Turkish Recognition

January 27, 2001

Turkish writers appeal to Turkish government

Turks, writers appeal to Turkish government to admit Armenian genocide

Agence France-Presse

04/23/1999

WASHINGTON, April 23 (AFP) - More than 150 intellectuals, the majority of them Turkish-Americans, called on the Turkish government Friday to admit that a genocidal campaign against ethnic Armenians was perpetrated under Turkish rule in 1915.

"After 84 years the Turkish government continues to deny the genocide of the Armenians by blaming the victims and undermining historical fact with false rhetoric," according to the signatories of an open letter published on a full page of Friday's Washington Post.

Saturday, April 24, will be the anniversary of the beginning of the genocide the letter said. An official campaign to exterminate Turkey's Aremenian population was conducted between 1894 and 1915, and sporadically thereafter.

Among the signatories to the letter were numerous university professors, sociologists, historians, theologians and famous writers including Norman Mailer, Wole Soyinka, William Styron, John Updike and Kurt Vonnegut.

"The Armenian Genocide was the most dramatic human rights issue of the time and was reported regularly in newspapers across the U.S.," the signatories wrote.

"Denial of genocide strives to reshape history in order to demonize the victims and rehabilitate the perpetrators. Denial of genocide is the final stage of genocide," they continued.

According to the full-page open letter, the Turkish government currently funds Turkish Studies chairmanships at US universities in order to pressure the recipients to avoid or sanitize this period of Turkish history in question.

February 2, 2001

Debating Genocide

Time Europe

January 30, 2001

Turks and Armenians are still at odds over the events of 1915

BY ANDREW FINKEL Istanbul

Jacques Brinion - AP

A man making victory sign in Paris as the government recognized the

1915 Armenian Genocide

The middle-aged woman in a large Istanbul supermarket toyed

nervously with the packet of butter in her shopping cart before

returning it to the shelf. "It's French," she explained to no one

in particular as her reason for selecting another brand. She was

expressing the resentment that she and many other Turks feel at the

French National Assembly's decision to enact a law recognising that

genocide was committed against the Armenians under the Ottoman

Empire in 1915.

In 1915 the Young Turk government regarded Turkish Armenians as a

dangerous source of instability, and decided to deport large

sections of the Armenian population estimated variously between

1.75 and 3 million. In what some claim was the first genocide of

the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Armenians were driven

from their homes and killed. Tens of thousands emigrated to

Russia, the Middle East, France and the U.S. Some 300,000 remained

in what became in 1923 the Turkish Republic, but their numbers have

dwindled to nearly a fifth of that figure through migration.

Turks reject the accusation of genocide, stating that Armenians

were among the many to perish in one of the most violent periods of

human history. They complain that the world fails to show concern

for the many Moslem civilians who died during the Russian advances

in 1915 nor does it remember the populations in the Caucasus killed

or deported by Stalin.

The Turkish government has responded to the National Assembly's

decision by canceling lucrative grain, defence and

telecommunications contracts with French firms. In Britain, the

Armenian diaspora has accused the British government of placing

politics above principle when it failed to give a more central

place to Armenian suffering in the newly-declared Holocaust

commemoration, held last week.

To many outside Turkey, the nations sensitivity to accusations

about events that took place more than eighty years ago is a

mystery. Turks themselves question the motives of longtime allies

in trying to dredge up these controversies. And the Armenians in

Turkey itself are caught in the middle. "I do not need another

government to tell me what happened to my ancestors," said Hrant

Dink, editor of the Istanbul-based "Agos" newspaper, which serves

the remaining Armenian community. He fears that the tragedy is

still being used as fodder by those on both sides of the divide -

Europeans who want to keep Ankara at arms length and a growing

ultra-nationalist right in Turkey itself that basks in this sort of

enmity.

"Our Armenian compatriots are for the most part prosperous; they go

to the best clubs and have their island summer houses ... You'd

expect them to take the Turkish side against Europe. So why have

they remained silent?" wrote Emin Colasan, right-wing columnist in

the mass-circulating "Hurriyet" newspaper, whose logo includes the

words "Turkey for the Turks".

Such attitudes fill Dink and other Turkish Armenians with despair.

He denies the view of the diaspora that Armenians living in Turkey

are being held hostage. They believe that it is years of silence

on the part of Turks themselves that has resulted in the current

impasse. "I want to be proud of my country with its past and

present," said Nazar Buyum, the head of a large Istanbul

advertising firm. The first step, in this way of thinking is to

stop labeling legitimate attempts to examine history as some sort

of conspiracy.

For those scholars undertaking the sensitive task of looking into

the events of 1915, the solemn declarations of foreign parliaments

are anything but welcome. Halil Berktay, professor at Istanbul's

Sabanci University describes the French Parliament as being

"incredibly stupid" by simply fuelling intolerance on both sides.

The action, Berktay believes, has strangled a growing dialogue

between historians in Turkey and abroad. He himself speaks from

painful experience after having been the target of what he

describes as a McCarthyite witch-hunt after an interview in which

he expressed the "open secret" that Turkish irregular units

attacked Armenian civilians as they were forcibly evacuated from

their homes in 1915.

"The question of genocide should be left to historians," said the

Turkish President Ahmet Nejdet Sezer in an attempt late last year

to diffuse nationalist passionsa remark that earned him criticism

at home for being too soft. To people like Berktay, the issue of

whether it was genocide is a legal not a historical question: "Our

job is to explain what happened and why it happened."

Yet Turkish attitudes may only change slowly. Some Turkish

bureaucrats privately fear that admission of any sort of guilt

would open the country up to the three Rsrecognition, reparations,

and perhaps even the restitution of territory. Emotions, too, play

a part. Senior foreign ministry officials remember all too vividly

the terrorist attacks mounted by radical Armenian groups during the

1970s and 1980s. Among the 71 killed were 34 diplomats.

Some Turkish politicians accuse critics of double standards. Why,

they ask, is the West concerned with one people's historical

suffering when others are suffering now? "Some 20% of Azerbaijan

is currently under Armenian occupation," said Ismail Cem, the

Turkish foreign minister in a recent briefing to foreign

journalists, voicing the concern that Europe is eager to look at

events in 1915 but has turned a blind eye to the recent conflict

that has produce one million Azerbaijani refugees.

For the most part, Turks believe that the Armenian lobby is

wilfully misrepresenting history. The version taught in Turkish

schools is that Armenians allowed themselves to be caught up in

Great Power politics in an attempt to create their own state during

World War I. Pro-Turkish historians dispute that 1.5 million

Armenians died, but even they admit that between 300,00 and 600,000

perished. However Turks also died as the result of Armenian

atrocities committed behind the lines of the advancing Russian

army.

This does not explain, according to Dink, why Armenians died in

provinces far away from the Eastern front. He describes Armenians

as still suffering from their fixation with their own tragedy and

Turks by their need to deny it. "The only remedy is to help each

other," he said.

February 3, 2001

.....

[This message has been edited by levonyeshilian (edited February 10, 2001).]

February 3, 2001

This most be Sirius - Levon is Hugging MJ -

February 10, 2001

quote:

"Ninety percent of the Turks are absolutely convinced there was no
genocide and that, on the contrary, it was the Armenians who killed
Turks. It is a very sincere belief."

Something to keep in mind when turks show up here: there's difference between someone who is a denialist and one who is simply unaware of the truth.

February 10, 2001

Turkey angered by Greek accusations of genocide

By Claudia Parsons

ANKARA, Feb 10 (Reuters) - Turkey has complained to Athens about

the passing of a decree accusing Turks of genocide against Greeks

in the early 1920s, but Greece said the issue was historical and

should have no bearing on current good relations.

The decree, accusing Turks of the massacre of Orthodox Greeks in

Anatolia during Turkey's War of Independence, was voted on by the

Greek parliament two years ago. It has now been signed by

ministers and is to go to the president for signing.

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said he hoped it would not be

signed.

"Nobody with the slightest bit of sense could ever take these

claims seriously," he told reporters in Ankara.

"It is a historical fact known to all how much the Greeks used

oppression and cruelty during their invasion of Anatolia."

Turkey's Foreign Ministry had summoned the Greek ambassador to

discuss the issue on Friday.

But Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman Panos Beglitis said the timing

of the final stages of the decree's passage -- at a time of

improvement in traditionally strained bilateral relations -- was

coincidence.

"It is a clearly historical issue, completely unrelated to

bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey," he said. "I don't

believe this will affect our good relations."

Greece and Turkey nurture territorial disputes over several Aegean

islands and are bitterly divided over Cyprus -- and such issues

still have the potential to be an irritant in relations.

"BIZARRE THING"

Asked if Turkey planned to take action, Ecevit said: "It is

nothing to be taken seriously. Probably some sensible people in

Greece will take this bizarre thing off the agenda."

A Turkish diplomatic source added: "It's absurd, it's not a

serious thing -- except that it is serious in the sense that it

doesn't befit the climate of relations, or the climate which we're

trying to create in relations."

The decree proposes to make September 14 a day of commemoration for

the alleged genocide of Greeks in 1922.

Before World War One over a million Greeks lived in Anatolia, which

they call Asia Minor, while many Muslims lived in Greece, which for

several centuries until 1829 was part of the Ottoman empire.

Most Greeks were driven out of Anatolia during and after Turkey's

War of Independence, which culminated in 1922. Each side accuses

the other of atrocities as Orthodox Greeks fled, pursued by Muslim

Turks.

Relations between the two NATO allies have thawed since major

earthquakes in both countries in 1999 which sparked mutual

outpourings of sympathy and aid.

Last month, Turkey was enraged when France passed a law recognising

claims that around 1.5 million Armenians were massacred in eastern

Anatolia in 1915. Turkey rejects claims of genocide, saying far

fewer people died and both sides suffered casualties in partisan

fighting as the Ottoman empire collapsed.

12:25 02-10-01

February 11, 2001

The Military Tribunal

The trials constitute a milestone in Turkish legal history. The post-war Turkish authorities had to reckon with a theocratic system which had an established legacy of severity in dealing with non-Muslim subject nationalities embroiled in conflict with Ottoman authorities. The trials challenged this legacy by introducing a novel element in the handling of nationality conflicts. For the first time, Ottoman-Turkish authorities of the highest rank were being held accountable for their crimes against these nationalities. To add emphasis to this novelty, the Sultan and his government did so via a Special Military Tribunal, whose work proceeded under a succession of Ottoman governments in the wake of an exhausting war which had ended with the devastating defeat of the Ottoman army.

It is most certain that this undertaking was dictated by political expediency. On the one hand, it was hoped that it would be possible to inculpate the lttihadist Party leadership as primarily, if not exclusively, responsible for the Armenian massacres, thereby exculpating the rest of the Turkish nation. On the other, many representatives of the victorious Allies nurtured a strong belief that the punishment of the perpetrators might induce the victors to be lenient at the Peace Conference. The sudden escape from Istanbul on the night of November 1, 1918, of the seven arch leaders of lttihad Party, including the wartime ministers of war, marine, interior, and education, as well as the two top Internal Security and Police officers, exacerbated the situation. Strong voices in the Press and Parliament began to agitate for the prompt arrest and prosecution of remaining high-ranking suspects. The personal antagonism ofVahdeddin, the new Sultan, for the "Committee of Union and Progress"-the lttihadist Party-facilitated this targeting of the residual leadership of that party. Old and new opponents of the latter, especially leaders of the hitherto suppressed opposition ltilaf Party, assumed an active role in this drive, which at times deteriorated into outright persecution.

The task of the Special Military Tribunal was not easy as it faced very serious resistance from lttihadist partisans who continued to dominate the Civil Service, the ministries of War, Interior, and Justice, and, above all, the central and local offices of the powerful Istanbul Police. These tried to impede the work of the Tribunal by temporizing, withholding documents, stalling the transmission of information, and occasionally outright disobedience of court orders. Obstruction was clandestinely abetted by operatives of the residual Special Organization (SO), the outfit which had actually carried out the killing operations of the Armenian genocide. Secret cells of the SO in the Ottoman capital unleashed a campaign of intimidation against the judges, the attorneys-general, and witnesses for the Tribunal, as well as against those organs of the press whose editors exposed details of the Armenian genocide by publishing eye-witness testimonies of Turkish citizens anxious to see the criminals punished. Members of these cells even managed to organize the escape from the main military prison of such foremost lttihadists murderers as Army Group Commander Halil Pa§a, Central Committee member Ku^uk Talat, and Diyarbekir Governor-General Dr. Reit. (14)

In addition to this encumbrance, the Tribunal suffered from instability as it underwent four changes in structure and function between December 1918 and November 1920. These changes included revisions of its statutes, a switch from a military-civilian to strictly military court-martial (March 1919), and the enlarging of the scope of the charges to encompass "overthrowing the government" (April 1920) added to the principal charges of "deportation and massacre." Turnover among the presiding judges and attorneys-general in charge of the prosecution was considerable; there were at least six of the former and nine of the latter. (15) Parallel to these turnovers, Cabinet and ministerial changes affected the personnel of the Tribunal-there were ten different justice ministers alone. In the eight months following the Armistice, there were six different Cabinets, with Tevfik Pa§a alone forming three successive Cabinets between November 1918 and February 1919. In the initial three months (February-May 1919) of the Tribunal three Interior Ministers were successively appointed, only to resign or be relieved of their posts.

Despite all these handicaps, however, the Tribunal functioned in the inhospitable milieu as best it could. It was able to secure, authenticate, and compile an array of documents, including formal and informal orders for massacre, implicating the Ottoman High Command, the ministers of interior and justice, and the top leadership of the lttihad Party. The Tribunals Key Indictment and nearly all of its verdicts are predicated upon these documents rather than courtroom testimony. Owing to the ascendancy of Kemalism first in the interior of the country, then gaining momentum in 1919 and 1920, and eventually prevailing throughout the entire land, displacing and expelling the Sultans government in Istanbul, the prosecution ultimately faltered. Only a fraction of the 200 suspects (including 150 civilian officials of government and party and 22 military officers) against whom the so-called Mazhar Inquiry Commission had marshaled incriminating evidence and prepared separate files for delivery to the Tribunal could be convicted. With the fall of the Republic of Armenia in November-December 1920, invaded and demolished by the Kemalist General Kazirn Karabeldr, and the attendant demise of pro-Sultan Darnad Ferids fifth and last Cabinet, the courts-martial were jettisoned.

Despite initial cooperation between the two in opposing the Sultans government for placating the victors, lttihadism should not be confounded with Kemalism. The former was bent on reestablishing itself in postwar Turkey without relinquishing its Panturldc and Panislamic ambitions. The latter was trying to mitigate the disastrous consequences of a military defeat by confronting the victorious allies as a provincial insurgency, unless the allies were willing to recognize the sovereign rights of a new Turkish republic, bereft of expansionist, Panturldc ambitions. The cooperation failed because the lttihadists continued to conspire to seize power, displace the Kemalists, and reimpose a new lttihadist regime. In the end the leaders of the new republic, led by Mustafa Kemal, liquidated the residual leadership of lttihad following a series of trials, conducted by the Independence Tribunal in July and August 1926; about ten top lttihadist leaders were hanged, including Special Organization chieftains Dr. Nazirn, Yenibah^eli Nail, Filibeli Hilmi, National Security Director Canbolat, and Hur§it. Kara Kemal, the right hand man of party boss Talat, committed suicide after he was caught hiding in a chicken coop. The principal charge leveled against all of them was conspiracy to assassinate Mustafa Kemal and overthrow his republican regime.

All difficulties notwithstanding, the Tribunal performed its task of investigating the genocide of the Armenians with the help of the Administration's Mazhar Inquiry Commission, adjunct inquiry commissions attached to the Tribunal, and Parliament's Fifth Inquiry Commission (Besinci §ube Tahkikat Komisyonu). As the series of Verdiets demonstrates, the Tribunal substantiated the key charge of premeditated (ta'ammuden) mass murder organized by the Central Committee of the lttihad Party, carried out by the "Special Organization" (Tegkilatl Mahsusa), largely consisting of hardcore criminals released from the empires prisons for the purpose.

The following is being confined to the description and analysis of the main Verdicts the Tribunal issued after each trial series, the main Indictment itself, and the sittings of the main trial series involving the Cabinet ministers and the top lttihadists. As we shall see, each Verdict or series has its own distinct characteristics.

By Vahakn N. Dadrian http://www.genocide.am/dadrian/miltrib.htm

February 11, 2001

The Yozgat Trial Series

This series dealt with the massacres in the district of Yozgat, which in the Ottoman provincial administration setup represented the unit of Sancak (district) within the boundaries of the province (vilayet) of Ankara. The district itself comprised three administrative subunits called kazas (counties), namely Bogazliyan, Akdag Madeni, and Yozgat, the latter representing the center of the district and located at a distance of some 110 miles east of Ankara. According to Ottoman statistics, of a total pre-war Armenian population of 33,133 in Yozgat district, 31,147 were "deported." Of these, 3208 were from Akdag Madeni kaza, 13,259 from Yozgat kaza, and 14,680 from the 15 villages of Bogazliyan kaza. The majority of these Armenians lived dispersed in the districts 48 villages. Their community life centered around 14 churches and 63 schools they maintained as a religious minority. At the first trial of the series (February 5, 1919), the Attorney General disclosed that out of about 1,800 Armenians from the town of Yozgat proper only 88 survivors could be counted.

The Yozgat trials examined "the deportations and massacres" in 18 sittings be-tween February 5 and April 7, 1919. At the 12th sitting (March 6), the trials were interrupted, to continue on March 24 when the Tribunals chief judge and the attor-ney general were replaced and new court martial statutes introduced in connection with the installation of Damad Ferids first Cabinet. Ferid resolved to be more rigor-ous in the task of prosecution. There were three defendants. At the 17th sitting the chief judge declared that the trial of one of them, 36-year-old Feyyaz Ali, a govern-mental estates official (evkaf memuru) was being detached for inclusion in a projected second series of Yozgat trials. Of the remaining two, Mehmet Kemal, the 35-year-old ex-kaymakam (sub-district governor) of Bogazliyan and subsequently interim district governor of Yozgat, was the principal defendant; his co-defendant was 44-year-old Major Mehmet Tevfik, commander of Yozgats gendarmery battalion. These defen-dants were represented altogether by six defense attorneys. All three defendants were subjected to pre-trial interrogations, both written and oral, during which they made a number of confessions.

The defense counsel challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, arguing that since the alleged crimes were perpetrated in distant Yozgat they could not be tried in Istanbul. The counsel for Mehmet Kemal, the principal defendant, argued that since his client had already been tried on identical charges it was unlawful to try him a second time. A prompt investigation, however, revealed that Kemal had been tried in absentia not on deportation and massacre charges, but rather embezzlement, for personally appropriating the riches of the Armenian victims. Sentenced to three months of prison and acquitted upon his request for a retrial, the Court now rejected Kemals arguments: at issue now was a capital crime. The Court maintained that Is-tanbul was the proper venue since orders for the massacres came from Istanbul.

In his opening remarks Attorney-General Sami launched a two-pronged attack against both the victims and the perpetrators. He blamed the former for provoking the atrocities, the April-May 1915 "events of Van" (Van Vakuatt), when the Arme-nians of that eastern province rose up to defend their lives after the governor had begun to massacre them. The Armenians were "separatists" who transgressed their religious community status to clamor for equal rights and seek the intervention of foreign powers; they eventually became tools of these powers. This stimulated the antagonism of the Muslims and culminated in the Deportation Law in May 1915. Sami then inveighed against "the government officials big and small" who perpetrated "heartrending crimes against the Armenians in the course of implementing this law." He added that "an order from above is only then executable when it is in accord with ones conscience." Describing them as "crimes against humanity," Sami concluded that the task of this Court was "to establish these crimes and punish the guilty. (16)

The Armenian lawyers appearing as "personal prosecutors" (muddei §ahsi) and as "private complainants" (miifteki) in the next sitting (February 8) strongly objected to the Attorney Generals characterization of the Armenians. Humayak Khosrovian (17) categorically rejected the charge of Armenian provocation, insisting that all the Armenians wanted was "justice, coupled with security, a goal which neither the Tanzimat reforms (18) nor Sultan Abdul Hamit could attain." Rather than labeling the Armenians tools of foreign powers, people should look at German Emperor Wilhelm II and others as responsible for the Armenian tragedy, (19) the victims of which he placed at 1.2 million. Addressing the issue of the Van events, he accused Sami of disingenuousness, since the leaders whom he had accused of "sabotaging" the Turkish war effort had actually been trying to pacify the region, and had been treacherously killed by the Van authorities, thereby "driving the Armenian population of that province to desper-ate self-defense." Even if the charge were true, there was no moral or legal justifica-tion to victimize for it the entire Armenian population of Yozgat, whose "innocence regarding sabotage had been established."

In light of these "distortions and inaccuracies," and the injection of politics into the judicial proceedings, Khosrovian moved that Sami be disqualified by the panel of judges. But Sami reiterated that he neither denied nor minimized the enormity of the crime against the Armenians, rejecting the charge that he had injected politics in his speech. After deliberating for fifteen minutes, the judges declared that they were not going to be influenced by political arguments from either side and refused to disqualify Sami. The three Armenian lawyers thereupon walked out in protest and refused to continue to serve as counsel for their surviving clients. (20)

The Commission of Inquiry, headed by Mazhar, former governor-general and a career civil servant in Ottoman provincial administration, successfully subpoenaed forty-two official documents from the post-war district governor ofYozgat. Each was authenticated by Interior Ministry officials and marked "It conforms to the original." Many of these cipher telegrams bore the names of two military officers involved in planning the deportations. Both were subpoenaed and in the course of testimony confirmed the authenticity of the documents. One of them was Colonel §ahabeddin, Interim Commander ofKayseris 15th Division, Kayseri being one of the five districts of Ankara province. The other was Colonel Halil Recayi, Deputy Commander of the 5th Army Corps, stationed at Ankara. In addition, the Court obtained a lengthy affi-davit from Major Mehmet Salim, the wartime Military Commandant of Yozgat and President of its Recruitment Office. In it the Turkish major candidly admits the mag-nitude of the crimes against Yozgats Armenians, detailing atrocities and describing the pivotal role of lttihad Party leaders, whom he identifies by name and position.

During the 9th sitting alone (February 22, 1919), the prosecutor introduced twelve cipher telegrams which demonstrated that the word "deportation" meant "massacre." This critical piece of evidence was confirmed by Colonel Halil Recayi, who during the course of his testimony at the 7th sitting (February 18) explicitly admitted that he had received from Colonel §ahabeddin cipher telegrams about the killing operations and that "deportation" in fact meant "massacre" (kesim). When con-fronted with deciphered telegrams bearing his name, and warned. Colonel §ahabed-din suffered a fainting (bayginlik) spell and had to be escorted out of the courtroorn. When he resumed his testimony at the next sitting, he declared, "I can confirm that the Armenian population was massacred in and around Bogazliyan" (8th and 9th sit-tings, February 20 and 22). In another cipher telegram, which was introduced at the 2nd sitting (February 8, 1919), and which bore the number 169 and the date of July 14, 1915, the same colonel reports that the Armenians were being subjected to fright-ful acts of looting. Throughout the trials, widespread robbery, plunder, and pillaging of the victim population appeared in stark relief as essential components of genocide (sittings nos. 3,4,7,11, February 10, II, 16 and March 5, 1919, respectively).

The Attorney General emphasized that he was basing his closing arguments on authenticated documents in the possession of the Court, rather than the testimony of Armenian witnesses. He referred to the testimony of the senior Muslim religious official of Bogazliyan, the Mufti, who had exhorted the chief defendant, Kemal, to cease and desist by invoking sacred Muslim law, and of the former governor ofYozgat district, Cemal, who had begged the same Kemal not to reduce the common people to accomplices by enlisting them in criminal acts. The testimony of Colonels §ahabed-din and Recayi, and others, the Attorney General concluded, confirmed the organized nature of the Yozgat mass murder.

The first documentary evidence of the dishonesty of defense claims that their acts were motivated by Armenian threats to Turkish security came from Colonel §a-habeddin, who in his cipher telegram of July 14, 1915, addressed to Colonel Recayi in Ankara, stated that "there was no evidence whatsoever" about any uprising being planned (hic bir delail olmadigi) (2nd sitting, February 8, 1919). An equally authorita-tive detail came from Yozgats former district governor (mutassarrif) who was in office at the time the alleged uprising took place. In his testimony Cemal emphatically stated that this accusation was false, that he personally had investigated the matter, and that "The description 'rebellion' is somewhat exaggerated (Isyan sozii biraz sumulludur) [for] the brigandage of ten people cannot be regarded as rebellion" (on kisinin §ekaveti isyan addedilmez). He concluded that the entire matter was an insig-nificant clash of a few Armenians with gendarmes pursuing them, "wretched fugitives desperately trying to stay alive" (11th sitting, March 5, 1919).

As a result of this refutation, Yozgats gendarmery battalion commander Major Tevfik, the second defendant, felt constrained to amend his testimony about a sup-posed Armenian "insurgency." He conceded that his use of the word meant acts of resistance by fugitives trying to escape military service or deportation (15th sitting, March 27, 1919). In written testimony sent on I December, 1918, to the Interior Ministry in Istanbul, Rifaat Bey, a Muslim notable from Yozgat, described in great detail the merciless bloodbaths Major Tevfik organized in and around Yozgat and the vast riches he acquired as a result. Rifaat portrays him as a bloodthirsty man who bragged about his role as executioner of Damad Salih Pa§a, whom the lttihadists had hanged in 1913 on charges of complicity in the assassination of Grand Vizier Mahmut (^evket Pa§a in Istanbul; (21) in line with his duties as an executioner (cellat). Major Tevfik avowedly pulled the chair from under the feet of the condemned, who was a member of the Ottoman royal family.

According to Rifaat, Major Tevfik almost completely annihilated the Armenian population of Yozgat. He first slaughtered males between the ages of 15 and 75 at Ta§ Punar village with "hatchets and axes as the victims kept screaming like birds" (balta ile kus gibi bagirtarak katl ve imha). "Thereafter, he carted off in wagons the belong-ings and jewelry of the victims to his home." Unable to endure the heartrending screams of the victims, a delegation of the Muslim population from the neighboring villages appealed to the major to have mercy on the women and children-in the name of the seriat, the Muslim Sacred Law-with cries of "kill us off in their stead," as they knelt at the feet of his horse. But the commander was inexorable. He pulled his gun and began shooting the supplicants. Major Tevfik then had the Armenian inhabitants of several villages of Akdag Maden and Bogazliyan, as well Kum Kuyu village burned alive in their homes. Rifaat ended his written testimony by denouncing Tevfik as "a wild beast" (canavar) and "bloodthirsty" (hunhar), and pleaded "for the sake of God" that the court "take the requisite steps. (22)

The atrocities adduced during the proceedings against district Governor Kemal exceeded in heinousness those recounted in all other testimony. His zest for massa-cring Armenians, especially women and children, was unexcelled. On his way to the village Giiller (Keller), the most notorious of the killing fields, for example, Kemal is reported to have remarked to his wife that he and his henchmen "were going to the theater," and he was observed smoldng a water-pipe amidst the moans, groans and shrieks of the people in mortal agony (muztarib halkin enin ve iztirabati karsisinda mumaileyhin nargile ictigini) (3rd sitting, February 10, 1919). In the next sitting of the Tribunal Kemal was described as angry at the ineptness of the Turkish villagers rounded up to help his 500 mounted brigands massacre a convoy of several thousand deportees. Shouting furiously at them, "You don't seem to know how to slaughter," (Siz kesmesini bilmiyorsunuz), he reportedly demonstrated a more efficient way of dispatching the victims; the throats were to be slashed diagonally instead of horizon-tally (4th sitting, February II, 1919). In the course of still another sitting, he was described as brandishing his sword and at the same time inciting his henchmen with the words, "Get going, get going. Haven't our mothers home us for this day?" (Anamiz bizi bugiin icin dogurmadi ml?) (5th sitting, February 12, 1919). (23)

Abdullahzade Mehmet, Bogazhyan Mufti (the provincial Muslim jurisconsult) advised the Court in written testimony that Kemals method of destroying the Arme-nians consisted of liquidating the males first and subsequently massacring the convoys of women and children. During an encounter in the Bogazliyan Recruitment Bureau Mehmet had warned Kemal of "the wrath of God," to which Kemal retorted that the Mufti seemed to want to be more kindhearted than the government. The Mufti added that Kemal perpetrated his crimes with the help of gendarmes and brigands, the large part of the population being opposed to the crimes. Kemal denied the account, and when the presiding judge retorted, "Why should an old Mufti lie?" Kemals bland answer was, "I don't know." (Sitting 7, February 18; sitting 13, March 24, 1919).

An extensive January 15, 1919, affidavit prepared at the request of the Mazhar Inquiry Commission Major Mehmet Salim, the Military Commandant of Yozgat and President of the latters Recruitment Bureau referred to above, provides every conceivable detail on the conception, organization, control, and execution of the Arme-nian genocide in the district of Yozgat. Salim forthrightly stressed the point that un-derlying the entire scheme of deportations lay "a policy of extermination" (imha siyaseti) which Kemal mercilessly implemented in his district. The details were plot-ted out "in nightly merry-making, drinking parties." Together with his drinking pals Kemal would work out these details for "the next days operations." The atrocities were intended to help redeem "lttihad's national aspirations" and became its "official policy." According to the same affidavit, the massacre of the male victims followed a uniform pattern. In order to render them defenseless they were marched off in twos or fours "with arms and hands tied up." The implements used were "axes, spades, swords, knives, hatchets." (24) As to the secret character of the designs on the Ottoman Armenians, defendant Kemal himself unwittingly supplied proof. In the course of his December 16, 1918, second pretrial interrogation, Kemal volunteered the information that the central authorities in Istanbul had ordered him to "burn" certain ciphers after reading them (okuduktan sonra yakilmast emir olundugundan). Yet, twice during the trials he flatly recanted this statement (3rd and 13th sittings, February 10 and March 24, 1919, respectively). Cemal, the former governor, described to the Court how lttihads Re-sponsible Secretary in Ankara (a position akin to Gauleiters of the Third Reich), Hu-seyin Necati, had ordered him to interpret "deportation" as a code word for "mas-sacre." But Cemal wanted to see the wording of the respective order of the Central Committee of lttihad, Necati refused to give him the piece of paper from which he had read it out (sitting II, March 5, 1919).

Defendant Mehmet Kemal reportedly had close family ties to certain people in Van. One source maintains that he was Governor-General Cevdets brother-in-law. (25) In any event, he is quoted by some people as having sworn to avenge the loss of his relatives in the April-May 1915 conflagration of Van, which ended with the defeat of Cevdet and his forces by contingents of the Russian Caucasian Army. Cevdet failed to subdue the small Armenian fighting force which rose to avert the massacre of the rest of the Armenian population of Van province. The final Turkish defeat was at-tended by heavy losses in men and equipment. (26)

There is no doubt that Kemal was affected by this and possibly by family losses in Van. This is reflected in Attorney General Samis opening remarks, specifically mentioning "the Van uprising" and the consequent rise of hostile feelings against the Armenians. Kemal was subsequently quoted as saying to his cronies that through the massacres that he was carrying out against the Armenians, he was avenging his father-in-law (15th sitting, March 27, 1915). This was confirmed by a sergeant of the gendar-mery ofYozgat, a veteran of the killing operations executed on the Yozgat-Bogazliyan trek, who explained Kemals ferocity by a reference to losses his family reportedly sustained in the Van province in April or May 1915. Sergeant §iikru quoted the con-victed governor as follows: "I swore by the Prophet Mohammed, I will not leave any Armenian alive in the district ofYozgat." This rage was so elemental, added the ser-geant, that he behaved especially savagely against women and children during whose destruction he didn't even try to maintain secrecy. (27) According to his biographer-of course on the other hand-district Governor Kemal had for a period taught a college course on civilization! (28)

Consistent with Ottoman legal tradition, Kemal was afforded the chance to de-liver a speech before the Verdict. His lawyers had already reargued his innocence, blaming in the process the Armenians for everything. His speech was drafted for him by Halil Mente§e, one of the chief lttihadists, under arrest on similar charges and being held in the same Bekiraga prison as Kemal. (29) During the war Halil had occu-pied the posts of Foreign and Justice Minister and for a long time President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, in which capacity he had unsuccessfully tried to block the parliamentary investigation of the massacres. In the speech Kemal called attention to the losses and suffering of the Muslims fleeing the onslaught of "Armenian guerillas fighting in the Russian army and committing barbaric massacres." He claimed to have strengthened the Ottoman State by "obeying the orders" of the gov-ernment. "Whatever atrocities were committed against the Armenians," he said, "were counteractive blows by Muslims who were provoked by the Armenians." He closed his speech with an appeal to "Islamic conscience" (18th sitting, April 7, 1919).

The Verdict, death by hanging, was rendered the next day and carried out on April 10. The Court had rejected the Attorney Generals proposal to rely on Article 56 of the Ottoman Penal Code, which assumed a land of civil war involving mutual hostilities and excesses, instead, it relied on Article 45, which clearly distinguished victims from perpetrators. The defendants were found guilty for inciting not only the local Muslims, but Muslims in general. Moreover, the Tribunal exonerated the vast majority of the Armenian population of Yozgat, which had "proven its dedication and loyalty to the Ottoman State." In any event, the Tribunal maintained that even if it were true that Van Armenians were guilty of provocation, Yozgat Armenians could not be held responsible for them: "such transfer of guilt is illegal."

Perhaps the most important feature of the Verdict was its conclusion that the deportations were a cloak for the intended massacres. "There can be no doubt and no hesitation" on this point, it declared in that conclusion (guphe ve tereddiit btrak-madigindan . . .). (30) Gendarmery commander Tevfik, the other defendant, was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labor as an accessory to the crime.

Were these crimes investigated and punished during the war as claimed by past and present Turkish authorities and authors? The answer to this question came dur-ing the questioning of Aziz Nedim in one of the court sittings. Nedim had been a Civil Inspector in the Ottoman provincial administration and a friend of Talat from the days of Salonild. In May 1916 Talat had sent him to Bogazliyan, ostensibly to investigate abuses and crimes committed during the deportations. But in his pre-trial deposition Nedim had declared that according to the order issued to him (emri sami), he "was not authorized to investigate massacres." Attorney General Sami underscored this point when Nedim personally appeared in court under subpoena. (Sitting II, March 5, 1919). (31) Sami pointed out that "when inspectors came, they limited their investigations to wide-ranging abuses involving plunder and fraud." The officials in-volved were mildly punished not for expropriating the victims, but rather for appro-priating their possessions instead of transferring them to the Treasury. This was pre-cisely why Governor Kemal was originally taken to court not for the massacres he organized, but for "irregularities" in handling the goods and possessions of the Arme-nians. He was convicted, dismissed from his new post at Izmit, only to be reinstated a year later under dubious circumstances. (32)

By Vahakn N. Dadrian http://www.genocide.am/dadrian/yozgat.htm

February 11, 2001

Introduction

The prosecution of dozens of World War I Turkish war criminals by a Turkish Military Tribunal has vet to engage the attention of scholars of legal history-, in particular genocide studies. The present article continues efforts by this author to counteract this negligence by directing attention to those trial sessions which previously received only passing attention.(1) When analyzed to some extent, however, these sessions may shed significant light on the twin issues of prevention and punishment that are the touchstone of the UN Convention on Genocide. These issues continue to punctuate contemporary debate on genocide as the ultimate crime.

Yielding to German political and military pressure, on October 29, 1914, Turkey-relinquished its openly proclaimed neutrality in the war which was then raging in Europe. Through a combined surprise attack against Russian warships and coastal installations in the Black Sea, Turkey on tliat day entered the war. England and France, Russia's allies, declared war against Turkey on November 5, three days after Russia. This aggression would entail for defeated Turkey legal and political liabilities. Two factors animating this belligerence appear critical. Turkey signed on August 2, 1914, a secret political and military alliance with Germany because the top leaders of the lttihad Party (the Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP), led by Enver, War Minister and de facto Supreme Commander of the Ottoman Armed Forces, had divined that Germany would emerge victorious in the war. Kaiser Wilhelms long-standing pro-Turkish attitudes and policies on the one hand, and Envers boundless faith in German military prowess on the other, contributed to this judgment. Moreover, Germany had agreed by treaty to help Turkey recover territories lost to Russia in previous wars. Germany shared Turkeys historical animosity toward Russia. (2) The prospect of assisting militarily in the obliteration of the perennial Russian threat rein-forced Turkish inclinations to identify with Imperial Germany.

"Nationalities" problems, the Achilles' heel that had led to the incremental truncation of the decaying multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, continued to bedevil its new lttihadist rulers. That affliction was exacerbated when on February 8, 1914, the lttihadist leaders were impelled, if not compelled, by the Great Powers to sign a new "Armenian Reform Act" giving control over the administration of the eastern provinces containing the bulk of the Ottoman Armenian population to European "Inspectors General." (3) The fact that the initiative for this Act came from the Russians, who had doggedly interceded on behalf of the Armenians in protracted negotiations in 1912 and 1913, embittered the lttihadist leaders. The latter would soon find it convenient and expedient to direct their ire against their vulnerable Armenian subjects. The Russian threat became identified with an Armenian threat. These developments took on a greater significance because the Reform Act grew out of a major military calamity for Turkey. The redoubtable Ottoman army had suffered crushing defeats in 1912 during the first Balkan War at the hands of the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks, former subject nationalities. The war itself resulted in part from massacres the Turks had committed during conflicts over a similar "Reform Act" for the Balkans, namely Article 23 of the Berlin Peace Treaty, stipulating reforms in Macedonia. (4)v This legacy made the new Armenian Reform Act extremely portentous.(5)

It is against this backdrop that the crystallization of the scheme to destroy the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire must be understood. Involved here is a historical process through which the antecedents of the Turko-Armenian conflict gained cumulative momentum. German, Austrian, and especially Turkish documents demonstrate that Turkish belligerence was conditioned by an urge to eliminate the last nationality conflicts in the Ottoman Empire, in particular the most perilous, the Armenian. (6) Similar documents indicate that the Turks saw their alliance with Austria and Germany as a protective shield for their genocidal scheme. (7) The Armenian geno-cide thus fits, implicitly at least, the stipulation of the Nuremberg Charter that genocide, in order to be prosecuted, has to involve crimes committed "in execution of or in connection with war. (8) Virtually the same point was made in the Key Indictment of the Turkish Military Tribunal. (9)

The juridical proceedings and findings of the Turkish Military Tribunal as recorded in Takvimi Vekayi, the official gazette of the Ottoman government, whose supplements (ilave) served as the judicial journal of the Tribunal, form the basis of this article. The "Key," or main. Indictment and the "Key Verdict," as well as other subsidiary indictments and verdicts were based on primarily official and authenti-cated documents (10) (a practice followed later at Nuremberg as well). As far as is known, outside Turkey only the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate Archive and the Nu.bar Library in Paris own the originals of these "supplement" issues. The official published transcripts of the debates in the Ottoman Parliaments Lower House (Meclisi Mebusan) and Upper House (Meclisi Ayan) in November and December 1918 have also been utilized. The Turkish daily press has been consulted for some of the details of testimony given by defendants and witnesses in pre-trial interrogations and various sittings of the court.

These auxiliary sources reinforce the findings of the Military Tribunal. As the executive branch of the Ottoman government, for example, considered instituting courts martial, the legislative branch was providing ammunition. In his inaugural ad-dress on October 19, 1918, for example, the Upper Houses President openly declared that during the war "the Armenians were savagely killed. (11) A month later, a promi-nent Ottoman statesman made a crucial revelation: during his term as post-war Presi-dent of the Council of State he came into possession of evidence documenting the fact that the Central Committee of lttihad had planned and ordered the massacre of the provincial Armenian population. (12) Upon further examination, Re§it AkifPa^a determined that the lttihad Party and its boss, Talat, were responsible for the mas-sacres. On the basis of this determination the Attorney General launched his investi-gation of the lttihad Party in early December 1918. The Lower House, i.e., the Chamber of Deputies, held similar debates and heard similar revelations before the courts martial period. On December II, 1918, Trabzons deputy declared that he had "personally observed" an episode of the drowning operations on the Black Sea, during which "the Armenians, under the pretext of being taken to another port city, were loaded onto barges and thrown overboard in the high seas". (13) The transcripts which record this evidence represent a crucial source of documentation.

By Vahakn N. Dadrian http://www.genocide.am/dadrian/intro.htm

February 11, 2001

Notes in the text of The Turkish Military Tribunal's Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial Series (see the above materials by Dadrian. More details available at http://www.genocide.am/dadrian/content.htm )

1. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications," Yale Journal of International Law 14:2 (Summer 1989), pp. 221-334; "The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal," International Journal of Middle Ea-st Studies 23:4 (November 1991), pp. 549-76; and, "A Textual Analysis of the Key Indict-ment of the Turkish Military Tribunal Investigating the Armenian Genocide," Armenian Re-view 44:1/173 (Spring 1991), pp. 1-36.

2. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Cenocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus, 3rd edition (Providence/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), pp. 284-86.

3. For details see ibid., pp. 212-16.

4. Ibid., pp. 185-92.

5. Ibid., pp. 192-99.

6. Ibid., pp. 207-11.

7. Vahakn N. Dadrian, German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity (Cambridge: Blue Crane Books, 1995), pp. 232-33.

8. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law," p. 324, n. 393.

9. Vahakn N. Dadrian, Tile Armenian Genocide in Official Turkish Records (Collected Essays of the author), special edition of Journal of Political and Military Sociology 22:1 (Summer 1994), p. 151.

10. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide," International Journal of Middle East Stud-ies 18:3 (August 1986), pp. 325-27; idem., "A Textual Analysis," pp. 32-34.

11. Dadrian, The Armenian Genocide in Official Turkish Records, p. 95. That inaugural speech was delivered by then Senate President Ahmet Riza.

12. Ibid., p. 85. The statesman was Senator Re§it Akif Pa§a, who in the course of a meteoric ascendancy was elevated to the rank of Vizier, highest administrative position in the Ottoman Empire and second only to that of the sultan. He made his revelation in the Senate on Novem-ber 21, 1918.

13. Ibid., p. 45. The deputy was Mehmet Emin Hafiz, a lawyer who briefly occupied the post of Minister of Justice in the fledgling Turkish Republic

14. For details of these escapes see Hiisameddin Ertiik, lki Devrin Perde Arkait, S. Tansu, ed. (Istanbul: Hilmi, 1957), pp. 213, 326-27; Halil Pa§a, lttihad ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyete: Bitmeyen Suva? (Istanbul: Yaylacik, 1972), pp. 280-83; F.O. (British Foreign Office) 406/41/ 132278, Rear Admiral and British Deputy High Commissioner at Istanbul Richard Webb's September 7, 1919 report to British Foreign Secretary Lord G. N. Curzon.

Halil started his World War I career as military governor of the Ottoman capital. In December 1914 he was asked by War Minister Enver, whose uncle he was, to form the Fifth Expeditionary Force to invade the Caucasus by way of Iran. Having failed, mainly because of the defeat at Dilman, defended by an Armenian volunteer contingent led by the legendary commander Antranik in the summer of 1915, Halil withdrew to the provinces of Van and Bitlis. The ensuing massacres of Armenians were particularly ferocious. Taking over the right wing of the Ilird Army, Halil, with the active assistance of the governors of these two provinces, took the initiative in this lethal enterprise. He then commanded the 18th Army Corps. In January 1916 Halil became Commander of the Vlth Army in Iraq. Finally, in the summer of 1918 he was promoted to Commander-in-Chief of Army Group East that marehed into the Caucasus and remained there until the Armistice. Throughout this period Halil, with the scheming of his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Vasfi Basri, destroyed the Armenian population of the areas falling under his control; he was especially methodical about killing Armenians serving in his units, including those of the Russian Caucasus Army captured as POWs. By his own admission General Halils career is characterized by strong loyalties to lttihad. To a British captain visiting him in the Bekiraga prison from which he, along with his cohort, K. Talat, escaped, Halil proudly and caustically asserted in 1919 that the number of his victims included, "300,000 Armenians. . . . It can be more or less, I didn't count." In the summer of 1918 in Yerevan he boasted to an Armenian audience that "I have endeavored to wipe out the Arme-nian nation to the last individual." Ibid. (Halil), pp. 241, 274.

See also German Foreign Minutry Archives. A. A. Botschaft Konstantinopel, vol. 171, no. 60. German Vice-Consul in Musul Holsteins November 4, 1915 report: "A colonel in the staff of Halil [probably his chief of staff Basri. V.N.D.] told me just now that the Armenians in Musul too must be slaughtered . . . Halils troops have already perpetrated massacres in the North." German Vice-Consul Scheubner-Richter's 4 December 1915 report to Berlin: "Halils expedition to northern Iran entailed the massacre of his Armenian and Syrian battalions." A. A. Tiirkei 183/45, A33457. For details of the handling of Halils escape by the Sultans govern-ment see Takvimi Vekayi no. 3480 (Sultans order to prosecute Gen. Halil), and Takvimi Vekayi no. 3731. Veterinarian Re§it, Governor-General ofDiyarbeldr province, openly declared that he was first a Turk, and as a physician he was having the Armenians obliterated since it is "the duty of a doctor to destroy microbes." Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians" Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1:2 (1986), p. 175. Dr. Re§it was arrested on January 18, 1919 but escaped on January 25; unlike the other.

two escapees, he was (racked down by the police, but before he could be taken he killed him-self. Zeid Sanhan, Kurtuluf Savaft Cunliigu (Ankara: Ogretmen Diinyasi, 1982), pp. 108, 121. 15. The six chief judges were: Mahmud Hayret, Ali Feyzi, Mustafa Nazirn, Nemrud (Ktird) Mustafa, Esad Pa§a and Hur^id Pa§a; the nine attorneys general were: Sami, Kharalambos, YusufZiya, Cavit, Mustafa Nazmi, Muammer, Feridun, Re§at and §evla.

16. Ali (^ankaya, Yeni Mulkiye Tarihi ve Mulkiyeliler vol. 3 (Ankara: Mars, 1969), p. 1158. Turkish newspapers lkdam, Sabah, Yeni CUn, Hadisat, Istiklal, February 6, 1919 issues.

17. A graduate of the same Civil Service school as the defendant, Mehmet Kemal, Khosrovian was at the time a professor in his own alma mater, and prior to the outbreak of the war was professor of international law at the Istanbul Law School.

18. It refers to the 1839-1876 period during which two reform edicts were issued (1839 and 1856) with the intent to modernize and westernize the Ottoman state system, which eventually became highly centralized and deformed itself into an autocratic despotism. The debacle was essentially due to the conflict between the entrenched Ottoman theocracy and legalistic West-ern secularism.

19. For an in-depth analysis see Dadrian, Germany's Respon.sibility, pp. 8-13, 49-54, 109-13, 137-41,171-72,182-86.

20. The other two Armenian lawyers were Avedis Sourenian and Hagop Bahri. See Turkish daily press: lkdam, Yenigiim, Hadisat, and French language newspaper. Renaissance, February 9,1919.

21. The assassination on June II, 1913 was an act of retaliation by the conspirators of the opposition Itilaf Party. They wished to deal a crippling blow to lttihad, which had re-seized power by a coup d'etat on January 23, 1913. Though not an lttihadist himself. General §evket indirectly was helping the lttihadist leaders to consolidate their power while he himself was becoming "the most powerful figure" in the Ottoman Empire. Many historians suspect that lttihad leaders had some foreknowledge of the plot but didn't do anything, hoping to regain power and wipe out all opposition.

22. The Ottoman-Turkish text of this affidavit is in the Jerusalem Armenian Patriachate Ar-chive; Series 21, File M, doc. no. 469.

23. lien, February II, 12, 13, 1919 issues. Even though the Turkish newspaper lien does not indicate the source revealing defendant Kemals utterances likening a killing operation to "go-ing to theatre," a document in the Jerusalem Patriachate Archive identifies that source as Ziil-fikar Ali Hanim, the distraught wife of the defendant himself. The statement details Kemals relish in dispatching his victims. As she put it, "It is impossible to describe the things that transpired at Gliller (Keller). . . . Twenty families, comprising little girls and infants and belong-ing to the rich Atamian dynasty, were likewise deported. When the next day I asked Kemal whither they had gone, with a smile he answered thusly, "They joined their compatriots in the other world. They are resting now in eternal peace." Jerusalem Armenian Patriachate Archive Series II, File Zh (tenth character of the Armenian alphabet), doc. no. 478-79, registry no. 32, dated November 28,1918.

24. Ibid., Series 21, File M, docs. 574-77. There is confirmation of the use of these imple-ments in the 4th, 6th, and 15th sittings, respectively February II and 15, and March 27, 1919. 25. Jean Nalbandian, Physionomie tragu]ue d'une vielle nation, vol. 2 (Bruxelles, 1959), p. 17.

26. Dadrian, German Responsibility, pp. 29-34.

27. Krikoris Balalaan (Reverend), Hai Koghkotan. Trvakner Hai Mardirosakroutianen: Ber-linen Tebi Zor, 1914-1920 (Vienna: Mechitarist Publishers, 1922), pp. 213, 215-17. Sargeant §tikru is cited as a supervisor of the area massacres in the written testimony of Major Mehmet Salim, the Military Commandant ofYozgat cited above, n. 24. He is also cited at the 5th sitting (February 12) and at the 16th sitting (March 29, 1919) by witnesses reciting their experiences.

28. (Cankaya, Yeni Mtilkiye, p. 1156. The school in question was the Rodosto Junior College (ldadi), and the time February 9-October 14, 1910.

29. Halil Mente^e Amlan (Istanbul: Hurriyet Vakfi, 1986), pp. 238-39. The centerpiece of Kemals defense was the same his counsel had advanced in previous sittings, namely that he had merely obeyed orders and had thereby strengthened the state. Le Courrier de Turquie April 9, Hadisat, April 8, 1919. This practice of empowering subordinates to engage in killing was scorned by Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, Chief Counsel for the United States at Nuremberg. Referring to the Nazi leaders at the dock, he declared: "These defendants were men of a station and rank which does not soil its own hands with blood. They were men who knew how to use lesser folks as tools." The Nurnberg Case (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), p. 37.

30. Takvimi Vekayi, no. 3617, p. 2.

31. Vakit, lkdam. Renaissance, March 6, 1919.

32. (^ankaya, Yeni Mtilkiye, p. 1157. Kemal was convicted on January 22, 1916 on charges of "dereliction of duty" for pillaging the goods of Armenian victims in Bogazliyan; five months later he was relieved of his new post at Izmit, where he had become Director of Refugees. On July 25, 1918 the Court of Appeal at Konya quashed the conviction and he was appointed to the new post of Inspector of Agriculture!

33. Takvimi Vekayi, no. 3616, p. 3.

34. This group consisted of Dr. Ahmed Midhat, Besim Ziihdi, Avni Bey, Abdul Gani, Hasan Salahaddin, Aleppos Cemal, Konyas Abdiidulkadir, Kastamonus Deputy Secretary Munir, Karahisars Liquidation Commission Chairman Agah, commission member Hayreddin, and HUseyin Cevdet.

35. The absent included Ankara Deputy Hilmi, Afyon Karahisar deputy Agaoglu Ahmed, re-tired cavalry colonel Miimtaz, Saruhan deputy Sabri, Istanbul deputy Salahaddin Cimeoz, Erzerum deputy Htiseyin Tosun, ex-Salonila responsible secretary Ali Riza, ex-Konya governor-general Samih Rifat, chief of hanwls guild Ferid, Cihanbeyli (Akfehir) director Fehmi, Mayor Miiftizade Kalil, Ak^ehirs police chief Hasan Basri, Aleppo brigands chief Necati, Bolvadins lttihadist representative Mtiftizade Mehmet Ali, Haci Attar Karafazi Hasan-Htiseyin, and father of Enver Pa§a, Haci Ahmed.

36. Takvimi Vekayi. no. 3589, p. 168 left, and p. 169 right column.

37. Ibid., no. 3596, p. 210 left column.

38. Ibid., no. 3772, pp. 4 left, 5 right column.

39. Ibid., no. 3540, pp. 7, 8.

40. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

41. Ibid., pp. 5, 8.

42. Ibid., pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.42.

43. Ibid., pp. 4, 5, 6, 8.

44. Ibid., pp. 4, 5, 6.

45. Ibid., p. 7.

46. Ibid., pp. 7, 8.

47. Ibid., pp. 5, 6. For details of atrocities at Deir Zor see Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Compara-tive Aspects of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Socio-Historical Perspective" in Is the Holocaust Uni 48. Said Halim, the ex-Grand Vizier, was defended, for example, by Celaleddin Arif and by Hasan Hayri; Halil Mente§e was defended by Esad and Kazirn Tahsin; Midhat §iikrii by Saaded-din Ferid, Ahmet Rarniz, and Hasan Hayri; Ziya Gokalp by Haydar Rifat and Ismail Tevfik; Ahmet §ukru by Saadeddin Ferid.

49. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional argument see Dadrian, "Genocide as a Prob-lem of National and International Law," pp. 304, 305, 306 n. 332.

50. Takvimi Vekayi, no. 3604, pp. 128-32.

51. Ibid., no. 3571, pp. 128-32.

52. Ibid., pp. 130, 131; no. 3540, p. 5.

53. Ibid., p. 6.

54. Ibid., no. 3571, p. 130.

55. Ibid., p. 130.

56. Ibid., no. 3543, pp. 26-30.

57. Ibid., p. 29.

58. Ibid., p. 27.

59. Ibid., no. 3553 (3554), p. 68.

60. Ibid., no. 3543, p. 30.

61. Harb Kabinelerinin Isticvabl, Valat Publication Series, no. 2 (Istanbul, 1933), p. 537.

62. Takvimi Vekayi, no. 3549, p. 59.

63. Idid., no. 3543, pp. 28, 29.

64. Ali lhsan Sabis, Harp Hatlralanm, vol. 2 (Ankara, 1951), p. 192. A. Mil, "Urnumi Harpte Te^kilati Mahsusa," Vaktt, installment no. 96, February 8, 1934.

65. lbid.,p.30.

66. Ibid., no. 3553 (3554), p. 89.

67. Ibid., p. 86.

68. Ibid., no. 3547, p. 46.

69. Ibid., no. 3557, pp. 103, 104.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., no. 3543, p. 27.

73. Ibid., no. 3604, p. 217.

74. Ibid., p. 217.

75. Ibid., p. 218.

76. Those sentenced to death were Talat, Enver, Cemal, Drs. Behaeddin §akir and Nazirn, Trabzon province's vali (Governor-General) Azmi, Trabzon's Responsible Secretary Nail, Er-zincan districts deputy Sagirzade Halet, Bolus Responsible Secretary Dr. Ahmet Midhat, Bayburt districts Special Organization gendarmery contingents commander Mehmet Necati, and Erzincan districts Special Organization operatives Kirmo Yusuf and (^avu§ Asian. The three lesser convicts hanged were Mehmed Kemal, Abdullah Avni (Hayran Baba), and Bay-burt's county executive (kayrrulkam) Behrarnzade Nusret. See Dadrian, "Genocide as a Prob-lem of National and International Law," n. I, p. 309 n. 355.

77. British Foreign Office Archives (FO) 371/4174/118392, folio 267, Tuly 7, 1919 communi-cation.

78. Based on Turkish press materials, this is the overview one gets of these men. Five received 15 years, three 10 years, one 6 years and 3 months, one 5 years and 4 months, and six men less than I year.

79. FO 371/6509/E10023, folios 100-101, August 24, 1921 legal opinion.

80. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law," n. I, pp. 311-15.

81. Midhat §ukrii (Bleda), Imparatorlugun fokiifti (Istanbul: Remzi, 1979), p. 62.

82. Fethi Okyar, U{ Devirde Bir Adam, C. Kutay, ed. (Istanbul: Tercuman Publishers, 1980), p. 280.

83. FO 371/4173/61185, folio 1270/278. Minutes recorded on April 22, 1919.

84. FO 371/5049/E6376; 6504/E9112; 6504/E10411, folio 130; 6499/E3110, folio 190.

85. Zeia Sanhan, Kurtulu} Savafl Cunltigti (The Chronology of the Fight for Independence) vol. 3 (Ankara: Ogretmen, 1986), p. 167.

86. Dadrian, History of the Armenian Cenocide, n. 2, pp. 357-59.

87. Ibid., pp. 360-63.

88. On several occasions after the war Mustafa Kemal denounced the lttihadist leaders for the massacres, in one interview calling them "scoundrels" who deserved to be "hanged." But all of these interviews were with foreign journalists, and his comments were made accordingly. See Dadrian, "The Documentation," p. 575 n. 64.

89. Kemal Ataturk, Nutuk, 7th ed., vol. 3 (Istanbul: Milli Egitim, 1963), doc. no. 220, p. 1183.

90. Halil Pa§a, lttihad, pp. 259, 261 note.

91. Kemal AtatUrk, Nutuk, n. 90, doc. no. 142, p. 1080.

92. T.B.M.M. CizU Celse Zabttlan, vol. I (Ankara: Turkiye l§ Banka Publications, 1985), p. 177, right hand column.

93. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law," p. 309 n. 355.

94. Dadrian, History of the Armenian Cenocide, pp. 394-416.

February 11, 2001

RFE/RL Turkey: Uproar Over Genocide Reflects Need To Reconcile With Past

By Jean-Christophe Peuch

Anger among the Turkish people and its government over the recently

passed French law recognizing the Armenian genocide of

1915 remains strong. Ankara has cancelled hundreds of millions of

dollars worth of potential contracts with French companies

and threatened to boycott French goods. RFE/RL correspondent

Jean-Christophe Peuch reports the uproar may reflect

Turkey's deep-rooted discomfort over its own history -- and uncertainty

about its future as it seeks to gain entry into the

European Union.

Prague, 9 February 2001 (RFE/RL) -- France's adoption last month of

a bill recognizing the 1915 killings of Armenians in eastern

Anatolia as genocide has caused a public outcry in Turkey.

This week, Turk Telecom announced it would exclude France's Alcatel

group from a tender to supply equipment for a mobile telephone

network, while the Turkish Youth and Sports Office said it would

boycott eight international competitions that are to take place in

France this year.

These decisions were among the latest in a series of economic and

other reprisals decided by the Turkish authorities in the aftermath

of the French vote.

Although France is among Turkey's main economic partners, with

bilateral trade amounting to $4.5 billion in 1999, relations

between Paris and Ankara have soured over the Armenian genocide

issue.

"Farewell France!" lamented Turkey's "Hurriyet" mass-circulation

daily newspaper in its 19 January issue, the morning after the vote

in the French lower house of parliament, the National Assembly.

Passions have grown stronger since French President Jacques Chirac

signed the bill into law last week.

Istanbul taxi drivers suddenly became reluctant to drive French

visitors, while some Turkish civil servants have called for a

boycott of French goods and for a ban on the teaching of French

language in schools.

The "Milliyet" daily on 2 February, quoting a circular issued by

the under-secretary of defense, reported that Turkish military

personnel have been ordered not to attend parties and dinners with

French officials or businessmen.

Ankara's harsh tone appears to be out of proportion to the cautious

wording of the French law. The eight-word text explicitly avoids

assigning blame for the 1915 killings, and neither Turkey nor the

Ottoman Empire is named.

Still, judging from the reaction, it appears as if every Turkish

citizen felt personally offended.

Etienne Copeaux is a regional expert at France's Group for Research

and Studies on Middle Eastern and Mediterranean Affairs [known

under the French acronym GREMMO]. He tells RFE/RL that the main

reason behind the uproar lies in a state-controlled educational

system that ignores the multi-cultural history of the Anatolian

peninsula.

"This official [version of history] is constructed in such a way

that it seems there is a continuum in the history of the Turks. In

the history of the Turks, not in the history of the land, not in

the history of Anatolia. The history of Anatolia, a land that has

known several empires, several cultures -- including Armenian and

Greek cultures -- is totally ignored. As a result, a Turkish

child, a Turkish citizen, who receives a normal education does not

know that civilizations other than his own have existed on the land

where he lives."

Doru Ergil teaches political science at Ankara University. He

agrees that Ankara's reaction, which he likens to hysteria, is

rooted in Turks' ignorance of their own past:

"I personally learned about an 'Armenian affair' in the last decade

of the Ottoman era when I was a graduate student in the United

States. [i learned about it] from Armenian students who were

pursuing their graduate studies there. What I want to say is that

the Turks do not know about their recent history and they react

emotionally when [somebody tells them:] 'You've done something

wrong.'"

The first mention of the 1915 events appeared in Turkish textbooks

only in the mid-1980s as part of efforts to refute accusations of

genocide then put forward by the Armenian diaspora.

Armenians claim 1.5 million of their compatriots were killed in the

last years of the Ottoman Empire as part of what they describe as a

deliberate policy of extermination.

Turkish historians, on the contrary, say the "Young Turk"

government in power then decided to "displace" the Armenians of

eastern Anatolia to Syria to prevent them from collaborating with

neighboring Russia. They say that only rogue elements should be

blamed for the killings of most of what Turkish officials estimate

as the 300,000 Armenians who died en route to Syria.

Ankara also says Russian-armed Armenian militia slaughtered

thousands of Muslims in April 1915, a month before the "Young

Turks" ordered the Armenians deported. It also says Armenian and

Greek auxiliary soldiers massacred Turks in 1918 and 1919, while

Allied troops occupied large parts of Turkey.

French analyst Copeaux says that this belief is deeply rooted in

the Turkish mentality.

"Ninety percent of the Turks are absolutely convinced there was no

genocide and that, on the contrary, it was the Armenians who killed

Turks. It is a very sincere belief. The [Turkish] educational

system has been most successful. This kind of totalitarianism in

the educational system has perfectly succeeded in transforming the

Turkish mentality."

Copeaux also says that many Turkish intellectuals believe eastern

Anatolia's Armenians fell victim to a genocidal policy. But, he

adds, few dare contradict the official version of events for fear

of reprisal from authorities.

Turkish prosecutors yesterday filed charges against the former

president of the Ankara-based Human Rights Association for

reportedly saying Turkey should apologize for its treatment of

Armenians and other minorities in the early 20th century. If found

guilty of "insulting and vilifying Turkishness," the man, Akin

Birdal, faces up to six years in prison.

Copeaux sees two reasons behind Turkey's denial of the genocide.

The first, he says, is that Turkish authorities fear that if they

recognize the 1915 mass killings as genocide then Armenians around

the world would press for material compensation.

Armenian President Robert Kocharian told Turkish media last week

that Yerevan wants only an apology from Turkey and that Ankara is

wrong to fear Armenia would ask for damages or file territorial

claims.

Copeaux says the second reason behind the denial is deeply rooted

in Turks' vision of the world.

"To recognize the genocide would be to recognize that a very large

number of Armenians used to live in Anatolia. Therefore, it would

mean there is a multi-cultural Anatolia. But, as we can see today

with the issue of the Kurds, the Turkish state is envisaged as a

uni-cultural state, a state with a single culture, a single

language. So [to recognize the Armenian genocide] would mean

Turkey should offer concessions not only to Kurds but also to other

nationalities that still live in Turkey."

Turkey is last in line among 13 candidate states for EU membership.

Ankara won candidacy status in 1999, but the EU has stipulated a

range of political, economic and social changes it would like to

see before Turkey can start negotiations.

The country's influential military has expressed reservations about

reforms required for EU entry, fearing membership would reduce its

influence over domestic and foreign policy.

The EU's Accession Partnership Accord with Turkey, published last

year, has caused anger within the top command because of references

to Cyprus and territorial disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea.

Yet, most analysts point out that the military, which has directly

or indirectly toppled three governments since 1960, does not stand

against EU membership. They say the Turkish army balks mostly at

concessions it sees as threatening national security.

Copeaux believes that Turkish leaders need to reconcile themselves

with their own history before seeking entry into the EU.

"The Turks experience [the genocide issue] as a problem between

themselves and Europe, even between themselves and the world. And

it definitely is a problem. They are aware that their conception

of history, their world view, is an obstacle and that if they

really want to be part of Europe and larger international groups

they will have to review their conception of history, their world

view and so forth. But their world view -- that is, the kind of

teaching they dispense [in schools] -- does not allow them to

overcome this obstacle."

Last week, EU Enlargement Commissioner Guenter Verheugen threw his

weight into the dispute between France and Turkey. Verheugen

called on Ankara not to overreact to France's genocide law. He

said Turkey's anger "would not serve the cause of debate and mutual

comprehension."

February 15, 2001

Turkey should take more serious steps, not retaliation

11 February, 2001

Turkish Probe issue 421,

Leaving behind talks and threats, the Turkish government and its

universities should organize international conferences and symposiums

inviting Armenian, French and American historians to discuss what happened

in history

Ankara - Turkish Daily News

Despite the fact that it has lost speed in comparison to the first few days,

reactions against France have continued since French President Jacques

Chirac signed a controversial law recognizing the so-called Armenian

genocide.

However, someone should stop and think to realize that a retaliation is not

a lasting solution for a problem. If Turkey does not want to face these

types of problems again it should seriously take the issues into

consideration and prepare a master plan on how to overcome it and not feel

that it is being cornered from this so-called Armenian allegation.

What can Turkey do? First it should open the archives for the usage of all

historians that may help Turkey to defend its thesis that there was no such

genocide against the Armenians in history. Otherwise, the Armenians will

continue their baseless allegations.

In this issue, a Turkish diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told

the Turkish Daily News that there was no problem with the archives from

Turkey's point of view. He indicated that the only problem with the archives

is the method of classification, not the content of the documents relating

to the Armenian events in 1915.

However, western diplomats in Ankara have voiced their concern on Ottoman

archives claiming that not all the archives were open to researchers

implicitly; implying that Turkey has something to hide from the historians.

Responding to allegations, the diplomat said there was no document

whatsoever in the archives to support Armenian allegations. On the contrary,

he said all studies show that there is no document in the Ottoman archives

talking about killing Armenians. He added that the only problem with the

archives is the method of classification.

Secondly, leaving behind talking and threats, the Turkish government and

universities should organize international conferences and symposiums

inviting the Armenian, French and American historians to discuss what

happened in history.

Retaliations continue

Meanwhile in retaliation, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has made the

decision to suspend its military relations and all activities with France to

protest the controversial law.

It has been reported that no military visit to France in 2001 will be held

according to this decision. The Turkish general staff sent an outline of the

decision to all force commands.

Last week another reaction came from sports circles. Turkey's Youth and

Sports Activities General Director Kemal Mutlu revealed that Turkish

national teams and sport clubs will not take part in sport activities

organized in France if they are not obligatory. He also added that they will

not invite French teams to sports competitions to be held in Turkey.

Turkey previously announced that in retaliation to the French decision it

has canceled several military and civil bids given to French companies,

valued at millions of dollars.

-----------

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may be reproduced, further distributed or archived without the prior

permission of the publisher. Contact Turkish Daily News Online at http://www.TurkishDailyNews.com for details.

-----------

MJ · February 23, 2001

THE GENOCIDE OF THE ARMENIANS

AND THE SILENCE OF THE TURKS.

Taner Akçam

The genocide of the Armenians has been a taboo topic for us Turks for eighty years. The eighty-year-old silence has produced such tension and a mountain of prejudice, not only between the two societies , i.e. the Turkish and the Armenian, but also in the academic world, that even the development of a common language in which the subject could be discussed is becoming a serious problem. For this reason, the fact that I, a Turkish historian, am critically approaching this subject for the first time is more important perhaps than the content of my speech. There is not only the risk that I may be accused of treason in Turkey, but also the risk that you may want to perceive me on this podium as the corporate representative of the Turks, expecting from me an account for the Turkish stance of the last eighty years. Conscious of all these problems, I ask you to listen to me, a historian who is about to speak to you solely in his own name.

My purpose is neither to hide behind the "pretext of having been born too late" nor to assert that I do not have my share in the "collective responsibility." Quite the contrary, independent of what position I personally may take, I am aware that I am a member of that collectivity which produced "the perpetrators" (or that I belong to a group of perpetrators). Precisely for this reason, I would like to explore the topic fully conscious of the fact as to what it means in this sense "being a member" and "bearing collective responsibility." It is easier for our generation, which cannot be held directly responsible for the events, to reflect upon the past and to define it as an essential element in our collective identity. This "haughtiness," this vantage of my generation perhaps could help to finally achieve a breakthrough.

On the other hand, the meaning of the passage of eighty years cannot be underestimated. It is incumbent upon us to "remember" a reality that was treated in our history as a non-event, one which was simply denied, to "recover it in our consciousness," and to assign to it the proper significance, But what shape can or will this recovered memory take? What does it mean "to incorporate the fact of the genocide in our historical present, and what will be the result? A start can only be made by way of discovering the meaning of belonging to the perpetrator group and of bearing collective responsibility. We have these and many other questions to answer.

At this juncture I would like to explain just how the Turks view or do not view the Armenian Genocide and how they have made it a taboo topic. The question to which I am seeking an answer may be formulated in the following way: why is it that a calm discussion of the subject is not possible, even if we proceed from the premise that there has not been any occurrence of genocide? Wherein lie the reasons for reacting to the topic with an agitation rarely observed elsewhere? I do not claim that I can answer this question in all its aspects. I will merely list some points that I consider meriting discussion.

I am of the opinion that the formation of the Turkish national identity played a decisive role not only in the decision to commit genocide but also in the current denial and tabooing of it. It is therefore indispensable that I first delve into the peculiarities of the origin of national identity and some of the related factors. I proceed from a concept that the well-known sociologist Norbert Elias has framed. He spoke of "national habitat,"' linking it firmly with the process of the formation of nation states. The concept epitomizes some of the peculiarities which were formed during the creation of a nation state. These peculiarities reflect a common mentality, an ethos permeating the psyche of the entire nation and help to explain why in certain situations general patterns of behavior emerge. In other words, a direct link is being established between national identity and the rise of a nation state, at the same time recognizing the central role of the nation state in the evolution of national identity.

1. UNDERSTANDING THE PERPETRATORS AND THEIR VIEWS

Generally speaking, we are inclined to characterize as "inhuman" acts that we consider morally reprehensible because of their dreadfulness. The revulsion we feel against these acts obviates any need to understand them. This attitude is well suited to engender a distance between us and the act in question, thereby preventing us from identifying with "what is bad." We can perhaps assuage our consciences by this means, but we must recognize that this does not help us to achieve "understanding" or to "evaluate" adequately. Adomo called our attention to the fact that beyond a moralistic attitude, the need "to understand" is absolutely necessary. He offered the following observation:

In the final analysis, the issue concerns the manner in which the past is recalled and integrated into the present; whether we stop at mere reproach or resolutely withstand the sense of horror in order to be able to comprehend even the incomprehensible.

On the other hand, however, difficulties likewise arise with the so-called scientific objective approach. In the first place, the scientific language that can be defined as a "dictionary intended for non-humans," because of its capability to objectify the events, is handicapped in terms of establishing a distance from the language used by the "perpetrators." Every attempt "to understand" has the potential of relativizing and justifying the act of perpetration. We must see to it that every historical reconstruction that "wants to know how events have transpired," as Walter Benjamin maintained, uses the method of introspection when analysing the perpetrator, and consequently becomes guilty of moral indolence.'

For this reason, perhaps it is better not to create a common perspective while analysing a phenomenon such as genocide, but to rely instead on two different perspectives, the perspective of the "perpetrators" and that of the "victims."' These two distinct perspectives bring to the fore distinctly different material for the reconstruction of historical events. The works that have been produced up to today about the genocide of the Armenians have essentially emanated from the perspective of the "victim group." My attempt in this regard can be understood as an investigation of the subject from the viewpoint of the "perpetrator group," a venture that could not be undertaken until now because of the past history of denial and tabooing.

The most important point in which the "perpetrator perspective" differs from the "victim perspective" is the predominance of the factor of historical continuity. In this perpetrator perspective, genocïde appears neither as an "unintended accident" nor as an "aberrant phenomenon" free from the exertions of a cultural/ political background, and not likely to repeat itself. This argument does not suggest that events such as genocide are the inevitable result of the sway of certain cultural/political conditions. Certainly, genocide is afforded only by virtue of the existence of a set of very specific conditions that coincide in a special way with the dynamics of a compatible cultural/political background. By sensitizing ourselves to their significance we can better understand and define those special conditions that lead to genocide and determine the extent to which those factors that constitute the above-mentioned cultural/political background are still in effect today.

While I maintain that past events have shaped Turkish national identity and do even determine our present behavioral patterns, others may object that this "has nothing to do with modem times," because the events took place in a "past era." Thus it can be argued from a modem viewpoint that the consequences of the events of a hundred years ago have no great significance insofar as their relationship to the marks they left behind is concerned. Instead of initiating a discussion on these ideas, I would like to limit myself to adducing here a statement by Norbert Elias:

It is always amazing to ascertain the remarkable degree of persistence with which certain patterns of thinking, feeling and acting can endure in one and the same society over many generations, even though the members of that society do make specific adjustments to changing circumstances.'

This is also my thesis with reference to Turkey. If, for example, we examine the arguments that are being advanced with regard to the Kurds, we can recognize evidence of the surprising degree to which the state of mind, the model of thinking that dominated in the decade after 1 91 0, persists today. I do not want to be understood as saying that there is a simple "danger of recurrence." But before we take shelter behind such an easing of the emotions, we would do well to inquire whether the social conditions and the mentality from which the act of genocide has sprung still persists. This is the only way in which we can understand and combat the presence of a barbaric potential, however in different forms, at the core of societies.

If in given societies certain destructive potentials exist as peculiar ingredients of national identity, as a type of mentality, then we must make a conscious effort toward reckoning with these. One of the most important ways to confront a mentality that directs, to a great extent, subconscious processes entailing, almost automatically, spontaneous reactions, consists of bringing this mentality to the conscious level. This is the method that Adomo called "confronting the subject."' If you want "to understand" and analyze collectively committed cruelty, and you wish to prevent the repetition of such events, then you will not find a solution if you direct your attention primarily to the group of "victims." Attention must be directed to the "perpetrators" in order to uncover a series of "conscious or unconscious" mechanisms which underlie their actions, for it is the activation of these mechanisms that makes these people "perpetrators."

Following this general introduction, I would like to list below, in the form of a thesis, a few fundamental features of Turkish national identity that have played an important role in the decision to commit genocide as well as in the subsequent tabooing of the topic.

11. SOME CHARACTERISTIC TRAITS OF TURKISH

NATIONAL IDENTITY

1. Compared to France, Germany and other European states, Turkish nationalism and Turkish national consciousness entered the historical stage very late. There are different reasons for this belatedness. Special significance attaches to the influence of Islam and the cosmopolitan character of the Ottoman Empire. Because of its late development, Turkish nationalism was strongly influenced by Social Darwinism and racist ideologies. This intellectual background of Turkish nationalism, combined with the urgent need to catch up, made that nationalism aggressive.

2. Turkish nationalism arose as a reaction to the experience of constant humiliations. Turkish national sentiment constantly suffered from the effects of an inferiority complex. Various factors played a role in this. Critical, however, was the fact that the Turks not only were continuously humiliated and loathed, but they were conscious of this humiliation. The Turkish political elite had clear ideas as to what people thought of the Turks, and this knowledge became an important determining factor for their actions. One of the consequences was a strong "sense of being misunderstood" and a fear of being isolated. A nation that was humiliated in this way in the past and is also conscious of that experience, will try to prove its own greatness and importance. As Elias noted:

The established feeling of inferiority ... and the resentment, the sensitivity to the humiliation, often connected with it was countered [and compensated] with the preoccupation with its own greatness and power.

The result is a penchant for power.

3. Turkish national identity evolved in conditions in which the fear of annihilation and dissolution was omnipresent. The process of disintegration afflicting the Ottoman Empire was of such gravity that it produced a traumatic anxiety among Ottoman leaders. The fear of annihilation and disintegration, fed by a deep consciousness of weakness and helplessness, is "the midwife" of Turkish national identity.

One result of this mental attitude was to reflect upon the possible reasons, persons and circles of political operatives that could have caused these negative developments. Seen through the prism of Turkish national identity, the Christian minorities were viewed as one of the primary factors responsible for the decline and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Christians were, therefore, stigmatized as enemies. This enmity was rendered all the more intense by the fact that some imperial powers used the Christians as a lever in order to realize the partition of the empire consistent with their own power interests. The Christians hereby obtained certain economic and social privileges.

Another factor which created an image of hostile Christians was the role Islam played in this connection. On the basis of Islamic culture and its system of laws, the Moslems have always considered the Christians as an inferior minority group and have never viewed them as being equal to themselves. Thus the Christians did not enjoy equality in the Ottoman Empire. But during the stages marking the disintegration of the Empire, the reforms and economic privileges led to a change in the position of the Christians. The Turks gradually lost their social status as a superior class. They could not reconcile themselves to the idea of equality with the Christians by way of reforms, or that a Christian minority should attain a better economic position than they. This loss of status led to the rise of hate-revenge sentiments against those who were seen as responsible. The Moslems did not "peacefully" accept their steadily weakening position. This awareness of loss of status played a significant role in the enactment of the massacre against Christians, and the history of the nineteenth century provides much evidence for this.

4. The psychology of those found on the brink of disaster and dying a slow death was shaped through two peculiarities. First, the rebellious Christian minorities lived in the fringe areas of the empire. Continual losses of territory on the fringes of the empire had created among the Turks a siege mentality, that is, the feeling that the empire was encircled by enemies. Elias points out certain features in the development of the German nation state, the incidence of which may be observed in the development of the Turkish nation state also:

The process of state development for the Germans was deeply influenced by their position as a central block in the configuration of those three ethnic blocks. The Latinized and Slavic groups again and again felt threatened by the populous German state. Representatives of the nascent German state simultaneously felt threatened from different sides. All parties quite recklessly availed themselves of every opportunity for expansion that presented itself. The pressures stemming from this configuration of states in the center led to a continuous crumbling of the peripheral regions that separated from the German union of states and established themselves as independent states.

Second, this "crumbling" of the fringes was not the result of the military defeats of the Ottoman leadership. The insurrections of the minorities could almost always be crushed. It was pressure from abroad that forced the Ottomans to make political concessions to those they defeated militarily. Thus a nation and its elite, who were accustomed to dominating others over the course of centuries, were shocked by the ability of others to toy with and degrade their honor. One way that nations under pressure from above and reduced to whipping boys tend to react is by way of avenging themselves against those they hold responsible for their misfortune. Elias captures the essence of this dynamic when he writes:

A state's relative weakness vis-à-vis other states creates specific crises for the people involved. They suffer physical insecurity, doubt their own worth, feel degraded and disgraced and are prone to indulging in wishful thinking about revenge that they would like to inflict on those they hold responsible for the situation.

5. Another characteristic of Turkish national identity is the fact that the Turks consider themselves the actual, true victims of history. "We are the nation upon whom actual injustice was inflicted. We are a persecuted nation, but no one recognizes that. We are treated as the "'stepchildren' of history." Two factors have contributed to the evolution of this mental attitude. First, throughout the nineteenth century, the national wars of liberation of Christian groups in the Balkans (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, etc.) were experienced as massacres of the Moslem population. Secondly, Europe paid no attention to the massacres of Moslems, although European nations were highly sensitive to the massacres of Christians and utilized every occasion to interfere. It is not an exaggeration to say that in the minds of the Moslems had entrenched itself the firm belief that the entire world was poised against them; they considered themselves the victims of history.

6. Two essential factors are responsible for the difficulty of the Turks in coping with this sentiment of collapse and worthlessness. First, there was the deeply rooted belief in the superiority of the Turks over other peoples and the right of Turks to dominate them. There is still talk today of erecting a world empire and of dominating other nations as signposts of Turkish superiority and historical uniqueness. The most important reason for this attitude lies in the fact that the Turks, as a ruling stratum, (even though they themselves were not conscious of their Turkishness), and under the influence of Islamic thought, identified themselves with Islam and felt superior to the empire's other religious groups. The idea of the " ruling nation" (Millet-I Hakime) dominated the thinking of the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elite. At the same time, the Ottoman-Turkish ruling elite was overwhelmed by the greatness of its own past. There was really an enormous gap between the sense of belonging to an empire that ruled over three continents and the current situation, in which national honor was being dragged through the mud. The conflict between these past and present realities intensified the need to 1) reject the present, 2) return to the old days of imperial glory, and 3) punish those who were accused of being responsible for the current malaise.

It is possible, even necessary, to introduce here additional factors for consideration. The decision to commit genocide can be understood only against this background, but I do not claim that the genocide is a direct result of this frame of mind. Needed were additional conditions which, however, could lead to genocide only in this context. One of these conditions was that the Turks were the heirs to a sublime and glorious past but were steadily growing weak and were suffering from the ills of the exaltation of their past. The demise was unavoidable in the event of a war. The decision for genocide arose within the purview of this assumption.

Generally speaking, nations that have a "great and glorious" past live in the shadow of and under the burden of this past. When such nations lapse into a position of weakness, when they are repeatedly wounded in their sense of honor and degraded and have a premonition of ruination, the burden of the awareness of the past, its ballast, becomes even greater. The stronger the feeling of loss of worth and the level of humiliation, the more forcefully is the past idealized and its recovery made a priority. Depending on how strongly it is believed that the glorious past could become the ideal future, the potential for violent action, which is deemed to be needed, will be increased.

A wounded national pride, a national identity unsure of itself, and a national ideal looking backwards to the past were the cumulative effects of the troubled German history (which can also be read as OttomanTurkish history-T.A.), which in the long-run is punctuated by defeats and an ensuing loss of power. The vision of a greater past projected into the future provided a fertile environment for the rise of especially vicious forms of behavior and credos.

As a rule, the desire to apply power against those who are held responsible for the loss of strength and power, humiliation, and the loss of worth is the result of these developments. Parallel to this debacle and loss of self-worth, one has to consider other occurrences. Accelerated disintegration and fragmentation of the national state give rise to feelings of fear of "annihilation"," siege by enemies," and "a war of naked survival fought with one's back to the wall" in the later stages of this process. When the situation is seen as increasingly hopeless, those in power who cannot prevent this decline become increasingly aggressive. When the national elite sees it as less and less probable that a great and ideal future can be created and that the goal appears in jeopardy and the process of decline is unstoppable, the countermeasures meant to stop this process acquire a more and more barbaric character. The resort to genocide stands at the apex of this process. If this process of decline is erratic, and now and then hopes spring up that one can find a way out, the end result promises to be even more painful. When a nation has a premonition of downfall it will never concede that it is at the edge of such a downfall and will stubbornly focus on the dream of a great future. In such a situation, the dreams become even more unrealizable.

The force of the downward trend was reflected in the extreme brutality of the means with which they tried to stop it .... With their backs to the wall, the defenders easily become the destroyers of civilization. They easily become barbarians.

This was the history of the Turks before World War 1. PanTuranism and the ideal of a great Turkish empire became stronger as the disintegration and partition of the empire progressed and the situation grew more hopeless. While the quest for a collective identity that would hold the empire together proved abortive, the leadership turned farther toward the East, to regions and peoples where the ideal of empire could be realized. The Turks perceived the First World War as an historical opportunity. Those who had suffered defeat and lived through a painful process, including degradation and loss of honor, for years, now saw the looming on the horizon of an historical opportunity to stop the decline from which there was otherwise no escape. The Turks' bad fortune, it was thought, could now be reversed and the disintegration stopped. The great Turkish empire could be recreated; not on all the same lands, but on another expanse inhabited by loyal Turkish people worthy of trust. It was as if the clouds had unexpectedly lifted to reveal the contours of a glorious sun.

The rapid succession of military debacles the Turks suffered during the first months of World War I had a very sobering effect however. Especially the defeat at Sarikamish, near Kars, in the Anatolian east, in December 1914 and January 1915, burst the Turanian-lslamic dream like a soap bubble. The Ottoman-Turkish rulers could, however, assign blame and identify those responsible for this defeat. The Turks had not really lost; they had been betrayed. Elias' description in the German context is apt here: "[The defeat] had been caused by cunning deception, by criminals, by means of a conspiracy, by a 'stab in the back' administered by internal traitors in the rear of the combat troops." This quote from Elias, though describing the Nazi case, can not only logically be extended to the rationale advanced for the case of the Armenian Genocide, but it can literally be seen as a general accusation levelled against the Armenians in some studies of the genocide.

The sudden loss of an historical opportunity that had resulted from the constant military setbacks, humiliations, and losses of self-worth coincided with another historical event. Enemy forces stood at the entrance of the Dardanelles in March, 1915, and with that, the end of the empire was in sight. Without a doubt, this cast a special dark pallor over the mood of the Ottoman leaders. The land, (Anatolia), so quintessential for the survival of the Turks, would be handed over to the Armenians after the defeat. There had been a corresponding plan for reform even before the war. In order to avert such a possible outcome, the Turks had resort to the most ruthless and daring action. "When a chronic feeling of sinking, of being driven into a corner and encircled by the enemy awakens the belief that only absolute ruthlessness can rescue the vanishing power and glory..." then one does not recoil before the idea of using the most barbaric methods. The dimensions of the sense of loss of self-worth and of meaning, and the fact that the Ottoman Empire stood at the doorstep of defeat led rapidly to desperate actions that were "insane" and reckless. Ottoman-Turkish ruling circles were gripped by the great fear that the end of the empire could become a reality. Their refusal to accept this led to the brutality of the measures they undertook for deliverance. It is probably not incorrect to consider the Armenian Genocide as a product of this frame of mind. The battle for the Dardanelles lasted 259 days and represented a kind of "purgatory."" Death and resurrection were being lived every day. It is probably no accident, however, that the genocide of the Armenians became a compelling issue after the defeat at Sarikamish and at a time when the war for the Dardanelles had become a struggle for life and death.

111. THE REASONS FOR TURKISH SILENCE

Why is discussion of the Arrnenian Genocide a taboo? Why do we Turks have the feeling that lightning has struck our bones whenever the theme is addressed? What are the reasons for this sensitivity and indisposition? At first these reactions appear difficult to comprehend. If it wishes, Turkey can recognize the fact of genocide, at the same time asserting that it had no connection to the act. There is sufficient material available to justify doing this. Turkey maintains that it is a completely new state. Official history propounds the thesis that the war of liberation was also directed against the Ottoman rulers. Moreover, a few members of the Ittihad party that organized the genocide were brought before the court in 1926, and some of them were executed. Even if an explanation along the lines of "it is indeed regrettable, but we did not do it, it was the Ottomans" would meet with strong objections, it could be seen as a normal, expected pattern of response.

Since the possibilities of a discussion free from portentous problems are not being pursued, there must be deeper underlying reasons for the extreme reactions, evasions, and denials. In the form of a preliminary thesis, I would suggest for consideration the following points, fully cognizant of the fact that they are rudimentary points and need to be developed further.

111 A. LACK OF HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The first and most important point concerns the lack of historical consciousness in Turkish society. I would characterize amnesia as a social disease in Turkey. The inability to remember refers not only to the period of World War I but also to incidents from the 1860s and 1870s that have long since been forgotten.

To begin with, the founders of the Turkish Republic have severed our connections and bonds to history. Each state that asserts itself as a new entity must provide a basis for its legitimacy and predicate that legitimacy on the historical past. The Kemalist cadres of the republic had serious difficulties with this issue. Islam had consigned everything that was called Turkish to oblivion over the entire course of Ottoman history. For that reason, the rulers of the new republic had no possibility of linking their newly established nation state, which they fashioned on the principle of Turkish national identity, with the Ottomans. They had to find a new Turkish history for themselves. They had to skip backwards six hundred years, past the Ottomans, who had repressed the idea of Turkishness, and who had even degraded it. As a final result, this long time span of history was treated as non-existent.

Through a series of reforms, this time interval, intended or not, was stricken from memory. The Latin alphabet was introduced with the "revolution" of 1928. Thus future generations were barred access to the written testimony of the past. The Turkification of the language was carried out in such an extreme and rapid fashion that the younger generations can no longer understand the language of the 1930s. Consequently, the relationship to the past and to history became circumscribed by the manner in which a few officially approved history professors defined it. It is difficult to conceive of a society that has no access to what has occurred before 1928. Yet it is true that people cannot even read the diaries of their parents and forebears. As a society, we are dependent today on what is etched in our memory, what we have ourselves experienced and what has been conveyed to us by our family members.

111 B. THE REASONS FOR "WANTING TO FORGET"

Lack of historical consciousness is a common problem. However, there are still more direct reasons for fearing the discussion of the Armenian Genocide as if one feared "a monster." I hereby maintain that the "wish to forget history" is directly related to the genocide of the Armenians. In order to be freed from the connotations of the term genocide, the founders of modem Turkey undertook a kind of cleansing as they ushered in the republic. The slow but continuous disintegration of the great empire, the military defeats in wars that continued over the years, the loss of tens of thousands of people, a society whose dignity was scorned along with the constant loss of self-worth, overwhelmed by the imagery of a great history, fantasies about recreating the past, the terminal bursting of these dreams, and the inability to absorb and integrate these numerous contradictions, and ... finally, the genocide: that constitutes a social trauma of major proportions.

As is the case with individuals, so it is also with societies that they experience difficulty in incorporating in their own living history events that produce crises. Mechanisms of blocking out and forgetfulness intrude and encumber the effort to overcome the difficulty. The reason why the republic is described as a new birth, as a zero point, lies in the psychological crises generated by the legacy of the past and the desire to not remember it. The republic believes that the entire dismal image can be suddenly erased and that the Turks can thus be delivered from a nightmare, from an extremely dangerous, fatal illness.

I believe that this frame of mind plays an important role in steering all discussion away from the genocide. To raise the issue is akin to telling someone who was miraculously delivered from a fatal illness that the disease is not really in remission and that he should brace himself for a relapse. Not only do people not want to think of decline, humiliation, and disgrace, but people do not want also to be reminded of them. We like to believe that we have recovered and that we have acquired a new persona. Therefore, the official line is that Turkey emerged from a period of upheaval in history from which "a new personality was created from nothing."

I maintain here that we have not yet recovered, that we have not yet acquired the "new personality that has divested itself of the spell of the old crises," and that as long as we do not talk about the Armenian Genocide, our chances of creating a new "other" remains rather tenuous. As long as the act of perpetration is not consciously accounted for, all peculiarities of this event will live on in the unconscious. If, as Turkey maintains, a decisive turning point really occurred and a completely new element emerged, then there should be a link to the past that would be free of the problems prevalent today. The desperate effort to avoid any discussion about the genocide is the most telling proof that the assertion regarding the rise of a "completely new and other element" is not a valid one. A society, a state does not like to confront an imagery that is at variance with its self imagery, and, as such, is likely destroy its world of fantasies. Herein lies the reason for our sharp reaction to those who call our attention to that reality.

111 C. "WANTING TO FORGET" IS A KIND OF SEQUEL

Another question that must be addressed is what do we expect if we "forget" the genocide or drive its reality into the inner recesses of the unconscious? My suggestion at this point is a kind of "historical quest for the traces." To be sure, it is not just a matter of repressing the memory of a historical period. Through such repression, even the conditions that led to the Armenian Genocide are relegated to the unconscious. However, they are not destroyed, but live on in another form.

The Turks were gripped by powerful impulses of wishful thinking during the years of World War 1. They wanted to free themselves from the shackles of their weak and powerless position, They wanted to establish a new strong hegemony and thereby cast off their feelings of humiliation and disgrace. We can speak of the fact that a strong collective narcissism was developed, primarily through the vehicles of Pan-Turanism and Pan-lslamicism. These needs remained unsatisfied as a result of the Ottoman defeat. Collective narcissism suffered hard blows and neither the community that perceived itself as such a collective, nor individuals have come to terms with this frustration. The relinquishing of the goals to which the elite aspired was not an act that could be compared to a reckoning with the past, but a mere "swallowing." In this respect, the words of Mustafa Kemal are very instructive with regard to Pan-Turanism and Pan-lslamism. It was essential for him not to turn against them, but to choose not to deal with what could not be achieved, given Turkey's insufficient resources.

In the final analysis, the past was not shut off, it is waiting in the unconscious to be summoned up again. "Social-psychologically, it is to be expected that the damaged collective narcissism is lying in wait for a chance to be repaired. It grasps for whatever brings the past consciously into harmony with the narcissistic wish, but there is also the possibility that reality can be modeled in such a way as if there was no damage in the first place. I do not assert at this juncture that collective narcissism will again manifest itself in Pan-Turanic goals. That can occur in yet another way. The underlying drive, however, is the desire to again dominate other nations and to again become a great power.

I will not go into how this affects the unfolding of the present day realities in Turkey. There are, however, a series of indications that we have begun to recover from the shock of the debacles of World War 1. Fundamental changes in world structure and the relative economic strength of Turkey compared to its neighbors reinforce the desire in Turkey to return to the old powerful days of empire. It can be argued that this condition accounts for one of the essential reasons for the strengthening of nationalistic and fundamentalist forces in Turkey. The desire to be a great power and to return to the old days does not derive from a psychology of disintegration and decline, but from a belief that it can be fulfilled through modem Turkey's own resources and strength.

111 D. OUR SELF IMAGE AND THE GENOCIDE

One of the most important reasons for the tabooing of the Armenian Genocide lies in the coupling of this event with the establishment of the republic. To a certain extent, the establishment of the republic depended heavily on the genocide. The founders of the republic knew that, and they were not averse to expressing it openly. For example, one of the leaders of the Ittihad ve Terakki stated: "If we had not cleaned up the eastern provinces of Armenian militia who were cooperating with the Russians, there would have been no possibility of founding our national state." A speech was delivered in the first parliament of the young republic, the thrust of which was that we accept the label of "murderers" since it served the purpose of saving the fatherland:

You know that the problem of [Armenian] deportations threw the world in an uproar and all of us were labeled murderers. We knew before this was done that world opinion would not be favorable and this would bring loathing and hatred upon us. Why have we resigned ourselves to being called murderers? Those are things that have only happened in order to secure something that is more holy and valuable than our own live at the future of the fatherland.

These "brave" words that the Turkish Republic was built on the genocide of the Armenians were reflections of the enthusiasm of the years during which the Turkish Republic was founded. In the course of time, however, we have sketched out an entirely contrary portrayal. Our nation state "had been created from nothing and in opposition against the imperial forces," an achievement of which we could be proud. The Turkish state was the symbolic proof of a national existence, that "we had dug ourselves" out of the national void "with our fingernails." Anti-imperialism was an indispensable component of our national identity. One aspect of national identity of which we were obviously proud was the organizing of the "National Forces" (Kuvayi Milliye) that had helped us obtain our independence. The "spirit" of these fighting forces, which originally were part of the first guerrilla units of the Turkish national movement, was still inspiring the generation of 1968 as a symbol of anti-imperialist identity.

One of the most important reasons we go out of our way not to discuss the Armenian Genocide is, therefore, the fear that our faith in ourselves would collapse. The model, the structures of thought that we use to explain the genocide to the world and in Turkey could collapse through such discussions. A discussion of the Armenian Genocide could reveal that this Turkish state was not a result of a war fought against the imperial powers, but, on the contrary, a product of the war against the Greek and Armenian minorities. It could show that a significant part of the National Forces consisted either of murderers who directly participated in the Armenian Genocide or of thieves who had become rich by plundering Armenian possessions.

Three different aspects can be discussed with respect to the connection between the Armenian Genocide and the establishment of the Turkish republic. First, the Turkish national movement was organized by the Ittihad ve Terakki party that had carried out the wartime genocide. It is known that the plans for this movement were already drafted during the First World War. In case of military defeat, preparations were made to organize a long lasting resistance. These plans were carried out in the Armistice of 1918 and thereafter.

An important point is that organizations, such as the "Society for the Defense of the Rights..." and "Rejection of Occupation," that were the mainstay of the forces supporting the national movement in Anatolia, were formed either directly on the order of Talaat ***** or with the aid of the Karakol (Police Station) organization connected to Talaat and Enver. If we look at the regions in which those organizations were established and the sequence of the acts of their founding, it becomes clear that these events initially took place everywhere a perceived Armenian or Greek danger existed. Of the first five resistance organizations that were founded after the Mudros Armistice agreement, from the 30th of October,1918 to the end of the year, three were directed against the Armenian and two against the Greek minorities.

The local cadres of Ittihad ve Terakki constituted the main elements among the founders of these associations. This overlap of membership was so great that when later the central organization "A-RMHC" (Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia) formed a party, it was stipulated that no one from the "Freedom and Accord Party," seen as an enemy of Ittihad ve Terakki, could become a member." An important mission of the Karakol movement, which organized the national movement in Anatolia, was to arrange the escape to Anatolia of those Ittihadists who had been involved in the Armenian Genocide and who were then being sought by the British. To some extent the organization was a symbol of the nexus linking the Armenian Genocide to the resistance movement in Anatolia.

The second important connection between the genocide and the national movement concerned the formation of a new class of wealthy men in Anatolia who had enriched themselves thanks to the genocide. Even Turks point to the fact that the economic motive played an important role in the Armenian Genocide. An important figure in the national movement, Halide Edip, said, "...there was a strong economic one ... this was to end the economic supremacy of the Armenians thereby clearing the markets for the Turks and the Germans." The prominent people who had enriched themselves through the genocide feared that the Armenians could return to avenge themselves and reclaim their goods. After all, this was part of the Allied agenda. These nouveaux riches were drawn even closer to the national movement on those occasions when Armenians did return with occupying forces to reclaim their goods and carry out a few acts of revenge, especially in the Çukorova (Adana, transl.) region. The newly rich thus became an integral part of the national movement. In many areas the resistance was directly organized by these newly rich elements. It was not an accident but rather a necessity that in many regions members of the governing bodies of the organizations for the protection of rights were those whose fortunes had been made as a consequence of the genocide of the Armenians.

Among those who had been enriched through the genocide were some who served directly at the side of Kemal himself. Topal Osman, for example, was one who later advanced to the rank of commander of the guard battalion, (protecting the institution of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, and the person of Mustafa Kemal-transl.), and Ali Cenani, who had been exiled to Malta, later became the Minister of Commerce in the new republic. The list can be expanded. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 22, 1922, the national government repealed a January 8, 1920 law of the Istanbul government concerning the restitution of Armenian goods. This change served to reinstate the law of September, 1915 concerning the Abandoned Goods [of the Armenians]. The government in Ankara knew it had to take into account the interests of those who had a share in the founding of the republic.

The third important link between the genocide of the Armenians and the republic is a natural outcome of the first. The initial organizers of the national movement were people who had directly participated in the enactment of the genocide. Those who set up the first units of the National Forces in the Marmara, Aegean, and Black Sea regions and held important posts in these units were for the most part people sought by the occupation forces and the government in Istanbul for their participation in the genocide. When Kemal began to organize the resistance in Anatolia, he received the strongest support from the Ittihadists for whom there were arrest warrants on account of their role in the genocide. Many who were sought or were actually arrested and deported to Malta for their role in the genocide, but fled or escaped later, received important posts in Ankara. There are many examples, but a few should suffice here. Sükrü Kaya became the Interior Minister and held the office of Secretary-General in the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), founded by none other than Mustafa Kemal. During the deportations of Armenians he was "Director General of the Office for the Settlement of Nomadic Tribes and Refugees." This was attached to the Interior Ministry and was officially responsible for the implementation of the Armenian "deportations." For this reason Sükrü Kaya was also known as "Director General for Deportation" (Sevkiyat Reis-i Umumisi). Mustafa Abdülhalik (Renda) was the governor of Bitlis and later Aleppo during the genocide. Rossler [Germany's veteran consul at Aleppo-trans.) said of him that: "[He] works inexorably on the annihilation of the Armenians. In an affidavit prepared by Vehip Pahsa, the commandant of the Third Army (during the war, in February, 1916) the special role of Abdülhalik Renda in the genocide is being emphasized. According to General Vehip's testimony, thousands of human beings were burned alive in the region around Mush, a district under the control of Mustafa Abdülhalik. This event is mentioned in German consular reports as well as by eyewitnesses.

There are others, for example, Arif Fevzi (Prinçcizade), who was a deputy from Dlyarbekir during the war years. He was suspect number 2743 in the warrant prepared by the British for the detainees in Malta, was assigned to the group implicated in the genocide, and was to be charged as such. He held the office of Minister of Public Affairs from July 21, 1922 to October 27, 1923. Ali Cenani Bey, the Ittihad ve Terakki deputy for Aintep, was suspect number 2805. He had enriched himself from the loot and spoils associated with the genocide. "In the English archives ... a very dirty file exists on him." He was the Minister of Commerce between November 22, 1924 and May 17, 1926.

Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras was also one of those who held important political posts in subsequent years. During World War I he was a member of the High Council on Health, which was responsible for the burial of the dead Armenians. Between 1925 and 1938, he served as Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey.

This list could be extended by several pages. It can be stated conclusively that Mustafa Kemal led "the war of liberation ... with Ittihadists who were sought for Greek and Armenian incidents and ... was supported by and relied on prominent persons who carried the ghost of the Greeks and Armenians into the subculture of the resistance movement. Participation in the national war of liberation was a vital necessity, a last refuge for all members of Ittihad ve Terakki and especially the special organization that masterminded the organization of the genocide. Only two alternatives existed for them. Either they surrendered to be sentenced to hard labour or death, or they fled to Anatolia and organized the national resistance. A well-known journalist and close friend of Mustafa Kemal, Falih Rifke Atay, expressed this quite clearly:

When the English and their allies began to demand an accounting from the Ittihadists and especially of the murderers of the Armenians after the end of the war, everyone who had something to hide armed himself and joined a gang.

I think that the tabooing of the Armenian Genocide in a republic whose foundation was created in this way is "understandable." The devastation that would ensue if we had to now stigmatize those whom we regarded as "great saviors" and "people who created a nation from nothing," as "murderers and thieves" is palpable. It seems so much simpler to completely deny the genocide than to seize the initiative and face the obliteration of the ingrained notions about the Republic and our own national identity. I would like to conclude my talk at this point with an open question: What significance do the effects of such a policy have for society today and in the future, especially when such "denial" means that the frame of mind and the pattern of behavior that led to the genocide against the Armenians continue to exist?

http://www.omroep.nl/human/tv/muur/artikel2.htm

Pilafhead · February 23, 2001

Good things are happening.

It sounds as if that last piece is 6 years old, but the others are encouraging current developments. It seems there is slow, but strong momentum building in our favor.

MJ · March 2, 2001

I hope nothing of the kind happens to Ali.

_____________________________________________

Armenian National Committee of America

888 17th Street, NW, Suite 904

Washington, DC, 20006

Tel. (202) 775-1918

Fax (202) 775-5648

E-mail: anca@anca.org

Internet: <http://www.anca.org/>http://www.anca.org

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

Contact: Elizabeth S. Chouldjian

March 2, 2001

Tel: (202) 775-1918

TURKEY PROSECUTING HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST

ON CHARGES OF RECOGNIZING ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

-- Turkish Government Escalating Enforcement of Armenian Genocide "Gag Rule" on its Own Citizens

WASHINGTON, DC - The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) today called on the U.S. State Department to protest the

prosecution of a Turkish human rights activist on charges that he had called on Turkey to apologize for the Armenian Genocide.

The activist, Akin Birdal, is the former president of the Istanbul-based Human Rights Association and Turkey's leading human rights advocate. He recently completed a 10 month sentence for speeches he gave in 1995 and 1996 supporting the democratic aspirations of the Kurdish people. The Armenian Genocide-related charges currently against him carry a maximum prison sentence of six years.

According to a March 1st Associated Press (AP) article, "Birdal's lawyer Sedat Aslantas said earlier that his client had made remarks about Turkey's treatment of minorities in general and not

particularly the Armenians." The AP story also noted that "dozens of writers, journalists and intellectuals have been jailed under Turkish laws which limit freedom of speech."

"The State Department should not stand quietly on the sidelines as the Turkish government violates internationally accepted

protections of freedom of expression, intimidating its own citizens by enforcing an Armenian Genocide 'Gag Rule,'" said ANCA Executive Director Aram Hamparian. "By this standard, the Turkish government would arrest President Bush for his campaign statements, imprison the overwhelming majority of the U.S. Congress for supporting

Genocide recognition legislation, prosecute nearly every Holocaust and Genocide scholar for affirming the facts of the Armenian

Genocide, and indict basically everybody else that they have not paid off or intimidated into complicity in their shameful campaign of genocide denial."

Congressman Smith Criticizes the Turkish

Government's Intimidation of its Own Citizens

Turkey's efforts to block Armenian Genocide recognition were also discussed during a March 27th hearing of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Operations. As part of his

argument against proposed cutbacks in U.S. international broadcasting programs in Turkey, Subcommittee member Chris Smith

(R-NJ) reviewed for the panel the campaign of threats and intimidation the Turkish government used last year against the

White House and Congress to prevent consideration of the Armenian

Genocide resolution. Given the heavy handed tactics the Turkish government has shown it is willing to use against more powerful

foreign nations, he asked his colleagues to imagine the types of intimidation they are using against their own citizens, out of the

public spotlight.

Assyrian Priest's Arrest Included in State Department Human Rights Report. In a related matter, the State Department's recently released annual human rights report on Turkey included information on the arrest of Father Yusuf Akbulut, an Assyrian priest charged with inciting "racial and sectarian hatred" for mentioning the Armenian

Genocide in an interview with Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper.

An ANCA grassroots campaign initiated in December of last year urged individuals to call on the State Department to formally

protest Father Akbulut's unfair arrest and prosecution to the State Department. In a departure from past practice, the State

Department's report included mention of the Armenian Genocide, in a sentence describing the circumstances of Father Yusuf's arrest,

without prefacing the term with words such as "alleged" or using evasive or euphemistic terminology. The section dealing with this

matter reads as follows:

"In October a Syriac priest was charged under Article 312 for 'inciting religious, racial and sectarian hatred' for comments he made to the media about legislation under consideration at that time by the U.S. Congress that referred to Armenian genocide. The trial of the priest, who spoke in favor of the legislation, began in December. He spent one night under arrest but otherwise has been free to continue his pastoral duties."

The full text of the State Department's human rights report on Turkey can be found at the following world wide web address:

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=844>http://w

ww.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/index.cfm?docid=844

Additional information can on both the Akin Birdal and the Father Akbulut cases can be obtained by contacting Acting Assistant

Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor: The Hon. Michael E. Parmly; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; U.S. Department of State; 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. Tel: (202) 647-2126. Fax: (202) 647-5283

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