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CaliforniaCourier.com Assistant to the Azerbaijani military attache in the United States is arrested for gold smuggling in Turkey · DECEMBER 2, 2024 BAKU (Tass) — Gahraman Mammadov, senior adviser to the Azerbaijani military attache in the United States, was detained by Turkish law enforcement agencies on suspicion of gold smuggling, a criminal case was opened against him at home and an arrest sentence was passed. This was reported by the State Security Service (SSS) of Azerbaijan. According to the ministry, “substantial suspicions were revealed” that Mammadov, in collusion with another Azerbaijani citizen Anar Gasimov and foreign citizens, participated in the smuggling of gold from the United Arab Emirates to Turkey. Using a diplomatic passport, he carried gold bars brought from the UAE by Gasimov through the customs border of the two countries without declaration, but was detained by Turkish law enforcement agencies when he was heading to a hotel in Istanbul by taxi. “During the inspection of the bag that was with Mammadov, 70 kg of gold bars with a total value of more than 10.220 million manats (more than $6 million) were found and confiscated.” The report notes that during the investigation, another package with gold bars weighing 14 kg was found in the storage of the Istanbul airport, which also did not pass the customs declaration procedure. According to information, within the framework of the criminal case being investigated by the State Security Service of Azerbaijan, a criminal case has been opened against Mammadov under a number of articles of the country’s criminal code providing for liability for smuggling and abuse of official authority, the Baku Military Court has chosen a preventive measure in the form of arrest against him. https://www.thecaliforniacourier.com/assistant-to-the-azerbaijani-military-attache-in-the-united-states-is-arrested-for-gold-smuggling-in-turkey/?fbclid=IwY2xjawG82UJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHbdoLYh1vQ2Gxft7E2aVO7S35SaegIeN0A1lgvcuXW_gc85xFg6gbZF3Bg_aem_V8nvKRBq

Armenpress.am Near East09:53, 3 December 2024 Iraqi fighters head to Syria to battle rebels but Lebanon's Hezbollah stays out – Reuters Read the article in: ՀայերենРусский 3 minute read YEREVAN, DECEMBER 3, ARMENPRESS. Hundreds of Iran-backed Iraqi fighters crossed into Syria on Monday to help the government fight rebels who seized Aleppo last week, but Lebanon's Hezbollah has no plans for now to join them, Reuters reported citing sources. Iran's constellation of allied regional militia groups, aided by Russian air power, has been integral to the success of pro-government forces in subduing rebels in Syria who rose up against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011, according to Reuters. The rebel storm of Aleppo is the biggest success of anti-Assad fighters for years. Government forces had held complete control of Aleppo since capturing what was then Syria's largest city in a siege in 2016, one of the major turning points of a war that has killed hundreds of thousands of people. The head of Syria's main opposition group abroad, Hadi al-Bahra, told Reuters the rebels were able to seize the city so quickly because Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups were distracted by their conflict with Israel. Preparations had been made since last year for an assault on Aleppo, but it was held up by the war in Gaza, he said. Syria's civil war had been frozen since 2020, with Assad in control of most territory and all major cities. Rebels still held an enclave in the northwest, Turkey-backed forces held a strip along the northern border and U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led forces controlled a pocket in the northeast. Iraqi and Syrian sources confirmed the deployment of more Iran-backed Iraqi fighters to Syria. Iran's Foreign Minister said Tehran "will provide any support needed" and that "resistance groups" would come to Assad's aid. At least 300 fighters, primarily from Iraq's Badr and Nujabaa groups, crossed late on Sunday using a dirt road to avoid the official border crossing, two Iraqi security sources said, adding that they were there to defend a Shi'ite shrine. A senior Syrian military source said the fighters had crossed in small groups to avoid airstrikes. "These are fresh reinforcements being sent to aid our comrades on the front lines in the north," the source said. Published by Armenpress, original at https://armenpress.am/en/article/1206510?fbclid=IwY2xjawG8zuFleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHX5QwHGz2pF2_MdEdkWqcmKruPQo5d_OopruvYmMKKDkowq8GElaUZZwMg_aem_KZ2l-X48dcQPVnC-deg4YQ

JSTOR Daily Oct 16, 2024 The Genocide Before the Shoah For a century, Jews in Turkey have maintained a strategic silence when it comes to recognizing the Armenian genocide. Could that be changing? Armenian refugees, 1920 via Wikimedia Commons By: Türkay Salim Nefes When it comes to acknowledging the Armenian genocide of 1915, Turkish Jews have navigated a delicate balance. It is impossible to understand this approach without a nuanced exploration of memory, political attitudes, and identity. With my colleagues Özgür Kaymak and Doğan Gürpınar, I have endeavored to do just that; earlier this year we published a study examining how Jews in Turkey have both engaged with historical tragedies and have also adopted the state ideology vis-à-vis the Armenians. We conducted in-depth interviews with fourteen members of the Turkish Jewish community. Our conversations illuminated the influence of the so-called Kayades mindset, which is characterized by discretion and alignment with official narratives. Indeed, it is a defining feature of Turkish Jewish identity in contrast with the so-called Avlaremoz mindset, which is characterized by engagement and solidarity with other marginalized groups. The Avlaremoz mindset challenges prevailing narratives, including official rhetoric denying historic Turkish mistreatment of Armenians. Below are key insights our research revealed. Historical Context and Community Dynamics The history of Jews in Turkey, much like that of the Armenians there, is marked by alternating phases of peaceful coexistence and conflict with the majority Turks. During the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922), both communities were classified as “protected minorities,” or dhimmis, as they came to be known in the fifteenth century. As non-Muslim subjects, most Armenians, who adhered to the Armenian Apostolic Church, were granted limited autonomy in exchange for paying a special tax in addition to other conditions. In the Empire, Armenians and Jews largely lived parallel lives, maintaining their own distinct communal, religious, and cultural practices. Overall, these two minority communities were not strong allies, nor were they antagonists. If their shared status fostered any sense of mutual understanding, it didn’t translate into a close-knit bond. Over centuries, Armenians and Jews in Turkey interacted mainly out of necessity, thriving independently and without nurturing any particular sense of fellowship. The Kayades mindset, with its strategic silence and go-along-to-get-along tactics, has pervaded the Jewish community since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Turkish nationalism drastically changed the circumstances of Armenians and Jews alike. At the same time, the rise of Armenian nationalism and the pursuit of an independent state intensified hostility and conflict in the Empire. In 1915, the Ottoman government initiated a systematic campaign against its Armenian residents, beginning with the arrest and execution of more than 200 intellectuals and community leaders in Istanbul. This was followed by the administration of mass deportations. Historian Mark Levene estimates that these events led to the deaths of between 600,000 and over a million Armenians; before 1915, the population was 1.5 million. While many historians and countries recognize what the Turks visited upon the Armenians as genocide, within Turkey, that term remains deeply contested. Indeed, the state officially denies this classification, and in its denial perpetuates a complex and often painful historical debate. Official population statistics for non-Muslim minorities in modern Turkey have not been recorded since 1965. Nonetheless, current estimates suggest that around 14,500 Jews live in the country today, a marked decline from 1914, when census data from the Ottoman regime indicates that there were some 128,000 Jews, descended predominantly from those who fled the Iberian Peninsula in 1492. By 1965, their ranks had fallen to 38,000. A similar pattern is observed among the Armenian minority, whose numbers fell sharply from 1,204,000 in 1914 to 64,000 by 1965. For Turkish Jews, the struggle for acceptance in a predominantly Muslim country has been fraught with challenges. Discriminatory policies, such as the Wealth Tax of 1942, targeted Jews alongside other non-Muslim minorities, mainly Greeks and Armenians, fostering a collective sense of vulnerability. This shared experience didn’t produce significant solidarity between these cohorts; they continued to lead parallel lives, much as they had during the Ottoman period. Experiences in modern Turkey shaped the collective identity and political strategies of Turkish Jewry, contributing to the emergence of the aforementioned distinct mindsets: the Kayades and the Avlaremoz. The Kayades mindset, with its strategic silence and go-along-to-get-along tactics, has prevailed in the Jewish community since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Rooted in the Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) word for “keeping quiet” or “minding one’s own business,” this approach reflects a pragmatic attempt to maintain a low profile and avoid conflict with the majority population. Adherents to this strategy emphasize their loyalty to the Turkish state, participating in official efforts to deny the Armenian genocide. Historian Eldad Ben Aharon has described the Turkish Jewish elite, who since the 1970s have lobbied against the recognition of the Armenian genocide in the United States, as informal ambassadors for Turkey. This stance may be seen as a protective reflex, born of necessity to preserve community safety and status, writes Ben Aharon; it has largely succeeded. In our research, a member of the Turkish Jewish community described this pragmatic approach as “a silent agreement: We will not interfere in state affairs, we will focus on doing well in trade and live quietly without creating trouble.” A pivotal calamity in Jewish history, the Holocaust has come to influence profoundly how Turkish Jews perceive the Armenian genocide. In contrast, since the late 2010s, the Avlaremoz mindset has emerged particularly among younger Turkish Jews who advocate for a more vocal and critical engagement with contemporary political and social issues. Encapsulated in the Ladino phrase meaning “we will speak,” this perspective challenges the traditional silence and addresses broader issues of minority rights. The Avlaremoz mindset promotes solidarity with other marginalized groups and calls for a reevaluation of Turkey’s official narratives, including the one which denies absolutely the Armenian genocide. One individual whom we interviewed expressed this evolving attitude as follows: “Silence is somewhat broken. This is not easy for the generation of my parents. It is against the official stance of the community. Perhaps now, it could be overcome.” The Shadow of the Holocaust A pivotal calamity in Jewish history, the Holocaust has come to influence profoundly how Turkish Jews perceive the Armenian genocide. Predictably, the memory of the Holocaust engenders a deep sensitivity to any discussions about it. However, this sensitivity manifests in contrasting ways. The Holocaust’s central place in Jewish identity can lead to competitive victimhood, where any acknowledgement of the suffering of one group is perceived as diminishing the recognition of and importance of another’s. This dynamic complicates the acknowledgment of any genocide other than the Holocaust, including that of Armenians. “I place the Armenian genocide in the context of a period dominated by the conflicts of nationalistic movements,” said one member of the Turkish Jewish community. “Unlike the Holocaust, it is not rooted in the Turks considering themselves racially superior; it is more political and religious in nature. Nevertheless, was there a genocide? Yes.” An Evolving Future In his discussion of how in-group solidarity and identity can influence the acceptance or rejection of knowledge about suffering, sociologist Joachim Savelsberg highlights that the struggle over genocide recognition is ongoing and will continue to be shaped by both global human rights norms and local political dynamics. The Turkish Jewish community’s internal debates and evolving attitudes serve as a microcosm of the broader societal shifts in Turkey, illustrating the processes through which collective memory and historical justice are negotiated and redefined. By examining these dynamics, future studies may offer further insights into the potential for historical reconciliation in Turkey. The significance of this exploration into Turkish Jewish perspectives extends beyond the historical and sociopolitical context of Turkey. It underscores the dynamics of how minorities navigate identities, historical traumas, and political pressures. The Turkish Jewish community in particular faces the challenge of balancing historical experiences, such as the Holocaust, with the prevailing state narratives around the genocide of the Armenians. On the one hand, there is an implicit expectation to conform with the state’s conviction; on the other, Turkish Jews confront the difficult reality of Holocaust denial. This illustrates the intricate ways minority communities must navigate their own histories while engaging with national and global discourses on historical injustices. Examining the nuanced responses of Turkish Jews demonstrates the challenges communities face in reconciling their own histories with national narratives. Understanding these dynamics can inform international efforts to promote human rights and foster intercommunal solidarity in heterogeneous societies. https://daily.jstor.org/the-genocide-before-the-shoah/

Transitions, Czech Rep. Dec 3 2024 What’s Next for Armenia? by Arshaluys Barseghyan As Georgia-EU relations decline after Georgian Dream backtracks on EU integration, where does this leave Armenia as the region’s only state with serious EU aspirations? From OC Media. Since the 26 October Georgian parliamentary elections, which were found by both local and international observers to have had serious violations, Georgian Dream has solidified their hold on the government and has continued to turn its back on the West. The prospect has led to some doubts in how far Armenia may be able to push its own EU aspirations. Tigran Grigoryan, a political analyst and the head of the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think-tank, foresees a shift in Armenia’s proactive Western approach but no “serious crisis” in relations with the West. “At his latest press conference, Pashinyan hinted that the outcome of the Georgian elections could impact Armenia’s foreign policy decision-making. This means that if [Georgian Dream] remains in power in Georgia, it is likely that Yerevan will tone down its pro-Western rhetoric,” wrote Grigoryan on X, the day of the Georgian elections. Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior research fellow at the APRI Armenia think tank, also noted before the elections that if Georgian Dream won, it would mean a continued “drift away from the West” and that if Donald Trump in turn came to power in the U.S., that American involvement in the South Caucasus “might decrease.” “In this scenario, Armenia might have to readjust its foreign policy and relations with regional powers, perhaps considering cooperation with non-Western organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS,” wrote Poghosyan. In an interview with CivilNet on 31 October, Grigoryan highlighted that even before the Georgian elections, he observed shifts in the Armenian ruling power’s rhetoric and actions, noticing “a certain balancing.” Among such actions was Armenia’s participation in October in the BRICS summit in Russia and in the 3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform in Turkey, organizations Poghosyan also noted in his analysis. With Georgian Dream’s victory, Grigoryan believes that an emphasis will now be placed on regulating the relations with Armenia’s immediate neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, with a much greater motivation to reach a peace agreement with Azerbaijan “at all costs.” “In this situation, Armenia once again finds itself in isolation. If for the past 20 years, Armenia was the only country seeking closer relations with Russia, now the opposite picture is emerging. Armenia is the only country [in the region] that seems to want to have closer relations with the West,” Grigoryan told Civilnet. Similarly, Poghosyan argued in an interview from 29 October that it would be “very challenging” for Armenia to become the only “pro-Western country” in the South Caucasus and to “bring the West into the South Caucasus” because this might put Armenia against all regional powers. This, in turn, could create “very negative implications for Armenia,” which suffered defeat and remains “significantly vulnerable for potential new Azerbaijani attacks,” in addition to dealing with an unresolved normalization process with Turkey. A Bridge Connecting the South Caucasus to the EU? During the pre-election campaign, Georgian opposition leaders were vocal about the possible impact a Georgian Dream victory could have on European integration, seeking to attract Armenian voters. Two days before the election, the third president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili wrote in Armenian on Facebook, telling the Georgian-Armenian community that “the existence of our neighbor Armenia, as well as the fate of peace in the Caucasus, depends on Georgia’s return to the European path.” Prior to this, at the end of September, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili stated that Armenia “needs a Georgian bridge” in its European aspirations. “After the elections on 26 October, either Georgia will return to its European path, I am sure of this […], or Georgia will no longer exist, and this will be a tragedy not only for us, but also for neighboring Armenia, which is developing in the same direction and which needs a Georgian bridge, and this will be a tragedy for the Caucasus and the representation of Europe in this region,” Zourabichvili said. However, Sergey Lagodinsky, a member of the European Parliament representing Germany, told Armenian reporters the day prior to the Georgian elections that Armenia could turn into that bridge, despite finding itself “in a tough situation if there is further negative development in Georgia.” The “situation might create unique chances for Armenia, as the country could become some sort of a bridge connecting the EU with the South Caucasus [politically], as well as with the whole region to the east,” Lagodinsy said. Unlike Lagodinsky, Stefan Meister – the head of the Centre for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations – told OC Media that because of its geographic location as a landlocked country, Armenia cannot replace Georgia. Moreover, Meister did not see “such a pro-European or transatlantic-oriented society” in Armenia, as compared to Georgia. “For Armenia in its current geopolitical and security situation, it is as much important to have good relations with its other neighbors, especially Iran but also Turkey. That will limit its role as a bridge to Europe,” Meister told OC Media, adding that he could imagine Armenia becoming “a hub for civil society in the region if the government can guarantee safety of people.” Is EU Integration Still Possible? Peter Stano, a spokesperson for the European Commission’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, told OC Media that each country in the region “has its role to play.” “The bilateral partnerships the EU develops are about the partners concerned and not an instrument to use to ‘replace’ or ‘complement’ partnerships or relations with others,” Stano said. “Georgia progressing or not progressing on its EU path has nothing to do with and has no influence on the bilateral relationship of the EU with Armenia. What we do with Armenia responds only and exclusively to the level of ambition of Armenia,” Stano added. Stano also highlighted Yerevan’s statement from October 2023, expressing readiness to move closer to the EU, which responded with the launch of work on a new EU-Armenia Partnership Agenda, which “is dedicated to continue developing cooperation between the EU and Armenia, and both sides are determined to make progress on this.” “We are proceeding well. Just two months ago, we launched visa liberalization dialogue, which is a clear sign that we are moving forward with the Partnership Agenda. Our relations are developing on a positive track; they are stronger than ever, and there continues to be a mutual interest to advance them further,” Stano told OC Media. The Armenian Foreign Ministry refrained from commenting on the possible impact of the Georgian elections on Armenia’s foreign policy. While the authorities have been rather noncommittal in their statements, Olesya Vartanyan, a regional expert on security issues and conflicts in the South Caucasus, pointed at the timing of the launch of visa liberalization talks with Armenia as a form of “confirmation” to the Armenian government that there is still room for cooperation. Despite the fact that Armenia has sought such dialogue for a while, Vartanyan believed it was launched in September before the Georgian elections “on purpose,” taking into the consideration that Georgia “would be going through some turbulence.” “If we were to have a situation when Brussels first cancels visa liberalization for Georgia, and [then] there is a conversation on launching it in Armenia, it would have raised many more questions and would have created many more problems,” Vartanyan told OC Media. Vartanyan also emphasized that the EU often thinks geographically when considering cooperation and integration, “but that does not necessarily mean that the Georgian election automatically closes the door for Armenia.” However, she noted that if some in Armenia’s leadership are seeking an excuse to cancel some of the processes or to stop thinking about how to deepen the relationship, they can find a pretext, such as the Georgian elections. Similarly, Ondrej Ditrych, a senior analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies, told OC Media that Armenia could have an advantage as the only state in the South Caucasus with real European aspirations. “It is true that this also means certain limitations in terms of the ultimate goal of EU membership – at least as long as Georgia’s integration is effectively stalled. But much can be achieved in the meantime – in terms of limiting dependencies and vulnerabilities related to them, institutional capacity-building, or easing mobility. I don’t think there are reasons for desperation. It is important to take a long, strategic view.” For Meister, however, it was important that expectations were kept realistic. EU membership in the near future or any close integration with the EU for Armenia is “neither in Armenia’s interest nor has the EU capacities for this.” “But to develop close ties in areas like human exchange, security, energy, and economic cooperation is possible, and opening the visa negotiations is one important step. Definitely the situation in Georgia will impact these developments, but from the EU side it means more resources and attention for Armenia, and if Yerevan is able to use this in its reform process without alienating its direct neighbors it can really come closer to the EU without direct integration and too much alienation of Russia,” Meister told OC Media. A Question of Economics? While much of the discussion has related to Armenia–EU relations, that is not the only area in Armenia experts expect to see affected following the Georgian elections. According to Vartanyan, Armenia’s Western integration is “the most theoretical” issue in terms of the risks for Armenia. Instead, she highlighted more short-term and longer potential impacts that Armenia should pay attention to regarding what is happening in Georgia. One of these short-term risks could be “some violence or turbulence” in Tbilisi, which could destabilize the situation in the country, creating “some problems for the Armenian cargo that uses Georgia as a transit country to travel to the West, but to Russia first of all.” Another short-term risk Vartanyan highlighted is potential sanctions. “When the U.S. sanctioned just two Georgian officials in September, it right away had an effect on the Georgian currency – it started devaluating,” Vartanyan said. “If we are to see more sanctions and more restrictions, in that sense there will be an immediate effect in terms of the problem of the Georgian economy and Georgian businesses. Especially in the last couple of years they started investing in Armenia, and recently we had a Georgian bank that purchased a big share of one of the biggest Armenian banks.” As for the long-term risks, Vartanyan pointed to the potential increase of Russian investment and the decline of Western investors, who think more about the region rather than solely Armenia. Vartanyan told OC Media that if Georgia deepens its crisis with Western countries – and gets closer with Russia, including the resumption of diplomatic ties – there would be an increased Russian presence in “some key projects,” including transit roads that interest both foreign investors and Russia. This would mean greater Russian influence in the region, a factor Armenia must consider when discussing its cooperation with the West, as well as for its domestic development. “To be honest, the economy, the sanctions issue, and also the Russian presence in my view are much more important than the entire conversation about whether Armenia goes to the West or not because of the Georgia elections. You can still work on Western integration even with Georgia going through some turbulence, but if we are to see more sanctions and a Russian presence in Georgia, that’s much more serious for Armenia.” … Arshaluys Barseghyan is a journalist focusing on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, politics, and social and gender issues. She is also a close observer of the media environment of Armenia, as well as an advocate of fact-checking and media literacy. This piece originally appeared in OC Media. Republished by permission. https://tol.org/client/article/whats-next-for-armenia.html

Armenpress.am Near East11:15, 30 November 2024 Situation in Aleppo worrying and complex, says Aleppo's “Gandzasar” weekly editor Read the article in: Հայերեն 1 minute read YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 30, ARMENPRESS. The situation in the Syrian city of Aleppo is currently concerning and complex. In an interview with Armenpress, editor of Aleppo's Gandzasar weekly Zarmik Poghikyan, commented on the news of anti-government armed groups invading the city. “The situation is worrying and complex,” Poghikyan stated, adding that Armenians in Aleppo are currently staying in their homes. Earlier, the Berio National Primacy of Aleppo had urged Armenians in the city to remain indoors and not to panic. On November 29, anti-government armed groups in Syria invaded Aleppo, announcing the capture of the Aleppo Municipality and sharing videos to confirm this claim. Armenia has temporarily suspended the activities of its humanitarian demining and medical team in Aleppo, Syria, which has been operating there since 2019. The team has returned to Armenia. Published by Armenpress, original at https://armenpress.am/en/article/1206335?fbclid=IwY2xjawG40cJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHW8cRwm0JpeELIZdcM6pa7YE0sizDCzX31e8Yq_AHsL3Fnl2qkYicRF3IA_aem_V9czBUEPewtXIaOc5Nd1mw

Armenpress.am Politics14:56, 29 November 2024 No Armenian citizens among victims of Syria developments – MFA Read the article in: EspañolՀայերենРусский 1 minute read YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 29, ARMENPRESS. There are no Armenian citizens among the victims of the developments in Syria, foreign ministry spokesperson Ani Badalyan said in response to an inquiry from Armenpress. “According to latest information there are no Armenian citizens among the victims,” Badalyan said. The Syrian army earlier launched a counterattack against Jabhat al-Nusra extremist militants who had captured over 20 settlements near Aleppo. The counterattack was also taking place in Idlib. According to various media reports several hundreds of militants were killed by the Syrian government forces. Al Mayadeen reported that the Syrian army is repelling the militant offensive in Idlib. Published by Armenpress, original at https://armenpress.am/en/article/1206278?fbclid=IwY2xjawG3iYBleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHXpKjAzA9LXLLnq45l3R1aKXg9KHCbJkyDnoARmXeCRWQlY6ga9TOEVIRQ_aem_hVHPk841zlidoxk5wIwCRA

Armenpress.am World18:51, 29 November 2024 Anti-government forces breach the city of Aleppo Read the article in: Հայերեն 1 minute read YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 29, ARMENPRESS. Rebel forces have entered parts of Syria's second-largest city, Aleppo, a monitoring group says, in the biggest offensive against the government in years, BBC reports. According to local sources, clashes have erupted across various parts of the city, leading to casualties and destruction. Authorities state that armed groups are attempting to seize control of strategic locations. Published by Armenpress, original at https://armenpress.am/en/article/1206312?fbclid=IwY2xjawG3iLdleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHev4wzj8aG2B8CTszJaIxxBHaEUN-THJNfmYUzMtXfGTVLzVcj5clJRJxA_aem_HkpmDYukczirE4DNb2ShVg

Lying comes naturally to some! 😬

Hiding behind technicality called bs! The Armenian side is now refusing all meetings in the CSTO format, but supports all documents adopted by the organization. Putin does not rule out that Armenia will return to full-fledged participation in the CSTO. https://eadaily.com/en/news/2024/11/28/putin-explained-why-the-csto-did-not-intervene-in-the-conflict-in-karabakh

ARKA, Armenia Nov 28 2024 Putin: ‘Today's situation between Armenia and CSTO most likely dictated by internal political processes in Armenia itself’ 28.11.2024, 18:15 The situation between Armenia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is most likely dictated by internal political processes in Armenia itself, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed today. YEREVAN, 28 November. /ARKA/. The situation between Armenia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is most likely dictated by internal political processes in Armenia itself, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed today. ‘Each country has the right to choose what it wants to do for ensuring its security. I think that today's situation between Armenia and the CSTO is most likely dictated by internal political processes in Armenia itself. Of course, it is all connected with the consequences of the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh,‘ Pution said on the sidelines of the CSTO leaders’ meeting in Astana. Putin did not rule out that Armenia could return to full participation in the CSTO. ‘This is a very sensitive issue. It is always easy to make some assessments from the outside - it is always more complicated from inside. In my opinion, any member country of the organisation should determine for itself what corresponds to its national interests. We will treat it with respect - that's the first thing. Secondly, Armenia has not announced its withdrawal. It said that it is taking a pause, but at the same time it supports all the documents that are adopted during our meeting today. If that is so, then there is a possibility that Armenia would return to full-scale work within CSTO. We'll see. I will repeat once again, the decision in the end, of course, is up to the member country of the organisation,’ Putin said. Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan did not participate in the gathering In February 2024, Armenia announced the freezing of its membership in the CSTO and later also refused to pay membership fees to the Russia-led organisation. On 12 June, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that the next logical step in relations with the CSTO would be to withdraw from the military pact, which failed to protect its member Armenia when Azerbaijan invades parts of its territory. On 18 September, Pashinyan said that the CSTO was not fulfilling its defence commitments to Armenia and was creating existential threats to its security and sovereignty. -0- https://arka.am/en/news/politics/putin-today-s-situation-between-armenia-and-csto-most-likely-dictated-by-internal-political-processe/

Jamestown Foundation Nov 27 2024 Pashinyan’s Fresh-Faced Populism Signals Start of Armenian Election Cycle Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 171 By: Onnik James Krikorian November 27, 2024 03:46 PM Executive Summary: As Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ratings continue to decline, a viral video of him shaving has been interpreted as the start of the government’s preparations for the next parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for mid-June 2026 at the latest. The resignation of key officials has strengthened this opinion, instructed to do so by messages sent to them by Pashinyan. Many believe the prime minister is attempting to shirk responsibility for his flagging ratings by blaming others within his team. Armenia’s opposition echoes this view and links the move to the need to regain political legitimacy in Armenia through elections to sign an agreement to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and eventually hold a referendum on changing the constitution. On November 14, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan lambasted the country’s 1990 Declaration of Independence, equating the historical document to the non-existence of the current Republic (Azatutyun, November 14). The issue of the declaration, which contains claims to what is considered sovereign Azerbaijani territory in the form of the former Soviet-era “Mountainous Region of Karabakh,” then an autonomous district, has proven to be the main obstacle to Yerevan and Baku finally concluding a long-anticipated peace agreement (see EDM, January 31, June 25, September 11). The outcry about these comments was significant but soon diminished, perhaps by design, when Pashinyan later the same evening posted a video on social media shaving off his now trademark beard (Facebook.com/surenyants;News.am; Instagram.com/nikolpashinyan_official, November 14). Although unshaven for his career prior to the 2018 street protests that brought him to power, Pashinyan has sported a beard ever since and created a new post-revolutionary image (see EDM, May 3, 2018, April 26, 2019). While some media took a light-hearted approach to the change, others were more sarcastic, with one regional analyst asking if this was “the end of the revolution” (X.com/Tigartsakh, November 14; OC Media, November 15). Pashinyan has long been a populist ready to distract attention from controversial decisions (AIR Center, September 7, 2020; Nikoghosyan, Ter-Matevosyan, “From ‘revolution’ to war: deciphering Armenia’s populist foreign policy-making process, ” August 25, 2022; Commonspace, April 11). Adding to this speculation that political intent was behind the move, many noticed that Pashinyan appeared to wink at the camera at the end (Hraparak, November 26). In an interview aired on November 22, Pashinyan finally spoke about the new image, claiming it was done to celebrate one of his daughter’s birthdays (News.am, November 23). Nonetheless, his critics maintain that along with his regularly posted social media videos, including resuming bicycling at home and on official visits abroad, the real reason was “political puppetry” ahead of elections due to be held no later than June 2026 (Euasianet, October 2, 2018; News.am, November 18). Critics also pointed to high-profile changes in his government when a rumor started to circulate on November 17, a Sunday, that he had instructed key officials to submit their resignations the following day. The instructions were sent via WhatsApp messenger or short message service (SMS) (Hraparak, November 18; News.am, November 22). Many analysts saw the dismissal as marking the start of the pre-election cycle in Armenia (Hraparak; Facebook.com/surenyants, November 18). Media pointed out that the extent of the dismissals was unprecedented, especially as they were proceeded by a much-publicized tirade of criticism against members of his own government (EVN Report, November 20). Some also noted, however, that many of the replacements were women, leading one Azerbaijani analyst to suggest that the changes were made to appease the European Union who consider higher gender diversity in government as a sign of democratization (Facebook.com/farhad.mammadov.35, November 21). While the observation may be correct, Armenian analysts rule this out as the change’s primary motivation (Youtube.com/civilnet, November 21). The dismissals followed Pashinyan’s harsh criticism of his government the previous week. Among those messaged were the heads of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Investigative Committee, the Anti-Corruption Committee, the State Revenue Committee, and the Ministers of Interior and Infrastructure. Media speculated that the demand was rooted in Pashinyan’s desire to reverse his diminishing popularity ahead of the 2026 vote amid widespread public apathy (Eurasianet, October 24). Some consider that the vote might even be called earlier next year (Azatutyun, November 18). Similar to the opposition, most analysts consider that the move marks the start of preparing for the next elections, especially by removing others whom he can blame for failing to trust the government among the population (Azatutyun, November 18). Pashinyan maintains that the removals were not “personal, but systemic,” as more allegations have surfaced that he was guided only by salvaging his reputation by sacrificing the officials (Eurasianet, November 18). In October, in a survey by the International Republican Institute, only 16 percent of respondents expressed trust in his leadership (International Republican Institute, October 18). Further, only 20 percent of respondents said they would vote for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party if parliamentary elections were held that Sunday. The symbolism of both shaving his beard and instructing subordinates to resign was not lost on many veteran commentators on local politics. There has also been much focus on how Civil Contract has applied pressure to increase its influence and standing in rural communities (Civilnet.am, November 27). The failed appearance of a pro-opposition cleric attempting to force Pashinyan’s resignation earlier this year was a further sign that the government would have to act, they opine (see EDM, May 14, June 5; Aliq Media, November 18). Adding to the speculation, Pashinyan has further explained the dismissals and replacements as part of a new strategy to distinguish between officials who had served in the governments of his unpopular predecessors and those who took part in or eventually supported his much-touted 2018 revolution (Azatutyun, November 26). Some, however, are refusing to leave their positions. According to press reports, two Civil Contract members of parliament initially ignored the message to resign their parliamentary mandates. One did so, while the other refused to (Azatutyun, November 19, 20). The Anti-Corruption Committee summoned the renegade deputy (Azatutyun, November 22). The opposition claims that ideological differences could also be the reason for removing the deputies (Hraparak, November 26). The General Prosecutor’s Office has also reportedly opened cases against the dismissed head of the Supreme Judicial Council and Minister of Justice, though it denies the claims (Azatutyun, November 26). On November 24, there was an interview with Pashinyan in which he spent one hour discussing the changes until dedicating the remaining 30 minutes to outlining Armenia’s position in ongoing talks to normalize relations with Azerbaijan. Some speculate that Pashinyan might be addressing both issues at the same time. Even though nothing indicates this, the opposition maintains that the embattled prime minister seeks re-election by mid-2026 as a prerequisite to holding a controversial referendum to change the constitution in 2027 (Hraparak, November 21). In one video discussion, two Armenian political commentators linked the shaving of his beard, the high-profile dismissals via resignation, and preparing for new elections. They further maintain that Pashinyan seeks assured control over power structures to prevent any challenge to his leadership within his own party structure. They also compare such a possibility to the palace coup that deposed Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, when he too was ready to sign a compromise peace agreement with Azerbaijan in 1998 amid a weak government, weaker opposition, and widespread public apathy and precarious legitimacy (Youtube.com/civilnet, November 21). Pashinyan’s recent actions point to a potential effort to consolidate power, bolster public confidence, and navigate the precarious road to potential re-election, all while balancing the delicate and contentious issue of peace with Azerbaijan. https://jamestown.org/program/pashinyans-fresh-faced-populism-signals-start-of-armenian-election-cycle/

Book Reveals 8,000 Letters by Armenian Survivors of 1890’s Turkish Massacres By Harut Sassounian TheCaliforniaCourier.com I just received the first volume of a valuable book published in Yerevan in 2021 that makes public for the first time some of the 8,000 handwritten letters by survivors of the 1894-96 Turkish massacres of 300,000 Armenians in Western Armenia (present-day Turkey), organized by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. This unique book, authored by Vera Sahakyan and published by the Matenadaran, the repository of ancient manuscripts and documents in Yerevan, reproduces the eyewitness testimonies of 200 Armenian survivors of the Turkish massacres from the 28 villages in the Bulanekh province of the Mush region who had fled to Eastern Armenia. The heart-wrenching letters were sent to Catholicos of All-Armenians Mkrtich Khrimian (1893-1907), known endearingly as Khrimian Hayrig, located in Etchmiadzin, the headquarters of the Armenian Apostolic Church, seeking his compassionate aid for their basic necessities of food and lodging. The letters of the Armenian survivors were kept for several decades in the archives of Etchmiadzin and subsequently transferred to Matenadaran. The author plans to publish several more volumes in the future to cover the rest of the 8,000 letters. Many of the letters in volume 1 were translated into English by Lucine Minasian. Here are excerpts from some of the letters written to the Catholicos by the Armenian survivors of the 1894-96 Turkish massacres: -- On October 29, 1896, Yeghiazar Hagopian, a refugee from Bulanekh’s Kakarlu village of Mush, wrote: “I was able to flee the barbaric Kurdish killings. Besides totally looting us, they murdered my son, and I barely escaped, only losing the fingers of my right hand. It’s already been four months that I have been wandering around here begging for alms…. My family, famished and naked, is impatiently waiting for me back in the homeland. I beseech you to at least grant me some travel money.” -- On October 14, 1894, Mardiros Mouradian, an inhabitant from Khoshgaldi village of Lower Bulanekh, wrote: “The unlawful Tajiks [Turks] attacked my lamentable and poor family beating us with stones on the one hand, and fatally shooting my 20-year-old son on the other hand. They pillaged my whole fortune and even disrobed us.” -- On July 11, 1895, Parish Priest Hovhannes Der Bedrossian from Molahkant village of Mush wrote: “Being attacked by Kurds and Hamidian troops, we abandoned our homes and possessions and barely fled secretly to Russia to survive. Now, we are wandering poor, delusional, famished… bereft of a single piece of dry bread.” -- On January 2, 1896, Hagop Levoniants from Bulanekh’s Liz village wrote: “Our intention is self-defense -- we appeal to you that you will free us, our people, and our homeland from the Turkish iron yoke. Hand us a few weapons so we can go and reach our eight friends who have been writing us letter after letter, asking us to reach them soon.” -- On January 13, 1897, Mkrtich Haroutyounyan from Bulanekh’s Khristam Kadouk village wrote: “We barely survived the atrocities…and freed ourselves from the pitiless claws of the furious Ottoman government…. I plead for some rags and some rubles that will cover my travel costs, so I can protect my family from the frost and attain daily sustenance for them during the wintertime.” -- On September 30, 1895, Yaghush Mkrtichian (five people) and Yalduz Mardirosian (six people), two widows of refugee families from Bulanekh’s Kharakhlo village of Mush, wrote: “Both of us have been widowed for almost two years, as the heads [of our families] were killed by the Kurds. Being frightened, we fled here. They took everything we owned. They didn’t leave anything -- neither cattle nor possessions.” --On March 15, 1894, Baghdasar Margosian from Keakarlou village of Mush wrote: “Enduring numerous tortures and sufferings, we could barely free ourselves from death. The unlawful warden released us from prison, demanding 80 pieces of gold. Afterwards, they looted all my movable and immovable property and forcibly imprisoned my son.” -- On July 17, 1895, Sahag Garabedian from Hamzasheikh village of Bulanekh Province wrote: “Because of the barbarity committed by the government and the Turks, we left our homeland and fled to Russia. My father died. Now there are five of us, including my old mother. Presently, my family lives in a hut with lice in the Armidlu village.” -- On April 19, 1894, Priest Mateos Der Kevorkian from Bulanekh village and Sahag Serovpian from Karakilise village wrote: “Since September 1893, the Kurds and Turks of Turkey have been torturing our Armenians intensely and oppressing them. They have been looting our harvested wheat. They have been pillaging our stored wheat. At nights they commit adultery with our wives and then kill them. When the Armenian laborers come back from abroad, they rob their money and homes and kill them. Eighteen families from Hamzasheikh village were forcibly converted into Turkish religion. Three of them were killed and now there is an order to hang 28 people…. Effendis and aghas forcibly demand 40-50 gold pieces from Armenian peasants or kill them. Prelate Priest Nercess has been sentenced to two years in jail. They forcibly demanded from him 450 gold pieces which were collected by passing a plate [in church] and now he is in prison. Effendis and aghas are forcibly taking over the Armenian villages, harming and torturing people….” This is a valuable book because it: 1) Documents the 1894-96 massacres of Armenians through eyewitness accounts of the survivors; 2) Gives present-day Armenians the opportunity to find the names of their ancestors who used to live in Western Armenia; 3) Reveals that some of the little-known villages in the region were indeed inhabited by Armenians.

Asbarez.com Artsakh’s Dadivank Given to Azerbaijan’s So-Called ‘Albanian-Udi’ Community by Asbarez Staff November 27, 2024 in Armenia, Artsakh, Featured Story, Latest, News, Top Stories The Dadivank Armenian Monastery. Photo by: Nerses Matinyan The Dadivank Monastery, which is located in occupied Artsakh, has been handed over to Azerbaijan’s so-called Udi community, Monument Watch reported. After the end of the Artsakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan’s regime began its campaign of misappropriating Armenian cultural heritage. The Albanian-Udi, a Christian people who follow the Armenian Gregorian Church, were invited by the government to use former Armenian religious sites, including the Dadivank Monastery, for their own religious purposes. Although the historic inscriptions preserved on the walls of Dadivank, as well as the khachkars on display, are tied directly to Armenians, Azerbaijan continues to push false narratives in an attempt to rewrite history. Azerbaijan’s appropriation of Armenian cultural and religious heritage has been carried out using a “methodological manual” of propaganda built on a number of false premises, reported the Armenia-based “Geghard” Scientific Analytical Foundation. According to Azerbaijanis, cultural sites that are linked to ethnic Armenians, especially those that are inscribed with Armenian script, are from the modern era. They claim that these historic sites were tampered with by Armenians either throughout the 19th century or during what they call “years of occupation” by Armenians in Artsakh. This exact tactic has been used in the case of a 10th century Armenian fortress called Amberd. According to Faik Ismayilov, a researcher at the A. Bakikhanov Institute of History and Ethnology of Azerbaijan’s National Academy of Sciences, the Armenian inscriptions on the walls of the Vahramashen Church, located next to Amberd, were added in the early 20th century. Based on several false claims made by scientists from Azerbaijan’s Academy of Sciences, Armenians allegedly started committing “material and spiritual crimes against Albanian churches” starting in 1836, when the “Albanian Church became a diocese was subjected to Etchmiadzin Church,” reported the Azertac Azerbaijan State News Agency. This same false claim, that Armenians are adding inscriptions to cultural or religious heritage sites, has also been applied to the Dadivank Armenian Monastery, which came under Azerbaijani control in late November 2020. Recently, Azerbaijani media outlet Report.az published a brief article, titled “The Major Azerbaijani Monastery Khudavang Subjected to Armenian Forgeries.” According to the article, between 1993 and 2020, “Armenians attempted to falsify the monastery’s history by presenting it as Armenian. For instance, the symbols of the complex were supposedly replaced, different crosses were installed, ancient Armenian inscriptions were added to the walls, and old Udi-Albanian graves were destroyed.” Armenian inscriptions and carvings on the walls of Dadivank. Photo by: Nerses Matinyan In 2021, representatives of Azerbaijan’s Udi community visited Dadivank to conduct religious services, lead by head of the Albanian-Udi Christian Community Robert Mobili. Mobili is known for backing Azerbaijan’s false claims about Armenian heritage. In 2024, L’Osservatore Romano, the official daily newspaper of the Vatican, published an article titled “Dadivank, Gandzasar, and Khatiravank Monasteries in the Clouds.” In the article, Dadivank and Gandzasar are not linked to Armenian heritage, but that of Albanian, with no shred of evidence. The Azerbaijani government continues its anti-Armenian campaign of falsifying history by manipulating and concealing information, and using misinformation to rewrite history by creating a new narrative. https://asbarez.com/dadivank-given-to-azerbaijans-albanian-udi-christian-community/?fbclid=IwY2xjawG0-z1leHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHcGlynKJAYHlYcMNZD59D6etgHzH5Six5XJQ9D3-_lE1_dYVTYLTkvsKvA_aem_40rNHNuWVTd7tO0SPPKUoQ

Armenpress.am Azerbaijan21:00, 27 November 2024 Baku threatens Polish President for his visit to Armenian-Azerbaijani border Read the article in: العربيةՀայերենРусский 1 minute read YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 27, ARMENPRESS. Azerbaijan has sharply reacted to the visit of Polish President Andrzej Duda to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border as part of his official visit to Armenia, which was conducted with representatives of the European Union Mission in Armenia. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry has issued a statement threatening the head of one of the major European countries. “We deeply regret that the President of the country which is officially a “strategic partner” of Azerbaijan has participated in the unacceptable diplomatic “binocular show” leading to the aggravation of relations between Azerbaijan and Poland,” the foreign ministry said on the social media platform X. “Despite the numerous messages sent from Azerbaijani officials to the Presidential Administration and Foreign Ministry of Poland, the Polish side did not refrain from this provocative step,” it noted, promising to take appropriate diplomatic measures against “this unfriendly action''. Published by Armenpress, original at https://armenpress.am/en/article/1206116?fbclid=IwY2xjawG09wRleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHbYTE8p-sOjcZDfybvFmiLSgmQ8mj6XZItXIHmxxTCu4DXCg5TJ8N62W5g_aem_S7l2wyhVfUPcsqa4zuYUiw

Armenpress.am Armenia11:58, 27 November 2024 Armenia among safest countries in the world in Numbeo rating Read the article in: EspañolفارسیFrançaisՀայերենქართულიРусский简体中文 1 minute read YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 27, ARMENPRESS. Armenia is the 8th safest country in the world according to the 2024 safety and crime index of Numbeo. The Numbeo Safety Index placed Andorra 1st, the UAE 2nd, and Qatar 3rd. Armenia is in between Hong Kong (7th) and Japan (9th). Armenia’s neighbor Georgia is 21st, Azerbaijan is 33rd, Iran is 92nd and Turkey is 54th. Published by Armenpress, original at https://armenpress.am/en/article/1206037?fbclid=IwY2xjawG09YpleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHQocVOsYAwLhN3joN5CL6wTG8XkYXBIxY9GfCi1vjSPJxcTF_crbJV_n7Q_aem_skGuc4IGQ2QWAkapIGMpuA