Yervant1 Posted February 28, 2014 Report Share Posted February 28, 2014 CILICIAN ARMENIANS AND THE GENOCIDEArmenian News Network / GroongFebruary 28, 2014By Eddie ArnavoudianPART ONE: the two-pronged assault on the Armenian nation and people I.Despite its ridiculous title, Shmavon Torosyan's `The NationalLiberation Movement of Cilician Armenians - 1919-1920' (371pp, 1987,Yerevan, Armenia) is significant for reminding of an oft neglected butcritical dimension of the Armenian Genocide carried out by the Ottomanstate and the Young Turks. It is also a vital reminder of therepugnant, revolting, treacherous character of imperial France'sArmenian policy, as repugnant, revolting and treacherous as theBritish and the Tsarist States.Though not part of historic Armenia, Cilicia with its ancient Armenianheritage was home to a major Armenian community. Its economic eliteweighed even more than its numbers, aided as it was by the region'sgeographic location along fertile cotton plantations and Mediterraneancoastal routes. As a consequence Cilicia became a dangerous combustionpoint for the much wider conflict between Armenian economic elites andtheir emerging and often envious Turkish opponents, now buttressed bythe extreme nationalist Young Turks. Proximity to Europe, anintersecting point for trade between Europe, Anatolia, the Arab worldand further east, also made Cilicia an object of imperial envy andambition, that of the French, first and foremost, but also of theBritish, ambition in which Armenians featured as minor and readilydisposable pawns.In the settling of scores with their Armenian rivals, the cleansing ofhistoric western Armenia would not suffice to secure the Turkish elitethe supremacy it desired. Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the Turkisheconomic class confronted an Armenian economic network that extendedfrom Istanbul, through to Anatolia, western Armenia and Ciliciatoo. There could be no Turkish triumph in the nationalist contestwithout the destruction of Armenian trading, agricultural andindustrial fortifications across Asia Minor. Here Cilician Armeniaformed a crucial battleground. Besides being disproportionatelypowerful, Armenian economic interest rested not just on a substantialArmenian community with, but on one with, as demonstrated in Zeitun, aformidable military-political tradition of resistance.It is in this context that one must see the 1909 Adana massacres ofmore 30,000 Armenians, notoriously executed during the second year ofthe so-called democratic Young Turk revolution with which the Armenianpolitical movement was then in alliance. The 1909 Adana slaughter wasa stage in a longer-term Turkish nationalist project to dismantle itsdreaded Armenian opponent. If the 1895-96 pogroms and murder of300,000 Armenians in western Armenia had delivered a body blow toArmenian development there, Armenian Cilicia had then escaped theworst. Adana in 1909 was thus Cilician Armenia's 1895-96, a decisivebludgeon that blasted the foundations of Cilician Armenian economicand political development, drove tens of thousands out of their landsand so softened the entire Armenian nation up for the final solutionof 1915.1915, the date of the Young Turk final solution, may indeed have beencontingent, an opportunity seized in war. The Ottoman State was ofcourse ready to seize such opportunies and able to act rapidly for itwas master of the existing apparatus of repression, mass murder andgenocide that had been put in place and into operation long before.Even while 1915 was the critical, major stage, the process of Genocidehad begun much earlier continued for much longer. If 1895-96 was afirst major preparatory blow, Adana in 1909 was the second. And beyonddecisive 1915 there were yet more stages: the burning out of thesubstantial and wealthy Armenian community in Smyrna, the emptying ofIstanbul and then the relentless Kemalist assault on the remnants ofArmenian economic bastions that continued into the 1950s.In illuminating the process of Genocide Torosyan effectively dissolvesclaims, including those of historian Armenian Leo, that the 1915deportations were inevitable Young Turk responses to an alleged`pro-Russian' Armenian uprising in Van. Van in fact was a legitimaterevolt by its Armenian population seeking to defend itself againstdeportation and Genocide. The Cilician deportations had in fact begunbefore the Van uprising and served indeed a particular purpose. As anopening move in the murder of a nation, Cilician deportations servedto remove all possible outposts and refuges that could have offeredaid and assistance to the larger caravans of Armenians from westernArmenia being driven into the executioners' deserts of Syria.The Cilician experience in 1909, in 1915 and in the post war erashows, and decisively so that the Young Turk programme of genocidepursued a double strategy, a two pronged ambition ranging across theentire territory of the Ottoman Empire. The absolute, non-negotiablecondition for Turkish hegemony in Asia Minor was both the cleansing ofhistoric Armenia and the destruction of Armenian economic bastionsthroughout the borders of what was to emerge as the new Kemalistrepublic.Virulent racist nationalists, the Young Turks to secure the region'sterritorial integrity sought to assimilate, murder or expel all othernational groups, thus the uprooting and cleansing of Armenians fromtheir historic homelands. But alone, the defeat of Armenians inWestern Armenia would not have secured the Turkish elites thepre-eminence and primacy they so viciously desired. Armenian economicpower positioned, as it was, even firmer in Cilicia, in Smyrna andIstanbul would remain a major threat to Turkish nationalism. And so tothese areas they also directed their venom. II.Torosyan's seeking to present 1919-1920 Armenian history in Cilicia asa `national liberation movement' is preposterous. He describes not anational emancipation struggle but an instance of disastrousdependency on imperialist powers, here on the French that was evenmore catastrophic than Armenian dependency on Tsarist power in theCaucuses. In the post-World War One era, as European imperial powerssought to slice up the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian leadership inCilicia became a willing and active instrument of French colonialambitions in the region, and never anything more.Possessing insufficient armed forces of their own, for a very shortperiod the French developed and financed an Armenian Legion ofvolunteer soldiers as a means of sustaining their Cilicianambitions. Deployed in some decisive battles the Armenian legioncontributed to temporarily disabling the Ottoman Army in the regionand so became in some respects a direct agent of French occupyingforces in Cilicia. Both the Armenian Legion and the large swathe ofArmenian refugees that encouraged by the French returned thereafter toCilicia did so not at the behest of Armenian policy but of Frenchcolonial ambition.French sponsorship of Armenian resettlement in their Cilicianhomelands had no regards whatsoever for Armenians' immediate securityor long term viability as a community. Just as soon as French forcesrealised the impossibility of their colonial venture they disbandedthe Armenian Legion, withdrew their forces and left the Armeniancivilian population to the mercy of Kemal Ataturk bent on cleansingArmenians from the whole of the territory of the collapsed OttomanEmpire. Why the French so rapidly retreated is not made altogetherclear. They certainly lacked the military capacity to defeat Ataturk'sforces alone. And as imperialist rivalries deepened the Frenchleadership perhaps hoping to remain a step ahead of their Britishrivals, set about currying favour with Kemal's movement now clearlyemerging master of Asia Minor.Whatever the determinants of French policy, Armenian dependence uponit was in every conceivable way a total disaster.To be assured of Armenian collaboration, the French besides hinting atsupport for Armenian autonomy in Cilicia stretched their deception toeven suggest prospects of independent Armenian nationhood. But even asthey did this, they left intact all the main Ottoman institutions ofgovernment and state - the local Ottoman Turkish military forces, thecourts and public political authorities. Simultaneously they refusedto allow the Armenian Legion to evolve into a disciplined andgenuinely effective military formation. So when it came to the crunch,in the wake of French retreat from Cilicia, Armenian remnants of theGenocide and the rag-tag Armenian Legion proved no match for Kemal'sarms or for French perfidy.So gullible, so sheepishly faithful to French colonialism was theArmenian leadership that it did virtually nothing to establishseparate and independent relations with Turkish forces andcommunities. It was as if the Turkish people, who like the Armeniansshared rights in a region they too had lived for centuries, simply didnot exist. Armenian leaders had expected French colonial forces totame or dispose of Turks and allow Armenians to go about theirbusiness with no regard for Turkish concerns or interests.Premised entirely on what was clearly French imperial and colonialambition in Turkey within which it hoped to secure its own subordinateends Armenian policy in Cilicia was disastrous. In the wake of Frenchwithdrawal Armenians were not only left utterly isolated, they wereworse still now reviled even more by Turkish communities alreadywhipped into a frenzy of hatred against Armenians. Even as they hadreturned to justly reclaim their own land, Armenians were charged withcollaborating with the French imperialists. They were regarded andtreated as part of the French colonial forces seeking thedismemberment of their homeland and therefore as legitimate targets ofKemal Ataturk's nationalist movement.Considering Armenian policy in post-war Cilicia it is difficult toadopt a categorical condemnatory stance. Armenians in post-GenocideCilicia faced an impossible position. Uprooted, without anchor,destroyed economically, lacking any independent military forces andwith no hope of any protection from any Armenian sources, they wereutterly and totally vulnerable and so easy prey for Frenchmachinations. Desperate after the war, they had only two choices:remain in exile, set up life in the Arab world or return home underFrench auspices, at the behest of the French, as an instrument oftheir colonial ambitions, but at least with some hope of rebuildingtheir lives in their homelands. That they confronted such a situationwas without doubt a result of the Young Turk Genocide.In post-World War One Cilicia, the Armenian community had no means ofrelying on themselves. They had little or no possibility of developingan independent survival strategy. The dye had been cast by theGenocide that had devastated any independent Armenian potential inCilicia. So between the hammer of French imperialism and the anvil ofa ferocious Turkish nationalism like feathers in a storm the Armenianleadership was easily carried away by empty pro-Armenian Frenchdeclarations. Often sat in comfortable European hotels they evenprattled on about a Greater Armenia that would bring together Ciliciaand historic western Armenia to form an independent `greater Armenia'sponsored by the triumphant imperial powers.This of course was only to offer more grist to the mill of chauvinistTurkish nationalism that already portrayed Armenians, alongsideFrench, British and US, as forces preparing to drive Turks from lands,not just in Cilicia but throughout an Asia Minor that they too hadinhabited for generations. With Armenians appearing as imperialistassistants, their own historically legitimate demands to a return totheir own expropriated lands in western Armenia, Cilicia and AsiaMinor were presented as colonial land-grabbing. And in the Darwiniannationalist jungle that was created Armenians became easy prey forTurkish nationalism.Two concluding chapters on Armenian defensive battles in Marash andHajun and the Armenian-Christian declaration of Cilician autonomy tellyet more grisly tales of French treachery and deception to whichArmenians fell fatally foul. French betrayal of their one-timeArmenian allies in Cilicia was categorical, utter and complete. InMarash and Hajun they actively obstructed and even sabotaged Armeniandefensive operations going so far as to supply Kemal's troops withcritical military intelligence. The resulting civilian slaughter isshocking. After Marsash and Hajun Armenians were forced to alsoretreat from Sis and Ayntab and then were broken down in Adana. Thetoxic mix of French imperial policy and Armenian dependence put an endto a historic Armenian presence in Cilicia, a region that had oncebeen grounds for an Armenian monarchic state. * * * * *Torosyan's study for all its faults, that here require no rehearsal,and for all his rather naïve indignation in the face of Frenchtreachery, provides ample data to construct a full critique of Frenchimperialism in the region after the war. To secure Armenian aid andfighting men they promised Armenians the sky. But just as soon as theysaw fit, they abandoned them, dissolved the Armenian Legion and cutrelations with Armenian secular leaders. Like the British and Russianstates, the French too feared any independent Armenian power. They toofeared independent Armenian arrangements with Turkish movements thathowever unstable or ephemeral, would be at French imperial expense.Rather than entertain such a prospect the French happily looked on asCilician Armenians were murdered and burnt out of their homes yetagain. French imperialism only approved of Armenians as malleablepuppets or as corpses.--Eddie Arnavoudian holds degrees in history and politics fromManchester, England, and is Groong's commentator-in-residence onArmenian literature. His works on literary and political issueshave also appeared in Harach in Paris, Nairi in Beirut and OpenLetter in Los Angeles. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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