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What? You have no idea guys...As far as the Armenians in Armenia and the Caucasus region are concerned...Hamestness was a pre-marital thing, but after marrige it was a whole different story...
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And what's the difference here, Nairi?
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Vigil, it's fine. Just calm down, OK?
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Stormy, how much more exactly?
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Huffzone, you could ask the Armenian newspapers to publish a short story each. I am sure some of them would not mind. BTW, the Armenia diaspora in all Asia is around 700-800 people (excluding Australia) with 60% living there on temporary basis (short term business, studies etc.). Africa is not worth an effort with exception of some Arab countries.
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http://www.forbes.com/business/forbes/2004/0816/020.html Paul Klebnikov 1963-2004 How Russia Went Down A Dead End James W. Michaels, 08.16.04 Early in the 20th century, before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia's was the fastest-growing economy in Europe. Industrial production doubled in just 15 years, productivity was up by half. Russia was a contender in steel, textiles and oil. It had a popularly elected Parliament, the Duma. A large and growing peasant population were becoming landowning farmers. Its middle-class, capitalist sector was asserting itself. "On the eve of [WWI] Russia was quite rapidly entering an era of prosperity." So wrote Leonard Schapiro, an outstanding scholar of the Russian revolution, adding that what Russian development required was simply more time. So much for the myth that the communists modernized a feudal society. This surprises a lot of otherwise well-informed people, but this little-known fact underlay much of what Paul Klebnikov strove to accomplish. Paul's faith in Russia was not merely emotional. He understood that but for the Bolshevik coup, Russia would today be a prosperous, democratic country perhaps on a par with, but more powerful than, Britain or France or Germany. To better understand where Paul was coming from I borrowed from his family a copy of Paul's Ph.D. dissertation (it earned him a doctorate from the London School of Economics in 1991). The thesis was on the Stolypin reforms, named for the reformist Russian prime minister Pyotr Stolypin. Stolypin was assassinated in 1911, but his economic reforms continued after his death. Stolypin was a liberal in the old sense of wanting to liberalize the economy. He had to fight against both the socialist left and the hard-core traditionalists. Neither the socialist left nor the hard right wanted peasants to become property owners. Stolypin's reforms were more economic than political. They gave peasants the right to own land and to work it for their own benefit rather than as part of the traditional feudal commune. If they chose, the peasants could sell their land to other farmers and move to the cities. Stolypin freed the creativity of the individual Russian at the same time as rapid industrialization was opening new opportunities for entrepreneurial people in the cities. The reforms encouraged Russians to work harder and to work more effectively; per capita income surged. But when the czar blundered into the First World War he brought this progress to a crushing halt. Badly beaten, demoralized and often hungry, the decimated Russian armies mutinied. In the resulting chaos a small ruthless band of conspirators known as Bolsheviks grabbed power under Lenin and Trotsky. They either killed Stolypin's yeoman farmers or forced them back into collectivity. In short, the Bolsheviks aborted progress. I hope to see Paul's thesis published as a book one day soon. It could serve as a guide to those who want to help poor countries with rapidly growing populations escape the poverty trap. As Paul convincingly demonstrates, you don't do it through government programs. You do it by unleashing individual initiative and disseminating information. In the first issue of the Russian version of FORBES you could see what Paul was trying to accomplish: He wanted to help Russia get back on the road to capitalism, democracy and civil society, where it was before the Bolsheviks sent it down a dead end. Paul aimed at this in two ways: by raising standards of taste and ethics among the new business class and by exposing the corruption, cronyism and thuggery that stood in the way of progress. The Putin government in Moscow faces some crucial tests in the near future. Will it bring to justice the killers of Paul and other journalists? Will it treat fairly the minority shareholders of the Yukos oil company? Will it distance itself from some of its shady associates? Will it permit a really free press in Russia? Let's hope that Putin emulates Stolypin and does the right thing. If he rises to the occasion, Russia, with her great resources and educated population, will be a splendid place to invest.
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/gender/story/0,1...1277408,00.html We had more sex in the 50s, says survey David Ward Friday August 6, 2004 The Guardian You may not believe this but Prima magazine says it so it must be true: married women have less sex today than their grandmothers did. The magazine said women in the 1950s had sex an average of twice a week. But a survey found two-thirds of today's women said they were too tired to manage that much. Cynics may say the fact that there was only one television station 50 years ago, which shut down at about 10pm, could be a factor. Prima's study focused on how women's attitudes towards love, sex and marriage had changed since the 1940s. It found that sex before marriage was now the norm, with four out of five couples sleeping together by the fifth date; but after marriage the passion died down. "We studied four generations of married women and found the grandmothers were having more sex back in the 1950s than their granddaughters are having now," said the features editor, Ruth Tierney. "Since then we have started working and often still have to run the home and look after the kids. It's hard to find the time for sex, and when we go to bed we are too tired to do anything but sleep."
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Groul, I'm realy ignorant on this. Can you, please, go by steps: what to click and what to type exactly? I'll pay you with more fancy Turkish links
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Thanks for the notice Vava, but that's too much work... and I'm not getting paid for this Can you, please, remove this thread. I have a feeling it will go the wrong way anyway... Thanks in advance.
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Vigil, the purpose of this thread is to let people like you and me know what the Turks publish on us. See, I only put the links...
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Guys, could everybody, please, give an opinion if you consider the music on armenstock.com Intro to be rabiz. I'm just interested where this melody fits in your categorization of Armenian music.
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Diplomatic observer Armenian intervention on the way to EU: http://www.diplomaticobserver.com/news_read.asp?id=1043 Armenians escape from their lands: http://www.diplomaticobserver.com/news_read.asp?id=1033 Institute for Armenian research Armenia's Jewish Scepticism and Its Impact on Armenia-Israel Relations: http://www.eraren.org/eng/articles/ArmeniasJewishScepticism.htm Edited to remove links & place them in CODE tags
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Associated Press Worldstream August 4, 2004 Wednesday 4:47 PM Eastern Time Azerbaijan lashes out at Armenian enclave over military exercises BAKU, Azerbaijan Azerbaijan sharply criticized authorities in the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Artsax on Wednesday for holding military exercises, calling the maneuvers a provocation that would hurt efforts to reach a settlement over the disputed region. The Foreign Ministry expressed "deep concern" about the exercises and said the international community would not be fooled by the portrayal of "these actions by illegal armed formations of the separatist regime" as "exercises of the so-called armed forces of Nagorno-Artsax." It said the exercises would hamper preparations for the next meeting between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which backs the internationally unrecognized ethnic Armenian government of Nagorno-Artsax. A spokesman for the military in Nagorno-Artsax, which has been de facto independent since Azerbaijan's forces were driven out in 1994, said Tuesday that it had begun a 10-day exercise meant to test combat-readiness and improve coordination in "defensive battles and counterattacks." With no settlement in sight a decade after a cease-fire ended a war that killed some 30,000 people and drove about a million from their homes, there are fears a new armed conflict could erupt. Forces of Nagorno-Artsax's government also hold several sectors of Azerbaijan outside of the enclave itself, and sporadic firing takes place across the demilitarized zone that separates the forces.
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Eurasianet Organization Aug 5 2004 CURRENCY FLUCTUATION CAUSES CONCERN IN ARMENIA Haroutiun Khachatrian: 8/05/04 Rapid exchange-rate fluctuation, in which the Armenian currency has significantly strengthened against the US dollar, is a source of concern in Armenia. Many local economic observers suspect the country's currency market is being manipulated by speculators. Following its introduction in 1993, the Armenian currency, the dram, steadily declined in value against the US dollar - until this spring. So far in 2004, the dollar has lost roughly 7 percent of its worth versus the dram. Whereas early this year the exchange rate stood at about 563 drams to the dollar, the rate is now hovering at about 520-to-one. Many economists in Yerevan say there is no sound basis for the dram's appreciation, sparking suggestions that artificial pressure is responsible for the sudden currency rate change. Most believe that speculators are responsible for the recent fluctuation. The fact that during a three-day span in mid July the exchange rate went from 520 drams to one US dollar to 495-to-one has helped fuel such suspicion. The exchange rate shortly thereafter returned to the 520-to-one level. Concern about the exchange rate reached such a point that President Robert Kocharian convened a special session of top government economic officials to discuss ways to stabilize the dram. Meanwhile, Central Bank officials said the dram's appreciation is the result of a dramatic rise in the influx of US dollars into Armenia. According to the bank, there are three sources for rapid growth of dollars circulating in the Armenian economy: an increase in exports; the growth of the tourist industry; and significantly more cash remittances coming into Armenia from Armenians living and working abroad. Remittances have reportedly jumped 40 percent so far this year over the same period in 2003. Some economists now suggest Armenia is suffering from a form of "Dutch disease" in which a country's economy is overly dependent on one export commodity, ultimately creating unfavorable exchange rates that cause other economic sectors in the country to stagnate. In most cases, those countries that have suffered from "Dutch disease" are oil-and-gas exporters. In Armenia's case, the country's main export appears to be skilled workers, who find work abroad and then ship back a portion of their earning to relatives at home. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Central Bank chairman Tigran Sargsian, in statements concerning the exchange rate fluctuation, has downplayed the possibility of manipulation by speculators. He also has expressed a preference for a hands-off approach by the Central Bank, adding that, in his view, the dram's value is not near a point where it could frustrate exports. The Central Bank position has been attacked by some economists. In an interview published July 30 on the Iravunk web site, economist Eduard Agajanov accused the Central Bank of negligence. In taking no action on the exchange rate, the bank "forgets that the main goal of central banks all over the world is to stabilize the currencies of their countries," said Agajanov, who formerly headed the State Statistics Committee. Agajanov said there were several options open to the Central Bank. One way to prevent such sudden exchange rate fluctuations, he added, would be for the Central Bank to increase the money supply to counter the influx of dollars. The dram's sudden and unexpected rise could benefit the government. The 2004 state budget was calculated on the basis of a dram-dollar exchange rate in the range of 580-to-one. If the rate remains at present levels, the government may have a far easier time keeping spending levels within budgetary projections. The flip side is that dollar's loss in value has somewhat damaged commerce inside the country, and has eroded the savings of many Armenians. This is because many Armenians have a greater level of trust in the dollar than in the national currency. A significant number of business transactions in the country are calculated in dollars, while roughly two-thirds of Armenian bank account holders maintain their savings in the US currency. The drop in the dollar's value has caused many entrepreneurs to incur losses in recent months. Some economists, including Agajanov, worry that the lack of Central Bank action to stabilize the exchange rate may be setting Armenia up for financial upheaval down the road. They point to the fact that the amount of remittances coming into Armenia could fall just as fast as they have risen in recent months, rendering it impossible to rely on the dram's current relative strength. Agajanov predicted that the dram is headed for a crash. "One fine day, when this [present-day] agitation subsides, the rate of the dram will suddenly plummet, with all the negative consequences that will ensue," he said. Editor's Note: Haroutiun Khachatrian is a Yerevan-based writer specializing in economic and political affairs.
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Sasun, it will be very hard for me to explain this to you by simply quoting Steiner. And it will not be a good idea to present you isolated pharagraphs if you want to grasp the whole thing. And it is not good to quote his writings on the Evil first I suggest to read these: Anthroposophical leading thoughts The philosophy of freedom A road to self-knowledge He doesn't have comments on serial killers specifically. However, his lectures on Lucifer provide understanding of this. I would suggest you to read the "Parfume" by Patric Suskind. His general idea is that a serial killer accumulates a specific pattern of evil insticts of the society he lives in. I think Suskind is familiar with Steiners works.
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RFE/RL Armenia Report - 08/04/2004 Azeri Official Yearns For Armenia's Conquest By Emil Danielyan Armenia will cease to exist as an independent state and its territory will be incorporated into Azerbaijan over the next three decades, a senior Azerbaijani military official was quoted Wednesday as saying, raising anti-Armenian bellicose rhetoric in Baku to new heights. `Within the next 25-years there will exist no state of Armenia in the South Caucasus,' Colonel Ramiz Melikov, the chief spokesman for Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry, said, according to the Baku daily `Zerkalo.' `Those people have done so many nasty things to their neighbors that they have no right to live in this region.' `Modern Armenia is built on historical Azerbaijani lands,' he added. `I think that in 25-30 years' times its territory will again come under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction.' Melikov was quoted in an extensive `Zerkalo' article that called on the Azerbaijani government to promptly restart the war with the Armenians and win back Nagorno-Artsax. The Azerbaijani leadership regularly threatens to do just that, complaining about the international community's reluctance to end Armenian control of the disputed region. The most recent such threat came from President Ilham Aliev last week. `Zerkalo' said Azerbaijani military officials believe that their troops are prepared for renewed hostilities and that `the upcoming war will not be long-lasting.' `Today the personnel of the Azerbaijani armed forces is not the one that existed ten years ago,' Melikov said. `We substantially exceed Armenia with the size of the population and the number of soldiers. Soon the entire world will recognize Armenia as an aggressor country. That is why Armenia is now on the brink of defeat.' Melikov's doomsday scenario for Armenia's future is bound to be laughed off by the Armenian government. Official Yerevan has repeatedly dismissed bellicose statements from Baku, saying that Azerbaijan would have long resumed the war without a warning had it been confident of victory. But its reaction to Aliev's latest threats was unusually sharp, with the Armenian Foreign Ministry warning Azerbaijan of `disastrous consequences.' As if to drive home the point, the armed forces of the internationally unrecognized Nagorno-Artsax Republic began on Tuesday a ten-day military exercise which officials say will test their combat-readiness during `defensive and counter-offensive operations.' The war games followed a call-up of army reservists and will involve the use of live ammunition. Regional and international observers agree that Azerbaijan is unlikely to try a military solution to the Artsax dispute mid-way through the development of its Caspian Sea oil reserves by Western multinationals. Successful implementation of those multibillion-dollar projects is a key objective of U.S. policy in the South Caucasus. Hence, periodical statements by U.S. officials warning the conflicting parties against ending the decade-long truce in Artsax. The outgoing U.S. ambassador to Armenia, John Ordway, described as `extremely low' the likelihood of renewed fighting last February. `We would do everything we can to prevent it from happening,' he said. And `Zerkalo' itself quoted an unnamed Western diplomat in Baku last week as saying that the Azerbaijani society and army are not prepared for war and that the West does not take its government's threats seriously.
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http://www.athens2004.com
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1. To play a game you must first be in the game. 2. However, the U.S. is doing that already and no one displays the willingness to stop it. 3. Vigil, you're thinking in very maximalistic and rigid categories. Armenia does not have to take one side, U.S. or Russia, on all issues. There is soft power, there are personal interests of leaders and their team, there are temporary tactical steps that can be reversed and dozen of other factors that you push aside and look only at who likes whom. Azerbaijan is using very carefully desined strategy based on its natural endowments and we can potentially be outmaneuved if we do not address their step and the implications of these steps in the region in consistent manner.
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Politics first: the Kremlin tightens its control By Carola Hoyos and Arkady Ostrovsky Published: August 5 2004 04:00 | Last updated: August 5 2004 04:00 http://news.ft.com/cms/s/29dfd2b4-e67c-11d...000e2511c8.html On July 22, the day that Yukos, the oil company, warned of its imminent bankruptcy and its main production subsidiary was seized by bailiffs, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, held a meeting with James Mulva, the chief executive of ConocoPhillips, and Vagit Alekperov, the Soviet-era oil boss who now heads Lukoil, Russia's flagship oil company. The president had some good news for Mr Mulva: the government had just signed a decree to sell its 7.6 per cent stake in Lukoil - a private company which represents the Russian state in major international ventures - and signalled that ConocoPhillips was welcome to bid for it. Mr Putin added that he would like to see a more active relationship between Russian and US companies in the energy sector. Investors and traders were confused: should they sell Russian energy stocks because the country's largest oil company was being made bankrupt in violation of shareholders' rights, or should they buy assets because foreign companies were moving in? Of all Russian companies, Yukos has been the most active in seeking foreign investors, while Lukoil has remained cautious about foreign equity partners. But with its seemingly contradictory actions, the government was, in fact, sending a clear message: "we rule". Having gained almost total political power in the country, Mr Putin and his entourage are proceeding to take control over what Lenin called the "commanding heights" of the economy. This does not mean that Russia is about to start nationalising private business and property or that foreign investment will dry up. It does, however, mean that the Kremlin will decide who can and who cannot invest in Russia. It will increase the state's control over strategic parts of the economy at the expense of the oligarchs who accumulated their wealth through privatisations in the 1990s. Although Yukos was yesterday given more breathing space by the justice ministry, which allowed it to pay salaries and to continue operating, there is little doubt that the balance of power is shifting towards more state-oriented companies such as Lukoil. Alexander Radygin, an economist at the Institute for the Economy in Transition, argued in a recent paper that, over the past four years of Mr Putin's presidency, Russia has been moving towards "state capitalism" where power belongs to the bureaucracy rather than to private business. "The dominant trends of the past few years have been the growing expansion of property interests of the Russian state, an attempt to establish control over capital flows in the Russian economy and a desire to make business dependent on state institutions - despite decisions about deregulation, administrative reform and privatisation plans," Mr Radygin says. This trend is most visible in the oil and gas industry, which accounts for almost 20 per cent of gross domestic product, according to the World Bank. While the state, and people who identify themselves with it, are also strengthening their positions in banking, telecommunications and media, the attack on Yukos is crucial to both domestic and foreign investors because it shows the limitations of the market economy in Russia. Al Breach, chief economist at Brunswick UBS, the Russian arm of the the Swiss bank UBS, says: "The Yukos affair demonstrates that property rights mean very little in Russia compared to politics. The ownership of assets is contingent on a political regime. If the regime changes so does the property structure." The investigation of Yukos's taxes was initially interpreted by investors as a by-product of a political brawl between Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos's key shareholder and former chief executive, and the Kremlin. Following Mr Khodorkovsky's arrest, they continued to buy Yukos shares believing the company's integrity was not in doubt. Even when Yukos was presented with a back-tax claim of $3.4bn it was seen as an attempt to rid Mr Khodorkovsky of his wealth. Investors were reassured by Mr Putin's promise that his government would do all it could to avoid the company going bankrupt. But the justice ministry's actions over the past few weeks indicate that the campaign was not aimed at merely curbing Mr Khodorkovsky's political ambitions or ridding him of his wealth. Taking financial control of Yukos, one of Russia's most dynamic oil companies, was at least as powerful a goal. Mr Khodorkovsky, who is standing trial for fraud and tax evasion, has volunteered to give up his shares in Yukos to settle the tax debt. The company has offered the government its stake in Sibneft an oil company, which would have paid for most of the tax arrears. Both offers were ignored. Instead, bailiffs, who are part of the justice ministry seized Yuganskneftegas, Yukos's largest production subsidiary, valued at $30bn, and are preparing it for sale to settle the tax bill. Yevgeny Yasin, a former economics minister, says: "This is the most blatant demonstration that the attack on Yukos has little to do with taxes and everything to do with re-distribution of property and control over the oil industry from independent minded private owners to politically loyal hands." Mr Yasin says the Kremlin appears keen to have the same degree of control in the oil industry as it already does in the gas sector. Unlike the oil industry, which was largely privatised in the mid 1990s, the gas sector has remained largely in state hands. The reform of Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly, has long been seen as the litmus test of Russia's commitment to market reforms. But on the eve of his re-election as Russian president in March, Mr Putin ruled out its break-up. The government holds 37 per cent in the company and is planning to increase it to 51 per cent. It will be assisted by Alexei Miller, who was appointed by Mr Putin four years ago as chief executive to reassert control. Mr Miller has bought back many of the assets sold or transferred to other companies by the previous managers. Now he wants to go further and build Gazprom into a state-controlled, broad energy holding. The company already owns about 10 per cent of UES, the electricity monopoly, and is in the process of creating an oil business. Reform of UES - headed by Anatoly Chubais, the author of Russia's controversial privatisations of the 1990s - has also been put on ice. According to Mr Chubais's plan, UES should have been divided into power generation companies and sold to private investors while the grid stayed in state hands. But Mikhail Fradkov, the prime minister, has delayed the sell-offs because of unease over who the buyers might be. It seems unlikely in the present political climate that the government would allow the uncontrolled sale of energy assets which could increase the size of the oligarchic groups. While energy remains the backbone of the Russian economy, the state is also strengthening its position in other areas, including banking. The banking sector is still dominated by Sberbank, which has 20,000 branches across the country and holds 62 per cent of all deposits. The central bank is pushing ahead with banking reform but it has no plans for breaking Sberbank's monopoly. "We shall not even think about what to do with Sberbank until 2007," Andrei Kozlov, a deputy chairman of the central bank, has said. The recent liquidity crisis in the banking system shook public confidence in private banks and bolstered the position of Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank, both state-owned institutions. Problems at Guta Bank, which suspended operations last month, triggered a wave of withdrawals from private banks. Alfa Bank saw an outflow of $240m from retail accounts in just one week. Sberbank reported a net inflow of Rbs10.2bn and Vneshtorgbank, the second largest state bank, not only saw its deposits grow by 9 per cent in July, but took over Guta Bank for Rbs1m and assumed its obligations with $700m of assistance from the central bank. Control of the banking sector gives the government the possibility of allocating capital to any industry of its choice. "Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank give credits to Russia's largest companies and have exclusive access to the biggest and cheapest financial resources - the savings of the populations and deposits of the central bank," Mr Radygin of the Institute for the Economy in Transition says. The state appears equally reluctant to give up control over the population's pension savings, despite a provision for future pensioners to transfer some of their savings to a private scheme. "One gets an impression that the real aim of the government was not to reform the pension system but to maximise financial resources under the state control," Mr Radygin says. Meanwhile, both state-owned and some private companies are urging Mr Putin to exercise tougher control over the market economy. Last week the heads of energy companies Lukoil, Rosneft, Transneft and TNK-BP said in a letter to Mr Putin that "the management and regulation of economic processes in the market economy is a natural and necessary obligation of the state". The principles of "managed democracy" which has already led to an almost total control of political process by the Kremlin, is now being extended to business. The question is who will manage the commanding heights of the economy? One group that seems well placed to benefit from growing state control is the siloviki - people with a background in security services and the military, many of whom lost out in the1990s. Since Mr Putin's election as president, however, they have managed to penetrate almost every level of the political pyramid. Last week Igor Sechin, the deputy head of Mr Putin's administration who is closely associated with the siloviki, was appointed chairman of Rosneft, the state-owned oil company. Mr Sechin, who acts as a gate-keeper for Mr Putin, is widely believed to be one of the initiators of the attack on Yukos. (Mr Sechin's daughter recently married the son of Vladimir Ustinov, the prosecutor general, who made the case against Yukos shareholders.) Mr Sechin's appointment led many analysts to believe that Rosneft could become the recipient of at least some of Yukos's assets. Another candidate for Yukos's assets is Surgutneftegas, a company tightly controlled by Vladimir Bogdanov, a Soviet-era oil man loyal to the Kremlin and Mr Putin. "Russia is following the path of former Soviet republics such as Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan, where economic wealth is concentrated in the hands of a ruling political clan. Putin may not realise that he is creating a new oligarchy which, once it has enriched itself, will pose a considerable threat to his own authority," says Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist who has conducted a study of Mr Putin's political elite. Mr Breach says: "We are moving from a system which was deeply imperfect but tried to live up to the rule of law and market principles, to a system that is more political." So what are the lessons and implications for foreign investors? The key lesson is the lack of respect for property rights. "What matters is control over the cash-flow, rather than ownership," says Mr Breach. This poses a serious risk for minority investors in any Russian company. It also means that market capitalisation of Russian companies is likely to remain low compared with their foreign counterparts. Although the oligarchs who enriched themselves during the 1990s privatisations were far from being at the forefront of corporate governance - many of them diluted minority shareholders's stakes and siphoned profits into private bank accounts - over the past decade they transformed outdated Soviet assets into thriving and increasingly transparent businesses. This was well reflected in the growing market capitalisation of the companies. They have also proved their ability to survive the tough and often lawless conditions of Russian business. The siloviki and state bureaucrats have no such record. They have shown little respect for the right of minority shareholders so far - as the Yukos affair demonstrates - and they may be reluctant to open up their business interests to shareholder scrutiny. For strategic investors, the trend towards greater state control of the economy does not mean the end of foreign investment and privatisations, but implies that any merger or acquisition - particularly one involving a foreign company - is impossible without the Kremlin's approval. The sale of assets is likely to take into account the political loyalty of the buyer. ussia will remain an attractive investment for oil companies looking to replace their reserves (see below). But instead of negotiating with the company - as ExxonMobil did when it pursued a stake in Yukos - energy companies are having to talk directly to the Kremlin - as ConocoPhillips did when it formed a partnership with Lukoil. Large foreign companies have plenty of experience of operating in authoritarian environments, such as the Soviet Union in the 1970s and China today. In the short term, state control of the economy could provide stability for foreign companies and reduce their risk of facing aggressive Russian business practices. In the long term, as Mr Breach argues, any system based on the political allocation of resources is prone to crisis, as the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated only too vividly. The moves against Yukos by Vladimir Putin, the president, have brought a new level of uncertainty to Russia's oil sector. But for the world's largest international oil companies, the country is too big a prize to let go. Continued turmoil in Iraq, surging demand in China and dwindling production and reserve growth have combined to make oil companies and consumers desperate for oil. And Russia is seen as the country outside Saudi Arabia with the most potential to help meet strong global demand. Oil executives - most of whom are cautious about speaking of Russia's political moves for fear of the Kremlin or giving away their strategy - are uneasy with Moscow's strengthened grip over its oil assets. Nevertheless, they continue to search for opportunities, driven by fierce competition over reserves and concerns that the Kremlin will be likely to allow a limited number of foreign deals. Outside Russia the pickings are slim, with many oil executives believing that the world's large fields have already been discovered. Many of the remaining reserves lie in the Middle East, where regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have kept the doors largely closed to international investment. BP, the world's second largest energy group, is the only big oil company with a corporate deal in Russia - an $8bn joint venture with TNK. Last week, BP revealed that its production would have fallen 7 per cent in the first quarter of this year from last year had it not been for its partnership; instead it reported overall production growth of 18 per cent in the second quarter. Lord John Browne, BP's chief executive, last week said the Yukos affair had had no impact on TNK-BP and that "everything was going in the right direction". Analysts say that ExxonMobil, the world's largest energy group, which has a relatively small presence in Russia, needs to make the biggest new investment because of its size. It had been looking to link up with Yukos, but analysts now expect Yukos's biggest subsidiary to go to a Russian buyer. Meanwhile, ChevronTexaco has had its eye on Sibneft. In April, France's Total retained bankers to advise them on how to get its hands on a share of the company after Roman Abramovich, its largest shareholder, made clear his eagerness to sell. ConocoPhilips, of the US, is looking to expand its relationship with Lukoil, Russia's second largest oil company. The company says that one of its options is to buy the stake the government intends to sell later this year and augment it with shares bought from Lukoil's top management. Royal Dutch/Shell, the world's third largest energy group, already has its biggest single direct investment in Russia's Sakhalin region. "We are keeping an eye on what happens and are thinking through whether those opportunities are available to us." says Malcolm Brinded, head of the company's exploration and production. The large number of suitors and a record high oil price have given Mr Putin the opportunity to play coy. He did, however, welcome potential US investors when he met James Mulva, head of ConocoPhilips, last month. "I would like to see relations between Russian and US businesses develop more actively," he said. While Mr Putin has not made it easy for foreign investors, industry observers say Russia needs the oil companies to develop its resource base. "Without advanced technology it would not be possible for Russia to reach its full production potential," says Stewart Johnston of Charles River Associates, industry consultants. The US has made clear that it wants to form a strategic partnership with Russia to reduce America's dependence on the Middle East. But Spencer Abraham, US secretary of energy, has told Mr Putin that some of his recent decisions, including the threat to revoke ExxonMobil's exploration license in eastern Siberia, could dampen US investor interest. Mr Putin has yet to go as far as the leaders of many of the world's biggest oil-rich states when they nationalised their oil industries between 1960 and 1980. But his slow progress in authorising foreign investment for oil has delayed supplies the world needs. Carola Hoyos
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Kremlin denies Yukos compromise The Russian justice ministry has gone back on a decision allowing Yukos access to the oil firm's bank accounts to keep its operations running. The ministry denied having taken a decision to allow Yukos to use the money; it added that the notice sent to Yukos by a bailiff had been irregular. Furthermore, it said any money coming into the accounts would be "seized or switched" to pay Yukos' tax bills. Crude oil prices, already rising on Thursday, jumped after the statement. Concern over the fate of Yukos, which produces one fifth of Russia's oil, has contributed to record oil prices. Uncertainty Oil prices fell back slightly from record highs on Wednesday after traders learned that Yukos had a financial lifeline. Yukos had welcomed the decision to let it dip into the frozen accounts, saying it would enable the firm to "steadily pay off our tax bill". Oil prices eased as the news lessened the risk Yukos might have to stop pumping oil or declare bankruptcy. The picture is now much less certain. Shares in the Russian oil giant fell more than 14% on the Moscow exchange within minutes of the announcement. The price of a barrel of Brent crude in London rose 73 cents to $40.43 by mid-afternoon on Thursday, while on the New York Mercantile exchange oil was trading up 42 cents at $43.25. "Yukos is the major story supporting prices," said Nauman Barakat, an executive at US oil analysts Refco. Yukos has been ordered to pay $3.4bn (£1.8bn) of back taxes for 2000. Sidestepping a crisis The company is embroiled in a long-running stand-off with the state over tax evasion. Its founder - Russia's richest man Mikhail Khodorkovsky - is in jail whilst on trial on separate charges of tax fraud and embezzlement. Foreign governments are thought to have lobbied the Kremlin as oil prices have soared in recent days. "The government does not want the company's operations to be materially affected by the Yukos affair as that would escalate what is now an internal matter into an international scandal," Renaissance Capital analyst Adam Landes wrote in a research note. He said the Russian government was likely to ensure that oil production continues. So far, Yukos has managed to pay $700m of its $3.4bn (£1.8bn) tax bill for the year 2000, and its executives have vowed to try their best to pay off the remainder soon. But commentators warn that if the government presses on with 2001-2003 tax claims, the bill could end up being as high as $10bn. Yukos is regarded as one of the most transparent Russian companies, but also in the Kremlin's eyes as one that has gained too much influence and political power. Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/3537862.stm Published: 2004/08/05 15:22:26 GMT
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Sasun By strategic interest I mean the geo-political setting in th South Caucasus, which has significatly changed since the events in Georgia. Putin is now facing the dilema of chosing sides beween Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan by making pro-Western steps is pressuring Russia to decrease its assistance to Armenia. If Armenia displays total agreement with Russia's actions the Russian military elite may pressure Putin to influence Armenia on Karabagh, so that Azerbaijan stays in Russian sphere of influence. This is the reason of Azerbaijan's latest war retoric and shootings on the border. Armenia must show Russia that it is not going to stay calm if Russia chooses to change its position. By sacrifice I mean sacrifice. The contrubution that I meanting can not be compared to those of Spain and the Philippines. I think the reason I meantion above is worth it. Maybe I went too far by mentioning a regiment but our displayed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in an issue of U.S. concern is necessary at the present. Edit: fixed the quotes
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http://www.nautilus.org/gps/virtual-diaspo...hop_report.html Virtual Diasporas: A New Frontier of National Security (Op-ed) Michel S. Laguerre With the advent of the information technology revolution, the recent mass migration of the “Rest” into the “West”, the continuing diasporization of the American metropolis, and the evolving globalization process, concerns are emerging in various quarters about the role of virtual diasporas in national security. The focus on the relations between diasporas and US foreign policy is not new, but reached its peak of interest during the period of the cold war whose context shaped our understanding of the issue. Some view diasporas as maintaining their loyalty more to the homeland than the hostland; others argue that they are committed to both countries; and still others see them as assimilated individuals who care exclusively about the welfare of their country of residence. While the mechanisms of their participation in American politics—whether the emphasis is on their ethnic interests or their transnational orientation—are well known, the role of virtual diasporas—in their relations to real diasporas, the homeland, hostland, or American security—is, however, less known. By virtual diaspora, we mean the use of cyberspace by immigrants or descendants of an immigrant group for the purpose of participating or engaging in online interactional transactions. Such virtual interaction can be with members of the diasporic group living in the same foreign country or in other countries, with individuals or entities in the homeland, or with non-members of the group in the hostland and elsewhere. By extension, virtual diaspora is the cyberexpansion of real diaspora. No virtual diaspora can be sustained without real life diasporas and in this sense it is not a separate entity, but rather a pole of a continuum. The same way diasporas form diverse communities of interests, virtual diasporas are not monolithic either. Every diasporic group tends to generate a plurality of virtual diasporas around areas of interest such as religion, politics, gender, professions and the like. Since the membership comes from the same pool, these virtual diasporas tend to be made up of intersecting circuits that crisscross one another while maintaining their distinct focuses. The following examples are presented to highlight the importance of virtual diasporas in the management and resolution of transnational conflict, in general, and national security, in particular. No single group is identified here to underscore the widespread reality of the phenomenon. Virtual diasporas add a cyberdimension to the resolution of national problems and through their participation and contribution to the debate, they transnationalize such conflicts. As national governments spend an ordinate amount of money to engineer telecommunications policies, to create and maintain web sites and in some cases provide online services to netizens, they are also concerned about online diasporic activities that may undermine their political basis of support. New positions are being developed to monitor these activities and gather intelligence. Virtual diasporas use the Internet to develop strategic alliances with grassroots activists, thereby allowing them an opportunity to apply global pressure on the hostland or homeland’s government. Virtual diasporas achieve their highest levels of efficiency when they combine their efforts—consciously or unconsciously—with real diasporic groups to reach a specific goal, such as, for example, lobbying government officials in the hosltand on behalf of the homeland. One side may strengthen or revive the position of the other because they may target different aspects of the problem and one side may sustain its efforts longer than the other, thereby making it possible for the latter to recoup its interests in the issue. Diasporic cyber attacks are the new source of conflict in the diasporic community. Web sites of pro-government and opposition groups are destroyed to prevent the participants from enlarging the size of their group and from spreading the news and views of their organizations. These attacks force such groups either to abandon their enterprise, to seek the help of volunteer technicians, or else to ask the community for funds to help defray these unforeseen expenses. Virtual diasporas, by engaging in the domestic and foreign policies of the hostland while participating via the Internet in the political affairs of the homeland, add a new dimension to the transnational or even global architecture of national security.
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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FH06Ag02.html http://www.atimes.com Central Asia The clandestine Soviet Union By Victor Yasmann Nationalist revanchism has been gaining momentum in recent years among various political groups in Russia and has been greeted with some sympathy from the Kremlin. In the past, this sentiment has taken the form of open calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union, but recently a more provocative set of ideas have been making the rounds in Russia. Maksim Kalashnikov, author of The Broken Sword of Empire (1998) and Battle for the Heavens (2000) - books that glorified Soviet militarism and earned him the moniker "Russia's Tom Clancy" - gave new impetus to the revanchist movement with the 2003 publication of Forward to the USSR-2, a book that is subtitled The National Idea or the Direction of the Main Offensive. Kalashnikov's real name is Vladimir Kucherenko, and he is a former deputy editor of the online magazine Stringer and a journalist for Rossiiskaya gazeta. Forward to the USSR-2 has gone through several editions over the past 18 months and its popularity has become widespread. Kalashnikov's vision of USSR-2 is a version of an unrealized scenario for the reform of the Soviet Union that dates back to the early 1980s and that is attributed to then KGB director Yurii Andropov. It was later popularized by the nationalist ideologue Aleksandr Prokhanov. "In 1980, the United States had a nightmare in which it saw the transformation of the USSR, a country with a clumsy socialist economy, into the smart, aggressive, and strong-willed super corporation Red Star," reads the cover blurb to Forward to the USSR-2. "It might have emerged as a creature never before seen in history, combining the most advanced Soviet defense technologies with billions of gas dollars and the incredible might of the Soviet secret services. The United States did everything in its power to make sure this scenario never materialized, but can we realize it now?" Kalashnikov, who has rejected Western models of economic development for Russia, answers a definite "yes" to this question. Those who advocate Western liberal economics, Kalashnikov writes, argue that if Russia follows their policies the country will reach Western living standards within a few decades. "However, under the conditions of globalization, we do not have this much time," Kalashnikov writes. Kalashnikov, however, also rejects calls for the restoration of the former Soviet system, describing the Soviet Union as "the country of the party's miasma ... Nationalizing Russia's old-fashioned and obsolete industry as the Communists suggest is absolute stupidity," he writes. Likewise, Kalashnikov rejects economic-development models such as those pursued by China, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico or Pakistan. He argues that Russia cannot become a cheap producer of consumer goods because it does not have a cheap labor force, inexpensive and accessible natural resources, or convenient means of transporting manufactured goods to world markets. He notes that Russian workers must pay as much on utilities and other costs associated with surviving in Russia's harsh climate as workers in the countries mentioned above earn each year. This fact alone is enough to make Russian goods non-competitive on international markets. Kalashnikov also argues that basing the Russian economy on the export of mineral resources is shortsighted. He repeats the arguments that noted military economist Andrei Parshev put forward in his 2000 book Why Russia Is Not America. In that book, Parshev argued that once the Soviet-built economic and transportation infrastructure is exhausted, the extraction of Russia natural resources will become forbiddingly expensive. The only way for Russia to thrive is through the dream of USSR-2, Kalashnikov argues, urging the country to adopt several innovative development strategies that he calls "miracles". Kalashnikov's first miracle is financial. He argues that it is stupid to use oil revenues to create a stabilization fund to repay the debts racked up by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and former Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Instead, Russia should sue the West to demand the return of gold deposited in Western banks by the czarist government during World War I. Kalashnikov argues that Russia must make such cases before the years 2014-17 or the government's claims will expire. Next, Kalashnikov calls for an ideological miracle. He says the state must put forward an ideology that will be broadly attractive and will help the country avoid "suicidal clashes" with China and Islam. Such an ideology must help the country develop previously unthinkable alliances, such as with Saudi Arabia, he writes. The next step, Kalashnikov argues, is an "ethnopsychological" miracle. He writes that the new state cannot be created with the current mentality of the Russian people, who he says are "ignorant not only of national ideals, but even of their own self-interests ... Therefore, it is necessary to create a new nation from the remnants of the Russian people, a new race that possesses the novel psychological quality of seeing itself as 'a nation of super-creators and geniuses'," Kalashnikov writes, echoing classic Nazi-style rhetoric. The centerpiece of Kalashnikov's project is the "organizational" wonder. He proposes creating a clandestine state behind the facade of the Russian Federation, a country he sees as "incurably ill and destined to perish". He describes the clandestine state as "a network that combines the features of a party, an army, a secret service, the mafia, a church, and a business community ... This kind of networked brotherhood should exist alongside the official Russian state, never openly warring with it," Kalashnikov writes. "The brotherhood should form a strategic union with the Russian president." Kalashnikov argues that such a parallel state will be able to act where the official state cannot. Utilizing its covert status, it will be able to operate wherever there are Russian communities - in Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe and the United States. One of the first tasks of this secret state will be to regain control over financial resources controlled by the oligarchs and, more broadly, by the entire class of "new Russians". "Using psychological and other special methods, we will turn them into zombies, obedient to the will of the secret state and investing their money where the state tells them to," Kalashnikov writes in the foreword to Forward to the USSR-2. "Superficially, nothing will change and the current business community, with its assets in Russia and abroad, will continue to operate," Kalashnikov writes, "but in reality, control over financial flows will be recaptured by the secret state. In this way, we will avoid accusations of violating civil and property rights and other such nonsense. There will be no mass arrests, no demonstrative transfers of confiscated money into state funds." He writes that it is sufficient to apply pressure successfully to one or two oligarchs in order to bring all of them into submission. Leaving no doubt as to whom he has in mind, Kalashnikov writes in his latest book, Ride the Lightning (2003), about an oligarch named Samuil Modorkovskii and a company called Sokos, clear allusions to embattled oil giant Yukos and its former chief executive officer, Mikhail Khodorkovskii. Kalashnikov describes Modorkovskii as smart and energetic, but as someone who sees no future for Russia and who is looking to transfer the money gained from exploiting Russia's oil to the West. "Coercion and levers of fear should be used" against such people, Kalashnikov writes, seeming to justify the campaign against Khodorkovskii that was about to unfold. "God himself allows us to fight them with sophistication and acute cruelty." As for geographic expansion, Kalashnikov argues that it should not be necessary to repeat the experience of the Soviet Union. USSR-2 will be a "federal empire" and the states of the South Caucasus, Ukraine and, especially, the Central Asian republics can enter the new USSR with their own sovereignty, legislation and currencies intact. "We should tell our former southern republics that friendship with the United States will bring them no good," Kalashnikov writes. He said that while the United States criticizes these countries for corruption and human-rights violations, Russia will not demand any liberalization and will not intervene into their internal affairs. Instead, Russia will build military bases "that will defend both your and our security", Kalashnikov writes. Russia will build nuclear power plants and desalinization plants "for which you can pay with gold and uranium". In return Russia will ask little - "equal status" for ethnic Russians, unfettered access for "our imperial television channels", and a role for Russian capital in the exploration for and exploitation of local natural resources. It remains uncertain exactly how influential Kalashnikov's books and ideas actually are in Russia's corridors of power. But it cannot be denied that many, many pages from his books echo the most frightening headlines in contemporary Russian news reports. Many scenes in his books seem like the latest breaking news from Moscow. Victor J Yasmann is a senior regional analyst with RFE/RL Online and specializes in Russian and Central Eurasian affairs, foreign policy, and international security. He holds a master of arts in economics from the Kharkiv Engineering Economic Institute and joined RFE/RL as a Soviet affairs analyst in 1984.
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Sasun, can you show me a country whose strategic interests are at stake that is not making sacrifices.
