Court will decide whether the hundreds of foreign nationals held at Guantanamo have a right to challenge their detention in court. The justices also will consider whether—as in the case of American-born Taliban fighter Yasser Hamdi—U.S. citizens can be declared “enemy combatants” and imprisoned indefinitely. The case of Jose Padilla—the alleged “dirty bomber” captured not in Afghanistan but at O’Hare airport—almost certainly will be added to the docket. One only hopes that Cole’s superb book somehow finds its way into the Supreme Court’s inner sanctum. ---------------------- Where Cole considers the constitutional implications of the domestic war on terrorism, Christian Parenti is more concerned with the sociopolitical consequences of government control. In The Soft Cage, Parenti examines much of the same history as Cole, but he comes at the issue from a more theoretical and cultural perspective. Through this prism, “9/11 looks less like a seismic shift from freedom to tyranny and more like an aggressive and opportunistic acceleration of this country’s long, slow decline into the soft cage” of ubiquitous surveillance. What made Parenti’s previous book, Lockdown America, stand out was its melding of radical political analysis with on-the-ground reporting. There’s less shoe-leather journalism in The Soft Cage. But armed with a journalist’s instincts and a well-thumbed copy of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, Parenti tracks the development of surveillance from the slave patrols to the modern digital revolution, in which “Americans have embraced their loss of privacy with patriotic vigor and pop-culture nonchalance.” Parenti makes fine use of historical documents, digging up advertisements searching for runaway slaves and dusty ledgers filled with mug shots of Chinese immigrant “rogues.” He uncovers a pamphlet published in 1936 as part of an effort to fingerprint the entire population of Berkeley, California. In it, the Citizens Committee on Universal Registration in California declares, “Whoever so registers himself is proud of being identified with modern society and is willing to play the game according to the rules.” The national drive for universal fingerprinting—started by (who else?) J. Edgar Hoover—was presented as a public safety issue. But Parenti argues its real purpose was controlling racial minorities, political dissidents and the poor. The claims that fingerprinting would reduce crime, prevent child kidnapping or help ID amnesia victims were implausible at best. The Berkeley police offered a more honest rationale: Fingerprinting would “bring about the identity of, and enable us to follow the movement and activities of, Communists, Anarchists and Radicals.” Parenti seizes on Foucault’s notions of the “panopticon”—a circular prison dreamed up by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, in which prisoners know they could always be watched and thus are forced to “internalize the gaze” of their captors. The panopticon is a metaphor for the modern state, the “perfect cage in which surveillance harnesses the captive to play the role of both ward and warden.” So it is that the state achieves much more power through surveillance than it ever could with brute force. Following from Foucault, Parenti shows how technologies developed for different, even innocuous purposes expand to support a system of disciplinary control. As technology proliferated with the digital revolution, we gradually became more accepting of being under constant watch. Parenti explains: “The emerging architecture of the soft cage of total surveillance is perhaps most frightening because it is so mundane, decentralized and even convenient.” Indeed, convenience is sold in exchange for personal information, tracking our taste preferences and travel plans. But along with credit cards, ATMs and automated tollbooths came “an unplanned, unexamined extension of state power and social discipline.” Those credit cards record purchases and movements. Most ATMs have surveillance cameras. “There are risks in social anonymity,” Parenti writes. “But the risks of omniscient and omnipotent state and corporate power are far worse.” ---------------------- Parenti shows that the advance of surveillance technologies and the expansion of their reach can’t be separated from efforts to stifle dissent. The surveillance networks sprouting in major cities disproportionately target racial minorities; one recent study found blacks twice as likely as whites to be watched “for no obvious reason.” The closed-circuit cameras proliferating in schools, on street corners and outside government buildings are used by police to spy on political protesters. Today’s Pinkertons pack camcorders to intimidate striking workers. As Parenti notes, “surveillance has a politically chilling effect.” Yet Parenti concludes that only “sustained protest” can establish limits on government and corporate surveillance. He discredits the idea that the innocent and law-abiding have nothing to worry about, arguing that privacy isn’t simply an individual “quality of life” issue. “The right to be let alone,” as Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once defined it, is—or must become—a political issue as well. There are a few hopeful signs that the public is beginning to recognize the fundamental threats to their inalienable rights. Popular outrage met John Poindexter’s data-mining schemes, thwarted efforts to institute a national ID card, and sunk Operation TIPS—which called on meter readers and letter carriers to spy on their neighbors. Dissenting voices have risen among librarians, conservatives like former House Majority Leader Dick Armey, and even Democrats, who started clapping during the State of the Union when Bush mentioned that “key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire next year.” Most remarkably the New York City Council recently joined dozens of other locales in repudiating the Patriot Act. You can be sure John Ashcroft is closely monitoring these developments. Craig Aaron writes a monthly column from Washington, where he is an investigative reporter for Public Citizen's Congress Watch and www.WhiteHouseForSale.org He is the former managing editor of In These Times and the editor of Appeal to Reason: 25 Years In These Times (Seven Stories Press). Now a senior editor of the magazine, his reporting, commentary and criticism also have appeared in The Progressive, TomPaine.com, The Memphis Flyer and other publications.
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Where are Iraq's Pentagon papers? By Daniel Ellsberg, 2/22/2004 AS MORE and more of our young men and women come home from Iraq crippled or in body bags this election season, Americans ask, with increasing urgency, "Why did we send our children to die in Iraq? Was this war necessary?" Indeed, Tim Russert asked the president precisely that on "Meet the Press" a few weeks ago: "In light of not finding the weapons of mass destruction, do you believe the war in Iraq is a war of choice or a war of necessity?" President Bush replied "It's a war of necessity. . . . the man was a threat. . . . the evidence we have uncovered so far says we had no choice." To the contrary. The evidence uncovered so far says that Saddam was not a threat, to us or his neighbors. Nor -- lacking any evidence of complicity in 9/11 or links to Al Qaeda -- was there a persuasive case that he would have been a significant threat even if he had possessed WMDs. In order to bolster their arguments and gain congressional, public, and international support, high officials chose to conceal the fact that their belief in the existence of Iraqi WMDs was entirely inferential, reflecting flimsy evidence and testimony from sources whose reliability was highly controversial. This actual state of inadequate information, well known to the US and British intelligence community, was deliberately denied by the highest officials in repeated phrases such as, "we know . . . ," "bulletproof evidence," "beyond any doubt," "Saddam possesses. . . ," "British intelligence has learned," and "these are not assertions, these are facts." The euphemism for such descriptions of the strength of evidence favoring the need to go to war is "exaggeration." A more accurate term is "lies." I've been here before. On my first full-time day of work as a high-level staff aide in the Pentagon, Aug. 4, 1964, I heard President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explain our first bombing raids against North Vietnam as a response to "unequivocal evidence" of an "unprovoked" attack on our destroyers "on routine patrol" in the Tonkin Gulf. Already that night I knew, along with many other Pentagon insiders, that each of these statements was a lie. "Unequivocal"? I had personally read, 10 hours before our bombers were launched, a "Flash" cable from Captain Herrick, commanding the destroyers, which put in doubt all of his cables that had crossed my desk earlier that day reporting up to 21 torpedoes fired at his ships. Attributing the prior reports to "freak weather effects and an overeager sonarman," Herrick recommended that no further action be taken till there had been complete evaluation, including daylight reconnaissance. Congress was given no hint of this recommendation (which his superiors ignored) or the uncertainties emphasized by Herrick, in the top secret testimony it received from McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk before it passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution three days later with only two dissenting votes. In hearings in February 1968, Senator J. William Fulbright said that if he had known of the Herrick cable alone, he would not have managed the Senate passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, "a great disservice to the Senate" which he regretted "more than anything I have ever done in my life." He hadn't known of that cable because I, among many others, didn't tell him. I didn't dream of doing such a thing at the time; and if the thought had occurred to me, I'm sure I would have rejected it. Now I wish fervently that I had made those cables -- along with the rest of the contents of my safe in August 1964, demonstrating the equal falsity of the other statements about "unprovoked" attacks, "routine patrols," and "we seek no wider war" -- available to Congress and the electorate that same autumn, before the bombs had started falling. When I finally did so belatedly in 1971, former Senator Wayne Morse, who had cast one of the two dissenting votes in 1964, told me that if I had given him those documents at that time, "The Tonkin Gulf Resolution would never have gotten out of committee. And if it had been brought to a vote, it would never have passed." That's a heavy burden to bear. However, just as Senators Byrd and Kennedy, the only two remaining in the Senate who voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, learned from an error they have regretted for almost 40 years and tried to warn their current colleagues against repeating it last fall, so can insiders such as I once was do better than I did then. Individuals inside government, from low-level clerks to Cabinet members, have the power -- to be sure, at the risk of their careers -- to tell the truth. There are surely drawers full of documents in Washington right now -- the Pentagon Papers of Iraq -- that, if leaked in bulk, would drastically alter the public discourse on whether we should have sent our children to kill and to die in Iraq, and more urgently, whether we should continue to do so. I urge patriotic and conscientious Americans who have access to these documents, and who know it is wrong for their bosses to lie to the public about why we are in this war, to consider doing what I wish I had done in 1964 or early 1965, years earlier than I did: Go to Congress and the press; tell the truth, with documents. The personal risks are real, but a war's worth of lives are at stake. Daniel Ellsberg is the author of "Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers."
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Indeed hope they face more than embarrassment... WAR AND CRIME February 5, 2004 by Joe Sobran "It took us ten months to find Saddam Hussein," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "The reality is that the hole he was found hiding in was large enough to hold enough biological weapons to kill thousands of human beings." Yes, and so is my basement, if it comes to that. So until we've found and searched every last cavity in Iraq, the "preemptive" war must be assumed to be justified? "What we have learned so far has not proven Saddam Hussein had what intelligence indicated and what we believed he had," Rumsfeld added, "but it has also not proven the opposite." And what would Rumsfeld accept as proving the opposite? We are left to wonder. He is setting up the administration's case so that it's pretty well unfalsifiable. It's an old trick. CIA director George Tenet likewise says that intelligence is rarely 100 per cent right or 100 per cent wrong. All right, but the CIA has made some notable goofs: it failed to predict the Iranian Revolution, which toppled the shah, and it was still grossly overrating the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union when Communism collapsed. Yet these people, like astrologers, keep expecting the public to take them seriously, no matter how many blunders they commit. The great Irish satirist Jonathan Swift once exposed an astrologer by prophesying his death on a certain date. When the date passed and the astrologer protested that he was still alive, Swift, refusing to take his word for it, puckishly accused his survivors of perpetrating a hoax. The public roared with laughter. That's one way to deal with a fraud. So how do we deal with the Bush administration, whose "war on terror" has descended to quibbles about where Saddam Hussein has stuffed away his mythical arsenal? Rush Limbaugh, George W. Bush's own dittohead, still parrots the official line and says only "liberals" can doubt it. He's out of touch. Plenty of us nonliberals don't believe it either. In fact, many of the neoconservative war nerds who demanded military action against Iraq, Iran, Syria, and other "rogue nations" (some were licking their chops at the prospect of "World War IV") were griping that the CIA was full of mushy libs who rejected clear evidence of Saddam's world-class arsenal. Today they insist that arms inspector David Kay's conclusion that that arsenal was nonexistent somehow vindicates the case for the war! One's head spins. It wasn't the CIA that was pushing for war. The Bush crowd and the neocons had hungered for it long before the 9/11 attacks gave them an excuse and a receptive public. Bush cited the phantom arsenal as the urgent reason for war, and he wasn't tentative about it; he never suggested that his intelligence was less than 100 per cent certain. On the contrary, he maintained that there was no doubt at all. Now that everyone but the dittoheads knows better, even Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have toned down their hysterical claims about the arsenal, without admitting that the whole war was misconceived. After all, their jobs and reputations are at stake. Not that they face any severe penalty for deceiving the public and waging aggressive war. One little irony of the drama is that Saddam is the only one facing a Nuremberg-style trial, when he's the only one who may have been telling the truth about those "weapons of mass destruction." For once the modus operandi of the modern state has been starkly exposed. The Iraq war may join Vietnam and Watergate in the liberal litany of government corruption. In a way that would be a pity, because the recitation of "Vietnam and Watergate" has, for a generation, invited us to suppose that these were abnormal occurrences, when they are quite typical, except that the machinations of the perpetrators were eventually found out and put in plain view. It's naive to assume that the crimes that are detected are the only ones committed. The lawless modern state is a gigantic criminal operation, and any private firm that was found to be running like the state would be not only driven out of business, but prosecuted on many counts. Bush & Co. should be grateful that they face nothing worse than political embarrassment for their crimes. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Read this column on-line at "http://www.sobran.com/columns/2004/040205.shtml". Copyright © 2004 by the Griffin Internet Syndicate, www.griffnews.com. This column may not be published in print or Internet publications without express permission of Griffin Internet Syndicate. You may forward it to interested individuals if you use this entire page, including the following disclaimer: "SOBRAN'S and Joe Sobran's columns are available by subscription. For details and samples, see http://www.sobran.com/e-mail.shtml, write PR@griffnews.com, or call 800-513-5053."
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What Bush Did Wrong during the War by Sheldon Richman, February 23, 2004 The brouhaha over what President Bush did or didn’t do in Alabama during the war in Vietnam misses the point. Even if he put in all the time required by the Air National Guard, the real question, which nearly everyone evades, is: what obligation did a young man have with respect to that war? Every “respectable” politician must say (if he is to remain “respectable”) that when one’s country calls one to war, one goes. In 1968 men were being drafted and sent 10,000 miles from home to shoot Vietnamese, so it was said, to save Vietnam from communism. But there were legal ways to avoid the draft. You could go to college. After that you could go to graduate school. (That eventually became a less-sure out.) Or you could join the National Guard. This is not a slur on the Guard. Its units are being sent to war today — regrettably. But during the Vietnam war, this was not so. Everyone my age (54) knew in the late 1960s that if you got into the Guard, you would not be sent to Vietnam. That’s why people joined — or tried to join. Not everyone could get in. You needed connections. A Bush in Texas, needless to say, had connections. President Bush said he supported the war in Vietnam, although he thinks it was a mistake to let the politicians run it. (Reality check: Wars are waged by governments. Therefore, all wars are political, as Clausewitz taught us.) He supported it, but he opted out of volunteering to go even when he joined the Guard. Why? I suppose his reason was something like Vice President Cheney’s reason for taking student deferments from the draft: he had “other priorities.” That’s okay, but I imagine all the other draftees did too. (As a potential draftee, I certainly did; luckily I was medically deferred.) What they didn’t have were connections or academic credentials. Too bad for them. Colin Powell, a Vietnam vet and now secretary of state, used to resent it that privileged kids were able to avoid Vietnam. He doesn’t talk that way now. In my view, the problem back then was not that the rich and well-connected could get out of what is preciously called “service.” The problem was that the unrich and unconnected couldn’t. In other words, the problem (or one of them) was the draft. By any reasonable definition, the draft is slavery. It may be for only two years (if the draftee survives), but it is slavery nonetheless. What about this alleged obligation to fight when your “country calls”? I have news for you: countries don’t call. Governments do. No wait; that’s still too abstract, too elevated. During the Vietnam war, it was Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon who were calling. Two corrupt political men were sending kids to kill and die in a jungle they’d never have gone to otherwise. (We shouldn’t let the pro-war members of Congress off the hook either. They could have stopped it.) If we’re going to de-romanticize war, we can start by getting clear about who does the calling. Now we have a different question. Was a young man morally obligated to obey Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon when ordered off to war? I can’t see where this obligation would come from. Back then an 18-year-old couldn’t even vote. But even if he could, why would that impose an obligation to abandon his life on command? The upshot is that no one should be faulted today for having avoided Vietnam, however he accomplished it. (Yes, that includes Bill Clinton.) Any society dedicated to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, if it is to have any integrity, must acknowledge that the draft was criminal and that avoidance was justified. President Bush’s flaw lies not in having avoided Vietnam. It lies in his not saying forthrightly that he should not have had to face that necessity — and that no American should ever have to face such a necessity in the future. Sheldon Richman is senior fellow at The Future of Freedom Foundation, author of Tethered Citizens: Time to Repeal the Welfare State, and editor of The Freeman magazine. Send him email.
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Interesting article - Family Values By Becky O'Malley, Berkeley Daily Planet February 22, 2004 Today, Feb. 17, my parents have been married for 65 years. They are still living in their home by themselves, at 89 and 91. Our family is very lucky to have them still with us, still in good spirits and relatively good health. We appreciate all they've done for us, and for others, during their long life together. One of the nice things about growing up with two parents like mine was that they introduced their offspring to many different ways of enjoying life. From my father, I learned to love music. Most nights when my sister and I were little, after he came back from serving in the Navy in World War II, he sang us to sleep with the deep bass voice that had made him a valued member of his undergraduate glee club. The repertoire didn't vary much, though it was democratically mixed: popular ditties from the '20s and '30s, college fight songs, spirituals, operetta standards, and always Brahms' Lullaby as the finale. From my mother, I learned to love words. She knew about all the best children's authors of the era: Milne, White, Travers. When I got older, she'd read aloud with me from favorite poets. I particularly enjoyed our dramatic reading of Robert Browning's poetic thriller,"My Last Duchess." A high point of the week for both of us was the day the mailman brought "The New Yorker." My mother went right for the short stories, while I started off with cartoons but eventually moved on to the hard stuff. She also knew the best places to get used books, so we read lovely illustrated editions of all the 19th and early 20th century classics: Alcott, Hawthorne, Cooper, Scott, Dickens… My mother has always known the best places to get everything to enrich life. She follows, without doing it consciously, William Morris's dictum "have nothing in your houses that you do not know to be useful, or believe to be beautiful," but her ace in the hole is that she's very good at finding what she believes to be beautiful at bargain rates. My childhood trips with her to "Father Dempsey's" thrift emporium taught me that you can turn your living space into a personal art gallery on any budget. She still loves to go to a garage sale of a Sunday. My father liked outdoor excursions too when my sister and I were growing up, but nature walks rather than garage sales. He showed us the interesting things you can see on any outdoor path at a child's level: the way acorns come apart, and what caterpillars are up to. My parents set a good example for their children; both my sister and I have been happily married for more than 40 years. We can testify to the many joys of a stable family life. My parents still take care of one another every day, and often, still, of their children, their grandchildren, and now their great-grandchildren. That's what marriage is all about, in the end, people taking care of other people. Love helps, and of course passion (which is not the same as love) gets things off to a rousing start. But what marriage really means is that adults have voluntarily accepted the duty of looking after one another and of bringing up children if they have them. Many religions, including the Christian church, have traditionally viewed marital promises as being made by the spouses to one another, sometimes blessed by the approval of a priest or a congregation, but valid with or without the participation of the state. When people agree to take on additional responsibilities to one another by marrying, the community as a whole benefits. That's why governments have historically conferred special privileges on those who are willing to get married, providing them with stable rules for property ownership, inheritance and tax benefits. Many countries such as France have two ceremonies, one in church and the other at city hall, to recognize the dual nature of marriage. Of course people sometimes take care of one another even without marriage. Families, whether or not they are state-sanctioned, take care of each other much of the time. Friends do look out for friends, whether or not they've promised to do so. But the distinctive thing about the marriage contract is that it's both voluntary (unlike families) and intended to be binding (unlike friendships). Until recently, the most obvious benefit of conventional marriage to the rest of society was that two grown-ups signed up in advance to raise the kids of the next generation. Religious groups have been wary about trusting members of other religions to do this important job, so they've often put barriers in the way of "mixed marriages." When my parents were married in 1939, they couldn't be married in church, because my mother was a Catholic and my father was not, though a priest did agree to marry them in my grandparents' home. By the time I got married 21 years later, Catholics had dropped the rule against church weddings, but there were still state-enforced prohibitions of racially "mixed marriages." Not until 1967 did the U.S. Supreme Court outlaw "statutory schemes to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications." Times change. Children in the upcoming generation of American families like ours have ancestors from Africa and Asia as well as from Europe. Their parents have gotten married in multi-religious or non-religious ceremonies. And 30 more years out, our descendants will be amazed to learn that it was once considered to be in the public interest to prevent consenting adults from promising to take care of one another, just because of what they do or don't do in their bedrooms. Statutory schemes to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of gender classifications will then seem as absurd as the unconstitutional laws against racially mixed marriages do now. With the widespread availability of birth control, children are no longer considered an inevitable result of marriage, even when partners are of different genders. People who won't have children to take care of them in their old age need, even more, to make sure that someone has signed up for the job. It's not safe, in the age of Bush and Schwarzenegger, with managed care, attacks on Medicare, falling stock values, and looted pension funds in the news, to rely on government to provide a safety net. But when children are part of the plan, it's even clearer that any kind of marriage prohibition is foolish. Those who want to conceive children can do so with or without marriage, but it's in the best interest of society to do everything possible to encourage those who want to become parents to find partners to help with the job. Religious groups, under our constitution, are allowed to have all kinds of silly rules about which marriages they bless, but we should expect more from the government. There is no good public policy reason for the state to dictate what the sexual relationship between parental partners needs to be. My parents are different kinds of people, and that made them more creative and interesting parents, but the fact that one is a man and the other is a woman was not the most important difference between them. Every child deserves parents like mine. Many children have been successfully raised by single parents, but children are who come into the world, as I did, with two fine though different people already signed up to educate them about life and its pleasures, are very fortunate. The new mayor of San Francisco has gotten a lot of praise for removing marriage barriers for same-sex couples, and he deserves it. There's no reason for the mayors of all U.S. cities not to do the same. Becky O'Malley is executive editor of the Daily Planet.
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OK, I know I shouldn't pick on Bush alone, but... W's Reality Gap By Mark Green, AlterNet February 20, 2004 George W. Bush is different, very different. Other presidents have misled, deceived, even lied. When Ike was asked his worst mistake, he candidly said, "The lie we told [about the U-2]." LBJ and the Gulf of Tonkin were examples of both deception and self-deception. The problem today is not simply that "Bush is a liar." While only he knows whether he's intentionally saying untrue things, it is a provable fact that he says untrue things, again and again, on issues large and small, day in and day out. The problem is not "16 words" in last year's State of the Union but 160,000 words on stem cells, global warming, the "death tax," the Iraq-9/11 connection and the Saddam-al Qaeda connection, the rise of deficits, cuts to Americorps, the air in downtown Manhattan after 9/11. On and on. It is beyond controversy that W "has such a high regard for the truth," as Lincoln said of a rival, "that he uses it sparingly." Why this penchant for falsehoods? First, George W. Bush begins any policy consideration with three fundamental questions: What does the religious right want? What does big business want? What do the neo-conservatives want? If he has stood up to any of these core supporters in the past three years, examples don't come readily to mind. Convinced by political advisor Karl Rove that the way to a second term is to "activate the base," his policy process is more catechismic than empiric – instead of facts leading to conclusions, conclusions lead to "facts." Second, he is openly uninterested in learning and reading – the Bushes "aren't serious, studious readers" he has said, also admitting that he now reads headlines, not articles. The point is not that he's stupid, only that he knew less about policy and the world as a presidential candidate than the average graduate student in government. Lacking Eisenhower's worldliness or JFK's intellect, however, Bush is prone to grab onto a politically useful intellectual framework like a life preserver and then not let go – whether it's Myron Magnet's sour interpretation of the 60s in "The Dream and the Nightmare" or Paul Wolfowitz's Pollyannaish analysis of the likely consequences of an American invasion of Iraq. The result: the most radical, messianic and misleading presidency of modern times. Frankly, no one else comes close. It has gotten to the point that President Bush appears to believe that he can do almost anything if he says the opposite: hence "no child left behind," "clean skies law," "healthy forests," and "love the poor" are mantras repeated in the hope that he can bend reality to his will. Arthur Miller calls it "the power of audacity." Bush himself in the past has aptly called the first Tuesday in November "Reality Day" because talk ends when there's a real result. So what happens on presidential "reality days" when the results are the opposite of his wishful assertions – when we find neither WMD nor cheering crowds in Iraq, when a surplus of $5 trillion becomes a deficit of $4 trillion, when there are so few stem cell lines for scientific research that scientists leave for London, when the ice caps melt due to global warming, when a Supreme Court of largely Republican appointees rules that affirmative action is not "quotas" but desirable – and when the populations of even our allies regard us as a "bungling bully" (in the phrase of the Financial Times). When Presidents Reagan and Bush 41 were shown how their pie-in-the-sky economics were producing ruinous deficits, they enacted tax hikes to begin to correct the economy. Not Bush 43. Hearing only applause as he shuttles between his financial base to military bases – W retreats into messianic incompetence. "We don't second guess out of the White House," he announces, confusing stubbornness for strength; and he tells the G-8 leaders in 2001, "Look, I know what I believe and what I believe is right." Whenever President Bush is now confronted with an unacceptable reality, he either changes the subject – is steroid use really more important than the environment? – or expresses confidence in his certainty. "I'm absolutely confident that..." he'll say, as if the issue is his determination rather than his conclusion. One is reminded of Igor in Young Frankenstein, who when asked about the foot-high hump on his back blithely answers, "What hump?" This is not just a credibility gap but a reality gap. An empirically challenged and uninformed leader in denial and governing on a (right) wing and a prayer, however, is a big problem. What if Bush were president during the missiles of October – would he have been able to avoid a nuclear war? That he squandered a quarter trillion dollars and 4,000 American casualties attacking Iraq because al Qaeda in Afghanistan attacked us is not encouraging. Just when they're needed, the usual mechanisms to bring a president to his senses are badly malfunctioning. A Congress of the same party now almost never holds adversarial hearings or holds him accountable, unlike how the Republican Congress treated Clinton. And with noteworthy exceptions, most of the media essentially gave him a pass on his eyebrow-raising military and business histories. The early and continuing storyline was that he was a charming guy who made up funny names for reporters and was no pompous prevaricator like his 2000 opponent. It was strange that, until the Niger-uranium fabrication, the media wrote far more about the spectacular deceptions of Jayson Blair than the more consequential deceptions of George W. Bush. Of course, adding to his immunity is the understandable impulse to rally around a president during a crisis – a crisis the president regularly stokes as in his recent "State of Baghdad address" to the Congress. Or as commentator E.J. Dionne put it, W's slogan might as well be "the only thing we have to fear is the loss of fear itself." So it comes down to November 2. If the public rewards W with a second term – and with no re-election contest to impose any possible moderating influence – then W's far-right impulses will be vindicated and corroborated. On that "reality day," which will prevail – Bush's certainty or our reality? Mark Green, president of the New Democracy Project, is the author, with Eric Alterman, of The Book On Bush: How George W. (Mis)leads America (Viking 2004).
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AVOID DANGEROUS MANIPULATIONS IN FIELD OF PROCREATION VATICAN CITY, FEB 21, 2004 (VIS) – This morning the Holy Father received participants in the 10th General Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life which has just dedicated two days to studying the problem of artificial procreation. After emphasizing that the theme that they are addressing “is rife with problems and implications that deserve careful examination,” the Pope said: “Basic values are at stake, values not only for faithful Christians but also for mankind.” John Paul II emphasized that the conjugal act in which husband and wife become father and mother “through total reciprocal gift of self makes them cooperators of the Creator while bringing a new human being into the world who is called to eternal life. This beautiful act which transcends the life of the parents cannot be substituted by a mere technological procedure which is devoid of human value and subject to the dictates of science and technology.” “The duty of scientists is that of researching the causes of male and female infertility. … Precisely for this reason, I want to encourage scientific research in order to naturally overcome sterility in married couples and I also want to urge specialists to rely on procedures which are effective for that purpose. My wish is that on the road to true prevention and authentic therapy the scientific community – this appeal goes out particularly to scientists who are believers – may be able to obtain comforting progress.” After affirming that the Pontifical Academy should do everything possible to promote initiatives that avoid “dangerous manipulations in the processes of artificial procreation,” the Holy Father concluded by asking all faithful “to commit themselves to facilitating authentic ways of research, resisting in decisive moments suggestions of a technology that wants to substitute true paternity and maternity and therefore that does harm to the dignity of parents and children alike.” AC/PROCREATION/… VIS 040223 (310)
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About a week until it is "300 days and no WMD" - 'Five Lies' Lives On By Christopher Scheer, Robert Scheer and Lakshmi Chaudhry, AlterNet February 22, 2004 Editor's Note: This is a modified excerpt from the new edition of "The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told Us About Iraq" by Robert Scheer, Christopher Scheer, and Lakshmi Chaudhry. The new edition includes an up-to-the-minute epilogue analyzing the series of important developments that have shaped the debate over post-war Iraq, and more importantly, the missing weapons of mass destruction. To buy the book, visit FiveLies.com. On February 17, President Bush sought once again to extricate himself from the scandal that simply won't go away: the missing Iraqi WMD. "My administration looked at the intelligence and we saw a danger," he told thousands of U.S. soldiers at Fort Polk, Louisiana. "Members of Congress looked at the same intelligence, and they saw a danger. The United Nations Security Council looked at the intelligence and it saw a danger. We reached a reasonable conclusion that Saddam Hussein was a danger." It's no surprise that the independent commission appointed by the president has been carefully instructed to only look into lapses in intelligence-gathering, and not at the ways in which the administration may have exaggerated or misused intelligence. Now that it has become clear that Saddam Hussein's fabled weapons programs simply "did not exist," as the outgoing chief weapons inspector David Kay put it, the White House is scrambling to cast its now exposed lies as the inevitable consequence of a massive intelligence failure. In other words, the flaw lay not in the "reasonable conclusion" of the administration, but the evidence it was based on. Whatever the state of U.S. intelligence gathering, the Bush administration's sales pitch for the Iraq War relied on public displays of classified data to an unprecedented degree, a practice that has now come to haunt the White House. Scrutiny of the record since Bush assumed office shows a clear and disturbing pattern: the manipulation of intelligence data to fit the administration's preconceived theories to support a policy based on a political agenda rather than the facts at hand. The practice, which far surpasses the usual political sleight-of-hand employed by previous administrations, was so pervasive as to alarm career intelligence analysts. "I believe the Bush administration did not provide an accurate picture to the American people of the military threat posed by Iraq. Most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they were provided," said Gregory Thielmann, a key whistleblower who was the former director of the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) until September 2002. "This administration has had a faith-based intelligence attitude: 'We know the answers – give us the intelligence to support those answers, '" he said. Remember the OSP? Where Donald Rumsfeld went for his Iraq intelligence was to something called the Office of Special Plans that he himself had formed as a sort of personal intelligence agency. The day-to-day intelligence operations were run by ex-Cheney aide and former Navy officer William Luti, reporting to Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, a former Reagan official. According to the Guardian, "The ideologically driven network functioned like a shadow government, much of it off the official payroll and beyond congressional oversight. But it proved powerful enough to prevail in a struggle with the State Department and the CIA by establishing a justification for war." The OSP amassed huge amounts of raw intelligence from "report officers" in the CIA's directorate of operations whose job it is to cull credible information from reports filed by agents around the world. Under pressure from Pentagon hawks, the officers became reluctant to discard any report, however farfetched, if it bolstered the administrations case for war. John B. Judis and Spencer Ackerman revealed in a New Republic article published in June 2003 that there was "no consensus" within the U.S. intelligence community on the level of threat posed by Saddam. Judis and Ackerman reported, "The administration ignored, and even suppressed, disagreement within the intelligence agencies and pressured the CIA to reaffirm its preferred version of the Iraqi threat." Bush then would repeatedly deploy this misleading data to sell the war in his speeches. A Pattern of Deception There is no better example of the pattern of deception that has defined the administration's case for the war than its claim that Saddam Hussein possessed a well-established nuclear weapons program. On Sept. 8, 2002, in a classic example of how easy it is for the White House to manipulate the media, and thus the public, the New York Times ran a story planted by the Bush administration. The front-page article, written by Judith Miller and Michael Gordon and headlined "U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts," informed Americans that, according to unnamed Bush officials, Iraq had repeatedly attempted to secretly purchase aluminum tubes "specially designed" for enriching uranium as part of a nuclear weapons program based on their "diameter, thickness, and other technical properties." It was the ultimate advertorial: great placement, perfect message, excellent timing – all basically controlled by the advertiser but looking as if it came from "neutral" sources. From its August launch through its acceptance by Congress in October, the Bush marketing campaign for the war was perfectly executed, and the tubes revelation was a classic example. By the time the truth that the attempted purchases were neither secret nor likely intended for nuclear uses was tracked down and exposed by whistle-blowers, journalists, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, it wouldn't matter, having already served dutifully as a scary totem in Bush speech after Bush speech. When its power did flag, it would simply be replaced by another shaky fact put into the rotation and foisted upon a compliant media. This leak-and-retreat tactic proved astonishingly effective up to and through the war. One key to a president exploiting shaky yet convenient intelligence data is to always maintain deniability. Aiding and abetting this is the array of different intelligence agencies that the president has reporting to him – CIA, NSA, FBI, and sub-agencies of State, Defense, and so on – not to mention the information generated by allied nations' intelligence agencies that are passed along (more on that later). Combined, these agencies, each with its own strong institutional biases and rivalries, generates so much data that it is child's play for politicians (or reporters with good sources) to cherry-pick opinions that fit their policy platform (or story angle). The Real Intelligence Failure In an effort to control this kind of chicanery, the intelligence agencies are often required to pool their insights and evidence into overview documents to see whether or not there is a consensus as to their reliability. Relevant experts may also be called in, especially in a case like this where highly technical expertise was essential to separating fact from fiction. When the experts looked at the tubes later cited by the White House, however, questions immediately arose over whether they were appropriate for centrifuges used in a nuclear reactor. Working under a blanket of enormous pressure coming from the White House, and especially the vice president, to find damning things regarding Iraq and nuclear weapons, a full-blown row soon broke out within the alphabet soup of U.S. intelligence agencies over this obscure issue. For their part, CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency believed the tubes were similar to those used in Iraq's previous attempt to build nukes, while the State Department's INR and the Department of Energy were adamant that they were in fact much more appropriate for artillery shells. The division was made explicit in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate report on Saddam's pursuit of WMD, as the State Department experts insisted a sharply worded dissent be included in the overall report, controlled by the top dog in the intelligence "community," the CIA. While the NIE cited "compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program," the INR dissent (which was later dismissed by the White House as a footnote), stated explicitly "the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program." Meanwhile, British experts weighed in against the White House's interpretation and some CIA analysts also expressed doubts. The longer the tubes bounced around the intelligence community, the iffier it got as a piece of evidence affirming Iraq's threat to the world. Ultimately, however, the CIA, as the top intelligence agency, won out, forcing their analysis into the NIE, leading inevitably to the New York Times front-page headline trumpeting its scoop. Role of the CIA The CIA's complicity in this prototypical Bush bait and switch tactic can be clearly seen when looking back at the annual reports the agency delivered to Congress on the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In its 1997 report, Iraq only warranted three paragraphs, to the effect that Baghdad possessed dual-use equipment that could be used for biological or chemical programs. There was no mention of a nuclear weapons program. By 2002, however, the Iraq section was seven times as long, and warned that "all intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons" and the country could produce a nuclear bomb "within a year" if it got its hands on weapons-grade material. The CIA also reported as late as 2001 that enforcement of the UN arms embargo on Iraq was "generally successful" – but this reference was dropped in the 2002 report sent to a White House that claimed the embargo wasn't working. Why, then, had the reports become so shrill on the topic after Bush's inauguration, presenting the same intelligence with a completely different interpretation? After all, the CIA even had the same director under both Clinton and Bush. "I'm afraid that the U.S. intelligence community, particularly the CIA . . . is sometimes quite sensitive to the political winds," Thielmann, formerly a senior intelligence official at the State Department, told Newsday. Despite what David Kay may claim, a number of CIA officers clearly felt the brunt of the administration's desire for the "right" kind of intelligence. Vice President Cheney, in particular, made a number of personal trips to the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to meet with low-level analysts who were reviewing the raw intelligence on Iraq. As one CIA official told the South African Mail and Guardian, "[He] sent signals, intended or otherwise, that a certain output was desired from here." Other visitors to CIA headquarters representing the White House included Cheney's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, and ex-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who joined the Pentagon as a "consultant" after 9/11. "That would freak people out," a former CIA official told the New Republic. The Mythic Consensus While the Bush administration now claims otherwise, there was no consensus whatsoever over Saddam's weapons capabilities. The New Republic's investigation revealed many of the tube skeptics still hopping mad, incited by the continued use of the centrifuge claim. One intelligence analyst, who was part of the internal multi-agency tubes investigation, angrily – though anonymously – told the magazine known for its hawkish stances, "You had senior American officials like Condoleezza Rice saying the only use of this aluminum really is uranium centrifuges. She said that on television. And that's just a lie." And Rice hadn't stopped there. After saying on the Sept. 8, 2002 Late Edition that the tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs," she then went on to brandish the ultimate image of twentieth century terror: "The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly [Hussein] can acquire nuclear weapons, but we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." And contrary to the president's claims that the UN shared his interpretation of Saddam's capabilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency was blunt in its assessment of the tubes. On Jan. 24, ElBaradei told the Washington Post, "It may be technically possible that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium, but you'd have to believe that Iraq deliberately ordered the wrong stock and intended to spend a great deal of time and money reworking each piece." And on Mar. 7, the IAEA stated its analysis quite clearly in its formal report to the United Nations, just two weeks before the war to "disarm Saddam Hussein" began. The truth is that the White House continued to be hell-bent on supersizing our fear in the lead up to the war, turning an admittedly scary world into a chamber of horrors. And it used every weapon in its arsenal – from outright intimidation to skilful media manipulation – to achieve its goal. Claiming that this well-oiled campaign was instead a well-intentioned error is just the latest in a very long list of Bush lies.
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World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- WSWS : News & Analysis : North America Pentagon institutionalises indefinite detention without trial at Guantanamo Bay By Richard Phillips 23 February 2004 Back to screen version | Send this link by email | Email the author Notwithstanding the impending repatriation of five British detainees and one Danish prisoner incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay, the Bush administration has further undermined the basic legal and democratic rights of those held in the infamous military prison with the announcement of a new measure that will institutionalise the illegal detentions. On February 13, the Pentagon announced that it would establish “administrative review panels” to determine the future of the hundreds held in Guantanamo Bay. Pentagon spokesmen claimed that the three-member panels would act like a “quasi-parole board” and allow prisoners to plea their case for release. The status of the prisoners would be reviewed annually, spokesmen said. The so-called “review panels” have nothing to do with granting any rights to detainees, most of whom have been held for more than two years without charge or access to lawyers or their families. To compare them to parole boards established to review the prison terms for convicted criminals is simply absurd. Rather, the new panels will simply make permanent the present arbitrary procedures under which hundreds of prisoners seized in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere are being held indefinitely in breach of international law. As US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the Miami Chamber of Commerce on February 13, the Bush administration regards the ongoing detentions in Guantanamo Bay as a “security necessity” and some detainees might never be released. Rumsfeld said that although it was “unusual” to detain people without trial or lawyers “America was a nation at war” and “different rules [now] applied”. Criminal law was not appropriate to those jailed who were involved in acts of terror against America and could therefore be held for “as long as necessary”. The “review panels”, which will be appointed by Rumsfeld and other senior Pentagon officials, are internal bodies with no independence whatsoever. They will include the same intelligence operatives and military interrogators, who grilled the prisoners. There is no right of appeal or guaranteed legal representations for prisoners brought before the panels. Nor are those charged and found not guilty of any alleged crimes by a US military tribunal, guaranteed release or repatriation. As an unnamed senior Pentagon spokesman told the New York Times on February 13: “[W]hether a person is to be charged before a military commission is not the reason we’re holding them.” It was possible, the official continued, “that an individual could be convicted by a tribunal and serve a five-year sentence and then not be released if he were judged to be a danger.” Center for Constitutional Rights president Michael Ratner, who is leading a US Supreme Court appeal for the Guantanamo Bay prisoners to be given legal hearings in American courts, immediately denounced the review panels and said he was stunned by Rumsfeld’s brazen defence of the illegal detentions. “The idea that you could theoretically keep someone locked up forever under these circumstances is reprehensible,” he said. “It’s nothing to do with law as any person should understand it, at least since the Magna Carta,” he said. “How do you know without a trial that these people are even dangerous? It all depends on the military’s word.” Amnesty International rejected White House claims that the panels constituted fair treatment for the detainees. “That is a sham,” William Schulz, Amnesty International US executive director, said. “It’s not justice to jail a man without charge for years, then offer him a chance to protest his innocence tarred by a presumption of guilt.” Stephen Kenny, lawyer for David Hicks, one of the two Australians held in Guantanamo Bay and due to face a military trial on as yet unspecified charges, said the review panels were “a pitiful effort to give some show of a process” in the face of growing international criticism. He called for Hicks’s immediate release and said there should have been independent hearings to determine whether detainees were prisoners of war or criminals. If they were POWs they should be treated under international conventions while criminals should be tried. Two years after being placed in Guantanamo Bay, Hicks had still not been formally charged with anything, he said. Guantanamo Bay breaches the Geneva Conventions on the rights of POWs and is an international human rights scandal. Prisoners have no basic rights, no contact with the outside world, apart from heavily censored letters, and are subjected to interrogation by military and intelligence officers. Over the last two years the Pentagon has increased the number of those held from just over 100 to approximately 660 prisoners. As well as hundreds of small metal cages and shipping containers used as cells, other jails have been built, including Camp Iguana, which is used to hold at least 10 prisoners under the age of 18. Another jail, Camp Echo, is currently being built which will contain permanent interrogation rooms and cells for those defined as “pre-commission detainees”—those selected to face military tribunals. This solid-wall prison, which will be finished in the next five months, will hold at least 100 detainees. When questioned at a Washington press briefing, Paul Butler, US deputy assistant secretary of defence for special operations, refused to provide any details on the most basic issues. He would not say if detainees brought before the new panels would have the right to a lawyer or to any form of legal appeal. When pressed he made clear that the final say would rest where it does at present—with the military and the Bush administration. Like the new buildings being erected at Guantanamo Bay, the proposed panels simply confirm that what was initially established as a temporary measure following the US military intervention in Afghanistan is being transformed into a permanent concentration camp. The Bush administration is creating its own American gulag for arbitrary and indefinite incarceration not only of the existing detainees but those seized in any future wars of aggression. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1998-2004 World Socialist Web Site All rights reserved
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Famously on this day in 1898 French writer Emile Zola said 'J'accuse' to his government for anti-semitism and the wrongful imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus. A controversial place, Guantanamo Bay was leased by Cuba to the United States forever on this day in 1903.
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I know how you feel, Gevo. But don't be afraid of becoming a "loner," because they're not going to change, and in time as you adapt and accept new people you meet or whatever might think the same of you. In the end it is the people that don't think themselves to death who are happy.
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We are animals, competition is there, but it's not just beauty - wits and such are in there, too! Hence I don't have "low opinions" of people based on the way they dress - unless they're pretty outrageous. At least none that I am aware of... The article sadly says nothing about the shallowness of the people who participated in the survey.
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For every Hannoveran Ascession there must be a Hannoveran Descension. Ask the Hye Forum village idiot - he knows.
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No it will not. You Amerikanskis are a hopeless case.
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No further questions.
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For the life of me, I snack on olives. Mango - yum. Not too keen on pineapple. Junk food - only if I have to.
