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'Our' Boys in Armenia Are Dead


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'Our' Boys in Armenia Are Dead

 

By Mark Almond

The Wall Street Journal Europe

November 1, 1999

 

Since the great crash of the Russian ruble in 1998, many have

complained that Washington and its allies have put all their post-Soviet

eggs in Boris Yeltsin's basket. Western leaders have recently paid lip

service to depersonalizing their approach to the region. But throughout

the whole former Soviet Union, and not least in the trans-Caucasus,

Western policy has remained fixated on making deals with a handful of

politicians regardless of their political legitimacy at home. The inherent

contradiction between Western rhetoric about promoting democracy

and the rule of law, and the West's backing for compliant supporters of

Western interests, is now coming into the open after last week's

televised massacre in the Armenian Parliament.

 

Although it is clear that Russia's interests in blocking U.S. domination

of its old stomping ground in the Caucasus stand to gain from the

murders in Yerevan, Russia's secret services may not have had a hand

in the mayhem on Wednesday. A lot of people stood to benefit from the

murders of the dominant parliamentary leaders in Armenia. And,

tragically, the explanation offered by the assassins for their deed rang

true for many Armenians.

 

Last time I was in Yerevan, in May, locals accused the murdered men of

all sorts of corruption. It was striking that even inside his own campaign

headquarters the slain prime minister Vazgen Sarkisian was

accompanied by five bodyguards. However shocked most Armenians

will have been by the violence, the absence of an outpouring of public

grief since Wednesday is palpable. Even if they disapprove of murder,

so many Armenians have lived in worsening poverty throughout the

years of independence that their sympathy for Sarkisian is very limited.

 

Despite the resumption of the savage war between the Russians and

the Chechens, Western policy makers seemed to think that the three

small states to the south of the Caucasus could avoid the backwash of

instability. Indeed, Washington sometimes gave the impression that if

the Russians had their hands full in Chechnya, then Western goals of

stabilizing the south Caucasian states could be more easily achieved.

By knocking the heads of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia together,

Western policy makers hoped to resolve local disputes and thereby to

facilitate the great project of linking the fabled oil wealth of the Caspian

basin with Western consumers via a pipeline bringing benefits to all

three states in the region.

 

It was for that purpose that key U.S. Administration officials like

Deputy-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and regional expert Stephen

Sestanovich were in Yerevan on the day of the massacre. The State

Department has been putting a lot of effort into tailoring a deal between

Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of

Nagorno-Artsax.

 

For the West, with its focus on the pipeline issue, Sarkisian had

become an unlikely ally and his domestic sins were overlooked. Back

in February 1998, as Armenian defense minister, Sarkisian had been a

key figure in the palace coup that forced Armenia's president since

independence, Levon Ter-Petrossian, to resign. Mr. Ter-Petrossian

was considered too willing to compromise with Azerbaijan over

Nagorno-Artsax. At that time, U.S. officials and Western oil interests

were deeply alarmed that the new power constellation in Yerevan would

block any deal with Azerbaijan. The fact that the former leader of the

Armenians in Nagorno-Artsax, Robert Kocharian, was the likely

successor to Mr. Ter-Petrossian, only added to Washington's alarm

about the political upheaval in Armenia.

 

Short of plausible alternatives to a hardliner over Nagorno-Artsax --

since they had put all their trust in the ability of the authoritarian Mr.

Ter-Petrossian to push through any deal with Baku -- Western

diplomats in Armenia found themselves talking up the candidacy of the

former leader of the Communist Party, Karen Demirchyan. He had,

after all, shared many years of comradely cooperation with ex-regional

Communist bosses like Haydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze.

 

Then quite suddenly, Sarkisian shifted his ground and turned against

Mr. Kocharian, uniting his power-base with Mr. Demirchyan's in this

May's parliamentary election. It was a winning combination, even if

enthusiasm among ordinary Armenians for an alliance of the old and

new nomenklatura promoted cynicism rather than enthusiasm. Despite

his nationalist past, Sarkisian's role in toppling Mr. Ter-Petrossian had

made him a more valuable interlocutor for the West.

 

For all the rhetoric about supporting democracy in the former Soviet

Union since 1991, the West in general, and the United States in

particular as the West's most powerful representative, have tended to

fall back on Cold War principles in the power game in the Caucasus.

Democracy is good, but having "our sons of bitches" in charge is

better.

 

Now the price of Armenian cooperation in the so-called "deal of the

century" for Azeri oil looks more expensive. Suspiciously, key allies of

President Kocharian were not in the chamber for the shooting. And

Russian military aid to Armenia was already being stepped up before

the killings with the delivery of Mig 29 fighter planes. Russia's strategy

for restoration of control of the northern pipeline route from Azerbaijan

through Chechnya seems on track.

 

At the same time, U.S. supplies of helicopters and other military aid to

Georgia, which offers an alternative to the long-planned pipeline from

Baku to Turkey via Armenia, looks less likely to bolster President

Shevardnadze in his on-off conflicts with two autonomous regions on

the Black Sea coast, Abkhazia and Adjaria. Russian success so far in

Chechnya even seems to be causing that cynical old weathervane in

Baku, President Aliev, to tack away from Western oil companies and

drop a few advisers too closely associated with a pro-American line.

 

All the while genuine democratic forces in the region have been starved

of Western support as our focus has been on the leaders willing to cut

deals. Now, by an irony of history, the only beneficiary of political

upheaval in the region is likely to be Russia. Perversely, its local allies

enjoy more popular support than the West's regional partners.

 

Eighty years ago British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour declined to

get involved and to support the anti-Bolshevik forces in the internal

struggle for power in the trans-Caucasus because "If they want to cut

their own throats why do we not let them do it? We [should] protect,

Batumi, Baku, the railway between them and the pipeline."

 

In the end, of course, Balfour failed to protect either the West's

democratic principles or its oil interests. The West may now be about

to lose out in the same place for the same reasons at the dawn of a

new century.

 

Mr. Almond is distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution

(Stanford, California) and lecturer in modern history at Oriel College,

Oxford.

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