Guest Posted July 11, 2000 Report Share Posted July 11, 2000 'Our' Boys in Armenia Are Dead By Mark Almond The Wall Street Journal Europe November 1, 1999 Since the great crash of the Russian ruble in 1998, many have complained that Washington and its allies have put all their post-Soviet eggs in Boris Yeltsin's basket. Western leaders have recently paid lip service to depersonalizing their approach to the region. But throughout the whole former Soviet Union, and not least in the trans-Caucasus, Western policy has remained fixated on making deals with a handful of politicians regardless of their political legitimacy at home. The inherent contradiction between Western rhetoric about promoting democracy and the rule of law, and the West's backing for compliant supporters of Western interests, is now coming into the open after last week's televised massacre in the Armenian Parliament. Although it is clear that Russia's interests in blocking U.S. domination of its old stomping ground in the Caucasus stand to gain from the murders in Yerevan, Russia's secret services may not have had a hand in the mayhem on Wednesday. A lot of people stood to benefit from the murders of the dominant parliamentary leaders in Armenia. And, tragically, the explanation offered by the assassins for their deed rang true for many Armenians. Last time I was in Yerevan, in May, locals accused the murdered men of all sorts of corruption. It was striking that even inside his own campaign headquarters the slain prime minister Vazgen Sarkisian was accompanied by five bodyguards. However shocked most Armenians will have been by the violence, the absence of an outpouring of public grief since Wednesday is palpable. Even if they disapprove of murder, so many Armenians have lived in worsening poverty throughout the years of independence that their sympathy for Sarkisian is very limited. Despite the resumption of the savage war between the Russians and the Chechens, Western policy makers seemed to think that the three small states to the south of the Caucasus could avoid the backwash of instability. Indeed, Washington sometimes gave the impression that if the Russians had their hands full in Chechnya, then Western goals of stabilizing the south Caucasian states could be more easily achieved. By knocking the heads of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia together, Western policy makers hoped to resolve local disputes and thereby to facilitate the great project of linking the fabled oil wealth of the Caspian basin with Western consumers via a pipeline bringing benefits to all three states in the region. It was for that purpose that key U.S. Administration officials like Deputy-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and regional expert Stephen Sestanovich were in Yerevan on the day of the massacre. The State Department has been putting a lot of effort into tailoring a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Artsax. For the West, with its focus on the pipeline issue, Sarkisian had become an unlikely ally and his domestic sins were overlooked. Back in February 1998, as Armenian defense minister, Sarkisian had been a key figure in the palace coup that forced Armenia's president since independence, Levon Ter-Petrossian, to resign. Mr. Ter-Petrossian was considered too willing to compromise with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Artsax. At that time, U.S. officials and Western oil interests were deeply alarmed that the new power constellation in Yerevan would block any deal with Azerbaijan. The fact that the former leader of the Armenians in Nagorno-Artsax, Robert Kocharian, was the likely successor to Mr. Ter-Petrossian, only added to Washington's alarm about the political upheaval in Armenia. Short of plausible alternatives to a hardliner over Nagorno-Artsax -- since they had put all their trust in the ability of the authoritarian Mr. Ter-Petrossian to push through any deal with Baku -- Western diplomats in Armenia found themselves talking up the candidacy of the former leader of the Communist Party, Karen Demirchyan. He had, after all, shared many years of comradely cooperation with ex-regional Communist bosses like Haydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze. Then quite suddenly, Sarkisian shifted his ground and turned against Mr. Kocharian, uniting his power-base with Mr. Demirchyan's in this May's parliamentary election. It was a winning combination, even if enthusiasm among ordinary Armenians for an alliance of the old and new nomenklatura promoted cynicism rather than enthusiasm. Despite his nationalist past, Sarkisian's role in toppling Mr. Ter-Petrossian had made him a more valuable interlocutor for the West. For all the rhetoric about supporting democracy in the former Soviet Union since 1991, the West in general, and the United States in particular as the West's most powerful representative, have tended to fall back on Cold War principles in the power game in the Caucasus. Democracy is good, but having "our sons of bitches" in charge is better. Now the price of Armenian cooperation in the so-called "deal of the century" for Azeri oil looks more expensive. Suspiciously, key allies of President Kocharian were not in the chamber for the shooting. And Russian military aid to Armenia was already being stepped up before the killings with the delivery of Mig 29 fighter planes. Russia's strategy for restoration of control of the northern pipeline route from Azerbaijan through Chechnya seems on track. At the same time, U.S. supplies of helicopters and other military aid to Georgia, which offers an alternative to the long-planned pipeline from Baku to Turkey via Armenia, looks less likely to bolster President Shevardnadze in his on-off conflicts with two autonomous regions on the Black Sea coast, Abkhazia and Adjaria. Russian success so far in Chechnya even seems to be causing that cynical old weathervane in Baku, President Aliev, to tack away from Western oil companies and drop a few advisers too closely associated with a pro-American line. All the while genuine democratic forces in the region have been starved of Western support as our focus has been on the leaders willing to cut deals. Now, by an irony of history, the only beneficiary of political upheaval in the region is likely to be Russia. Perversely, its local allies enjoy more popular support than the West's regional partners. Eighty years ago British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour declined to get involved and to support the anti-Bolshevik forces in the internal struggle for power in the trans-Caucasus because "If they want to cut their own throats why do we not let them do it? We [should] protect, Batumi, Baku, the railway between them and the pipeline." In the end, of course, Balfour failed to protect either the West's democratic principles or its oil interests. The West may now be about to lose out in the same place for the same reasons at the dawn of a new century. Mr. Almond is distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, California) and lecturer in modern history at Oriel College, Oxford. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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