A War In The Caucasus

[Aratta-Kingdom]

AZERBAIJAN: MOUNTING PRESSURE IN THE SPACE BETWEEN

 

Stratfor

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/r...e.php?id=294762

Aug 31 2007

 

Summary

 

Azerbaijan is finding itself in a very vulnerable position at the front

line of the Russian resurgence. It also finds itself in a pressure

cooker as Russia and Iran attempt to redefine their neighborhoods.

 

Analysis

 

New Kremlin point man Sergei Naryshkin arrived in Azerbaijan for

wide-ranging talks Aug. 31 with the Azerbaijani leadership. After 17

years of working with Western powers, Baku is finding itself drawn

back into the Russian sphere of influence. Sparks really will begin to

fly as the former Soviet republic returns to its standard geopolitical

status as a (shrinking) buffer between Russia and Iran.

 

Azerbaijan has enthusiastically courted Western powers ever since

the Soviet breakup, seeking investment in its military and energy

industries. But it has always known that its pro-Western proclivities

could only exist at the pleasure of Moscow. Unlike Georgia to its

west, Azerbaijan shares no border with a NATO country, so Baku always

tried to tread softly (politically speaking) when the issue of Russian

preferences arose.

 

With Russian power now rising, Azerbaijan is adopting a radically

different tack than Georgia. Tbilisi sees the coming evolution as a

zero-sum game, and as such, its public face has turned shrill in an

attempt to keep the West engaged in order to avoid being crushed by

Russian moves. By contrast, Baku is attempting to appease Russian

strategic needs, while keeping its Western investment -- and thus

its source of income -- intact.

 

Azerbaijan's real problems, however, are just beginning. The Russian

resurgence is not happening in a vacuum but in parallel with the

resurgence of Iran to Azerbaijan's south. Iran and Russia are far from

natural allies, something poorly understood outside the Caucasus. The

two have come into conflict several times in the past.

 

Iran's most recent foreign occupier was the Soviet Union.

 

Historically, Persian and Russian power has clashed -- violently --

along their mutual border.

 

The two states' relative friendliness since the end of the Cold War

was a product of their weakness. As Iran recovered from its revolution

and Russia fell from Soviet-era highs, the two countries' spheres of

influence shrank so precipitously that their interests no longer rubbed

up against each other. With no interests in contact, there were no

interests in conflict. The two countries found it useful to cooperate

not only in ways rhetorical -- primarily lambasting the United States

-- but also in terms of weapons sales and technology transfers.

 

But the year is no longer 1998. Russia has had 10 years to climb up

from its post-Soviet nadir and Russian power is pushing against all of

its borders -- including to the south. Similarly, Iran has recovered

from its loss of 1 million people during the Iran-Iraq war in the

1980s. Tehran is now more confident than it has been in decades,

and its influence is seeping into not only Iraq and the Persian Gulf,

but also into the Caucasus and Central Asia -- areas Moscow considers

its exclusive playground.

 

And so warm rhetoric is giving way to cold calculations. Russia

has stalled, and probably outright abandoned, efforts to finish the

Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, in part due to the (accurate)

concern that a resurging, nuclear-armed Iran would be more of a threat

to Russia than to the United States (and even Israel). Russia also is

laying the groundwork for a geopolitical twist by mooting the idea

of allowing the United States sustained access to the Gabala radar

base in Azerbaijan, a radar base designed to monitor Iranian airspace.

 

And it should be no surprise that it will be in Azerbaijan that Iran

and Russia will face off most directly. Azerbaijan, the buffer between

the two, has a foot in each camp: Its population speaks Russian, but

is historically Shiite in religion, making it a natural rope in the

coming Russian-Iranian tug-of-war. An additional complication will

be Armenia -- which both Russia and Iran unofficially have supported

in its military efforts to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh, an

Armenian-populated enclave within Azerbaijan.

 

The most brutal, and unfortunately most likely, consequence in the

midterm is that the two powers will fight a proxy war in the Caucasus

using Armenia and Azerbaijan as their pawns. In large part, this

is because such a war is inevitable. Azerbaijan's newly developed

energy wealth -- it is now producing about 1 million barrels per day

of crude and some 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and as a

result is enjoying an annual gross domestic product growth rate in

excess of 30 percent -- has empowered it to go on a military buildup

of a sort the region has not seen since World War I as a step toward

recovering its territory from Armenian forces.

 

With a war coming, and Russian-Iranian competition building, the two

larger powers will be motivated to shape to their own advantage the

conflict between the two minor powers. The only thing that remains

unclear is which side Russia and Iran will support more thoroughly.

 

[Aaron]

It's mostly stuff we already new. We never considered, because of Azerbaijan's inability to reasonably assess its 1994 defeat, that a second war was improbable.

 

At least we know we were ready to go for concessions, bargain territories versus independence, a referendum, let refugees return, etc. Our demands were not maximalist or unrealistic, it's just that Azeris wanted Everything back to the 1988 status. They have unimaginable wealth, natural resources, all possibilities to become a developed nation and live well ... but they still demand what isn't theirs, they still want more. It kind of reminds me of the "The fisherman and the goldfish" from Pushkin.

 

We could have not done better and this makes the second war an imposed one, not one we looked for or intentionally asked for. There should be no regrets, extreme feelings of responsibility, or guilt from our part for what is to happen! As Stratfor puts it, it was almost inevitable from the very start.

 

Let's just hope we'll win it too.

A.

Edited September 1, 2007 by Aaron

[Aratta-Kingdom]

It's mostly stuff we already new. We never considered, because of Azerbaijan's inability to reasonably assess its 1994 defeat, that a second war was improbable.

 

At least we know we were ready to go for concessions, bargain territories versus independence, a referendum, let refugees return, etc. Our demands were not maximalist or unrealistic, it's just that Azeris wanted Everything back to the 1988 status. They have unimaginable wealth, natural resources, all possibilities to become a developed nation and live well ... but they still demand what isn't theirs, they still want more. It kind of reminds me of the "The fisherman and the goldfish" from Pushkin.

 

We could have not done better and this makes the second war an imposed one, not one we looked for or intentionally asked for. There should be no regrets, extreme feelings of responsibility, or guilt from our part for what is to happen! As Stratfor puts it, it was almost inevitable from the very start.

 

Let's just hope we'll win it too.

A.

 

"At least we know we were ready to go for concessions, bargain territories versus independence, a referendum, let refugees return, etc."

 

WE??? Who are those 'we'?

 

 

"They have unimaginable wealth, natural resources, all possibilities to become a developed nation and live well"

 

 

This kind of sounds to me like a fairy-tale. The jews have unimaginable wealth, not the azeris. Iran has natural resources but still lives in 1600s.

 

 

aliyev junior will start a war with a hope to use it as a pretext to prolong his staying in the power. Just like in the first war, the azeris will again get help from muslim terrorists, from the jews, and from their brothers from turkey. The second war, however, will be nothing like the first one...

 

 

 

 

[Aaron]

Aratta

 

No matter how hard liner one is, he can't deny that Armenian leaders (past or present) have been ready to cut a deal with the enemy. A deal which would somehow involve the return of some (not all) territories versus a final recognition of Artsakh's independence by the International community and most importantly Azerbaijan ... otherwise, what is it that's being negotiated for over 13 years ??

 

Whether such a deal is reachable or not, given Azerbaijan's stance, is another story!

 

In any case, I think you did understand the point I wanted to make in my first post i.e. that Azerbaijan is being maximalist and that they would be responsible for a second war.

 

A.

[AK-47]

aliyev junior will start a war with a hope to use it as a pretext to prolong his staying in the power. Just like in the first war, the azeris will again get help from muslim terrorists, from the jews, and from their brothers from turkey. The second war, however, will be nothing like the first one...

That's interesting... what's your take on how the second war, if it happens, will differ from the first war other than that we are now in primarily defensive positions?

[AVO]

This time around Iran won't have any objections when we take Nakhijevan. and Turkeys hands will be held be the EU.

[Aratta-Kingdom]

That's interesting... what's your take on how the second war, if it happens, will differ from the first war other than that we are now in primarily defensive positions?

 

AK, I don't have much time, but with this short message, I'll try answer to your question.

 

Aliyev junior wantshis 'family'slegacy to live long after he/they are gone. In fact, most azeris already worship aliyev senior. The only way junior can gain the respect of his people, is to win a war against the armenians. The negotiation process he uses to gain a time with a hope that one day his army will be able to crash the armenians. He knows today his army is not ready to stand against the armos. He also knows that the oil companies will not let him to stay in power if he starts a war.

On the top of all that, "king aliyev" knows during the second war Iran, Russia, Turkey, U.S. will be directly involved in helping the sides...While packeting the oil money, aliyev junior puts all his hopes on foreign forces ...13 years of cease fire was enough for him to build a strong army. Instead, he has chosen to keep armenia in a blockade with a hope to weaken the power of the armenians.

 

In 1991, when the first war started, almost 40% of armenia was destroyed because of the earthquake. During the first war, the armenians had noarmy and no guns to stand against the soviet/azeri soldiers.

 

We won the war because of the 'will power' of the people. Let's agree to never underestimate the power of the ordinary armenians who stood against the soviet army, the azeri armywhich was trained by the turks&israelis.Those people have also crashed thousands of well trained afghan, arab, and chechen fighters. Do you honestly belive a thing like that can happen by accident? Don't you think today we are in a much better position than we were in 1991 when the people of Armenia and Artsak were left in a cold without guns or bread...?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Aratta-Kingdom]

ALIEV AVOIDS SPEAKING OF MILITARY RESOLUTION?

By Agavni Haroutiunian, Translated by L.H.

 

AZG Armenian Daily #161

06/09/2007

 

Karabakh Issue

 

"Azerbaijan is aware of the Armenian army's capability, and that our

army's efficiency is high.

 

That is why Azerbaijan has not realized its aggressive announcements

yet. However, in case of necessity the Armenian army will fulfill

the tasks set to it", announced Armenian Defense Minister Mikael

Harutyunian.

 

These kinds of announcements do not remain unanswered; the announcement

of the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev at a sitting discussing issue

of the Azerbaijani refugees was a kind of answer. "We'll never give

independence to Nagorno Karabakh", announced Ilham Aliyev according to

the Azerbaijani media. Naturally, he did not forget to mention that

the conflict would be settled in the frameworks of the territorial

integrity of Azerbaijan, providing protection of the rights of the

refugees and forcibly evacuated.

 

Forgetting about the fact that the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh is

already independent and doesn't need anyone's permit, the Azerbaijani

president announced that his country was for the peaceful settlement

of the conflict.

 

Nevertheless, "... if the Karabakh conflict is not settled

peacefully, the official Baku will use other variants of conflict

resolution. We are able to set free our territories in any way

possible", announced Aliyev actually avoiding to use the words

"military resolution". Moreover, Aliyev seems not to want to speak

about "the fighting ability" of the Azerbaijani army this time,

and speaking of the peaceful settlement of the conflict he didn't

present the variants of the peaceful resolution.