What do you think...

[Guest]

...is the reason why Turkey and Azarbaijan started the recent media campain on Kudish gurilla camps in Armenia. It's completely false.

[Guest]

They have nothing better to do.

[Guest]

If Armenia makes a mistake in political balance in the region, that will be the "reason" to attack us.

[Guest]

If it's a reason to attack then I think they will attack Syria also. Turkey has this problem with Syria for years already. So far they've crossed the borders of Iraq for that reason if I'm not mistaken.

[Guest]

Why don't they(Turks) go back to central asia? They do nothing, but start trouble wherever they go.

[Guest]

quote:

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Originally posted by Garo:
If it's a reason to attack then I think they will attack Syria also. Turkey has this problem with Syria for years already. So far they've crossed the borders of Iraq for that reason if I'm not mistaken.

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Yes Garo you're right, but in 1996 Turkey and Syria were on the verge of a major conflict. But Syria did not make the mistake I'm talking about. And also a conflitc with Syria and an attack on Armenia are different things. If Azerbaijan attacks us on the basis of "restoration of its territorial integrity", Turkey can just deploy its forces along our border to keep a part of our army out of activities on Armenian-Azery border. They can provocate tensions by sending their plains accross our border and refuse to accept the violations blaming us for that etc. etc. The result will be the further decline of Armenia's population. And they don't need a longtime conflict for that.

[Guest]

http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg25200.html

 

Armenia views with concern Russian president's visit to Azerbaijan

 

Yerkir

16 Dec 00

 

There seems to be nothing strange in Russia's president making his

postponed visit to Azerbaijan in the first 10 days in January. But

Armenian political thought always feels jealous of any Russian-

Azerbaijani meeting, all the more so when it is a meeting of the

presidents of both countries. The anxiety also has historical

grounds, as during the 1920s the Azeri side did nothing for the

Russian revolution, managed to participate in the neutralization of

the Baku commune and the arrest of the 26 commissars and as a

reward got Artsakh (Artsax), Nakhichevan [Naxcivan] and Gardman

[Northern Artsax]. Today Nakhichevan and Gardman are a loss for

the Armenians, but in the heroic Artsakh, the Nagornyy Artsax

Republic is proclaimed, free and independent from Azerbaijan.

Undoubtedly Russia played a great role in the formation of the

regional geopolitical map so it also has rights. Armenian anxiety

arises from wondering whether Azerbaijan can really make tempting

proposals and in any way influence the Russian position. It should

be remembered that Russia is a strategic partner of Armenia and,

according to clear logic, nothing should take place in Baku that

will be opposed to the interests of Armenia. Here there is a very

significant condition - the Artsax issue. When it says Armenia,

is Russia also including Artsax or is Artsax considered to be a

liberated region apart from Armenia which could become a gift for

Azerbaijan if the latter made a political turn towards Moscow?

Finally for Russia Azerbaijan is a more significant geopolitical

unit than Artsax. Artsax has a political price when Azerbaijan

is on an anti-Russian wave. But immediately after [Azerbaijan]

changes its political position and becomes Russia's partner, the

restraining and tempting role of Artsax will return in itself.

Undoubtedly these are unpleasant thoughts but sober, political

thought demands that possible scenarios be pictured to the end.

 

Now let us look at the events from Baku's point of view. In fact

the following balance is put on the scale: if you want to have

Artsax, give up your independence. In the 1920s such a thing

took place: in one night Musavat Azerbaijan was proclaimed Soviet

and got an unforeseen reward, Artsax, Nakhichevan, Gardman. But

it should not be thought that the 80-year-old scenario could easily

be repeated. Azerbaijan itself will not wish to lose its

independence. Turkey as well as the USA will not let Russian

soldiers again construct border posts from Goradiz [Horadiz] to

Lenkoran [Lankaran] along the former border. Although the loss of

Artsax does not have a decisive significance for the global

programmes of Turkey, the return of Azerbaijan into the arms of

Russia would finally put an end to its efforts to move from Baku to

the North Caucasus and Central Asia. So willy-nilly both Turkic

countries have to resign themselves to the loss of Artsax if they

are to avoid using independence as a political trade-off. If after

the visit of the Russian president Azerbaijan finally satisfies

itself that it is no use hoping for Russia's support on Artsax,

in that case it may gradually forget Artsax either by the

repetition of negotiations or by appealing to brute force.

 

The decisive role of Armenia arises here in fighting finally to

save the liberated Artsakh. In this case the strategic partner may

also step forward with all its power. We may once again resign

ourselves to it from the following words of Vladimir Putin to the

president [Robert Kocharyan] before his official visit to Armenia:

"I am sure that the continuation of the private and direct dialogue

between us will promote the enlargement of multilateral Russian-

Armenian cooperation and will bring it to a new qualitative level."

In Armenia the authorities as well as the political forces and most

of the people are sure the "new qualitative level" first of all

concerns the national and state security of the country including

Artsax. In connection with this, the director of the CIS,

institute, Konstantin Zatulin, said more clearly: "In the Caucasus

Moscow must undoubtedly support Yerevan." As for Artsax,

touching on the question from the point of view of Russia's

interests, he considers it expedient to keep today's status quo.

The fact that Mr Zatulin strictly differentiates Armenia's and

Artsakh's different roles from the point of view of Russia's

interests is worthy of attention. Anyway, it is also very

important that today they are sure in Russia of the strategic

significance of the independent and free Artsakh republic. And if

the Russians do not consider it expedient to change the present

status quo of Artsakh, bilateral relations may be expected to be at

the centre of future Russian-Azerbaijani summit meetings.

 

Eight agreements on cooperation in trade and the economy, customs

and transport spheres are reported to be being drawn up for

signing. And that is natural. Numerous questions have accumulated

between the two neighbouring countries which need to be solved.

These issues which do not raise serious political difficulties will

get a satisfactory solution. The same cannot be said about

Azerbaijan's treatment of Chechnya in connection with the

exploitation of the Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and overall

the negotiations cannot overcome all the problems in one go. First

of all returning to the Artsax conflict we can be certain that

Azerbaijan will again present its demands and ask for Russian

support, which must be resolved in its favour. Russia as the

visitor is obliged to listen attentively to the demands presented

but again we may be sure that in the sphere of businesslike policy,

it will be based only on its vital interests. This is the alphabet

of policy and eastern hospitality and the perfect art of praising

by state officials may not bring about basic changes.

 

Credit: Yerkir, Yerevan, in Armenian 16 Dec 00 p 1