Bush - Putin Summit In Bratislava

[Armen]

Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation

Friday, February 25, 2005 -- Volume 2, Issue 39

 

IN THIS ISSUE:

*Bush chides Putin over democracy and human rights …

*…but both presidents talk past each other on meaning of democracy

*Did Bush press Putin on Georgia, Moldova, and the Baltic states?

*Yushchenko meets Bush at NATO headquarters

 

RUSSIAN COMMENTATORS: PUTIN WON ON POINTS

 

As expected, the issue of Russian democracy -- or, rather, its shrinkage -- figured in President George W. Bush's summit with President Vladimir Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, at least in the joint press conference they held following their two-and-a-half hour private meeting. However, the American president's expressions of concern about the Kremlin's ongoing centralization of power made up only about a quarter of his opening remarks, and even these critical comments were largely oblique and, judging by their tone, made more in sorrow than anger.

 

"It's very important that we establish not only a working relationship, but that we understand that in the 21st century strong countries are built by developing strong democracies," Bush said in his opening remarks. "And so we talked about democracy. Democracies always reflect a country's customs and culture, and I know that. But democracies have certain things in common: They have a rule of law and protection of minorities, a free press, and a viable political opposition. Russia has made tremendous progress over the last 15 years. It's an amazing transformation of the nation. And I applaud President Putin for dealing with a country that is in transformation. And it's been hard work. I was able to share my concerns about Russia's commitment in fulfilling these universal principles. I did so in a constructive and friendly way. I reaffirmed my belief that it is democracy and freedom that bring true security and prosperity in every land. We may not always agree with each other, and we haven't over the last four years -- that's for certain -- but we found a lot agreement, a lot of common ground, and the world is better for it" (Whitehouse.gov, February 24).

 

The U.S. president's comments about democracy and human rights in Russia were noticeably milder than those in his speech in Brussels on February 21. "[F]or Russia to make progress as a European nation, the Russian government must renew a commitment to democracy and the rule of law," Bush said in the Brussels speech. "We recognize that reform will not happen overnight. We must always remind Russia, however, that our alliance stands for a free press, a vital opposition, the sharing of power, and the rule of law -- and the United States and all European countries should place democratic reform at the heart of their dialogue with Russia" (Whitehouse.gov, February 21).

 

In his Bratislava speech, Putin said that Russia would never return to the past -- something he has said before -- but added his now familiar caveat: that "the principles of democracy should be adequate to the current status of the development of Russia, to our history and our traditions." Bush indicated that he accepted this explanation, answering one reporter's question by saying: "I think the most important statement that you heard, and I heard, was the President's statement, when he declared his absolute support for democracy in Russia, and they're not turning back. To me, that is the most important statement of my private meeting, and it's the most important statement of this public press conference." Bush added: "And I can tell you what it's like dealing with the man over the last four years: When he tells you something, he means it."

 

In addition, while members of the American press corps asked both presidents tough questions about the human rights situation in Russia, questions from several members of the Russian press corps actually forced President Bush into the position of having to deny that the United States has retreated from democracy. Andrei Kolesnikov of Kommersant referred in a question to "the great powers" that the American security services have assumed, "due to which the private lives of citizens are now being monitored by the state," and added: "This could be explained away by the consequences of September 11th, but this has nothing to do with democratic values." Bush responded by saying that he lives in a "transparent country" in which the government is accountable and must behave constitutionally.

 

At this point, Putin actually came to Bush's defense, stating: "I would like to support my American counterpart. I'm absolutely confident that democracy is not anarchy. It is not the possibility to do anything you want. It is not the possibility for anyone to rob your own people. Democracy is, among other things, and first and foremost, the possibility to democratically make democratic laws and the capability of the state to enforce those laws." The American president was also put on the defensive when Interfax correspondent Alexei Meshkov asked Putin why he does not raise the issue of "violations of the rights of journalists in the United States, about the fact that some journalists have been fired" (Whitehouse.gov, February 24).

 

Several Russian observers felt that Putin got the better of Bush in the joint press conference. "Were it proper to ask who carried the day at the summit in Bratislava -- Russia or the U.S. -- I would risk calling the Russian president the winner on points," Arkady Dubnov wrote from Bratislava for the February 25 edition of Vremya novosti. "In spite of George Bush's repeated statements that he would directly put the issue of the rejection of democracy in Russia before Vladimir Putin, the press heard nothing of the sort from the American president yesterday. On the contrary, Bush radiated satisfaction and even pride from having received from 'friend Vladimir' assurances that Russia now as before is devoted to democracy and will not betray the choice it made 14 years ago."

 

Other observers had a similar take. "The subject of the underdevelopment of Russian democracy was raised a huge number of times in the days preceding the summit," Ilya Baranov wrote for Gazeta.ru on February 24. "Many American and European politicians insistently advised the American president to draw attention to that subject during the course of his conversation with Putin. At the end of the day, the accents were maximally softened and what is more the Russian president returned the favor."

 

For his part, State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev said that the summit "exceeded the most optimistic expectations." He added that "discussions of the subject of democracy did not occupy the central place in the two presidents' talks, and George Bush's comment that the field of our disagreements is considerably narrower than the field of [our] coinciding interests can be considered crucial" (Interfax, February 24).

 

Despite this upbeat appraisal of the summit by an important Kremlin ally, it is worth noting that the Kremlin's official website posted a transcript of statements made at the presidents' joint press conference in Bratislava that includes only questions to and answers by Putin (Kremlin.ru, February 24).

 

--Charles Gurin

 

 

DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY MAY PUT BUSH AND PUTIN ON COLLISION COURSE

 

All smiles and backslapping notwithstanding, the Bush-Putin Bratislava summit laid bare the stark divergence of the two leaders' political philosophies. Describing their social ideals and values, "George" and "Vladimir" seem to be using the same words, but they mean different things. This ideological disconnect will likely increase tension in the U.S.-Russian relationship over the perceived American role in the democratization of post-Soviet Eurasia.

 

Speaking yesterday (February 24) to the cheering crowds in Bratislava's main square, U.S. President George W. Bush, true to the spirit of his inaugural address, praised the 1989 Velvet Revolution that defeated communism in Czechoslovakia. "In recent times," Bush continued, "we have witnessed landmark events in the history of liberty: a Rose Revolution in Georgia, an Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and now a Purple Revolution in Iraq" -- apparently a reference to the voters' ink used in the January 30 Iraqi elections (BBC, February 24).

 

Bush's tribute to revolutionary changes came right before his meeting with Putin and likely irritated Russia, which had considered Georgia and Ukraine to be within its sphere of influence. With the coming elections in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova -- two countries that commentators believe may be part of the next round of "colored revolutions" -- the Kremlin leader and his counterparts in the former Soviet republics are getting increasingly nervous about what some analysts and policymakers characterize as "the third wave of liberation."

 

For Putin and post-Soviet rulers in the Caucasus and Central Asia, this liberation process presents a two-fold danger. First, it challenges the system of "phony democracy" that these leaders have built in their countries. Second, it leads to the geopolitical re-orientation of the nations that are "liberated," thus undermining Russia-led efforts to fashion an alternative bloc in post-Soviet Eurasia.

 

In an indirect polemic with Bush, Putin has explicitly expressed his wariness of what he called a revived "theory of permanent revolution." Talking to Slovak journalists on the eve of his trip to Bratislava, the Russian leader said he could not understand the logic of "imposing" democracy on the nations of Russia's "near abroad." "If democracy doesn't work in the post-Soviet countries -- as some people seem to believe -- what's the need to introduce it there?" "But if we introduce democratic principles [into these countries' political systems], why then do we need revolutions there?" (kremlin.ru, February 22).

 

Leading their own ideological offensive, Putin and the leaders of the other CIS countries have asserted that democratic principles and institutions should be adapted to domestic realities and historical traditions. As Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov famously put it, democracy is not potato and cannot be readily transplanted from one field to the other.

 

Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov eagerly agrees. "Each [people] has its own path [of democratic development]," he said in a rare interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta. "Being guided by the fundamental principles of people's power, we at the same time have to correlate our actions with the people's mentality and their thousand-year-old way of life"(Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 14).

 

Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev, who accuses the West of encouraging the opposition ahead of his country's parliamentary elections on February 27 and presidential polls in October, warned there was little chance for a peaceful revolution in Central Asia. "Such schemes of seizing power would simply lead to civil war here," he contends (Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 28).

 

Most Kremlin strategists share this concern and argue that the "export of revolutionary technologies" into Central Asia would likely lead to the serious destabilization of the region (Kommersant, February 24). As Center for Political Technologies analyst Alexei Makarkin pointed out, the Putinists who are suspicious of any possible "revolutionary interference" in Russia's domestic politics by Western-backed forces "would in fact be compelled to defend the principle of sovereignty" in any Central Asian country should a "color revolution" take place there (Rossiiskaya gazeta, January 18).

 

The big question, however, is whether Russia is capable of mediating or managing any future political crisis in what it still considers its strategic backyard. There is no denying that Moscow is dramatically losing its influence in the post-Soviet space. Its attempts to create more viable cooperation structures inside the loosely organized and amorphous CIS have failed miserably. The Ukrainian election demonstrated that the Putin administration cannot boast of more sophisticated means of leverage than force. Thus, some political pundits argue, if we see an increase in Western activities in post-Soviet territories, they would indicate an increase in doubts that Russia can handle the role of regional powerbroker (Rossiya v globalnoi politike, January/February 2005).

 

It is no wonder, then, that influential commentators such as Sergei Karaganov, the head of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, believe that Moscow and Washington "will fail to agree on anything regarding the CIS or rather will agree to continue our rivalry there" (kreml.org, February 21). Other respected foreign-policy analysts share the pessimistic view on the possibility of Russian-U.S. accommodation in the post-Soviet space or, in fact, in other spheres. There is much more dividing the two countries than there is bringing them closer, they say, adding that it remains to be seen how long the good personal relations between the two presidents can survive a direct collision of national interests (TV-Tsentr, February 18).

 

--Igor Torbakov

 

GEORGIA, MOLDOVA, BALTICS FIGURE ON SIDELINES OF BUSH-PUTIN SUMMIT

 

Russia's military and political pressures on Georgia, Moldova, and the Baltic states figured prominently in discussions on the eve and the sidelines of the Bush-Putin summit in Bratislava, but there was no indication that U.S. President George W. Bush raised those issues in his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. No mention was made of those issues during the concluding joint news conference or in a White House-distributed checklist of issues that were discussed by the two presidents on February 24.

 

On February 23, Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, in his capacity as summit host, listened thoughtfully and sympathetically to a representative group of pro-democracy activists and analysts, whose concerns he was asked to pass on to Bush along with a request to raise those issues with Putin the next day. Dzurinda candidly indicated that such issues as Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova, or inflammatory anti-Baltic propaganda from Moscow, were probably not going to be raised, because this summit had other priorities.

 

In his February 24 speech to the citizens of Bratislava in the central square, Bush included three mentions of Georgia's democratic revolution, along with three mentions of the democratic revolution in Ukraine (White House press release, February 24). Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili commented in Tbilisi, "Never in its history has Georgia had so much [Western] support as it now has in order to be successful . . . never before has our country had such a good chance to get up on its feet" (Imedi Television, February 24).

 

That comment is amply substantiated on many levels; but, as one speaker noted in the analysts' meeting, Georgia's is a "democracy under the gun," urgently needing to be made secure against Russian military blackmail inside the country and on its northern border. In the same meeting, which was open to the press, OSCE Secretary-General Jan Kubis expressed regret over the delays in initiating a Border Monitoring Operation in Georgia, in place of the Russia-terminated BMO. One of the Rose Revolution leaders, Giorgi Bokeria, now in parliament, informed that same meeting that Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov had the preceding week in Tbilisi raised manifestly unfulfillable preconditions to an agreement on military issues, in effect turning it from an agreement on troop withdrawal into one on the open-ended presence of Russian troops.

 

Also on February 24, just before going into the meeting with Putin, Bush held a brief reception in honor of leaders of East European freedom movements. In this meeting, Belarusians asked Bush to urge Putin to call on President Aleksandr Lukashenka to investigate the "disappearances" of opposition figures who are presumed murdered. Georgians asked Bush to convey the message to Putin that Russia should cease threatening Georgia. Baltic members of the European Parliament, who had led the liberation movements and then the restored states, asked that current Baltic concerns along with those of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, be raised with Putin (BNS, February 24). Clarification is now pending from the White House as to whether Bush has raised with Putin the issues of uppermost concern to those whom Bush honored as "Freedom Champions."

 

In Chisinau on February 23, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin expressed hope that the next day's summit would facilitate settlement of the Transnistria conflict, on a basis other than "federalization," which Moldova rules out. At the same news conference, Voronin deplored heavy-handed Russian support for pro-Moscow parties in Moldova's ongoing parliamentary election campaign (Moldpres, February 23). As in the case of Georgia, there was no indication from the U.S. side whether Bush had raised the issue of Russian troop withdrawal from Moldova with Putin in Bratislava.

 

It was Lavrov who stated, "Putin has [received] full agreement on the part of President Bush" regarding the need for "acting with reciprocal transparency" in Moldova and in Central Asian countries (Itar-Tass, February 24). Lavrov's obscure comment appears designed to frighten Chisinau into concluding that some sort of deal was made at Moldova's expense. Bush, in his public speech in Bratislava's central square, briefly reminded Moldova that it "has the opportunity to place its democratic credentials beyond doubt as its people head to the polls."

 

--Vladimir Socor

 

UKRAINE MOVES A STEP CLOSER TO EUROPE

 

During President Viktor Yushchenko's first month in office, he visited Europe twice, appearing at the European Parliament, EU, Council of Europe, and NATO. After a month of such visits and meetings there can be no doubt that Yushchenko is serious when he spoke of "the end of multi-vectorism" (Ukrayinska pravda, February 22). Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk said that Ukraine's foreign policy will now be "consistent and predictable" and move away from the previous policy of "sending contradictory measures depending on which country he [former president Leonid Kuchma] was visiting" (Reuters, February 1).

 

Much has changed under Yushchenko, but not everything. The West does view Yushchenko as genuinely committed to the domestic policies required for Euro-Atlantic integration. Kuchma had always demanded a signal of future membership from the EU before launching reforms.

 

However, most Western governments did not expect a Yushchenko victory or an Orange Revolution, much less greater Ukrainian interest in joining NATO and the EU. The strains caused by his ascendancy were evident during Yushchenko's meetings in Western Europe this week. Ukraine's allies in its quest for Euro-Atlantic integration are the United States, Canada, the post-communist new members of the EU, and Scandinavia.

 

Of these countries, the United States is key to Ukraine's NATO membership, but Washington can only indirectly lobby for its inclusion in the EU. President George W. Bush mentioned Ukraine twice in his State of the Union address, and Ukraine's democratic revolution certainly fits his announced plans to support democracy around the world.

 

Bush and Yushchenko met at NATO headquarters shortly before Bush's summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. During their encounter, Bush compared Yushchenko to George Washington, praising him as somebody who had just led a "peaceful revolution based upon the same values that we hold dear" (Ukrainian News, nato.int, February 22).

 

Bush invited Yushchenko to visit the United States in the first week of April. Their talks contrast sharply with U.S.-Ukraine relations under Kuchma. Bush refused to meet Kuchma until the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul when they briefly met as part of a U.S. "thank you" for Ukraine's military contribution to Iraq.

 

Nevertheless, the Bush administration continues the difficult task of ideologically supporting Ukraine's democratic revolution while remaining geopolitically committed to cooperating with Russia. Since the Orange Revolution, the balance has tipped in Ukraine's favor, leaving Russia increasingly seen as autocratic, imperialist, and of little further use in the campaign against international terrorism. Advocates of supporting Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration are now emerging in the U.S. Congress, leaving Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her purported russophilism in the minority (Washington Post, December 14, 2004, February 16, 2005; Financial Times, December 27, 2004).

 

The "Old Europe" countries of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg continue to remain apathetic towards Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. French President Jacques Chirac's early departure from the Ukraine-NATO Commission was seen by many as a diplomatic snub (International Herald Tribune, February 24). France, a non-military member of NATO, was always lukewarm towards EU enlargement in general, while Great Britain has been more enthusiastic. However, London remains apathetic toward Ukraine. Britain's position is likely to gradually become more positive, particularly with U.S. prodding.

 

Moscow seeks to block Ukraine's westward orientation through the "Old Europe" bloc. Although Russia's official position is that Ukraine's membership in the EU is "OK" (while NATO is "nyet"), Moscow cannot truly wish Yushchenko success. But the more it lobbies "old Europe" to block Ukraine's EU aspirations, the more it will drive Ukraine into the hands of NATO, where the United States dominates and membership is easier to attain.

 

Russia now has a much less pliant government in Kyiv. Yushchenko and the government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko are looking for the right diplomatic formula to reject the CIS Single Economic Space. They also want Russia to treat Ukraine as part of the "Far Abroad," not the CIS "Near Abroad."

 

For the first time, Ukraine's foreign policy will be coordinated by a united group ideologically committed to Euro-Atlantic integration. These include Foreign Minister Tarasyuk (returning to the post after Putin successfully lobbied for his removal in October 2000), Defense Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Oleh Rybachuk, and Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Petro Poroshenko. Tymoshenko will focus on domestic affairs.

 

Ukraine's emerging new foreign policy will be judged on its success in having Ukraine designated a market economy this year and receiving WTO membership before the March 2006 parliamentary elections. Kyiv is committed to fulfilling the just-signed three-year Action Plan (with an additional 11 action points drawn up to provide additional support to Yushchenko) and completing the ten-year Partnership and Cooperation Agreement by 2007. Yushchenko believes these accomplishments will lead to an accession treaty with the EU in 2007-2008 (Ukrayinska pravda, February 23).

 

The situation with NATO is more complex. Attaining NATO membership is easier and quicker than that for the EU. Grytsenko has predicted that Ukraine would be a NATO member by 2009 (Ukrayinska pravda, February 21). However, there will be some domestic opposition from the Communist Party and former Kuchma loyalists, as well as opposition from Russia. Consequently, Tymoshenko's government program omits any mention of NATO and does not plan to accelerate the application process until after the 2006 elections. Nevertheless, after the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting, Yushchenko confirmed that he is seeking Ukraine's integration into both NATO and the EU (Ukrayinska pravda, February 22).

 

Poroshenko left the NATO-Ukraine Commission with greater optimism about NATO's readiness to provide "very strong and powerful support" (UNIAN, February 22). Both Bush and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer emphasized NATO's "open-door" policy that would admit Ukraine if its reformist policies are successful. Yushchenko hopes that the EU will also move to an "open-door" policy after 2007.

 

--Taras Kuzio