-
Posts
32,837 -
Joined
-
Last visited
-
Days Won
333
Content Type
Profiles
Forums
Events
Gallery
Everything posted by MosJan
-
December Fraud of 1993 Though Russia had a bunch of its own problems amidst disorder of the beginning of 1990s, it could not remain indifferent to bloody events in the outskirts of the collapsed USSR (from Artsax and Transdniestria to Tajikistan) as they posed a threat for it either. Nevertheless, primitive speculations are circulating that Moscow held the key to the resolution of smoldering conflicts but was reluctant to act as it is easier to control former soviet and now independent States if they are warring. Everybody remembers the word Artsax turning into common noun for interethnic clashes and a cockpit of wide-range and fierce war. But we easily forget how the fires that flamed all South Caucasus were extinguished due to insistent assistance of Russia and what it cost the latter. The conflict is not liquidated so far; it continues to smoke. But there has been no bloodshed for eleven years now. The peak of military actions in Artsax falls on 1993. Those were not local skirmishes anymore but practically pitched battles and wide-range operations with application of modern arms and seizures of extensive territories. The initiative passed to the Armenians: apart from the Artsax people and volunteers from different countries, the regular army of Armenia has already stepped in the war. The other party recruited diverse mercenaries including many officers through military enlistment offices in a number of regions in Russia and about two thousand Afghan mojahedins. Russia got more active as mediator from mid-1993 inclining the conflicting sides at first to measures on restriction of military actions and then to all-out ceasefire. But the path to the ceasefire in May 12 of 1994 was full of bitter failures because of a number of broken ceasefires. Those first ceasefires appeared short-lived. (To be sure, for second half of 1993 the bloodshed was suspended for whole two months if we add these terms of ceasefires: 2 months of 6 were calm and it is a great period regarding saved human lives!) Nobody, except for Russia -- neither other States, nor the OSCE Minsk group -- managed to curb even temporarily military actions in Artsax (even when they had chance). But it is no wonder: as Moscow, contrary to other mediators, purposefully pursued cessation of the bloodshed, above all. Russia’s motives were not only those of humane character (though this is enough for it) but also calculations that it is more difficult to negotiate while war is in process. Our western partners hardly wanted continuation of military actions but they were not striving for ceasefire as Russia did. They had other priorities... The result of faded hopes in 1993 produced not only affliction but also serious direct or indirect consequences. In early September the Armenians slowed with troops’ removal from conquered Azerbaijani regional center of Kubatlu as official Yerevan and Stepanakert publicly promised earlier. The opportunity to display flexibility, which is so needed for all sides for overcoming obstinacy in every issue, was thus missed. You see the first gesture of goodwill should come from those who are in more favorable position; nobody is capable of such gestures in disadvantage, as that would be considered weakness and defeatism. In October breakdowns from the Azerbaijani side followed: a dangerous incident took place on at Kuydzhak village on October 10 and Azeris finally broke ceasefire on October 21 losing all southwest of the country. But it must be noted that the ceasefire would maintain longer when even one of the sides really needed a break. So, one such break was prolonged for four times and lasted from August 31 till October 21. Heydar Aliyev needed more favorable conditions for the presidential election on October 3, which was the last step transferring authority in his hands. The break of ceasefire in mid-December of 1993 that was reached on "the highest level" by Russian Foreign Ministry’s support is especially notable for its absurdity and bloody consequences it yielded. This time the cause of the break was not any annoying incident on the front (as it happened before owing to precipitate actions of commanders or uncontrolled of groups) but a bungle or a cynical trick in made in offices in capital cities. Here is how it was. I learnt in Moscow on 16 December, 1993, that military actions in the south near the town of Beylagan have again aggravated. Mutual accusations followed as usual. I called president Нeydar Aliyev and leader of Artsax Armenians, Robert Kocharian, by High Frequency phone. They both marvelously quickly gave consent for general ceasefire. We agreed to stop fire for 10 days at midnight on December 17 in order to negotiate over its prolongation. Heydar Aliyev told that from political leadership A. Jalilov, deputy chairman of Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, will sign the agreement and from the military -- head of the Supreme Headquarters N. Sadikhov. Robert Kocharian charges Arkady Ghukasian and S. Ohanian with the job. I immediately faxed Baku and Stepanakert the outline of the document for drawing it up. The text slightly differs from former similar agreements. We have barely enough time, only few hours, as after documents are ready we should send both sides’ faxes to each other to confirm reciprocity of accepted obligations. And the military command should give appropriate orders after that and to inform commanders at the front as soon as possible. I soon receive the fax from Stepanakert: everything is signed without corrections or insertions. Precious hours pass, and the document from Baku is still missing. Knowing that Heydar Aliyev is very busy getting ready for France visit, I begin to hurry Baku. They assured me that the delay is of technical character and the document will be signed upon N. Sadikhov’s soonest return in Baku. No remarks or concerning the text dropped. To speed up signing, I sent the fax with the signature of Artsax authorities to the Office of president of Azerbaijan ahead of time (I used to dispatch faxes usually after receiving documents from both sides). The Azeris now could see that Stepanakert had undertaken to stop fire if they do the same. They should not have delusion on this ground as the text makes it clear that the arrangement will come into force only after the mediator has confirmed that he got documents from both sides. Taking into account tough situation in Beylagan and that everything was talked over personally with the Azerbaijani president (there is no one higher – I have to trust!), I probed Robert Kocharian: what about terminating fire today at midnight "as gentle gesture" and not postpone it because "of a technical delay" in Baku? (I repent now of my naivety!). To my surprise, Robert Kocharian known for his toughness does not object. It seemed that both sides issued orders to armies: it is impossible to control it from Moscow. Yet, mutual pretensions for infringements followed again in the morning. I continued forcing Baku to sign the next day and I passed sides’ protests and urgent demands to take action. Failures in such situations are extremely undesirable, yet they took place (one can assume that subordinate didn’t receive and execute an order in due time). Sometimes situation was gradually corrected, passing into lull. But the delay with signing of the document is already unprecedented! It continued the next day too. The president of Azerbaijan was already inaccessible for High Frequency phone. The wires must have worn out so hard did I try to contact Heydar Aliyev’ staff, chairman of parliament, minister of a defense and the Headquarters. Telephone conversations cannot be taped but the fax to Aliyev’s secretary was kept: "Tariel, please tell the President that the mediator did not get the Azeri text on ceasefire signed by A. Jalilov and N. Sadikhov till now from Baku. It’s impossible to work in such conditions. It’s a rather serious work and there should be order. Or then it is necessary to cancel the ceasefire. 18. ХII. 21.00". No answer again. At last, only on December 19, at 9:40 p.m. (more than three days after the arrangement with Heydar Aliyev!) the fax on the blank of the minister of the defense of Azerbaijan with the signatures of Jalilov and Sadikhov arrived. The paper left extremely unserious impression. It was not at all what we have been expecting since December 16 - not only by the form and address but also by the content. The first gimmick was obvious - there was no date. Secondly, the letter was addressed not to the mediator and "leadership of Nagorno Artsax", as it has been before, but only to the mediator. The signature of Jalilov was not trustworthy - it’s scarcely resembled the previous ones. And most importantly, there was almost nothing left from our draft in the text that we had dispatched to Baku a long time before and which was signed by Stepanakert. The essence of the matter was wiped out and it seemed that the concern was not reaching ceasefire but prolonging an existing ceasefire. In short, the letter was completely unsuitable for drawing up what had been agreed with Heydar Aliyev. Besides, the Armenians were offered to withdraw troops back for 10 kms: it was not even specified where exactly - seemingly along the whole frontline! To cap all absurdities, it expressed hope in the end that "all signed arrangements will be strictly followed"! What is it all meant for? It was a sneer at common sense to the detriment of their own people! Should I remind how such delicate agreements are to be drawn up? Usually, plenipotentiary representatives of the sides sign one document at one time and in one place. But Baku preferred to sign the arrangements with Artsax in absentia (by fax via us as a rule) not to recognize Artsax Armenians as a side in the conflict. We, as mediators, had nothing against it. But it’s a truism the text of a document should be absolutely identical in any procedure (if there are amendments, they should be talked over with the other side directly or through the mediator). Certainly, it is impossible to consider change of the contents or form of the text unilaterally, without prior arrangement with the other side, especially backdating, neither rightful nor correct. Is it possible that high-ranking officials in Baku were unaware of it? (By the way, on 18 and 19 December minister of defense of Azerbaijan, Mamedov, sent me for 3 times the lists of infringements from the Armenians’ side counting down from the ceasefire. As if Baku already had already drawn it up properly!). In the meantime, Heydar Aliyev was already in Paris. I scribbled a draft cipher message to our ambassador in France, Yuri Ryzhov. He was to quickly find the Azeri president and delicately express bewilderment that his indications were not carried out in Baku. Despite the rigid schedule of the visit, Yuri Alekseyevich found him and passes the message of the Foreign Ministry of Russia. He informed Aliyev that the letter from Baku is unacceptable for drawing up ceasefire but confirmed our readiness to start new negotiation for reaching armistice. Ryzhov emphasized that we consider honesty of the sides and faithfulness to the accepted obligations an indispensable condition of mediation, otherwise mutual mistrust between them will deepen. The president assured the ambassador as though he had given Baku all necessary orders and promised to settle the matter upon his return (!) (it is uncertain how he settled the matter). What kind of performance was it? A chain of ridiculous misunderstandings? Fatal inconsistency inside the Baku administration? "Illiteracy" of signatories? An attempt of direct swindle? Above all, what orders did Aliyev give before leaving for Paris? And, in the end, was that possible to disobey the president in Baku? There is no ready answer to these questions – we leave it to readers’ taste to choose. How simple it was to find a solution! Mid-December was the beginning of attempts of Azerbaijani counterattack on the front. Some date it back just to December 17, others to the beginning of December 20s but it is clear that it was the largest attempt in Artsax war to throw the Armenian troops back. Our new offer during the escalation of fights to agree on two-week "New Year" armistice from December 31 was not accepted either. The offer was sent personally to Heydar Aliyev on December 30 but we got no answer, though Artsax Armenians agreed this time, too. At the CIS summit in Ashghabat on December 23-24, i.e. in the interval between failures of both attempts of ceasefire, Aliyev told mass media that (quoting ITAR TASS) "[he] prefers peaceful settlement of the conflict and stands for the immediate halt of military actions between the confronting sides". In his opinion, "necessary conditions for that have not been created yet and direct contacts with the representatives of the Armenian community of Nagorno Artsax did not help the process either". The counterattacks called, probably, to create these "necessary conditions", soon have choked, bringing Azeris only small local success in the region of Horadiz. But fierce fighting in the winter of 1993-94 still long continued taking heavy tolls for both sides. From now on Baku stops direct contacts with Stepanakert, completely ignoring it as a side in the conflict, though in 1993 it entered into agreement on restriction of military actions and ceasefire or its prolongation with Nagorno Artsax (even without any participation of Yerevan) for ten (!) times. Russia, as a mediator considered that there are 3 sides in this conflict and being realistic about its unusual configuration, obstinately involved Yerevan in the settlement process but not for banishing Stepanakert at all. December of 1993 vividly illustrates constant difficulties of mediator’s work with the sides. It shows how important are the political will, accuracy of actions and faithfulness of the leaders to their given words. And, by the way, it shines light on why the military actions battered the region for five more months that brought considerable human loss, material destructions and increase of Azeri refugee flow for which Baku now verbally cares... Who will answer for needless victims? Is that surprising that mutual mistrust of the sides appeared to be the scourge of Artsax settlement?! The December fraud of 1993 only aggravated it. I shall not hide how extremely disappointed and even depressed was I as a mediator. But I could not give up as bloodshed in Artsax and over it still continued.
-
THE FIRST RESTRICTIONS of MILITARY ACTIONS The basic scope of military actions, especially attacks in Nagorno Artsax and around it, fall on 1993. It doesn’t lessen the importance of the events in Shushi and Lachin at all (May, 1992) and the attacks of the Azeri army in the summer of the same year in territory of the former NKAR, as well as double-edged battles in the winter and spring,1994, shortly before the ceasefire on May 12. As a whole, 1993 passed in the atmosphere of the Armenians’ military activity. In late March they occupied Kelbajar region, widely closing Armenia and Nagorno Artsax. In summer, the Armenians surrounded and occupied the cities Aghdam and Fizouli, two important basic points of the Azeri forces near the Eastern gates of Nagorno Artsax, as well as Mardakert in the North. Then The Armenian-Artsax forces kept staying near the southwestern regions of Azerbaijan (Djebrail, Zangelan, Kubatlu), threatening to come out to the border with Iran along the Araxes River. In October, 1993, having taken advantage of the local violations of ceasefire from the Azeri side, they unfolded a large-scale attack, surrounded and occupied the whole southwest. In winter, 1993-94, the Azeri armed forces initiated a series of attacks. But the attacks either ended in failure (particularly, in Kelbajar), or brought local success (for example, in Goradiza, near the border with Iran). * * * The first year of the OSCE Minsk group’s activities (since June, 1992) showed that it can’t effectively play the role of mediator, to stop or hold the spreading of the armed conflict in the new regions with all the consequences following: increase in the number of the victims and the material destructions, increase of refugee wave, as well as the danger of making the conflict an international one. Moreover, the Minsk group obviously underestimated the importance of stopping the bloodshed. We continued our the activities in the Minsk group, trying to make it take the right path, counteracting the attempts of the Western diplomats to use this format in their geo-political interests, directed first of all to lessening the Russia’ influence in the South Caucasus. In this situation we had to double our own efforts as mediator, more actively meeting with the authorities of the countries in conflict, calling them for achieving a ceasefire. It is necessary to indicate in points the line of our actions directed to the ceasefire since the mid 1993. Certainly, in real life they coincided with our activities in the Minsk group. One can understand them out of the given context not always. There have been a number of ceasefires or other restrictions of the military actions achieved by direct mediation of Russia in the summer and the autumn of 1993. They were either violated shortly after, or we managed to prolong them for some period. That was a line of hopes and disappointment, nervous tension and embarrassing tiredness. The issued we raised in the beginning were not too arrogant -- it was important, that the sides could gradually get accustomed to the idea that they could stop bombing the cities or at least shoot for some days. One can’t say that we realized – sooner, we felt intuitively -- that no miracle will take place, that we will fail to stop the fire with one step, as P.S. Grachev, Russian defense minister, expected in Sochi, September 1992. We will have to achieve that through insistent attempts, notwithstanding the frequent digressions, prevarications of the sides, or stopping the short ceasefires they happened to achieve. "Annals" of the military actions’ restrictions and ceasefires in Artsax can seem rather boring but one can’t understand how a long ceasefire and relative stability were achieved in the region without that. The long-lasting narration can be explained by the fact that each day of restricted or stopped military action has saved many human lives. Mainly, this covers the period since mid-1993 till May 1994. It is worth mentioning that serious inner changes took place in Azerbaijan in this period. The general events are widely known: the dramatic escape of Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev’s coming to power that returned from Nakhijevan to Baku as a result of violent events that took place in Gyandja in early June. On June 15 he became the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan, while after Elchibey’s escape to Keleki, on June 18, he became the first person in the state (since June 24 - "acting President of the Azerbaijan Republic "). I will not touch upon the events in Baku (it is quite a different story) but all the things that will speak of happened in this very context. The mission of Russia managed to independently achieve the first essential agreement between the sides in conflict on June 17, 1993 (just few hours before Elchibey’s escape from Baku). It was a period of fierce fights in Mardakert, Askeran and Aghdam regions, a period of insistent mutual accusations, of attacks and shootings. Notwithstanding the numerous warnings addressed to the Armenians of Artsax (including the ones made from Moscow) not to try to take advantage of the inner political crisis in Azerbaijan, they couldn’t stand the temptation and began attacks directed to the central parts of the front on June 12. (The day before S. Huseynov, removed some of "his" troops from Artsax front because of contradictions he had with Elchibey after the bloody events on June 4, in Gyandja.) In that period the armed forces of Azerbaijan actively bombed the Armenian settlements. Thus, on June 17, Stepanakert underwent hardest bombings. The arrangement between the parties achieved as a result of our telephone conversations with Baku and Stepanakert was quite a simple one but was of great importance for the residents of the two suffered cities that became targets of military actions. It was a mutual obligation not to bomb Aghdam and Stepanakert. Recently, I found out that the documents I have, half forgotten, but historical for this conflict, began fading without any chances to restore them. It was already impossible to read the text on some of the sheets. In June 1993 we had the best and contemporary means of transferring texts via fax. We could use telephone communication, even through HF (high frequency phone), only for conversations, negotiations. In order to make more concrete and specified statement we had to either dictate the texts by HF or better send them by fax. The Electronic communication was not available for us and our partners even in the capitals of developed countries. We used fax communication so widely for sending texts to Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan that we involuntarily created a new king of job, calling it "fax diplomacy". Such a frequent use of fax was conditioned by other factors, too. The parties, as a rule, evaded from direct meetings either with the participation of a mediator or without it. It was hard to gather their representatives around one table for signing the arrangements that we had already achieved. The military actions also hindered the transport communication in the region. There have been few transportation means in the region, as well. We had to do many things very quickly and at a distance, very often from Moscow. As the sides did not trust each other, they needed mediators to believe in something and also, to have a witness in case of treason of the opponent. Certainly, very often the mediators were accepted with caution by the sides, each of them suspected him in playing on the side of the other party. That is why it was better to receive written texts in serious cases even from the mediator, especially for reporting the authorities. In one word, there have been many reasons. But the main point is that the strict positions of the sides made them the slaves of their own incompliance. Alas, the facsimile paper fades fast. Recently I decided to reprint the text of the first documents to preserve their essence, at least, even without grace of the forms and arms, without "odor" of signatures. The technology of remote dialogue between the sides through the mediator, when he was in Moscow, was as a rule, the following way: the mediator would make the text of the arrangements based on telephone negotiation with the sides and would send it to Baku or Stepanakert for being signed. In case the sides agreed with the wordings, the sides would send back the signed document to Moscow, while the mediator would have to send it to the opposite party. The mediator would work in the same way when, later, Armenia began participating in such agreements as a third party. Certainly, not always the sides signed the text in the way it was send by the mediator. There were many cases when this or that side made its corrections into the text, which is quite normal before signing the document. But sometimes it was done during signing without discussing with the mediator or directly with the opponent. Such, behavior of the sides revealed the lack of political culture or, at least, lack of relevant experience. Sometimes these could be trifles that didn’t touch upon the very essence of the agreement but in some cases such steps of the parties could ruin the principal agreement that was supposed to be reached orally. We will touch upon a classical example of such behavior later, dwelling on the events of December 1993. In June, 1993, The Artsax side didn’t use official form but they had an unusually large (diameter 4,5 cms) round stamp with an inscription "The Nagorno Artsax Republic. Committee of Self-Defense". The inscription was made in Russian and Armenian. The text prepared by the mediator and signed by a Nagorno Artsax military principal, said: "In case of the opposite side’s consent to immediately undertake the commitment not to shell and bomb Stepanakert, we will immediately undertake the commitment not to shell and bomb Aghdam. S. Babayan, commander of the Army of Defense, Nagorno Artsax Republic 17.06.93, 22:30" And a huge round stamp! The form of the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry bore the state symbols and the address, as it was required: 370601, Baku, Azizbekov Avenue, 3. Here is the full text of the document from Baku: "June 17, 1993 23:00 Defense Ministry of the Azerbaijan Republic. Fax 38-30-69 (8922) Moscow, fax 230-24-74 (095) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia To Mr. Kazimirov In case of the opposite side’s consent to immediately undertake the commitment not to shell Aghdam, we will undertake the commitment not to shell Khankendi. S. Abiyev, head of the Headquarters of the Azerbaijani Republic’s Armed Forces." As soon as I received the signed faxes in my office on the Smolensk Square, I immediately sent the faxes to the sides, giving documentary confirmation of the telephone arrangement achieved between them on that day: the text by S. Abiyev was sent to Stepanakert, while the text by S. Babayan went to Baku. Soon both addressees confirmed that they received the documents and it seemed that the sides should keep this arrangement. It is not accidental that the June 17 documents bear no indication of deadlines of actions. Each time we had the opportunity we achieved open-ended commitments, trying to stop or limit the military actions. When comparing the texts of both sides, one can see the disputes of the sides around the name of the main city of Nagorno Artsax. But another thing is more important: the silence of Baku about the bombing. Certainly, the Armenian side had no air forces, in fact, while the Baku officials obviously didn’t want to stop bombing Stepanakert/Khankendi (by the way it has been bombed even in mid-June). Thus, as a result, they agreed only on limitation of rocketing Stepanakert and Aghdam. But even this shortened agreement was severely tested soon. Only two days later, on June 19, the same Samvel Babayan sent me Note №97, having signed the form of Nagorno Artsax Self-defense Committee already as acting commander (here, I will represent the original message, edited by the author). "Taking advantage of the previous arrangement between the sides on undertaking commitments not to expose to shooting the cities of Stepanakert and Aghdam, the Azeri side is gathering military equipment in Aghdam, including "Grad" rockets and exposes to shooting and bombing the dwelling places of Nagorno Artsax Republic. On behalf of the Commanders of NKR Self-Defence Forces, I have to warn that in case such actions continue to take place, we will take steps in response to press the hotbeds. The actions in response will begin in an hour after you receive the given message. The Azeri side will bear the responsibility for everything". The natural reaction to such a note will be that one will regret about the lack of the common sense or literacy of the author. But this reaction will pass away very soon, as you come to think that hardly the mater is about only this. One can read between the lines of this "notification" that both sides tried to deceive each other. In this case, the Azeri side didn’t break the arrangement of June 17 (as it forbade to shoot, rocket the two cities only). Certainly, bombing and shelling of towns and villages directly violate the international humanitarian right but the Azeris did not undertake commitments concerning military actions in other regions or about not gathering military engineering in this or that district. If the matter was really that the Artsax authorities could suggest to enlarge the former arrangement, including two new obligations. But, probably, it was not included in their plans. The "warning" concerning "the continuation of such military actions" is hardly grounded. The insignificancy of the motivation is obvious, as the mediator had not a single opportunity to agree and decide these issues at a distance in an hour only. The very text of Babayan’s letter testified to their decision to deliberately break the former arrangement that was hidden behind the epistolary tricks of the newly appointed commander from Artsax. So, it was so hard to deal with the first arrangement between the sides. Certainly, we managed to preserve it somehow through contacting with the parties. The Armenians called their actions responding measures for pressing the weapon emplacement of the enemy around Aghdam. Both sides protested about violations during the next days. The protests were discussed by the sides as well as during the telephone talks with RF Foreign Ministry; some measures were taken for remove concerns . Nevertheless, the military commanders of the parties stated that the general activeness of military actions, as well as usage of hard weapons decreased in those regions for a while. On June 24 the Foreign Ministry of Russia emphasized the inadmissibility of interfering the affairs of Azerbaijan, as well as the importance of implementing the Resolution №822 of the UN Security Council. The matter was that the US and, particularly, Turkey, cherishing hopes concerning the President of Azerbaijan Elchibey, were suspicious about the legitimacy of the changes that took place in Baku. In future they began to use it as a measure for pressure over the new Baku authorities and the issue of the human rights, demanding to set free the arrested members of the People’s front of Azerbaijan. Sometimes, they were falling into absurdity, for example, the State Department used the word combination "the so called actions in Gyandja." On June 25 I discussed with the military commanders of the Armenians of Artsax some measures of limiting the military actions for removing concern of the sides in over Askeran-Aghdam, as well as in Mardakert/Agdere. I immediately sent my suggestions to Safar Abiyev about balanced withdrawal of Artsax’s Armenians and the Azeri forces from a number of dwelling places and hills of the region. We wanted to decrease the fire of the battles and to make the parties return to the positions of June 14 when Stepanakert, last of the three sides, gave consent for the plan of the "Minsk nine" though they asked for a month’s delay for its implementation. But the sides proved to be unprepared for such "conciliatory" gestures (later, we had to give up such suggestions for a while). But if the Artsax side directly said that in some places they can’t remove their forces from the occupied positions, the Azeris delayed their answer (as a result, the Artsax Armenians occupied the hills around Mardakert, making the Azeris leave that). Receiving no answer from Abiyev concerning my suggestions, I had to send the same message with the sign "urgent" to Heydar Aliyev on June 26. At about 15:00 Heydar Aliyev called the head of the mediators’ mission of Russia and suggested to assist stopping the battles around Aghdam. He said that the Armenians again tried to surround and conquer the city. Being busy in sharing the "heritage" of Elchibey and settling the affairs with the brave "colonel" Suret Huseynov, he emphasized that in the current inner political situation of Azerbaijan the loss of Aghdam would cause fatal consequences. He even stated that he is determined to settle the Artsax issue in the most constructive way and will be closely contacting with Yerevan in that issue, but at present a pause in the military actions is needed. On June 26, during the second telephone conversation about the situation around Aghdam, Aliyev said that he wants to change the permanent representative of Azerbaijan to Moscow. He asked what I think of Khikmet Gadzhi-Zade, the permanent representative. I answered that though he belonged to the People’s Front of Azerbaijan, he was quite flexible and constructive and rather actively participated in the negotiations in Moscow around the ceasefire. I told how he was disavowed from Baku twice. Listening me till the end, Heydar Aliyev said that he is still "a man from the street" and expressed willingness to appoint a more solid representative – Prof. Ramiz Rizayev (member of the Academy of Science of Azerbaijan). Literarily, immediately at 17:11, Gadzhi-zade informed RF Foreign Ministry about stopping his functions without explaining the reasons. Reporting A. V. Kozirev about the conversations with Aliyev, I stated that in my contacts with Baku and Stepanakert I try to stop the military actions in Aghdam and Mardakert where fierce battles were on. I said that we unfold larger intermediary suggestions. By the midnight of June 26 we managed to achieve agreement of the sides on the ceasefire of the abovementioned military for a week (i.e. till the morning of July 4). Here is the first text. No comments: "230-24-74. Moscow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia, to Mr. W.N. Kazimirov In case you confirm the consent of the opposite side, we undertake the commitment that for one week beginning from 5:00 a.m. of June27 we will stop any attacks and attempts to go forward from the contact line that is set up at the abovementioned moment; any rocket, artillery fire as well as air bombardment on the whole area of the military actions from the village Madagiz, in the North, and to Aghdam, in the South. This arrangement will be in force immediately after the abovementioned confirmation is received. Colonel Abiyev, head of Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijani Republic. June 27, 1993". We received the same text from Stepanakert, signed "Samvel Babayan, Commander of Defense Army of NKR". After we sent the texts to Stepanakert and Baku relevantly, we made sure that they received them. One of the messages sent to A. Ghukasian bore my inscription, saying, "Did you receive Abiyev’s text? 27.VI.1: 45. VK." The confirmations of the mediator that the document signed by the other side was not enough, each side wanted to have obvious confirmation by fax, at least. Unfortunately, the arrangement of June 27 wasn’t achieved easily. They still were shooting in the morning, some incidents took place, and only by the noon we managed to cease the fire. In the same period, the Russian mediator, facing the violations made by the one or the other side, began suggesting them a system of measures directed to decreasing such incidents to secure the achieved agreement even in such cases. These measures envisaged informing the opponent side about the violation either though High Frequency communication or though RF Foreign Ministry (its exact time and place, character and consequences). The other side had to give a written answer not later than in three hours, including the measures taken. When RF Foreign Ministry received such information, we had to inform the other side (immediately during the working days, while during the rest of the time as soon as possible). Willingly condemning each other in both real and false violations, the sides didn’t express big readiness to use the incidents’ settlement mechanisms. That’s why, the Russian mediator had to return to this for several times, insisting of the suggested system of measures. In the evening of June 27, Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharian agreed through me that they can enlarge and prolong the agreement on ceasing the attacks, the shooting and bombardments. On June 29, according to the arrangement with Aliyev, A.V. Kozirev especially sent a message to the sides in conflict with this very suggestion. UN Secretary General, acting chairman of OSCE, members of the Security Council and Minsk group were informed about this message. We spared no efforts to achieve the realization of the attained mutual understanding, but we failed. On July 2, RF Foreign Ministry made a new suggestion to the sides in the development of these ideas, i.e. to prolong the June 27 arrangement for a whole month (till August 4) and spread over the zones of Fizouli and Hadrout. We also suggested not to bomb the dwelling places within a radius of 10 km. from the center of the cities of Aghdam and Agdjabedi, Askeran and Martouni (i.e. two enlarged security zones for the each side), without locating rocket emplacement or arms near the settlements. The order of the actions in case of violating the arrangement in the most vulnerable places for the sides was also discussed. Stepanakert didn’t accept the suggestion of mutual withdrawal of the forces from the recently occupied hills and the occupied villages, but they agreed with the rest of the suggestions. As for the Azeris, it seemed that the idea was talked over with Aliyev. But Abiyev, notwithstanding the numerous cases of reminding, gave no response to our suggestions. Meanwhile, we received the information that in Yerevan and Baku the US diplomats took measures directed against prolonging and enlargement of the arrangements, achieved between Baku and Stepanakert with the assistance of RF Foreign Minister. They tried to make the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno Artsax contribute to reanimation of "the trio" (Russia, the US and Turkey), notwithstanding our curt refusal to the Americans to work in this format. Using the issue of legitimacy of the changes that took place in Baku as a pressure lever, the American made the Azeris throw out the triple initiative of Russia, Turkey and the US, though already in June it was replaced with "the plan of the Minsk nine." On July 2, Aliyev especially turned to all the countries of the world, particularly, to the US, Turkey and Russia, as to the initiators of peaceful suggestions, entrusting these three states with the main responsibility for realizing them. On July 5, he invited the ambassadors of the three countries, complaining about the serious complications at the front, especially about the fact that the Armenians moved close to Aghdam. He called for the three sides to effectively contribute to the achievement of the goals. It’s worth mentioning that Heydar Aliyev already pictured Russia, the US and Turkey as the guarantors of the conflict’s settlement. On the other hand, what did the reproaches of Aliyev hurled in Baku press, saying that none of the three States took any concrete measure, mean? He said this after several attempts of Russia to stop the military actions and Baku’s deviation to carry out the suggested measures! Facing such reproaches and the inexact statements concerning the commitments and guarantees of Russia, the US and Turkey, we had to send a personal letter to Vafa Guliadze, adviser of Heydar Aliyev, saying that there are not any commitments or guarantees yet and that one shouldn’t confuse the role of a mediator with the one of a guarantor. I bought him the list of the steps taken by Russia in June and in early July directed to de-escalation of the military actions. As a result, Baku declined the suggestion to prolong the arrangement for a month. The week of the June 27 ceasefire expired on July 4 and the battles around Aghdam resumed. Soon (in three weeks) the Armenians occupied this strategically important point, transportation crossroad and a big city, where 60 thousand people used to live. Besides, the Azeris said afterwards from time to time that as if the Armenians broke the arrangement, without saying that the very Baku didn’t want to prolong and enlarge the previous arrangement.
-
PROLOGUE Everything connected with Artsax began for me very simply but thoroughly turned my life for some years. At the end of April of 1992 minister of foreign affairs of Russia, A.V. Kozirev, called me and offered to engage in the settlement process of conflict in Nagorno Artsax. By then I had already served at the Ministry for almost 40 years; though I was the head of the Department of African Countries at the Foreign Ministry for the last 1.5 years, it would be difficult to call myself specialist in African studies as my only experience was the mission in only one African country -- Angola. It was a rather tough but meanwhile a very interesting period (1987-90) for a USSR ambassador as the southwester Africa -- Namibia and Angola -- were turning from wars to peace. But it was not obviously enough I think for taking up African issues in the foreign policy of our country. Now try to guess what motivates the principals of the Foreign Ministry in their choices? I do not know what Eduard Shevardnadze’s motivation was for recalling me from Luanda and appointing the head of the Department of African Countries. Nor can I guess why A.V. Kozirev chose me while he decided to put up an intermediary mission of Russia on peaceful settlement of Nagorno Artsax conflict. Someone asserted later as if my experience of participant in conflict settlement in southwestern Africa has played some kind of role in appointing me the head of Russian intermediary mission in Artsax. Now we had to deal not with a remote continent but with close countries that were already "foreign" for Russia. It was not long ago when the South Caucasus was one of outskirts of our country and, as it seemed at a distance, rather cozy and nice one. And now armed conflicts battered the region killing thousand of people. More importantly, I had to engage in the very first and most wide-range conflict, and most "ancient" of active volcanoes in this region and in all the territory of the Soviet Union. I have never had a chance to study such issues concerning not foreign countries but a country that was not long ago our common country. I played only a rather incidental role of member of a mandatory commission of XXVIII congress of the Communist Party. This commission was to immediately look into the mandates of three "unwanted" delegates of the congress of Nagorno Artsax Autonomous Region (at that point, striving to outwit the Center, the Artsax Armenians refused to participate in republican congress in Baku, where three delegates by Nagorno Artsax quota were elected for the ХХVIII congress: an Azeri, an Armenian and a Russian but right after this they elected three delegates of their own in Artsax). At the same congress, I started correspondence with the first secretary of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party, Ayaz Mutalibov, on the events in Sumgait. This was indeed my first encounter with Artsax issue -- two years prior to my assignment. I have stayed in the South Caucasus only two days before while accompanying minister of foreign affairs of Cuba Isidoro Malmierca in his Yerevan trip during his USSR official visit in the beginning of 80s. What was Nagorno Artsax conflict for us during that period, in the beginning of 1992? The widely used definition "friend-enemy" from military aviation could hardly be applied in this case. The conflict was not to be considered "ours" any more -- both Armenia and Azerbaijan already have proclaimed independence. But it was impossible to treat it as "foreign": either Azeris or Armenians were still our own people -- those were our guys dying! And it turned to be then one of the key features of our intermediary mission in Artsax. That very fact also facilitated to our work in many respects and extremely complicated it tying our hands. But at that moment, in the minister’s room, rather puzzled by his offer, I could only murmur without choosing words: "Frankly speaking, I am not excited over the idea. But if it is necessary, I’ll take it". A. Kozirev has not found it probably a sufficiently convincing refusal. The order on setting an intermediary mission of Russia on Nagorno Artsax headed by special envoy was signed in a few days, on 5 May, 1992. I used to recollect my conversation with my friend and classmate envoy Vsevolod Oleandrov as a funny incident. He told me that has just got a new post connected with Armenia. "Is it connected with Artsax?" I sympathetically asked him and added: "Well, thanks to God, that it’s a two-sided issue! ". It was just a day before my conversation with the minister and my mission on Artsax. I began looking into the tough essence of Nagorno Artsax conflict. I spent a year only on digestion of the principles. I remember that only in the first half of 1993 I felt confident enough as regards to the conflicting sides and in contacts with many foreign partners in Minsk group set within framework of OSCE to help in settling the conflict. But the structure of this tragic confrontation in the South Caucasus, that overflowed regional boundaries, is so many-sided that even now, years later, I notice my ignorance in one or another aspect. The conflict’s echo quite often reaches us today across the ocean. To proceed closer to the matter, I shall tell at once about the character of the Nagorno Artsax conflict and its peculiarity. Seemingly, there is no need of special introduction. The shock from the first armed convulsion that shook the foundations of great world power -- the Soviet Union -- is too alive in our memory. The word "Artsax" became a common noun indicating armed conflicts on the territory of former USSR (owing to its duration, cruelty, hopelessness and irrationality). It is true for the conflicts, which already sprinkled the earth with blood in different corners of Eurasia and for the ones that are still to come. The malignancy of Artsax precedent is in the fact that it encouraged, almost "legalized", a number of such confrontations. Its destabilizing effect overflowed regional boundaries. But somehow Artsax also served as caution as it prevented political confrontations to flare up in bloody clashes and direct military actions. Yet, it is impossible to bypass a series of features of Artsax conflict that were distinguishing it from other post-soviet conflicts in many respects. Firstly, Artsax issue has ancient historic roots (as opposed to the other, "young" conflicts): the clashes between Armenians and Azeris in the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th are well-known. This fact predetermined a special degree of mutual mistrust of the sides, emotional-psychological tension of the present conflict, its fierce and lingering character. What sets military actions in Artsax apart is the fact that there were very few POWs compared with the killed and the unaccounted-for people: the sides took captives in exceptional cases. That’s why the ethnic cleansing there during the war was specific: hundreds of thousand civilians ran upon enemy’s oncoming thus turning into refugees. The sides quite often accuse each other of deportation but it was more inherent in the first phase of the conflict. There were less deported people during the years of war than those who abandoned native places, fearing deportation or severe treatment of the other side. The other peculiarity of Artsax is the gradual overflow of separate hotbeds of conflict into a real war, especial from the end of 1991. A war that included large-scale attacks and seizure of vast territories. The fights crept far beyond Nagorno Artsax, reached borders of third states, coming closer to dangerous verge of internationalization of the conflict. Transport and energetic blockade distorted economy and ecology of the whole region. The interests of Russia, Georgia, Iran and Turkey were directly infringed. Thirdly, it was in Artsax that the modern heavy armament, including tanks and other armored vehicles, artillery and mounts for volley fire and bombarding aviation, largely was used. The strikes on settlements and civil objects were no rarity, and that resulted in great number of victims among the civilians as well as in increase of mass flows deportees and refugees. Multiple rough violations of norms of the international humanitarian right that didn’t stop even after the ceasefire are peculiar for this conflict. The phenomenon of mercenary is another feature of the Artsax conflict. The specific political configuration of Artsax conflict created and still creates complexities. Contrary to "two-dimensional" domestic conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan, where two sides directly confront each other on ethnic, clannish or other basis, the picture of confrontation in Artsax is not that simple: there were two sides in the military conflict and three in the political: Azerbaijan, Nagorno Artsax and Armenia. Features of both domestic and external conflict (let alone the Soviet period of 1988-91) are intertwined in Artsax’s case. And only this conflict includes two former soviet republics and nowadays two sovereign states that are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. All these peculiarities of war in Nagorno Artsax urgently called for preventing it from further overgrowth, especially internationalization, and its soonest suppression -- to stop at least only the bloodshed and then achieve gradual de-escalation of the conflict, passing on to political settlement in state of ceasefire. Unfortunately, ruling elites of the conflicting parties, especial one of them, could not part with illusory hopes to achieve their goal by military power for long and displayed irreconcilability and inflexibility. There is no need to explain that the specificity of this conflict only aggravated the matter and complicated peacekeeping efforts. General destabilization of the situation in the region stymied ceasefire efforts and peaceful settlement. Everything I told does not certainly exhaust all the characteristics of Artsax conflict but much has already been told and written about it. Though much less was written about its settlement, there are just greater absurdities and distortions in this sphere. Therefore I also ventured on a "crusade" against lie and muddle over Artsax settlement with a focus on Russia’s role in it.
-
Why? Many of my colleagues from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ventured, especially after retiring from active work, to take up writing their memoirs and thoughts on their service. Some of them hid it behind book covers, others in their desks. They urged me to write many times. Friends often reproached me telling that not everybody bechanced to witness so many diverse and important events during diplomatic service. But I obviously lacked courage or serious motivation to venture that. Besides, I was not sure whether the others would be interested in it. Meanwhile, things began slipping my memory, breaking whole periods into separate episodes. So, Budapest events of October of 1956 were far behind, Brazil with the military coup in 1964 was drifting away, the war in Angola with first attempts for peace in the end of 80s was also gradually slipping out. I also was embarrassed that authors of memoirs often puff up trying to play up their personality amidst events… Nobody, certainly, can avoid subjectivity if he tells about events that involved not necessarily his personality but that he witnessed. I was afraid to give way to such sins or, even worse than that, I feared of filling up the gaps in my memory with fantasy or adjust the narrative to a made-up scheme. Suddenly I received stimulus from the most unexpected side! Artsax is like a drug. Having invincibly addicted to it, I kept on watching settlement process over Nagorno Artsax issue that I had to take up comparatively recently, from 1992 to 1996. This period is still fresh in my memory and there are more materials on this than on other events. Reading what the others wrote on Artsax I found every now and then inaccuracies, confusion, false versions, pretentious statement etc. Most of them dealt with Russia’s role in the settlement. But I was the one who headed Russia’s intermediary mission on Artsax in that period and was Russian President’s representative on the settlement of the conflict -- personal, special and plenipotentiary respectively. I also represented Russia in the OSCE Minsk group as a co-chair. In other words, few people know the process in that period better than I. Like an alarm clock, my mind would call up: you know how it happened – not the way as it is written here! Why are you keeping silent?.. Meanwhile, the history of the conflict and its neutralization is being recited by people who learnt things through hearsay, were far from the events they describe and read and cut out information from here and there. I would put up with it if it were journalists as they work helter-skelter and can be excused for some mistakes more or less. But among those who mess with the facts are researches that are supposed to seriously check and recheck sources instead of blindly referring to them. Some participants of events also stretch the truth whether because of memory failure or yearning to push through their own version. What kind of researches or memoirs are these if they lack the vital element -- authenticity?! The ringing of these alarm clocks already began flow together in unbearable boom. It’s time to put an end to lies and slander over Russia’s role in the process of Artsax settlement… Just then I realized that I still remember certain things, that there are many documents of 90s on Artsax. But even this could not make me take up my pen -- I simply stuck to the keyboard and began typing letters with only one finger -- I never learnt typing.
-
PEACE TO Artsax (to the structure of settlement) Ву Vladimir Kazimirov, http://vn.kazimirov.ru Instead of introduction Dear visitor of this site, Under this heading I placed my memoirs basically on the period when I was obliged to head Russia’s intermediary mission on Artsax settlement, be representative of the President of Russian Federation on Nagorno Artsax issue and also participant and co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk group from Russia (1992-96). I would like to spur a serious study of history of peaceful and political settlement of Artsax conflict. I shall be glad for critical remarks, corrections, even for refutations on separate episodes. I am ready to survey them, first of all, not from positions of author’s insulted vanity but from natural desire to attach more reliability to the description of events of recent past, which, unfortunately, already suffers both involuntary confusion and deliberate distortions. Moreover, I am ready to make corrections to my text or include alternative versions in view of remarks. I have turned to Azerbaijani and Armenian colleagues either involved in this process or closely watching it with an offer to draw the objective picture of Artsax settlement history in this site. I’ll post the sketches in the site bit by bit as they are ready. I shall begin with a number of important, at least as I see them, though inconsequent episodes: my appointment to "fire brigade" on Artsax, first restrictions of military actions, Bishkek, ceasefire since May 12, 1994. I shall try to gradually fill in the gaps that divide them. In view of some disputes on separate events or episodes, I will probably have to attach documents of this process as appendices to these memoirs. And now let me start looking forward to your arguments or criticism. Alexander Tvardovsky put it right indicating the truth: "Let it be thicker no matter how bitter it is".
-
US STATE DEPARTMENT: ARMENIA AMONG COUNTRIES THAT CAN POTENTIALLY BECOME MONEY LAUNDERING CENTERS 24.03.2005 03:50 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ The US State Department annually publishes a report assessing the money laundering record. Situation in 200 states in the world is being analyzed, Washington ProFile reported. Countries are divided into three categories: “most problematic” (countries where large sums of money are laundered – the US itself is included in this group), “problematic” (such processes are registered, however they have a limited scope) and “traceable” (countries, which do not encounter such problems, but can potentially become money laundering centers.” Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK are among the European and Eurasian countries, included in “the most problematic” category in 2004. Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Ireland, Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Uzbekistan (it has moved here from the “traced” category) and the Czech Republic are considered “problematic”. Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Island, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Norway, San Marino, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan are included in the “traced” category. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net"
-
PACE AZERI DELEGATION MEMBER CALLED OSCE FACT FINDING MISSION REPORT ON SETTLEMENTS IN Artsax-ADJACENT TERRITORIES FALSE 24.03.2005 04:17 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ Member of the delegation of Azerbaijan to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, political scientist Aidyn Mirzazade has expressed opinion that on the whole the OSCE fact finding mission report on settlement of the territories adjacent to Nagorno Artsax is advantageous to Azerbaijan, as the issue was raised by the Azeri party, which possesses many facts of locating population in Artsax. Mirzazade emphasized that the settlement of population in those territories «runs counter to international conventions, noting that first of all it is necessary for provide for normal living conditions in these territories, and the Armenian party has not done it – on the contrary, it banished the local population, depriving it of its property.» «Armenia has been trying to fail the mission work. However, the mission virtually confirmed the facts provided by our Government over settlement of people, who are not citizens of Azerbaijan. Each time during the mission work Armenia and Nagorno Artsax put forward new conditions. First they said that there are no such cases, then – that the work will be continued. This showed that the Azeri party was right when making statements,» he noted. The political scientist considered the mission arriving at a conclusion that the settlement of population is not being carried out by Armenia as a political statement. In his opinion, «being far from the reality, this thesis is aimed at keeping Armenia in a relatively favorable condition. Mirzazade said, «factual proof of Armenia's direct participation in the process will be presented along with the demand of their being studied at the following stages.» In his words, «other thesis in the mission report, which do not reflect the reality, in fact cleared up many issues.» «Firstly, it became visible that Armenians residing outside Armenia are not inclined to living either in this country or in the occupied Nagorno Artsax. One million people are ousted from the occupied lands, hence the same number should be settled to arrange normal economy. The fact finding mission stated that some 3 thousand people are settled, thus a notable human deficit is present. The Armenian Diaspora is not interested in settling these lands either. The reasons for Armenia, pursuing a predatory policy remain unknown, taking into account its population leaving abroad and it cannot benefit from the occupied lands,» Mirzazade stated. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net"
-
OSKANIAN: ARMENIAN GENOCIDE INTERNATIONAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS LIE IN TWO DIFFERENT PLANES 24.03.2005 05:07 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ «Turkey is trying to take preventive measure to prevent measures devoted to the 90-th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. However, we will work in the normal regime and we plan to hold many measures,» Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian stated, the Yerkir newspaper reported. In his words, the issue has exceeded the limits of merely Armenian circles and having felt it Turkey opens a wide counteraction front. «However, this front is not directed against Armenia, but against the international community, against the humanity,» the Armenian Minister accentuated, adding that such policy will be futile, as there is one reality and Turkey has to put up with it. «In any case the issue of the international acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide and the Armenian-Turkish relations lie in two different planes and do not intersect. For us the issue of the Genocide is not a precondition for normalization of relations with Turkey. We are always ready to dialogue with the Turkish party, however we will be consistent in the Genocide issue,» the Armenian Foreign Minister said. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net" Send | Print
-
YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS OF ARMENIA DEMAND TO CANCEL KIRKOROV CONCERT IN YEREVAN 24.03.2005 05:57 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ Today Armenian youth organizations of Armenia send a complaint letter to the organizers of the concert of Philipp Kirkorov in Yerevan. The message authors called not to admit the concert. Grounding their demand they noted in their message the fact that Kirkorov adheres to an evident anti-Armenian and even Turkish-minded stand and lately publicly insulted an Armenian female journalist, having emphasized her background with contempt. The authors of the complaint consider inviting a singer propagating Turkish songs to Armenia on the eve of the 90-th anniversary of the Genocide an amoral step. The income expected from the concert is not commensurable with the moral values represented by the national and human dignity. Representatives of youth organizations noted that in case Kirkorov concert is not canceled, they reserve the right to resort to practical actions not to admit the concert. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net" Send | Print
-
CILICIA ARMENIAN SAILER TO CONTINUE VOYAGE MAY 9 24.03.2005 06:53 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ Leaving the Venetian port, Cilicia Armenian sailing ship will continue its voyage May 9, 2005, Arminfo news agency reported. As Cilicia captain and Ayas Club Chairman Karen Balayan noted at today’s press conference, the stay of Cilicia in European and Near Eastern seaports was marked with arousing interest towards the history of Armenia, revival of the social life of the Armenian Diaspora. Armenian sailors, having only the experience of sailing the Lake Sevan, mastered the Black and Mediterranean, Marmara and Aegean Seas. An exhibition devoted to the 20-th anniversary of Ayas Club. This April Cilicia voyage will be presented in a documentary. In 2006 after the third stage of the expedition, the route of which is not determined yet, the sailer will be delivered to Armenia. After that the opening of the Sea Museum and the issue of Navigation Pages of Armenia book are planned. Karen Balayan specially thanked Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian for the diplomatic support to the expedition. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net"
-
ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO ALLOCATE $300 THOUSAND TO EVENTS OF 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 24.03.2005 07:31 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ In the course of its today's sitting the Armenian Government has decided to allocate some 130 million 688 thousand drams (some $300 thousand) from the reserve fund to events marking the 90-th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. By another decision, 102 million 935 thousand drams (over $220 thousand) are appropriated to organize events marking the 1600-th anniversary of the Armenian written language. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net"
-
et yerekvanits et es mtatsum ??? HE ha yes gnatsy Sushi
-
Azat jan see - >> http://www.narek-store.com/shop/SearchResu...exid=6X3IFWKRIF BTW - Pic's on the CD cover are of the same Qyamancha ( One above your post) MY Qyamancha
-
Qyamancha - Might of been invented by some other nation - but The fact is our Armenia Qyamancha - Or Qyamani - Are the Best http://duduk.com/Arm-music-ins/Qyamancha/1850-55Van/Mvc-001f.jpg http://duduk.com/Arm-music-ins/Qyamancha/1850-55Van/Mvc-006f.jpg This is a 1850-1855 Armenian Qyamancha Made in VAN Armenia
-
Spike Fiddle The spike fiddle is considered a rebab, which is part of the lute family, and typically has 2 or 3 strings. The word rebab is an Arabic term translated as bowed string instrument. It is closely associated with Islamic culture, and dates back to at least the 8th century. Its roots are probably in Arabia or Persia, and its influence has reached from Indonesia to Europe and Africa (it is thought to be the earliest ancestor of the violin). There are two basic types of rebab: wooden fiddles with pear-shaped bodies, and spiked fiddles, named for the spike on the bottom of the instrument on which it stands while being played. Spiked rebabs typically have no frets, but instead, the fingers of your left hand become movable bridges. http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/Uploaded/spkf.jpg http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/uploaded/spkf_small.jpg http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/Uploaded/spkt.jpg
-
http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/Uploaded/ekts.jpg Ektara KTS Ektara, Soprano Soprano Ektara is 5 inches x 23 inches, simple and fun to play, one string can be made to give a range of tones by applying pressure at various points along the neck. Simple and fun to play. Made in India http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/Uploaded/ektb.jpg EKTB Ektara, Bass Bass Ektara has 2 strings. The strings can be made to give a range of tones by applying pressure at various points along the neck. Simple and fun to play. Made in India http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/Uploaded/rebc.jpg Rebec with Hard Case Rebec has 3 gut strings with bow and hard case. Made in Pakistan http://www.worldmusicalinstruments.com/Uploaded/kemt.jpg KEMT Kemence, Turkish Rebec, Small Kemence, Turkish Rebec has 3 strings, 15" length. Includes bow, resin and soft case. Made in Turkey
-
Vahan jan nice ot see you are you looking to make a Chitchat place for Business? Frenet has some chat rooms w/in Armenia hmm chem handipel jishtn asats
-
http://www.farm-2-market.com/images/products/sturgeon.jpg A prehistoric survivor of the ice age, Sturgeon is the largest freshwater fish in the world, some exceeding 2,000 pounds! Ancient Romans thought Sturgeon an aphrodisiac with life-extending properties. Henry I of England declared it the "Royal Fish." King Edward II was so devoted to Sturgeon he issued a decree that any Sturgeon caught must first be offered to the throne. In 1609 Henry Hudson noted abundant Sturgeon in his namesake river, one large enough to sink a boat near what is now the George Washington Bridge. Throughout the 17th Century, Sturgeon was found in huge numbers from Alaska to Monterey Bay on the West Coast, in rivers throughout the East, in the Great Lakes, and in the Mississippi Valley. Sturgeon was so popular that in the 1830's a canning plant in New Jersey built for the unheard of sum of one million dollars, processed more than a thousand fish per shift. Less than 30 years later, over-fishing killed the sturgeon and the plant closed. Sturgeon remains scarce to this day. A few farms experiment with Sturgeon culture but production is limited. The population of sturgeon in the fabled Columbia River Basin has strengthened recently, thanks to a hatchery operated by the California Department of Fish and Game. Baby sturgeon or "fry" are released to "seed" the Columbia, and managed for long-term sustainability. Sturgeon" Looking like an aquatic dinosaur, the sturgeon may be the ugliest fish swimming. But the lean, firm meat has a delicious flavor. It can be grilled, sautéed, baked, poached or fried. It stands up to the boldest of preparations and is almost impossible to over-cook. Those who love swordfish but are concerned about its status as a nearly endangered species will enjoy the mild taste of sturgeon and find it an excellent alternative
-
all you need is to take some $ ok not $ but $$$$ and all will be fine
-
mi 2 or araj naym eyi da ehhh mi 15 ~20 or el hamperenq es andzrevner@ verchana
-
Health Advisory Catching and Eating Sport Fish in California Fish are nutritious and good for you to eat. But some fish you catch may take in toxic chemicals from the water they live in and the food they eat. Some of these chemicals build up in the fish--and in you--over time. Although the levels found are usually low, large amounts may be harmful. It's a good idea to follow a few precautions in consuming fish, particularly if you eat fish often. This advisory gives some tips on how you should catch, prepare, and eat fish. It is not intended to discourage you from eating fish, but should be used as a guide to make your sport fish eating safer. Fish that contain high levels of toxic chemicals are found in many different parts of California. Here are some examples of those places: * Southern California (Los Angeles area) - certain kinds of fish contain high levels of industrial chemicals and pesticides. White croakers in some locations should not be eaten, and other fish should be eaten in limited amounts. * San Francisco Bay and Delta - mercury, PCBs, and other chemicals have been found in fish. Advisories have been issued for most sport fish species. * Coastal inland lakes - fish in some lakes have high levels of mercury. The amounts of chemicals found in sport fish in California are not known to cause immediate sickness. But chemicals can collect in the body over time and they may eventually affect your health or that of your children. Some of the adverse health effects that might occur from continued exposure to high levels of toxic chemicals in fish are: * Cancer * Slower growth or brain damage in children * Kidney damage When places are found with fish that contain high levels of chemicals, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) issues health advisories. The advisories tell how much of the fish you can eat without worry, or whether it is recommended to eat any at all. These advisories appear in the California Sport Fishing Regulations booklet and are also available from OEHHA. There may be locations that are not yet known where fish and shellfish may be contaminated with chemicals. If you fish for sport or to feed your family, you can reduce your exposure to harmful chemicals by taking the precautions below. Following this general advice and any advisories for specific locations where you fish will protect your health and your family's health. Tips to Protect Your Health Fish in a variety of locations rather than in one location Chemical levels can vary from place to place. Your overall exposure to chemicals is likely to be lower if you fish at a variety of places rather than one usual spot that might have high contamination levels. Eat different types of fish Some species of fish have more chemicals than others due to different feeding behaviors. You can reduce your intake of chemicals if you eat smaller amounts of several different types of fish, rather than a large amount of one type that may have high levels of chemicals. Eat smaller fish Some chemicals can build up in fish with age. The larger the fish, the higher the levels of chemicals they may contain, within the same species. For example, large striped bass (over 36 inches) may contain as much as 20 times more mercury than small striped bass (18 to 20 inches). It's always fun to catch large fish, but it's safer to eat smaller ones. If you keep large fish, freeze some of the fish and eat smaller meals spaced out over time. Cooking and Preparing Fish Eat only fillet portions The fillet portions of fish are the safest parts to eat. Chemicals tend to be much higher in the guts and liver of fish. Do not eat these parts and do not use them to make sauces, stock or chowder. http://www.oehha.ca.gov/fish/images/cutfish.gif Trim away fat Many chemicals, including DDT, PCBs and dioxins, are stored in the fat. You can reduce your exposure to these chemicals by trimming fatty areas. Fat is located along the back, belly, and lateral line (See figure). Also, skin the fish to remove the thin layer of fat under the skin. Fish diagram Cook so that fat drips off Bake, broil, steam, or grill fish on a rack so that the juices from the fat drip off during cooking. Throw out the juices. Deep frying in vegetable oil (not animal fats like butter) or poaching will also remove some of the fat, but discard the liquid after cooking. Chowders and stews are not advisable . Cook fish or shellfish that you catch and observe quarantines Certain fin fish may carry parasites (worms), and shellfish that you gather may have viruses or infectious bacteria that can make you sick . Thorough cooking will destroy harmful parasites and germs. Some shellfish, particularly mussels, may contain natural toxins that cause paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP) or other serious illness, and even death. Cooking will not destroy these toxins, so it is important to observe shellfish quarantines. Mussels are quarantined from May 1 through October 30 in California, and local quarantines may be posted for other bivalves. Call the 24-hour PSP information line for recorded information about quarantines at (800) 553-4133 in California, or at (510) 540-2605 (for callers in the 510 area, or out of state). For more information on natural contaminants in fish and shellfish, contact the regional marine advisor for your area by calling the Cooperative Extension Office under the county government listings in your phone book. The annual mussel quarantine does not apply to companies licensed by the State as certified shellfish harvesters. The California Department of Health Services tests and certifies the shellfish from these companies to be safe. Commercially harvested fish purchased in stores or restaurants are also subject to inspection and regulation, and are not permitted on the market if found to contain chemicals that exceed regulatory limits. Lowering your risk Each of the recommendations above helps lower your chances of taking in harmful chemicals when you eat fish. Follow as many of them as you can. If you follow this advice and any OEHHA advisories that apply to places where you fish, you will protect your health and you will benefit from this nutritious source of food. Refer to the California Sport Fishing Regulations booklet or call OEHHA for information on specific advisories. Special risk populations OEHHA's specific advisories often recommend lower eating amounts for pregnant women, women who plan to get pregnant, women who are breastfeeding, and children who are 5 years or younger. Some chemicals may be passed on to the unborn child through the placenta or to the newborn through the mother's milk. Babies and young children have developing organs and systems, including the brain, that are more affected by some chemicals. Following the advisories is therefore especially important for these special risk groups. For more information Please contact: California Environmental Protection Agency Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment Sacramento headquarters, PETS 1001 I Street, Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 327-7319 our mailing address: Post Office Box 4010 Sacramento, CA 95812-4010. Oakland office, (510) 622-3170 OEHHA/PETS 1515 Clay Street, 16th floor Oakland, CA 94612
-
SERGE SARGSIAN: WEAPON DEPOTS IN ARMENIA AND Artsax ALWAYS KEPT UNDER STRICT CONTROL 23.03.2005 08:08 /PanARMENIAN.Net/ The accusations brought against the Armenian citizen, who was wanted by the police, are based on the fact that he was trying to sell arms in the US. Meanwhile the investigation showed that no single weapon was exported from Armenia, Secretary of the Security Council, Defense Minister Serge Sargsian stated today, IA Regnum reports. In his words, the weapon depots in Armenia and Nagorno Artsax were always kept under strict control. “No thefts have been ever registered”, the Minister stated. To remind, Armenian citizen Artur Solomonian and his brother Levon Solomonian were detained on suspicion of arms traffic in the US. They were both wanted by the law enforcers for avoiding the obligatory military service. According to the investigators, the Armenian citizen headed the gang composed of the citizens of Armenia, Georgia and the US. <!> Reproduction in full or in part is prohibited without reference to "PanARMENIAN.Net"
-
Anet jan sa ir vro mek CD'na ??
-
Zat jan Ari Pasadena im dzerqov Avazi vra milav Coofe dnem qez hamar
