Yervant1 Posted June 27 Report Share Posted June 27 Jamestown Foundation June 25 2024 Constitutional Delay in Armenia Threatens to Derail Peace Talks With Azerbaijan Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 96 By: Onnik James Krikorian June 25, 2024 05:01 PM Executive Summary: In June, Baku reiterated its demand that any peace agreement must explicitly address changes in the Armenian Constitution, including the removal of what Azerbaijan and Türkiye perceive as territorial claims against them. Since taking power in 2018, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has sought to revise the constitution, but efforts have been derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic, ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan, and snap elections. Government officials and commentators in Azerbaijan have asserted that the constitutional reforms should be implemented on a deadline if a peace agreement is to be signed, while the situation in Armenia remains unclear. On June 19, Armenian media revealed that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had signed an executive order on May 24 instructing the Council for Constitutional Reforms to “draft a new constitution from scratch” by January 2027 (Azatutyun, June 19). The announcement surprised many, as the council, established in 2022, had already finalized work on proposals for constitutional amendments earlier this year. While Pashinyan had previously considered replacing the constitution entirely, he has acknowledged a minimal need for changes in governance. The renewed focus on constitutional reforms comes as Azerbaijani officials have been calling for the removal of territorial claims within the Armenian Constitution against Azerbaijan and Türkiye, which has become a main point of contention in peace talks between Baku and Yerevan (Anadolu Agency, June 6; Apa.az, June 25). At the beginning of the year, the Armenian premier said that the country should have a constitution “adopted by the people of Armenia” with “results of a vote that do not give rise to doubts” (Armenian Prime Minister, January 19). Pashinyan was referring to referenda held in 2005 and 2015 that were marred by opposition claims of voter fraud and low-voter turnout (Eurasianet, November 29, 2005; December 7, 2015). In January, he concluded that Armenia would benefit from a constitution that makes the country “more competitive and viable in new geopolitical and regional conditions,” a comment many took as referring to normalizing relations with neighboring Azerbaijan and Türkiye (ArmInfo, January 19). Yerevan’s past plans for a referendum to amend the constitution were postponed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Second Karabakh War in 2020, and snap elections in June 2021 (see EDM, January 31). Last year, discussions also included proposals to replace state emblems and remove a controversial preamble asserting territorial claims within Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Earlier this year, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated calls to remove references to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence and the 1989 joint statement on the “Reunification of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh” (Azatutyun, February 1). In early June, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan would not sign a normalization agreement with Armenia unless the preamble was removed (Azatutyun, June 6). “The signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is simply impossible if the existing constitution of Armenia remains unchanged,” Aliyev declared. In response, the Armenian Foreign Ministry denounced Aliyev’s remarks as “blatant interference in the internal affairs of our country” (Azatutyun, June 7). The peace agreement currently under negotiation includes clauses preventing domestic laws from breaching the treaty after ratification. Pashinyan has nonetheless admitted that the preamble includes a “confrontational narrative within the regional environment that [has] kept us in constant conflict with our neighbors” (Civilnet.am, January 20). That sentiment has been challenged by opposition figures who accuse him of yielding to Baku’s pressure (see EDM, April 8). Some past agreements elsewhere in the world have been cited as possible models for bridging the gap between Yerevan’s constitutional impasse and Baku’s demands. For example, James Sharpe, former British ambassador to Azerbaijan, recently referred to the Good Friday Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland, which necessitated constitutional changes through referenda in Ireland (Caliber, June 11). Some South Caucasus observers have advised caution on such a strategy, given past low-voter turnout and growing apathy and political disengagement among the Armenian population (Commonspace.eu, June 15). Analysts in Azerbaijan have said that Aliyev will likely delay a peace treaty until Armenia revises its constitutional preamble (AIR Center, June 12). Farid Shafiyev, chair of the Baku-based Center for Analysis of International Relations, echoes this position but proposes including a commitment to constitutional changes in the treaty within a defined period (e.g., one year) after it is signed (Report.az, June 10). The Azerbaijani Center for South Caucasus Studies has also suggested “holding a referendum to amend Armenia’s constitution and bringing the peace treaty into force after a certain period following its signing.” The organization stresses that “it is not the Pashinyan government but Armenian society that must decide through a referendum whether the treaty will come into force” (JAM News, June 14). Still others, such as Azerbaijani member of parliament Rasim Musabekov, have suggested that Pashinyan could approach the Constitutional Court to have the preamble declared null and void to sign an agreement before drafting a new constitution (Aze.Media, June 10). Daniel Ioannisyan, an Armenian activist and civil society representative on the Council for Constitutional Reforms, supports Pashinyan’s timeline, with a new constitution being completed by late 2026 and a referendum held no sooner than 2027 (Facebook.com/Daniel_Ioannisyan, June 22). Broad public involvement in discussing the changes for at least a year is necessary to ensure that the amendments will pass. As of now, there has been no official response to the latest delays in constitutional reforms or whether Baku finds the revised timeline acceptable. The Council for Constitutional Reforms has also raised concerns that it received no formal notification regarding these changes. Ioannisyan currently describes the new process as “unattended,” stating that there has so far been no indication of when the council might commence work on the new constitution (Azatutyun, June 24). On June 20, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Aliyev to expedite reaching a peace agreement with Yerevan (US Department of State, June 20). The Azerbaijani account of the conversation, however, highlighted the importance of Armenia ceasing its territorial claims against Azerbaijan as outlined in Yerevan’s constitutional framework (President of Azerbaijan, June 21). In such an environment, whether the ongoing delays will prevent the signing of an agreement to normalize relations remains unclear. It is not even clear whether the demand concerns signing a framework or comprehensive deal. While Azerbaijan might have time to wait, Armenia arguably does not. Pashinyan will need to present an acceptable peace deal to the Armenian electorate as his Civil Contract party prepares for elections in 2026. Without one, the risk grows that the opposition can again claim that unilateral concessions made to Azerbaijan were unnecessary all along (DW, May 2). https://jamestown.org/program/constitutional-delay-in-armenia-threatens-to-derail-peace-talks-with-azerbaijan/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Yervant1 Posted June 28 Report Share Posted June 28 Armenpress.am Armenia's future lies in Europe, says Bundestag Deputy Read the article in:العربيةՀայերենქართულიРусский 1 minute read YEREVAN, JUNE 27, ARMENPRESS. Deputies of the National Assembly of Armenia met with the chairman and members of the Bundestag's EU Affairs Committee in Berlin. Head of the Armenian National Assembly Civil Contract Faction Hayk Konjoryan said on social media. "Armenia has always been a European country and the future of Armenia lies in Europe," said Head of the EU Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag Anton Hofreiter. The parties discussed prospects for deepening Armenia-EU relations. Both sides noted that Armenia's democratic development should enhance its resilience and security. They also discussed deepening economic and energy cooperation between Armenia and the EU, along with upcoming projects. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1194650?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1-72yLOS0JYJ8uaeD2JC2XxzKn1VrvMnZXWvXtouoaiRqEMD92Tc-P9Qk_aem_n5puk8K4gQC3zhknzyuQxw Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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Yervant1 Posted July 2 Report Share Posted July 2 July 1 2024 Can France Rescue Armenia From its Security Isolation? By Bianca Leon and SaraJane Rzegocki July 1, 2024 Ties of religion, people, and high culture between France and Armenia stretch back more than 1,000 years. Now Paris has once again emerged as a key ally. Armenia is having a bad decade. The military ascendency was achieved in the 1990s, allowing it to create the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which ended in military defeat. Its neighbors are mostly hostile or suspicious, and Russia, its former military guarantor, has washed its hands of the government in Yerevan. Only Iran shows any support, but its increasingly close relationship with the Kremlin and interest in expanding trade routes with Russia through Armenia’s arch-enemy, Azerbaijan, makes its position less certain. Armenian fears were driven home by Azerbaijan’s two stunning victories in 2020 and September 2023, when it ultimately conquered Nagorno-Karabakh and forced the departure of more than 100,000 Armenians. What to do? Step forward France. Aside from their historical ties, including a deep-rooted Armenian diaspora, France has long sought to exert diplomatic influence in the South Caucasus. The country was a leader within the OSCE Minsk Group, which was created to establish a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Comprising co-chairs France, Russia, and the US, the group’s efforts, ultimately, fell short of achieving a long-lasting resolution. This time France hopes to make a more lasting impact. As an immediate step, France has bolstered Armenia’s defenses by providing air defense radars and a forthcoming agreement will see the delivery of Mistral anti-air missiles. It has also addressed Armenian worries that there might be further escalation in the region, with President Emmanuel Macron reiterating an unwavering commitment to Armenia’s independence, territorial integrity, and democratic processes, before his meeting with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in February. These steps set alarm bells ringing for Azerbaijan’s authoritarian leader Ilham Aliyev and his government. A stronger Armenia is better able to resist pressure from its victorious neighbor, and French involvement clearly strengthens its hand. Azerbaijan accused France of planting the seeds of new military conflict, while Russia — whose share of Armenian military equipment has fallen from about 90% to around 15% — suggested nothing good would come from a NATO country “penetrating” the South Caucasus. There are however limits to what France can do. It’s 2,000 miles from Paris to Yerevan and a quick look at the map explains that shipping or flying in people and goods is not easy if landlocked Armenia’s allies object. France alone cannot provide the security guarantees that Armenia needs in the event of a full-scale invasion from Azerbaijan. https://cepa.org/article/can-france-rescue-armenia-from-its-security-isolation/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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Yervant1 Posted July 4 Report Share Posted July 4 OC Media July 3 2024 Armenian soldier arrested for ‘treason and espionage’ in Azerbaijani honey trap 3 July 2024 ByArshaluys Barseghyan An Armenian contract soldier has been arrested for allegedly handing over state and military secrets to Azerbaijan in exchange for sexual favours. Armenia’s Investigative Committee announced the charges pressed against the 43-year-old contract soldier on Wednesday. The soldier is accused of communicating with an undercover Azerbaijani agent, who allegedly lured him into having ‘romantic conversations’ with them. The Investigative Committee said the soldier had ‘collected and handed over state service secrets, as well as military information regarding the weapons of the combat position under the protection of their unit’ between January 2023 and February 2024. ‘Those actions caused damage to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and external security of the Republic of Armenia’, read the statement. If found guilty, the soldier could face up to twenty years or life imprisonment. The unnamed soldier was the latest among dozens to be charged with espionage in the years following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020. In September 2022, then Prosecutor General Arthur Davtyan proposed constitutional and legal changes that would prescribe the death penalty for treason. He suggested that after examining several treason prosecutions during and after the 2020 war made ‘the question of strengthening the criminal and legal fight against this type of crime, and tightening the punitive policy, a priority’. As of May, CivilNet reported that more than 30 criminal cases were launched against people accused of treason. Seventeen of those resulted in indictments with more than 25 people being tried in court, of which three people have so far been found guilty. https://oc-media.org/armenian-soldier-arrested-for-treason-and-espionage-in-azerbaijani-honey-trap/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Yervant1 Posted July 4 Report Share Posted July 4 Armenpress.am In parallel to peace treaty negotiations, Baku creates new obstacles, delaying its signing -Mirzoyan Read the article in:العربيةEspañolفارسیFrançaisՀայերենРусский简体中文 2 minute read YEREVAN, JULY 3, ARMENPRESS. In parallel with the ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Yerevan, unfortunately, sees new obstacles created by Baku to artificially delay the process. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said this during a joint press conference with Georgian Foreign Minister Ilia Darchiashvili. He thanked the Georgian side for supporting the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan. "We attach great importance to the continuation of the delimitation process based on the Alma-Ata Declaration. In parallel, the peace agreement is being prepared, and Armenia is also very constructive here. Armenia's proposals and approaches are transparent," the minister emphasized, stating that Armenia considers it realistic to complete the preparation and sign the peace agreement with Azerbaijan within a month through intensive work. Mirzoyan reiterated that Armenia has not received a positive response from Azerbaijan regarding this proposal. “On the contrary, we see that new, I can say with confidence, artificial obstacles are being created to delay the process, but we continue to believe that there is a historical opportunity to establish long-term peace in the region,” Mirzoyan said. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1195030?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3l2iJrll60znjfFTvvq87UmVvGDKbt5KbSQ9-xsgf2Ao1GkPq3sG3S7P4_aem_EW5NwIw3Owt23jXJuDzI9A Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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Yervant1 Posted July 6 Report Share Posted July 6 India - July 5 2024 India to help Armenia match Azerbaijan’s military power By Ajay Kumar Haldar - July 5, 2024 3 Armenia has reportedly contacted India to ask about purchasing theater quasi-ballistic missiles; this action was probably instigated by Azerbaijan’s recent deployment of the Israeli-manufactured LORA system. With a 400km range, the LORA became an issue for Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The use of Azerbaijan in the last stages of the war, especially against the Lachin corridor bridge, demonstrated the possible threat it poses. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for possible LORA production in India was signed at Aero India 2023 by Bharat Electronics and IAI. This license arrangement is probably still in its early phases, though. The Prahaar is a 200km tactical ballistic missile developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO). Although they haven’t been formally recruited yet, the Indian military currently prefers the Pralay missile system which has a range of 500 km. It’s still unclear what precisely Armenia is requesting, and how India would respond. Such weapons are delicate, which adds another level of difficulty. Notably, Armenia already uses the 90-kilometer-range Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) from India. The desire of Armenia to obtain longer-range missiles highlights the continuous tensions in the region. It is unclear if India will grant Armenia’s request; considerations such as continuing license agreements and national security priorities may influence the outcome. https://vidhannews.com/international/india-to-help-armenia-match-azerbaijans-military-power/3895/ 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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Yervant1 Posted July 7 Report Share Posted July 7 The Deep Dive July 5 2024 Armenia and US in Talks for New Nuclear Power Plant Armenia is in “substantive” negotiations with the United States to build a new nuclear power plant, according to Armen Grigoryan, the head of Armenia’s Security Council. The talks are currently focused on establishing a legal framework for the project, with Grigoryan indicating that further progress awaits action from the US side. ‘Without a legal framework, we cannot move forward. At this moment, I can say that the ball is in the US’ court’, Grigoryan said but did not provide more details. This development marks a shift from Armenia’s previous plans. In 2021, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced discussions with Russia about replacing the aging Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, the sole nuclear facility in the Caucasus region. Armenia subsequently contracted Russia’s Rosatom in 2023 to extend Metsamor’s operational life until 2036. A joint statement from an Armenia-US-EU summit revealed American intentions to support Armenia in diversifying its energy production, including exploring new civil nuclear power options. This aligns with a 2022 memorandum of understanding between Armenia and the US on civil nuclear cooperation. If the project moves forward, it will represent a pivotal shift in Armenia’s energy landscape and diplomatic relationships. This initiative could significantly reduce Armenia’s reliance on Russian energy resources while strengthening ties with Western allies. The new nuclear power plant would not only modernize Armenia’s energy infrastructure but also potentially reshape its geopolitical position in the Caucasus region. https://thedeepdive.ca/armenia-and-us-in-talks-for-new-nuclear-power-plant/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Yervant1 Posted July 11 Report Share Posted July 11 Armenpress.am Blinken says Armenia, Azerbaijan close to being able to reach a final agreement Read the article in:العربيةفارسیFrançaisՀայերենРусский 2 minute read YEREVAN, JULY 10, ARMENPRESS. Armenia and Azerbaijan are very close to being able to reach a final agreement, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Wednesday. “Over the last year, year and a half, Armenia and Azerbaijan have done very important work toward negotiating and concluding a peace agreement – one that is durable, one that is dignified, and one that would open extraordinary possibilities for both countries, the region that they share, and for their relationship with the United States. Throughout this process, the United States has sought to be helpful and supportive, along with the European Union and many colleagues in Europe. Today is an opportunity to take stock in the progress that’s been made, what remains. But based on all of the engagements that we’ve had, including in recent weeks, I believe both countries are very close to being able to reach a final agreement, one that the United States would strongly, strongly support. So I’m very appreciative of today to, again, take stock of where we are and to see what more the United States can do to be helpful in helping you reach an agreement. Thanks to you both for being here”, U.S. State Department quoted Blinken as saying. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1195473?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0nhrO0AIf_ggLJ4050GvcxNQQccm_BR0LNSIvVi83t3109ahUvZVvl6cg_aem_GI9iY0Z10I2GsRIbXYjLLA Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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Yervant1 Posted July 13 Report Share Posted July 13 July 12 2024 COMMENT: Armenia needs a green light from Brussels to fulfil its European dream By Robert Ananyan in Yerevan July 12, 2024 Under threat from Russia and Azerbaijan, Armenia is seeking new partners and guarantees in the West. European integration or even joining the European Union has become one of the top issues on Armenia's political agenda. The anti-government rallies of pro-Russian opposition forces that started in the spring have failed. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan remains in power, during whose tenure cooperation with the US and the EU has intensified unprecedentedly, peaking at a April 5 meeting in Brussels. Now, the "Platform of Democratic Forces" uniting four pro-Western parties, is pressuring Pashinyan’s government. They are demanding a referendum on EU membership, pointing to Ukraine and Moldova, which have already begun negotiations on membership. Pashinyan has not dismissed these demands. Moreover, on October 17, 2023, he declared from the European Parliament's podium that "Armenia is ready to be as close to the EU as the EU considers possible”. Theoretically, this should mean membership if the European Union deems it possible. Recently, during the "Armenian Democracy Forum" held in Yerevan, Pashinyan was more candid, stating he wouldn’t have made such a statement if he thought Armenians did not support the idea. Indeed, according to a poll conducted a few months ago by the International Republican Institute, Russia's rating has plummeted, and the country, once considered an ally, is now seen as one of three states posing political and economic threats. Meanwhile, the US, France, and the EU are perceived by Armenians as their leading security and economic partners. The West almost has no negative ratings. Public opinion today is therefore favourable, and if Pashinyan calls for a referendum on EU membership, it will likely result in a positive outcome. However, he wants assurances that Brussels will also welcome Armenians' pro-European aspirations. Armenia needs to be confident that it will receive EU candidate status, like neighbouring Georgia. Pashinyan insists that he cannot say how ready the European Union is for Armenia's membership. Thus, Armenia's leader is publicly asking the newly elected leadership of the European Union and the European Parliament for an answer on whether they see Armenia in the EU. More specifically, is the EU ready to start negotiations with Armenia as it is doing with Ukraine and Moldova? But the economic and geopolitical situation is difficult. If these problems are not overcome, Yerevan cannot be deemed a realistic candidate for the EU. EU intensifies its focus After four years of negotiations, Armenia's third president, Serzh Sargsyan, refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 and decided to make Armenia part of the Russia-led Customs Union, later called the EEU. In 2017, Armenia and the EU signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, which differs from the Association Agreement only by the absence of the free trade component. Since 2020, the European Union has noticeably intensified its attention on the South Caucasus. Georgia has obtained candidate status for membership. Georgia's fate will be decided in the parliamentary elections in October. Today, Yerevan and Brussels are trying to align Armenia's economic standards with European ones, opening the doors of European markets for Armenian producers. In 2021, the EU offered Armenia a new economic and investment plan, a €2.6 billion support package. So far, €550 million of this amount has been spent and invested in the economy, mostly consisting of preferential loans supporting small and medium-sized businesses. The rest mainly concerns capital expenditures. The EU has also assumed a security role by deploying an observer mission in Armenia on the border with Azerbaijan. The EU also wants Armenia to participate in the Black Sea transmission cable project, contributing to the European continent's energy security. This year, the partnership council agreed to start work on a new EU-Armenia partnership agenda. A document on high political commitment has been prepared, which should record the high level of political relations between Armenia and the European Union and agree on more concrete programmes. This is a higher-status document than the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. Armenia should complete the implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by 2027. Currently, the agreement is 80% implemented. Thus, in two to three years, Armenia and the EU should summarize the implementation of the agreement and commit to raising relations to a new level. Theoretically, this could mean granting Armenia candidate status for EU membership. Ursula von der Leyen, who is likely to continue presiding over the European Commission, has positive experience working with Armenia. The main issue at the April 5 meeting in Brussels with the participation of Pashinyan, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and von der Leyen, was increasing Armenia's resilience and economic resilience. The EU and the US intend to help Armenia mitigate risks, diversify trade, expand technological infrastructure, and strengthen economic and institutional resilience. For its part, the United States is committed to enhancing Armenia's food security and facilitating the flow of agricultural products across Armenia's borders. The US and Armenia have a preliminary agreement on constructing an American nuclear power plant. The US has also included Armenia in the Middle Corridor project connecting Central Asia to Europe and Nato countries, but its implementation is tied to the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement. The document agreed upon at the April 5 meeting lays serious groundwork for preparing Armenia's economy to shift toward Europe. Armenia has significant homework to cut off its economic dependence on Russia and move closer to the EU. This is a challenging task. Armenian businesses do not exert much effort to sell goods in the Russian market, as low-quality and cheap goods are easily sold. Armenian exports to Russia amounted to $7-8 billion in 2023. This is a significant share of Armenia's economy but has also created an unhealthy dependence on the Russian economy. On April 5, the US and the EU essentially committed to supporting Armenia in raising its economic standards and entering European markets. Yerevan and Brussels are currently working to establish laboratories in Armenia to allow certified Armenian products to be exported to Europe without hindrance. Economic sector officials promise to ensure a positive outcome in trade route diversification in the next 1-2 years, as 3,000 Armenian companies have already modernized their equipment. Economic risks However, it will not be easy to sever Armenia's economic dependence on Russia, especially since Armenia's economy has doubled since 2020, nearing the $25 billion mark. A significant portion of this growth is due to exports to Russia. Armenia is one of the world's leaders in economic growth, but if Yerevan wants to join the European Union, it must take risks and leave the EEU. Armenia cannot be a member of two economic unions. The Armenian government has indicated that it has calculated the economic and political sanctions Russia might impose in case of a sharp turn towards to the EU. To prevent Armenia's economy from collapsing due to Russian sanctions, the new EU leadership must be decisive in supporting Armenia. Only with economic guarantees will Pashinyan's government take the step of shaking up economic relations with Russia, knowing that it will create new security threats. To reduce energy dependence, the American side is supporting the Armenian government in developing and implementing a diversification and liberalization strategy. High-ranking Armenian officials candidly admit off the record that politically, Yerevan will easily decide to join the EU. The idea of EU membership is popular in Armenia. However, they want Armenia's economic resilience to increase and get closer to European standards. In the case of Russian sanctions, Armenian producers must be ready to transition to European markets.Today, Armenia's economy is preparing for such a scenario. However, the process's efficiency can only be assessed at a critical moment. Pashinyan's government will likely take practical steps to apply for EU membership in 2026 during the parliamentary elections. It can be expected that the "Platform of Democratic Forces" and the "Civil Contract" will compete in 2026 to be the flagbearers of the European integration agenda. The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the periodic military attacks planned by Azerbaijan and Russia have undermined the Pashinyan government's positions. He needs to give voters a new reason to vote for the Civil Contract party. He will likely announce before 2026 that if Armenians want to see concrete steps towards EU membership, they must choose his political team. But if Brussels responds positively to Pashinyan’s raising of the issue in the coming months, the process of obtaining candidate status for the EU could accelerate. The escalation of security threats against Armenia may also prompt Pashinyan to speed up the process. There is a prevailing view among Armenia's political elite that Azerbaijan will not dare to start a war against a country with EU candidate status. Handling Russia There is a perspective that Armenia is forced to maintain a balance or ambiguity between Russia and the West to increase its leverage. This might have worked until February 24, 2022. Pashinyan's government is now convinced that Russia threatens Armenia's independence and sovereignty. Moreover, Pashinyan has accused two CSTO member states, Belarus and Russia, of supporting Azerbaijan in preparing for war against Armenia. Today, Pashinyan's government is heading towards freezing relations with Moscow. Pashinyan understands that leaving the CSTO would also mean leaving the EEU. Yerevan has suspended its participation in the CSTO, and it is only a de jure a member of this alliance. Armenian officials frequently express accusatory and critical remarks towards Moscow, freezing political contacts with Russian officials. Receiving only threats and dangers to its independence instead of support from Russia, Armenia has made deepening cooperation with the EU and the US its main tool for protecting its statehood. Armenia is deepening its cooperation with the West at Russia's expense. Yet the step of joining the EU will be a major earthquake in Armenian-Russian relations, and Yerevan must approach that day in good economic and security shape. Sharp anti-Russian steps can endanger the gradual distancing from Moscow. Yerevan has chosen a subtle, smooth, and peaceful approach to disengagement, avoiding the noisy and dangerous experience of Georgia's former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Recently, Armenia and the USA have elevated their relations to the level of a strategic partnership commission. While postponing the exercise with Georgia, the USA is conducting an exercise with Armenia. The USA is involved in the reform of the Armenian Armed Forces. Under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron, France broke the taboo and is selling weapons to Armenia, which still holds CSTO membership. With France's support, the European Union very quickly deployed observers on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. On April 5, crucial economic projects were agreed upon. All this might have seemed like fantasy a year ago, but today it is a reality. However, Armenia may lose an important partner in its European integration efforts if Donald Trump is elected US president in November. Joe Biden's administration has elevated US-Armenia relations to a strategic level, which might be cancelled by Trump. Armenia could also lose a powerful ally in France. If the right-wing populist forces continue their triumph in France and Macron loses his political support in parliament, French support might weaken. The likelihood of forming a right-wing populist government in France could not only end Paris's activity towards Armenia but also weaken the EU as a geopolitical actor. This could endanger the EU's enlargement policy and even cast doubt on Ukraine's membership. Strengthening Macron's position in France and Biden's reelection would accelerate Armenia's European integration process and give more confidence to Pashinyan. Today, it is not possible to unequivocally assert that Armenia will not apply for EU membership. This depends primarily on the policies adopted by the member states of the European Union and the newly elected leadership of the EU regarding enlargement. If the parties opposing EU enlargement continue to win at the national level, Yerevan's European course might be halted or complicated. For a long time, Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary impeded the process of providing 10 million euros in support from the European Peace Facility to Armenia. But eventually, Hungary gave its consent. Armenia is currently negotiating with individual EU countries on visa liberalization. It is understood that Austria, with a centre-right political government, has also posed certain difficulties in negotiations with Armenia. In the next elections, the far-right Freedom Party may win in Austria. This could also jeopardize the EU's enlargement policy. Unexpectedly positive news comes from Iran. The election of the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as president will be favourable for Armenia's European integration agenda. Pezeshkian is a supporter of improving relations with the West and could approach Armenia's aspiration to join the EU with understanding. For Iran, the establishment of a Western military base in Armenia is a red line, while EU membership is seen as a chance for economic cooperation with the West. It will also be important that the Georgian Dream party of Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose pro-Russian stance threatens the country's EU membership, does not win in Georgia in October. By controlling Georgia, Russia could also close Armenia's path to Europe. The referendum on EU membership is purely a technical process and not the most crucial. Armenia must become European in terms of economy, energy, security, democracy, human rights, and political system. Armenia needs to carry out internal procedures of European integration as efficiently as possible. Theoretically, Armenia can adopt European standards without joining the EU if geopolitical conditions are unfavourable. However, if Russia weakens in the war against Ukraine, if the administrations of Macron and Biden continue to govern, and if the EU member states and the European Commission continue their enlargement policy, Armenia will apply for candidate status for EU membership. Armenia is awaiting the formation of a new geopolitical status quo, where the collective West, with global ambitions, will have a dominant role. https://www.intellinews.com/comment-armenia-needs-a-green-light-from-brussels-to-fulfil-its-european-dream-333520/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Yervant1 Posted July 14 Report Share Posted July 14 CommonSpace.eu July 13 2024 Ahead of November, Armenia and Azerbaijan juggle for their geopolitical position 13 JULY 2024 Onnik James Krikorian In the lead-up to this year's NATO Summit in Washington D.C., it was uncertain whether Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov would meet. However, a last-minute announcement confirmed that they would, albeit not in a bilateral format, but with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Expectations were low, given disagreements over Azerbaijani demands for Armenia to change its constitution and the United States now apparently pushing its own vision for unblocking trade and communication in the region. Nonetheless, Blinken again emphasised that the two were close to reaching a deal. The foreign ministers issued identical scant three-paragraph statements which at least referred to a “historic agreement.” Meanwhile, Moscow expressed its displeasure at both foreign ministers being invited to the event, which also marked the 75th anniversary of the military alliance in existence to counter the former Soviet Union at first and now the Russian Federation. For Armenia, as it seeks to diversify its economic, energy, and security needs away from its former sponsor, such a posture is now welcomed as it seeks external support to balance itself against Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is now also reliant on Western support as he seeks to reverse his declining ratings. He has also found it useful to make Russia a scapegoat for his own security failings that saw the collapse of previous negotiations prior to September 2020 when war broke out instead. The same is true for the exodus of just over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Karabakh last year. For Azerbaijan, however, the situation is more complex. Baku is cautious about being drawn into geopolitical confrontations, especially given its shared border with the Russian Federation. As a result, Baku has to be more flexible in its geopolitical manoeuvring while Yerevan has significantly less options in comparison. Nonetheless, for the United States and European Union, any successful diversification by Armenia means normalisation with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The country is landlocked and needs access to both Europe and later Central Asia. This therefore concerns Iran, one of its two trade routes operating given closed borders with its other neighbours. Only last week the Iranian State Media reported that if normalisation occurs then efforts must be made to increase the amount of gas supplied to Armenia when a barter agreement for electricity in return expires in 2030. Otherwise, Azerbaijan and Türkiye will take the initiative if the United States has its way. However, achieving that would require not only normalising relations with Azerbaijan but prematurely ending Gazprom's monopoly on the Armenian market and its pipelines, something set to continue until 2043. Some analysts supportive of Pashinyan have suggested the nationalisation of these pipelines, but that would be a significant gamble. Despite U.S. ambitions to bypass and exclude China and Russia from new regional trade routes neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan likely share this view. Even in 2001, a month after talks between then-presidents Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev at Key West, Pashinyan expressed such a perspective in his Haykakan Zhamanak newspaper. Even over two decades ago, the country's long-term future rested on financially benefiting from everyone if a trade route from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan via Armenia was restored, he wrote. At any rate, following the talks between Bayramov, Mirzoyan, and Blinken at the recent NATO summit, many analysts are skeptical that anything will emerge from it. First, the Biden administration might have less than six months left in office, though this is of course unknown, and secondly, neither side seems able to trust each other. The main difference between them is that while Baku can afford to wait for a deal, Yerevan cannot since Pashinyan needs to demonstrate how his “peace agenda” paid off and brought with it human, political, and security benefits by the time of elections set for mid-2026 at the latest. The stakes will be even higher if nothing comes by next year. On July 18th, both Aliyev and Pashinyan could attend the next European Political Community (EPC) summit at Blenheim Palace in the United Kingdom. It is worth noting, however, that Azerbaijan withdrew from the last EPC in Granada. Whether that happens again next week will be particularly revealing given that Hungary, a country considered the closest to Azerbaijan and Russia in the European Union, will host the following EPC on 7 November. This means that the EPC in Budapest will occur not only two days after the U.S. presidential elections on 5 November but also two days before the UN Climate Change Conference in Baku on 9 November. All three events could therefore prove pivotal. Hopes, though diminishing, were for some kind of agreement to be signed by COP-29. Assuming one is to come, though there is so far no indication that it will, few are expecting a comprehensive peace treaty. A framework agreement, however, would be better than none. Consider it at least akin to the Basic or Madrid Principles drawn up during the heyday of the OSCE Minsk Group but which were never officially endorsed, thus leading to the 44-day-war in 2020. Even though a comprehensive agreement is the ideal, it is imperative that past mistakes are not repeated again. source: Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, photojournalist, and consultant from the U.K. who has covered the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict since 1994. photo: US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, hosted Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Azerbaijani foreign minister Jeyhun Bayramov, for talks in Washington DC in July on the margins of the NATO summit The views expressed in opinion pieces and commentaries do not necessarily reflect the position of commonspace.eu or its partners https://www.commonspace.eu/opinion/opinion-ahead-november-armenia-and-azerbaijan-juggle-their-geopolitical-position Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Yervant1 Posted July 14 Report Share Posted July 14 London School of Economics, UK July 13 2024 Why the world must support Armenia’s “defeated democracy” against Russian hybrid warfare Areg Kochinyan July 12th, 2024 Since Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, Russia has used economic, political, and (indirectly by means of Azerbaijan) military means to undermine the country’s democratic government. The recapture by Azerbaijan of Nagorno Karabakh and the displacement of its entire ethnic-Armenian population was achieved under the watchful eye of Russian “peacekeeping” troops, making a mockery of Russia’s formal status as an Armenian ally. This unfortunate reality raises the question of whether Armenia’s democratisation has come at the cost of its security – a view encouraged by authoritarian, pro-Russian figures seeking to return to power in Yerevan. This dangerous thesis would fly in the face of the idea of democratic security – the idea that democracy is a security asset. If democracy is so good for national security, how come democratisation in Armenia has coincided with lost wars and destabilisation? But if we are to prove this Kremlin-friendly narrative wrong, we need to understand why Armenia has ended up in this position. And also ask what methods can be used to bolster a “defeated democracy”? The Kremlin doesn’t trust or like any government that rises to power as a result of democratisation. It is also usually hostile to any democratic system, at least within the borders of the former Soviet Empire. Modern Russia has become an antidemocratic revisionist power that aims to roll back the post-1989 democratic wave and reinstall autocratic regimes in its neighbourhood. This is similar to the position of the Russian Empire during the mid-19th century “Concert of Europe” era when it attempted to push back against contemporary developments such as the Austrian revolutions. The new democratic government in Armenia at first tried to avoid confrontation with Russia and minimise the level of mistrust and animosity. For this reason, Armenia supported every major Russian initiative before the war in Ukraine (even violent interventions in Syria and Kazakhstan). There was a period when the Armenian political elite believed that it was possible to both remain within the Russian sphere of influence and pursue democratisation. But this proved impossible not only because of the Kremlin’s principal opposition to democratic development but also due to changes in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. Since 2016, Armenia had already been steadily losing its role as Russia’s key strategic ally in the region. For Moscow, Armenia’s principal rivals – Azerbaijan and Turkey – were transforming into more important partners. Just before the Ukraine invasion, Putin hosted Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev and signed a strategic partnership agreement. Azerbaijan has now become one of the Kremlin’s most important partners on logistics and energy, and has been used as a tool of hybrid warfare against Armenia. Turkey has also become a major energy and connectivity hub for Russia. Turkey is now the only major market on its western border still open to Russia and the only partner in the West with whom Russian cooperation grows. For example Turkey and Russia have cooperated on nuclear power stations, the Turkstream gas pipeline, and Turkey’s purchase of Russian S400 missile systems. Furthermore, all three countries are led by governments with authoritarian leanings. Thus, Armenia, currently the only country in the region where democracy is advancing rather than backsliding, confronts a triple alliance of Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian Turkey and the outright dictatorships of Russia and Azerbaijan. This was evident in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, the attacks on Armenia proper between 2021-3, and finally during the full capture of Nagorno-Karabakh and the total displacement of its population. In the latter case, Russia did nothing to stop Azerbaijan. But Russia had already long been conducting a campaign of hybrid warfare against Armenia. Russia cut off the gas supply to Armenia for more than 2 months in 2023, created artificial problems for Armenian goods in its market, and failed to supply weaponry that Armenia had paid for. According to a statement by the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, the latter move aimed to weaken Armenia’s negotiation leverage with Azerbaijan. Russia has also backed attempts to replace Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, including through non-democratic means. One might ask: Why is this all being done? The answer is simple: Moscow wants the complete subordination of Armenia. It also supports the creation of an extraterritorial “Zangezur corridor” that would link Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan. Despite this grave picture, Armenia remains too dependent on Russia to act boldly on its own. Russia maintains a military base in Gyumri, Russian border guards stand on Armenia’s western and southern frontiers, and Armenia is a member of the Russia-led CSTO alliance set up as an alternative to NATO. Armenia and Russia also have joint air defence divisions. But this dependence goes beyond these hard security issues. There is also the issue of the economy (Russia is Armenia’s biggest trade partner), energy (Russia supplies almost all the natural gas and uranium), and infrastructure (Russia controls Armenia’s railroad system, power cables, and natural gas pipelines). All this adds up to a difficult position for Armenia. To withstand this and survive as a democracy, Armenia needs support. This, at best, could look like what France is currently doing. That is supplying weapons and ammunition, supporting reforms in the armed forces, and helping develop territorial and air defence systems. But Armenia also needs political support to enable it to normalise the situation on the ground. Such projects include the country’s initiative to start border delimitation and demarcation processes with Azerbaijan and Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative. The latter is a connectivity project that aims to unlock the economic potential of the region based on international order and the rule of law. Russian hybrid warfare targets not only Armenian democracy but also Armenia’s very independence. Russia maintains an imperial land collection mindset and is ready to sacrifice its former Armenian allies’ interests to fulfil its goals. This puts Armenia in a similar position as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which also see Euro-Atlantic integration as a means of survival and protection against the Russian threat. But there also needs to be a matching willingness in the West to support Armenia and ensure that the tiny Caucasus nation is rewarded and not punished for its fealty to democratic values. This blog is published in partnership with the Democratic Security Institute (DSI) based in Tbilisi, Georgia. It is part of a series of blogs authored by fellows from DSI’s Eurasia Democratic Security Network (EDSN) on the interrelationship between democracy and security in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. EDSN is supported by the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Areg Kochinyan is the president of Research Center on Security policy an Armenian think tank concentrated on foreign affairs, security, resilience, regional and global politics. He runs Dilemma TV series on the issues of security and democracy. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2024/07/12/why-the-world-must-support-armenias-defeated-democracy-against-russian-hybrid-warfare/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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Yervant1 Posted July 16 Report Share Posted July 16 Byline Times July 15 2024 Why Armenia’s Latest Anti-Government Movement Failed and What South Caucasus Conflicts Reveal About Future of Global Politics A charismatic bishop led thousands to protest the government’s handling of tensions with Azerbaijan, but experts say the movement has proven only a flash in the pan Will Neal 15 July 2024 Tens of thousands took to the streets of Yerevan earlier in May to demand the resignation of the Armenian government. Coming at the same time as massive popular protests in neighbouring Georgia over a punitive new law on ‘foreign influence’, it seemed change was in the air in the South Caucasus. However, while the demonstrations in Georgia have since galvanised the country’s previously fractured political opposition toward unity ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for October, experts say the ‘Tavush for Homeland’ protests in neighbouring Armenia appear to have now ended not with a bang, but a whimper. “After its initial launch in May, we saw a rapid decline in the number of people. It’s one thing to come out and yell and make fiery speeches, but then everyone just went home,” says Richard Giragosian, founding director of the Regional Studies Centre, a Yerevan-based think tank. “In other words, it simply petered out after a steady erosion of momentum.” Led by the charismatic Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, Armenia’s latest anti-government movement stood as testament to the sheer scale of popular outcry over Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s recent decision to hand four villages in the country’s northeast Tavush region over to Azerbaijan, with whom Armenia has been locked in a perpetual cycle of either frozen or active conflict since both nations’ independence from the Soviet Union. These territorial concessions have come just months after the latest chapter in the ongoing conflict saw more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians forced to flee a lightning Azerbaijani assault on Nagorno Karabakh – a previously autonomous mountain enclave within Azerbaijan’s borders, regarded by many as the spiritual homeland of the Armenian people – following a ten month blockade that had pushed the region’s inhabitants to the brink of starvation. “The primary driver behind the recent protest movement was this feeling of hopelessness, the anger and resentment for everything that has happened between Armenia and Azerbaijan, especially over the past four years,” says Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior research fellow at think-tank ARPI Armenia. “Then in the spring, the government said they were going to start this border delimitation process, starting from the Tavush region – I think for many people, it was simply the last straw.” Despite the scale of public outcry, Giragosian and Poghosyan say there are a variety of reasons the recent demonstrations failed to mount a challenge to the incumbent administration of comparable force to that which saw the previous government ousted in Armenia’s pro-democracy, anti-corruption revolution of 2018. The protests were blighted almost from the start by an apparent absence of effective political coordination. Although a highly popular public figure, Galstanyan has no experience in office, while Armenia’s political opposition have largely failed to recover their credibility since the revolution. Demands for the government’s resignation, and the protesters’ nomination of Galstanyan to replace Pashinyan as prime minister, therefore came without a clear roadmap for how exactly this envisioned transition of power was actually supposed to take place. “For me, the key moment was when Archbishop Galstanyan said, ‘Ok, we will resolve everything within a month’, but did not then provide a viable way to do that,” says Poghosyan. “How were they going to achieve this, how were they going to force ruling party members to vote to impeach the prime minister? How were they going to force resignations? The lack of understanding about how it was all going to happen, that was a key factor.” Pashinyan also continues to wield what critics have described as excessive control of both the country’s judiciary and law enforcement authorities. This not only meant any chances of a coup were slim to none, but also that the government was able to prevent early episodes of police violence against protesters from progressing to a severe crackdown. “After an initial degree of overreaction by the police and security forces, I think the government was very careful and cautious to ensure discipline – in other words to avoid an escalation, coupled with a strategy of simply not going for the bait,” Giragosian says. “Think of it as prime minister’s question time in the House of Commons, that question from the backbench opposition that simply goes unanswered.” Giragosian adds there is also a degree to which, behind the outrage and fury of the protests, a reluctant resignation has set in over the desperate position that Armenia now finds itself in both with regard to ongoing border disputes with Azerbaijan, and on the international stage. With its hands full carrying out Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, Moscow has gradually distanced itself from its historic role as security guarantor between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This has in turn witnessed something of a deepening trend toward irredentism and domestic radicalism in Baku, with diminishing Kremlin interest most recently being perceived as having provided something of a greenlight for Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno Karabakh last September. Locked between two historically hostile nations, with Turkey to its west and Azerbaijan in the east, many feel Armenia has found itself in dire need of new alliances. Among those voices would appear to be Pashinyan, who has lately confirmed Armenia’s imminent withdrawal from the Russian-led CSTO while also seeking mediation from the US on peace talks with the Aliyev regime and deepening defence ties with France. “It is a difficult resignation of the population, accepting our weakness and lack of leverage,” Giragosian explains. “However, that has ended from a state of denial into a much more realistic accommodation of how to play a weak hand better, which is why I think the outlook for domestic stability is actually pretty strong.” Whether this shift in foreign policy outlook will yield greater national security in the longer-term remains to be seen. As Giragosian notes, Western engagement in negotiations for a lasting amnesty between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not necessarily ensure the outcome of those talks will not prove a “punitive peace” for Armenia, nor afford a guarantee of protection in the event Azerbaijan should choose to violate whatever treaty may eventually be put in place. What’s nevertheless clear is how even after two years, the fallout of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine continues to prove a driving force in a wider realignment of powers in this former corner of the Soviet Union, itself perhaps something of a study-in-miniature on the wider shift in global order prompted by the conflict. “Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the South Caucasus is becoming more and more entangled in a confrontation between Russia and the West,” Poghosyan says. “What’s happening in the region is a sign of what the post-unipolar world is going to look like. More chaotic, more complex – many actors with contradicting interests fighting between themselves, and meanwhile using smaller states and smaller powers as leverage.” https://bylinetimes.com/2024/07/15/why-armenias-latest-anti-government-movement-failed-and-what-south-caucasus-conflicts-reveal-about-future-of-global-politics/ 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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