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Turkey Shot Itself in the Foot by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #238 March 25, 2003 The refusal of the Turkish parliament to grant the U.S. the use of air bases and troop transit to open the Northern front against Saddam is likely to signal a watershed in U.S.-Turkish relations. Policy makers in Washington and Ankara have expressed fears that the strategic ties between Washington and Ankara will be gravely weakened. Turkey is about to pay a high price for what many in the two capitals see as the largest strategic blunder of its leaders since it sided with the German Empire and Austria-Hungary in World War I. It will take a lot of efforts on both sides to put this Humpty-Dumpty together again - and a thankless and difficult task that may be. After weeks of suspense, Ankara has finally allowed the U.S. Air Force to use Turkish airspace - last weekend - for strikes against Iraq. The Turkish government, however, failed to pass the authorization for the use of the Turkish air bases and for transit of the U.S. Army's Fourth Armored Division through the Turkish territory, despite the Bush Administration offering Turkey $6 billion in military and economic aid. Explanations abound as to why Ankara shot itself in the foot, as far as its relations with the United States are concerned. Turkish AK (Justice and Development) Party's moderately Islamist government, led by the newly elected Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and foreign minister Abdullah Gul, quoted broad opposition of the Turkish public as the main reason to limit U.S. involvement in Turkey. Some polls said that over 90 percent of the public reject the war. The government, however, did not impose party discipline in the crucial parliamentary vote to allow U.S. troops to deploy, thus sending a subtle message to the members of Parliament to vote as they like. Two factors contributed to Erdogan's failure to prevent an unprecedented crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations: First, a lack of policy experience; and Second, a hidden agenda of broadening ties with Islamic countries. However, the Turkish political establishment lists a series of concerns, which may be detrimental to Turkey in the future. Turkish experts and observers stress that the leading European states are highly unlikely to allow Turkey's accession into the expanded European Union, while closer integration with the Muslim world, advocated by the previous Islamist government let by Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, will derail Turkey's economic and technological progress. Thus, they say, abandonment of close ties to the U.S. is a strategic catastrophe for Turkey. Washington's policy toward Ankara may reflect a number of changes in the future, not the least of which is the U.S. no longer seeing Turkey as a special strategic partner, or even as a reliable ally. As Iran is arming itself with ballistic missiles and, quite possibly, nuclear weapons, the Pentagon may not be as happy with Turkey's participation in ballistic missile defense programs led by the U.S. as it was only some months ago. Further, on the technology transfer side, Washington may lean on Israel to curb or stop the current wide ranging cooperation between the Turkish military and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and military industries on both sides. For decades, Ankara counted on Washington to support it on a number of sensitive bilateral economic and foreign policy issues, but today Washington will be less likely to unquestionably support Turkey. As the International Monetary Fund will disburse the $16 billion loan package, the U.S. Executive Director at the Fund is likely to demand a much more stringent adherence to performance criteria than in the past. Moreover, the future economic bailouts become more unlikely, while investors vote with their pocketbook: the Turkish stock market crashed by whopping 20 percent since it became clear that the Erdogan government effectively rejected the U.S. economic assistance package. Geopolitically, numerous issues arise: Washington will be less likely to support Turkey against Greek claims in the AegÅan Sea. The U.S. State Department may become more critical of Turkey on partition of Cyprus, in place since 1974 due to the Turkish invasion. American support for Turkey's accession into the EU may also be called into question. It may be more difficult to see Ankara as a balance to Moscow in Central Asia, especially as radical Islam, not Russian neo-imperialism, is currently viewed as the main threat in the region. Long-standing U.S. support to Baku-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline (MEP), including financing issues, may not be as enthusiastic as it was. Issues related to the Armenian-Turkish relations are also particularly sensitive. For years, the American-Armenian community has built its muscle in the Congress. The Armenian lobby counts over 100 members on both sides of the isle, many on key committees and with a powerful political clout. Turkish experts fear that the Bush Administration will drop its long-term resistance to classifying Ottoman atrocities against Armenian civilians in 1915 as an "Armenian holocaust". In 2000, President Clinton personally intervened to defeat House Resolution 596 - a draft legislation to express the attitude of the Unites States on the Armenian alleged genocide. While that Resolution was defeated, after the recent U.S.-Turkish friction, this may not be the case in the future. Congressional recognition of the Armenian `genocide' by the Ottoman authorities may become relevant if and when reparation claims by genocide survivors or their heirs may be launched. U.S. policy makers are fuming, because they view Ankara as throwing decades of close military cooperation to the wind. The Turkish military, for years favorites of the U.S., seem to be unable or unwilling to challenge their democratically elected political masters. The anger is palpable, because the Pentagon has counted on Turkey to facilitate the opening of a crucial northern front against Saddam, and because of Turkey's insistence on deploying its own troops in Northern Iraq - a step the U.S. opposes. Turkey has already sent up to 2,500 troops into Kurdistan - allegedly to prevent emergence of independent Kurdish state - which may distract large Kurdish forces to guard against the Turks. Pentagon planners counted on the Kurdish militia known as peshmerga to attack Saddam's military and to assist the U.S. in securing northern Iraqi oil fields around Mosul and Kirkuk. Instead, a nightmarish scenario of Turkish-Kurdish hostilities has emerged. Moreover, reported contacts between Iranian envoys and the Turkish government further complicate prosecution of the war as the U.S. is trying to ensure that Tehran and Ankara do not enter the fray to partition Iraqi Kurdistan and secure the oil fields for themselves. Such a development would dramatically complicate American involvement in the volatile Northern Iraq. Only a dramatic turnaround by the Turkish government and the military, such as allowing the Fourth Division to move through Turkey to Northern Iraq, and a green light to use military bases such as Incirlik - both highly unlikely at the time of this writing - may quickly improve the bilateral relations. Otherwise, the U.S.-Turkish ties that were forged during the Korean and Cold War, will be set back by decades, not years. The imbroglio may end potential U.S. support for future Turkish military involvement in domestic politics. If the Turkish military is incapable of weighing in on a matter of vital importance to the U.S., why would Washington tolerate violations of democratic norms by the military? In the long run, Turkey may be dealt with ` on case by case basis', a senior Washington military expert and a retired U.S. military intelligence officer said, ` but the memory of what happened will hang like a dark cloud, slow to dissipate.' Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation. He often visits Turkey.
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I found this article to be very interesting and I thought I should share it with you. Why We're Really Fighting This War... From Kim 10-10-1 Jeff, Attached is a telling excerpt from Congress in 1998: Link It's patently obvious to me now, that this entire horrendous situation has been deliberately engineered to sieze control of these vast oil and gas reserves by the NWO. I'm sick for America. Read on... U.S. INTERESTS IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 12, 1998 Next we would like to hear from Mr. John J. Maresca, vice president of international relations, Unocal Corporation. You may proceed as you wish. STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MARESCA, VICE PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNOCAL CORPORATION Mr. Maresca. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to see you again. I am John Maresca, vice president for international relations of the Unocal Corporation. Unocal, as you know, is one of the world's leading energy resource and project development companies. I appreciate your invitation to speak here today. I believe these hearings are important and timely. I congratulate you for focusing on Central Asia oil and gas reserves and the role they play in shaping U.S. policy. I would like to focus today on three issues. First, the need for multiple pipeline routes for Central Asian oil and gas resources. Second, the need for U.S. support for international and regional efforts to achieve balanced and lasting political settlements to the conflicts in the region, including Afghanistan. Third, the need for structured assistance to encourage economic reforms and the development of appropriate investment climates in the region. In this regard, we specifically support repeal or removal of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Mr. Chairman, the Caspian region contains tremendous untapped hydrocarbon reserves. Just to give an idea of the scale, proven natural gas reserves equal more than 236 trillion cubic feet. The region's total oil reserves may well reach more than 60 billion barrels of oil. Some estimates are as high as 200 billion barrels. In 1995, the region was producing only 870,000 barrels per day. By 2010, western companies could increase production to about 4.5 million barrels a day, an increase of more than 500 percent in only 15 years. If this occurs, the region would represent about 5 percent of the world's total oil production. One major problem has yet to be resolved: how to get the region's vast energy resources to the markets where they are needed. Central Asia is isolated. Their natural resources are landlocked, both geographically and politically. Each of the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia faces difficult political challenges. Some have unsettled wars or latent conflicts. Others have evolving systems where the laws and even the courts are dynamic and changing. In addition, a chief technical obstacle which we in the industry face in transporting oil is the region's existing pipeline infrastructure. Because the region's pipelines were constructed during the Moscow-centered Soviet period, they tend to head north and west toward Russia. There are no connections to the south and east. But Russia is currently unlikely to absorb large new quantities of foreign oil. It's unlikely to be a significant market for new energy in the next decade. It lacks the capacity to deliver it to other markets. Two major infrastructure projects are seeking to meet the need for additional export capacity. One, under the aegis of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, plans to build a pipeline west from the northern Caspian to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Oil would then go by tanker through the Bosporus to the Mediterranean and world markets. The other project is sponsored by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, a consortium of 11 foreign oil companies, including four American companies, Unocal, Amoco, Exxon and Pennzoil. This consortium conceives of two possible routes, one line would angle north and cross the north Caucasus to Novorossiysk. The other route would cross Georgia to a shipping terminal on the Black Sea. This second route could be extended west and south across Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. But even if both pipelines were built, they would not have enough total capacity to transport all the oil expected to flow from the region in the future. Nor would they have the capability to move it to the right markets. Other export pipelines must be built. At Unocal, we believe that the central factor in planning these pipelines should be the location of the future energy markets that are most likely to need these new supplies. Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union are all slow growth markets where demand will grow at only a half a percent to perhaps 1.2 percent per year during the period 1995 to 2010. Asia is a different story all together. It will have a rapidly increasing energy consumption need. Prior to the recent turbulence in the Asian Pacific economies, we at Unocal anticipated that this region's demand for oil would almost double by 2010. Although the short-term increase in demand will probably not meet these expectations, we stand behind our long-term estimates. I should note that it is in everyone's interest that there be adequate supplies for Asia's increasing energy requirements. If Asia's energy needs are not satisfied, they will simply put pressure on all world markets, driving prices upwards everywhere. The key question then is how the energy resources of Central Asia can be made available to nearby Asian markets. There are two possible solutions, with several variations. One option is to go east across China, but this would mean constructing a pipeline of more than 3,000 k ilometers just to reach Central China. In addition, there would have to be a 2,000-kilometer connection to reach the main population centers along the coast. The question then is what will be the cost of transporting oil through this pipeline, and what would be the netback which the producers would receive. For those who are not familiar with the terminology, the netback is the price which the producer receives for his oil or gas at the wellhead after all the transportation costs have been deducted. So it's the price he receives for the oil he produces at the wellhead. The second option is to build a pipeline south from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. One obvious route south would cross Iran, but this is foreclosed for American companies because of U.S. sanctions legislation. The only other possible route is across Afghanistan, which has of course its own unique challenges. The country has been involved in bitter warfare for almost two decades, and is still divided by civil war. From the outset, we have made it clear that construction of the pipeline we have proposed across Afghanistan could not begin until a recognized government is in place that has the confidence of governments, lenders, and our company. Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have worked very closely with the University of Nebraska at Omaha in developing a training program for Afghanistan which will be open to both men and women, and which will operate in both parts of the country, the north and south. Unocal foresees a pipeline which would become part of a regional system that will gather oil from existing pipeline infrastructure in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. The 1,040-mile long oil pipeline would extend south through Afghanistan to an export terminal that would be constructed on the Pakistan coast. This 42-inch diameter pipeline will have a shipping capacity of one million barrels of oil per day. The estimated cost of the project, which is similar in scope to the trans-Alaska pipeline, is about $2.5 billion. Given the plentiful natural gas supplies of Central Asia, our aim is to link gas resources with the nearest viable markets. This is basic for the commercial viability of any gas project. But these projects also face geopolitical challenges. Unocal and the Turkish company Koc Holding are interested in bringing competitive gas supplies to Turkey. The proposed Eurasia natural gas pipeline would transport gas from Turkmenistan directly across the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. Of course the demarcation of the Caspian remains an issue. Last October, the Central Asia Gas Pipeline Consortium, called CentGas, in which Unocal holds an interest, was formed to develop a gas pipeline which will link Turkmenistan's vast Dauletabad gas field with markets in Pakistan and possibly India. The proposed 790-mile pipeline will open up new markets for this gas, traveling from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Multan in Pakistan. The proposed extension would move gas on to New Delhi, where it would connect with an existing pipeline. As with the proposed Central Asia oil pipeline, CentGas can not begin construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan Government is in place. The Central Asia and Caspian region is blessed with abundant oil and gas that can enhance the lives of the region's residents, and provide energy for growth in both Europe and Asia. The impact of these resources on U.S. commercial interests and U.S. foreign policy is also significant. Without peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the region, cross-border oil and gas pipelines are not likely to be built. We urge the Administration and the Congress to give strong support to the U.N.-led peace process in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government should use its influence to help find solutions to all of the region's conflicts. U.S. assistance in developing these new economies will be crucial to business success. We thus also encourage strong technical assistance programs throughout the region. Specifically, we urge repeal or removal of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. This section unfairly restricts U.S. Government assistance to the government of Azerbaijan and limits U.S. influence in the region. Developing cost-effective export routes for Central Asian resources is a formidable task, but not an impossible one. Unocal and other American companies like it are fully prepared to undertake the job and to make Central Asia once again into the crossroads it has been in the past. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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US seeks air base in Armenia - Yerevan paper Haykakan Zhamanak 15 Mar 03 YEREVAN Text of unattributed report by Armenian newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak on 15 March entitled "Military airport in Armenia" According to reliable sources, the US authorities have suggested to the Armenian authorities the opening of an American military base in Armenia, more precisely, a military airport. Our diplomatic sources say that the airports of Stepanavan, Dzhermuk and Kapan may be suitable for this role. In fact, the last two airports do not work, and according to our information, in the event that these airports are given to them, the Americans are ready to raise them to the desired level. It is hard to say how the Americans imagine a joint military presence for them and the Russians. But the idea is interesting in itself.
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quote: I am Armenian, member of a tiny tribe hence my preference will always be supporting her before my personal morality or interests. That's every Armenian's obligation.
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"I'm against the war, except if it is going to benefit me". That's right. There's nothing wrong with that. It seems like most of you here have a very short memory of Turkey. Why are you getting so offended about the Turks loosing the trust and the "friendship" of the US over the Iraq issue? Yes, Armenia should take an adnvantage from the situation, if Turkey finally decides not to let the US use the bases. The world does not revolve around Armenia. Armenia could vanish tomorrow and it would make no difference to almost everyone. I'm sure it wouldn't make a difference to you, or else you wouldn't say such a thing. Allowing foreign troops in one's country will damage the sovereignty of that country. I am against it and respect the decision that Turkish Parliament made. Too bad that you're not being respected back. Eshi ankanjum knatsek chem haskanum??? Some of our leaders did the same thing not notiecing the train that passed them by. quote:RUBO:I hope Turkey's standing with US greatly damages due to refusal to allow US troops for now. Apparently BUSH threatened visiting Turkish officials that Armenian lobby is waiting to reinstate the genocide bill in congress. I hope US finally realizes how unreliable Turkey is as an ally Turkey is and will be a US puppet but I was hoping with some facts backing me on this that Bush administration is not happy about the delay and millions wasted due to Turkish parliament vote. I believe US will see that Turkey is just a prostitute demanding money for perceived or unperceived reasons. I do hope that Greeks and Armenians make every effort highlighting the Turkey’s duplicity and hopefully tarnish the image for good. I agree with you 100%.
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Which type of Armenians most inclined to date or marry out o
KoRn replied to a topic in Love and Romance
The part where I wrote "completed 7th grade" sounded dumb. I meant to say that I completed my 7th grade in Armenia so that you'll know that I was brough up over there not in US. -
Which type of Armenians most inclined to date or marry out o
KoRn replied to a topic in Love and Romance
I think that Armenians in the Diaspora are more likely to marry odars, since they have lived among odars all their lives. I can't really say which diasporan group is more likely to marry others because I was born in ARmenia, but I think that it's hard to say which ones are more likely to marry odars because it is something that can happen to every single Diasporan group. I agree that some Soviet ARmenians marry outside of their group, especially with Russian Jews, (I think that they can do much better than that) There are also some Armenians who marry Russians. I don't know why but I kind of have problems with going out with an ARmenian guy. I never ever had a good relationship with an ARmenian guy. I don't mean to offend armenians guys in thsi forum but I've seen the worst in ARmenian guys. I've had many odar boyfriends, mostly Arabic guys and I've been in much better relationships with them all than with an ARmenian. I'm not saying that I've dated Armenians alot, since where I live there are not many Armneians (at least I don't know many). I go to Armenia almost every summer and I still don't click with Armenians guys in Armenia. Armenians guys are such critics. Every time that an ARmenian guy finds out that I've been in a relationship with an Arabs (I dated my last Arab boyfriend for about 2 years) they all get pissed off, especially the Soviet ARmenian guys. Some guys think that just because I date Arabs or an Indian (hindu) with whom I'm going out right now then I don't give a bs about anything that's Armenian, which is not right because I know everything that has t6o do with Armenia or Armenians, since I completed my 7th grade in Armenia. One guy told me that instead of ingoring those idiots I'm dating them and that I need to learn to appreaciate who I'm This is just one of the problems that I have with ARmenian guys. My father is cool with everything that I do & my mom is very open minded. She actually likes my current bf saying that he's an inteligent and descent person. There were few times that my parents didnt' let me go out with Armenian guys because they didnt' like them. I know that this may seem pretty weird for some of you, but I can asure you that my parents are very Armenian. My parents are very smart (scientists)& we're very close, so It's not like they don't care about me or anything like that. So I think that your background doesn't really matter when it comes to your tastes & mentallity. I don't know if you guys would agree but in my opinion Hayastantsis are much open minded than other ARmenians in diaspora. -
Do any of you know if Journey and Symphony of Silence can be rented right now?
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BBC 2 shows documentary on Armenian genocideAzg web site, Yerevan13 Feb 03 The BBC documentary on Armenian genocide "Armenia: The Betrayed", originally broadcast on Sunday 26 January on BBC 2, will be presented at Glendale Public Library on 22 February. The British-made documentary is a part of the growing pressure on the British government to recognize the Armenian genocide. Reporter Fergal Keane "investigates how a terrible slaughter, three quarters of a century ago, has returned to haunt the relationship between Turkey and its western allies". The presentation, organized jointly by the Gomidas Institute, Abril Books and Sterndale Classics, also serves to introduce to the US, London-based Sterndale Classics presented by Ara Sarafian and Hilmar Kaiser. Sterndale Classics is the latest development in providing academic underpinnings to the Armenian genocide debate in Great Britain. Both Sarafian and Kaiser have been involved in British efforts for the recognition of the Armenian genocide.
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Do you guys know any good and informative websites where I can find the short history of Armenia being the 1st christian nation? My world history teacher asked us about the 1st countries who were Christian and Muslim, to which I asnwered Saudi Arabia and Armenia when he tells me "No, it's Saudi Arabia and Greece" So if you guys know any good sites regarding the history of it please let me know. thanx
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It's funny how many "people" had their cameras on WTC minutes before the first plane crushed into the first bulding. In the beginning, the media was only showing few videotapes of the planes crushing into the WTC at few different angles, but later they started showing the planes crushing into WTC basiclly from every single angle. Only naive poeople, like those who believe everything that the media tells them can believe that the government had no idea of what was going to happen. Who knows maybe bin-Laden had nothing to do with 9/11.
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MosJan Liovin hamadzainem. Im hairs 2 amis araj erb erevanumer 12 or arit unetsav lsel ira motik engeroj txain vor@ shat taxandavor jazzain erajishte. Hairs asets vor himikva jahelutun@ te arvestum ev te erajshtutian mej miain tsgtume haykakanin. Nuinpes asets vor shat zarmatseler lselov ira engeroj txain vor@ miain haykakan jazzer nvagum. Erb hartsrets nran te inchu haykakan jazz, na asets vor aid erajshtutun@ inkne, ev vor kani vor ink@ haya piti gri ev nvagi haykakan jazz.
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mention not mentioned sorry
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I guess I forgot to mentioned but I was only talking about Armenians from Armenia who do speak Armenian but don't use the language when they're together in public. Harout, Es hamadzainem ko het. Es nuinpes teselem ko asats dzevi hayerin. ES ski tentsnerin chemel handipel hayastanum erb endexei aprum.
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THOOT I know that most of teh oil is in the south. I was just saying what I read.
