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Analysis: Energy wars of the Caucasus


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Analysis: Energy wars of the Caucasus

 

TBILISI, Georgia, Sep 30, 2002 (United Press International via COMTEX) -- For

centuries, it's been the place where interests and empires have collided.

Romans, Persians, Byzantines and Ottomans, among others, have affected the

Caucasus, usually to the detriment of its inhabitants.

 

Now, the two main combatants are Russia and the West, led by the United States.

 

While Western countries have sponsored new energy-sector infrastructure, Russia

has been consolidating its control over existing infrastructure.

 

Through projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the United States

enhances economic and political influence in the region. Moscow, meanwhile,

wants to maintain its role as key energy supplier. It is truly a battle of

titans, involving multinationals like British Petroleum, Unocal and Gazprom.

 

It remains to be seen whether the locals will win out -- or see their interests

swallowed up by these giants.

 

Writing on Eurasianet.org, analyst Haroutiun Khachatrian praised Russia's

Caucasus "commitment ... at a moment when private and other international

investors are shying away from the region."

 

July's debt restructuring deal means Russia will write off $98 million of

commercial-rated Armenian debt, in exchange for shares in five state-owned

interests. This protects Moscow from yet another CIS-state loan default, and

also bolsters its military and energy sectors.

 

The companies involved will probably include a robot factory, "two or three

research institutes which once served the USSR's military-industrial complex,"

and the Hrazdan thermal plant. The last of these has strategic value -- it can

supply up to 40 percent of Armenia's electricity. Russia can also create cheap

electricity, by building a proposed Iran-Armenia gas pipeline.

 

According to Khachatrian, electricity competition between Russia and Armenia

will "diminish or end." Still, Russia will increase control over the electricity

supplies of not only Armenia, but also of Georgia and eastern Turkey.

 

Georgia sees little benefit in further Russian encroachment. A bellicose Moscow

is threatening to bomb Chechens on Georgian territory. Another cold Caucasus

winter is approaching, and the Georgians fear more strong-arming. In the past,

power cuts have meant four hours of electricity a day, in the dead of winter.

 

In 1998, when the government put Tbilgaz, the state-owned gas distributor up for

sale, it was hoped that this particular albatross would take off, and not look

back. Saddled in debt, ruined by chronic mismanagement, Tbilgaz exemplified

post-Soviet Georgia's worst characteristics. Yet in the first of three

unsuccessful tenders, only Sakgaz came forward, but couldn't meet the tender

terms. In the third tender, Israel's Tahal was interested, but only briefly.

 

Now, Tbilgaz will be acquired by its own supplier, Gazprom's subsidiary Itera,

to whom it owes $24 million. Itera is currently Georgia's exclusive gas

supplier.

 

Itera is to acquire 51 percent of Tbilgaz. As in Armenia, the deal involves

infrastructure swaps, but not debt absolution. Rather, Tbilgaz's $24 million

debt will undergo five-year restructuring- based on future revenues. While Itera

pledged not to raise tariffs and to find cheaper gas, the government must

increase budget subsidies.

 

These two case studies exemplify the vulture-like way in which Russia has

devoured the dying beasts of the Caucasus.

 

Yet the Caucasus energy sector is more ambivalent. Americans do in fact have a

stake in existing infrastructure -- for now. Georgia's single largest investor

is American giant AES, which operates three power plants and owns 75 percent of

Telasi, Tbilisi's electricity distributor. These were subsumed into "Silk Road"

BV, an AES subsidiary, which operates hydroelectric, gas, coal and oil, plants

in Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. In December 1999, around $60 million in EBRD

and IFC loans were announced for AES Telasi.

 

However, insiders say that AES -- to cut its larger international losses -- is

now on the verge of pulling out of unprofitable Georgia. Although AES has denied

this possibility, it would not be surprising.

 

Neighboring Turkey's 8 percent annual increase in energy demand makes it one of

Europe's fastest growing markets. Yet it has poor infrastructure and dwindling

supplies of oil and gas. According to the APS Oil Review, Turkey's reserves have

dropped below 300 million barrels, and "the chances of local and foreign

explorers finding major hydrocarbon reserves in this country are slim."

 

Turkey is thus investing considerably in foreign exploration and production

ventures. It receives Azeri gas, and the new Blue Stream pipeline (which can

supply Turkey with 16 bcn of Russian gas annually) will also help appease

consumer demand. Yet this also stymies energy independence. Turkey too has

occasionally suffered from foreign-ordered blackouts.

 

There may be light at the end of the tunnel, but it won't be reached for another

2-3 years. On Sept. 18 in Baku, the Georgian, Azeri and Turkish authorities

inaugurated the long-awaited Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The $3 billion

project, run by British Petroleum, also involves Italy's Eni Spa, Norway's

Statoil ASA, and Unocal.

 

BTC's sister project is a $2.9 billion gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum). It

exploits one of the world's richest gas fields, and should help solve Georgia's

energy problems -- when finished in 2005. BTC is a boon for the Caucasus

countries. At least that's how it's being billed. Yet whether it will benefit

the citizenry, and not just the multinationals and ruling elite, is unclear.

 

Recently, several Caucasus NGO's voiced concerns about potential environmental

hazards. They also questioned whether locals will receive derivative energy

supply and jobs.

 

The Dutch Ministry of Environment, commissioned to write an impact assessment

report for Georgia, warns that the pipeline will traverse the "highly sensitive"

areas of Borjomi, Bakuriani and Tsalka. The region is famous for mineral water

-- Georgians swear by its salutary effects -- and also contains a ski resort,

health spas, and a protected wilderness area.

 

Borjomi Mineral Water alone has 1,200 employees, and accounts for 80 percent of

the region's revenues. This year's estimated turnover is $30 million. Within

five years sales are expected to top $100 million annually. The company doesn't

depend on government subsidies -- in fact, its revenues help subsidize the

government. Its shareholders include both foreign and Georgian interests, like

TBC Bank (Georgia's first private bank). And the EBRD and IFC have invested $14

million since 1997. Clearly, a lot is at stake.

 

Borjomi's general manager Jacques Fleury told United Press International the

company's concerns: "we understand that any major breakage of the pipe, whether

accidental or criminal, would result in a flood of up to 7,000 tons of oil --

which I think could be the end of our business."

 

Borjomi is seeking a mutually beneficial compromise solution with the pipeline

backers. Says Fleury: "We are asking the operator to use protective measures

that would be recommended in similarly sensitive areas of Western Europe -- the

best solution being to divert the pipeline to a more southerly route." The issue

remains unresolved.

 

British Petroleum claims up to 80 percent of the 2,500 needed workers can be

locally recruited. Critics say it'll be closer to half, and only temporary work.

But in impoverished Georgia, anything will help.

 

Another problem is land compensation. Those whose property falls within the

pipeline's path are elated, whereas landowners further away feel frozen out.

Jaba Ebanoidze, representative of the landowners' rights association, recently

told local media that the compensation procedure is not "clearly defined," and

that "appraiser companies simply do not exist in Georgia." Ebanoidze envisioned

a further scenario, whereby miffed landowners off the pipeline route disrupt

construction, to spite their luckier neighbors.

 

This is analogous, on a microcosmic scale, to Russia's irritation with the

Caucasus states. In 1992, Abkhaz separatists were aided surreptitiously by

Russia, many believe, to keep Georgia unstable. The Nagorno-Artsax dispute

between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a relic of Soviet demographic ploys, is a

managed, frozen conflict prolonging Russia's regional diplomatic relevance. But

with the BTC on its way from pipe dream to pipeline, and Washington expanding

its influence, it's doubtful that the Caucasus sandbox can fit two kings.

 

By CHRISTOPHER DELISO, UPI Business Correspondent

 

Copyright 2002 by United Press International.

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