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My two cents about LTP. While he made numerous mistakes, one has to acknowledge the fact that he was pivotal figure in establishing an independent Armenia. If LTP did not take away the weapons from HAB and didn’t incorporate Yerkrapah and other paramilitary units into a newly established army in 1990 Armenia would have had the faith of Georgia, failed state. LTP went away from political stage peacefully, unlike Gamsakhurdia or Elchibey. Given the circumstances I think history will judge LTP’s performance very positively, since it was during his presidency that war was won, Armenia became the most stable state in the region. The biggest failures of LTP are the presidential elections in ’95, and the fact that he did not have a good personnel policy and surrounded himself by clans and shady figures.
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Truly amazing!!! It’s like a story about many of us and our friends. In a way many of us have gone through the route described above. (Sasun blot can never be forgotten, we have managed to import it to many universities in United States. It’s becoming more and more popular in some universities in Northern California). The question why did we have to immigrate naturally comes to ones mind after reading the article? Why our country could not satisfy us? Ili xorosho tam gde nas net. I think in the hearts of many of us still lingers the question, “Will we ever return”. As a famous poet once said, “Vorteghits enk galis, yev ur enk gnum”
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An interesting article, though contains points that I strongly disagree with. Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), United States Dec 3 2003 Georgia: Soros, Stalin, And a Gallon of Wine by Roman Bessonov On Nov. 21, two correspondents of the Russian newspaper Kommersant Daily travelled from Gori, Georgia, the birthplace of Iosif Stalin, to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi - accompanying a column of opposition activists headed by Michael Saakashvili, an ambitious young man with an American education and economic views considered by Georgian businessmen to be "complete nonsense." After a rally before the huge statue of Stalin, the marchers set out under a Crusaders' banner with five white crosses on a field of red. A 40-liter cask of wine helped them along. By the time the buses were greeted by thousands at Rustaveli Prospect in central Tbilisi, Saakashvili had decided to introduce prohibition for a 24-hour period. Next day, the square in front of the Parliament in Rustaveli Prospect was flooded with a huge crowd of enthusiastic supporters of Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze, and Zurab Zhvania - three former top activists of President Eduard Shevardnadze's Citizens' Union of Georgia, now assembling to overthrow him. Shevardnadze was scheduled to open the first session of a new Parliament, elected on Nov. 2. The three opposition leaders, however, refused to take part, insisting that the election returns had been falsified. They had two arguments in support of this position: first, that the official results conflicted with exit polls; secondly, the U.S. State Department had just declared that the election returns had been falsified. In fact, the official returns were not unfavorable to Shevardnadze's young opponents. Saakashvili's National Movement won 18%, the Burjanadze-Democrats bloc 9%, and the New Rightists over 7% of the vote. Shalva Natelashvili's Labor Party, also regarded as a part of the opposition for its harsh criticism of Shevardnadze's economic and social policy (but not working with Saakashvili, et al.), was credited with 12%. In the new Parliament, the President's opponents could have prepared an orderly transition to a new state leadership, scheduled to take place with Presidential elections in 2005. Shevardnadze, now 75, had already promised Georgians and the world community that his current term was his last. The election results had been forecast with great precision in an analytical article in Moscow's Nezavisimaya Gazeta in August. Its authors correctly noted the increased popularity not only of Saakashvili's party, but also of the Revival Party of Aslan Abashidze, president of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria in Georgia's West. Meanwhile, the President's Citizens' Union, now without its former general secretary Zurab Zhvania (who had joined Mrs. Burjanadze in her brand new party project), had merged with several well-established parties - Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia's National Democratic Union, and Vakhtang Rcheulishvili's Socialist Party - into the Union for New Georgia. On the eve of the elections, the President's bloc was gaining additional support from ethnic minorities, who fear Saakashvili's nationalist banners. And even the remains of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's movement expressed support for Shevardnadze, though the latter was first made President in the wake of Gamsakhurdia's overthrow in 1991. Meanwhile, the Revival Party had almost unanimous support in Ajaria's main city, Batumi, as well as growing influence in Tbilisi and in the Armenian-populated district of Javakheti. But Saakashvili had proclaimed, months before, that he was organizing a "velvet revolution" to remove Shevardnadze. And the exit polls said the elections were a fakery. These exit polls were conducted not by the Georgians, nor by official observers from the United States, Russia, or the EU. They were provided by a Washington-based polling company, Global Strategy Group, which works for the U.S. Democratic National Committee and boasts of having run Al Gore's campaign in 2000. One more message, which activated the street campaign of Shevardnadze's opponents, was a report from The Times of London, published by Georgian media the day before the expected opening of Parliament. Claiming that Shevardnadze planned to emigrate, the report came with a photo of a luxurious villa, allegedly purchased for Shevardnadze in Germany. It may have been true that Germany was prepared to provide political asylum for Shevardnadze. It is also true that the - now former - elected President of Georgia had very close relations with the German establishment, since, as Soviet Foreign Minister, he had played a crucial role in German reunification in 1989-1990. It was also true that this strong affinity of Shevardnadze towards Germany was a matter of permanent dissatisfaction for those in the Anglo-American oligarchy, who preferred their own, completely controlled and predictable stooge, instead of him. Such interests were out to undermine any productive political economic relations between Georgia and either Germany or Russia, using traditional carrot-and-stick methods. The carrots were mostly virtual, expressed in quite unrealistic, but heavily advertised investment projects, which especially irritated the Russian side, as well as neighboring Armenia. Sticks would come down on Shevardnadze's head, any time he even attempted to seek - never mind implement - an alternative to Anglo-American geopolitics in the region. Western mass media compared Shevardnadze with King Lear. On the day of the well-prepared revolt, he found himself almost completely isolated. By the time Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov arrived in Tbilisi on the evening of Nov. 22, Shevardnadze had already lost access even to national television. The Old Fox and the Young Tomcats Eduard Shevardnadze's relations with Moscow had been undermined in 1997 by a large and very attractive carrot from Britain. This was the scenario of a Caucasus Common Market, uniting Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia's breakaway Republic of Chechnya, and, potentially, the whole Caucasus. The headquarters of the project was to be in Tbilisi, involving Shevardnadze's nephew and then-President of Azerbaijan Haidar Aliyev's son. Its promoters were Lord Alistair McAlpine and a Polish adventurer named Macej Jachimczyk, who converted to Islam in London and took the name "Mansur." At the center of the project stood the Chechen gangster, former felon Hojakhmed Nukhayev, who did not speak English but controlled Russia's Post of Novorossiysk. The Common Market scheme collapsed after a group of British engineers was decapitated in Chechnya, but Moscow would not forget this flirtation by Shevardnadze's circles with Chechen rebel leader Maskhadov, and reminded Shevardnadze about it immediately after the Sept. 11, 2001 catastrophe in New York and Washington. President Vladimir Putin raised the issue of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge as a cradle of Chechen gangsters, whose links with Afghan narcotics- and arms-trade networks were being highlighted in international mass media at that time. The chill in Russian-Georgian relations affected ordinary people, as well as top officials. A visa regime for travel between the two countries, introduced by the Russian side, hurt the popularity of both Shevardnadze and Putin within Georgia. Further feeding Georgians' disappointment with Russia was the haughty tone of the Moscow liberal mass media, which bullied, offended, and ridiculed not only Shevardnadze, but Georgia as a nation. Stinkbombs blasted by Izvestia, Moskovsky Komsomolets, and other Moscow papers - owned by Russia's foreign-tied nouveaux riches - echoed in the hearts of Georgians as painfully as did bombs dropped from Russian aircraft on Pankisi Gorge. No wonder Georgians felt offended, rather than inspired, when liberal wunderkind Anatoli Chubais, CEO of Russia's United Energy Systems, bought control over the Tbilisi electric power utility, Telasi. (The seller was the U.S.-based AES Corporation, specialists in electricity privatization, which had bought and exploited the Tbilisi power grid, and now wanted out.) Chubais declared himself a "liberal imperialist." Georgians were no happier about the "secret protocols" signed earlier this year between Shevardnadze and CEO Alexei Miller of the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom. Secrecy arouses not inspiration, but suspicion. Moscow's "liberal imperialists," regarded by ordinary Russians as merciless and immoral privatizers, were perceived in Georgia as invaders, not as friends in need. Russia's offer to supply natural gas and electricity was seen as a Trojan Horse, and no wonder! In his comments on the purchase of Telasi, Chubais focussed more on the prospects for Russian energy sales to Turkey, than on bringing light and heat into homes in Georgia. The Gazprom projects that Miller and Shevardnadze discussed off the record were economically very promising indeed. Shevardnadze was losing faith in U.S. promises to build a gas pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Turkey's Erzerum, across Georgia. Experience told him Georgia might freeze before this project were completed. Miller promoted two more realistic projects, also undoubtedly much cheaper. The Russian gas monopoly proposed to refurbish two existing gas pipelines - one connecting Vladikavkaz (the capital of North Ossetia, in Russia) with Tbilisi and Yerevan, Armenia, and another connecting the Blue Stream (Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea floor) with Tbilisi and Batumi. The latter project could be seen as a bridge between Georgia's central cities and Ajaria, which would benefit not only personal relations between Shevardnadze and Abashidze, but the integrity of Georgia. The Russian side, as often before, overlooked the influence of the mass media on the population. The Rustavi-2 TV channel - financed by George Soros' Open Society Georgia Foundation as an "independent" media source - warmed Georgian homes more efficiently than the dull, greasy moustache of Alexei Miller or the freckled nose of a newly converted imperialist Chubais, whose name in Tbilisi, as in Moscow or Vladivostok, is usually given to tomcats with a talent for stealing sausages. Chubais and Miller, bold as they might be, realized they were trying to steal a juicy sausage from very powerful international interests. Months before, Gazprom had been forced to reduce prices of Blue Stream gas exports to Turkey - not only because of U.S. pressure on Turkey, but also due to Turkey's own economic problems, which made the original agreement with Gazprom unsustainable. If the talks were public, the Turkish side could become angry and close off Blue Stream altogether. But, as the Russian saying goes, you can't hide an awl in a sack. It didn't take surveillance satellites to see that the Vladikavkaz pipeline was under reconstruction. Secrecy played into the hands of the new, Western-trained generation of Georgian politicians, who used these - economically reasonable - Russian gas and electricity infrastructure development proposals, as yet another reason for dumping Shevardnadze - to whom they actually owed a great deal of their careers. Thus the Russian overtures, discredited by Miller's whispers and Chubais' chatter, turned into a real Trojan horse for Shevardnadze. "Georgia should not sell its independence for electricity" - these words of Speaker of the Parliament Nino Burjanadze became the motto of a new wave of anti-Russian sentiment, transforming the political scene of Georgia. Two years ago, any Georgian official, told that Michael Saakashvili was a realistic Presidential candidate, would have laughed in your face: Who? This young, haughty demagogue with a wild mixture of ideas in his overheated brain? Today, Saakashvili is a not only a political star in the Tbilisi sky, but a person whose words and actions move masses, and directly affect the political mood throughout most of Georgia. Both Moscow influentials and their counterparts in Tbilisi government offices overlooked the steady rise of the new star, which started not in Summer 2003, but much earlier. The Ghost of the Fifth Rome On Sept. 18, 2001, Justice Minister Michael Saakashvili arrived at the Parliament of Georgia with a pack of photos, depicting luxurious mansions owned by top police officials. Meanwhile, mass media reported that his flat was visited by "unidentified persons," who tried to steal some documentation. This added heat to the media scandal, portraying the ambitious minister as a target of organized crime and corruption, and initiating his ascent to the exceptional popularity he enjoys today. The engineers of his career had studied the psychology and moods of the Georgians - and not only Georgians. In a similar way, "anti-corruption careers" were made in other transitional or Third World countries, from Mexico to the Philippines. The Georgian brew was cooked to a recipe tested many times before, especially where luxury and misery live side by side, and the physical economy is ruined. The country Shevardnadze took charge of in 1992 was actually in worse shape than it is today; but progress has been very slow, due to his trust in the West. Joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) with a ruined economy, Georgia, like Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, expected a huge flow of investments. Instead, money fled the country. Saakashvili and his ilk, however, avoid the real background of the economic problems, instead blaming particular figures in the landscape. Economists from the New Rightist Party, later his ally against Shevardnadze, admitted that Saakashvili's economic views are a wild mix of unrealistic assessments. Saakashvili resigned as Justice Minister, with complaints that the state leadership (to which he owed his party and government career), was impeding implementation of his demagogic National Anti-Corruption Plan. This project had received ample attention from megaspeculator George Soros, who promised assistance in the effort to cleanse the Georgian establishment. Soros appreciated the earlier reform of the law enforcement bodies, whereby the Penitentiary Authority was transferred from the Internal Affairs Ministry to the Ministry of Justice. As Saakashvili's partner, Soros was going to become a benefactor of Georgian jails, to improve the conditions there. In Georgia's destroyed economy - especially after its WTO entry - the penitentiary industry, with George Soros' help, would become an island of prosperity. But that was not enough for the megaspeculator: The next step was supposed to be a sound whipping of the Georgian police, replacing its top cadres with "decent persons" selected by him and Saakashvili. Though the effort ostensibly failed, the discredited Internal Affairs Minister Kakha Targamadze was forced out, replaced by Koba Narchemashvili. The website of Soros' Open Society Georgia Foundation was not indifferent to this change of figures. Earlier, as head of the Customs Authority, Narchemashvili had been blamed by Tax Minister Michael Machavariani for "not opposing crime." But Soros' site explained that Machavariani, in attacking Narchemashvili, was motivated purely by personal ambition, intending to introduce his own crony to the lucrative customs post! In addition, the site warned that the new Internal Affairs Minister would have difficulty fighting crime, because of the resistance of Targamadze's old staff. This excessive sympathy of Soros towards Narchemashvili may explain the unexpectedly easy surrender of the police to the crowd under the Crusaders' banners, on Nov. 21. For the whole period from September 2001 till November 2003, Saakashvili was under ardent tutelage from George Soros. The latter's Open Society Georgia Foundation co-founded the Liberty Institute of Georgia, and launched a "youth assistance program." Its young disciples were promptly organized into a movement entitled Kmara! (Enough!), which took lessons in organizing protest actions from professionals in former Yugoslavia and Ukraine. The broad-shouldered young guys in leather jackets, who mounted the tribune of the Parliament on Saturday, Nov. 22, smashing tables and chairs, belonged to Kmara! As the BBC's correspondent said, these persons "hissed out" the elected President from the Parliament building. The social-populist phraseology of Saakashvili and the choice of Gori as launch-place for the decisive move into Tbilisi, represent nothing new in this sort of "regime change" operation. Anywhere George Soros appeared in the post-Soviet area, he would mimic the character of the local protest mood. In Lviv, Ukraine, his magazine Derzhavnist (Statehood) introduced the idea of "Ukraine as the Fourth Rome," and published an article saying that the execution of Jews in Babiy Yar, near Kiev, in 1941, was actually an execution of Ukrainian patriots by Jewish commissars. The local Jewish community was shocked, as were, no doubt, survivors of Stalin's prisons in Georgia, but such details have never bothered Soros, for whom the end seemed to justify any means. After all, Stalin's image might serve as a suitable symbol of a "Fifth Rome." It was St. George's day on Sunday, Nov. 23, when Shevardnadze resigned. George Soros' day was celebrated with gallons of wine in the central squares of Tbilisi. Backing the Georgian Opposition George Soros may have found his disciple, Saakashvili, at the offices of Patterson, Belknap, Webb, and Tyler LLC in Tbilisi, where the young lawyer started his career after coming home in 1992 from study at Columbia University. A professor there, R. Scott Horton, combines the careers of human rights defender, and privatization consultant in the former U.S.S.R. In the 1980s, he was the lawyer for aging Academician Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner. Today, Horton represents the Ukrainian intelligence Major Mykola Melnychenko, whose peddling of audiotapes of President Leonid Kuchma's private conversation launched a political crisis in Ukraine in 2001. At a 1998 Columbia University conference on Caspian oil reserves (co-sponsored by Exxon), this friend of dissidents presented a report astronomically remote from human rights - on the juridical implications of the division of the Caspian Sea. By that time, Patterson, Belknap, Webb, and Tyler had been in Kazakstan for ten years, and in Moscow for five. In Russia, the firm is a partner of Alpha Group's Tyumen Oil Co. (TNK), recently merged with British Petroleum, and the largest Russian telecommunications company, Svyazinvest, co-privatized by George Soros, Boris Jordan, and Vladimir Potanin in 1997. Another "permanent nomenklatura" figure, now operating for the Carlyle Group (defense contractors), is ex-Secretary of State James Baker III. He turned up in Tbilisi in August, to present urgent amendments to the Election Code, which became known in Georgia as "the Baker Plan." Implementation of the demands foundered in a brawl among opposition forces, seeking seats on the Electoral Commission. James Baker III arrived not merely to advise. He expressed his opinion that the next leader of Georgia should be Nino Burjanadze, Speaker of the Parliament. Shortly before his arrival, PA Consulting, the American management company for Georgia's United [Electricity] Distribution Authority, disconnected 23 districts for non-payment of debts. And at the same time, a International Monetary Fund mission was pressuring Georgia's government to impose new austerity measures. Though the economy has been controlled by criminal clans for years, the President alone was blamed for the increasing economic problems. One can imagine President Shevardnadze faced with such massive sabotage and permanently bullied by the inviolable "human rights" mouthpiece, Rustavi-2; he appeared to be close to real depression. But this was what was expected of him: Should he have been reluctant to resign, a "grateful" Burjanadze reserved for herself the option of declaring him incompetent. If Georgia's King Lear had not resigned on St. George Soros' Day, he might have faced an Anglo-American mental examination. Georgia's 'Lady Thatcher' The scandal around the Russian energy proposals was a real political gift to Mrs. Burjanadze, whose reputation in Tbilisi was far from perfect. A series of spicy articles had followed the 2002 appointment of her husband, Badri Bitsadze, to the post of Deputy General Prosecutor. (A day before the revolt, he resigned, complaining of "pressure" from the already powerless Shevardnadze.) "The Landlady of a Big House," as Tbilisi papers called her, had figured in press accounts of a scandal around the Tbilisi office of Maskhadov's unrecognized Chechen government. This office was headquartered in the building on Gulua Street, where the company of Mrs. Burjanadze's father, Anzori, a former Communist Party official and big grain trader, was also located. The head of the Chechen office, Hizri Aldamov, claimed that his mission in Georgia was unofficial, but Russian sources listed him among the ambassadors of the independent Ichkeria (Chechnya), most of whom had criminal backgrounds. Aldamov had twice been in jail for economic wrongdoing. When Ichkeria's office was caught smuggling pharmaceuticals from Turkey, Aldamov threatened to release compromising information on Georgia's customs agency - and was immediately forgiven. His son, caught in Pankisi with drugs, was also safely released. He continued issuing more than eccentric statements; Radio Liberty quoted him naming Russia's Vladimir Putin as global terrorist No.1, and Osama bin Laden as an agent of the Russian special services. When in Summer 2002, Hizri Aldamov was forced to leave his office in Gulua Street (so as not to compromise Mrs. Burjanadze's family), he declared that he really had been working for Maskhadov - contradicting Maskhadov himself, as well as Georgia's Foreign Security Chief Avtandil Ioseliani. When he participated in a later international human rights event in Tbilisi, however, Aldamov was identified by a Chechen website as "the general representative of Ichkeria in Georgia." Mrs. Burjanadze's family connections with Chechen separatists well correspond with her international career. The case of Chechnya, as well as other Caucasus insurgencies, and many other "indigenist" movements across the globe, was inherited from Lord Palmerston's 19th-Century Foreign Office, by today's top figures in "human rights" and "anti-corruption" circles of the British oligarchy. It is quite natural that Nino Burjanadze's political ideal is Margaret Thatcher. In 1995-98 - the heyday of the Caucasus Common Market project - Mrs. Burjanadze chaired Georgia's Permanent Parliamentary Delegation in Great Britain. Burjanadze's mission in Britain was obviously the starting point for her career in European institutions. In 1998, she was selected as a Rapporteur of the General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Issues of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, and two years later became a vice president of OSCE's PA. This status played a decisive role in her election as the Speaker of Georgia's Parliament. Immediately thereafter, she also became an officer of the Black Sea Community of Economic Cooperation. During the parliamentary elections, several candidates protested that Burjanadze was using her Speaker's staff and facilities for her personal needs. And she was a candidate, the leader of an election bloc named after herself, at the same time as representing an international institution that supervised the elections. Such a combination of roles and functions fits the classic definition of corruption, as does Saakashvili's simultaneous employment in the Parliament and a U.S. law firm internationally known as a lobbyist for powerful transnational corporations. Burjanadze was a professor of law in the Tbilisi University. Before becoming the Speaker, she headed the Law Committee of Parliament. In that capacity, she participated in IREX's international conference "Black Sea Region: Priorities and Prospectives for the XXI Century." Among the other speakers, we find a familiar name: R. Scott Horton, professor of Columbia University, partner of Patterson, Belknap, Webb, and Tyler, president of International Human Rights Fund, director of the Sakharov Fund, etc., etc. The Stolen Alternative Since the major Russian TV channels, obediently bowing to the generally accepted version of the events in Tbilisi, describe them as a "velvet revolution" - concealing the tragic truth from Russians on the eve of their own Dec. 7 parliamentary elections - the only source of detailed information from Georgia for the Russian audience is Aslan Abashidze's Ajara TV. This channel was disconnected from Tbilisi on the day of the revolt, along with the state TV company, giving Soros' Rustavi-2 a monopoly. For months before, Rustavi-2 had been slandering the leader of Ajaria, describing the aged Aslan, a Georgian nobleman, as an old Communist apparatchik and potential dictator - though Abashidze never danced around the statue of Stalin, and his highly professional TV company broadcast not only the best classic Soviet movies, but also the masterpieces of European and American cinema art. Abashidze's mass media relied upon the feelings and tastes of a thinking intellectual and an industrious peasant, not just following their expectations, but trying to upgrade their education. For several years, it had been a source of hope for a decent life, in which human happiness was associated with productive labor. It had been a very strong alternative to Rustavi-2, which played on the impulsive instincts of poorly educated youth to revolt against alleged "corruption." After years of personal conflict, Abashidze found a common language with Shevardnadze, when the President of Georgia, realizing the menace to his own career and to the Georgian nation, tried - unsuccessfully - to crack down on Rustavi-2 TV. Abashidze's Agordzineba (Revival) Party was the only political force that came out into the streets of Tbilisi to protect the President, and the city's industries, from Saakashvili's crowds. Abashidze's own TV channel, Ajara TV, strongly opposed the National Movement, labelling it as "fascist." Within Ajaria, Abashidze is the undisputed authority. The 93% vote for the Revival Party, questioned by "independent" mass media, is regarded by informed Russian observers as probably genuine. Ajaria has a functioning physical economy and relatively acceptable standard of living - lower than in Moscow, but higher than anywhere else in the Caucasus. In 1992, Abashidze did not allow Gamsakhurdia's paramilitary squads to enter Batumi, and established his own army. However, he did not separate himself from Georgia like the leadership of Abkhazia (where the central authorities have next to no power), though Ajaria's port facility, fruit plantations, and vast trade operations with Turkey gave him the perfect opportunity to do so. Instead, he has tried to influence the rest of Georgia with the example of his economic success, probably hoping to inherit power on a national level, through a legitimate election. Abashidze's efforts to establish his party with organizations in all the districts of Georgia, were evidence of that. Through the Mayor of Batumi, an ethnic Abkhaz, and a number of his military aides, Abashidze had established his own relations with influentials in breakaway Abkhazia. It was no surprise that after he and Shevardnadze shook hands in Summer 2002, Abashidze acquired special responsibility for Georgian-Abkhaz diplomacy. While Aslan Abashidze, step by step, was developing a scenario for the reunification of Georgia, Saakashvili, and the TV channel created for him by George Soros, were threatening Abkhazia with a new war, simultaneously slamming Abashidze as a potential "dictator." His behavior reminded Abashidze of the late Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who eliminated Abkhazia's autonomy, triggering a separatist war eagerly exploited by organized crime, with its traditional interest in having quasi-independence for the area and complete control over the Sukhumi port. As soon as the opposition declared its victory, forcing Shevardnadze to resign, Abkhazia and South Ossetia confirmed their independent status, while Abashidze, as he had warned in advance, closed the borders of Ajaria to Georgian forces. The effect of Soros' activity is always the same. As we well know from the experience of Eastern Europe, anywhere his foundation was rooted, anti-industrial "indigenist" movements raised their heads, including the movement for separation of Transylvania from Romania. Separatism of this kind is habitually tied up with a decay of the real economy, to be replaced with a post-industrial "smuggling economy," to the profit of the international drug trade. No wonder Abashidze's economic success is something ideologically unacceptable for George Soros. And it will be no shock, if the banners with Crusader crosses will soon be seen along the road to Batumi - this time with weapons. Guns, Drugs, and Flowers "It is not a velvet revolution," Abashidze said in his Nov. 24 interview, broadcast by Ajara TV. "Velvet revolutionaries don't turn upside down party offices, as these guys from Kmara! did with the Revival Party office in the very heart of Tbilisi, in the famous Lagidze building. We hardly saved our co-chairman from death on Saturday." Revival's co-chairman, Jemal Goghitidze, was not accidentally most hated by the Kmara! guys. He had co-chaired the press conference providing the evidence that Rustavi-2 and Kmara! were directly financed by George Soros. Days later, Kakha Lomaya, head of the Open Society in Tbilisi, had to confirm that the Kmara! project "was coordinated in New York." One more speaker at that press conference, Giya Topadze, head of the Industry Will Save Georgia party, also became a target of Saakashvili's fanatics. In a fit of "velvet revolutionary rage," they rampaged through Tbilisi, smashing bottles of beer and lemonade produced by Topadze's company. Woe to those who untimely mention the name of Saint George! This irrational rage, intentionally fed during months of preparations for the coup, requires a target. In order to keep the crowd around him during the Presidential campaign, Saakashvili will have to invent one image of evil after another. According to Ajara's last reports, "velvet revolutionaries" are already taking aim at local mayors, who did not take the side of the National Movement on their way from Gori to Tbilisi, and at the director of Tbilisi University. As was easy to foresee, the ascent of a crowd waving nationalist banners, dating back to olden times, more troublesome than glorious, is more likely to destroy the integrity of Georgia than to reunify the shattered country. Abashidze's closing of the borders of Ajaria paralyzed Georgian-Turkish trade operations. Simultaneously, the leaderships of Abkhazia and South Ossetia enforced their border regimes. In Javakheti, the Armenian-populated province, Saakashvili's ascent is also viewed with anxiety and disgust. Javakheti's Armenian community has close ties with Yerevan, which has found itself between two potentially hostile regimes, and Iran, which is an official target of the United States - of George Bush and George Soros, John McCain and Joe Lieberman. McCain, one more "specialist" in human rights and Kazak oil (as well as Turkmenian natural gas), visited Tbilisi a month and a half before the coup. The remaining Russian military facilities are mainly based in Javakheti, and provide jobs for a significant part of the population. The prospect of using this territory as a stronghold for "containing" and eventually attacking Iran, hardly inspires the population, but it warms the already overheated fantasy of U.S. neo-conservative and anti-Islamic lunatics of all types. The same geopolitics suggests the complete isolation of Armenia from any kind of support from Russia. This isolation, in its turn, will be used for pushing the long-discussed exchange of territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan, designed to eliminate Armenia's border with Iran. Terra Incognita Regarding the declared plans for a natural gas route from Baku to Turkey, the next likely target of the authors of the Georgian coup d'état may be Turkmenistan, the major source of gas in the Caspian basin. President Niyazov recently survived an assassination attempt. One more obvious target is Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma. Ex-KGB dissident Melnychenko, like a gun in the first act of a Chekhov play, is hanging on the wall till a suitable moment. A global empire is most dangerous in the period of agony. For its real masters in the Anglo-American permanent nomenklatura, it is desperately important to keep the American minds under control. The coup d'état in Tbilisi will be presented there as a new victory of democracy. The real Tbilisi may starve, but the virtual Tbilisi is going to be presented as one more model democratic state, with no electricity and gas, but with medieval banners, Stalin and all. In his latest interview to Kommersant, Saakashvili already moved away from the label "velvet revolution." "It is something else," he said. "Maybe a flower revolution?" suggested a helpful author. Saakashvili accepted the new definition. Saakashvili's supporters, their brains full of Soros' populist propaganda, are happy that their legitimate President has gotten the Milosevic treatment - without an attempt to look at the map of the former Yugoslavia, crumbled into small parts, some of them with a still unclear status of statehood. Exactly such a future, corresponding with the "divide and conquer" principle, is the most probable future of Georgia under Saakashvili's rule. The specific kind of business, advocated by George Soros across the globe, benefits from unrecognized states with destroyed economies. Arms and drug traders traditionally use such territories as their bases of operations. Therefore, Saakashvili's easy victory and the state of emergency in Abkhazia may be parts of the same plan. Global organized crime will definitely thank Soros for his success in Georgia's destruction. Meanwhile, the U.S. oil and gas corporations, serving as tools in a more lucrative game, will express their gratitude with injections of cash into the liberal empire-pushing (Soros-funded) faction of the U.S. Democratic Party, on the eve of the American Presidential elections. Why else was the coup d'état needed before the scheduled change of power in Georgia, granting it, under the cover of the "Fifth Rome," the fate of a "flower province" - an economically doomed territory, whose citizens, instead of going to the university, will survive by selling flowers in the bazaars of Moscow and Istanbul?
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An interesting article in today's Montreal Gazette. http://www.canada.com/montreal/montrealgaz...4D-59A3566029D0 Georgia seemed to have it all But in spite of its highly educated work force, strategic location, sub-tropical climate and tourist-pleasing landscapes, the former Soviet republic is a failed state desperately in need of reform LEVON SEVUNTS The Gazette Wednesday, November 26, 2003 Opposition supporters in Tbilisi celebrate Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation. CREDIT: MISHA JAPARIDZE, AP Armenia and Azerbaijan can breath a sigh of relief now that the upheaval in neghbouring Georgia turned into a "velvet revolution" and did not degenerate into civil war. For both those feuding countries, Georgia is a vital link to the outside world. About 90 per cent of Armenia's trade passes through Georgia. And Azerbaijan depends on Georgia to ship its Caspian oil to world markets, and hopes that an oil pipeline to be built through Georgia will bring it future prosperity. Georgia also has substantial Armenian and Azeri minorities, which would have been caught in the crossfire of a civil war. But for presidents Robert Kocharian of Armenia and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, the resignation of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze is bad news. Opposition parties in Armenia and Azerbaijan have been following Shevardnadze's ouster closely, hoping to do the same with their respective presidents. The success of the Georgian opposition will only encourage them to try harder to get rid of Kocharian and Aliyev. But can they? All three countries in the South Caucasus went through a series of deeply flawed parliamentary and presidential elections recently. Huge - and in the case of Azerbaijan violent - protests followed. Both Aliyev and Kocharian are seen by some as lacking in legitimacy. Yet only in Georgia did protesters manage to boot out the president. Why? In truth, Georgia has so far been a failed state. It once enjoyed the highest standard of living in the Soviet Union, and seemed to have been blessed with everything to become a prosperous independent country. It has a highly educated workforce, a strategic location on the crossroads between Asia and Europe, an incredibly hospitable and warm people, breathtaking landscapes and rich culture to attract tourism, and a mild subtropical climate for agriculture. But instead, Georgia has been lurching from crisis to crisis. A wave of extreme, myopic nationalism swept through Georgia in 1990, as it struggled for independence from the Soviet Union under the leadership of its first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Gamsakhurdia's rallying cry, "Georgia for Georgians," was suicidal for a country that consists of a patchwork of ethnic groups with distinct cultures. Even before Georgia gained its independence, it lost control over South Ossetia (not without interference from Russia). In December of 1991, I watched the private militia of reputed-mobster-turned-democrat Dzaba Ioseliani pound the presidential palace in downtown Tbilisi with Second World War anti-aircraft guns. Gamsakhurdia eventually fled but not before Tbilisi's majestic Rustaveli Ave. was gutted by house -to--house fighting. In came Eduard Shevardnadze to the rescue of Mother Georgia. By then, real trouble was brewing in Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and it seemed that the country would fall apart. In September 1993, the minority Abkhazs (again not without Russian help) delivered a humiliating defeat to Georgia's ill-disciplined army, and drove out the majority Georgian population. Shevardnadze himself, trapped in the Abkhaz capital, Sukhum, had to be rescued by elite Russian marines. To his credit, despite the loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Shevardnadze managed to keep the country together. That's what he will be remembered for. But 10 years later, Georgia still doesn't have much of an army. Georgian police are notoriously corrupt and incompetent. Crime is rampant and Georgians still suffer from chronic electricity and water shortages. The Georgian opposition was able to capitalize on this. The people who stormed the parliament building last week did so not only to restore their democratic rights but also to bring back an uninterrupted supply of electricity, and law and order. Despite their share of war and political turmoil, Armenia and Azerbaijan are in much better shape as states. Partly because of the threat of resumption of war between them, Armenia and Azerbaijan keep their armies and law enforcement forces in reasonable shape. Armenia, thanks to radical market reforms prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and help from the vast Armenian diaspora, and Azerbaijan, thanks to its oil wealth, are in much better economic shape than Georgia, too. Rallying public support and defeating the iron fist of the government in Armenia or Azerbaijan would be much harder, especially since the opposition in both countries lacks leaders of the same calibre or appeal as Georgia's Western-educated Mikhail Saakashvili and parliament speaker Nino Burdzhanadze. No, opposition forces in Armenia and Azerbaijan will have come to power the hard way - through elections.
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I think if Armenia continues developing at this rate within a few years it will catch not only Switzerland, but also United States and Japan. The country should take a little break in its development; otherwise at such a pace god knows what can happen. Tishe edesh’ dal’she budesh. One thing I can remind you of, in late ‘90s when Argentine economy was growing in double digits, and IMF and World Bank were actively supporting the economic policies of Harvard technocrats, very few people could actually see that the country is build on IMF and World Bank capital, and most of the investments are made in very liquid assets, so in case of a little scare, panic selling was inevitable. Where does IMF money go? What sectors are developing that can lead to higher exports? I am just amazed how do you close your eyes and point at some bogus economic numbers, without seeing the whole picture. The country is in blockade and is cut off from economic developments of the region. The cost of transportation is enormously high, and judicial system which has to protect investors is nothing but a rubber stamp. I want this numbers to reflect changes in peoples lives, I want the country to develop, but development to me doesn’t mean 15 or 20% economic growth, it means an actual increase in living standards.
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I don't know how to post it in Armenian, but the following interview of Vazgen Manoukian in today's Aravot should shed some light about military's involvement in Armenia's elections. http://www.aravot.am/2003/aravot_arm/Novem...mber/25/p02.htm
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A leader who does not respect the rule of law, can not expect ordinary citizens to respect it either. Leaders should live by example. I don't think current leadership of Armenia, or past leadership of Georgia has led its country by example. Interesting article about the Georgia's Revolutin in one of the premier magazines, Economist http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaySto...tory_id=2243603 Georgia’s velvet revolution Nov 25th 2003 From The Economist Global Agenda A peaceful revolution in Georgia has forced Edward Shevardnadze to step down as president, just three weeks after his party's “victory” in a rigged election. What had looked like a grave crisis may have ended up as a triumph for democracy MORE than a decade after it swept Eastern Europe free of Communist regimes, people power has removed another ancient relic from a former Soviet satellite. Edward Shevardnadze’s departure after 11 years as Georgia’s president was remarkable above all for its peacefulness: after three weeks of non-violent protests against fraudulent parliamentary elections, and after his supporters in government and in the armed forces had begun to desert him, he bowed to the inevitable and resigned on the night of Sunday November 23rd. Proud Georgians will point to this non-violence to argue that their country is fundamentally different to its Caucasian neighbours, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both of these held flawed elections earlier this year too. But the consequences were not a “velvet revolution” like Georgia’s but, in Azerbaijan’s case, violently repressed riots and, in Armenia’s, a weary resignation by the people that they could do little to change things. That things in Georgia happened differently is a tribute partly to the vibrancy of the democratic opposition there, and partly to the fact that the West’s involvement—both in monitoring the elections and in speaking out about fraud afterwards—was much greater. But it also reflects the fact that Mr Shevardnadze was already an extraordinarily weak and unpopular leader. The day before resigning, he had declared a state of emergency in the face of the mounting protests, but it soon became doubtful that the armed forces would carry out his orders. The country that Mr Shevardnadze leaves to Georgia’s next leader bears the marks of his weakness. It is a place where corruption flourishes and the economy stagnates. On Tuesday, the speaker of the outgoing parliament, Nino Burdzhanadze, who has taken over as interim president, said the country faced economic collapse and would be seeking foreign aid. Besides its dire economic straits, Georgia is at risk of falling to pieces altogether. The secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia show strong signs of preference for belonging to Russia. The Kremlin has maintained its influence there as a way of undermining Mr Shevardnadze—who is as hated in Moscow as he is admired in Washington for his role, while Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign minister, in the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the autocratic leader of the Ajaria region, Aslan Abashidze, runs it as an autonomous fief. His response to Mr Shevardnadze’s ousting was to close Ajaria’s borders and declare his own state of emergency. Mr Shevardnadze used to warn of chaos if he were ever deposed; he referred to himself as the guarantor of stability in the Caucasus. For all his faults, he was a wily and experienced politician, wise in the intrigues of the region, who could rely on good contacts in the West to get him out of many a scrape. It remains to be seen whether his successor’s newness to the job will be an advantage or a weakness. On Tuesday, Georgia's outgoing parliament decided to hold an election for a new president on January 4th. Earlier, the supreme court had annulled most of the results in the November 2nd parliamentary elections, paving the way for fresh polls in the legislature, possibly on the same date as the presidential vote. The leading presidential candidate is Mikhail Saakashvili, a populist, young (35) lawyer with a western image. He will, unlike Mr Shevardnadze, have the support of the people. But he inherits a grand old mess. And while opposition groups were united in their push to oust the president, they will now revert to competing intensely for power. Despite the challenges facing Georgia, it seems that its crisis has ended up as a triumph for democracy. President George Bush’s officials welcomed Mr Shevardnadze’s resignation and the calling of fresh elections, which came three weeks after Mr Bush had laid out a vision of bringing democracy to the Middle East. But American officials also paid tribute to Mr Shevardnadze’s role in ending Soviet communism. The reaction of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was also ambivalent: Mr Putin said he was worried that Mr Shevardnadze had been forced to quit under threat of violence, but he also pointed out the toppled president's “systemic errors in foreign, domestic and economic policy”. Despite their jostling for influence in Georgia, it seems that America and Russia forged a pragmatic alliance to help bring about a bloodless resolution to the country's political crisis. Mr Shevardnadze had taken the country closer to America and Western Europe—much to Russia’s irritation—and Georgia was rewarded with American military training and equipment, plus cash to help its near-bankrupt government. Russia still maintains military bases in Georgia, which has a border with the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya. And it provides most of Georgia’s energy needs through a gas pipeline. Though Georgia is not a big oil producer, it is an important route between the West and the fast-growing Caspian oilfields. Two western oil companies—Britain’s BP and Norway’s Statoil—reassured their shareholders on Monday that Georgia’s turmoil did not threaten their plans to build oil and gas pipelines through the country, linking platforms in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea to Turkey, thereby avoiding Russia. It is also believed that Russia has a rival plan to get its gas to other countries via Georgia. So there will inevitably be conspiracy-theorists who will say it is all about oil (and gas). But the toppling of Georgia's veteran president has more to do with the fact that both Georgians and Mr Shevardnadze’s foreign backers had finally grown sick of his failure—12 years after he helped to end the Soviet empire—to turn the promises of democracy and economic development into reality. It also seems to be a further step in the so-called “third wave of democratisation”, which has slowly been sweeping the world since the mid-1970s, and in which one country after another has decided to swap authoritarianism for people power.
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People have to realize that it’s not about Kocharyan or Demirchyan; or Shevardnadze or Burjanadze, but it’s all about respecting people’s right to elect its leaders and choose its future. It’s about establishing a political system where the transfer of power is done peacefully, and not forced upon people. I admire Georgian opposition for standing their ground and not compromising the trust put upon their shoulders by Georgian people.
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I take my hat off to Georgian people, and their opposition. Unlike Demichian / Sarkissian tandem, Saakashvili / Burjanadze were relentless, and went all the way. They did not bargain with people’s votes, and kept their promise of not deserting people. Georgian opposition had a solid platform, and alternative to development of Georgia. Armenia’s opposition’s only promise was to solve October 27 killings. They were revanchists who did not have a plan, when they took people to streets. Democracy did not win in Armenia, because we did not have leaders capable to fight dictators. Everybod in Armenia knows that Kocharyan, like Shevardnadze is a failed leader. He failed to respect people’s choice. Any leader, who does not respect the choice of the people, doesn’t have a moral right to be a leader. Good or bad are very subjective terms, all that matters at the end of the day is whether the leader respects people’s choice; otherwise he is nothing else but a dictator. Kocharyan might have performed economic miracles, might have turned Armenia into next Singapore, but if people does not want him he should be courageous enough to step down and respect democratic principles.
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Interesting assessment of elections in Caucasus. This makes one remember that at one time US was supporting Saddam and Osama Bin Laden. Isn't it in the best interests of US to ostracize leaders in countries where the human rights are violated, and democracy is only a poorly performed spectacle for the outside world. http://www.truthnews.net/world/2003110081.htm A Smoldering Caucasus And The Quiet Americans Tom Lantos, November 20, 2003 President Bush has declared that the time is ripe for a new strategy to foster democracy in the Middle East. If it ends up looking anything like what the US has done lately in the Caucasus, we might as well not even try. Caspian oil reserves - an alternative that could reduce US dependence on OPEC - seem to count for more than human rights and democracy in US policy toward the region. The Republic of Georgia is but the most recent example: Its Nov. 2 parliamentary elections were such a sham that the country's Central Electoral Commission invalidated the results at a number of polling stations and held a repeat election at those stations Sunday - but even that turned into a fiasco when several polls didn't receive ballots in time. There have been widespread calls within Georgia to scrap all the Nov. 2 election results and start again; President Eduard Shevardnadze has refused. Now thousands are taking to the streets in protests that bear a striking resemblance to antigovernment protests in the 1990s that swept Mr. Shevardnadze to power, but not before the country descended into civil war. And what is the US government's public position on this crisis? While Western observers describe the elections as blatantly manipulated by the Shevardnadze government, the State Department has been studiously low-key, sending high-level representatives but withholding significant public comment. And Mr. Bush has said nothing at all. The Georgian situation practically replicates what happened with the Armenian presidential elections earlier this year and the elections in Azerbaijan last month. In both cases, widespread fraud elicited only a mild rebuke from the US. The political sovereignty and economic stability of the three Caucasus states are very much in the national interest of the US, which has cultivated them as allies since the breakup of the Soviet Union loosened Russia's hold on the region. The relationships paid off after the Sept. 11 attacks, when the Caucasus states allowed US flyover rights on the way to the war in Afghanistan. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has allocated substantial human and financial resources to sustain these nations and preserve their viability as independent states. Its efforts to develop civil society include funding nongovernmental organizations, promoting development of political parties, and supporting a free press. But for what, if the US fails to show some backbone about ensuring free and fair elections? Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are ruled by presidents who lack legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of their citizens. Widespread ballot irregularities in Armenia have led to charges that the election was stolen. In Azerbaijan, authorities acted openly to secure President Ilham Aliyev's victory by excluding the opposition from the electoral process. Without a broad mandate from their respective electorates, neither Mr. Aliyev nor President Robert Kocharian will be able to steer his nation toward economic prosperity, let alone end the Nagorno-Artsax conflict that has damaged relations between them for a decade. The lack of democracy and civil society will also prevent the Caucasus from tackling the post-Soviet brand of corruption now endemic to the region. The exploration and transport of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Sea to Western markets must continue, but this development must proceed in an equitable manner benefitting all citizens of the producer and transit counties. A failure to fully promote democracy will ensure that the profits from oil production will end up in the Swiss bank accounts of corrupt leaders and government officials. While it's true that the US has to work with the Alievs, Kocharians, and Shevardnadzes of this world to continue protecting its interests, at the very least the State Department should openly hold these leaders' feet to the fire on democracy. More important, though, would be a ringing rebuke from the secretary of State himself, or even Bush. When the three countries of the southern Caucasus gained their independence in 1991, they inherited abysmal economies, corruption, ethnic and territorial conflicts, and weak civil societies. But they also had a highly educated populace, hungry for democracy and economic freedom, and strong secular traditions separating religion and state. Since then, the US has made a significant investment in the region in hope of building stable democracies based on the rule of law and market economies. Recently the US has reinforced their sovereignty, minimized Iranian and Russian influences, and secured the support of all three governments in the war against terrorism. But in respect to the most fundamental value of American foreign policy - promoting democracy and human rights - the US has fallen short in the Caucasus. The highest levels of US government must hold the leaders of these countries accountable until they demonstrate they can lead in an enlightened way consistent with their international commitments. Otherwise, the Caucasus may disintegrate into a string of failed and authoritarian states, and no amount of Caspian oil will save the US from the result. Congressman Tom Lantos of California is the ranking Democratic member of the House International Relations Committee.
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What other independent nation celebrates its colonization. Is it a turning point of history when one colonizer is replaced by the other? The blind Russophilia has been in the roots of evil of Armenian nation and continues to be one. Are we so incapable to see the reality and learn from history that each nation has its interests and as famous British proverb says, "There are no eternal enemies, but there are only eternal interests". When will we be able to kill the Russophile in us, and become an Armenophile? Why do we even glamorize Khachatur Abovyan for his famous stupidity "Orhnvi en s'hat@ vor Rusi vot@ mtav hayots yerkir@". Just something to think about. I, as an Armenian, am so disappointed at my ancestors for their inability to defend themselves, and for willingly putting their fate into the hands of others. ITAR-TASS News Agency TASS October 24, 2003 Friday 5:54 AM Eastern Time Armenia observes 175th anniversary of joining Russia By Tigran Liloyan YEREVAN, October 24 A scientific conference, entitled "Turning point in history," opened in Yerevan on Friday. It is being held on the occasion of the 175th anniversary of East Armenia's joining of Russia (1801-1828). "Despite the changing of a political situation, this event will always be of history-making significance for the Armenian nation," said Academician Vladimir Barkhudaryan, Vice President of the Armenian National Academy of Sciences. "The main lesson to be drawn from the developments, that took place 175 years ago, is a conscious and popular character of the alliance with Russia," said Armen Darbiryan, head of the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University. Anatoly Dryukov, Russian ambassador to Armenia, said, "the dialogue maintained by the Russian and Armenian leaders, as well as the level of problems tackled by them, determine further cooperation between the two countries in the political, economic and military spheres, along with concerted actions in the international arena." Prominent scientists from the leading Russian universities and colleges made reports at the conference.
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http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniarepor...560B50DD838.ASP Armenian, Russian Nuclear Experts Opposed To Metsamor Closure By Atom Markarian The strategic nuclear power station at Metsamor is safe enough to continue to operate for at least 13 more years, Armenia’s and Russia’s leading atomic energy scientists said Friday in a further sign that it will not be shut down soon. Armen Abakian, director of a Moscow-based research institute that works for nuclear plants across Russia, brushed aside Western fears that Metsamor’s sole Soviet-built reactor, exploited since 1980, poses a danger to environment. He argued that the reactor’s operational longevity is 30 years and given the fact that it was not operational between 1989 and 1995 the plant can safely produce electricity at least until 2016. “Such facilities are usually given an extra 15 years of life,” Abakian told a scientific symposium in Yerevan. “Therefore, the Armenian atomic station can function even until 2031.” Abakian’s Armenian counterpart, Vahram Petrosian, made the same point, saying that Metsamor, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of Armenia’s annual energy production, should not be decommissioned before 2016. “I don’t consider its early closure justified,” he said. Petrosian added that Metsamor’s operational safety has been considerably boosted since 1995 with the financial and technical assistance of Western governments and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “They are very serious in taking safety measures. There has been no occasion of conflict between us and the authorities; they have been very cooperative,” Massoud Samiei, a senior IAEA official, had told RFE/RL in October 2002. Nonetheless, European Union experts believe that Metsamor’s light-water reactor is one the most dangerous of its kind and is vulnerable to nuclear disasters. The United States largely shares those concerns. The EU had secured in the late 1990s a tentative Armenian pledge to shut down Metsamor by 2004. But official Yerevan has repeatedly stated in recent years that it will not do so without putting in place an alternative source of cheap energy, something which will hardly happen in the near future. Metsamor’s closure has become even more unlikely after Russia’s state-run Unified Energy Systems utility was granted last month its five-year management in exchange for repaying its $40 million debts to Russian nuclear fuel suppliers. “The EU is much more demanding towards others than itself,” UES vice-chairman Andrei Rapoport said as he sealed the deal in Yerevan. According to Abakian, Russian nuclear energy officials and scientists draw encouragement from Armenia’s experience as they fight back Western attempts to have all Soviet-era nuclear plants in Eastern Europe decommissioned. He pointed to the fact that Metsamor is the only nuclear facility in the world that was reactivated after standing idle for six years. “When everyone around the world attacks us, we cite Armenia’s example,” he said. “We say, ‘See, they made an experiment and it worked.’”
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http://www.cenn.org/magazine_1/The_Armenian.html The article by Tigran Hovhannisyan says it all about Armenian Nuclear Plant. The Armenian Nuclear Plant Pros and Cons by Tigran Hovhannisyan The Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) is situated near the small town of Metsamor, 30 kilometers away from Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. Its construction was a fundamental part of the Soviet energy infrastructure. In the late 1960s, the need for a power source supporting the rapidly growing Armenian industry became obvious. The main source of energy in previous decades was the cascade of hydropower plants on the river Hrazdan. Unfortunately, due to excessive use of resources of the river Hrazdan - the main water supplier of Lake Sevan - the level of water in the lake decreased by 18 meters, noticeably changing the natural environmental balance of Armenia. In order to restore and maintain the level of the lake, an expensive tunnel was constructed through the mountains to connect the River Arpa with Lake Sevan. Why it was decided to construct a NPP rather than a new gas or oil pipeline is still unknown. However, there are rumors that this decision was taken due to the principles of the planned socialist economy in the South Caucasus. Basically, the region had to have its own plant, and since Heydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze were more influential in the Politburo of the Communist Party of the USSR, Azerbaijan and Georgia were spared the dubious honor of hosting it. Construction of the first and second units of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant was completed in 1976 and 1980 respectively. Both used pressurized water reactors of the type BBEP-440/B270 - a type similar to those operating at the Kozlodui NPP of Bulgaria. In addition to the standard design, additional features were incorporated into the construction, which allowed the primary circuit and safety systems to withstand an earthquake having a magnitude of up to 8.0 by the Richter scale. Quite soon, the Metsamor NPP reached one of the highest operation records in the Soviet Union, with 815 megawatts of generating capacity. It provided more than one quarter of Armenia's total power production, and created a noticeable surplus, which was exported to neighboring republics. The devastating Armenian earthquake of December 7, 1988 ruined the north of the country just in the beginning of Armenia's movement for independence, and in the midst of the ethnic conflict in Nagorno Artsax. The general opinion of the public was that it was impossible to operate the plant, which was situated in the seismic zone (9.0 by the Richter scale). Both reactors were closed down on January 6, 1989, although the plant was not damaged by the earthquake, and was operating safely. The events of the following five years developed rather unfavorably for Armenia. The conflict in Nagorno-Artsax grew into war, and an economic blockade by Armenias neighbors resulted in a catastrophic decrease in energy resources. From 1992 to 1995, Armenia was immersed in darkness; people had electricity one to two hours a day. The only functioning gas pipeline passed through Georgia, and internal political events there often were reflected in the gas supply to Armenia. However, the closing of the Metsamor NPP entailed other problems that could lead to an environmental catastrophe. The 550-megawatt Sevan-Hrazdan hydroelectric cascade again became the main supplier of electricity to Armenia. As a result, the level of Lake Sevan, which had barely increased by 1.2 meters in the 1980s, came down in less than a year. The water level again dropped below the ecologically safe limit. But when, in the beginning of 1990s, desperate people began to cut trees for heating their apartments in unprecedented cold winters, it was a real catastrophe. As a result, the forests and groves planted by the efforts of previous generations in the towns almost disappeared. The situation was more complicated in those regions where forest-cutting led to unprecedented soil erosion that altered the fragile balance between these territories and neighboring areas. Even the large-scale tree-planting campaigns of the last few years could restore only a small part of cut forest massifs. This critical situation forced the government of Armenia to restart the nuclear power station. It was a decision that was very uncharacteristic of the nuclear industry. The 407 megawatt second unit was restarted in April 1993, and since then has been operating under the constant control of international observers. However, the safety of the Metsamor NPP is a political rather than an environmental issue. Almost all neighboring states are concerned about the current condition of the Armenian NPP, and therefore each technical problem is the subject of sharp disputes. Even the assurances of the experts from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) working at the plant cannot prevent surges of articles in the mass media containing apocalyptic forecasts for the future of the region in the event of an accident at the NPP, as it was in Chernobyl. The reactor of the Armenian NPP fundamentally differs from the reactor of the Chernobyl NPP. The concerns of the Georgian media regarding this matter are acceptable, but until now no one has considered the consequences for Armenia, or even for Georgia, which imports electric power from the NPP, of shutting it down. As for Azerbaijan, accusations about contamination of the Azerbaijani Republic with nuclear waste from the Metsamor NPP appear almost every week. What are the current realities and how can Armenia handle present and future problems? Traditional energy resources (oil, coal and gas) either have not been discovered or do not exist at all on the territory of the republic. Therefore, Armenia depends on imports almost entirely - an unsafe reality due to the present conditions existing in the region. Even Armenia's successful solution of the energy crisis will not solve future problems: the emission of substances resulting in the "greenhouse effect" contradicts the spirit of the Rio Convention, which Armenia signed in order to pledge to minimize harmful impacts on the environment. Hydropower plants based on water resources have both limited opportunities and capabilities. If some new HPPs are constructed as planned, they will be able to meet the demands of their own district, but not of developing industry. In addition, these HPPs are subject to environmental concerns too, and can provoke negative comments from neighboring states. Alternative sources like wind, solar, and geothermal energy are considered to be the future sources of energy once they are developed enough to make these options economically feasible. However, during the next two decades, the environmental advantages of alternative sources will not be able to outweigh their high costs. After the earthquake in 1988, Armenia carried out experiments with solar and wind energy like no other state in the region, but the results were rather modest. Thus, if constructed, contemporary solar plants will be able to generate only 10% of the electricity needed in Armenia, and this energy will be much more expensive. In short, world experience shows that at present alternative sources of energy cannot generate the volume of electricity required for industry, but can be used as auxiliary power. Nuclear energy can generate much more electricity and has a great potential for growth. Statistics show that nuclear power plants provide 70-80% of the energy generated in developed countries. Uranium is easily transportable and environmentally acceptable if properly treated. However, it requires adherence to strict standards of safety. The problem of its utilization is a serious one even in developed countries. Public opinion polls carried out recently indicated that more than 70% of the Armenian population considers nuclear energy to be a major source of energy in the future. With all these pros and cons, Armenia has to build its energy policy for the coming decades in order to ensure its economic growth. The issue of adequate sources of energy is of vital importance for the well being of Armenia. The most realistic sources are first, traditional (oil and gas) resources, which will become possible after the development of a regional infrastructure, and second, nuclear power (with improved and safer reactors). Maintaining such a flexible balance and providing the opportunities both for solving current problems and ensuring development in the future is an urgent issue for Armenia. The understanding and assistance of neighboring countries in overcoming these problems will definitely help Armenia to pay more attention to environmental protection for the welfare of the whole region.
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Armenia needs the nuclear plant, to avoid the dark years of early ‘90s. I believe experts have estimated that it will cost Armenia $1 billion to build a new nuclear plant, equipped with best security measures. Considering the inhospitable geopolitical environment of Armenia, when 2 of its neighbors are openly hostile and one is not stable to guarantee the safety of transit fuel (remember the early ‘90s) I think it’s imperative for Armenia to become energy independent from its neighbors. The reason Armenian Nuclear Plant is considered a threat to US national security is the cordial relationship of Armenia and nuclear weapon seeking Iran. I think it was last year or a few years ago when Armenia signed an agreement about cooperation, which included cooperation in a military field. In fact one of the factories in Charentsavan was black listed by US last year for selling equipment to Iran that will help them in their goal of obtaining nuclear weapons. This can be considered warning to Armenian government to reconsider its incohesive and incompetent foreign policy, which was the brightest achievement of the previous administration. Actually a few days ago Aravot had an editorial about this subject. http://www.aravot.am/2003/aravot_arm/Octob...ober/18/p04.htm MJ building a gas pipeline from Iran through Armenia is gaining momentum as Armenian leadership realizes its importance to its national security. I guess one can hope "Better late than never". http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1134.html 10/22/03 Armenia terms transfer of gas from Iran significant Armenia`s Energy Minister Armen Movsisyan said in Yerevan on Wednesday that Yerevan attaches great significance to the project to transfer Iran`s gas to Armenia, and called for expediting the implementation of the project as soon as possible, IRNA reported. Movsisyan, speaking in a meeting with the visiting governor general of Iran`s East Azarbaijan province, said Yerevan is determined to cooperate with Iran on the project, stressing that Iranian officials have also pledged to provide all necessary assistance to make the project operational. He further stressed that Iran and Armenia have agreed to construct two units of a hydroelectric plant with a production capacity of 80 megawatts on the banks of the Aras River. Movsisyan added that Armenia would use Iran`s experience in constructing the plant. Elsewhere in his remarks, the Armenian energy minister said that Tehran and Yerevan are also considering to start a new project to transfer Iran`s electricity to Armenia. He said the project will come on stream in mid-2004, stressing that it will double Iran`s exports of electricity to Armenia. Movsisyan further stressed that Iran and Armenia signed a memorandum of understanding last year for the construction of a wind power plant, stressing that the construction of the plant will start next year.
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Is this a result of the incompetency of political elite of Armenia? http://www.bellona.no/en/international/rus...tion/31560.html Armenian nuclear plant threatens US security The United States has included the closure of the Armenian nuclear reactor in its plans for securing weapons of mass destruction for next year. 2003-10-22 13:51 According to a recent US State Department report, Armenia last year agreed with the US’ request to shut down its only reactor, which presents a grave environmental risk. According to the State Department, it has also become a risk for the national security of the US, which feels threatened by potential thefts of Armenian reactor materials and technology by international terrorists, Centran.ru, the Central-Asian news Internet site, reported. However, although the plant is slated for shutdown next year, the report does not specify how much money will be spent on the closure. Last year, US government agencies allocated $10.2m for security programmes in Armenia, said the website. Recently, the Armenian nuclear power plant was taken over by the Russian energy supply giant, RAO Unified Energy System of Russia, as part of Armenian debt redemption to Russia.
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Independence is a very noble idea, but it should serve a purpose of creating a strong state where citizens of Armenia can live and prosper. Allow me to paraphrase from American Declaration of Independence before you read the article from Armenianow.com "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security." So will anyone blame people of Armenia for overthrowing their usurpers? http://www.armenianow.com/2003/october10/outsideeye/ Sometimes it is the seemingly insignificant events that say the most about the living condition: Putting a new coat of polish on worn-out shoes; sweeping trash from a sidewalk that is hardly more than dirt itself; carrying yourself with dignity on your way to borrow money . . . Such things. We have a story this week that could be seen as insignificant, unless you look past the event itself and to the mentality that creates the environment in which such actions flourish. Some trees were uprooted from an Armenian hillside and replanted to decorate a Yerevan cafe. So what? So what, is that the trees were planted 30 years ago in an effort to filter the air and protect, via a "greenbelt", the environment. Now they are practically nothing but potted plants, likely to dry out and do little more than filter clouds of cigarette smoke from one of too many Yerevan cafes. So what, is that the person who put them there is the very appointed government official - the Minister of Protection of Nature - whose title should spell out pretty clearly the irony here. That Minister took 30 years of cultivated nature - significantly in this case, government property - probably damaged it, and turned it into window dressing for his wife's cafe. The official was clever enough to disguise the intentions of his action. He filled out papers saying the trees were going to be used for aesthetic enhancement of a government property in Kotayk. But two days after those papers were filed, the 15-to-20-foot silver spruces became landscaping for Mrs. Minister's central Yerevan cafe. So what? So what, is that an environmental protection group - the Union of Greens - found out about the transplanting and asked the General Prosecutor's Office to look into it. An investigator found that violations had occurred. I guess the fact that it involved an appointed official got somebody's attention, so the President was advised that his Minister of Nature Protection had arguably defiled his very title. The President told prosecutors to back off, answering their investigation with, in effect: "So what?" I came here from California, but I am not a tree hugger. I find it hard to get worked up over environmental issues because I generally find them arrogant suppositions that Mother Nature can't find a way to take care of herself - like, after billions of years she needs our puny help. This isn't about trees. It is a damn lot about the environment here, however. The environment here is that abuse of government-appointed power is seen as a privilege of the post, rather than a punishable offense. I wish this incident with the trees were the most egregious example of that fact. In any case, since it is our jumping off point on this occasion please indulge further examination of this "insignificant" occurrence. First, does anybody question how it is that prime property, i.e., cafe sites in one of the busiest parks in the capital, ends up owned by families who run the government? Does anybody question whether it is right that a pensioner in the city center can hardly find a park bench that isn't attached to the disco-deafening noise of a cafe? Or that a strolling family has no green space for introducing babies to nature because the green space has been overtaken by concrete and neon put up to entice business for the well-connected? Finally, is it too ironic that government officials/cafe owners cut down park trees to make room for their cafes, then uproot trees from government property to decorate them? Okay, okay. I won't unravel the whole socio-political ball of thread over this one. So what? It's just some trees, right?
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Since the above provided article is about Argentina, I think todays article in Toronto Star about demise of major industrial country of early 1900s is very interesting. http://www.torontostar.com/NASApp/cs/Conte...id=971358637177 A few lessons from Argentina Prior to last week's International Monetary Fund/World Bank annual meeting in Dubai, a new agreement between Argentina and the Fund was signed. Afterwards, the country proposed a restructuring deal to private bondholders that would see them forfeiting on average 75 per cent of the face value of their bonds and Nester Kirchner, Argentina's president, at a speech before the United Nations General Assembly a couple of days ago, said that it is not possible to obtain repayment from the "dead," sending the message that co-operation from creditors is critical for all sides. A century ago, Argentina was one of the most prosperous countries in the world, ahead of Canada and other current powerhouses. Immigrants flocked to the land of plenty and growth appeared unstoppable. Today, a tepid recovery is in place after the latest of many economic crises hit in late 2001. For the locals, the pattern is all too familiar. A period of progress unexpectedly interrupted, short period of chaos, quick, dramatic drop in standards of living and a modest recovery that holds until, predictably, the next unexpected event comes along. People in Argentina have been getting poorer for the last half-century and the trend is not changing. What went wrong? This question has fascinated some bright economic and political minds for a long time. I think it was Milton Friedman, Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences who said that coming out of the World War II, two peculiar economies should be noted. Japan, a devastated country, became an industrial nation. Argentina, a privileged country and major creditor to several of the combatants, squandered most of its wealth. Explaining it, he said, is very difficult. One clear reason is that Argentina was on the wrong side of the world in geopolitical terms. Its Spanish heritage was the substantive difference from other world powers of the day. Far from the action and culturally isolated from the mostly English-speaking dominant economies, it was just a matter of time before it was sidelined. Another reason is the reduction of value in its exporting goods. Food staples were once the main world commodities and viewed by Argentina as a continuous ticket to prosperity. With good climate, fertile soil, homogeneous population, away from troubled lands and social conflicts, riches came easy. The counterpart was a lukewarm attitude toward industrialization and a lack of commitment to make hard choices. While the immigrant waves of the early part of the last century, almost exclusively Europeans, strengthened the industrial base, industrialization never materialized except for isolated attempts during the mid 1900s. The world moved along the path of the Industrial Revolution and the value of food staples lessened. There was no answer to reverse the trend. I believe, however, that the decline has much deeper roots. The country actively participated in its demise. Even when all seemed right, Argentina managed to live beyond its means politically and economically. The country acted at times like an all-powerful entity without actually being one. It copied from some empires in history the "invincibility" belief and ran with it thoughtlessly for long stretches of time. Argentina believed its destiny was to lead Latin America. The Falklands War was a glaring example. An illegitimate government happily engaged a much superior military power. Like an idol with feet of clay, the state behaved reprehensibly toward certain segments of its own population. The target depended on the government of the day. While the Dirty War and the disappeared are now well-known, there is a long litany of internal misdeeds from the trivial to the tragic that prove the point. It is as if, upon arriving at a fork in the road, the country made the easy rather than the right choice most of the time and paid a heavy price in the process. And yet, the country has great potential, with promising, talented people, always on the verge of getting back on the road to prosperity. The current economic recovery has come with some strengthening of the democratic institutions and an apparent resolve to address fundamental issues. Not that all is well or that past mistakes will not be repeated. On the contrary, many years of tough decisions lie ahead and there is a high likelihood that the vicious cycle might be repeated. There are some lessons for Canada here. The countries share some similarities: an expansive land; a small and mostly urban population; a large percentage of immigrants; and a reliance on natural resources. While differences also abound, like Argentina we are always only a few wrong decisions away from following its path. To avoid it, fiscal and political responsibilities must be respected and our cultural, ethnic and religious diversity must continue to be embraced, nurtured, treasured. When the U.S. runs enormous deficits, fiscal complacency might sound acceptable. As basic freedoms come under attack in the U.S. in the name of fighting terrorism, it might be tempting to follow the same path. But with new leaders coming into office at all levels of government, Argentina's fate is well worth remembering.
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A very reputable magazine The Deal had an article about the economy of Argentina, and that prompted me to make some comparisons between Argentina and Armenia, and first of all about the foreign investment. The example of Argentina shows that even though capital flight has its bad consequences, there are some positives in it too. It allows local capital, which is more stable and won't leave at first signs of trouble and instability as it happened in some Latin American and East Asian countries, to be more entrenched in the country. Instead of wooing foreign capital to the country at any cost I think developing business climate and infrastructure is more essential. The current saga of ArmenTel is a great example of flaws of privatization and it's consequences of foreign ownership. As welcoming as Armenians look toward foreign capital I don't think it should be viewed as white knight of Armenian economy. The people of Republic of Armenia, not Diasporans, or foreigners should be the integral part of rebuilding the country. Interesting article I think it's an interesting one. As foreigners flee, Argentines buy by Leslie M. Mira in Buenos Aires Posted 03:04 EST, 2, Oct 2003 Pundits have dubbed it the "Argentinization" of Argentina's economy — the slow but steady acquisition by Argentines of foreign-owned companies, many of which plunged into insolvency after the country's currency, the peso, became unglued from the dollar last year With president Nestor Kirchner nursing their country back from an 11% fall in GDP last year, Argentines have become white-knight investors, buying cheap assets in sectors including telecommunications, banking, Internet and media from fleeing foreign investors. Most recently, on Sept. 9, Grupo W., owned by Argentina's agriculture-producing Werthein family, announced it would buy a 48% stake of France Télécom SA's share of Telecom Argentina for $135 million. Local entrepreneurs are the logical successors as they best understand the economic and political uncertainties (Argentina last year had five presidents in less than a month). "They're more comfortable with the risk," observes Alex Kook, an M&A attorney with Baker & McKenzie's Buenos Aires office. "They don't panic or get scared, and they're looking for long-term opportunities." The flurry of purchases by Argentines contrasts sharply to the exuberant 1990s, when foreign investors — led by Spaniards and French — invested billions in Argentina's key telecom, natural gas and oil assets. Now many have cut their losses. Canada's Scotiabank, which last year took after-tax charges of C$540 million ($399 million) on Argentina losses, sold its 91 Scotiabank Quilmes branches to two Argentine-owned companies, Banco Bansud SA and Banco Comafi. Terms of the sale were not disclosed. Two other Argentine groups, Banco Banex and Grupo Roggio, are in line to bid for the assets of the Argentine operations of Crédit Agricole SA, which is selling majority stakes in three provincial banks, Banco Suquia, Banco Bisel and Banco Bersa. Citing currency losses, the French bank pulled out in May 2002, and a government-led auction is expected to name the winners later this year. Last year Argentine media celebrity Daniel Hadad and other local investors bought Argentina's Canal 9 from Spanish-owned Telefónica SA for a reported $30 million. And Datco SA, an Argentine-owned Internet technology company with operations in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, last year bought the Argentine subsidiaries of broadband operators Velocom Inc. and Winstar Communications Inc. Argentine-owned companies "will have a better grasp of the politics and enjoy a higher degree of social acceptance compared to foreigners," says Raphael Ber, a consultant with Argentine Research. But the local buyers face plenty of challenges, too, he adds. "These are banks which aren't very competitive," he notes, adding that their relatively small scale will generate higher costs compared with their larger competitors. "They'll be limited by how much capital they'll have to invest in their operations." Foreigners have also been lured by bargain Argentine assets, especially risk-acclimated Latin Americans. Last year Brazilian-owned Petróleo Brasileiro SA bought Perez Companc SA's natural gas and oil interests for $1 billion. Pending debt restructuring negotiations, Mexican-owned América Móvil SA de CV and other investors are angling to buy a stake of cellular phone company CTI Móvil SA, which Verizon Communications Inc. opted to ditch after the cell-phone operator defaulted on $1.1 billion in debt. But Argentine companies are leveraging their local advantages to thwart outsiders, Ber says. Indeed, some view the Werthein family's purchase of most of France Télécom's Argentine assets as a move to stymie Teléfonos de México SA de CV's entrance into Argentina. Telmex is controlled by Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, who also controls América Móvil, and is aggressively expanding throughout Latin America. France Télécom's departure is partly rooted in local politics. Kirchner, a stern critic of the International Monetary Fund, has stonewalled pleas from the IMF, France Télécom and other utilities to increase rates, which have gone unchanged since the January 2002 peso devaluation. Kirchner has said Argentines cannot afford to pay higher telephone or electricity rates. Publicly, Grupo W. has toed a line sympathetic to Kirchner's. In an interview with local newspaper Pagina 12, Gerardo Werthein, director of the group, said telecom executives will "first have to see if a [rate] adjustment is necessary, and if so, how much." "This sounds more like a government official and less like an operator," says Enrique Carrier, a telecom analyst with Carrier y Asociados. "For the moment, this takes pressure off the issue of higher phone rates." If Argentines can gather the capital, there will likely be more chances to shop. Electricité de France, which owns Argentine electricity company Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad de Mendoza SA, is considering leaving Argentina unless customers start paying their bills, a spokeswoman said. Debtors include the provincial government of Mendoza, which owes $30 million to EdF, according to the company. "The message is 'Argentina is recuperating, and locals want to invest,'" Carrier says. "For the government, it's a vote of confidence that Argentines are able to buy distressed companies."
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I don't know how to post Armenian fonts, but I'll post the link to the article in today's Aravot edition, which had an interesting editorial about Vahan Hovhannisyan and "Dro". Here is the link http://www.aravot.am/2003/aravot_arm/Octob...ravot_index.htm
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For those of you who are fluent in Russian, I think the article in this website answers some questions about emigration from Armenia. http://www.caucasusjournalists.net/item.asp?id=32
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People immigrate for many reasons, some for economic, others for political and social. First immigrants from Soviet Armenia were expatriates (local Armenians used to call them Akhpar) who moved to Armenia after the World War II. The cultural clash between the locals and the expatriates, led to resentment and ridicule of expatriates. It’s sad and tragic that local population did not embrace the expatriates as gracefully; as many expatriates thought they’d be greeted. Many had the rosy picture of Armenia, and were disappointed to find it poor and in poverty. These people took the first chance to leave Armenia, and that started the first immigration wave from Armenia in late 70’s. In early 90’s when Soviet Union collapsed it became a lot easier to immigrate. Many escaped the collapsing economy and war (I personally belong to this group). Most of the people that lived in Armenia in early 90’s remember the “hovharayin anjatumner”, where we had only 2-3 hours of electricity each day. When it was so cold you could barely feel your fingers, when people had to burn books to warm up. Those were the times when the endurance of people’s tolerance of inhumane conditions was tested. Some of us were not able to pass the test and took the road of immigration. Most went to Russia, the lucky ones to the West. No it’s not the government that was at fault, it was the loss of hope that things will get better that prompted people to leave their country. There is this saying in Russian “Nadezhda umeraet poslednim”, “i v te vremena u nas uzhe nadezhdi ne bilo”. It basically translates to “Hopes die last”, and at the time there was no hope for anything. Yes it’s a noble thing to endure hardships, and read about victories in military fields in books and newspapers, but it’s another thing to live through it. No one can blame Armenian immigrants for immigrating. When I first moved to US, many American-Armenians blamed me for leaving Armenia. My response was usually the following, “Menk ayskan tari hayrenkum aprel enk, hayrenik karucel, hima el mi kich duk gnacek hayreniki kaghcrutyun@ zgacek”. It’s great to advise people to commit noble deeds, and to endure hardships, but it’s another thing to actually do the noble thing and live through hardships. So to those who say why I came my answer would be, “there was no hope in the future”. I wanted to do something with my life and I couldn’t make my dreams come true in Armenia.
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Very interesting article about the failures of Bush Administratiion. The surprising part is that it was printed in conservative Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...ml?nav=hptoc_eo Why the CEO in Chief Needs an Audit By Richard Cohen Thursday, July 10, 2003; Page A23 The Bush White House is run on a business model. The president is the CEO. He delegates to others, including the vice president, who was once a CEO himself. It therefore should come as no surprise that George W. Bush, a Harvard MBA after all, is doing what other CEOs do when they get into trouble. In his case, he's "restated" his reasons for going to war. Corporations do this all the time. If a profit of, say, $2.8 billion turns out to be a loss of a similar amount on account of unanticipated developments (corruption, greed, the demands of mistresses), the figure merely gets "restated." Usually no one is held responsible for this, because a billion here or a billion there can, as we know, fall through the cracks. In fact, the CEO -- having been given a bonus for such a banner year -- is then given another one for managing his company through difficult times. In the same way, the president recently restated some of the reasons for invading Iraq. Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program, which Bush told the world was being "reconstituted," may in fact not exist. The White House the other day restated its earlier insistence that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from the West African nation of Niger. It turned out that the supporting documents had been forged. The White House admitted that in a press release left behind after Bush had departed for Africa. Similarly, the accusation that Iraq was buying high-strength aluminum tubes, which Bush said were "used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons," has to be restated. The tubes appear to have been bought for another purpose entirely and may not be high-strength after all. As for the charge that Iraq was bristling with other weapons of mass destruction, none have yet been found, raising the distinct possibility that -- in an upcoming quarter -- this too will be restated and the Bush administration will take a one-time charge against future credibility. In fact, should we -- the stockholders of this operation -- look back at the original business plan for the proposed Bush administration, we will find that almost everything has been restated. During the campaign, Bush said he would not go in for peacekeeping operations abroad. He appears ready to do so in Liberia. He also said he would not get engaged, as did the previous CEO, Bill Clinton, in the nitty-gritty of Middle East peace negotiation. The administration is now choosing intersections in Gaza for traffic lights. Restatement follows restatement until we poor stockholders have no choice but to conclude that either the Bush administration did not know what it was talking about when it came into office or does not know what it is talking about now. Not even in corporate America can you hold two contradictory positions simultaneously. One of them, as any CEO can tell you, has to be restated. The Bush administration's interim business plan called for the capture or killing of Osama bin Laden. On account of a botched operation in the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan, this now has to be restated. Similarly, the proclaimed determination to rid the world of Saddam Hussein also has not succeeded. As with bin Laden, this failure will be restated as not being all that important. You learn this sort of thing in business school. In fact, the entire business plan for Iraq has to be restated. It turns out that the country simply will not govern itself, that some elements resent the U.S. occupation and that it will take more troops to administer the country than originally thought. In some way, this abject failure to plan for an occupation -- despite repeated warnings -- will have to be creatively restated. To paraphrase the president, bring on the restatement. The dangers of an immense budget deficit have been restated. Rising unemployment has been restated to blame the Clinton administration. The critical importance of relations with Mexico has been restated. The evils of affirmative action were -- after the Supreme Court ruled -- restated and so, of course, were the reasons for going to war in Iraq. Now it is to rid that country of Saddam Hussein and establish the predicates for a Middle East peace. I like them both. Still, all these restatements suggest a business plan that was both flawed from the start and implemented with an appalling level of incompetence. Despite that, the CEO of this mismanaged operation is not held accountable and remains popular with the shareholders. It used to be that the buck stopped with the president. To state the obvious, that's been restated. © 2003 The Washington Post Company
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This was sent to me by an associate that works in Washington. I thought you'd find it interesting. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts This paper was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. Prepared under the direction of the National Intelligence Council. http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/globaltren...2015/index.html
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I think this will have serious implications in regional security of Caucasus. The presence of US forces in Azerbaijan and Russian forces in Armenia puts two Cold War foes against each other once again. June 10, 2003 6:37 a.m. EDT WSJ In a Massive Shift, U.S. Plans To Reduce Troops in Germany By GREG JAFFE Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon plans to significantly shrink the U.S. force of 70,000 troops in Germany, a military stronghold for half a century, and put far more American forces in Africa and the Caucasus region. The push -- part of the most radical redeployment of American forces since the end of the Cold War -- is driven by the increasing importance that the U.S. is placing on protecting key oil reserves in Africa and the Caucasus region near the Caspian Sea, as well as addressing concerns about combating terrorism. Pentagon officials say they expect final decisions to be made in the coming months and that troops could begin moving in about a year. The moves come in the wake of Germany's opposition to the war in Iraq and are likely to be interpreted as a rebuke of Berlin. Pentagon officials, however, said the moves aren't related to Germany's antiwar stance and noted that the Germans didn't place any major restrictions on the U.S. troops operating from that country during the war to topple Saddam Hussein. Indeed the Pentagon is reluctant to cut the size of its force in Europe too much out of concern that it might lose its leading status within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Retaining our leadership of NATO is very important. We need to have a number [of troops] in Europe that gives us that status," Gen. Charles Wald, deputy commander of U.S. European Command, said. In the Caucasus region, defense officials said the U.S. is likely to have as many as 15,000 troops, some rotating through small, spartan bases in places such as Azerbaijan. Most of them, however, would move through larger, but still relatively bare-bones facilities in Romania and Bulgaria near ports on the Black Sea. "In the Caspian Sea you have large mineral reserves. ... We want to be able to assure the long-term viability of those resources," Gen. Wald said. In Africa, the defense officials said, the U.S. could increase its presence to as many as 5,000 to 6,500 troops from about 1,500 Marines and special-operations soldiers currently based in Djibouti. The troops would use as many as a dozen semipermanent bases in Africa. U.S. officials also expect to maintain about 5,000 to 10,000 troops in Poland, where they have access to large training ranges without the same environmental restrictions that have made training in Germany increasingly hard. The increases in Africa, eastern Europe and the Caucasus are likely to come at the expense of Germany and to a lesser extent Britain, where the U.S. will consolidate its forces. U.S. officials say they are looking at pulling Army soldiers from big garrison bases. In particular, Army forces in the German cities of Heidelburg, Wiesbaden, Grafenwöhr and Würzburg, are all likely to see their numbers reduced. The local economies are likely to suffer from those reductions. "It is definitely going to get smaller" and some of the changes will take place "fairly quick," Gen. Wald said of the Army presence in Germany. But the expense might limit the speed and scope of the redeployments. The Pentagon already plans to spend $11 billion over four years shifting U.S. troops and upgrading defenses on the Korean peninsula. The changes in Europe, which involve far more troops, are likely to cost even more. "All of this stuff sounds good. But no one has put a price tag on any of it," one senior military official said. In contrast to Korea, where South Korean officials are paying part of the bill, the U.S. forces shifting away from Western Europe can't expect allies to pick up much of the tab. Some Pentagon officials said that early plans called for reducing the Army's presence, which accounts for the vast majority of the 70,000 troops in Germany, by as much as 75%. Gen. Wald said final decisions haven't been made and that several options are still being considered. One big strike against the German bases is that they are landlocked. The Pentagon is especially keen on shifting U.S. ground forces toward ports, where they can quickly be loaded onto fast-moving ships. U.S. officials also complain that environmental regulations at large German training ranges have made it difficult for forces to conduct realistic exercises. One of those ranges, for instance, has been reclassified as a European Union environmental-protection zone to protect rare plants and animals. Despite the restrictions, some German facilities have proved so useful that they will be retained. In particular, military officials say that Ramstein Air Base, in southern Germany, will remain a critical air hub. The U.S. European Command, based in Stuttgart, also isn't likely to move. Key air hubs in Italy and Spain are also unlikely to be downsized. In Africa, virtually all of the facilities where the U.S. is looking at establishing a presence will require infrastructure improvements. In North Africa, Pentagon officials are looking at establishing semipermanent bases in Algeria, Morocco and possibly Tunisia. The U.S. expects to keep a small number of troops at these facilities and then rotate through a larger force. It is considering smaller, more-austere bases in Senegal, Ghana, Mali and Kenya. U.S. officials said that a key mission for U.S. forces would be to ensure that Nigeria's oil fields, which in the future could account for as much as 25% of all U.S. oil imports, are secure. Prior to the buildup for the war to oust the regime in Baghdad, the U.S. had about 4,000 to 5,000 troops in Saudi Arabia enforcing the southern no-fly zone in Iraq. Now, as part of a world-wide shift, some of those troops will be moved to Qatar and others will return to the U.S. Similarly, the U.S. had about 3,000 Air Force personnel at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey enforcing the northern no-fly zone. The U.S. expects to retain about 500 troops there. But the ultimate size of the force may depend on what kind of assurances the Turks, who balked at allowing the U.S. to stage ground troops or fly missions from their soil, give the U.S. regarding troops in the future. Late last week, senior Bush administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, met with Kyrgyzstan's foreign minister, Askar Aitmatov, about the U.S. military's growing presence in that country. The Kyrgyz minister came to Washington seeking greater military aid and assurances that the U.S. would step up reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan following the war there. "We expressed our concerns with the deteriorating situation in that country," Mr. Aitmatov said of his meeting with Mr. Cheney.
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Isn't it idiotic that members of ruling elite describe the whole nation as immature, in order to justify their failures and imcompetence. http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniarepor...A49D1C4BEB4.ASP Armenians ‘Not Yet Ready’ For Western Democracy, Election Chief Says By Karine Kalantarian Armenian society has not yet matured enough to hold elections meeting Western standards for democracy, the head of Armenia’s Central Election Commission (CEC) claimed on Monday in another bid to rationalize serious irregularities reported during the recent presidential vote. Artak Sahradian echoed Robert Kocharian’s earlier complaints that the West, which has strongly criticized his reelection, is too strict in assessing Armenia’s commitment to liberal democracy. Sahradian said bluntly that it is “absurd” to expect an election not marred by vote rigging from a nation that has been independent for only 11 years and had for decades been part of the Soviet empire. “The society itself should develop and reach that level,” he told a seminar in Yerevan. “Believe me, it is impossible to bring it [to that level] artificially.” The seminar, organized by the Council of Europe, focused on ways of improving electoral practices that have long thwarted Armenia’s democratization and tarnished its image in the West. Sahradian claimed that despite the chronic electoral fraud, the country is slowly but steadily moving towards the standards it pledged to respect when it joined the Strasbourg-based organization in January 2001. The disputed presidential election marked another step in that direction, he added. A joint observer mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) concluded that the vote, held in two rounds on February 19 and March 5, fell short of democratic standards. The observers reported “widespread” ballot box stuffing and other “serious” irregularities. While admitting “numerous” violations of the law during the voting and counting processes, Kocharian insists that those had no impact on the official outcome of the election. He has also complained that the Western observers standards for a clean vote were too stringent for a country like Armenia. Sahradian, like other senior Armenian officials, argued that they reported significant irregularities only from 13 percent of polling stations they visited during the March 5 run-off. The OSCE/PACE mission called it a “disturbingly high figure,” in its final election report issued last week.
