Getting Turkey Right

[Azat]

Getting Turkey right

 

By Ariel Cohen

 

Washington is trying to "get Turkey right" after the Iraq war. Until the election of the Islamist government in the fall of 2002 Ankara looked like the staunchest U.S. ally in the region. In the aftermath of its decision last March not to allow the 4th Infantry Division to deploy in Northern Iraq using Turkish territory, the country looks geopolitically confused. A recent two-week trip to the region confirms it.

 

The old saying, "Turks have no friends, and the friends of the Turks are other Turks." Secular Turks, however, claims the AK Party leadership is pursuing an Islamist diplomatic agenda. As one official put it, "In the past, our leaders talked about Turkish interests, now they are talking about the Ummah [the global Islamic community]."

 

Publicly, officials say they "did nothing wrong" to the U.S. Moreover, a senior government adviser complained he was "irritated" that there is a Polish sector in Iraq, as Poland "was on the losing side" in the Cold War, while Turkey was an U.S. ally. The message to the delegation of the Assembly of Turkish-American Associations (ATAA), a U.S.-based lobbying group, which visited Turkey in June was blunt. "The Turkish authorities clearly want us to go back to the U.S. and tell people that Turkey made no mistakes and to defend Ankara's policies before the Iraqi war," one Turkish-American leader complained.

 

A member of the ATAA delegation declared that the moderate Islamist Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan preached to the delegation about the merits of promoting peace in Islam as a way to go to heaven.

 

Behind closed doors, however, Turks bitterly complain that the Erdogan government committed a monumental mistake and destroyed a decades-old strategic relationship with Washington.

 

A senior Turkish diplomat said that Ankara saw " ... no links to al Qaeda, no WMD, no threat from Saddam. ... The U.S. press coverage of Turkey's bargaining for a greater compensation package hurt Turkish pride. We were being depicted like haggling rug merchants." And U.S. delegations were perceived in Ankara as high-handed. "They would leave us lists of things they wanted to be done."

 

Turkey feared the U.S. would grant Kurds a state in Northern Iraq. The Turkish military even suspected that 62,000 troops that the U.S. intended to send to Iraq via Turkey would never leave Turkish soil. Focus on the Kurds, however, blinded Turkish officials to the importance of saving the relationship with the U.S.

 

Turkey's ability to spread moderate Islam is overstated. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, who spent 8 years in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, as an economist in the Islamic Development Bank, recently gave a speech in Tehran at the Organization of Islamic Conference. The speech, written by a secular Foreign Ministry official, stated that Islam is compatible with democracy and women's equality.

 

However, Turkey does not have the budget, the institutions, the personnel, or the commitment to promote this model. Turkey may promote moderate Islam if it puts its own house in order. That may not be enough.

 

The military, for decades a steward of Turkish foreign and security policy, is split at the top. Some generals do not cherish the idea of losing its independence and being subjugated to the Common European Foreign and Security Policy — which will be defined in and by Brussels.

 

Some have made statements about the possibility of developing an "independent" Turkish geostrategic course, which would abandon the close relationship with the U.S., but would allow Turkey to play a bigger role in Turkic-speaking countries and develop relations with Russia, China, Iran and Israel. Possibly, this may simply a propaganda ruse to scare the U.S. into forgiving Turkey for her less-than-loyal behavior during the war.

 

The role of the military in national decisionmaking is being questioned. Businesspeople and intellectuals say that while in the past they hoped the Turkish military would step in during a crisis and find a solution, today's problems may be so complex that the Army no longer has an answer. Some demand reallocation of resources, with a greater piece of the pie for civilian needs: "It is unacceptable that while education and health care get 3 percent to 4 percent of the budget, the military gets 30 percent to 35 percent."

 

Armenia remains a sore point in Turkish foreign policy. It continues to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's land, causing close to 1 million people to live as refugees. While the Turkish Foreign Ministry may be interested in opening the border to stimulate exchanges and trade, the military so far has vetoed the idea. This may change. Turkey now believes that opening her borders with Armenia will increase Ankara's leverage.

 

Turkey is also Iran's neighbor. One senior official claimed Tehran is closer to producing a nuclear bomb than the U.S. thinks: Iran may have the bomb within six to 12 months. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, however, wants to pursue consultations with its Iranian counterparts and has not voiced support for the American policy on Iran beyond the usual diplomatic interventions.

 

To conclude, Turkey is important as an energy transit country and as a democratic and moderate Muslim state closely cooperating with the U.S. in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East. The U.S. should support the Turkish bid to get into the EU because it will become the largest country of the Union, but also because it may balance off France and Germany.

 

In the short run, Turkish support in resolving the Iranian nuclear weapons program will be key in defining the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. Washington should continue to engage Turkey politically and militarily while remembering its less-than-stellar performance in the moment of need.

 

Ariel Cohen is research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He visited Turkey in June under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations' Atlantic Partnership Program and the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

[Stormig]

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j...sID=0&listSrc=Y

 

America switches its allegiance to Armenia

 

By Nathan Guttman

 

 

 

WASHINGTON - Some 88 years after one and a half

million Armenians were slaughtered in Turkey in

World War I, members of the Armenian community in

the United States feel for the first time that it

is possible American Congress will finally

recognize the genocide they experienced.

 

 

 

 

A draft resolution that

explicitly notes that what

happened to the Armenians in

the Ottoman Empire in the years

1915-1918 was a case of

genocide has already won the

endorsement of the House of

Representatives' Judiciary

Committee and is currently in

the process of obtaining

 

preliminary endorsement from the Senate. While

there were attempts in the past to win

recognition of the Armenian genocide from

American lawmakers, all were shot down by the

administration and congress, which were

consistently more attentive to Turkish rather

than Armenian interests. Now, however, members

of the Armenian diaspora believe their chances

have improved, not because support for the

Armenian cause has grown, but because of the

anti-Turkish wave now sweeping over the United

States since the war against Iraq.

 

House Resolution 193 was already approved in

late May by the House Judiciary Committee with

no opposition or reservations. In order to

bypass the obstacles faced by attempts to pass

similar resolutions in the past, the resolution

was not presented as relating exclusively to

the Armenians, but rather as a resolution

marking the 15th anniversary of American

implementation of the UN Genocide Convention.

 

The resolution cites a number of cases of

genocide in the 20th century, such as the

murder of the Herero in Namibia by the Germans

in 1904, the death of 5 million Ukrainians

during World War II, the murder of the Hutu by

the Tutsi and the Tutsi by the Hutu in Rwanda,

the slaughter of civilians in Cambodia by the

Khmer Rouge, the murder of 2 million people by

the Muslim Front in Sudan and the ethnic

cleansing in Bosnia.

 

Among this list can be found, for the first time

in an official American document, the genocide

of the Armenian people, which is expressly

described as an attempt by the Ottoman Turks to

liquidate the Christian Armenian population.

The resolution discusses mass deportation,

abductions, torture, mass murder and starvation

that occurred in two waves in 1915-1918 and

1920-1932, when 1.5 million out of a total of 2

million Armenians who lived within the borders

of the Ottoman Empire were murdered. The

resolution also notes that the slaughter ended

when the Turkish republic was established.

 

"The language of the resolution reflects the

effort to learn the lesson from genocides in

the past in order to prevent them from

occurring again," says Aram Hamparian,

executive director of the Armenian National

Committee of America (ANCA), an organization of

Armenians in the United States that has been

working to get the resolution approved. He says

that placing the Armenian genocide in the same

list with other cases of genocide throughout

the world underscores the acceptance of the

case of the Armenian people as genocide. "Only

that recognition can help us learn the lesson.

If we deny what had taken place, we will not be

able to move forward and make sure these

tragedies don't happen again."

 

Complicating efforts for peace

 

The legislative process is a long one. After

the approval in the House Judiciary Committee,

the supporters of the resolution must bring it

for a vote before the House plenary and gain a

majority. A similar process must be followed

through in the Senate, where the resolution is

currently in more preliminary stages and has

not yet been debated in committee. Last year,

the Armenians' attempt to gain recognition for

their genocide failed after the Senate recessed

before the draft resolution passed all the

approval stages.

 

There are numerous obstacles awaiting them this

time too. One of the principal ones is

presented by the American administration, which

has made it clear it opposes recognition of the

Armenian genocide. In a letter sent to the

chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Jim

Sensenbrenner, Jr., Assistant Secretary of

State, Legislative Affairs Paul V. Kelly

explained that the mention of the Armenian

genocide in the resolution could complicate

matters for the United States where its

international interests are concerned. "We

oppose HR 193's reference to the `Armenian

Genocide.' Were this wording adopted, it could

complicate our efforts to bring peace and

stability to the Caucasus and hamper ongoing

attempts to bring about Turkish-Armenian

reconciliation," writes Kelly to the committee

chair. He underscored the direction the

administration favors is one of direct

communication between the Turkish and Armenian

governments, adding, "Declarations such as this

one, however, hinder rather than encourage that

kind of dialogue."

 

The Turks have been exerting pressure on the

administration and Congress in an attempt to

prevent the endorsement of the resolution or at

least to change its wording. The Armenians

maintain that Turkish representatives in the

United States have been trying in the last few

months to create a semblance of an attempt at

reconciliation by inviting members of the

American Armenian community to meet with an

official representative of the Turkish Foreign

Ministry. The Armenians in the United States

maintain that the goal of the invitation was to

create the feeling that there was some form of

communication between the two sides and to

prove that Turkey was trying to stretch out its

hand to the Armenians, and that consequently

there was no justification for a resolution

that would define their actions against the

Armenians during World War I as genocide.

 

A cold American shoulder

 

But unlike in previous years, when the Turks

managed without difficulty to remove the matter

from the American public agenda, this time the

reality is different. "In the past we had

difficulties making our voice heard, because

there was an almost automatic backing of

Turkey. The latest events gave us the

opportunity to be heard by the administration

and by Congress, and they were responsive,"

says Hamparian. By the "latest events," he is

referring to the refusal by Turkey to allow the

stationing of 62,000 American troops on Turkish

soil on the eve of the war in Iraq, a step that

considerably disrupted the American war plan

and prevented it from establishing an effective

northern front against Saddam Hussein.

 

The disappointment of the strategic planners in

Washington at the decision by the Turkish

parliament not to allow the posting of American

troops in Turkey was profound, especially in

view of the pronounced effort the United States

made on the eve of the war to appease the

Turks. The American administration prepared a

huge aid package to the tune of billions of

dollars, exerted considerable pressure on

Europe to accept Turkey into the European Union

and expressed willingness to help in the matter

of Cyprus. "Turkey should admit that it had

made a mistake in not allowing U.S. troops,"

said Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz

after the war was over, giving the signal for

the administration's cold shoulder toward the

Turks.

 

The Turkish government was well aware of the

danger involved in the loss of American support

and launched an international campaign to

rehabilitate its relations with the United

States. "My country is your faithful ally and

friend," wrote Prime Minister Recep Tayyip

Erdogan in an article in the Wall Street

Journal after the war. After that, he sent

Deputy Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ugur

Ziyal for a visit to Washington, where he met

with all branches of government and visited all

the newspaper offices in order to reiterate the

friendship Turkey has for the United States and

the importance of it as a stable ally in such a

troublesome region.

 

But despite this, the Turks fear the crisis in

relations with the United States could pave the

way for a change in the declared position of

the United States toward the Armenian issue. "I

hope they will not take advantage of what

happened to pass an anti-Turkish resolution in

Congress," said Tuluy Tanch, the

minister-counselor in the Turkish Embassy in

Washington, adding, "It is true that the vote

of the Turkish parliament raised negative

feelings with some members of Congress, but it

should be seen as a Turkish democratic act, not

as an act of Turkish hostility toward the

U.S."

 

Eyes on the Jewish community

 

The Turks have a different version of the

events of 1915, which they describe as a

"tragedy." Turkish spokesmen explain that

during the war, Armenians from southern Turkey

joined forces with the Russian army and

attacked the Turkish army using terror tactics,

causing the Ottoman government to take steps

against them, including deportation.

"Unfortunately, and we aware of it, this was

not an easy task, and there were many

casualties as a result of the war, the climate

and the transportation difficulties," says

Tanch.

 

The Turkish government's official approach is

also at variance with the number of Armenians

who perished and claims that 1.5 million is a

fantastic and impossible figure because at that

time, there were not that many Armenians living

in the Ottoman empire. They also claim that in

trials held by Britain after the war in Malta,

in which Turks were convicted of murdering

Armenians, genocide was never proved. "It is

unfair to call it genocide. We see it as a

terrible result of war circumstances," states

the Turkish diplomat.

 

For now, the two communities in America continue

to maintain hostile relations. About 1.5

million Armenians live in the United States,

many of whom came immediately following the

massacre of Armenians in Turkey. Others, who

settled in the Middle East after the slaughter,

arrived in the United States in a second wave

of immigration after the war in Lebanon and the

Iranian revolution, with a third wave of

immigrants arriving after the independence of

Armenia in the wake of the fall of the Soviet

Union. The issue of recognition of the Armenian

genocide and the Turkish war crimes stands at

the head of the Armenian immigrants' priorities

and prevents any rapprochement with the Turkish

community, which is considered less organized,

but which also refuses to relinquish its

version of the events.

 

Both sides have their eyes on the American

Jewish community in the hope of winning support

for its struggle over public opinion and

American decision makers. The Turkish

government maintains close ties with Jewish

organizations and in the past year, Prime

Minister Erdogan (before taking office) and

Deputy Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ziyal

found time for closed meetings with

representatives of the community. The

Armenians, who do not have broad ties with the

Jewish community, are fighting for two main

goals - to guarantee the security of their

homeland and preserve the memory of the

genocide.

[Sip]

Great ... why the hell did I expect to see a cooking recipe here? Don't tell me that title is not deliberatly written like that. Maybe I spent too much time in the sun today? 7 hours straight in 102 degree heat

[THOTH]

Too bad that neither of these articles get all of their facts right...

[America-Hye]

Sip,

 

Is your mind fixated on FOOD? If I remember correctly you worked at a fast-food restaurant in your younger years. You were slimmer then and looked more like a germag-hye. You must have some Polish blood, since you have also gotten much darker over the last few years. This is a Polish genetic trait. Or is it an Armenia genetic trait inherited by the Polish when tens of thousands of Armenians "disappeared" into the Polish genepool?