new promising era New Promising Era "President" & VP Nikol Pashinian

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March 7 2024

"Armenia can ensure the security of its airport on its own": Russian border guards will leave Zvartnots

• JAMnews

• Yerevan

Withdrawal of Russian border guards from Armenia

“Armenia has sent an official letter to Russia regarding the cessation of the work of Russian border guards at Zvartnots Airport in Yerevan,” said secretary of the Security Council Armen Grigoryan during a briefing on March 7.

“Armenia has a clear position on this matter: only Armenian border troops should be responsible for border service at the airport,” he said.

Armenia shares land borders with four countries: Iran, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Armenian border guards patrol the Armenian-Georgian and Armenian-Azerbaijani borders. The Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Iranian borders are guarded by units of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Armenia signed a corresponding interstate agreement with Russia immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in September 1992.

Armen Grigoryan also commented on other aspects of Armenian-Russian relations, including Armenia’s prospects for participation in the CSTO military bloc (a post-Soviet bloc led by Russia) and arms procurement.

“Armenia has all the capabilities for full control” of its territory”

Secretary of the Security Council stated that over the years of independence, Armenia has acquired various capabilities and skills. And now it is able to independently and effectively control its airport.

Grigoryan also spoke about arms supplies from Russia. He reported that purchases of military equipment from Russia have decreased from 96 percent to less than 10 percent:

“This means that Armenia is implementing a policy of diversification, seeking and finding partners not only in the West but also in Asia, India, and other directions.”

The secretary of the Security Council emphasized that Yerevan has only recently implemented a diversification policy in the security sphere.

“Until at least December 2021, we relied almost 100 percent on Russia for all our security guarantees. And this did not help when security threats arose. We faced large-scale attacks from Azerbaijan and the occupation of Armenian territory [referring to military actions in May 2021 and September 2022].“

“Russia has poor relations with many countries”

Journalists asked the secretary of the Security Council if Armenia is preparing to leave the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), led by Russia. They did not receive a specific answer to this question.

“We asserted that Armenia shares a border with Azerbaijan, but in the CSTO, they claimed otherwise, and they didn’t even condemn the occupation of Armenian territory.”

Armen Grigoryan said that further relations need to be clarified with the CSTO. He reminded that Armenia expects explanations from the alliance partners regarding their stance on the CSTO’s sphere of responsibility, which includes recognition of Armenia’s borders:

The CSTO should respond, and Armenia’s questions “cannot remain hanging in the air”, Grigoryan said.

“Armenia is often accused of supposedly worsening relations with Russia. However, if you look at the situation more broadly, you’ll see many parallels. If someone’s relations deteriorate with many at once, it’s possibly that someone’s problem. It’s untrue that the West allegedly forces Armenia to spoil relations with Russia,” Grigoryan said.

https://jam-news.net/armenia-can-ensure-the-security-of-its-airport-on-its-own-russian-border-guards-will-leave-zvartnots/

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POLITICO

March 9 2024

Armenia mulling EU membership application, foreign minister says

“New opportunities are largely being discussed in Armenia nowadays,” Ararat. Mirzoyan said. “That includes membership in the European Union.”

BY GIAN VOLPICELLI

Armenia is considering applying to join the European Union, its Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said on Friday.

In a television interview with Turkish channel TRT on the sidelines of a diplomatic gathering in Antalya, Turkey, Mirzoyan said Armenia is seeking to get closer to the West amid worsening relations with Russia.

“New opportunities are largely being discussed in Armenia nowadays,” Mirzoyan said. “That includes membership in the European Union.”

His remarks follow reports in the Armenian press that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan plans to start the EU application process by late 2024.

Pashinyan has served as the country’s premier since 2018, and has spearheaded efforts to build deeper ties with the West, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the Kremlin’s growing support for Armenia’s regional rival Azerbaijan.

https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-mulling-eu-membership-application-foreign-minister-mirzoyan-says/

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March 9 2024

Armenia Orders Indian Artillery Guns Amid Azerbaijan Tensions; May Acquire ATAGS Before Indian Army – Reports

By

Ritu Sharma

-

March 9, 2024

As the tenuous peace in the South Caucasus is hanging by a thread, Azerbaijan and Armenia are heavily arming themselves. In the latest acquisition drive, Armenia has reportedly placed an order for the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) from India. These guns are considered to be the best in their category and can be deployed at high altitudes.

This procurement report has come even as the Indian Army is yet to finalize the contract for these guns that will be deployed along its border with China, an official confirmed to the EurAsian Times.

The Indian Army intends to order 310 of this indigenously developed artillery gun system. The guns have been the result of collaboration between the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Bharat Forge Limited, and Tata Advanced Systems Limited.

EurAsian Times contacted relevant authorities for official confirmation. Neither accepting nor denying the reports, the official, who wished to stay anonymous, said a formal reply could be expected next week. EurAsian Times will update the story.

Armenia had earlier ordered an MArG 155 wheeled self-propelled howitzer from Kalyani Forge India. In 2023, Armenia ordered six of these ATAGS. Now, it wants to procure 84 more ATAGS under US $155 million.

These ATAGS are designed for high mobility and rapid deployment. They have advanced communication systems and automatic command and control systems.

The ATAGS will replace the obsolete Soviet-vintage D-30 towed 122mm howitzers and 2A65 Msta-B 152 mm towed howitzers. Its high-altitude operability makes it ideal for Armenian forces. Armenia will be the first export customer of the ATAGS, which will open more export opportunities for India.

The Indian Army has already field-tested these guns in Pokhran, Balasore, and Sikkim, with temperatures ranging between -15 degrees Celsius and 50 degrees Celsius. The 155/52 mm caliber towed gun is an all-weather and terrain system. These howitzers can strike targets up to 50 kilometers, making them the best guns in their class. They can fire a burst of 5 rounds in 60 seconds and at a sustained rate of up to 60 rounds in 60 minutes.

The system’s field trials are over, and the finalization of the contract is facing some procedural delays.

In 2016, India purchased 145 M777 ultra-light howitzers from the US. The Indian Army needs these guns to replace the aging artillery in its inventory.

The ATAGS project was launched in 2013. In the early stages, the DRDO’s Armament Research & Development Establishment (ARDE) partnered with Bharat Forge Limited and Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) to manufacture the specialized guns, which were unveiled in 2022.

After the field trials, Bharat Forge’s CMD Baba Kalyani has said: “At the very first, the ATAGS is set to be the most advanced and the first gun in the world which can fire Bi-Modular Charge System (BMCS) zone 7.”

BMCS has been an important parameter during the trials. It means the gun is capable of firing Lower Zones for shorter ranges and Higher Zones for longer ranges.

India Emerges Key Defense Exporter To Armenia

Armenian intelligence indicates that Azerbaijan, armed with Turkish and Pakistani weapons, is planning a “full-scale war.” The Armenian response will be scripted by newly acquired Indian and French weapon systems.

Armenia has almost doubled its defense investments over the last year. In 2022, the spending was around US$700 million to US$800 million; now, in 2024, it will be US $1.4 billion or US $1.5 billion. The defense contracts with India alone account for a billion dollars.

Tensions between the two Caucasian countries have been high since Azerbaijan recaptured the Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 in a surprise military action.

The territory is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but a large swathe of its land is under Armenian administration and the casus belli for one of the longest-running conflicts in the world.

Nagorno-Karabakh has a majority of the Armenian population and has declared independence.

Armenia has equipped itself with Indian-made Pinaka MBRLS (considered at par with American HIMARS) and an anti-drone system. The Pinaka was delivered to Armenia via Iran in 2023.

Enhanced PINAKA rocket, developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully flight-tested from Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, in Odisha on November 04, 2020.

The news was not received well by the Baku leadership. Pinaka Mk-1 is a free-flight artillery rocket area bombardment system with a range of 38 kilometers, quick reaction time, and a high rate of fire. A single Pinaka system fires a salvo of 12 rockets from a multi-barrel launcher in 44 seconds, while a battery can fire 72 rockets.

India developed the Pinaka system as a replacement for the Russian GRAD BM-21, which is also present in the Armenian armed forces. Another important reason for Armenia’s choice was apprehension that Azerbaijan would deploy a greater number of drones, including suicide drones.

Armenia has also purchased an Indian-built surface-to-air missile (SAM) Akash. Akash is a short-range SAM system manufactured by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) to protect vulnerable areas and points from air attacks. The Akash Weapon System (AWS) can simultaneously engage Multiple Targets in Group Mode or Autonomous Mode.

• Ritu Sharma has been a journalist for over a decade, writing on defense, foreign affairs, and nuclear technology.
  

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/armenia-orders-indian-artillery-guns-amid-azerbaijan/

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MEHR News Agency, Iran

March 12 2024

Armenia notifies Russia about ending work of airport guards

TEHRAN, Mar. 12 (MNA) – The Kremlin on Tuesday said Russia received a notification from Armenia about ending the work of Russian border guards at Zvartnots International Airport in the capital Yerevan.

“Indeed, a departmental letter was received in this regard and contacts are now being carried out through departments. I can’t say more now,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in a press briefing in Moscow, Turkish Anadolu Agency reported.

Peskov further said contacts between Russian and Armenian authorities "at all possible levels" will continue.

Earlier in the day, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said during a press conference that the country's border guard sent a letter to the Russian side thanking them for their service.

Pashinyan further said the Armenian Border Guard acquired "enough experience, skills, and knowledge to carry out service at Zvartnots airport without the assistance of the Russian side.”

He also said the letter indicated that the work of the Russian border guards will end on Aug. 1.

MNA

https://en.mehrnews.com/news/212955/Armenia-notifies-Russia-about-ending-work-of-airport-guards

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March 12 2024

Armenia will withdraw from Russia’s answer to NATO if land lost to Azerbaijan is recognized by CSTO

Source: The New Voice of Ukraine

Armenia threatened to withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — Russia’s answer to NATO — if the organization recognizes the seizure of sovereign Armenia land by Azerbaijan, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said, as reported by the Russian state propaganda media RIA Novosti on March 12.

Armenia received assurances from the CSTO about its readiness to deploy peacekeepers along the border with Azerbaijan, but the organization did not specify the area of responsibility for its peacekeepers within the republic.

"We have a question about conflicting interpretations: Peacekeepers are neutral, but the CSTO is our organization,” Pashinyan said.

“If Armenia's sovereign territory is a 'red line' for the CSTO, please clarify your understanding of what constitutes Armenia's sovereign territory, as this remains unclear. This issue requires resolution.”

“If the CSTO addresses this question and its response aligns with Armenia's understanding, it indicates the issue between Armenia and the CSTO is resolved, along with the ensuing implications,” he said.

“However, if the CSTO's response does not align, Armenia will withdraw from the CSTO, though the timing remains uncertain."

The CSTO is a military-political international organization that includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.

Armenia has "frozen" its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Pashinyan announced on Feb. 23.

Armenia's membership in the CSTO, which is effectively controlled by Russia, creates "certain problems" for Armenia.

Neither the CSTO, nor Russia, acted when Azerbaijan seized Armenian land in a war of aggression in Sept. 2023.

Yerevan has since looked to Western partners for security matters, Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan said earlier.

The country is considering an application for membership in the European Union due to heightened tensions with Russia, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said on March 8.

https://sg.news.yahoo.com/armenia-withdraw-russia-answer-nato-123500847.html

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Armenpress.am

Enclave and non-enclave villages demanded by Azerbaijan not located within Armenia's sovereign territory: Pashinyan

18:02, 12 March 2024

YEREVAN, MARCH 12, ARMENPRESS. The Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declares that the villages that Azerbaijan demands have never been in the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia.

He made this statement in response to the question about Azerbaijan's continued territorial claims against Armenia, specifically Azerbaijan's demand to hand over four villages in the Tavush region.

Pashinyan noted that the names of the villages being raised in the Azerbaijani press have never existed in the territory of the Republic of Armenia; moreover, not only during Soviet times but even afterward.

''There has never been and cannot be any discussion about handing over any village of the region of Tavush to Azerbaijan,’’ said Pashinyan.

First of all, the Prime Minister noted that, in his opinion, there is some confusion, misunderstanding, and lack of understanding surrounding this issue, suggesting first to define the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

"First, let's define the territory of the Republic of Armenia so that we can clearly formulate where and why Azerbaijan has territorial claims against Armenia and where, essentially, it does not have or may not have any territorial claims against the Republic of Armenia," said Pashinyan, showing the participants the territory of Armenia on the map and emphasizing that the enclave and non-enclave villages that Azerbaijan claims are not within the sovereign territory of Armenia.

 

 

https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1132266.html?fbclid=IwAR02KnVITYRPf_bftnu7Jni6z4lfdLW8uzUe-duMMdkA_uNth79QDy7qPSk

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Armenpress.am

Pashinyan refers to Turkey's possible involvement in Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement

18:48, 12 March 2024

YEREVAN, MARCH 12, ARMENPRESS. According to the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, geopolitical actors should remain neutral; otherwise, they cannot play a constructive role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement process. Pashinyan made these remarks during a press conference on Tuesday in response to Armenpress question regarding whether there is a tendency in the West to involve Turkey in the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement process.

"As for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, I believe the correct formula and wording are that actors should maintain neutrality to play a constructive role there," Pashinyan said.

Regarding Turkey's role in the region and on the world stage, the Prime Minister noted: "The reality is that we both observe and feel Turkey's presence."

According to the Armenian Prime Minister, Armenia should have an agenda with Turkey and perceive it not through Azerbaijan but as a neighboring country.

''We have to acknowledge that Turkey also plays a significant international role,'' said Pashinyan.

The Prime Minister noted that communication with the Turkish leadership and the representatives from that country is not only unusual but also natural because Turkey and Armenia are neighbors. The PM added that it is neither unusual nor strange for the leaders of the two countries to have telephone conversations.

“I consider that we have a conversation and a dialogue with the President of Turkey, which is very complicated, not easy, but it is very important to have that conversation,’’ Pashinyan said.

The Armenian Prime Minister also added that understanding the subtle layers of consciousness in the society, it was a great effort for him to go and participate in the inauguration ceremony of the President of Turkey.

 

 

https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1132270.html?fbclid=IwAR0ucj2JaXhaYnbhFgiHmV0LPdcyQAg0nuHc8yotwIU_SZQrdEcTJio_oyk

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will Russia Putin allow it to happen ?

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Armenpress.am

European Parliament passes resolution proposing consideration of EU membership candidacy for Armenia

19:00, 13 March 2024

YEREVAN, MARCH 13, ARMENPRESS. At the session of the European Parliament, a resolution on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was put to the vote, this has been mentioned in the draft resolution published by the European Parliament.

The resolution authored by the European People's Party group is submitted as a joint initiative of all groups in the European Parliament.

In the draft of the resolution, the MEPs propose to consider the possibility of granting Armenia the status of a candidate for EU membership.

“should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations,’’ reads the draft joint resolution of the members of the EU’s legislative body.

The draft emphasizes that EU-Armenia relations are based on such common values as democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.

"The Republic of Armenia is ready to be as close to the European Union as the EU considers possible," the resolution quotes the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's address to the European Parliament on October 17, 2023.

The proposed resolution also refers to the events that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh in September of last year.

“ On 19 September 2023, after a nine month illegal blockade of the Lachin Corridor, disregarding its commitments included in the November 2020 ceasefire agreement and International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the remaining parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control; whereas more than 100 000 Armenians had to flee the territory, resulting in NagornoKarabakh being almost entirely deprived of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries,’’ the draft reads.

The resolution of the European Parliament also mentions about the continuous threats of the Azerbaijani leadership against the territorial integrity of Armenia.

“The Azerbaijani army continues to occupy approximately 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia.”

In their proposed resolution, the MEPs call on the executive bodies of the European Union, the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia in expanding cooperation with the European Union, which includes not only economic partnership, but also political dialogue, security, relations between people and other countries.

 

 

https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1132358.html?fbclid=IwAR0u7dnN2MWo5F4ePPg11hv7CqVYlADUkAm7fv9fHg5yvHplkYb8dYBvrsI

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The Insider

March 14 2024

Russia pushes Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, but Aliyev fears full-scale war due to Western sanctions threat, experts say

In recent weeks, Armenian authorities have been warning that Azerbaijan, which last year seized the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) region, is now preparing to attack Armenia itself. In a late February interview with France 24 TV, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan accused Azerbaijani authorities of not recognizing Armenia's territorial integrity, stating that an attack on his country is “highly likely.” Moreover, according to the Armenian side, Azerbaijani troops are currently occupying lands belonging to 31 Armenian villages, with the total occupied sovereign Armenian territory amounting to 170 square km.

The Insider spoke with regional experts about the likelihood of an Azerbaijani invasion, how prepared Armenia is for war, and what roles Russia, Turkey, and Western nations are playing in the developing situation.

The Likelihood of Invasion

Grant Mikaelian, Political Scientist, Economist, Senior Research Fellow at the Caucasus Institute (Yerevan)

“Over the past month, many signs indicate that the likelihood of a full-scale invasion has clearly increased. The negotiations have hit another impasse. Azerbaijan is ratcheting up its military rhetoric, largely connected to the recent snap presidential elections, held a year early, just as in 2020 before the war began [over Nagorno-Karabakh].

Azerbaijan demands Armenia create a corridor through its territory to connect Azerbaijan with Turkey in the south. However, Russia wants control over this road and has a preliminary agreement with Azerbaijan on this matter. Neither Armenia nor Iran and France desire this outcome. Consequently, a situation has arisen in which understanding between Russia and Armenia is severely strained.

There is also a scenario of a broader war. Azerbaijan is staking claims to Armenia's entire territory. Recently, [Azerbaijani president Ilhan] Aliyev referred to the border with Armenia as “conditional” in his speeches. Official documents are being issued stating all populated areas of Armenia bear alternative names. Three weeks ago, Aliyev ordered the mapping of all mineral deposits in Armenia, likely intending to seize them.”

Nerses Kopalyan, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada (USA)

The likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Armenia remains quite low for three general reasons: first, Azerbaijan does not have sufficient international political capital to deal with the fallout of fully invading an entire country, which would also entail an invasion of Yerevan, the capital; second, the scale of death and destruction, on both sides, will be immense, thus making the whole endeavor exceedingly risky (and Aliyev, regardless of rumors, is a highly risk-averse actor); and third, considering the amount of political, economic, and now military investments that the collective West is making in Armenia, they are not going to tolerate a full-scale invasion. In this context, it is one thing to have flare-ups on the border, or for Azerbaijan to attack and take a position or two, or make incursions of few hundred kilometers, but the full-scale, entire invasion of Armenia is a whole different ball game, and the probability of Azerbaijan taking such a high-risk move seems quite unlikely.

Azerbaijani political commentator, currently residing in Switzerland, former political prisoner Rauf Mirgadirov:

“I believe the likelihood of full-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia is minimal at present. A war would not benefit Ilham Aliyev at this juncture. He is now a victorious president who has fully consolidated his power for a defined period. Any war brings new casualties, and in this case, justifying such losses would be far more difficult. Aliyev is cautious, with a strong self-preservation instinct. He is well aware that, with the exception of Russia and perhaps Iran, virtually all external players oppose war, a reality he cannot ignore.

It is doubtful Aliyev would want to face sanctions. He reaps enormous revenues from exporting oil, petroleum products, and gas – a business underpinning his personal authority that he is unlikely to jeopardize.”

Arif Yunusov, Head of the Conflict Studies Department at the Institute of Peace and Democracy, former Azerbaijani political prisoner, currently residing in the Netherlands:

“A full-scale invasion is unlikely, but short-term military actions along the border are possible. Aliyev's objective is to implement Russia's plans to destabilize the situation in Armenia. Moscow will attempt to capitalize on the fighting to incite pro-Russian protests there.”

Andrey Areshev, Political Commentator, Expert at the Foundation for Strategic Culture:

“Currently, there are no signs of armed preparations for a full-scale invasion. However, Baku will undoubtedly employ all means of armed pressure to achieve its goals, namely establishing a connection between Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Armenia's Syunik region.

From what I understand, a few days ago, another meeting of the intergovernmental commission on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations took place, chaired by the deputy prime ministers from both sides. Still, judging by the limited information available, progress appears minimal. This opens up opportunities for wider escalation, although I don't anticipate a large-scale conflict. Nevertheless, localized attacks cannot be ruled out.

It seems Baku will attempt to exert pressure through information campaigns and alliance formations, primarily with Turkey. We know the Armenian-Turkish negotiation process is directly tied to the state of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, with Ankara stating no progress will occur until Yerevan agrees to Baku's conditions. I believe Azerbaijan will also exploit any serious deterioration in Russian-Armenian relations.”

Preparedness for War

The 44-day war for Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrated that the Armenian army is significantly outmatched by Azerbaijan's forces, as Azerbaijan managed to capture a substantial portion of the region. When Azerbaijan launched another offensive in September 2023, the Armenian army did not engage in the fighting, and the Artsakh defense forces were compelled to surrender. During an attack on Armenia's sovereign territory in September 2022, Azerbaijani troops advanced into Armenian territory and entrenched themselves there. Moreover, it is well-known that Azerbaijan receives significant supplies of modern weaponry from Turkey and Israel, while Armenia has only recently begun procuring armaments from France and India, while at the same time accusing Russia of failing to deliver weapons ordered and paid for by Yerevan.

Grant Mikaelian

“Primarily, the administrative apparatus must be prepared for war, yet Armenia's military leadership has experienced constant upheaval, with numerous generals under investigation. Effectively, a conflict exists between the government and the military. On the other hand, new weapons are being supplied from abroad, but they comprise diverse systems lacking cohesive integration. At this juncture, it is impossible to seriously argue that Armenia is ready for war. Furthermore, the border military infrastructure is ill-prepared, with feeble fortifications. Regrettably, over the past three years, little progress has been made on the new frontlines to adequately prepare for renewed hostilities.”

Nerses Kopalyan

“In the domain of high-intensity, localized invasions, or hybrid warfare, Armenia remains at a severe disadvantage, since the power asymmetry is heavily tilted towards Azerbaijan. Armenia's border areas are generally manned by conscripts, or else by a selective set of contracted/career soldiers, but they are not manned by highly-trained military platoons or special forces; on the other hand, when Azerbaijan undertakes localized incursions, they almost always use their special forces in a surgical fashion. This has been the modality of invasions/incursions that Azerbaijan has utilized against Armenia since 2021

But if the question is scaled up to an all-out war, then the dynamics are different. The Armenian armed forces are not the same armed forces as they were in 2020, since there have been qualitative improvements in training, NCO modeling, mission and command structures, and access to advanced weapons systems from France and India. Qualitatively and comparatively speaking, Azerbaijan still maintains an exponential advantage; however, the modality of warfare has shifted. Armenia, unlike in 2020, no longer has a military doctrine defined by full-frontal warfare that is akin to the Russo-Soviet model. Rather, Armenia has been slowly adopting and developing a small-state resiliency model, something more akin to a porcupine strategy. In this context, as far as Armenia's preparedness goes, the capacity and level of preparation is not specific to undertaking an offensive war, but rather, implementing a doctrine known as deterrence-by-denial. Thus, in more simple terms, Armenia is not trying to win a war, but rather to make an attack so costly that Azerbaijan will refrain from attacking, and that if it does attack, it would be deterred from continuing due to the high rate of losses.

Finally, an important component of preparedness must also address the Russia factor. Namely, whereas before 2020 Armenia falsely believed in the Russian security architecture (i.e., that Russia would fulfill its treaty obligations if Armenia is attacked), it no longer live under this false sense of security.”

Role of Russia

Russia has openly claimed its stake in the South Caucasus — alongside the broader post-Soviet domain — as part of its sphere of direct interests. Historically, Armenia stood as Russia's closest ally in the region, boasting membership in both the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Customs Union. However, recent events, notably Russia's perceived lack of support for Yerevan during Azerbaijan's assaults on Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper, have eroded trust in Moscow. Consequently, Armenian authorities have shifted their focus, with Pashinyan emphasizing the necessity to “diversify security alliances” by fostering ties with alternative partners. In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry leveled accusations of “unfriendly steps,” coupled with thinly veiled threats.

Grant Mikaelian

“Russia supports Azerbaijan's aggression. Russia does not like Armenia's policy after 2018, and Russia has chosen this strategy of undermining it. Russia generally takes this approach to post-Soviet countries — either a country will be maximally friendly towards Russia, or Russia will pursue a policy of undermining its statehood. I'm afraid that in relation to Armenia, the decision has already been made, and the pressure will increase, judging by the rhetoric of Russian officials, especially representatives of the Foreign Ministry. They have already completely synchronized with Azerbaijan.”

Arif Yunusov

“In 2018, a revolution began in Armenia. Pashinyan came to power and started a campaign against Russian forces, arresting Putin's personal friend Kocharyan. Putin himself called Pashinyan and asked him to release Kocharyan, even publicly congratulating him on his birthday when he was in prison. Putin's level is Biden, leaders of big countries, not some head of Armenia or Azerbaijan. And so he calls Pashinyan, demands to release his man, and Pashinyan tells him not to interfere in the country's internal affairs. This offended Putin. He's a vindictive person, and after that, Azerbaijan was given the go-ahead to act.

In 2020, Azerbaijan would not have started military actions <[n Nagorno-Karabakh] without Russia's consent. Pashinyan thought that Russia should take the side of its strategic ally in the Caucasus, namely Armenia, and did not believe that Russia would not come to the rescue. He called Putin several times a day, and Putin said: ‘We are neutral. The fighting is taking place on Azerbaijani territory. If they attack [internationally recognized Armenian territory], then the CSTO will come to help.’

For the first time in a quarter of a century, Russian troops appeared on Azerbaijani territory in the status of peacekeeping forces, but they do not intend to leave in 2025 [as is called for under the current agreement]. Putin has said more than once since then, especially in 2022: ‘We have come for a long time, and the peacekeeping troops will not leave.’ He plans to leave the Karabakh conflict to future generations. The main thing for him is to extend the presence of Russian troops for 10-15 years.

There are no Armenians in Karabakh now. So what is the point of a 2,000-strong peacekeeping contingent? Russia says they are guarding some equipment and weapons left behind by the Karabakh Armenians. But that equipment was all transferred to Ukraine [for use by the Russian army] within a few days. After that, they said they need to guard Armenian homes from looting. Nonsense.

In December of last year, in St. Petersburg, Putin proposed to Pashinyan: ‘Give your consent for the European peacekeepers [EU Civilian Mission in Armenia (EUMA)] to leave the border; instead, mine will be there. We can call them CSTO troops.’ Pashinyan categorically refused, because in Armenia they perfectly understand the role of Azerbaijan: it is an instrument of pressure from Moscow and Putin on Pashinyan and Armenia. We used to say that Armenia is Russia's outpost, but now Azerbaijan plays that role.

In Putin's vision, the post-Soviet landscape falls under Russia's sway, with independent states expected to align with Moscow's foreign policy objectives, eschewing Western influences such as NATO.”

Nerses Kopalyan

“It is in Russia's strategic interest for Azerbaijan to undertake attacks against Armenia, as this will make the security situation untenable for Armenia while leading, the Kremlin hopes, to the collapse of Armenia's democratic system.

Both Aliyev's interests and those of Russia are aligned on this matter. This is also consistent with regards to the issue of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor,” which is a Russo-Azerbaijani construct designed to not only further weaken Armenia, but to simply hand over control of the entirety of the middle belt of the country to the Russians. Note that the logic of the Zangezur Corridor is as follows: while Azerbaijan will have unhindered access to the corridor, the corridor will be monitored and manned by Russian troops, while Armenian troops and border guards must remain 2.5 kilometers away from the corridor on both sides. Simply put, there would be no Armenian presence in an area 5 kilometers wide and approximately 60 kilometers in length running across southern Armenia. For all intents and purposes, Russia will have autonomous control over sovereign Armenian territory, while Azerbaijan will have permission to use this space in agreement with the Russians. Conceptually, this allows Russia to reestablish control and dominance over Armenia (which it has now completely lost), while giving Baku unhindered access to its enclave of Nakhichevan. That’s why Putin is now pressuring Aliyev to invade Armenia and secure the Zangezur Corridor, because Putin needs it to reestablish dominance over Armenia. Aliyev, on the other hand, would want nothing more than unhindered access to Nakhichevan, but at the moment, the entire risk and burden of attacking Armenia and creating the corridor falls on Azerbaijan, while Russia will swoop in after and reap the benefits. This is not lost on Aliyev.

That being said, the prevailing rumors, or what one may deduce from developments, suggests that Aliyev must return the favor: Putin allowed Aliyev to take over Nagorno-Karabakh and ethnically cleanse the region of its Armenian population right under the watchful eyes of the Russian peacekeepers, and this was done in return for Aliyev's promise of delivering the Zangezur Corridor to the Russians.”

The Role of Turkey

Since Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991, Turkey has become Baku’s closest partner, with their respective leaders, Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, advocating the concept of “One Nation, Two States.” Since at least 2013, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises. In 2020, Turkey assisted Azerbaijan in capturing part of Nagorno-Karabakh, supplying Azerbaijan with military equipment, notably armed drones, and, reportedly, fighters on the ground.

Armenia's relations with Turkey have traditionally been hostile. Turkey still denies the Armenian Genocide perpetrated from 1915 to 1923 and continues to pose a threat to Armenia today. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between the countries are maintained; earlier in March, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan revealed that active negotiations are underway to open the land border.

Grant Mikaelian

“Erdoğan is Aliyev's main patron. Putin wants to occupy this position but cannot. Roughly 90% of Azerbaijan's army officers graduated from courses in Turkey. Essentially, it's the same army. The merging of these two states is happening under the slogan 'One Nation, Two States.'

Russia wants to maintain control but cannot, while Aliyev tries to leverage this to his advantage. Aliev is trying to balance Erdoğan's growing influence in Azerbaijan against Baku’s continuing relations with Russia. This asymmetric external influence on Azerbaijan largely contributes to all the wars in the region. Due to Russian and Turkish foreign policies, Azerbaijan has become aggressive and uncompromising. There were agreements that could have been formalized already, and Armenia was ready for that, but Azerbaijan rejected all of it and pursued a military scenario. Erdoğan plays the leading role here, certainly.”

Nerses Kopalyan

“As far as Erdoğan is concerned, his position has generally been exaggerated, in my opinion, and this is due to the fact that Baku-Ankara relations are not a master-slave, patron-satellite relationship, but rather one of an older brother supporting the decisions of its younger brother. To this end, Erdoğan has consistently supported whatever decision Aliyev has made with respect to Armenia, and as long as Baku's decisions do not contradict the will of Ankara (and as far as the South Caucasus go, this rarely, if ever, happens), Erdoğan will continue supporting the aspirations of the Aliyev regime.

Erdoğan has also used Baku as an intervening variable in its relations with Russia. Erdoğan remains content with Baku's role in the region and will continue supporting Aliyev's endeavor of making Azerbaijan the mini-hegemon of the region.”

Rauf Mirgadirov

“The influence of Turkey on Russia's foreign policy has significantly strengthened, particularly following Russia's incursion into Ukraine. This encompasses the export of energy resources through Turkey, bypassing sanctions, and receiving propagandistic support from Turkey, among other aspects. It's crucial to note that Russia and Turkey share a wide spectrum of relations, extending beyond just Karabakh to encompass the Black Sea, Ukraine, Libya, Syria, and the Middle East.

However, there exist numerous contradictions between Russia and Turkey, rendering their alliance temporary and tactical. These are two continental empires destined to vie for control over more territories.

Karabakh holds immense significance in Erdoğan's domestic politics. Erdoğan's primary electoral base comprises Islamists and nationalists, with no other significant allies remaining within the country. For Islamists and nationalists, the Karabakh issue assumes paramount importance — it's viewed as a show of solidarity with blood brothers, namely the Azerbaijanis, who are both a Turkic ethnic group and a Muslim population. Erdoğan portrays this victory as a collective triumph, a narrative that Azerbaijan supports.”

Arif Yunusov

“Turkey played a pivotal role in 2020. Thanks to Turkey, the Azerbaijani army underwent significant reform, modeling itself after the Turkish army and adopting NATO standards. Erdoğan was aware that Russia had given its approval to Azerbaijan for this conflict, but he harbored hopes of joint regional dominance with Putin post-war. However, Putin unequivocally informed Erdoğan, ‘This isn't Syria. The South Caucasus is within my sphere of influence, and your interference here is unwelcome.’ Erdoğan's aspirations were dashed. Putin threw him a token gesture — a minor and inconsequential information center in Agdam, where 60 Turkish officers pass time playing backgammon. Consequently, Turkish troops almost entirely withdrew from Azerbaijan in 2020, leaving Erdoğan deeply dissatisfied with Aliyev, who failed to support him.

Since then, the dynamics have shifted. Presently, Turkey views Azerbaijan's actions against Armenia with less enthusiasm. Essentially, following the Munich meeting, during Aliyev's visit to Turkey [in February], Erdoğan, subtly alluding to Russia, spoke of the disruptive role of a third party. While many initially thought he was referring to France, his remarks were directed at Russia.

Turkey recognizes that a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia would provoke strong Western reactions, which is not in Turkey's interest. Consequently, Turkey is now less actively supporting Azerbaijan; instead, it seeks to mitigate tensions and prevent a further escalation of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

Andrey Areshev

“Turkey is active on all fronts. Recently, we've seen assurances that contacts between Pashinyan and Erdoğan are maintained regularly, with discussions revolving around the necessity of opening the Armenian-Turkish land border. However, there is an obstacle: the signing of a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan is required, as in this scenario, Armenia would be firmly integrated into the ‘Turkish economic belt.’

The Turkish side is actively working to bolster this trend because the Caucasus holds importance for Turkey as a link connecting it to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. This constitutes the so-called middle corridor, serving as an alternative trade and economic route compared to those passing through Russia and Belarus, which are currently frozen for well-known reasons.”

Western Position

Since the early 2000s, the United States has provided military assistance to Azerbaijan under the pretext of containing Iran. It wasn't until 2023 that a number of congressmen began pushing to end this practice. In November, the U.S. Senate passed the Armenia Protection Act, which proposes a ban on military aid to Baku. For the most part, the European Union had until recently refrained from intervening in the affairs of the South Caucasus. However, in July 2022, as part of a gradual shift away from purchasing energy resources from Russia, the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan regarding strategic energy partnership. France is considered Armenia's main ally in Europe, but even Paris had offered only verbal support to Yerevan until recently.

Grant Mikaelian

“In March 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution against the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is currently happening at an alarming rate. Every day, we receive news of destroyed monuments, churches, and so on. On the other hand, just recently, the European Parliament passed a new resolution condemning Azerbaijan's aggression, its ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, and so forth. There are statements that ethnic cleansing is a red line, but actions speak louder than words. On one hand, the West has certain interests here because, thanks to Turkish and Azerbaijani diplomacy, the West and Russia are now competing to be closer to Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the West is not deeply immersed in this region and does not consider it a priority.”

Nerses Kopalyan

“There is a consistent pattern of Western nations more directly and concretely criticizing Azerbaijan, while supporting and offering diplomatic capital to Armenia. In essence, after September of 2022, Azerbaijan's caviar diplomacy fully collapsed, and Baku no longer enjoys favor in the E.U., in many Western capitals, or in the United States. It is an open secret that what has deterred Aliyev from attacking Armenia in the last two years has been the threat of U.S. sanctions; thus, it is American, and the collective Western diplomatic pressure, that has deterred Aliyev from its more egregious objectives.

More than that, the U.S. has agreed to begin talks to potentially sell weapons to Armenia, while leading the NCO training and mission-and-command programs with Armenia's military.”

Arif Yunusov

“In October of last year, the Americans, via diplomatic channels, informed Aliyev of their awareness that Azerbaijani troops were amassed along the border with Armenia in preparation for potential conflict. They conveyed that while they acknowledged Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, any incursion into sovereign Armenian territory would elicit a different response. In reaction, a disgruntled Aliyev initiated arrests from among pro-Western factions within Azerbaijan. The West disregarded the snap elections [in Azerbaijan]. Notably, during his February 14th inauguration, Aliyev omitted any mention of Western countries, a departure from his previous four inaugural speeches, in which he had referenced them. The Americans presented him with an ultimatum: either align with us or with Putin. Opting for the latter would result in sanctions and other consequences. The European Parliament has issued two resolutions concerning Azerbaijan and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Furthermore, assistance has begun to flow to Armenia, despite the drain on Western resources caused by the war in Ukraine.”

https://theins.ru/en/news/269956

[Yervant1]

Al-Mayadeen

March 14 2024

Armenian PM Pashinyan calls for public discussions on EU membership

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan urges for dialogue on the possibility of seeking EU membership as tensions with Russia increase.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan urged on Thursday for widespread public dialogue regarding a potential application for EU membership, amid deteriorating relations between the ex-Soviet nation and Russia.

The war in Ukraine has revitalized the EU's push for enlargement, prompting Brussels to formally put EU aspirants Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia on a membership trajectory after years of uncertainty.

Armenia's move away from Moscow underscores the dissatisfaction with what the nation's government has characterized as Russia's "inability to safeguard it against security threats" posed by its arch-rival neighbor, Azerbaijan. That said, Pashinyan on Thursday said that the possibility of joining the European Union "must become a widely discussed topic in society."

His remarks followed the European Parliament's passage of a resolution this week "on closer ties between the EU and Armenia," which suggested that Yerevan's prospective membership application "could pave the way for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations."

"This is yet another opportunity to discuss our vision of Armenia's future," Pashinyan told a government meeting in Yerevan, adding that his cabinet "has the political will to continue working towards a maximum deepening of Armenia's ties with the EU."

Deteriorating relations

In recent months, the notion of joining the EU has been actively deliberated within Prime Minister Pashinyan's political circle, with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan publicly expressing Armenia's European aspirations.

A divide deepened between Yerevan and Moscow since last year when Armenia accused Russia of failing to prevent Azerbaijan from seizing the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian separatists.

Pashinyan has repeatedly said that Armenia could quit the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Moscow-led security alliance of several ex-Soviet republics.

On Wednesday, Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, warned against the move which would cause "irreparable damage" to the countries' ties.

https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/armenian-pm-pashinyan-calls-for-public-discussions-on-eu-mem

[Yervant1]

March 14 2024

Armenia orders the ATAGS Artillery System, India establishes an air corridor
by PAUL ANTONOPOULOS

India inaugurated the flight that will allow strategic air cargo exports to Armenia. HALCON, a joint working group (JWG) formed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Container Corporation India (CONCOR), is undertaking this endeavour.

The flight marks a game-changing moment in India’s logistics infrastructure and strategic export capabilities, especially to a friendly country like Armenia that can only be reached by traversing Iran but is at the strategic crossroads of Europe and Asia and is a market for Indian exports.

These exports also include the military sector.

Under this context, it is little surprise that reports have already emerged of Armenia placing an order for the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), which can be deployed at high altitudes, something needed in Caucasian warfare.

EurAsian Times contacted relevant authorities for official confirmation. The official, who wished to stay anonymous, neither accepted nor denied the reports but said a formal reply could be expected next week.

Armenia has previously ordered an MArG 155 wheeled self-propelled howitzer from Kalyani Forge India. In 2023, Armenia ordered six of these ATAGS.

Now, it wants to procure 84 more ATAGS for US$155 million to replace the obsolete Soviet-vintage D-30 122 mm towed howitzers and 2A65 Msta-B 152 mm towed howitzers.

If this news is confirmed, Armenia will be the first export customer of the ATAGS, opening more export opportunities for India.

According to EurAsian Times, Armenian intelligence indicates that Azerbaijan, armed with Turkish and Pakistani weapons, is planning a “full-scale war.” The Armenian response will be with newly acquired Indian and French weapon systems.

Armenia has almost doubled its defence investments over the last year. In 2022, the spending was around US$700 million to US$800 million; now, in 2024, it will be US$1.4-1.5 billion. The defence contracts with India alone account for a billion dollars

https://greekcitytimes.com/2024/03/14/armenia-atags-artillery-system/

[Yervant1]

Agree until they change their mind again!

MediaMax, Armenia
March 15 2024



Armenian MFA: Armenia and Azerbaijan close to reaching agreement

Yerevan /Mediamax/. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said today that “we now have reached more mutual understanding with Azerbaijan than we had a month ago.”

“Armenia and Azerbaijan are close to agreeing to accept the border line between the two countries as it stood at the time of the collapse of the USSR in 1991, as a basis for demarcation and mutual recognition of territorial integrity. My impression is that we are very close to reaching a mutual agreement on that issue,” he said at the session of the parliament’s Foreign Affairs Standing Committee.

https://mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/54217/

 

[Yervant1]

Armenpress.am

Armenia to sign new cooperation document with European Union

16:09, 15 March 2024

YEREVAN, MARCH 15, ARMENPRESS. Armenia is developing a new cooperation document with the European Union, it is planned to sign it by July, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Paruyr Hovhannisyan said this at the meeting of the Standing Committee on European Integration Issues of the National Assembly.

 

If the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between Armenia and the EU is fully implemented, we will indeed have the status of a candidate country for EU membership. In addition to this, new directions of cooperation and new programs are being developed, which emerged as a result of a fact-finding mission that took place in November of last year.

 

Now, alongside these two processes and the _expression_ of our political rapprochement, a new document is being developed. Certain issues regarding it have been discussed at the Armenia-EU Partnership Council and at other working levels. We expect to receive a new draft in May, which should probably be adopted by July," said Hovhannisyan.

 

 

https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1132508.html?fbclid=IwAR3rQcvHj9iMEmf8QrNyB5xYfYE-UusP_OkocXqVpsA4Y653bZtIHpjL8nM

[MosJan]

[MosJan]

[MosJan]

[Yervant1]

March 18 2024

Ex-ombudsmen warn against withdrawal of Armenia’s lawsuits against Azerbaijan from international courts

Former Armenian and Artsakh ombudspersons Arman Tatoyan, Artak Beglaryan and Gegham Stepanyan, as well as lawyers representing the interests of Armenian citizens in international courts, Ara Ghazaryan and Siranush Sahakyan, issued a joint statement on Monday, warning against the withdrawal of Armenia’s lawsuits against Azerbaijan from international courts. The full statement is provided below.

“The statements made by the highest authorities of the Republic of Armenia regarding the potential withdrawal of Armenia’s lawsuits against Azerbaijan from international courts and other instances have raised serious concerns. Such steps will cause irreparable damage to the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian people.

Here are the key points:

1. The statements made by the top Armenian leadership are absolutely unacceptable.

2. The strategic aim of the lawsuits against Azerbaijan is to hold them accountable internationally for violations of the rights of the Armenians of Armenia and Artsakh, and the Armenian people in general. They are indispensable tools for the protection of our collective and individual rights and international justice.

3. Achieving stable and lasting peace, as well as preventing new Azerbaijani encroachments against the Republic of Armenia and its people through the occupation of Armenia’s sovereign territories and other crimes, is not possible without international justice.

4. The proceedings in international courts are essential for investigating crimes committed against the people of Artsakh and protecting collective rights. They are also crucial for the collective return of the Artsakh people, safeguarding spiritual and cultural heritage, public and private property in Artsakh, and ensuring a safe and dignified life after their return by establishing international protection mechanisms.

5. Furthermore, through the submitted lawsuits, the Republic of Armenia has committed to protecting the rights of victims who have suffered from Azerbaijani crimes, including the property and other rights of forcibly displaced Artsakh Armenians, in international courts.

As a result, persons have refrained from submitting individual complaints to international courts, and relinquishing legal remedies and transferring the issues to the political realm, there is no assurance that Azerbaijan will comply with the demands.

Therefore, the withdrawal of the claims submitted by Armenia will inevitably render these crucial international instruments unusable for protecting the rights of affected individuals due to the formal requirements of such instruments.

6. There are also numerous individual lawsuits in international courts, in addition to interstate applications. If these individual lawsuits are dropped, the fate of individual complaints becomes uncertain.

In such a scenario, the strength of individual complaints will be significantly diminished, or the international court could potentially consolidate them with interstate complaints that the country has withdrawn, leading to their rejection. Consequently, individuals will be deprived of international judicial protection of their rights due to an impermissible political decision by the government.

7. Complaints and demands presented in international courts hold immense significance for Armenia’s diplomacy. The withdrawal of international demands could inflict irreparable harm on Armenia’s standing in the global arena and weaken the foundations of its diplomatic resistance framework.

8. The Azerbaijani government has long perpetuated a policy of deep-seated racism and animosity towards Armenians, extending from Armenia and Artsakh to the Diaspora.

Azerbaijan not only neglects to protect Armenians or prevent violations of their rights but, at times, at the state level, actively endorses and condones harm against Armenians under the guise of “peace.” This includes heinous acts such as murders, torture, abductions, arbitrary detentions, and inflicting psychological trauma.

9. Furthermore, the current Azerbaijani genocidal policy exacerbates hostility after each offense, laying the groundwork for further atrocities. The threats against the collective existence of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian people have escalated in general.

10. Compounding this issue is Armenian authorities’ one-sided persistent acquiescence to Azerbaijan’s demands, driven by the futile hope that Azerbaijan will cease its actions. Unfortunately, this has not occurred in the past and it will not happen in the future.

11. The Azerbaijani authorities have never genuinely pursued peace; their international claims against Armenia were merely artificial gestures; mirroring steps aimed at deceiving the international community, creating a facade, and concealing their own crimes.

12. Withdrawal from lawsuits against Azerbaijan in international courts by the Armenian government would legitimize Azerbaijan’s policy of hatred and serious crimes against Armenians, potentially resulting in new violations of our rights and further crimes.

13. In light of the aforementioned, we strongly urge the Armenian authorities not to make any statements or take actions to withdraw from ongoing lawsuits against Azerbaijan in international courts.

Furthermore, we urge to initiate new legal actions based on all relevant conventions. This includes exploring avenues for seeking justice through the International Criminal Court to address the grave crime of forced displacement of the people of Artsakh.”

https://horizonweekly.ca/en/ex-ombudsmen-warn-against-withdrawal-of-armenias-lawsuits-against-azerbaijan-from-international-courts/

[Yervant1]

 

eurasianet

March 18 2024

 

Armenian PM signals willingness to make territorial concessions to facilitate border deal

 

Are the two sides closing in on a peace settlement?

Mar 18, 2024

Realizing his bargaining position is limited, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is making a pragmatic play to secure a border delimitation agreement with Azerbaijan: he appears willing to offer a unilateral give to ultimately get what Armenia needs.

Delimitation discussions appear stuck at present over Azerbaijan’s demand that it gain control of eight villages in border areas currently under Armenian jurisdiction. Pashinyan in comments to journalists signaled a willingness to unilaterally hand over four of the disputed villages. In doing so, he also suggested a practical way of settling the boundary between the two states. His initiative appears intended to deprive Azerbaijan of a pretext to launch new military action to seize territory, including any assault that could cut Armenia’s direct access to Iran.

“The de jure border that existed at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union was reaffirmed by the [1991] Alma-Ata declaration and not only by that declaration, but also by the agreements held in Prague on October 6, 2022,” Pashinyan said at a March 12 news conference.

Four of the disputed villages – Baghanis Ayrim, Lower Askipara, Kheyrimli, and Gizilhajili – were on the Azerbaijani side of the border between the two former Soviet republics and were occupied by Armenian forces in the 1990s, during the first Karabakh war, which concluded in 1994 after the signing of the Alma-Ata declaration.

Citing the Alma-Ata and Prague agreements, Pashinyan acknowledged that “the former administrative border, which existed during the Soviet Union, is somewhat beyond that present administrative border.” He went on to call for both states to reaffirm the frontier defined by the Alma-Ata agreement.

“In the process of [border] delimitation, we must work on reproducing that border in any format,” the Armenian prime minister said. “We must proceed from the de jure reality. What is Armenia is Armenia, what is not Armenia is not Armenia.”

Following Pashinyan’s logic, that means the Armenia’s immediate return of the four villages within Azerbaijan at the time of the Alma-Ata agreement. Earlier in 2024, Armeniamaintained that Azerbaijan currently controls 31 villages situated in roughly 200 square kilometers of land that are rightfully Armenian. There had been some talk in Yerevan of proposing a trade involving all the disputed settlements. But Pashinyan in his most recent comments made no mention of such a swap.

The remaining four villages that Azerbaijan is seeking is a trickier matter to settle. All are associated with one of the most bedeviling legacies of the Stalin era: they are village-sized exclaves that were primarily inhabited during the Soviet era by Azerbaijanis while being surrounded by Armenian territory.

On March 15, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan reaffirmed Pashinyan’s position during a meeting with lawmakers.

“The process of mutual recognition of territorial integrity and subsequent border delimitation must be based on the Alma-Ata declaration,” he said, referring to a 1991 document that committed newly independent ex-Soviet republics to recognizing their Soviet-era borders. Alma-Ata is presently known as Almaty, Kazakhstan’s commercial capital.

“There is more mutual understanding on this issue now than, for example, a month ago,” added Mirzoyan. “At least at the moment, I have the impression that we are very close to reaching a mutual agreement on this issue.”

Prior to Pashinyan’s March gambit, Azerbaijan had staked out an intransigent position about the return of the eight villages. “As for the four non-exclave Azerbaijani villages occupied by Armenia, their affiliation to Azerbaijan is beyond any doubt and they are subject to immediate liberation,” Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev said in the statement issued March 9, two days after the latest round of border delimitation talks. Mustafayev leads the Azerbaijani negotiating team.

“The issue of liberation of four of Azerbaijan’s exclave villages occupied by Armenia will also be resolved within the delimitation process,” he noted.

There has not been a specific Azerbaijani response to Pashinyan’s gambit. But in a March 14 speech in Baku, President Ilham Aliyev indicated that Azerbaijan and Armenia were close to a peace deal.

“Now that the Karabakh issue is closed, we are very close to peace. That’s what we think,” Aliyev said. “Meetings at the level of the foreign ministers of both countries have now resumed, and we think that peace is reachable. That is what we want. We restored historical justice and international law, and now it’s time to put an end to hostility in the region.”

The villages that Pashinyan seems willing to unilaterally hand back are important to Armenia from an infrastructure point of view. A highway to Georgia, as well as a pipeline carrying Russian gas to Armenia, pass through these villages. Pashinyan also addressed the issue in press comments, saying that he has instructed relevant state bodies to “reroute those lines so that they pass through Armenia’s de jure territory and so that we don’t have problems in that area.”

The prime minister’s remarks triggered an immediate outcry from long-standing government critics, who accuse Pashinyan of treachery and a failure to defend state interests.

“By unilaterally giving in, not only do you not create a guarantee that Azerbaijan will not attack, but on the contrary, you give them better conditions to attack you from those positions,” Anna Grigorian of the Hayastan alliance said in comments broadcast by RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.

https://eurasianet.org/armenian-pm-signals-willingness-to-make-territorial-concessions-to-facilitate-border-deal

[Yervant1]

Al-Jazeera, Qatar

March 19 2024

Armenia’s PM warns Azerbaijan could start war over disputed border villages

Armenia could face war by ‘end of the week’ if it does not return four Azerbaijani villages, PM Pashinyan says.

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has said his country could face a war with neighbouring Azerbaijan if it does not compromise and return four Azerbaijani villages it has held since the early 1990s.

In the video published on Tuesday, Pashinyan was speaking at a meeting with residents in northern Armenia’s Tavush region, close to a string of deserted Azerbaijani villages that Armenia has controlled since the early 1990s.

The four villages, which have been uninhabited for more than 30 years, are of strategic value to Armenia as they straddle the main road between Yerevan and the Georgian border.

Azerbaijan has said the return of its lands, which also include several tiny enclaves entirely surrounded by Armenian territory, is a necessary condition for a peace deal to end three decades of conflict over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan’s forces retook last September.

Pashinyan told locals on Monday, in the video clip that was circulated by his government, that failure to compromise over the villages could lead to war with Azerbaijan “by the end of the week”, Russian state news agency TASS reported.

“Now we can leave here, let’s go and tell [Azerbaijan] that no, we are not going to do anything. This means that at the end of the week a war will begin,” TASS quoted him as saying.

Armenia suffered a major defeat in September when Azerbaijan’s forces retook Nagorno-Karabakh in a lightning offensive, prompting almost all of that region’s estimated 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia.

Though Nagorno-Karabakh is recognised internationally as Azerbaijani territory, the region’s ethnic Armenians have enjoyed de facto independence from Azerbaijan since the war of the early 1990s.

Peace treaty

Azerbaijan and Armenia have said they now want to sign a formal peace treaty, but talks have become bogged down in issues including the demarcation of their 1,000km (620 mile) shared border, which remains closed and heavily militarised.

Pashinyan has signalled in recent weeks that he is willing to return Azerbaijani land controlled by Armenia, and suggested rerouting Armenia’s road network to avoid Azerbaijani territory.

Muslim-majority Azerbaijan also continues to control areas internationally recognised as part of Christian-majority Armenia.

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev said on Sunday his country was “closer than ever” to peace with Armenia, in remarks made after holding talks with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Baku.

Stoltenberg held talks on Tuesday with Pashinyan in Armenia, which is nominally a Russian ally though its relations with Moscow have deteriorated in recent months over what Armenia says is Russia’s failure to protect it from Azerbaijan.

As a result, Armenia has pivoted its foreign policy towards the West, to Russia’s chagrin, with senior officials suggesting it might one day apply for European Union membership.

Speaking at a news conference in Yerevan with Pashinyan, Stoltenberg welcomed what he called Armenia’s solidarity with Ukraine.

Commenting on Stoltenberg’s visit, the Kremlin said the bloc’s efforts to expand there were unlikely to help bring stability.

In a statement posted on Tuesday on the Telegram messaging app, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova suggested Armenia’s deepening ties with the West were the reason for it having to make concessions to Azerbaijan.

SOURCE: NEWS AGENCIES

HTTPS://WWW.ALJAZEERA.COM/NEWS/2024/3/19/ARMENIAS-PM-WARNS-AZERBAIJAN-COULD-START-WAR-OVER-DISPUTED-BORDER-VILLAGES