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National Security Strategy For Armenia


Yeznig

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Given all the discussion about Armen Aivazian I copy below a review of one of his books on the security situation of Armenia today. Evidently Aivazian is a man of substance. He would not otherwise be hounded by mediocrities and attacked by those who do not have the interests of the Armenian nation at heart. If have also found a review again by Arnavoudian of Aivazian's PhD thesis which I shall post. Though I have not found Arnavoudian's response to Avdoyan that hagopn referred to.

 

So here the review. I reckon I am a fan of Aivazian having read this review, even if I don't agree with everything in the review.

 

Yeznig

 

'Essential Elements for Armenia's National Security Doctrine: Part I'

by Armen Aivazian

(228pp, Yerevan, 2003)

 

Armenian News Network / Groong

May 10, 2004

 

By Eddie Arnavoudian

 

 

Armen Aivazian's 'Essential Elements for Armenia's National Security

Doctrine' is a welcome and thoughtful contribution to an urgently

needed discussion about the present and the future of the Armenian

people, the post-Soviet Armenian state and the Armenian nation.

Accounting for the political, military and economic realities of the

post-Soviet world order, Aivazian argues the case for a powerful and

independent socio-political and economic-military strategy that could

secure the long-term survival and development of the Armenian state

whose existence is threatened by hostile neighbours and by global

political developments.

 

 

I. THE ARGUMENT REHEARSED

 

In the face of the unceasing and growing flow of evidence highlighting

the steadily weakening foundations of the Armenian state, in the face

of the modern Armenian elite selling off Armenia's national wealth

without regard for the state and its future, Armen Aivazian's thesis

is largely indisputable. Contemporary forms of globalisation, together

with the current dominance of the US in international politics, pose a

threat to the people of small nations, to their cultures and their

civilisations. Overwhelmed by the US dollar, cowed by US military might

and swamped by its mass produced tinsel culture, the independent and

progressive development of the people of smaller nations is at risk as

US power, and one should add European Union power too, debilitates

their states and impoverishes their peoples' lives.

 

Among them, the people of Armenia confront additional and difficult

problems. The Armenian state borders the Turkish state, a preferred

US agent in the region that does not accept the existence of the

Armenian nation. Fearing that a ' strong Armenia could one day raise

questions about (the Turkish state's) responsibility for the Genocide

and demand (Turkish) territorial concessions' (p172), Turkey

'radically rejects the Armenian right to statehood' (p175), refuses to

establish full diplomatic relations and harbours active long-term

ambitions to invade and eliminate the country.

 

The problems besetting the Armenian people are compounded by the

failures of the post-Soviet elite. This elite has not set in place any

of the essential elements of genuine state independence and shows no

ambition to do so. It displays instead an 'absolute indifference' to

the interests 'of its population (and) to the Armenian people as a

whole.' (p23) The Armenian elite has destroyed the people's faith and

their hope for a better future in Armenia and alienated them from the

political process. The governing class's corruption, political and

economic ineptitude and criminality, its refusal to provide state

sponsorship for Armenian national culture and its failure to oppose

the harmful and inane features of western influence has reduced the

population to insufferable material and spiritual poverty. By such

behaviour, the current rulers of Armenia have and continue to drive

out of the land its best and most vigorous elements and meanwhile they

squander the wealth and resources that remain. This veritable

haemorrhage has severely weakened the foundations of the state,

rendering it impotent to confront any major regional or international

crises. So today 'Armenia and the Armenian people' are living through

'a systemic crisis embracing the political, economic, cultural, moral,

ideological and socio-psychological spheres' (p5) and one can in

effect speak of the 'de facto absence of a national state.' (p19)

 

Together with a critique of a deeply rotten Armenian governing class,

runs a rounded appreciation of the Armenian Diaspora. Recognising its

value for Armenia, Aivazian does not regard the Diaspora as beyond

reproach. Despite its benefits it acts as a magnet that empties

Armenia of its youth; its organisations are frequently the playthings

of foreign powers and its intellectual environment is not conducive to

the development of Armenian culture. Most significantly it generates

outlooks and attitudes that prioritise foreign interests over Armenian

ones. Remarking on the huge expenditure of resources that would be

better devoted to strengthening Armenia, Armen Aivazian makes some

telling points about the Diaspora-led genocide recognition campaign.

He does not oppose this campaign. But he does argue that it is being

conducted according to the same principals of begging from, and

reliance upon, western imperialist powers 'whose harmful results are

evident' from past Armenian history. (p153-4) Aivazian rightly notes

that western powers have no interest in the Armenian people, but use

Armenian 'genocide recognition formulas' as one of their 'means to

reign in Turkish ambitions to become a hegemonic regional power.

(p178) So where these states have passed resolutions recognising the

genocide these are vague and without practical consequence.

 

Today the future for the people of Armenia appears bleak, even as the

elite lives in idle luxury strutting around the world gorging itself

at the tables of its masters. However all is not hopeless. The

Armenian people have the resources to overcome subordination to the

new global order and to create for themselves a decent life on an

equal and secure footing. But, argues Aivazian, this can be brought

about only through a radical transformation, one that involves a

'strengthening of security in Armenia and Karabagh', the

'establishment of the rule of law and social justice' and a political

programme that guarantees the people 'the right to work and a decent

living standard'. Simultaneously a democratic Armenian state must

sponsor policies that encourage the 'development of an Armenian

culture'. And as significant as any of the above it must set about the

work of 'gradually eliminating' damaging 'strategic consequences' of

the Genocide. (p46-47)

 

Within this complex of measures the defence of Karabagh is of the

highest order. Any retreat or defeat here threatens the very existence

of Armenia. Shrunk in size from its historic boundaries Armenia is

penned into a corner and has no hinterland or unassailable bastions to

which it can retreat, regroup and recover in the event of hostile

aggression. In coping with and overcoming the dangers confronting them

Armenian citizens even as they rightly manoeuvre to exploit

oppositions between Russian and US policy, cannot afford to rely on

either of these powers. Armenians should put no faith in any big power

proclamations about justice. Aivazian notes how such proclamations

have led to no restitution for other people who have suffered

genocide, among them the Native Americans. The only guarantees for the

people of Armenia are the enactment of measures that will bring into

being a strong and independent state that relies on its own resources

and the power of its own people.

 

Such a line of argument suggested by Armen Aivazian's work is

powerful. There are however at least three areas of significant

ambiguity that, if unresolved, could vitiate the project of national

independence and development that he advocates.

 

 

II. QUESTIONS DEMANDING ANSWERS

 

No discussion of national security or national independence can be

adequate without a full consideration of the character and nature of

the nation in the modern global world order. This issue unfortunately

receives little attention. Here Armen Aivazian could have, but does

not draw on the legacy of Armenian political thought on the matter -

in particular that of Mikael Nalpantian and Raffi. Yet both have

particular purchase for the modern world order.

 

Nalpantian and Raffi correctly defined the nation in terms of the

needs and interests of the majority of people, the 'common people'.

Nalpantian argued that 'by the term "nation" we must understand the

common people and not those few families who have enriched themselves

from the sweat and blood of the people.' After all he notes, almost

as if he was writing from Yerevan in 2004, 'the rich are (well)

protected behind their barricades of wealth.' In the name of

globalisation, many dismiss such ideas, along with notions of national

independence, as useless relics of the past. They conveniently ignore

the fact that globalisation is essentially a euphemism disguising

great power domination of smaller and poorer nations. Today through

their control of global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and

WTO, a few great powers dictate the economic policies of smaller

nations, subordinating them to the interests of their own

trans-nationals.

 

Nalpantian's notion of the common people, not the elite,

constituting the nation's core and essence is even more appropriate in

today's global political and social conditions than in his own day.

Today elites of all nations are increasingly being 'denationalised' as

their ideology, interests, status and movements are fashioned by

forces outside their nation state and particularly by the overwhelming

force of US capitalism. Elites from small nations draw privilege and

status from their connection to and identification with the dominant

global or regional powers. So they come to serve as agents for these

powers rather than as representatives of their native state's

population. In the Armenian context, even the most casual reading of

press reports forcefully confirms the views of that great African

thinker Frantz Fanon. In his classical 'The Wretched of the Earth' he

noted how the elite of newly independent nations 'is not engaged in

production, nor in invention nor in labour'. Its 'innermost vocation'

he continues 'seems to be to keep in the running and to be part of the

racket.' So during its rule of the new nation 'it will in practice set

up its country as the brothel of Europe.' These are harsh words but

true, in the Armenian context too.

 

In contrast to the elite the majority population of these same small

and newly independent nations confront in the global order not just

growing barriers to their international movement but obstacles to

their social, economic and cultural progress and threats to their

independence and self-determination. For the common people of the

Third World, of which Armenia is in fact now a part, the global order

is an incarnation of injustice that by a variety of means drains their

land of its material and human wealth. For the people preserving their

national independence and creating a strong state can become part of

their resistance to the injustice and inequity of the global

order. For them the best elements of their national culture can also

serve as a repository of national identity and independence and can

help protect the people from absorption into the reactionary,

oppressive and passive culture of a dominant power. Thus their culture

can become a weapon for struggle against global injustice.

 

Armen Aivazian's solidarity with the common people is not in

question. Not only does he argue that the majority in Armenia is the

decisive element of the nation he also proposes that it must be armed

to provide for national security. But in this volume the majority,

the 'common people', remain nevertheless only as one component of

society. The nation and the notion of nationalism appear as separate

from the interests and needs of majority. Sometimes the concept of

nation seems even to incorporate the corrupt elite that Aivazian

exposes so effectively. Such a loosely defined conception runs the

risk of being transformed into a historic abstraction open to abuse

and exploitation by demagogues who do not have the interests of the

people of Armenia, Armenian culture and Armenian civilisation at

heart.

 

Closely related to a conception of the modern nation is that of the

role of the state in the national economy. No nation on earth, not

even those most wedded to a 'free-market' ideology, can do without

decisive state intervention in the economy. The case of the US state

is telling. For all its 'free market' declarations, it unabashedly and

unashamedly intervenes in economic affairs while criticising Third

world countries that intervene less! An active and direct role for

the state in the economy is all the more urgent for small nations such

as Armenia with its fragile economic foundation and its corrupt,

anti-democratic and unpatriotic elite.

 

The democratic state of any nation that intends to look after the

interests of its people, its welfare and its culture must have access

to all the nation's wealth and the power to allocate and distribute

national wealth and resources according to the needs of its people.

The state must be permitted a central role not just in recouping for

people and nation the billions of drams of stolen property but be

given the power to take any economic measures, including the

organisation of economic life, that are necessary for national

security, social welfare and independent development. Such measures

would of course bring the state into conflict with the contemporary

organisers of the global order. But the alternative to resistance is

continued and increasing enslavement to the dictates of the dominant

global powers, an enslavement that promises only further injustice and

more impoverishment.

 

Armen Aivazian demands a decent quality of life as a matter of right,

insisting that 'the concept of social justice' be 'at the foundation

of the development of Armenia.' (p96) This is, he argues further, a

central plank of a nation's national security. Yet he proposes no

significant economic role for the state, without which there can be no

social justice. Instead in opposition to 'jungle capitalism' and the

extreme polarisation between a wealthy elite and an impoverished mass,

a polarisation that is sapping the foundations of the nation, he

advances a notion of 'egalitarianism' defined as 'the establishment of

the rule of law and social morality' (p97) But who is to define the

rule of law and how is it to be established and enforced? Today the

elite controls state power and readily flouts all law and all rules

that are inconvenient to it. How will its lawlessness to be curtailed,

and its plunder of the national wealth and economy be stopped? Such

questions cannot be considered without assigning a critical role for

the democratic state in the national economy.

 

 

III. GENOCIDE RECOGNITION AND ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS

 

Dominating and determining all other concerns about national security,

argues Aivazian, are the problems of Armenian-Turkish relations at the

centre of which lies the still unresolved question of the Genocide of

1894-1922. A strong Armenian state must also deal with outstanding

problems of Genocide that still impinge on the life of the people of

Armenia. Against those who are inclined to consign the Genocide to the

sphere of historical studies alone, Aivazian points to the systematic

politicisation of the Genocide by the Turkish state for whom Turkish

'falsification of history (including genocide denial) has become an

object of enthusiastic intervention.' In contrast to Armenian

Government indifference, Turkey not only 'has an official state

position' on the Genocide but has assigned to its National Security

Council a sub-'Council for Struggle Against Groundless Charges of

Genocide.' (p183) as part of its strategy to undermine the right of

the Armenian people to self-determination. An Armenian state that

represents the interest of the people is obliged therefore 'to

preoccupy itself' with questions of Genocide and genocide recognition.

 

Here Aivazian raises fundamental questions. But he does so without the

necessary conceptual and political precision that would avoid getting

mired in irreconcilable disputes. His consideration is at points also

marked by an uncomfortable dualism that could muddy the basis of a

credible and democratic policy on the question. It is worth remarking

in advance however that his argument is not scarred by anti-Turkish

racism or by any 'sea-to-sea' Armenian nationalism that reduces

intelligent discussion to little more than bombastic bluster.

 

Aivazian is a proponent of the restoration of 'mutual trust between

Armenian and Turk'. He insists however that this can only come about

'through Turkey's recognition of the Armenian Genocide.' Flowing

'ineluctably from this' recognition will be the matters relating to

the 'provision of compensation for its victims', compensation that

includes 'certain territorial concessions'. These must however be

'subject to negotiation' (p173) between Armenian and Turkish

people. Alongside such propositions that suggest a democratic and

negotiated settlement is an approach amenable to an entirely different

interpretation. Discussing the Diaspora, Armen Aivazian writes that at

'this historical moment the liberation of Western Armenia cannot be

regarded as a realistic prospect. This however does not mean that

Armenians, and in particular Diaspora Armenians, should once and for

all renounce the idea of claiming their fatherland.' (p150) In the

same breath arguing that the 'majority of Armenia' 'remain(s) brutally

occupied' (p150) Armen Aivazian goes on to propose a vision of

Armenians 'regrouping' not just within the borders of the modern

Armenian state but 'in other portions of historical Armenia that' are

'to be liberated.' (p156).

 

There is here a dangerous imprecision in definition and ambition. What

territories are being discussed, how far are they to extend from the

existing borders of the Armenian state? In the event of any land

transfers how are the rights of non-Armenian citizens of an Armenian

state to be protected? Here the utmost precision is necessary because

such issues affect not just the illegitimate Turkish state but raises

hugely sensitive issues relating to and possibly affecting the lives

and futures of millions of ordinary men and women, Armenian, Turk,

Kurd and others.

 

A just and enduring 'restoration of mutual trust' that could generate

the maximum of good will among Armenians and Turks certainly requires

the recognition by the Turkish state of the Genocide carried out by

the Ottoman-Empire and Young Turks. But such official recognition

should in no way undermine the dignity of the ordinary Turkish people.

In return Armenians should acknowledge that the ordinary Turkish and

Kurdish population now living on lands that historically belonged to

Armenians before 1915 and that were part of classical Armenia are not

responsible for the Genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire and the

Young Turks. Where historic responsibility is to be assigned, it must

be to the state and the powers that be.

 

Clearly genocide recognition by the Turkish state will provide a

certain moral foundation to land and reparation claims by the Armenian

state. But in the current absence of genuinely democratic governments

in either Armenia or Turkey there is little possibility of genuine

democratic negotiation between the Armenian and Turkish people.

Prospects for resolving such contentious issues are therefore

extremely limited. Nevertheless it is clear that in the event of

genuine negotiations between genuine representatives of the Armenian

and Turkish people certain principles must apply.

 

Most crucially where land and border adjustments are to be made these

must flow from direct and democratic agreement of the ordinary people

living in the areas that may come under discussion. The forcible

incorporation of any people into the national borders of another

state, or their expulsion as a result of border changes, is both

undemocratic and a recipe for continued national animosities. This

must be avoided at all costs. Furthermore the democratic national,

cultural and social rights of different peoples living within a single

state need to be safeguarded with stern resolution.

 

Here one however does need to note that demands for certain land

concessions by a democratic Armenian state are by no means dependent

or conditional upon the Turkish state's genocide recognition. The

Turkish conquest of portions of historical Armenia and the cleansing

of these territories of their Armenian population by means of genocide

has pressed the current Armenian nation into geographic/territorial

boundaries that cannot sustain genuine national independence,

development, progress and stability. For the sake of both Armenian and

Turkish people this historic injustice demands correction.

 

Beyond land and border adjustments, descendents of Armenians from

historical Armenia must be granted the right of return to any part of

their homeland - whether this be in Turkey or Armenia. This right of

return must also apply to all people throughout the region. In this

regard Armenians should remember that there are many non-Armenians who

could exercise their right of return to regions in modern Armenia. Any

implementation of this right must not however be at the expense of one

single person, whether Armenian, Turkish, Kurdish or any other

people. As for the question of monetary or other kinds reparations,

none can be just that increases the burden of taxation and poverty

already borne by the Turkish and Kurdish people. Furthermore if

reparations are to be spoken of, they are and must be joint ventures

for the common good of all - not to be pocketed by individual

institutions.

 

The whole gamut of Armenian-Turkish relations are not exhausted or

resolved on the point of Turkish Genocide recognition. There are

issues of regional coexistence and security, of economic, social and

cultural relations, the protection of the cultural heritage of

different nations within single states that affect all the people of

the region - Armenian, Kurdish, Turkish, Azerbaijani, Georgian and

others. What form will economic, social and cultural relations between

people take? How will conflicting claims for the same lands be

resolved? How will centuries of animosities and deeply ingrained

prejudices be removed to secure prosperity in the broader region? How

will the corruption and criminality of the elites in these different

nations be controlled so as to allow democratic forces to attend to

such issues without them being abused and used to fire national

hatreds and animosities? All these matters that touch critically on

issues of national security will perhaps be considered in the planned

second volume of this work.

 

Despite unresolved questions, Armen Aivazian's 'Essential Elements for

Armenia's National Security Doctrine' provides a foundation for an

urgent discussion and for urgent immediate action. His case acquires

extra weight for the absence of any cheap polemic or rhetoric. It is a

call to arms animated by a refusal to accept as inevitable the steady

devastation of Armenia and its people by super power ambitions, the

reactionary influences of the new world order and the corruption of

the new Armenian governing elite.

 

 

--

Eddie Arnavoudian holds degrees in history and politics from

Manchester, England, and is Groong's commentator-in-residence on

Armenian literature. His works on literary and political issues

have also appeared in Harach in Paris, Nairi in Beirut and Open

Letter in Los Angeles.

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I agree with most of the points that Arnavoudian says Aivazian wrote.

 

I would add one point (maybe Aivazian has something along these lines as well). Armenia's current governing elite does not have any fears except for Putin, Bush and Shirak. They are not afraid of the people. They are not afraid that if they do something wrong they're going to be hang or crucified on the streets of Yerevan.

 

Armenia's ruling elite (including the HHSh) has never seen the people in serious rage agaist them that's why they're so laid back. They are afraid of each other but not the people.

 

1996 post election demonstration was brutally surpressed (by Vazgen Sargsyan). Vazgen Manoukian, the leader of opposition ran away.

 

2003 post election demonstration was brutally surpressed (by Robert Kocharian). All the unified opposition leaders were not present during the April 13 night. Again crisis of leadership.

 

It is already 2 times that they galvanize the people's feelings into extreme, lead people into an uprising and then they run away. You cannot imagine what kind of depression they develop in peoples minds when they do that.

 

In 1998 when Kocharian deposted Ter-Petrosian I was happy. But now Kochrian and his antourage's WILL must be BROKEN.

 

By this I don't mean that they need to leave their posts. No. That's not the problem. Anyone of this generation of politicians that will come to power, even Raffy Hovhanissian, will be in the same situation. Because the whole political field is rotten. He will be surrounded with the same circle of Lfik Samos etc.etc.

 

They need a collective shock therapy. How? I would just take them to the House of Parliament, all of them Ter-Petrossian, Kocharian, Opposition everyone and beat them for a week or so. Every day, the same time, the same amount of beating until they faint. And I would air in on TV1 channel.

 

Sorry for the tone guys.

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More on Aivazian on

 

www.artsakhworld.com

 

the special articles...... it is very interesting! But reading him, you have the impression that a cataclysm is about to happen to the armenians very soon and you do feel a strong sense of urgency (not to say panic).... the effect of is maybe even beyond the positive aspect the feeling should lead to in our hearts.

 

About the beating of the politicians.... I agree!

 

 

have a nice weekend

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