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Russian Press Digest

July 24, 2000

Why Washington Turned Away From Heydar Aliyev

Petr Romanov

 

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, p. 5

 

Disillusioned with policies of Azerbaijan's president, Washington grooms

Azeri exile for that post; Moscow, meanwhile, has good chance of restoring

its positions in Trans-Caucasus by undercutting U.S. presence.

 

 

Azerbaijan's political establishment was dismayed by the U.S. State

Department's sharp criticism of Baku for its support of international

terrorism, Chechen gunmen in particular. The country's President Heydar

Aliyev obviously had not expected such a blow -- by all accounts Baku's

policies would seem to be in line with Washington's interests in

Transcaucasia. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comes to the conclusion that the State

Department's attacks on Aliyev mean that Washington no longer banks on the

Azeri president.

 

The paper looks at several possible reasons for the sudden cooling-off in

relations between Washington and Baku. To start with, the Aliyev regime

presupposes continued tensions between Washington and Moscow. Since

Vladimir Putin became president Moscow has activated its policies in CIS

countries, and now the United States has to take account of Russia's

national interests in the post-Soviet space -- Washington has no direct

interest in confrontation with Moscow. American companies have suffered

losses as a result of Baku's oil projects which are largely politically

motivated. What Washington needs today is a less politicized Azeri

president who will not attempt to set the United States and Russia on

collision course.

 

Second, as time goes by, Aliyev is becoming a more unpredictable and

whimsical politician. Suffice it to recall his claim to the Trans- Caspian

gas pipeline, a project lobbied by Washington. Following his statement that

Azerbaijan would fill only half of the future pipeline with gas,

Turkmenia's President Saparmurat Niyazov immediately reoriented himself

toward Russia by signing an agreement on gas supplies. This led to the

collapse of an international consortium set up for the express purpose of

implementing the Trans-Caspian project. The collapse of the project marked

an enormous setback for U.S. foreign policy: Washington had hoped to use

the pipeline as an instrument of undermining the dependence of Turkmenia

and Uzbekistan on Russia and shoring up its own positions in Transcaucasia

and Central Asia.

 

Third, Washington is unhappy with the sorry state of Azerbaijan's economy.

It regards Azerbaijan as a key country of the Caspian and Central Asian

region and therefore wants to see stability in that country but the

wide-spread impoverishment of its population is bound to cause a social

explosion and destabilize the situation there.

 

Fourth, corruption in Azerbaijan has assumed menacing proportions. Foreign

investors have to contend with undisguised bribery and extortion on the

part of ranking Azeri officials, which makes any economic project

ineffective. For that reason many foreign investors have had to scale down

their activities in Azerbaijan. Besides, international humanitarian

supplies intended for Azeri refugees are vanishing without a trace. The

European Union, the Council of Europe and the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees have repeatedly expressed their indignation at the disappearance

of humanitarian aid and demanded a scrupulous enquiry.

 

Fifth, Aliyev's suppression of democracy and freedom of speech does not

suit the United States. Thousands of the president's political opponents

and activists of the opposition are behind bars. Many opposition newspapers

have gone bankrupt after the imposition of heavy fines on them for their

criticism of Aliyev and his relatives. Washington is also unhappy with

Azeri laws relating to parliamentary and presidential elections and the

Central Electoral Commission which leave much room for vote-rigging.

Besides, experts of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international

organizations have not recognized the legitimacy of the October 1998

presidential election that brought Aliyev to power and declared that it was

rigged.

 

Sixth, Washington is incensed by Aliyev's intention to hand the presidency

over to his son. A number of opposition parties in Azerbaijan have openly

declared that in that case they will call on their followers to resort to

acts of civil disobedience and start civil war.

 

The above circumstances portend a change of regime in Azerbaijan, which may

destabilize the situation throughout the Trans-Caucasus as well as in

Azerbaijan. This turn of events would conflict with Washington's

geopolitical plans. Therefore, U.S. and Turkish special services have

stepped up their activity in Azerbaijan to cushion the process and prevent

the situation in the region from being destabilized. Judging by reports in

the Azeri press, Washington is grooming former Speaker of Azerbaijan's

parliament Rasul Guliyev, now living in exile in the United States, as a

replacement for Aliyev.

 

Significantly, many of Azerbaijan's leading opposition parties as well as

Aliyev have become disillusioned with Western policies. They have accused

the West and especially the United States of hypocrisy, bias and double

standards. This circumstance has created a sort of vacuum that could be

filled by Russia. Today Moscow has a better chance of strengthening its

influence in the Trans-Caucasus than Washington does. What it needs to do

is adjust its policies in the region and give up its role as Yerevan's

military ally -- Armenia is in a state of war with Azerbaijan.

 

Unlike Azerbaijan's authorities the republic's population is in favor of

close integration with Russia. Therefore, if the pro-American Aliyev regime

is replaced with a pro-Moscow one, Azerbaijan may join the Customs Union of

Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan and even the Union of

Belarus and Russia.