Azeri Propaganda

[Aratta-Kingdom]

Baku reports on firing false 13.03.2008 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ The situation at the line of contact is still tensed but exchange of fire is not fixed, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian told reporters today.

 

“Azerbaijan keeps on circulating false information on ongoing skirmishes and casualties among Azeri servicemen. We do state that there is no exchange of fire presently and that we will refute the information spread by Azerbaijan,” the Minister said.

 

On March 4 early morning Azeri special forces attacked a position of the NKR Defense Army near Levonarkh settlement of Mardakert region. The attack was rebuffed and status quo restored. A crisis monitoring due on March 7 by request of the NKR MFA was postponed through Azerbaijan’s fault.

 

 

[Aratta-Kingdom]

Lets assume everything the azeris say is correct. Let's assume armenians are bad and they kill innocent azeri soldiers.

Is aliyev junior gonna just sit back and watch his soldiers either to be killed by the armenians or to run to the armenian side? What happened him calling for a war? Didn't he say his patience is running out? What is he waiting for?...Isn't now the time to act?

[Aratta-Kingdom]

FROZEN CONFLICTS THAW

 

Russia Profile

March 12 2008

Russia

 

The concept of frozen conflicts, an end to hostilities with no

resolution, is becoming more and more of an anachronism these days.

 

In post-Soviet countries and in autonomous republics, the political

equivalent of antifreeze has been thrown on the tense situations.

 

On Mar. 4, the situation in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Artsax

quickly took a turn for the worse. Starting at 5 a.m., eight to 13

soldiers died in an exchange of gunfire between the armed forces of

Azerbaijan and the army of the unrecognized NKR. (Although, it is not

really a secret to anybody that officers and soldiers from Armenia

serve in Artsax.)

 

That evening, the ministries of the two countries reported that the

conflict had subsided after a few hours. According to the Armenian

side, eight Azerbaijani military servicemen were killed and two NKR

servicemen were wounded. The Azerbaijani sources said 12 Armenian

servicemen were killed while one Azerbaijani serviceman and two

civilians from the Geranboy district were killed. Four Azerbaijani

servicemen were wounded.

 

This information, however, will most likely be rechecked and

corrected. But still, for the sake of comparison, we can say that in

all of last year, 30 people were killed during fire exchanges along

the cease-fire line (which is called the "front line" in Baku and

in Yerevan).

 

This hot spot in the former Soviet Union stands out from the rest.

 

First of all, the Nagorno-Artsax conflict was the most intensive

of any armed confrontation in the former Soviet Union. It started as

an internal conflict in 1988 and grew into an international affair

by 1991, lasting for three years.

 

Compared to other breakaway republics, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Transdnestr, Artsax had the largest number of victims, refugees and

temporarily displaced persons. Moreover, there are no international

peacemaking efforts in Artsax to appease the conflicting sides.

 

Instead, there is just a Ceasefire Agreement signed in May of 1994,

and the sides are separated by a front line. The only mediating body

is the Minsk OSCE group, the inefficiency of which has already given

rise to a number of legends.

 

Svante Cornell, a Swedish expert on the Artsax conflict, maintains

that the region's geopolitical significance and the risk of the

conflict growing into a war that would engulf it entirely, ranks the

Artsax first among all conflicts in the post-Soviet Eurasia.

 

"This is the only conflict that everyone talked about, with certain

grounds, as the conflict that carries the threat of a 'third world

war,'" he argued. "This is the only conflict in the Caucasus that

involves two independent states as the main participants. Russia

can be considered as a part in the Abkhazia conflict, but not one

of the main ones, while Armenia is definitely one of the two main

participants. But, more importantly, this conflict is roaring in

immediate vicinity of three states, each of which claims to play the

role of a regional power center - Russia, Turkey and Iran."

 

At different points in time, both Turkey and Iran considered the

possibility of becoming directly involved in the conflict, and each

time it would trigger a wave of protest in Russia, Cornell said.

 

Incidentally, the violation of the ceasefire on March 4 was not

unexpected. In 2007, the number of skirmishes and fire fights on the

front line increased nearly three-fold. The sides regularly test each

other's endurance. The regional arms race (thank God it's not about

nuclear arms yet) is, to some extent, a stabilizing factor. Both

sides are afraid of a big war. They fear not only human losses, but

also spoiling the image of the authorities (the legitimacy of which

depends on the Artsax factor, in many respects).

 

This is why any aggravation of the situation carries much higher

risk for the whole Southern Caucasus region, as well as for the CIS

as a whole. However, the March "military alert" in Artsax is just

a continuation of a tendency that started three years ago.

 

This tendency can be defined as an antifreeze of ethno-political

conflicts. Today (especially after the March incident), the term

"frozen conflicts," which is used in practically all international

political and legal documents, should be tossed aside. It is morally

outdated. A freeze implies the lack of any dynamics (either positive

or negative) in the development of the conflict. There are indeed

dynamics on the territory of the former Soviet Union, although they

cannot be considered positive.

 

There were numerous attempts to change the status quo of the conflict

zones in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1997, 1998 and in 2001,

such efforts were made in Abkhazia. However, until the year 2004,

these attempts did not adhere to a cogent strategy.

 

The situation changed in 2004, when the United States and the European

Union stirred up the issue of international recognition of Kosovo's

independence. In the United States and the EU, recognizing Kosovo

is considered "a special case" because of the overwhelming Albanian

majority and the region's unique political history.

 

In Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Transdnestr and Nagorny Artsax, the

Kosovo case is seen as a legal precedent. This means that the elites

of states recognized by the UN (Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan) had

aimed to "solve the problem of territorial integrity" before Kosovo

proclaimed its independence. After Kosovo's recognition this year,

states with territorial integrity issues have started increasing

their militarist rhetoric.

 

Azerbaijani leaders (starting with the country's president and

trickling down to high-ranking military officers) have mentioned,

on numerous occasions, that they are willing to go to any lengths,

including military measures, to restore the country's territorial

integrity.

 

The majority of the people also share this position. Sociological

research shows that 60 percent support a coercive solution to the old

conflict. Recently Ilkham Aliyev once again stressed the fact that his

country is ready to fight to the death. "Azerbaijan's military budget

is $1.3 billion, and it will continue to increase. We are purchasing

defense technology, airplanes and ammunition in preparation to liberate

occupied territories, and we are prepared to do it," he said during

a meeting with veterans of the Artsax war in the Khanlar District.

 

The Nagorny Artsax region was a zone of Armenian-Azerbaijani

conflict even before NKR proclaimed its independence in September of

1991, when the Soviet Union still existed, and the conflict was not

international. The logical question is how advantageous it really is

for Armenia and the breakaway region to provoke the republic whose

establishment is already prepared for harsh action.

 

On the other hand, it would also be wrong to say that Baku is ready

for a full-scale invasion of Artsax (where the Armenian forces

have strong fortifications). There will be a presidential election in

Azerbaijan in November 2008. Of course, the patriotic theme will be

central to the campaign. However, victims of any conflict and military

failures could have a boomerang effect on the country's political elite

and the president's popularity rating. This is why it is important

to realize that patriotic rhetoric is one matter, while real actions

are a completely different one. This is why the existence of some

"protocol of Baku sages" about attacking Artsax as a result of

Armenia's internal political crisis also seems very doubtful.

 

But what, then, is behind the most recent violation of the cease-fire

in the conflict zone? Firstly, this violation is definitely not the

first one. Comments and reports of some information agencies prove

that much. But during this month's incident, the number of victims

(no matter whose version you believe) is greater. A collision of this

scale and level of intensity has not taken place at the front line

for a long time.

 

Secondly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are living in such a state

that the conflict is not simply a factor of political life. It is a

factor of identification, and it is visible even in some everyday

details (especially in Azerbaijan, which was defeated in 1994,

but has definitely not accepted this defeat). In this situation,

even the nerves of an officer or soldier at the front line might be

of critical importance, and any mistake might prove to be fateful.

 

You do not need to receive instructions from the command center or

packets from the main headquarters for this kind of a situation. Both

societies are "worked up," especially those in Azerbaijan, where the

idea of revenge is gaining more and more popularity. Any spark might

cause a big fire.

 

Thirdly, the latest collision in Artsax took place in the post-Kosovo

period. Despite everything that is said about the unique nature of

self-determination in this ex-Serbian autonomy, it is obvious that

today the proclamation of independence of the new state in Pristina

encourages more friction between post-Soviet states and breakaway

republics. Some of them need to fight for being recognized even if

the recognition comes the day after tomorrow, not tomorrow.

 

Others want to finally dismiss the subject of territorial integrity.

 

What if tomorrow there is a new ideology and Kosovo stops being

so unique?

 

Thus, Kosovo's self-determination is objectively promoting not peace,

but further conflict in post-Soviet states. This much is obvious from

the almost simultaneous aggravations of the situation in Abkhazia

and South Ossetia.

 

Ilkham Aliyev is correct saying: "As you see, norms of international

law are violated in the world, and this has a negative influence on

conflict settlement. The factor of power and strength is still the

decisive one, and we'll reach our goal."

 

Actually, when there are no criteria for officially recognizing

de-facto states and when the mechanisms of conflict resolution are

reduced to politically correct small talk, the factor of strength

becomes, as the classics once put it, "the midwife of history."

 

Essentially, the main goal of any negotiations today should be

the elimination of the strength factor as the decisive component

of "conflict resolution." You can move toward compromises and

concessions only based on the agreement that there is no alternative to

non-military means of conflict settlement. Although, if the strength

factor became the main question in the Balkans, why are the mighty

of this world so sure that it won't be the same in Southern Caucasus,

where traditions of political violence are just as deep-rooted as in

Europe's powder keg?

 

Sergey Markedonov is the head of the Interethnic Relations Department

at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

[Yervant1]

The baboons are at it again!

 

 

 

TRADITIONAL ANTI-ARMENIAN CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED BY AZERBAIJAN

 

Panorama.am

13:21 16/02/2009

 

"Azerbaijan has started its traditional anti-Armenian campaign

over Khodjalou events in 1992. The official Azeri campaign takes

every measure to blame Armenian party in the tragedy by dripping

anti-Armenian poison into the consciousness of the international

society and native people," says the announcement made by the Foreign

Ministry of Nagorno Karabakh.

 

According to the release, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Nagorno

Karabakh focused native people's attention on the false photo

putblished on Azeri web site, particularly, the web site of "Heidar

Aliev foundation" (www.azerbaijan.az). It is a falsified photo of

dead citizens with an image of a populated are in the back. That

photo is a Kosovo photo and it is published in Serbian, Albanian,

German nd famous "New York Times" web sites.

 

"It is significant that the campaign has marked anti-Armenian focuses

and is used to strengthen the ethnic intolerance and hate of Azeri

towards Armenians. Unfortunately, "Khodjalou" is the highlight of

Azeri inner and foreign policy," says the announcement.

 

 

 

[Arpa]

Yes Yervant, even if this item may belong under the general Topic of “Comedistan”… However, it is not funny, it hurts.

=====

OH! YEAH!

That khojalu/kakalou fiction again. Some day they may learn the real meaning of “genocide/baboonicide”. I just saw somewhere, I can’t find it again, that there were a couple of hundreds of casualties, of which only some sixty were civilians.

BTW. Is there still a place by that name? Observe the maps below, half way between Stepanakert and aghdam/aghkakam.

http://hyeforum.com/index.php?showtopic=19998

Azerbaijan has started its traditional anti-Armenian campaign over Khodjalou events in 1992. The official Azeri campaign takes every measure to blame Armenian party in the tragedy by dripping anti-Armenian poison ...

View the full article

Maps;

http://www.armsite.com/maps/mshow.phtml?when=now&slide=8

http://www.armsite.com/maps/

Also observe- TRUTH;

http://www.karabagh.am/eng/GlavTem/xojalu.htm

http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/khojaly.shtml

In 1991 and early 1992, Azerbaijan used an Azeri inhabited village of Khojaly in Nagorno Karabakh as a launching pad for indiscriminate artillery and rocket fire on Stepanakert, the capital of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR), located only a short 15-minute drive from Khojaly. By the end of February 1992, intensive fire from Khojaly and other Azeri military strongholds in Karabakh had killed 243 people, including 14 children and 37 women, and wounded 491, including 53 children and 70 women. In addition, systematic and intense artillery and rocket fire against civilian targets in Stepanakert paralyzed the city, destroying hospitals, administrative buildings, schools, and homes. By controlling Khojaly, Azerbaijan also prohibited access to Karabakh’s airport, the only link with the outside world, which was used to bring food and medical aid. Furthermore, Khojaly was also used as a staging area for military offensives on Stepanakert and nearby Armenian-populated villages. Thus, Khojaly became a legitimate military target for Self-Defense Forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

http://budapest.sumgait.info/khojaly/offensive.htm

 

THE KHOJALU CASE: A SPECIAL DOSSIER

by Hayk Demoyan, Levon Melik-Shakhnazaryan

translated by Ruzanna Amiraghyan

The political situation in Azerbaijan in 1991-1992

4. Reasons for the assault of Khojalu | 5. The Khojalu offensive

6. About the participation of CIS 366-th regiment | 7. Development of the events after February 26

8. The causes of casualtes among civilians in Khojalu | 9. The total number of casualties

10. Conclusions | 11. Summary | 12. Appendix

 

5. THE KHOJALU OFFENSIVE

In terms of the Azerbaijani population Khojalu was the second after Shushi. The settlement is located in the strategically vital place and actually divides the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh into two. It was the military strategic importance of Khojalu that since the very beginning of the National-liberation movement of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh that the Azerbaijani authorities initiated intensive construction works and settling the Azerbaijanis from remote regions in Khojalu as well as Meskhetian Turks – since 1989. As a result of this single-minded policy of changing the demographic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and dissection of the Armenians of the region held by the Azerbaijani authorities the population of the settlement tripled from 2135 in 1988 to 6300 in 1991. Owing to this kind of artificial increase Khojalu was granted status of town.17 No doubt people were moving into a militarily and politically unstable region not on their own free will.

The following fact is another proof that the Azerbaijani authorities were informed on the forthcoming anticipatory assault of Armenians on Khojalu. By mid February 1992 before leaving for Minsk to the summit of the CIS, President A. Mutalibov ordered to throw all the accumulated reserves of the military equipment in the Aghdam region. 11 tanks and 12 infantry fighting machines BMP-2 were quickly delivered there, which together with the available in Aghdam 44 caterpillar armored machines of BRDM type, equipped with 12 millimeters calibers machine-guns presented an inspiring force, which could help the Khojalu settlers in case of an attack in any moment, but was also threaten Stepanakert itself.18

Besides, the Azerbaijani forces in Khojalu and the Aghdam region were equipped with over 35. 000 units of machine-guns and sub-machine guns with enough number of cartridges.19

R. Hajiev, member of the Aghdam department of PFA: «We could have helped the settlers of Khojalu, there were both forces and capabilities. But the leadership of the republic wanted to show the people that they lacked the force, and call for the help pf the CIS army once again, and to suppress the opposition with its help as well».20

Evidently, the authorities and the opposition claim one another responsible for the tragedy. Mutalibov is obviously speculating the Aghdam armed forces being under his control, and not the PFA. In their turn the functionaries of PFA tried to gain reputation of law-abiding citizens in the world. No wonder looters took advantage of the chaos to earn money on the tragedy of compatriots. For instance, the informal deputy defense minister of Azerbaijan Fahim Hajiev did not shrink from taking bribes from the widows and the relatives the killed Azerbaijanis to deliver their bodies.21

By the beginning of the assault part of the civilian population of Khojalu left the settlement, and by the end of February 1992, according to various sources, some 1000 to 2500 people still remained there, mostly peaceful civilians and soldiers of Azerbaijani armed formations. On February 15 the Armenian side made an ultimatum: the civilian population of Khojalu was offered to leave with a white flag.22

In the beginning of the attack, started on February 25, at 23:00 p.m., the Armeinan forces of NKR self-defense opened an aimed artillery fire against military objects and positions of the Azerbaijani forces, dislocated in the central part of the settlement. The successful shots spread havoc among the Azerbaijanis, which did not show serious resistance. Neither there was a more or less stubborn street fight in Khojalu; by 4 o’clock in the morning of February 26 the last centers of resistance were suppressed. Observers of the «Memorial» right protection organization inspecting the destructions in Khojalu confirmed the fact of artillery and not street fightings, which could result in a large number of casualties.23 It is worth mentioning that the order number 1, regulating the conduct of the members of the Armenian armed forces of NKR self-defense, strictly forbid any kind of violence against the civilians of the adversary.

Thus the assurances of the Azerbaijani side on a supposed mass elimination of peaceful Azerbaijani inhabitants of Khojalu are being discredited. Moreover, the radio intercepts of Azerbaijani military in Aghdam, later published in Azerbaijani mass media, also witness the latter. One of them reads: “Don’t kill children and women. Gather them in the center.”24 From our part we will mention that all the civilian population remaining in Khojalu was moved to Stepanakert and were passed without any conditions to the Azerbaijani side according to their will two days later. The fact of the voluntary handover of the inhabitants of Khojalu to Azerbaijan after a narrow inquiry was confirmed in the conclusion of the Moscow based right protection organization “Memorial”, as well as testified in a documentary film by a journalist from St. Petersburg Svetlana Kulchitskaya.

Part of the population began leaving Khojalu in Aghdam direction immediately after the start of the assault. Practically in all groups of the refugees there were armed people from the military garrison of the town. The people were leaving for two directions:

from the eastern suburb of the town to north-east along the Karkar River bed, leaving Askeran on the left. The corridor was left by the Armenian side for the population to safely leave. The width of the corridor made from 100 to 300 meters;

from the northern suburb of the town to north-east, leaving Askeran on the right. Only few used this way.25

Worthy to mention, the so called “corridors”, naturally, were not limited to certain meters, as it may possibly seem. These were directions from where Armenians did not advance and where no one shoot, letting people leave the zone of military actions. In reality the width of the directions made a kilometer or more.

As we can see, the Armenian forces did their best to escape unnecessary deaths on the side of the civilian population of Khojalu. The mayor of Khojalu Elman Mamedov also knew about the corridor: “We knew the corridor was left for the civilian population to leave...”.26

According to the report made by “Memorial”, nearly 200-300 people remained in Khojalu, hiding in the basements of the houses. After the assault they were moved to Stepanakert and were provided with food and medicines. The Armenian side stated it would agree to let them in exchange for its hostages.27

The Armenians informed Azerbaijanis about the existence of the humanitarian corridor also by loudspeakers, although it is possible that the greater part of the Khojalu inhabitants could had had not heard the messages.28

Indeed, it is likely, that not all the inhabitants of Khojalu had heard the warning, bu the masses of people moving in safe directions could have led the rest as well.

It is worth mentioning, that few days before the start of the assault the representatives of the Armenian side had repeatedly informed the authorities of Khojalu on the coming offensive using radio communication, calling them to take out the civilian population from the settlement immediately. The fact that this information was received by the Azerbaijani side and transmitted to Baku is confirmed also by a number of publications in Azerbaijani newspapers (Bakinskaya gazeta).29

After the Khojalu offensive 13 hostages of Armenian origin were found and released, including one child and 6 women. 30

On completion of the operation the troops of the Nagorno-Karabakh republican rescue service “Artsakh” found the bodies of 11 civilians, including one child and four women in Khojalu and its surroundings. This, of course, does not comprise the number of armed squadron members in military uniform. By the way, there number was not big either.

Thus all the rumors and accusations about the mass killings of civilian population in Khojalu are unmasked. On the other side, the fact of the death of many inhabitants of Khojalu remains unquestionable. How were hundreds of people killed and were exactly? The answer to this question reveals the truth and the fabrications about the events of February 1992.

 

17 Report of Memorial, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992.

18 Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 251.

19 Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. p. 268.

20 Izvestia, Moscow 12.04.1992.

21 Kiril Stolyarov, op. cit. pp. 255.

22 Helsinki Watch, op. cit., 1994, p. 20.

23 Ibid.

24 Azadlig, 26.02.1992.

25 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992, T. Goltz, op. cit., p. 122.

26 Russkaya misl’, 03.03.1992. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 02.04.1992.

27 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 02.04.1992.

28 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18.06.1992.

29 Ibid.

30 Statement of the Supreme Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, February, 1992.



RELATED:



Armenian massacres in Sumgait



Chronology of Karabakh war

 

 

 

 Hosted by sumgait.info

 

Edited February 16, 2009 by Arpa

[hosank]

Is aliyev junior gonna just sit back and watch his soldiers either to be killed by the armenians or to run to the armenian side?

 

no, aliyev is happy as long as the war is prolonged. he reaps the benefits of the oil-military industrial complex, (as everyone knows from all the azeri deserters) it isn't great. it also allows him to use emergency powers over his population with little questionning. so, aliyev is happy with the war. once and a while, he will make agressive speeches, or claim that the armenians are breaking the ceasefire...but aside from that..

 

about xojalu:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eynulla_Fatullayev

 

..and if you have google earth..just go slightly north-east of stepanakert, and you will see xojali