Georgia: Problems resembling those of Armenia

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Georgia: A Failing State?

Anatol Lieven: 1/30/01

 

EURASIA INSIGHT

February 4, 2001

 

Georgia is now mired in the worst crisis since the end - or rather

suspension - of the civil wars of the early 1990s, with several

factors having combined to precipitate trouble. The internal

reform process has effectively come to a halt amidst corruption on

a kleptocratic scale. In turn, this has helped prevent the economy

from re-orienting towards the West, leaving Georgia dependent on

Russian markets for exports both of goods and labor. In addition,

smuggling and organized criminal activity is rampant, as much of

the country operates beyond the government?s control.

 

Russia is also once again playing a significant role in Georgian

affairs. The limited reestablishment of Russian power under

Vladimir Putin has enabled Moscow to put pressure on Georgia. At

the same time, the presence of Chechen refugees and some fighters

in Georgia has given the Kremlin a major new incentive to meddle.

Russia?s repeated interruptions of supplies of natural gas to

Georgia (the excuse being Georgia?s unpaid debt of $179 million)

has had a severe effect on the economy and people. And if

effectively administered, the introduction in December of a visa

regime for Georgian visitors to Russia could have an even worse

effect in the longer run, as remittances from Georgian workers in

Russia (estimates for whose numbers range as high as 850,000) are

of great importance to many Georgian families and the economy as a

whole.

 

How has Georgia landed in such a desperate situation? Before 1989,

the Georgian SSR enjoyed a relatively favorable position within the

Soviet Union. Georgia was one of the few Soviet producers of wine,

brandy, and many kinds of fruit. Similarly, the ban on travel to

the outside world meant that Georgia, with its mountains and

beaches, also attracted a share of Soviet tourists out of all

proportion to its size.

 

However, forced isolation in the shoddy Soviet economy meant that

by the late 1980s, Georgian products were hopelessly uncompetitive

on world markets. Even more disastrous have been the moral and

cultural effects of Soviet rule. Georgian products were those most

prized on the Soviet black market, which grew enormously during the

Brezhnev years but which was still legally banned. Combined with

local traditions of defiant individualism and contempt of state

authority, this meant that Georgians came to play a leading part in

the "criminal" economy. Under Soviet rule, this contributed to

Georgians? surprisingly high real living standards. However, it

also bred a contempt for law. As the chairman of Georgia?s

anti-corruption commission, David Usupashvili, told me,

 

"People were naturally utterly cynical about Communist laws and

rules; but unfortunately, that fed a nihilistic mentality in which

under independence they still do not respect any laws or rules at

all. ... Corruption is a way of life. People don?t believe that

the state will ever provide services or enforce the law, so they

don?t pay taxes. There are only two ways to survive here. To

become financially strong yourself, or to place yourself under the

protection of someone who is stronger. But there is no way to be a

citizen, there is only a kind of feudalism, in politics,

government, business."

 

In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, tension among

Georgians and the aspirations of Georgian ethnic minorities

combined with manipulation from Moscow to produce disastrous

conflicts in the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In other areas too, the writ of Tbilisi barely runs: the

Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, ruled by its local strongman Aslan

Abashidze; the mountainous region of Svanetia; the

Armenian-populated district of Akhalkalaki (also home to a Russian

base); and most recently the Pankisi Gorge near the Chechen border

in Georgia?s eastern mountains, which Chechen refugees have turned

into a no-go area for the Georgian security forces, and a base for

kidnapping and other criminality.

 

In October 1993, Georgia?s defeat in Abkhazia led to a new revolt

in western Georgia by the followers of President Zviad

Gamsakhurdia, deposed in a coup in January 1992 and replaced by

Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Georgian communist boss and Soviet

foreign minister. The "Zviadists" were defeated with the help of

Russian tanks and other equipment, in return for which Moscow

extracted a promise from Shevardnadze that Georgia would join the

Commonwealth of Independent States and generally accept renewed

Russian hegemony.

 

In the following years, however, Russia?s defeat in the first

Chechen War, and continued economic decline, seemed to give Georgia

a new chance to escape from Moscow?s hated tutelage. Concurrently,

US interest in the Caucasus, and commitment to supporting Georgia

and Azerbaijan against Russia, greatly increased. Georgia then

took a series of steps to distance itself from Moscow and align

itself with the West: reducing co-operation with the CIS to a

minimum.

 

As part of its re-orientation towards the West, Georgia helped

establish a US-sponsored counter-organization, the "GUUAM" group of

former Soviet states; participated in NATO?s Partnership for Peace

Program, declaring its desire to join NATO itself; strongly

endorsed the US-backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline; and sought help from

the West and the OSCE to pressure Russia to withdraw its military

bases from Georgia (two were partially closed last year, but Russia

appears determined to hang on to the others).

 

These steps, or at least their more ostentatiously anti-Russian

aspects, may have been a serious miscalculation. The Russian army

is bogged down in Chechnya, but still looks a good deal stronger

than in the aftermath of the defeat of 1996 (I should say with due

humility that in my book on the first Chechen War, I too

exaggerated the extent of Russian weakness). Georgian hopes of

direct Western military support, leading to NATO membership, have

proved a wild fantasy, if only because of the disastrous condition

of the Georgian army.

 

No natural gas supplies have become available that could replace

those from Russia, on which the Georgian economy is utterly

dependent; and under Putin, the Russian government has shown a new

ability to create a coherent energy policy with partly geopolitical

goals. Azerbaijan?s oil reserves have so far proved much less than

hoped and Western oil companies have strongly resisted agreeing to

pay for the Baku-Ceyan pipeline across Georgia. Under President

Clinton, despite its strong rhetorical support for Baku-Ceyhan, the

US state also refused to invest directly in the project.

 

The West, and especially the United States, have indeed provided

relatively large sums in aid to Georgia, in part because of

hostility to Russian hegemony, and in part because of continued

gratitude to Shevardnadze for his role in helping peacefully to end

Soviet control over Eastern Europe in 1989-90. In recent years,

Georgia has been the third largest recipient of US aid in the world

in per capita terms. Unfortunately, the greater part of this aid

appears to have been stolen or otherwise squandered by the Georgian

ruling elites.

 

In the course of 2000, the Shevardnadze government came under heavy

pressure from Western governments to tackle corruption, leading to

the creation of an anti-corruption commission headed by respected

intellectuals; but privately, Western diplomats in Tbilisi admit

that it is pointless to aim at the prosecution of high-level

offenders. Instead, they are trying only to limit some of the

opportunities for corruption. Western disillusionment was deepened

by the massive rigging of the April 2000 presidential elections, in

which Shevardnadze officially received 79.8 per cent of the vote on

a 75.8 per cent turnout.

 

Acute energy shortages have continued for several years, and have

been made worse by the latest Russian pressure. In early December,

a widespread blackout led to thousands of citizens of Tbilisi

taking to the streets in protest. Other demonstrations have

demanded that the Georgian government take stronger measures

against criminal acts by Chechen refugees and the Chechen minority

in Georgia (the Kists). However, the Georgian security forces are

in a very poor position to respond to the crisis.

 

With Georgia?s capacity for internal regeneration low, the key

questions for the next months are how far Russia is prepared to go

in re-asserting hegemony over Georgia? Also, how far can Georgian

government go in compromising with Russia, and what the West is

prepared to do to help Georgia against Russia? One thing that no

Georgian government can do is to allow Russian troops to operate on

Georgian soil against Chechen guerrillas (a demand made by Moscow

at the start of the latest war), for this would badly damage

Georgian sovereignty and risk spreading the war deep into Georgia.

On the other hand, some compromise on leasing the remaining Russian

bases for an extended period may be possible, along the lines of

the Russian-Ukrainian deal over the Black Sea Fleet base at

Sevastopol.

 

Under pressure from Russian public opinion, President Putin

recently announced that Russia is reducing its military presence in

Chechnya and scaling down its campaign there, which in principle is

obviously good news >From Georgia. However, the Chechen fighters

are far from finished. If they inflict humiliating defeats on the

remaining Russian troops, then Moscow may be tempted once more to

seek a scapegoat in Georgia and in Chechen fighters allegedly based

there.

 

Failing this, Russian pressure seems unlikely to escalate to a

point where it threatens to destroy the existing Georgian state.

On the other hand, given Georgia?s record and the priorities of the

new US administration, it seems unlikely that US commitment to

Georgia will increase to the point where it could transform

Georgia?s geopolitical position, let alone its economy or system of

government. More likely is that this country will remain for the

foreseeable future a kind of unhappy geopolitical no-man?s-land.

 

Editor?s Note: Anatol Lieven is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC. He covered

Georgian events for The Times (London) in the early and mid-1990s,

and visited the country for research in December 2000

 

Posted January 30, 2001