Regional Security System

[MJ]

I came across the following interesting Article regarding the Caucasian regional security issues. It seems to be very much unison with the vision of some of the more mature Armenian political thinkers.

http://www.cpirs.org.ge/Archive/mcarthur.pdf

[Aaron]

MJ

I read the article and of course regional cooperation of the caucasian states is a must in order to stop playing the game of the bigger nations but what are the steps to take to achieve this (if possible). I really don't know, I guess if there is a will there is a way, true, but still, i need to see some sort of pattern to believe in it.

Robert kocharian did speak about regional cooperation under the influence of the 3 important states, Russia, Iran and U.S, he gave it the name of a formula (3+1 or something like that i don't remember), at least it shows he sees further than the tip of his nose, moreover president Der Bedrossian had done everything to normalize relations with Turkey (without the latter showing signs of understanding) and he was a moderate on the Karabagh issue, could he stay in power? obviously not. I think that in order for the 3 caucasian states to achieve something together there must be compromises made by each one of them, I also believe that Armenia, under the last 2 presidents we had (both rational and pragmatic persons), has done its share of showing where it is ready to go for durable peace (some sort of karabagh_azerbaijan confederation), and I think that compromising more than that for the sake of regional happiness is not in our interest since we don't have much left to lose, except the landlocked 30000 sq.km that history left us as a bone. I also believe the problem resides in Azerbaijan not being able to swallow its pride which leaves doors open to military confrontation. God forbid, Hopefully not.

I don't know if my comments make sense, if not then reorient me in my path.

[MJ]

Aaron,

 

I cannot formulate the steps to be taken so that to succeed in establishing balanced and complimentary Regional Security System. At least because it is less of a conceptual issue and more of a governance issue, though I admit that it is very difficult to establish – primarily because it is more up to the powers not to the Caucasian States. One thing is obvious to me that being in the sphere of influence of one or another Regional Power of Superpower, Armnia’s misery is cgoing to continue, as well as the misery of the rest of the Caucasian States.

 

I think the formula you mentioned above was something like 3+2, wasn’t it how it was called at the time? One or another way, I think compromises will be made by the three parties. The issue is whether compromises would be made between the US/Turkey, Iran and Russia.

 

I think Der Bedrosian achieved some success with Turkey, even though he didn’t achieve much of what he anticipated or desired. At least he set the course, on which the subsequent administration built further, as much as on the level of pre-governing slogans they claimed the opposite. The only difference in international issues between the current Administration and the previous one is their international push for the recognition of the Genocide. This was the only serious mistake of Der Bedrosian administration at the time, though I understand their logic not to push for it on a state level. That was a miscalculation, in my view. And Armenia’s push for recognition has yielded results – the recognition by France, for example.

 

I agree with your interpretations regarding Karabagh. Only would like to note that eventually, the issue of the compromise on the subject of Karabagh is really between Karabagh and Azerbaijan, as much as one may suspect that such a statement presents political maneuvering from the Armenian side.

 

In any case, I think it is neither in Armenia’s National Security Interests nor in Karabagh’s to have full integration of Karabagh into Armenia until the broader regional issues are addressed. On the other hand, it is not in Azerbaijan’s National Security Interests to have Karabagh independent, without having some broader issues addressed. They would rather tolerate Karabagh inside Armenia than independent. Therefore, until the broader problems have found solution, I expect nothing but deadlock in the Karabagh issue.

 

Nothing that I say is new. This understanding has existed in Armenia at least 12 years ago. The issue is the implementation of it, as you understand. But there is already some progress along these lines.

[MJ]

Putin Has His Own Candidate for Pre-emption

 

October 6, 2002

By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

 

 

 

While working to slow down the Bush administration's

campaign against Saddam Hussein, Russia has for weeks waged

a campaign of accusation and intimidation against

neighboring Georgia, where some Chechen fighters have taken

refuge. It's not the first such outburst by Russia's

president, Vladimir V. Putin, against his Georgian

counterpart, Eduard A. Shevardnadze. But Russia's

pitch-perfect parody of American antiterrorism policy has

commanded Washington's attention and could even derail

Russian-American cooperation.

 

On the eve of President Bush's Sept. 12 speech to the

United Nations on Iraq, Mr. Putin wrote Secretary General

Kofi Annan charging that Georgia's passivity toward Chechen

fighters on its territory violated Security Council

resolutions. Russia might therefore have to act

unilaterally. The chief of Russia's general staff insisted

that Mr. Shevardnadze was "in no way" different from Mullah

Omar of the Taliban.

 

The Russian defense minister announced that no United

Nations vote was needed to attack Georgia. One Russian

newspaper published military plans to occupy all of Georgia

- and thereby "dictate the terms" of its future existence

as a state. The headline: "Pre-emption Moscow-Style."

 

Mr. Shevardnadze has shown he can use Moscow's words

against it. Echoing the United Nations debate on Iraq, he

has invited Mr. Putin to send unarmed inspectors to see for

themselves that Georgian forces have cleared the area where

Russians say Chechen fighters roam at will.

 

When the current anti-Georgian frenzy began, many in both

Moscow and Washington saw it as a Russian military attempt

to deflect attention from the war in Chechnya. Russian

polls show popular confidence in the management of the war

has dropped to about 30 percent. Yet even the most

transparent scapegoating of Georgia seems to sell. No

surprise, then, that one of the generals reprimanded when

Chechen rebels shot down a military helicopter in August

told reporters last week that the Chechens got the missile

they had used from - yes - the Georgians.

 

If one believes Moscow journalists and politicians, Russian

generals fear more than professional disgrace in Chechnya.

By perpetuating the war, they also protect the black-market

livelihood they have there, selling oil, drugs, even

weapons. Yet blame-shifting is only one Russian aim in this

affair. Moscow's nationalistic agitation has brought other

motives to the surface, particularly the desire to take

Georgia down a peg.

 

For years Mr. Shevardnadze has said that letting Russian

combat forces into Georgia would engulf his country in the

same violence that Chechnya has experienced. To which some

Russians answer, "So what?" For them, if chaos could topple

Mr. Shevardnadze or break Georgia's budding relationship

with NATO, or wreck plans for pipelines that circumvent

Russia - well, what's wrong with a little chaos?

 

Russian officials disavow such ideas, but Moscow's threats

have guaranteed a strong show of American support for

Georgian independence. President Bush fired off a letter to

Mr. Shevardnadze, praising his "invaluable contribution" to

the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell,

while saying he wouldn't lecture the Russians, has publicly

warned them off any thought of using "brute force" against

Georgia.

 

Administration officials acknowledge that a Russian attack

on Georgia would be a fiasco for their friendly relations

with Mr. Putin. "Regime change" in Georgia would

reverberate across the entire former Soviet Union. In

Russia, it would make the idea of restoring some sort of

post-Soviet realm not just a nostalgic Communist obsession

but a respectable strategic alternative to joining the

West. Elsewhere, governments that the United States has

tried to help - or, as in central Asia, whose help it has

sought - would be on notice that America cannot, or will

not, help them stand up to Russia.

 

Despite its emotional heat and dangerous implications, Mr.

Putin's indictment of Georgia has already had its effect.

These days in Washington it's not good enough for any state

to say that it tolerates only a few terrorists and only

some of the time. Or that there aren't enough of them to

affect the outcome of the war next door. Or that the

terrorists wouldn't be a problem at all if the neighboring

state hadn't mismanaged the war in the first place.

 

Georgia can and does make these arguments, with real

persuasiveness. Yet, while holding the Russian at bay, the

Bush administration has apparently concluded that the only

way to avert disaster is to get the Georgians to address

the underlying problem rather than to win the debate.

 

Last spring, during an earlier round of Russian

accusations, the United States responded by announcing a

major military training program for Georgia. This time the

response has been: Get your act together - a serious state

doesn't make itself vulnerable by letting armed fighters

use its territory. Mr. Shevardnadze's sweep against the

fighters is one result. The fact that fighting has now

escalated in Chechnya itself, involving Chechen units with

nowhere else to go, may be another.

 

Russians often accuse the United States of blindness to Mr.

Shevardnadze's failings, but they're wrong. The afterglow

of admiration for his achievements as Soviet foreign

minister under Mikhail Gorbachev doesn't drive American

policy anymore. In fact, most American diplomats regard his

regime in Georgia as corrupt and ineffective and have given

up hope that any of Georgia's problems will be dealt with

seriously under his leadership. They know Mr. Shevardnadze

is a survivor. They just want to see him do enough to

survive.

 

If this confrontation ends more or less peacefully - a big

if - it may be because all the parties accept what they

least like in each other's policies. The United States may

not mind Russian pressure if it focuses Mr. Shevardnadze on

what he has to do. The Russians may not mind American

influence if it yields a change in Georgian policy. And the

Georgians may not mind being told they have to make

decisions they find it hard to make themselves.

 

In such an outcome, Russians who saw an opportunity to turn

back the growth of American influence will be disappointed.

But some of them may have known this was where they would

end up. Russia's foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, was asked

three weeks ago whether Russia didn't in fact need a larger

American presence in Georgia. "Maybe," he shrugged.

 

Stephen Sestanovich is a senior fellow at the Council on

Foreign Relations and a professor of international

diplomacy at Columbia.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/06/weekinre...=1035183328&ei=

1&en=2cd51cf2f52e70ff

[MJ]

Putin Has His Own Candidate for Pre-emption

NY Times

October 6, 2002

By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

 

While working to slow down the Bush administration's

campaign against Saddam Hussein, Russia has for weeks waged

a campaign of accusation and intimidation against

neighboring Georgia, where some Chechen fighters have taken

refuge. It's not the first such outburst by Russia's

president, Vladimir V. Putin, against his Georgian

counterpart, Eduard A. Shevardnadze. But Russia's

pitch-perfect parody of American antiterrorism policy has

commanded Washington's attention and could even derail

Russian-American cooperation.

 

On the eve of President Bush's Sept. 12 speech to the

United Nations on Iraq, Mr. Putin wrote Secretary General

Kofi Annan charging that Georgia's passivity toward Chechen

fighters on its territory violated Security Council

resolutions. Russia might therefore have to act

unilaterally. The chief of Russia's general staff insisted

that Mr. Shevardnadze was "in no way" different from Mullah

Omar of the Taliban.

 

The Russian defense minister announced that no United

Nations vote was needed to attack Georgia. One Russian

newspaper published military plans to occupy all of Georgia

- and thereby "dictate the terms" of its future existence

as a state. The headline: "Pre-emption Moscow-Style."

 

Mr. Shevardnadze has shown he can use Moscow's words

against it. Echoing the United Nations debate on Iraq, he

has invited Mr. Putin to send unarmed inspectors to see for

themselves that Georgian forces have cleared the area where

Russians say Chechen fighters roam at will.

 

When the current anti-Georgian frenzy began, many in both

Moscow and Washington saw it as a Russian military attempt

to deflect attention from the war in Chechnya. Russian

polls show popular confidence in the management of the war

has dropped to about 30 percent. Yet even the most

transparent scapegoating of Georgia seems to sell. No

surprise, then, that one of the generals reprimanded when

Chechen rebels shot down a military helicopter in August

told reporters last week that the Chechens got the missile

they had used from - yes - the Georgians.

 

If one believes Moscow journalists and politicians, Russian

generals fear more than professional disgrace in Chechnya.

By perpetuating the war, they also protect the black-market

livelihood they have there, selling oil, drugs, even

weapons. Yet blame-shifting is only one Russian aim in this

affair. Moscow's nationalistic agitation has brought other

motives to the surface, particularly the desire to take

Georgia down a peg.

 

For years Mr. Shevardnadze has said that letting Russian

combat forces into Georgia would engulf his country in the

same violence that Chechnya has experienced. To which some

Russians answer, "So what?" For them, if chaos could topple

Mr. Shevardnadze or break Georgia's budding relationship

with NATO, or wreck plans for pipelines that circumvent

Russia - well, what's wrong with a little chaos?

 

Russian officials disavow such ideas, but Moscow's threats

have guaranteed a strong show of American support for

Georgian independence. President Bush fired off a letter to

Mr. Shevardnadze, praising his "invaluable contribution" to

the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell,

while saying he wouldn't lecture the Russians, has publicly

warned them off any thought of using "brute force" against

Georgia.

 

Administration officials acknowledge that a Russian attack

on Georgia would be a fiasco for their friendly relations

with Mr. Putin. "Regime change" in Georgia would

reverberate across the entire former Soviet Union. In

Russia, it would make the idea of restoring some sort of

post-Soviet realm not just a nostalgic Communist obsession

but a respectable strategic alternative to joining the

West. Elsewhere, governments that the United States has

tried to help - or, as in central Asia, whose help it has

sought - would be on notice that America cannot, or will

not, help them stand up to Russia.

 

Despite its emotional heat and dangerous implications, Mr.

Putin's indictment of Georgia has already had its effect.

These days in Washington it's not good enough for any state

to say that it tolerates only a few terrorists and only

some of the time. Or that there aren't enough of them to

affect the outcome of the war next door. Or that the

terrorists wouldn't be a problem at all if the neighboring

state hadn't mismanaged the war in the first place.

 

Georgia can and does make these arguments, with real

persuasiveness. Yet, while holding the Russian at bay, the

Bush administration has apparently concluded that the only

way to avert disaster is to get the Georgians to address

the underlying problem rather than to win the debate.

 

Last spring, during an earlier round of Russian

accusations, the United States responded by announcing a

major military training program for Georgia. This time the

response has been: Get your act together - a serious state

doesn't make itself vulnerable by letting armed fighters

use its territory. Mr. Shevardnadze's sweep against the

fighters is one result. The fact that fighting has now

escalated in Chechnya itself, involving Chechen units with

nowhere else to go, may be another.

 

Russians often accuse the United States of blindness to Mr.

Shevardnadze's failings, but they're wrong. The afterglow

of admiration for his achievements as Soviet foreign

minister under Mikhail Gorbachev doesn't drive American

policy anymore. In fact, most American diplomats regard his

regime in Georgia as corrupt and ineffective and have given

up hope that any of Georgia's problems will be dealt with

seriously under his leadership. They know Mr. Shevardnadze

is a survivor. They just want to see him do enough to

survive.

 

If this confrontation ends more or less peacefully - a big

if - it may be because all the parties accept what they

least like in each other's policies. The United States may

not mind Russian pressure if it focuses Mr. Shevardnadze on

what he has to do. The Russians may not mind American

influence if it yields a change in Georgian policy. And the

Georgians may not mind being told they have to make

decisions they find it hard to make themselves.

 

In such an outcome, Russians who saw an opportunity to turn

back the growth of American influence will be disappointed.

But some of them may have known this was where they would

end up. Russia's foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, was asked

three weeks ago whether Russia didn't in fact need a larger

American presence in Georgia. "Maybe," he shrugged.

 

Stephen Sestanovich is a senior fellow at the Council on

Foreign Relations and a professor of international

diplomacy at Columbia.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/06/weekinre...=1035183328&ei=

1&en=2cd51cf2f52e70ff