Posted 12 January 2005 - 11:31 AM
this is from Groong, excellent commentary on recent articles
STEREOTYPES ABOUT ARMENIA
Armenian News Network / Groong
January 11, 2005
By Haroutiun Khachatrian
During the last five months, at least four articles appeared in
leading Western newspapers about Armenia. As if agreed initially, all
four are about the emigration problem. The general scheme of all
articles is as follows: (see, for example the latest article of this
"series" entitled "For Young Armenians, a Promised Land Without
Promise" in the December 9 issue of The New York Times). People are
quoted as saying that in Armenia jobs are difficult to find, or they
are paid less than similar jobs abroad. Statements of the opposite
type are also included, e.g. young people are quoted as saying that
they will try to find jobs in their homeland, etc. However, the
general tone remains negative, the titles are as sad as this one
(giving a respective signal to the readers, most of whom do not read
more of an article than its title). And, what is more important, the
data of statistics showing the migration of Armenian workforce is no
more a problem like it was in the 90s, that emigration and immigration
have already balanced, are generally ignored.
Some observers in Armenia express the opinion that there is a sort
of "conspiracy" or "political order" aimed to display reality in
Armenia worse than it is (even Haykakan Zhamanak, an opposition-minded
daily, has used these terms). I believe that, in fact, some
long-established stereotypes are to be blamed, according to which
Armenia cannot be described in a way other than a week and dependent
country. As shown below, even the works of serious political analysts
are not free of these stereotypes. I take two recent materials that
appeared on the www.eurasianet.org internet edition as typical
examples of such an attitude, although many others of this type can be
shown. They are: "Armenia: the Dream of Complementarity and the
Reality of Dependency" by Michael Weinstein, and the report of the
International Crisis Group entitled "Armenia: Internal Instability
Ahead.".
STEREOTYPE ONE. ARMENIA TOTALLY DEPENDS ON RUSSIA
Weinstein writes: "Armenia's primary dependence on Russia is
difficult to deny. Militarily, Russia has 2,500 troops in the
country... Russia is also Armenia's major trading partner, its largest
source of investment, the main destination of its surplus labor, the
provider of its energy needs and military equipment and its biggest
creditor..."
There are several errors in these fragments (I'll show some of
them below), but even their absence would not change the main
question: even if all of this were correct, would it mean a
pessimistic conclusion for Armenia? Yes, Russia has been the largest
source of investments in Armenia in the last two years (replacing
Greece), but does it mean increasing Armenia's dependency upon Russia?
Quite the opposite. Nor is the presence of the Russian troops in
Armenia a sign of unilateral dependency, as Russia is no less
interested in having these troops in its main partner country in the
Caucasus. True, Armenia depends heavily on fuel supply from
Russia. But Germany does as well. To a lesser extent, but Germany is a
richer country.
Moreover, many analysts, including Weinstein, fail to see that
this dependency will most likely decrease. He writes: "In May, 2004,
Kocharian visited Moscow for talks about Russia's displeasure with
Yerevan's initiatives. Moscow wants [Yerevan's] assurance that the
Iranian pipeline will not be extended through Georgia and under the
Black Sea to Ukraine, bypassing Russia and depriving it of a market
for gas." Hence, the author sees this meeting as a typical "failure
story", as Russia had prevented the Iran-Armenian gas pipeline from
being extended after Armenia. In fact this was a real success story,
as Russia could as well have simply prevented the construction of the
Iran-Armenia pipeline, thus preserving its own monopoly in the
Armenian gas market. After all, is it realistic for a country like
Armenia to be fully free of dependence on its neighbors? Especially on
one like Russia?
STEREOTYPE TWO: "COMPLEMENTARITY" IS A DREAM
Weinstein, the authors of the ICG report and many others (both in
Armenia and outside) speak about the so-called complementarity, the
key of the Armenian foreign policy, with skepticism if not
irony. "Since Yerevan lacks the resources to execute its
complementarirty policy successfully, that policy has become a hopeful
facade covering continuing dependence on Russia," Weinstein writes.
Since its first days of independence, Armenia has always sought to
keep equally good relations both with Russia and the U.S. (and the
West in general). This policy got the brand name of "complementarity"
in the late 90s. Let's see the results. Armenia is the only country
in the world, which has managed to preserve the status of a military
ally of Russia, and, at the same time, to be one of the largest
recipients of American assistance (for a long period, Armenia was the
third largest recipient in per capita terms, after Israel and
Egypt). In some years, Yerevan managed to pay its bills for the
Russian gas directly with the money provided by the U.S. If this is a
failure, what is the success?
STEREOTYPE THREE: ARMENIA IS NOT ORIENTED TO THE WEST
It is a long-term belief that Georgia and even Azerbaijan are more
inclined to adopt Western orientation than Armenia. Surprising as it
may look, this vision is based on the fact that the West is primarily
interested in contacts with Azerbaijan and Georgia (rather than with
Armenia) due to the oil pipeline now under construction. Another
arguable assumption supporting this belief is that, being a military
ally to Russia, Armenia should inevitably copy Moscow's economy policy
and foreign preferences as well. Such a perception has become even
stronger after the "Rose revolution" in Georgia. "Yerevan's policy of
complementarity contrasts with Tbilisi's pro-Western orientation since
the Rose Revolution and with Baku's "balanced" policy," Weinstein
writes, leaving the natural question "Where is the contrast?"
unanswered.
In reality, the status of a Russian ally hasn't prevented Armenia
from performing extensive economic reforms (according to the estimates
of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, in terms of
market reforms Armenia is the most advanced country among the
CIS). Contrary to what Weinstein states, Russia has never been
Armenia's main creditor. More than half of Armenia's foreign debt is
loans of the World Bank, i.e., it is made up of the funds provided by
the leading Western countries for economy reforms. As for the
bilateral loans, Russia was the largest creditor before 2002, as it
had provided several high-interest loans in the peak of the economy
crisis in mid-90s. After Yerevan settled this debt with the
debt-for-equity deal (hence making Russia responsible for the proper
work of these assets), Germany has become its largest creditor
country, as it extensively credits economy reconstruction and reforms
in Armenia at very concessive terms. All of these have led the
U.S. to include Armenia in the list of those eligible for getting
funds of the newly established Millennium Challenge Corporation (17
countries were elected among more than 70). Finally, Russia did not
prevent its ally from performing NATO war games in Armenia in 2003 and
from being included into the EU New Neighborhood policy in 2004.
STEREOTYPE FOUR: ARMENIA MAY FACE INSTABILITY
The report of the International Crisis Group contains a sound body
of analysis and recommendations, most of which cannot be
questioned. But, having read the whole report, one may ask, why have
its authors chosen to give it the title: "Armenia: Internal
Instability Ahead."? The fragment relevant to that idea in the report
is: "While the present opposition -- divided and seen by many as more
interested in regaining power than truly fixing the system -- does not
have wide popular resonance, the situation could become much more
explosive if a charismatic leader emerged." Obviously, such a
conclusion does not imply that Armenia is "facing
instability". Meanwhile, the possibility of internal instability in
Armenia is even lower, because what is currently branded as
opposition, i.e., the Ardarutiun (Justice) alliance, is not a real
opposition at all. Rather, it is a part of the current ruling elite
which has separated from it due to the events of the terrorist act of
October 27, 1999, and partly, due to some details of the tactics
towards the Nagorno Artsax problem.
What is even more important, the "opposition" does not enjoy
appreciable support of the country's business community. This is the
key reason why the regime lead by Kocharian has remained stable
(despite the violations and breaching during last year's elections)
and, will, most likely, keep stability in the future, even if a
"charismatic" opponent like Saakashvili or Yushchenko appears. The
only possibility of internal instability in Armenia may be due to some
split in the ruling coalition, but this possibility has not even been
considered in the report.
Hence, I can see no other reason for this alarming title to be
chosen except for the failure of the report's authors to get rid of
stereotypes about an "unstable" Armenia.
Of course, Armenia is far from being a prosperous country with a
stable environment. However, it is regrettable to see that analyses
and media reports often fail to reveal its true problems and tell the
readers about non-existing or forgotten ones.
--
Haroutiun Khachatrian is a Yerevan-based writer specializing in
economic and political affairs.
