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Poll: Is the U.S. going to invade Iran

Is the U.S. going to invade Iran

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#241 Yervant1

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Posted 01 February 2023 - 08:51 AM

How in hell this incident has anything to do with Armenians? This shows how much hatred they have, starting with their clerics!

pngddBhulFCZr.png

Armenia - Jan 31 2023
 
 
Top Azerbaijani cleric: Now we know Iran is not our brother, it is Armenia’s brother
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January 31, 2023 - 12:30 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net - Grand Mufti of the Caucasus Allahshukur Pashazade has slammed Iran for being “the brother of Armenia.”

Pashazade made the remarks when expressing condolences over the attack on Baku’s embassy in Tahran.

“We brought a shahid from Iran, which we considered fraternal. Now we know that they are not our brothers, they are the brothers of Armenia,” the cleric said, although it is unclear why he would reference Armenia in his remarks.

Azerbaijani-Iranian relations have been strained over the past two years. The situation worsened in recent months when Iran held two large-scale drills near the border with Azerbaijan. Iran has also opposed the opening of a “corridor” through Armenia, which Azerbaijan has been demanding since the end of the 2020 war in Nagorno Karabakh.
https://www.panarmen...rmenias_brother

 

 



#242 Yervant1

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Posted 01 February 2023 - 09:31 AM

png8d1V56t0b1.png
Jan 31 2023
 
 
Turkey rises, Russia fades as Iran and Azerbaijan clash over Armenia
Conflict is looming once again between Armenia and Azerbaijan as regional powers maneuver in the Caucasus.

January 31, 2023

SYUNIK, Armenia — A small hotel in Goris, a sleepy tourist resort in the Syunik region in southern Armenia, seems an unlikely backdrop for geopolitical maneuvers between Western powers, Turkey, Russia and Iran. But that is what the Hotel Mirhav, a trio of rustic cottages filled with antique kilims and copperware, has become amid fears of renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan from which Iran could emerge the biggest loser.

Numerous families have been sheltering here since Dec. 12, when Azerbaijan effectively cut off access to their native Nagorno-Karabakh, letting a group of self-described Azerbaijani “eco-activists” with no history of environmental advocacy barge through Russian peacekeepers to block the sole road linking the disputed enclave to Armenia.

The Armenian-majority region lies within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders but has governed itself under the name of the Republic of Artsakh since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

As regional powers butt heads, a full-blown humanitarian crisis is unfolding, with baby formula, medicines and other vital supplies growing scarcer by the day. Schools have been shuttered and Nagorno-Karabakh’s 120,000 inhabitants put on ration cards as Azerbaijan continues to disrupt gas and electricity supplies amid sub-zero temperatures. Armenia’s leaders accuse Azerbaijan of seeking to ethnically cleanse Nagorno-Karabakh by starving the local population and forcing it to leave.

Azerbaijan’s strongman President Ilham Aliyev hinted as much in a Jan. 10 TV interview, saying, “Conditions will be created for those who want to live [in Nagorno-Karabakh] under the flag of Azerbaijan. Like the citizens of Azerbaijan, their rights and security will be ensured.

“For whoever does not want to become our citizen, the road is not closed, but open. They can leave. They can go on their own, or they can ride with [Russian] peacekeepers, or they can go by bus. The road [to Armenia] is open.”

Rebukes from the European Union and stiffer ones from the United States have had little impact so far as the siege entered its 51st day today. The International Crisis Group ranked Nagorno-Karabakh second after Ukraine among the top 10 conflicts to watch in 2023, warning in a report this week that “another war on Europe’s Eastern flank is real.”

“I am stuck here with my two children. It’s an intolerable situation and I have no idea when it will end,” said Inna Gasparyan, whose husband and two other children are marooned in the capital Stepanakert. “The kids need vegetables. The shops are empty. What more can I tell you?” she said, her voice trailing off in despair.

At a nearby table in the Mirhav’s dining room, a clutch of men and women confer in hushed tones, studiously avoiding eye contact with fellow guests. They are members of the European Union’s 40-member civilian observer mission that is headquartered at the Mirhav. They were deployed to monitor a 250-kilometer (155-mile) cease-fire line after Azerbaijani troops crossed the border on Sept. 12 and captured a set of strategic heights inside Armenia. By the time Russia brokered a cease-fire two days later, as many as 300 servicemen were killed on both sides, marking the gravest escalation since Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war for a second time over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020.

With Turkey and Israel’s backing, Azerbaijan emerged victorious, snapping back all of its land occupied by Armenia in a previous conflict that erupted as the USSR disintegrated and shortening Iran’s de facto border with Armenia. It also took around a third of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is now thought to control roughly 200 square kilometers (124 square miles) of Armenian territory. For a newly muscular Baku, that wasn’t enough.

Catastrophe for Iran

The deeper worry is that seizing on Russia’s Ukraine woes and Iran’s domestic unrest, Aliyev will go for a bigger prize: a land and rail corridor that would link Azerbaijan via Armenia’s southernmost province Syunik to its largest exclave Nakhichevan and on to Turkey. It would separate Iran from Armenia, its sole Christian neighbor and a vital stepping stone to Western markets. Armenia, in turn, would be effectively deprived of potential military support from its friendliest neighbor, Iran.

The Zangezour corridor “would be a geopolitical catastrophe for Iran,” said Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian visiting fellow at the Berlin-based think tank SWP.

Vahan Kostanyan, special adviser to Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, told Al-Monitor in an exclusive interview, “Azerbaijan has three objectives: the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, to provoke large-scale military tension in the region and finally to push the Armenian side to give an extra-territorial corridor.” Kostanyan added, “Iran is an important partner. The border with Iran is of utmost importance to us. We have two closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, thus Iran and Georgia are our only gates to the outside world.”

Azerbaijan has angrily dismissed Armenia’s pleas for international action as propaganda, saying that the Red Cross and Russian peacekeepers are assuring the flow of food and medicine into Nagorno-Karabakh.

On Jan. 23, the EU announced that it was establishing what it called a Common Security and Defense Policy mission in Armenia. As many as 200 civilian observers are to be deployed to ensure that cease-fire lines are holding along the Azerbaijani border. As Schahen Zaytounchian, a retired Iranian-Armenian neurosurgeon who runs the Mirhav hotel, opined, “The presence of observers gives me a little bit of security. Only an idiot can make some aggression.”

But their mandate does not extend to Nagorno-Karabakh, for which it would need Azerbaijan’s consent. That is unlikely to be forthcoming. Russia’s Foreign Ministry lambasted the EU move as a combined effort with the United States “to gain a foothold at all costs.” Critics say the EU is seeking to make amends for a gas deal it signed in July with Azerbaijan to double gas imports in order to make up for the loss of Russian gas as a result of Ukraine-linked sanctions. The deal will have only further emboldened Baku.

Iran has always balked at the injection of more foreign actors in its backyard. However, Azizi contended, “The Europeans being there could balance Azerbaijan and that’s in line with Iran’s interests,” even though relations between the Islamic Republic and the EU are at an all-time low.

Aliyev has made no secret of his designs on the so-called “Zangezour corridor,” calling it a “historical necessity” and asserting repeatedly that it will “definitely be opened whether Armenia wants it or not.” Iran has called any attempt to alter its borders a "red line."

Tensions between the Shia-majority neighbors are escalating beyond Armenia. On Jan. 27, a gunman burst into the Azerbaijani Embassy in Tehran, killing the head of security at the mission and wounding two guards.

“We demand that this terrorist act be investigated and the terrorists be punished,” Aliyev said in a statement. Iranian authorities said the assailant, an Iranian man, had no political motives and that it was a “family affair.” But Azerbaijan isn’t buying it. Baku said it was shutting down its mission and withdrawing all its diplomatic staff from Tehran pending the results of thorough investigations. (The Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz will continue to function.) Video footage of the attack showing an Iranian security guard sitting inert as the perpetrator armed with a rifle entered the embassy has inflamed public sentiments in Azerbaijan.

An Israeli listening post

Some Azerbaijani officials believe that Iran staged the assault to punish Baku for sending its first ambassador to Israel this month after three decades of ties. Until now, Baku has held back so as to maintain the support of Arab countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, explained Zaur Shiriyev, a South Caucasus analyst for the International Crisis Group. Yet ties between Azerbaijan and the Jewish state have been flourishing for long years.

Benyamin Poghosyan, a Yerevan-based pundit said, “Azerbaijan is becoming an Israeli outpost in the region. There are Israeli advisers permanently based in Baku,” he told Al-Monitor.

The presence of Israeli military officials is frequently rumored yet impossible to prove. It’s common knowledge, however, that Azerbaijan, which is among Israel’s top suppliers of oil, has acquired large amounts of weapons from the Jewish state. Open-source intelligence showed cargo planes ferrying them throughout the 2020 war. Nor is it a secret that Israel has long used Azerbaijan to spy on Iran. 

In a bid to draw Baku to its side, Iran supported Azerbaijan, at least rhetorically, at the start of the 2020 war, not reckoning just how far Russia would allow it to advance. In a similar miscalculation, Armenia decided in 2020 to open its first diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv only for Israel to go all in with Azerbaijan.

Today, Azerbaijani security forces raided several media organizations in Baku accused of being on Tehran’s payroll. Seven people described as being part of an “Iranian spy network” were detained.

Since 2021, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has conducted large-scale military drills, most recently in October along its frontier with Azerbaijan. The latest, “Mighty Iran,” included setting up pontoon bridges and crossing the Aras River, which separates the two countries.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian told the state-run IRNA news agency in an Oct. 19 interview, “Iran will not permit the blockage of its connection route with Armenia, and in order to secure that objective the Islamic Republic of Iran also launched a war game in that region."

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned in an Oct. 3 tweet, “Those who dig a hole for their brothers will be the first to fall into it.”

On Jan. 20, Iran’s ambassador to Armenia paid a visit to his country’s newly established mission in Syunik’s administrative capital, Kapan. “Armenia’s security is Iran’s security,” Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri told the Kapan news corps. A giant Iranian flag hoisted above the drab consulate is meant to telegraph Iranian heft to Azerbaijani forces lurking in the nearby mountains.

Iran’s hawkishness is music to Armenian ears. Kostanyan, the ministerial adviser, told Al-Monitor, “We had intelligence that larger attacks were being prepared by Azerbaijan when it attacked Armenia last September. Iranian actions and statements helped to stop a further deterioration of that situation.” Others credit the United States for deterring Baku.

In the small town of Meghri on the Iranian border, restauranteur Asya Sarkisyan said business has remained thin since the 2020 war. With the threat of war growing, Sarkisyan said, “I don’t want to leave but I need to think about my children," adding, “Here in Meghri our hope is in Iran. But they will act in their own interest, of course.”

Syunik has strong cultural and historical links to Iran dating back to the early 16th century, when much of present-day Armenia was under Persian rule. The traces are seen in the wall paintings rendered in exquisite Persian miniature style in the 17th century St Hovhannes church in Meghri.

Vardan Voskanyan, who runs the Iran department at Yerevan State University’s Faculty of Oriental Studies, told Al-Monitor, “We took a lot of things from Iran. Armenia is a museum of ancient medieval Iran.”

“Iran is the only country that supported us economically when Turkey sealed the border,” Voskanyan recalled. “You can’t trust the West. They will only help Armenia when it becomes another Ukraine for Russia. They will help us only if Armenia becomes anti-Iran.”

IMG_1796.jpg?itok=MtEmaZMx

Persian influence is palpable in the 17th Century Surp Hovhannes Church in the Armenian town of Meghri on the Iranian border Jan. 20, 2023. (Amberin Zaman/Al-Monitor)

In November, Armenia and Iran inked an accord to double the amount of natural gas that Iran sells to its neighbor in exchange for the latter’s electricity during a visit by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Tehran.

Two-way trade shot up by 43% last year and Yerevan remains a popular watering hole for Iranians in search of booze and carnal pleasures. On a recent night, a bouncer at the Manoto club, a basement dive in central Yerevan, expressed surprise when this reporter and an Armenian colleague sought entry, saying, “It’s all Persians in there, brother.” Sure enough, wisps of Farsi wafted above the din of disco music as bearded men of all ages gawked at exotic dancers writhing under the venue’s purple strobe lights.

Lonely democrat

Pashinyan, who led his country’s Velvet Revolution in 2018, ending decades of corrupt and repressive rule, has to tread carefully. He needs Western support, particularly that of Washington, as in the words of a senior Armenian official speaking not for attribution, “The United States is more interested in safeguarding a democratic Armenia than the EU.”

In September, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi led a delegation to Yerevan just days after the Azerbaijani incursion. 

But Pashinyan is also in desperate need to rebuild his battered army. Russia is nominally Armenia’s top supplier, but it has yet to deliver billions of dollars’ worth of arms paid for by Yerevan, probably because they are being diverted to Ukraine. India is the only other country selling Armenia weapons, mainly because its arch enemy, Pakistan is a staunch backer of Azerbaijan. Iran would be a natural source for military kit. Yet the slightest hint of such deliveries from Tehran could trigger Western sanctions at a time when this country of 3 million is more vulnerable than it’s ever been since declaring its independence from Moscow in 1991.

Acquiring Iranian weapons “is not on our agenda,” Kostanyan, the ministerial adviser, told Al-Monitor.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is showing no such restraint. Mimicking Iran, it’s held several military exercises in the border region, most recently in December — a joint maneuver with Turkey called “Fraternal Fist.”

Ankara drones and military advisers helped cinch Baku’s 2020 victory and it's an advocate of a “Zangezour corridor” that would extend all the way to China. This would scrap its current dependence on Iran to reach Central Asian markets.

A cease-fire agreement brokered by Russia on Nov. 9, 2020, for Nagorno-Karabakh says that “all economic and transport connections in the region shall be unblocked.” Under its vaguely worded terms, Armenia is supposed to guarantee unobstructed passage through them and Russian border guards will oversee it all. However, Baku wants to be able to use the proposed artery through Syunik without being subjected to any Armenian customs controls. Armenia squarely rejects the idea, saying this would be a breach of its sovereignty. What if Azerbaijan, presumably with Turkish backing, were to up the ante and swallow a chunk of Syunik in order to attach Nakhichevan to its mainland?

The question weighs heavily in Akner, a village just northwest of Goris that was struck by Azerbaijani rockets on Sept. 13 during last year’s “two-day war.” One blew through the roof of the house shared by furniture salesman Edgar Salbuntz, his wife Ramela and his parents, Arevik and Kim. “Thanks to God we were at the neighbor's when it landed, otherwise we would all be dead,” Salbuntz told Al-Monitor as he pulled out what he said was a fragment of a Russian-made Grad rocket from a chest of drawers.

Like many in this mountainous region dotted with ancient monasteries and copper mines, he calls Syunik Armenia’s “backbone.” “If it’s gone, there will be no Armenia,” Salbuntz asserted. "But who can stand in Azerbaijan’s way?” he mused. On paper, it's Russia and her peacekeepers.

Armenia is a member of the Kremlin-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO), comprising six former Soviet states. When one is attacked the rest are meant to ride to its defense. Misgivings about Russian support began to emerge when Moscow sat on its hands as Armenian forces were decimated in the early days of the 2020 war. The feelings grew when Moscow failed to intervene against Azerbaijan in the September flareup.

Olesya Vartanyan, the International Crisis Group’s senior South Caucasus analyst, told Al-Monitor, “Since the Ukraine war, we are seeing an even more assertive Azerbaijan. Russian containment and deterrence has all but disappeared.”

No Turkish delights

Turkey stepped into the vacuum on Azerbaijan’s side even as it sought to normalize relations with Yerevan. For Pashinyan, peace with Turkey was meant to fend off further attacks by Azerbaijan. So far he’s got neither.

After four rounds of face-to-face talks, diplomatic relations have yet to be established though there are hopes on the Armenian side that Turkey will allow its foreign minister to travel overland to a diplomacy forum planned for March in the Turkish seaside resort of Antalya.

Land borders between the two countries remain closed save for nationals of other countries, a first baby step decided last year. A second was to start cargo flights. Richard Giragosian, founding director of the Regional Studies Center, an independent think tank in Yerevan, told Al-Monitor, “Air cargo is BS. There is no demand."

An Armenian source with close knowledge of the talks acknowledged, “Rapprochement with Turkey has yielded nothing. Turkey has entrenched itself further in the Caucasus. Through these negotiations it’s become more of a player.” The source, who sought anonymity in order to speak freely, observed that rather than use its growing influence to de-escalate tensions between the sides, “Turkey is encouraging Azerbaijan in its maximalist demands.”

Gohar Iskandaryan, an Armenian academic who specializes in Iran, said, “For the last two centuries Russia had the upper hand. Turkey is rising in the Caucasus.”

Yerevan-based analyst Tigran Grigorian concurred, saying, “Russia has become overly dependent on Turkey and Azerbaijan since the start of the war.”

The reality is far murkier. Laurence Broers, an associate fellow at Chatham House, said, “The geopolitics of the Caucasus is still very much in flux. In 2020, it looked as though Russia and Turkey had sealed the region’s fate by ejecting the Western power and ‘regionalizing’ the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.” Broers told Al-Monitor, “But Russia’s catastrophic invasion of Ukraine has shattered its standing as the security patron of the South Caucasus and driving a new strategic intimacy between Moscow and Iran.”

In Ukraine, the Kremlin’s discredited war machine increasingly relies on Iranian drones. Turkey’s fabled Bayraktars proved crucial in the defense of Kyiv. In the South Caucasus, much as in Syria, Russia, Iran and Turkey’s goals are both competitive and complementary.

“I think we’ll continue to see a very dynamic situation among these powers, almost a kind of ‘hyper polarity,’ with no single hegemon in control,” Broers said.

IMG_1727.jpg?itok=cEberlqV

With its mountain vistas and ancient churches, Armenia’s Syunik region is a hiker’s paradise. Image taken Jan. 19, 2023. (Amberin Zaman/Al-Monitor)

From Russia with no love

For Armenia’s Pashinyan, Russian peacekeepers’ inability — or Moscow's unwillingness, many say — to fend off the Azerbaijani “protesters” blocking the Lachin corridor appears to have been the last straw. On Jan. 10, Pashinyan said he had informed the CTSO that Armenia would no longer be hosting the bloc’s annual peacekeeping drill. “Their lack of response means that Russia’s military presence in Armenia not only does not guarantee Armenia’s security, but on the contrary, creates threats to Armenia’s security,” Pashinyan groused.

Indeed, there are many, including senior Armenian officials, who believe that Russia favors Aliyev’s Zangezour corridor scheme as this would give Russia direct land access to Turkey and a further means to bust Western sanctions. Russian peacekeepers would control the route and Armenian forces would notionally be deployed with them. But the prevailing consensus is that the Russians can’t be trusted and anti-Russian sentiments among ordinary Armenians are growing by the day. Dozens of protesters were detained in early January during an anti-Moscow rally outside Russia’s 102nd base in the city of Gyumri on the Turkish border. The crowd chanted slogans calling for Armenia to pull out of the CTSO and for Russian forces to leave.

“Moscow has made clear that it does not want to alienate Baku or its ally Ankara. From the high ground that they now control inside Armenia, Azerbaijani forces could sweep down to take more territory, which would cut off southern Armenia from the rest of the country and force Yerevan into more concessions. Some worry that if Baku grows frustrated with the pace of talks, it could well try its luck at exactly this manoeuvre,” the International Crisis Group commented in its new report.

On a recent afternoon in Goris, Russian peacekeepers stood outside their base smoking cigarettes, visibly bored. Others browsed the shelves of a richly stocked local supermarket before plumping for bananas and tangerines.

“When we ask them, ‘Why aren’t you doing anything to help us?’ they just stare blankly or say they were sent here for military service and don’t know what they are actually supposed to do,” said a shopkeeper who makes custom patches and other paraphernalia for the Russians. “Look,” he said, holding up a baseball cap in the colors of the Russian flag and embroidered with a giant “Z,” a symbol of support for the war on Ukraine. He declined to be identified by name.

Gevorg Mirzoyan, a construction worker in Akner who is helping Salbuntz repair his shattered home, agrees that Russia can no longer be counted upon. “I think Iran is a good ally,” he told Al-Monitor. Deepening discord between Iran and Azerbaijan is bolstering such sentiments across Syunik.

IMG_1703.jpg?itok=l3-AW6lt

Locals in Goris, Armenia, produce custom patches and other paraphernalia for Russian forces stationed there, Jan. 20, 2023. (Amberin Zaman/Al-Monitor)

In a further provocation, Aliyev has begun to play the ethnic card. Iran has a sizable Azeri population thought to equal 15-20% of its population. In a Nov. 25 address Aliyev asserted, "We had to conduct military exercises on the Iranian border to show that we are not afraid of them. We will do our best to protect the secular lifestyle of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis around the world, including Azerbaijanis in Iran. They are part of our people."

Aliyev went on, “There are schools that teach in Armenian in Iran, but there are no schools that teach in the Azerbaijani language. How can this be? If someone says that this is interference in internal affairs, we absolutely reject it. Azerbaijan's foreign policy is as plain as day. We did not and do not interfere in the internal affairs of any state."

The comments mark a big shift. Firdevs Robinson, former Caucasus editor for the BBC who closely monitors the region, told Al-Monitor. “Azerbaijani nationalists’ feelings of solidarity with Iran’s Azerbaijani ethnic minority and their hostility towards Iran for siding with Armenia are nothing new.” He went on, “What has been notable is the growing unfriendly rhetoric coming from Baku in recent months.”

The SWP’s Azizi believes that Azerbaijan’s efforts to sow separatism in Iran won’t have much of an effect. Azizi told Al-Monitor, “The ethnic factor in the recent Iranian protests have been quite marginal. Also, it's highly unlikely that Iranian Azeris would want to leave an authoritarian regime to join another one.”

Interviews with several Iranian-Azeri truck drivers parked along the road between Meghri and Goris suggested that Azizi may be right. Huseyin Ismaili, who has been carrying Iranian oil to Armenia for the past 15 years, told Al-Monitor, “Yes, it’s true that Azerbaijan is telling us to stand up for our culture and rights and all that. We hear this stuff on Azerbaijani and Turkish television channels.” He added, “They tell us we need freedom. We have enough freedom. Iran is good. Iran is beautiful. No thank you, I say.”

Still, Iran’s Azeri population would certainly react to armed confrontation with its ethnic kin across the border. “The only real option Tehran has, and is working on, is to return to its traditional policy of supporting Azerbaijan against Armenia,” Azizi said. “I cannot even rule out the possibility of Iran arming Armenia with drones and the like.”

Back in Yerevan, Iskandaryan, the Persophile academic, says she would welcome such a move.

“If we have to choose between annihilation as a nation or sanctions from America, I prefer the latter,” she said.

 

https://www.al-monit...sh-over-armenia


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#243 MosJan

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Posted 01 February 2023 - 11:42 AM



#244 MosJan

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Posted 01 February 2023 - 02:52 PM



#245 MosJan

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Posted 01 February 2023 - 02:54 PM

USA  has chosen turks & azersis as partners.... my understanding and believe has always been that Iran has an flexibility in and understanding to overcome all this ..but no .. 



#246 Yervant1

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Posted 02 February 2023 - 09:24 AM

MEHR News Agency, Iran
Feb 1 2023
 
 
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TEHRAN, Feb. 01 (MNA) – Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Mher Grigoryan said that Iran is a friendly country and an important partner for Armenia, calling for holding regular interactions between Yerevan and Tehran.

Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Mher Grigoryan and Vice President of Iran Masoud Mir Kazemi co-chaired the session of the monitoring commission of the course of agreements (steering committee) of the 17th session of the Armenian-Iranian Inter-Governmental Joint Commission in Tehran. 

The prospects of developing trade-economic relations between the two countries, as well as opportunities for enhancing the existing cooperation in energy and transport, were discussed at the session, Grigoryan’s office said in a read-out.

Ideas were exchanged around creating favorable conditions for developing and enhancing trade-economic relations, including within the framework of the EEU.

A day before the session, Deputy PM Mher Grigoryan and Iranian Vice President Masoud Mir Kazemi held a meeting, Armen Press reported.

The deputy ministers of territorial administration and infrastructures, economy, and environment of Armenia participated in separate themed discussions as part of the commission’s meeting to outline the existing problems in the mutually-beneficial directions of the Armenian-Iranian cooperation and to implement joint actions for solving them.

At the end of the session, the Deputy PM said that Iran is a friendly country and an important partner for Armenia, and thanked the Iranian side for the warm hospitality and attached importance to holding regular discussions in this format. Deputy PM Grigoryan invited Vice President of Iran Masoud Mir Kazemi to visit Yerevan for holding the next such meeting.

Both sides said the governments will focus on solving the recorded issues.

MP/PR

 


#247 Yervant1

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Posted 02 February 2023 - 09:36 AM

pngilbGvpfmMp.png
Feb 1 2023
 
 
Hawkish Iran helped stop larger Azerbaijani attacks says Armenia 1120_Nagorno_Karabakh_Armenia_Azerbaijan
 
 
Armenian soldiers were outgunned in the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh. / screengrab.
 
 
By bne IntelIiNews February 1, 2023

Iranian hawkishness helped to stop larger attacks when Azerbaijan launched a military assault on Armenia last September, according to Vahan Kostanyan, Armenia’s deputy foreign minister.

In an interview with Al-Monitor published as part of a January 31 article, Kostanyan said: “We had intelligence that larger attacks were being prepared by Azerbaijan when it attacked Armenia last September. Iranian actions and statements helped to stop a further deterioration of that situation.” Others credit the US for deterring Baku, noted the publication, also describing Iran’s hawkishness as “music to Armenia’s ears”.

Azerbaijan was equipped with major military hardware obtained from “brother nation” Turkey and Israel—where it has lately, to Iran’s ire, opened its first embassy—when it achieved a victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in late 2020, causing Armenia to cede it substantial occupied territories.

Encouraged by its victory, Baku then set its sights on a new target—a land and rail corridor that would link Azerbaijan via Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik to Azerbaijani exclave Nakhichevan and on to Turkey.

As Al-Monitor noted, this “Zangezour corridor” would “separate Iran from Armenia, its sole Christian neighbor and a vital stepping stone to Western markets. Armenia, in turn, would be effectively deprived of potential military support from its friendliest neighbor, Iran”.

The Zangezour corridor “would be a geopolitical catastrophe for Iran,” Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian visiting fellow at the Berlin-based think tank SWP, was quoted as saying.

In further comments in the interview, Kostanyan said: “Azerbaijan has three objectives: the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, to provoke large-scale military tension in the region and finally to push the Armenian side to give an extra-territorial corridor.” 

“Iran is an important partner. The border with Iran is of utmost importance to us. We have two closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, thus Iran and Georgia are our only gates to the outside world,” he added.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, with full backing from Turkey, has referred to the desired corridor as a “historical necessity”, and has said it will “definitely be opened whether Armenia wants it or not”.

But Iran has assessed that the operation of the corridor would interfere with its borders, something which it said is a "red line."

Warning Azerbaijan off rash actions, since 2021, Iran has conducted extensive military drills along its frontier with Azerbaijan. The latest, codenamed “Mighty Iran,” included setting up pontoon bridges for crossings of the Aras River, which makes up much of the border.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian told Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency last October that “Iran will not permit the blockage of its connection route with Armenia, and in order to secure that objective the Islamic Republic of Iran also launched a war game in that region."

Azerbaijan has responded with its own military exercises. In December, the “Fraternal Fist” drill, a joint manoeuvre with Turkey, took place.

As things stand, the focus is on what appears to be Azerbaijan’s latest aggressive ploy in its attempt to secure its objectives—an apparent blockade of Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh that has lasted more than 50 days.  The inhabitants’ only road to Armenia has been cut off by self-described Azerbaijani “eco-activists” who have taken control of the route in the face of passive Russian peacekeepers, deployed in the locality after the 2020 war.

Reports of food and medicine shortages among the blockaded inhabitants cut no ice with Baku, which says the claims amount to Armenian provocation and asserts it has no control over the activists.

The overall standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains a dangerous powder keg. Any evidence of Armenia obtaining Iranian armaments would, note observers, potentially ignite further conflict, though Yerevan, fearing US sanctions, has publicly stated it is not requesting weapons from Tehran.

https://www.intellin...?source=armenia



#248 MosJan

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Posted 02 February 2023 - 05:50 PM

more azeri BS >>>

#249 Yervant1

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Posted 04 February 2023 - 06:10 AM

pngn0t0Q0tR4E.png
Feb 3 2023
 
Will there be a war in Iran, and how might this threaten Armenia? Opinions
 

Iran and Armenia

In Armenia the alarming situation developing around Iran is of concern, as it creates risks for Armenia as well. Armenian experts believe that any shocks in Iran are not in the interests of Yerevan. They say that the risk of war given recent rapprochement between Iran and Russia and the sale of Iranian drones to the Russian Federation.

A series of powerful explosions occurred on the night of January 29 at military facilities in Iran. Among those hit by rockets is a factory that made drones many sources say are being supplied to Russia to fight the war in Ukraine. Some Western media reported that Israel was behind the strikes.

 

In the Armenian expert community, recent events in Iran have brought to the for discussion of the so-called “Zangezur corridor”, a road through the south of Armenia on the border with Iran which will connect Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan. AzerbaijanTurkey insist on having a “corridor”, that is, a road that Armenia will not control. Yerevan categorically refuses to take this step, offering any route through its territory, but with the preservation of its sovereign rights.

The President of Azerbaijan has repeatedly stated that Armenia will be forced to provide an extraterritorial corridor, “whether it wants it or not.” And this is perceived in Armenia as a “threat to break through the road by military means.” Iran is also categorically against the corridor. Some Armenian experts are sure that this is Tehran’s red line, but if Iran is drawn into a major war, Baku may be tempted to take advantage of the situation and get its corridor by force. Others believe that the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Armenia is not Iran, but norms of international law.

Zhanna Vardanyan, Iranist Information attack

“There have been similar attacks on Iran before, especially from Israel, in the form of various kinds of sabotage, in particular on nuclear and other strategic facilities for the production of UAVs, missiles, etc. The last attack cannot be compared with the previous either in scale or in the amount of harm caused. It’s just that this attack was accompanied by a powerful information attack of allegedly many explosions in different cities of the Islamic Republic.

In fact, the attack on the Ministry of Defense factory in Isfahan was officially confirmed. On the same day, there was a fire at a factory for the production of motor oils in the city of Sahid-Shalimi. Iran denied information about other explosions.

This powerful flow of disinformation came from the Arab, Israeli, Turkish and Azerbaijani media, and they were not confirmed in authoritative American publications, which spoke of only two incidents.

Iran_attack_2023-1024x576.jpgAn explosion in the city of Isfahan. Photo: svs-gru.ru/ Azerbaijani involvement

“The attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran the day before the drone strikes is personal in nature. Azerbaijan managed to seize the opportunity and turn everything against Iran, again through powerful propaganda. In this, Baku received support from Israel and Britain. This is evidenced by the first meetings of Azerbaijani officials immediately after the attack on the embassy, namely presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev with the ambassadors of Israel and Britain.

These countries may develop a plan of some kind of action against Iran, from propaganda and information warfare to assistance in sabotage.

Tehran has already accused Azerbaijan and Israel of attacking Iranian facilities from the territory of Azerbaijan, although Baku denied this.

That is, the involvement of Azerbaijan in this sabotage is possible given its obvious anti-Iranian position, but most likely not from its territory. The attack on the Iranian facility was carried out in Isfahan with the help of quadcopters, so it is likely that it was carried out by local agents. Isfahan is located in the center of Iran, and it is unlikely that these quadcopters could fly there from Azerbaijan.”

Inviolability of the Armenian-Iranian border

“Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have been aggravated in recent years due to the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the issue of the Armenian-Iranian border. Of course, there have been tense periods between now, but it never reached such a peak.

Iran’s clear and categorical position regarding the territorial integrity of Armenia and the “corridor” through the Armenian city of Meghri led to serious problems with Azerbaijan. In view of this, Baku is trying to put pressure on Iran, neutralize it on the corridor issue. And the attack on the Azerbaijani embassy was an excellent reason to turn everything against Iran, present it as a terrorist country, raise the issue of some international mechanisms, etc.

Months earlier there was a larger attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in London, but there was no such reaction from Baku as in the attack on the embassy in Iran.”

Test of strength

“In general, the situation around Iran as well as inside the country is quite tense, so any scenario is possible. If the circle continues to narrow, if the attacks continue, there will be various kinds of sabotage, then the situation may lead to Iran simply not being able to respond to various developments, including along the Meghri corridor.

It’s not that Iran can abandon its red lines, but that it can lose its influence. This can only happen in the worst case scenario. For example, if Armenia finds itself in a situation similar to the Syrian events. Iran may then try to make mutual concessions with other players and get its share.

The inertia and inaction of Armenia, the inability to defend its borders, territorial integrity and security of the country on its own can lead to the Syrian scenario. If Armenia continues to weaken, it could be divided between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran. This is the worst case scenario.

The way out of the situation for Armenia may be the opportunity to straighten up in a short time, stand up for its own security and take advantage of the support of countries with which it has common interests.”

Will there be a war in Iran?

“Iran has been threatened by war for a long time, and in the past they also talked about the great risks of war, but still there’s been no war. War in Iran was either delayed or avoided, or it was of a different nature. Today the situation in the Islamic Republic is tense, and the same mechanisms are being used: information warfare, sanctions, and minor sabotage in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon against pro-Iranian forces.

If there is a war in Iran, it will completely divert Tehran’s attention from Armenia, it will be busy with his own problems. And then perhaps Azerbaijan and Turkey would take advantage of the situation and attack Armenia. In any case, war on Iran is not in our interests.”

Who can attack Iran?

“Azerbaijan is already sufficiently involved in the anti-Iranian campaign, but the sides have so far refrained from a real war, taking into account the likely consequences. After all, not just Azerbaijan and Iran will fight, but in that case Turkey, Israel and the West will take an active part.

War in Iran is not beneficial not only for Armenia, but also for Russia, which has found a good partner in Iran in its isolation. Iran for the Russian Federation is an opportunity to circumvent sanctions. Moreover, Iran itself has many years of experience of sanctions behind it. Therefore a weakening of Iran is not in the interests of Russia. Of course, in a number of issues Iran and Russia are rivals, but in countering the West they are natural allies.”

Andrias Ghukasyan, political scientist Norms of international law – guarantor of Armenian-Iranian border

“Iran going to war with Israel is unlikely, as would be Azerbaijan’s participation. The states are not ready for this. What is happening today are elements of a hybrid war manifested in sabotage.

There is no Iranian red line on Armenian territorial integrity. There are norms of international law. But in Armenia there is propaganda that there are no norms of international law, and Azerbaijan can wage war and occupy [the southern region of Armenia] Syunik. The situation with Iran does not give Azerbaijan a reason for aggression against Armenia.

The fact that Iran did not retaliate against the drone attacks shows that the Iranian authorities have not made a final decision about whether to break off relations with the West and engage in a military confrontation or seek diplomatic solutions to difficult issues.”

https://jam-news.net/iran-and-armenia/



#250 MosJan

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Posted 09 February 2023 - 11:42 AM

Iran doesn’t oppose deployment of EU monitoring mission to Armenian-Azerbaijani border – ambassador

 

 

https://armenpress.a...ws/1103776.html


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#251 Yervant1

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Posted 10 February 2023 - 10:02 AM

Armenpress.am
 
Iran and Armenia will not allow creation of corridor – Ambassador Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri
 
 
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1103771.jpg 16:04, 9 February 2023

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 9, ARMENPRESS. Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri said that the leaders of Armenia and Iran are closely following the regional developments. The Ambassador said that in this context Armenia and Iran must have a special agenda.

 

“Armenia and Iran are and will be neighbors. Of course, we see some ruse, they speak about so-called corridors and some actions, but Iran and Armenia will not allow the creation of such corridor,” the Iranian ambassador said.

He added that the stance of both the Iranian and Armenian sides is very clear.

 

“We must also be proactive. We must see what new steps we can take. We shouldn’t wait for a new idea to come up, for example, about the opening of a corridor, for us to start deciding what position to adopt. We shouldn’t allow such thing,” he said.

 

He said the establishment of the Iranian consulate-general in Kapan is an exemplary action in this regard, as well as the upcoming opening of the Armenian consulate in Tabriz.

 

 

https://armenpress.a...__nG9dib_pL-4VY



#252 MosJan

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Posted 11 February 2023 - 03:50 PM



#253 Yervant1

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Posted 18 February 2023 - 08:15 AM

pngB7TmjifxBM.png
Al-Mayadeen
Feb 17 2023
 
The future of Tehran-Baku relations

There is already tension in the relations between Baku and Tehran, but it is possible to avoid breaking relationships or making them more dramatic.

Relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan have witnessed complications in recent years, but with the attack on the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tehran, things have become more complicated and sensitive. 

At the end of January, the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tehran was the target of an armed attack in which one citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan was killed and two others were injured. In the midst of the coldness of the relations, the telephone conversation between officials, condolences to Azerbaijan were not effective, and the media in Baku intensified their attacks against Iran.

In fact, Baku authorities called the attack on the embassy a "terrorist act" and issued a "travel warning" regarding the presence of Azerbaijan’s citizens in Iran. From Tehran's point of view, this was caused by the attacker's personal motivation. In fact, the complete departure of the embassy staff and their families from Tehran is "temporary" and does not mean the termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz is open. But this incident has affected the outlook of relations.

Changing geopolitics

Northern Aras was a part of Iran until the 19th century, but after the defeat in the war with Russia, it was ceded. After the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Tehran supported Baku at the beginning of the first Armenian-Azerbaijani war (1988-1994). However, Tehran's approach during the second 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan (2020), which supported the recovery of many lost areas, did not meet Baku's satisfaction.

In the interpretation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, Baku demands the right to have a land and extraterritorial rail corridor along the current border of Armenia and Iran (Azerbaijan- Syunik-Nakhchivan-Turkey) or Zangezur Corridor.

However, Tehran sided with Yerevan on the issue of the Zangezur Corridor and the dispute still remains. As of September 2022, Iran warned against changing the Azerbaijan-Armenia borders.

In addition to this, the expansion of relations between Iran and Armenia, the opening of the Iranian consulate in the city of Qapan in Armenia, the military maneuvers on the border of Aras, and in a way Iran's tacit support for Armenia can be seen, which is not welcomed by Baku. In fact, if the drills of Iran and Azerbaijan continue on the border like in the past years, it will not be possible to change the conditions to a completely normal situation in terms of relations.

Also, Tehran is worried about Turkey's aggressive policy near its borders. Iran is worried that the strengthening of Turkey's foothold in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus will limit Tehran's access to Armenia and weaken its transit advantage and its military-political and commercial-economic position. This would be a geopolitical disaster for Iran.

In another dimension, the deepening of relations between Azerbaijan and "Israel" has added to Iran's concerns, as in 2022, trade exchanges between Azerbaijan and "Israel" will reach more than 1.2 billion dollars. From Tehran's point of view, "Israel's" presence in the region and the relations between Azerbaijan and the Israeli occupation (like an iceberg) can lead to tension and differences in the relations between Tehran and Baku.

The expansion of relations between Azerbaijan and "Israel", and the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in "Tel Aviv" have also been criticized by Iran. For many years, Iran has accused "Israel" of attacks against its interests and sees allowing military presence near the borders, and sheltering Israeli forces in Azerbaijan, as practically turning Azerbaijan into a field of attack against Iran.

On the other hand, the reduction of Moscow's presence in the South Caucasus will force Iran to look for ways to increase its position in the region. But if Baku still feels that Tehran is not in a position to maintain its power in the South Caucasus, the tensions and conflicts will increase. Meanwhile, the 3+3 talks (Georgia+ Armenia+ Azerbaijan and Russia+ Iran+ Turkey) can be a useful solution to reduce tension and advance solutions for the Caucasus.

Politics and security

Iran is against the presence of foreign and extra-regional forces in the South Caucasus. The danger of the presence of foreign fighters near Iran's borders will lead to a reaction by Tehran.

In addition, the fact that Azerbaijani members of ISIS citizens were included in the terror attack on the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, and Baku's greater security and military cooperation with "Israel" and NATO, in addition to the arrest of many spies, can have a more negative impact on bilateral relations in the future.

Moreover, more than 12 percent of Iran's population are Azeri, and they are mostly present in the northwest of the country. Separatist activities in Iran can be an important challenge.

Iran is sensitive to some separatist sentiments and the reaction of pan-Azeri movements in the Republic of Azerbaijan. If the media and authorities of Azerbaijan fuel separatism, it can make relations much more challenging. In addition, continuous criticism can increase the scope of problems, and in November 2022, Iran's ambassador to Baku, and Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tehran, were summoned.

Economic relations

Despite the 25% growth of trade between the two countries, with the trade balance reaching about 120 million dollars, the fact is that Iran's trade with Azerbaijan does not constitute a significant figure, and despite the effects of political and security decisions, numerous economic potentials have not yet been realized.

The perspective of relationships

Condemning the armed attack at the entrance of the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tehran, Iran announced the arrest of the assailant and the investigation of various aspects of the incident.

In this situation, if Tehran convinces Baku about the result of the investigations, the punishment of criminals, and guarantees the security of diplomatic missions, relations will probably face an improvement.

There is already tension in the relations between Baku and Tehran, but it is possible to avoid breaking relationships or making them more dramatic.

Paying attention to the opportunities and political economic potentials in relations, such as fulfilling all the agreements reached, Iran's participation in the revival of Nagorno-Karabakh, the reconstruction of the railway line, the outpost in the Khoda Afrin area, the construction of a bridge over the Aras River, the completion of the North-South International Corridor (INSC) and... can lead to the restoration of relations.

However, the assumption of severance of relations between the two countries and even a military intervention is very pessimistic. Due to the existence of various geopolitical and political security variables involved, it is more likely that relations be reduced to a consulate level (Iranian consulate in Nakhchivan and Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz) or that diplomatic and political interaction be reduced in the short term. 

The opinions mentioned in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Al mayadeen, but rather express the opinion of its writer exclusively.
 


#254 MosJan

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Posted 02 March 2023 - 11:59 AM



#255 MosJan

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Posted 02 March 2023 - 12:00 PM



#256 Yervant1

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Posted 11 March 2023 - 10:36 AM

pngDuV_013uCJ.png
March 10 2023
 
 
Iran warns Turkey that it is uncomfortable with Israel’s presence in the Caucasus
 
 

Levent Kenez/Stockholm

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated at a press conference on Wednesday that Israel’s presence in the Caucasus is a threat to peace in the region, following a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, to whom he paid a visit to show solidarity with Turkey due to devastating earthquakes that struck the country on February 6.

Beginning his speech by applauding March 8, International Women’s Day, Abdollahian said women are the main element of society in Iran.

Stating that both countries should be sensitive to and careful about security in the region, the Iranian minister claimed that the most important reason for the crisis in the Caucasus was the presence of Israel in the region.

“We see the presence of the Zionist regime in the region as a major threat to peace and stability. Wherever this regime is involved, there has been insecurity and crisis. The Islamic Republic of Iran warns the parties to pay close attention to the behavior of the Zionist regime. They should not allow its presence in the region,” said the Iranian minister.

The basis of what Abdollahian implicitly expressed is no doubt the growing cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey. Iran sees Israel’s presence in Azerbaijan as part of its encirclement by the West. Tehran has long claimed that Israel is conducting intelligence operations by using Azeri elements in Iran and that it has succeeded in carrying out some sabotage and assassinations.

Israel had maintained a balance in relations with Armenia during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020; however, it at the same time provided tacit support to Azerbaijan. A significant number of the military vehicles and drones that led Azerbaijan to victory were purchased from Israel. Armenia protested this support by withdrawing its ambassador, whom it had appointed only two weeks earlier, in October 2020. In addition, during celebrations held after Azerbaijan’s victory, some Azerbaijanis waved the Israeli flag along with the flags of Azerbaijan and Turkey.

az-tr-is-flags.jpeg

Turkish media reported that according the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 26.6 percent of arms sales to Azerbaijan between 2011-2020 were from Israel. It is estimated that 17 percent of Israel’s total arms sales are directed to Azerbaijan. Israel is Azerbaijan’s third largest trading partner with exports of $1.33 billion, meeting 40 percent of Israel’s oil needs. Israel was the source of 69 percent of Azerbaijan’s arms purchases between 2016 and 2020.

Another issue that came to the agenda during the Iranian minister’s visit is Tehran’s insistence on playing an active role in the normalization of relations between Turkey and Syria.

The first high-level bilateral contact between Ankara and Damascus since the civil war that started in Syria in 2011 took place on December 28, 2022. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan met with Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas and head of intelligence Ali Mamlouk, hosted by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

Çavuşoğlu said he told his Iranian colleague that there was no problem with Iran’s participation in the next  meeting that will be held between foreign ministers, adding that the only mechanism for Syria that exists at the moment is the Astana Process, the quartet platform comprising Turkey, Syria, Iran and Russia.

 

Noting that work for a Turkish-Syrian-Russian foreign ministers meeting is under way, Çavuşoğlu said, “We’re planning to have all four parties involved. The Russians offered to hold a meeting at the technical level for the preparation of a possible foreign ministers meeting for next week. We’ll send our deputy minister to Moscow. The Iranian side will also participate,” he said.

https://nordicmonito.../2023/03/26020/



#257 Yervant1

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Posted 17 March 2023 - 06:32 AM

pngyGALdTtzgC.png
March 15 2023
 
 
Further strain in Azerbaijan-Iran relations Azerbaijan sent two notes of protest in the past week to its southern neighbor, with whom relations have been steadily deteriorating. Heydar Isayev Mar 15, 2023
 

Azerbaijan's strained relations with Iran aren't getting any better. Baku has sent two protest notes to Tehran in recent days.  

On March 11, Azerbaijan's foreign and defense ministries said in a joint statement that a military aircraft belonging to Iran flew non-stop along much of the length of the Azerbaijan-Iran state border from the direction of Zangilan district to Bilasuvar district and back. The route included several districts that Azerbaijan retook from Armenian forces in the 2020 Second Karabakh War. 

"Contrary to the internationally accepted practice of warning the neighboring country in advance about approaching military aircraft to the state border, such a close proximity of a military aircraft of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the state border between the two countries and flying over the border line threatens the safety of civil aviation, and further deteriorates bilateral relations," the English statement read. 

"The flight of a military aircraft for more than half an hour near the liberated territories of Azerbaijan is a provocation and unfriendly behavior towards Azerbaijan." 

It added that the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Seyyed Abbas Mousavi, had been summoned to the Foreign Ministry and was handed a note of protest.

Iran responded publicly two days later when Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani said the flight was routine and took place well inside Iranian territory. By publicly protesting the flight and summoning the ambassador, Baku was "acting not in good faith" and "outside the bounds of normal relations between countries, especially neighboring countries," he said.

Earlier, on March 9, the spokesperson of Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry, Aykhan Hajizade, told local media that Azerbaijan sent a note to Iran and was awaiting answers regarding the whereabouts of an Azerbaijani citizen who was lost in Iran. Farid Safarli, 26, had been in Iran since February 20 and was supposed to fly to Germany on March 4, but since then there has been no news of him, Hajizade said. 

Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry advised citizens "not to travel to Iran unless necessary, and those who do travel to show high caution" on January 27, after a deadly attack by a gunman on its embassy in Tehran. 

Following the embassy attack, where the security chief was killed and two officers were wounded, Azerbaijan evacuated its embassy staff, effectively scaling back diplomatic relations. 

On February 17, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev directly blamed "some branches of the Iranian establishment" for the attack and told journalists that the relations between the two countries could be normalized only after those responsible are brought to justice. 

The embassy attack was the most dramatic single incident in a deterioration of Baku-Tehran ties that has been going on for years. Azerbaijan has long accused Iran of favoring Armenia in the decades-long conflict over Karabakh – especially after the 2020 war, when Azerbaijan established control over its entire frontier with Iran.

Since then, Azerbaijan has regularly accused Iran of sending weapons to Armenians in Karabakh, and the two countries have repeatedly held military training along their shared border.

Another, related, factor in the tensions is Azerbaijan's warm ties with Iran's archrival Israel. 

Azerbaijan's active military cooperation with Israel -- whose extent was outlined in a recent article in Haaretz -- was instrumental in Baku's victory in the 2020 war. Tehran worries that Israel uses Azerbaijan as a base for gathering intelligence on Iran and views it as a staging ground for possible future attacks. 

A day before the controversial border flight, on March 10, Azerbaijani President Aliyev had a meeting with Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel in Baku. 

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to detain alleged Iran-backed agents of destabilization. On March 13, the pro-government news agency APA reported that 32 people "who carried out acts of sabotage and disruption under the guise of religion were identified and detained," though the news has yet to be confirmed by law enforcement. 

"Investigators established that they organized the sale of narcotics sent purposefully from the Islamic Republic of Iran and used the huge amount of money they got to promote religious radicalism in Azerbaijan and finance other disruptive activities," the report read.

Heydar Isayev is a journalist from Baku.

https://eurasianet.o...-iran-relations



#258 Yervant1

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Posted 29 March 2023 - 07:45 AM

pngxlGi01AErF.png
March 27 2023
 
 
Iran Not Opposed to Deployment of EU Monitoring Mission Along Armenian-Azerbaijani Border Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 50 By: Vali Kaleji

March 27, 2023 05:27 PM Age: 16 hours

EU-mission-to-border-640x360.jpg
(Source: The Moscow TImes)

The Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Abbas Badakhshan Zohouri, announced on the sidelines of the “Armenia-Iran Relations in Context of Common Interests” forum, which was held on February 10, that “Iran does not oppose the deployment of a civilian EU [European Union] monitoring mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border” (PanArmenian.net, February 10). Although the Iranian ambassador did not directly mention Azerbaijan, the Zangezur Corridor, nor the possible blockage of the common border between Iran and Armenia, nevertheless, he stipulated, “Armenia and Iran are and will be neighbors. Of course, we see some ruse, they speak about so-called corridors and some actions, but Iran and Armenia will not allow the creation of such a corridor” (Massis Post, February 9).

Tehran’s position on the EU mission is important for a number of reasons. First, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout the past three decades, traditionally, Iran has opposed the intervention of extra-regional forces, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, EU and United States, in the regional conflicts of the South Caucasus. For example, former Iranian ambassador to Armenia, Seyed Ali Saghaeyan, at a news conference in Yerevan on June 23, 2010, mentioned that “Iran is strongly opposed to US involvement in a multinational peacekeeping force that would presumably be deployed around Nagorno-Karabakh after the signing of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace accord” (Azatutyun.com, June 23, 2010).

In fact, Iran has traditionally supported a regional approach to developments in the South Caucasus, including efforts to find a solution to the Karabakh stand-off between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For this reason, Iran did not oppose the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces to the Karabakh region after the Second Karabakh War in 2020, nor to Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. In this regard, Iran supports the “3+3” regional cooperation format, which includes Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan plus Russia, Turkey and Iran. The format could serve as a new postwar regional integration platform (see EDM, June 16, 2021), as “over the past three decades, various initiatives for regional cooperation in the South Caucasus have been proposed, but none proved successful or long-lasting because each failed to include all of the wider region’s key members.” Thus, against this backdrop, especially in supporting the 3+3 regional cooperation format, Iran’s lack of opposition to the deployment of the EU monitoring mission represents a newfound approach.

Second, while Iran has not opposed the EU mission, Azerbaijan and Russia have voiced their opposition to it. In this regard, on January 10, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described the mission as a “fraud” (Media Max, January 24). For Russia’s part, during a press briefing on October 11, 2022, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova proclaimed, “We see this as yet another attempt by the EU to interfere by any means in the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan to oust our country’s mediation efforts” (Armenian Weekly, October 12, 2022). While the difference in positions between Tehran and Baku was not surprising, it was rather unexpected that the Russian view diverged from that of Iran as the two sides have traditionally agreed on how to approach the South Caucasus.

Third, Tehran’s position on the EU mission is largely the result of Iranian uneasiness concerning threats to its common border with Armenia. Overall, Tehran is not opposed to the implementation of the “ninth clause of the 2020 Karabakh ceasefire agreement,” but it strongly opposes the “change of international borders” in the South Caucasus, as well as “the blocking of the Iranian-Armenian border” (see EDM, October 14, 2022). Therefore, the Iranian government hopes to prevent the realization of these threats near Iran’s northwestern borders through the auspices of the EU monitoring mission.

Importantly, Iran has basically only been able to rely on Armenia in supporting these concerns over the past two years; Russia has not had the expected position regarding the security and border concerns of Iran and Armenia, especially in relation to the Zangezur Corridor. In fact, the Kremlin has demonstrated that it seemingly does not share Iran’s perception that the blocking of its common border with Armenia represents a serious security threat. For this reason, Moscow, unlike Tehran and Yerevan, not only does not object to Baku’s desired corridor but also believes that this corridor should be implemented to remove blockages in communication and transit routes (JAM-news, November 28, 2022).

In this regard, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mikhail Bocharnikov, who believes the necessary plans are in place for the development of the Zangezur Corridor, argued, “I do not see any unsolvable differences on this issue” (Hetq, February 9). In Iran, the view is prevalent that, despite the common interests of Iran and Russia in maintaining the balance of power in the South Caucasus, Russia’s transit, commercial and banking needs vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Turkey following the re-invasion of Ukraine have made Moscow more flexible in its relations with Baku and Ankara.

As the conflict zones between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh region and Syunik province, are in the southern part of the region, Iran is in a “very vulnerable situation” as compared to Georgia, Turkey and Russia. As a result, Iran “strongly opposes” another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan because it would directly threaten Iranian security and border conditions (Regioncenter.info, February 12). However, despite the direct consequences of both Karabakh wars on Iran’s northwestern border, unlike Ankara and Moscow, Tehran does not have a representative at the joint Russian-Turkish center for monitoring the ceasefire regime in Karabakh.

In these circumstances, Iran’s positive position regarding the EU monitoring mission could be a sign of Tehran’s dissatisfaction with the positions of Moscow and Baku—in spite of the fact that “Iran has always balked at the injection of more foreign actors in its backyard.” In truth, the EU mission could provide a balancing force that is “in line with Iran’s interests,” even when relations between Brussels and Tehran are at an “all-time low” (Al-Monitor, January 31).

However, it is extremely unlikely that Iran’s positive stance on the EU mission will be taken to the step of agreeing to the possible deployment of foreign military forces near Iran’s borders. In fact, this will likely remain in place as Tehran’s “red line” in the South Caucasus. Instead, it seems that, within the atmosphere of close relations between Tehran and Moscow, especially since the start of the war in Ukraine, Iran will prefer to convince Russia to accompany and pay more attention to Iran’s security concerns, as well as to prevent a change in the balance of power in the region to the detriment of both Moscow and Tehran.

 

https://jamestown.or...baijani-border/



#259 MosJan

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Posted 30 March 2023 - 11:06 AM



#260 Yervant1

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Posted 31 March 2023 - 08:21 AM

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March 30 2023
 
OPINION Existential crisis for Iran in South Caucasus
The question now is whether diplomacy will be enough to pull all sides back from the brink
By NIKOLA MIKOVICMARCH 30, 2023
 

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are threatening to destabilize the South Caucasus, prompting some to worry that Iran could eventually be pulled into a wider regional conflict. But is Iran really prepared to invade its Shia-majority neighbor to protect Armenia, or are recent military moves little more than bluster?

While Azerbaijan’s military continues to capture parts of Nagorno-Karabakh – internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan despite being under Armenian control for three decades – leaders in the energy-rich country accuse the Islamic Republic of amassing troops near its exclave of Nakhchivan, on Iran’s northwestern border.

Tehran hasn’t denied the allegations. On the contrary, the al-Quds Force – one of five branches of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – has reported that its bases near the Armenia-Azerbaijan border are on high alert for a possible attack.

Heavy logistical movements of the Azerbaijani army raised concerns in Iran that an operation against Armenia was imminent, and IRGC commander Brigadier-General Mohammad Pakpour visited the area last Friday.

There are even reports that IRGC forces in Iran’s provinces of East and West Azerbaijan – where ethnic Azeris make up most of the population – have been ordered to full combat readiness

But despite the recent spike in tensions, the current situation in the South Caucasus remains manageable, and Iran’s calculations are more strategic than tactical. At least for now. 

Azerbaijan uses the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a way to pressure Armenia to build its section of the Nakhchivan corridor, a land route that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan via southern Armenia’s province of Syunik. If built under Baku’s terms, the corridor would in effect cut off Iran from Armenia, something that Alireza Monadi, a representative of the Iranian city of Tabriz, said Tehran “will not allow.”

(Indeed, Mohammad-Reza Mirtajodini, Iran’s former vice-president for parliamentary affairs, has even called for Tehran to annex Nakhchivan in response.) 

The IRGC was even more direct. On its official Telegram channels, the Revolutionary Guard posted open threats to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev over his “hostile actions against Armenia.” Iran seems determined to prevent a potential Azerbaijani attack on southern Armenia, though it remains unclear how far it might go to avert such a scenario.

The reason for Iran’s concern is simple: Azerbaijan’s control over southern Armenia would jeopardize Tehran’s positions in the South Caucasus, and pose an existential threat to the Islamic Republic itself.

In the north, Iran would be completely surrounded by Turkic countries, and Tehran fears that Azerbaijan could eventually allow Israel to use its territory for attacks on the Islamic Republic. Already, Azerbaijan is strengthening its military and intelligence relations with Israel – Iran’s arch-enemy. 

If Tehran turns a blind eye to Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation, such a move could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. That’s why Tehran is expected to continue flexing its military muscles in the region – aiming to demonstrate that the territorial integrity of Armenia is Iran’s red line.

Time may be on Iran’s side, as the only major incident recently was in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Azerbaijani forces took “urgent measures” to prevent the construction of a road to bypass the Lachin corridor – the only road connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

For now, diplomacy appears to be the desired course of action. On March 11, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador in Baku to protest against the presence of an Iranian warplane over the disputed area. 

Earlier this year, Azerbaijan closed its embassy in Tehran and evacuated staff and their families after a gunman stormed the diplomatic mission, killing the security chief and wounding two guards. Thus diplomatic relations between the two neighbors remain tense, and both sides occasionally add fuel to the fire.

The question now is whether diplomacy will be enough to pull all sides back from the brink. Azerbaijan has considered engaging ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran as instruments against the Islamic Republic.

Last November, President Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan would “do everything to protect the rights, freedoms, and security of Azerbaijanis living abroad, including Azerbaijanis in Iran.” His statement was a direct message to the Islamic Republic, designed to show that Baku has significant leverage in, and over Tehran. 

Iran, for its part, could use the Shia factor as its trump card against Azerbaijan. But this could backfire, given that Baku frequently arrests members of Shiite groups that are allegedly planning to carry out acts of sabotage and disruption under the guise of religion.

If, however, Iran decides to raise the stakes and attack Israeli-backed Azerbaijan under any pretext, it risks an open confrontation with a country that will be strongly supported not only by Israel, but also by NATO member Turkey.

Thus policymakers in Tehran will have to think twice before taking any action in the South Caucasus. Direct confrontation can be avoided, but only if cooler heads prevail.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureauwhich holds copyright.

https://asiatimes.co...south-caucasus/






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