The Turkish-Israeli odd couple
by Raphael Israeli
Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs
Volume 45, Issue 1,
Pages 65-79 (Winter 2001)
Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Cultures, University of
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Turkey and Israel, by all accounts the predominant powers in the Middle
East, have in the past decade forged an unlikely alliance that baffles many
a keen observer of the region. On the face of it, there would seem to be
little historical or contemporary logic to a close relationship between the
two. One is large in size and population, the other comparatively tiny. One
is the well-established successor to a glorious empire, the other an
embattled state whose boundaries and very existence are challenged by
neighbors. One is Muslim, the other Jewish. One is just emerging from Third
World status and aspiring to join the European Union, the other thoroughly
modernized and well entrenched in Western culture. One is notoriously
deficient with regard to international norms of human rights and the rule of
law, the other a respected liberal democracy. One is subject to the whims of
its military, the other supremely civilian in its demeanor.
No one would suggest that some sudden love affair suffices to explain the
stunning rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. Nor could one point to new
common interests attracting the two to each other, because their common
borders with Arab states, common stand against terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism, cooperation in Central Asia, and certain economic interests
all pre-date the current entente and have occasionally caused as much
hostility as amicability. Rather, the origins of this momentous shift, which
is likely to shape the contours of Middle Eastern politics in the
foreseeable future, may be found in a triad of new contingencies: the end of
the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and the technological revolution
in Israel. The new configuration of regional and global forces unleashed by
these three contingencies has enabled Turkey and Israel to pursue a
partnership in military and civil, strategic and economic, institutional and
human affairs - a close relationship founded on shared interests that has
the potential to develop into an intimate and lasting rapport.
A telescoped chronology
The amazing development of bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel in
the 1990s stands out against the backdrop of the tenuous connection between
the two countries during the preceding forty years. Turkey recognized Israel
upon its birth in 1948, and in the following year, diplomatic relations
began at the level of legation, meaning that ministers, not ambassadors,
were exchanged. However, in November 1980, when the Knesset's passage of the
Jerusalem Law caused outrage throughout the Islamic world, Turkey recalled
its minister and downgraded relations to the level of second secretary, one
step short of breaking off diplomatic relations completely. It was not until
1985 that they were informally restored to the minister level.
Relations between Turkey and Israel began to improve dramatically after the
Gulf War and the announcement of the Madrid conference. The two nations
exchanged ambassadors in November 1991, and soon afterward Israeli president
Chaim Herzog visited Istanbul. When Turkish president Turgut Özal died in
April 1993, Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres attended the funeral in
Ankara, whereupon the Turkish foreign minister traveled to Israel in
November to conclude a cultural agreement. In January 1994 the president of
Israel made a state visit to Turkey, followed by another official visit by
the Israeli foreign minister to sign an agreement on the environment. In May
1994 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish parliament visited Israel.
Six months later, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller went to Israel with seven
ministers to conclude pacts on communications, law enforcement, and drugs,
and apparently also to discuss broader security and strategic concerns. At
least three more high-level visits took place in 1995, including Çiller's
attendance at the funeral of murdered Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
The diversity, frequency, and reciprocity of visits during the mid-1990s by
top-level officials - a tempo without parallel even in the links Israel has
maintained with the United States - suggested the importance that both
Turkey and Israel ascribed to their blossoming relationship. Was the frenzy
intended to make up for four decades of lost opportunities, or to catch up
with growing strategic dangers, or was it simply a reaction by Turkey to its
rejection by the European Community and its hope that, via Israel, it could
curry favor with the United States? Whatever the motives, there was a
certain paradox in the fact that from the 1950s through the 1980s, when
Israel was isolated and desperately sought an alliance with "outer ring"
states (including Iran and Ethiopia), Ankara shunned the Israelis, whereas
in the 1990s, when Israel was actively pursuing peace, breaking up the siege
that had enclosed it, and entertaining demarches from many nations, Turkey
should be so eager and forthcoming.
In the first half of 1996, further high-level visits and agreements attested
to the growing strength of the relationship. But in July of that year, the
Islamist head of Turkey's Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP), Necmettin
Erbakan, became prime minister, sparking apprehension that his commitment to
an Islamic foreign policy might threaten the rapprochement. But those fears
were mitigated by Çiller's retaining oversight of Turkish foreign policy as
deputy prime minister. Israeli president Ezer Weizman also held
consultations with leaders of several Turkish parties in Istanbul shortly
after Erbakan's ascent to power, and in April 1997 Erbakan himself received
Foreign Minister David Levy of Israel. In the succeeding years, reciprocal
visits by leading officials ensured the continued development of the
Turkish-Israeli relationship.
The event that lent a human dimension to this diplomacy was the series of
tragic earthquakes that shook western Turkey in the summer of 1999, causing
widespread death and destruction. In an effort out of all proportion to the
size and the resources of the country, and one that strengthened goodwill
far beyond the official level, Israel sent rescue teams, established field
hospitals, and donated great amounts of food, medicine, and money to Turkey.
Prime Minister Ehud Barak himself flew in to dedicate a prefabricated
village erected by Israelis to lodge some of the survivors of the quake.
Israel then maintained its assistance in the wake of another tremor in
November 1999, and it is symbolic that while the first rescue operation was
dubbed "Lifeline Operation," the second was called "Fraternity between
Nations."
In 2000, Turkey and Israel kept up the dizzying pace of contacts established
over the previous years. Weizman was invited to Turkey for his fifth visit,
and several Turkish ministers went to Israel to ask for assistance in the
reconstruction of devastated sites and rehabilitation of displaced
populations. Their requests for help indicated the extent to which their
countries' ties had been strengthened throughout the decade. The array of
visits and agreements, which resulted in sales of weapons by Israel and
permission for Israeli pilots to train over Turkish air space, also
engendered institutionalized dialogues. Since July 1999, a forum comprising
the two foreign ministers and other high officials has met regularly for
consultations, a strategic dialogue has brought together the top brass and
defense officials, and an academic dialogue has been established between the
Institute of Foreign Relations in Ankara and the Dayan Center at Tel-Aviv
University. Finally, the two nations' ministries of tourism jointly
published huge advertisements in the New York Times to attract tourists on
combined visits, prompting the Turkish press to run such headlines as
"Turkey-Israel: The Romantic Couple."1
Turkey's uneasy identity with the Middle East
Turkey's population of over 60 million people, 60 percent of whom live in
urban areas, is suffering from a severe identity crisis due to domestic and
international developments. For a democratic country that saw three military
takeovers in the last generation before government reverted to civilian
hands, the rise of Islam now presents a paradox. As in Egypt, Pakistan, and
Jordan, where the process of liberalization provoked a countercurrent in the
form of political Islam, Turkey has discovered that allowing all its people
to express themselves freely often results in their choosing Islam as a
focus of individual, communal, and political identity. This was so alarming
to the Turkish military, which regards itself as the guardian of the secular
legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, that it did not hesitate to force out the
democratically elected Erbakan government in 1997, given the latter's eager
and evident tilt toward Islamism and away from Israel.2 But breaking the
thermometer did not cure the fever. Rather, the military coup probably
exacerbated the Islamist challenge by spawning extraparliamentary movements
on the Right and the Left that resort to violence and threaten to undermine
domestic stability.
The late Turkish president Turgut Özal was often quoted as saying: "Turkey
is a secular state, I am not; I am a Muslim." This comment reflects the
inherent tension between the identity of most individuals as Muslims who
follow Islamic practice to varying degrees, and their role within a state
that has officially divorced itself from the faith. While in the West the
separation of the sacred and the secular has been effected relatively
painlessly and seems to work, no Islamic country has been able to come to
terms with such a separation, not even modern Turkey. Indeed, after visiting
Turkey in late 1996, the daughter of Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani noted similarities between the situation in Turkey and that in
"Iran at the end of the Shah's reign."3 This ominous comparison was perhaps
what prompted the military to install Mesut Yilmaz as prime minister and
send Erbakan packing in June 1997.
While the blunt intervention of the army calls into question Turkey's
maturity as a modern liberal state, there is no doubt that it also reflects
Turkey's determination to continue to align itself solidly with the West,
including Israel. It is equally evident, however, that Islam has insinuated
itself into the heart of Turkey's outwardly secular political system.
Islam has insinuated itself into the heart of Turkey's secular political
system.
It is reasonable to assume that should Islam reemerge as a strong political
force, the question of Turkish identity will again come to the fore and
militate against the present rapprochement with Israel.4
As a Muslim country and a member of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, Turkey has always had to walk a tightrope between its interest
in maintaining a relationship with Israel and its cultural, economic,
historical, and emotional commitment to Islam. For most of the period
preceding the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, Ankara tilted toward its
Islamic neighbors.5 But the worldwide process of globalization and sustained
development that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Persian
Gulf War drew Jerusalem and Ankara closer together. Many Arab and Islamic
countries and societies, however, remained fearful of such all-encompassing
changes and distanced themselves from their erstwhile Turkish ally. Turkish
president Süleyman Demirel's declaration that "Israel and Turkey have
decided on regional cooperation for increasing the economic welfare of the
region and curbing terrorism" contrasts sharply with the continuous attacks
on Israel by intellectuals and policymakers even in Arab countries that have
signed peace accords with Israel.6
The question of counterterrorism is of particular interest in this context,
because Israel and Turkey both found themselves in boundary disputes with
Syria (over the Golan Heights and Alexandrite, respectively) and opposed
Syria's efforts to establish hegemony in Lebanon. What is more, Damascus
also supported and sheltered terrorist groups directed against either Israel
or Turkey.7 Considering that Israel had backed the Kurdish rebellions in
Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s, it must have been difficult to collaborate with
the Turks in their own struggle against Kurdish insurgents. But Israel's
interest in thwarting Syria meshed well with Turkey's campaign against the
Syrian-supported Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-PKK),
and evidently outweighed points of principle. As for the Turks, their
simultaneous pursuit of relations with Israel and the Arabs was likened to a
man
who had both a wife and a mistress: he may feel a special attraction to his
mistress who possesses certain charms his wife lacks, but in public he must
appear a dutiful husband and cannot even officially acknowledge the
existence of the mistress. This is all the more true if the wife comes, as
do the Arabs, from a large and prominent family and has brought a big dowry
to the marriage.8
To be sure, Israelis resented this analogy because their country had never
demanded that Turkey divorce itself from its Arab and Muslim neighbors.
Israelis have always sought what the Turks were reluctant to grant them,
namely, a full and openly acknowledged relationship.
Turkey's long rebuff of Israel owes much to the treatment of the former by
the West. Turkey realized in the 1960s that in spite of its secularism,
loyalty to NATO, and attempts to emulate the West, its security was ignored
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent crisis over Cyprus.
Far from enjoying U.S. support, Ankara watched as the Americans rushed to
support Greece, "going so far as to supply the Greek Cypriots with arms for
their campaign against the Turkish minority and the British in Cyprus."9 The
Turks considered this a stab in the back and therefore pursued Muslim
solidarity in the wake of the OPEC embargo of 1973. Commercial relations
between Turkey and the Arab states picked up, especially with regard to
Turkish oil imports. But after the mid-1980s, the volume of that trade
slacked off, and its character changed as Turkish exports increased and its
oil imports decreased, diminishing considerably Ankara's dependence on those
ties. 10
Remarkable in this web of Turkish relations with the Arab world was its
love-hate relationship with Iraq. Both countries struggled against the
Kurds, who constituted about one-fifth of their respective populations.
Moreover, Baghdad's ability to sustain its long war with Iran in the 1980s
depended on the flow of oil across Turkish territory and the importation of
foodstuffs via Turkish ports. On the other hand, debt issues, conflict over
water distribution, and Turkey's support of the United States during
Operation Desert Storm drove Turkish-Iraqi relations to new lows. As a
consequence of that war, Turkey confronted not only vast economic deficits,
but also hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees who streamed across the
border from Iraq to find asylum on its territory. At the same time, however,
Turkey was also instrumental in implementing the oil-for-food program, which
eased Turkey's economic pressures by allowing it to ship oil from and
foodstuffs to Iraq.
In sum, Turkey's ties with the Muslim world have been mixed indeed. But
during much of the 1980s, even that equivocal relationship was warm compared
to the chill between Turkey and Israel.11 After passage of the Jerusalem Law
in 1980, the Turkish consulate general in Jerusalem was closed down,
allegedly under the pressure of Erbakan's Islamist party, and Turkish
Airlines and Turkish Maritime Lines ceased transport between Turkey and
Israel. It was not until 1986 that the level of diplomatic representation
was raised again, setting the stage for the entente that blossomed during
the 1990s.
The stunning events of 1989-91
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War sharply reduced
the importance of Turkey in the Western defense system and forced Ankara to
reevaluate its standing in the world. It was perhaps no coincidence that it
was in a meeting of Israel's and Turkey's foreign ministers in Moscow that
both sides sought to mend their relationship and exchange ambassadors for
the first time. The immediate causes were the outcome of Desert Storm and
the subsequent Madrid conference on Palestinian-Israeli peace. But the
rapprochement also stemmed from a clear realization by both parties that the
heralded new world order necessitated an upgrading of their relations.
Israel, having long pursued closer ties, needed no prodding. But the
prevailing opinion in Ankara was that the turn-about on relations with
Israel constituted one of the most important events in Turkish foreign
policy in the past fifty years.12
As a result of the Gulf War and the weakening of the Iraqi army, Turkey felt
secure, especially since the war left in Turkish hands vast amounts of
American weapons, including armored vehicles, fighter aircraft, and
missiles. It also received billions of dollars' worth of export contracts,
oil deliveries, customs concessions, canceled debts, grants, and access to
markets - all as compensation for its immense financial losses during the
war.13 Moreover, Turkey's support for the Western coalition against Iraq,
which was calculated to gain favor with the European Union, paid off at
least in part in 1995, when Ankara concluded a customs agreement with the
EU - far short of the full membership that Turkey covets, but a significant
step in that direction. 14 Hence, the Gulf War reminded the West that, even
in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey remained a
significant strategic asset.
The Madrid conference, closely followed by the Oslo accords of September
1993 between Israelis and Palestinians, solved another dilemma for the Turks
and allowed them to draw closer to Israel. For reasons more emotional than
rational, the Palestinian cause enjoyed almost universal support among the
Turkish citizenry. For the Islamists there, the matter was unambiguous:
Muslims must side with their coreligionists anywhere and under all
circumstances. Thus, Turkish foreign minister Mumtaz Soysal insisted in late
1994 that what Israel called Palestinian "terrorism" was merely the
Palestinians' attempt to defend their rights.15 The Israeli ambassador to
Turkey in those days, Zvi Elpeleg, also was of the opinion that no foreign
issue was of more concern to the Turks than the fate of the Palestinians.
Even such a left-wing intellectual as Ilhan Selcuk, a sworn secularist and
advocate of strong ties with Israel, believed that before any rapprochement
could occur, Israel had to "discharge all its obligations to the
Palestinians." 16 It is no wonder, then, that the Oslo accords removed one
of the greatest barriers to closer Turkish relations with Israel.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Azerbaijan and
the five republics of Central Asia, a fierce competition for the loyalty of
those countries and their inhabitants developed among Iran, Turkey, the
Arabs, and to a lesser extent Israel.17 The competition was not merely a
conventional struggle for spheres of influence, but (in the case of Iran and
Turkey especially) a sustained effort reminiscent of the Cold War in that
all means short of military confrontation were employed. While Turkey, as a
modernizing and pro-Western state, appealed to the urban elites in those
fledgling republics, Iran seemed to capitalize on popular support in the
countryside. 18 Of course, Islam in Central Asia had been diluted by seventy
years of Communist rule, and the people might have been expected to find the
moderate, secular regime in Turkey appealing. But at the same time, many
Central Asian Muslims were fascinated by the revival of their faith as the
basis for a total political, ethical, and social order, precisely because
they were long deprived of it. 19 This mood may have been further fostered
by the rout of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover there in
late 1996.
Not surprisingly, the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism was a
source of great concern to both Israel and Turkey, as well as to their joint
ally and benefactor, the United States. Turkey, taking advantage of its
ethno-linguistic affiliation with most of Central Asia (save Iranian
Tajikistan), mounted an orchestrated effort to establish a political,
cultural, and economic foothold there. As Prime Minister (later President)
Demirel put it at that time, those republics regarded Turkey as their "big
brother." Turkey's growing role in Central Asia stemmed not only from the
rapid dismantling of the Soviet empire, but also from the disintegration in
the Balkans and the rejection that Turkey encountered in Europe in spite of
its decades-long attempt to identify as European. Although it was a member
of NATO (an honor it had won thanks to its participation in the Korean War
in the 1950s), Turkey remained on the fringe of the European Union while its
archenemy Greece had gained full admittance. It was natural for the Turks,
therefore, to look eastwards and entertain pan-Turkic dreams. In June 1992,
having established a directorate for relations with the Commonwealth of
Independent States as well as with the nations of the Balkans and the
Caucasus, Turkey hosted a symposium of all Turkic-speaking nations and
minorities and a conference to create a new forum in which Turkey might play
a determining role.20
Aware that the future of these countries would hinge on their economic
progress, Demirel signed a series of commercial agreements with the new
republics, and President Özal visited all of them to ensure that Turkish
diplomatic, cultural, and economic influence would be omnipresent. With this
sustained effort (systematically supported by the United States), Turkey
sought to bring Central Asia closer to the West. For Ankara the stakes were,
and remain, high: if it does not respond to the Central Asians' eagerness to
draw close to them, they might be pushed into the arms of radical Iran or
fundamentalist Muslims. But if the Turks themselves go overboard in their
effort to court Central Asian governments, they might only give the European
Union new excuses to block their Westernization. Ankara's motivation for
increased reliance on the United States as a partner in its Central Asian
strategy thus became more apparent: Turkey understands that it could be
abandoned by Europe. And this is precisely where Turkish interests coincide
with those of Israel.
The attraction of Israel
Surprisingly enough, the new Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan have all
established diplomatic relations with Israel, although, due to their lack of
funds, not all have resident diplomatic missions yet. This is especially
noteworthy because, apart from Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, and
Senegal, the rest of the fifty-odd countries with large Islamic populations
have as yet been reluctant to commit themselves to full diplomatic relations
with Israel (which merely maintains interest offices in North African and
Persian Gulf states). However, the potential appeal of Israel to these new
nations is enormous for at least four reasons. First, most of these emerging
states are small in population if not in territory and are attracted by
Israel's model of how a small but determined state can achieve diplomatic,
economic, industrial, agricultural, technological, and military prowess.
Secondly, the stability of Israel's regime and its democratic nature offer
some hope to these new nations that by adopting similar sociopolitical
institutions, adapting to the technological and scientific environment of
the modern world, and internalizing certain values, even a small country can
thrive in the twenty-first century. Thirdly, Israel is considered by
developing countries, rightly or wrongly, as a conduit to the West in
general and the United States in particular. Emerging nations seeking
development assistance and foreign investment have usually established
diplomatic relations with Israel as soon as they shed their doctrinaire
Third World ideology and adopted pragmatic state-building policies.
Fourthly, Israel has broad experience and know-how to share in the fields of
water conservation, agrotechnology, and development of arid areas.
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, devastated by years of monoculture that polluted
their land and water, are much in need of Israeli expertise. So, too, are
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, which stand to benefit immensely
>From Israel's technologies.
These points of convergence not only attract Western and Turkish interest,
they also mesh well with Turkey's aspiration to forge a moderate, secular,
and developed Central Asia. Unlike great powers that may make their
assistance to those countries hinge on their global corporate interests or
use their power to exert political pressure, Israel offers aid without
demanding any collateral price. For its part, Turkey recognizes the value of
Israeli cooperation in shaping the future of Central Asia.
It is perhaps ironic that a forged anti-Semitic document concocted in
tsarist Russia at the turn of the twentieth century should reemerge again in
the past decades, not as a vicious and mischievous tool to fight the Jews,
but as a naive or benevolent myth to aggrandize Israel beyond measure. It is
true that in some circles, especially Arab and Islamic, the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion are still cited in their old anti-Semitic context.21 But the
new and far less invidious myth of Israel's international power, especially
in developing countries, draws from the same historical sources. For many
countries, including Turkey, Israel is important as a conduit for access to
the only remaining superpower. In short, the road to Washington leads
through Jerusalem.
This belief derives in part from the fact that Israel enjoys a privileged
and intimate relationship with the United States, and in part from the myth
of America's "redoubtable" and "omnipotent" Jewish lobby. Occasionally it
still engenders outbursts of anti-Semitic remarks, such as the Malaysian
prime minister's blaming financier George Soros and Jewish bankers for the
collapse of the Asian money markets in the late 1990s. To the allegedly
magical power of Jews in world economics and American domestic politics one
may add the widespread perception that Jews also control the world media,
enabling them to propagate any belief that serves their interests. And yet,
in the assessment of some policymakers in Turkey and throughout the Middle
East, this very belief in Jewish power also underscores the value of good
relations with Israel. Zvi Elpeleg, the former Israeli ambassador in Ankara,
has noted that "it is helpful that Turks believe in the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion, for this leads them to think that Israel has vast powers."22
Ilhan Selcuk, the Turkish intellectual, likewise observed that Muslims,
Arabs, Greeks, Kurds, Armenians, and their respective lobbies in America
would all like to see Kemalism vanish. His conclusion was: "We have nobody
but Israel ... and the Jewish Lobby" to depend on for support. Thus, it was
in the Turks' national interest to collaborate with Israel, because the
latter could relieve their isolation and balance the Greek and Armenian
lobbies in American politics. 23
Israeli-Turkish strategic convergence
Of all the complex issues affecting Turkey's relationship with Israel,
security, strategy, and military and technological collaboration are perhaps
the most acute and certainly the most important ones for the Turkish
generals who monitor their country's politics. Not only did the military, as
the guardian of the Kemalist heritage, initiate the rapprochement with
previously alienated Israel, but it also forced Erbakan's government to
accept that bold policy departure and then ousted him as soon as he refused
to pursue it further. The Islamist press went so far as to accuse Elpeleg of
"being the confidant of the generals who were intent on toppling the Erbakan
government."24 It is therefore no wonder that the most striking and rapid
advance in the relations between the two countries has been in the
military-strategic domain. Turkey has purchased advanced Israeli weaponry
and electronics, engaged in joint maneuvers, cooperated in counterterrorism
and intelligence gathering, and exchanged high-level visits with the Israeli
military.
These initiatives rest on the assumption that Turkey, surrounded by hostile,
authoritarian, unpredictable, and anti-Western regimes, would be foolish not
to cooperate with the only other power in the Middle East that is
democratic, stable, strong, and pro-Western. Israel, for its part, continues
to believe (as it has since the 1950s) that it must forge ties to the
strong, stable, and pro-Western peripheral states surrounding the Arab
world, thereby "leap-frogging" past the hostile ring of front-line Arab
states. Iran and Ethiopia played this role for decades, but by the end of
the 1970s the Islamic revolution in the former and the Marxist takeover of
the latter eliminated those two pillars, leaving Israel to rely on Turkey
alone. After the peace accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979, it became
all the more imperative for Israel to counterbalance its most formidable
enemies in the north and east (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) with Turkish power.
Syria, in particular, has maintained a long-standing territorial conflict
with Turkey, and the latter, merely by deploying troops on the Syrian
frontier, could force Syria to split its military power between two fronts,
thereby paralyzing any military threat emanating from Damascus. This indeed
helps to explain why Syria has kept quiet on the Golan issue for the past
three decades and why Turkey was left free to quash the separatist Kurdish
bases within its own borders. Hafez al-Assad could simply not afford to
provoke Turkish ire so long as he was locked in a struggle with Israel over
the Golan and Lebanon.
Economic ties maintain Turkey's balancing act between Israelis and Arabs.
The Turks likewise worry about the Kurds in Iraq, whose demands for
autonomy, if realized, could prompt similar agitation among Kurds within
Turkey. Still another concern is Iran's perceived hostility to the current
Turkish regime by dint of the latter's anti-Islamism and competition for
influence in the Central Asian republics.25 Add to that the growing fear in
Israel and Turkey of Iraqi and Iranian development of weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems, and it is evident that Turkey's and
Israel's respective interests converge along many avenues. It was for that
reason that the resumption of negotiations in 1999 between Israel and Syria,
a close ally of Iran, was a source of deep concern within Turkey. If Syria
achieved peace with Israel and gained control of the Golan, it would become
much freer to challenge Turkey with Iran's support, a menacing prospect for
Ankara. Therefore, although both Israel and Turkey have sought to appease
fears by stating that their alliance is not directed against any third
party, everyone understands that Syria and Iran may be its primary targets.
Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation is most evident in the relationship of
the two militaries,26 but another element of potential strategic value is
cooperation with regard to water supplies. Unlike its Middle Eastern
neighbors, Turkey suffers from no serious shortage of water, thanks to its
control over the headwaters of the Euphrates River (which flows into Syria
and Iraq) and its vast quantities of ground water fed by the rivers of
Anatolia. Thus, Ankara can exert considerable pressure on its enemies
downstream and deploy its surpluses of water to strategic advantage. For
example, Turkey promised Israel virtually unlimited quantities of fresh
water, either by tankers or pipeline, while restricting the supply of water
to some hostile neighbors. Although economic calculations may limit the
feasibility of such enterprises, it is evident that water may become, like
oil, a political weapon as the populations of the Middle East increase
rapidly and water resources dwindle. 27
A final arena for Turkish-Israeli cooperation, and one that has been second
only to military collaboration in importance over the past decade, is the
purely civilian domain of economic development, investment, and trade. The
huge volume of Israeli tourism to Turkey has long been acknowledged, but in
areas such as investment, construction, manufacturing, environment, water
and land conservation, technical cooperation, and joint enterprises, ties
have expanded more recently. From a measly $54 million in 1987, trade grew
to more than $1 billion by the end of the 1990s and was expected to reach $2
billion by 2001 - the largest flow of commerce between any two countries in
the Middle East - thanks to a 1997 free-trade agreement that opened new
vistas for business in both countries.28
To be sure, the political détente between Turkey and Israel initially
prompted the intensification and diversification of economic activity, but
the process seems to have acquired a dynamic of its own. The vast and
growing markets of Turkey are a powerful lure to Israeli investors and
exporters, and Turkey's low labor costs (at about one-third of Israel's)
encourage the flow of Turkish goods into Israel. However, due to the
limitations of Israel's tiny market, Turkey's aggregate trade with Arab
countries still surpasses by far the volume of bilateral Israeli-Turkish
exchanges. Moreover, remittances from millions of Turkish workers employed
in other Middle Eastern countries ensure the continuation of a balancing act
by Ankara between its Israeli and Arab partners.
Conclusions and prospects
On the eve of the Jewish Passover and Festival of Freedom in April 2000,
Israeli newspapers stressed the need for a greater humanitarian thrust to
international politics. The Israeli government and public responded to the
famine in Ethiopia with the same energy they showed at the time of the
earthquakes in Turkey. But when the successful and popular minister of
education, Yossi Sarid, announced in a ceremony commemorating the Armenian
genocide that the Israeli school system would henceforth include that
Turkish atrocity as part of its curriculum, protests poured in at once from
the Turks, for whom the Armenian massacres have been a most sensitive issue.
Only a few years before, Ankara had refused to accredit a respected Israeli
scholar, Ehud Toledano, as ambassador because of an allegation that he had
voiced accusations against the Turks and sympathized with the Armenians'
plight.
Predictably, all elements of Turkish society, not just the Islamists, viewed
the Armenian affair as proof of the unreliable Jewish state's tendency to
side with Christians against Muslims. Die-hard nationalists also seized upon
the on-again, off-again negotiations between Israel and Syria as a sign that
Israel would always subordinate Turkey's strategic interests to its own.
Israel's explanations to the effect that it could maintain its growing
relationship with Turkey even as it evoked the Armenian massacre (just as it
does with Germany despite recurrent references to the Shoah) fell on deaf
ears in Ankara. For unlike Germany, which has recognized its past and
accepted responsibility, Turkey continues to treat the Armenian massacre as
taboo and does not acknowledge any guilt. Disputes over Armenia and the
prospect of Israeli peace with Syria will continue to strain the
relationship between Turkish and Israeli governments, their strategic and
economic cooperation notwithstanding.
Another element of incongruity has crept in recently in the shape of a
nascent détente between Israel and Greece. The nature of this relationship
appears to be reminiscent of what occurred between Israel and Turkey a
decade ago: military coordination, sales of Israeli weaponry, upgrading of
outdated Greek equipment, visits of high officials, full diplomatic
relations, and a growing degree of intimacy between the governments. Ten
years ago it was unthinkable that either the Turks or the Greeks would have
countenanced a "courtship" involving Israel and both of them at the same
time. But now, as the old enmities between those archrivals seem to be
easing, they may be able to tolerate that arrangement, just as they have
learned to live with their joint membership in NATO and their prospective
partnership in the European Union. But it remains certain that each of them
would prefer to be the only bride under the wedding canopy, and that any
failure by Israel to take into consideration the sensibilities involved may
spoil its relations with both.
A further development with potentially serious consequences for Turkey and
Israel is Syria's slow turn back toward Iraq. Prior to the 1980s, tensions
already existed between the two "sister states" due to the competition for
hegemony between the two rival branches of the Baath Party to which both
claimed allegiance. The rivalry was also a matter of personal one-upmanship
between Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad. But in August 1980, just prior to
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, when Syria sided with Iran, the two
countries cut off their diplomatic relations. When Syria then joined (at
least nominally) the U.S.-led coalition during Desert Storm, the ties
between them deteriorated even further. In 1997, however, Syria was
desperate for cash, and so Assad swallowed his pride and approached the
Iraqis for contacts under the U.N. oil-for-food deal. By the spring of 2000,
the first signs of improvement emerged as Syrian goods found their way to
Iraqi markets and Iraqi oil was illicitly ferried via Syrian (and Turkish)
territory. Diplomatic negotiations aiming at normalization between the two
have been taking place through third parties, and there is even talk of
growing economic exchanges.29 Those two besieged and isolated states may be
forging a united front against the Americans, a joint defense against the
Turkish-Israeli alliance, and a fallback position should the Syrian-Israeli
talks over the Golan come to naught.
There is no doubt, however, that the most menacing issue in the
Turkish-Israeli partnership in the long term is the prospect that
ultra-nationalist or ultra-religious factions in Turkey may agitate to
return their country to its Anatolian-Asian or even Islamic roots, undoing
the Kemalist heritage so jealously guarded by the military. An insoluble
dilemma would then confront Israel and the West. Is the partnership with
Turkey so important that it is worth maintaining even under the bayonets of
the Turkish military? Or is it preferable to allow "democracy" to triumph
even at the cost of Turkey's slipping - as Iran did two decades ago and
Algeria almost did less than a decade ago - into the anti-Western Islamic
camp? The stepped-up activity of the Turkish Hizbullah in the eastern
confines of the country at the beginning of 2000, which generated killings
and arrests on a massive scale, and the gains of the Hizbullah in Lebanon
against Israel in summer 2000 do not augur well. For if the strategic
partnership between Israel and Turkey is perceived as resting on the
coercive power of their arms rather than on the democratic principles they
claim to uphold, its longevity will be anyone's guess.
Raphael Israeli is professor of Islamic, Middle Eastern, and Chinese affairs
at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and a senior fellow at its Harry Truman
Research Institute. He is author of some fifteen books and one hundred
articles on Islamic, Middle Eastern, and Chinese history
1 Dispatch from the Israeli Consulate in Istanbul to Foreign Ministry in
Jerusalem, Feb. 2000.
2 See A. Shmuelevitz, "The Attitude of the Islamic Press in Turkey Towards
Israel" (in Hebrew), in Hamizrah Hehadash (The New East), 1997-98, pp.
114-24.
3 Ha'aretz, Dec. 22, 1996.
4 See Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish-Israeli Relations through the Lens of the
Turkish Identity Debate," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 27, no. 1
(1997), pp. 22¯37.
5 Walter Weiker, "Turkey, the Middle East and Islam," Middle East Review,
Spring 1985, pp. 27-32.
6 Quotation from Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey and Israel: An Evolving
Partnership," Ariel Center For Policy Research, Policy Paper no. 47 (1998),
p. 5. See also Raphael Israeli, "Arab and Muslim Anti-Semitism," Ariel
Center For Policy Research (Apr. 2000).
7 George Gruen, "Turkey's Relations with Israel and Its Arab Neighbors: The
Impact of Basic Interests and Changing Circumstances," Middle East Review,
Spring 1985, pp. 33-43.
8 Ibid., p. 35. Also cited in Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece:
Uneasy Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: Frank Cass, 1987), p.
75.
9 Amikam Nachmani, Turkey and the Middle East (Ramat Gan: BESA Center for
Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, May 1999), p. 3.
10 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
11 See Ekrem Guvendiren, A Concise Report on Turkish-Israeli Relations
(Istanbul: Foreign Economic Relations Board, Apr. 1999), p. 9.
12 Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," Middle East
Quarterly, June 1998, p. 22.
13 Nachmani, Turkey and the Middle East, p. 15.
14 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
15 Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 22.
16 Ibid., p. 21.
17 This item is based mainly on R. Israeli, "The Islamic Republics of
Central Asia and the Middle East," International Journal of Group Rights,
vol. 3 (1995), pp. 31-46.
18 See Amalia Gent, "Turkish Claim to Leadership in Central Asia," Swiss
Review of World Affairs, May 1992, pp. 21-22.
19 "Central Asia: The Silk Road Catches Fire," Economist, Dec. 26, 1992.
20 "Turkey Spreads Its Wings," Economist, Aug. 6, 1992, pp. 4-5.
21 The charter of Hamas contains references to the Protocols, and some Arab
media currently resort to "citations" from them. In this regard, see "The
Charter of Allah: The Platform of Hamas," in The 1988-89 Annual of
Terrorism, ed. Yonah Alexander (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1990); and Israeli, Arab
and Muslim Anti-Semitism.
22 Ha'aretz, Sept. 30, 1997, cited in Nachmani, "The Remarkable
Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 21.
23 Cumhuriyet, Nov. 5, 1994, cited in Nachmani, "The Remarkable
Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 21.
24 Ha'aretz, Sept. 30, 1997, cited in Nachmani, "The Remarkable
Turkish-Israeli Ties," p. 22.
25 During Erbakan's tenure, Ankara and Tehran even achieved a brief
rapprochement. See Müftüler-Bac, Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership,
pp. 10-11.
26 See Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," pp. 24-26.
27 See Müftüler-Bac, Turkey and Israel: An Evolving Partnership, pp. 3¯5;
and Amikam Nachmani, Water Jitters in the Middle East (Ramat Gan: BESA
Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, June 1997).
28 See Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Ties," pp. 26-27; and Gil
Feiler, "Economic Relations between Turkey and Israel" (in Hebrew), in
Turkey and Israel in a Changing Middle East, ed. A. Shmuelevitz (Ramat Gan:
BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 1996).
29 Leon Barkho, "Iraq Betting on Oil Wealth to End Isolation," Associated
Press, Mar. 1, 2000.
Copyright © 2001 Foreign Policy Research Institute
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